President and Fellows of Harvard College

The Military Lands and the Imperial Estates in the Middle Byzantine Empire
Author(s): WARREN T. TREADGOLD
Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 7, Okeanos: Essays presented to Ihor evenko on his
Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students (1983), pp. 619-631
Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036121
Accessed: 09-12-2015 05:10 UTC
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The MilitaryLands and theImperialEstates

in theMiddle ByzantineEmpire
WARREN T. TREADGOLD

This essay treatstwo subjects,of whichone has receiveda greatdeal of

attentionfrom many Byzantinistsand the other has received little
attentionfromanyone but Ihor Sevcenko. As he once dedicated an
articleon the middle Byzantineimperialestatesto the memoryof his
teacher,HenriGrgoire,so I am pleased to dedicatea studytouchingon
the same topic to him as my own teacher.1
Today the traditionalview of Theodore Uspensky,Ernest Stein, and
thattheByzantinesystemof themesdated fromthe
GeorgeOstrogorsky
reignof Heraclius (610-41) is under attack. No one doubts that the
armiesof thelaterAnatolic,Armeniac,Thracesian,and Opsicianthemes
existed under Heraclius, because it is agreed that they were the old
mobile armiesof Oriens,Armenia,and Thrace and the armiesin the
fromtheiroriginalstationsand given
emperor'spresence,transferred
Greek formsof theirLatin names.The disputeis over the featuresthat
the traditionalview attributedto Heraclius's "new system" of the
themes.In Ostrogorsky'swords,"They werenot merelyadministrative
areas, but representedthe districtssettledby the troops. Inalienable
grantsof land (called in latersourcesaipaiicoiiK Kifjuaxa)weremade
to the soldiers on conditionof hereditarymilitaryservice."2 Several
1 Ihor Sevcenko,
"InscriptionCommemoratingSisinnios,'Curator' of Tzurulon (A.D.
813)," Byzantion35 (1965): 567-74.The presentarticlehas grownout of mybook on The
ByzantineState Financesin theEighthand NinthCenturies,East European Monographs:
ByzantineSeries II (New York, 1982).
2
George Ostrogorsky,
Historyof the ByzantineState, rev. ed. (New Brunswick,N.J.,
1969), pp. 95-98, especiallyp. 97 and fn. 1, with referencesto otherworks that agree
and disagreewith this thesis. For other surveysof the problem,see Walter E. Kaegi,
"Some Reconsiderationson the Themes (Seventh-NinthCenturies)," Jahrbuchder
sterreichischen
Byzantinischen
Gesellschaft16 (1967): 39-53,who is inclinedto question
the traditionalview, and A.N. Stratos,Byzantiumin the SeventhCentury,I: 602-634
(Amsterdam,1968), pp. 265-82,who is inclinedto adopt it.

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620

WARRENT. TREADGOLD

scholarshave denied that the themesreplaced the older, smallerprovincesforadministrative

purposesas earlyas Heraclius's reign; others
have broughtforwardevidencesuggesting
thatin mostrespectssuchwas
thecase.3 The idea thatmilitaryland grantswereassignedto thetroops
underHeracliushas been criticizedmore and defendedless.4
The criticsof the traditionalview of the militarylands have pointed
out thatno explicitand indisputableattestationof themappearsbeforea
novelofConstantineVII datable to between945 and 959. The mainpart
of thisnovel begins:
:
We therefore
decreethefollowing,whichunwritten
customprovidedpreviously
thatsoldiersnot be allowed to sell the lands on whichtheirobligationsto serve
(axpaxeiai) depend,but that immovablepropertyof fourpounds [of gold] in
value be retainedforeach obligationto serveof thecavalrymen(among whom
we declareshould also be numberedthose marinesenrolledin the armyof the
because theytoo providetheirown
Aegean Sea, Samos, and the Cibyrrhaeots,
equipment,and by rowingthemselvestheyperformonerousservices).For those
marinesservingforpay in theImperialFleet and forothermarinesup to now it
was providedby custom that immovablepropertyof two pounds [of gold in
value] shouldbe retainedforeach obligationto serve,whichalso seemsto us to
be sufficient.5

