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With this assumption, we are going to study two extreme economies: the
complete (Arrow-Debreu) security market economy and the general incomplete security market economy.
In this lecture, we focus on the complete (Arrow-Debreu) security economy.
%
& ...
=0
=1
market structure is
1 0 0
.
.
..
. .. ..
= 0 1 0 =
.
.. ... ...
0 0 1
1
2
= .. = (1 2 )>
.
=0
%
&
Thus, there will have two umbrellas contingent on the weather in tomorrow.
1
Umbrella 1 =
0
0
Umbrella 2 =
1
That is, Umbrella 1: The umbrella to be delivered in tomorrow if it will rain
tomorrow; and Umbrella 2: The umbrella to be delivered in tomorrow if it
will be sunshine tomorrow. The price for Umbrella 1 is the price of rain
tomorrow and the price for Umbrella 2 is the price of sunshine tomorrow.
3
11 21
1
1 2
1 2
2
2
2
= = ..
.. . .
..
.
.
.
.
1 2
say financial asset markets are complete if for any time 1 consumption
bundle 1 1 , there exists a portfolio = (1 2 )> such that
= 1
That is, at time 1, the portfolio will give the same payos as the consumption bundle 1 . The meaning of complete market is: you could buy any
time 1 consumption bundle from the existing markets if you have enough
time 0 consumption good.
Suppose
1
2
= .. = (1 2 )>
.
is the price vector of financial assets. How many units of time 0 consumption goods do we need to buy the portfolio supporting the consumption
bundle 1 ?
>
Question 1 Are Arrow-Debreu security markets complete?
%
&
=0
=1
Suppose there is only one riskless financial asset whose payos at time 1
are 1 at both states. That is
1
0
=
1
Is market complete?
No. For example, for consumption plan at time 1
1
1 =
2
can you find a portfolio = () such that
1
?
=
=
2
1 0 0
.
.
..
. .. ..
= 0 1 0
.
.. ... ...
0 0 1
1 # of
Thus, the agent has total time 0 wealth
= 0 + > 1
What does he want to buy for time 1s consumption bundle and time 0s
consumption good?
Next, suppose he is going to buy consumption bundle
= (0 1 ) = (0 11 12 1 )
Since the markets are complete, he can buy these as long as he has enough
wealth at time 0.
Similarly, time 1 consumption plan 1 is equivalent to buying a portfolio
= (11 12 1 )>
11 # of 1
12 # of 2
1 # of
Therefore, its total cost of this consumption bundle is
0 + > 1
Thus, the agents feasible budget set is
: 0 + > 1 0 + > 1 }
( ) = { R1+
+
It is noted that there is a unique inequality for expressing the agents budget
set in A-D economy though there are two time periods and states of nature
at time 1 (Can you imagine why?).
Accordingly, the agent solves the following utility maximization problem:
max ()
(1)
( )
7
which is equivalent to
max ()
+ > 1 0 + > 1
0
(0 1 ) R1+
+
(2)
11
..
.
max ()
+ > 1 = 0 + > 1
0
(0 1 ) R1+
+
(3)
()
L
0 = 0 0 = 0
()
L
=
1 = 0
1
1
= 1 2
and
0 + > 1 = 0 + > 1
(0 1 )> 0
0 0 + >
1 1 = 0
(0 1 )70+
lim
11
..
.
11
..
.
= +
0+
max ()
(*)
+ > 1 = 0 + > 1
0
1+
(0 1 ) R++
For (*) problem, we can use the Lagrangean method to find the unique
solution as follows:
The Lagrangean is
L = () [0 + > 1 0 > 1 ]
()
L
0 = 0 = 0
()
L
=
= 0
1
1
= 1 2
0 + > 1 = 0 + > 1
Any solution to the above first-order conditions is our solution.
From the first order conditions, we have:
(1)
()
=
0
That is, is the marginal utility at time 0;
(2)
()
=
0
()
= =
1
1
=
0
1
What is 1 =? one unit of consumption good at time 0 is equivalent
10
10
1
[log 11 + log 12 ]
2
1
=
+ as 0 0 +
0
0
1 1
=
+ as 1 0 +
1
2 1
= 1 2
That is, Assumption 3 is satisfied.
Thus, we can use the Lagrangean method to find the optimal solution:
L = () [0 + 1 11 + 2 12 0 1 11 2 12 ]
11
1
=
= =0
0
0
0
L
1 1
=
1 =
1 = 0
11
11
2 11
L
1 1
=
2 =
2 = 0
12
12
2 12
and
0 =
1
1
1
11 =
12 =
21
22
Let
0 + 1 11 + 2 12 = = 0 + 1 11 + 2 12
We have:
12 =
0 = 11 =
2
41
42
Thus, the example is completed.
)}
such
that:
0
1
=1
1. Given the state prices { }
=1 for each = 1 2 (0 1 ) is a
solution to the following utility maximization problem. That is,
(
0 1 ) = arg
max
0 +> 1 =0 +> 1
( ) = 1 2
=1
=1
=
0
1 =
for = 1 2
=1
P
=1
0 (spot market)
1 (financial market)
12
( )
0
= =
0 (0 )
= = 1 2
for any = 1 2
This theorem tells us that the state price is the ratio of the marginal
utility at time 1 and at state to the marginal utility at time 0.
From
( )
1
( )
0
we get
13
1. Given any agent 0 s equilibrium consumption bundle (
0 1 ) we can
find the equilibrium price for any Arrow-Debreu security
( )
1
( )
0
1+2 1 1
2 2
R+ and R1+2
+
1
(log 11 + log 12 )
2
and
1 = (100 0 0) and 2 = (0 200 50)
Find equilibrium prices 1 and 2 of 1 and 2
Solution: Given (1 2 )> 0 both agents solve utility maximization
problems. According to the example talked before
0 =
12 =
= 1 2
11 =
2
41
42
where
1 = > 1 = 100 2 = > 2 = 2001 + 502
14
10 + 20 = 10 + 20 =
111 + 211 = 111 + 211
That is,
41 + 2 = 2
121 2 = 2
Finally,
1
4
= 2 = 2 41 = 1
16
4
Next, we ask how Arrow-Debreu security markets help the agents for the
resource reallocation. For the eciency, we have
1 =
consumption bundle could be derived at time 0 by using Arrow-Debreu security markets, therefore, the original Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation
should be not Pareto ecient. But this leads to a contradiction.
Summary: An Arrow-Debreu security market economy has the
following properties:
1. Arrow-Debreu security markets are complete;
2. The AD security 0 s price is
( )
1
( )
0
1
( )
0
for any = 1 2 and = 1 2 they are not very useful since they
depend on the equilibrium allocation { } which is not observable. What
we can observe in reality is a countrys GDP! It would be wonderful if the
equilibrium prices depend on the total endowment
P
= =1 =
18