The novel further

providesthata soldiercould give or bequeathsuch
lands to others,but thentheobligationto servepassed to thenewowner
or, if the propertywas divided,was sharedproportionately
by the new
3 The criticsinclude A. Pertusi,"La formationdes thmes
byzantines,"Berichtezum
vol. 1 (Munich, 1958),and J. Karayannopoulos,
XL International
Byzantinisten-Kongress,
der byzantinischen
Die Entstehung
(Munich, 1959). The recentdefenders
Themenordnung
Basis of the ByzantineCoinage,c. 400-c. 900, and
are M. Hendy,"On theAdministrative
the Reformsof Heraclius," Universityof BirminghamHistorical Journal 12 (1970):
125-54,and N. Oikonomids,"Les premiresmentionsdes thmesdans la chroniquede
Institua16 (1975): 1-8.
Thophane," ZbornikRadova Vizantinoloskog
4 Here the criticsinclude P. Lemerle,
"Esquisse pour une histoireagrairede Byzance:
219 (1958) : 32-74,II in 219 : 254-84,and
Les sourceset les problmes,"I in Revuehistorique
and
III in 220 (1958): 43-94, Karayannopoulos(cited fn. 3), and J. Haldon, Recruitment
in theByzantineArmy,c. 550-950: A Studyon theOriginsof theStratiotika
Conscription
Ktemata(Vienna, 1979). AfterOstrogorskyhimself,the most recentdefenderof an early
date for the militarylands has been R.-J. Lilie, Die byzantinischeReaktion auf die
der Araber(Munich, 1976), pp. 311-14.
Ausbreitung
5
Kpcoae,ut|
earciouevxovuvax f|toOto, rcepr' aovfiOeiayppox;Jtpqniv
pexovxai KxrjuaxaiarccoXev,
evai xo axpaxuxai x v a axpateai Otiti
uv kvtixovKxfjaiv' Xixpcv
oruapw
auvxTipeiai ei icaxr|vaxpaxeav, irccov
xou xe
tcA.co|aoi)
o piOueaai KeXeouevKai xo ni xv axXov Tcoxexayuvou

Ayaoi) neXyovqKai xfjLuou Kai xv Kiuppaicoicov axaxoA.oiyap Kai ooxoi

Kai axepxai apeiac uexiai x TCTipeaa.
To x paaiXiK nXanua etcpyai
Kai xoi tanrcotuXcouoitjti vv Kpxn.aevk auvriOea o
TCTipexouuvoi
ei KaxTivaxpaxeav kvtixoviaabeaOai Kxfjaiv, Kai t^uvpKovxco
.ixp>v
vol. I (Athens,1931), pp. 222-23.
xeiv OKe.J. and P. Zepos, JusGraecoromanum,

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MILITARY LANDS AND IMPERIAL ESTATES

621

owners.If the soldierhad propertythat exceeded the minimumvalue,

whetherhe could sell it depended on how much of it was officially
as military
land. If all ofitwas registered,
he could notsellany
registered
he could sell theunregistered
of it. If onlypartof it was registered,
land
as longas he retainedtheminimumamount.If none of it was registered,
the minimumamount was to be registeredat once and the remainder
could be sold. If a man had only a fractionalobligationto serveor to
provide a soldier,the minimumpropertyhe could not sell was proportionatelyless. Furtherprovisionsestablishedthatmen held military
land on conditionof militaryservice- or alternatively
on conditionof
in
or
a
soldier
to take their
supplying joining supplying fullyequipped
place.6
As faras itgoes,thisnovelis clearenough.The traditionalviewis that
the novel describesa systemintroducedunderHeracliusas a matterof
custom,but made a matterof detailedlegal provisionsonlyin themidtenthcentury,when the growingpower of the aristocracyled some
soldiersto sell off theirmilitarylands to aristocratswho would not
providesoldiers.7The novel is compatiblewiththatview,but does not
proveit. By contrast,Paul Lemerleand othershave questionedwhether
this systemof militarylands even as a matterof custom went back
thantheninthcentury,and whetherevenin thetenthcenturyall
further
soldiershad such lands.8The militarylands do not seemto be explicitly
in saints' lives apparently
attestedearlier,thoughincidentalreferences
like
them
as
as
the
late eighthcentury,and
early
presupposesomething
thesourcesforthe seventhand earlyeighthcenturiesare so scantythat
an argumentfromsilencecarrieslittleweight.9As forwhetherall soldiers
had lands in the tenthcentury,the novel's repeatedwords "for each
seemto implythateach of
obligationto serve"(ei 8Kaxr|vcrcpcrceav)
the sortsof soldiersspecifieddid have militarylands, but the infantry,
certainlya sizable number,are not among thosespecified.The omission
could mean that the infantry
had no such lands, but in thatcase what
means of supportthe infantry
did have would be a question.
the
best
wouldbe to discover
Although
wayto resolvethecontroversy
clear evidenceof how thearmywas supportedin theseventhand eighth
centuries,no one has yetdiscoveredevidenceof thissortor givenreason
6

Zepos (cited fn. 5), I: 223-26. More detailedtreatmentof thisnovel will be foundin
Lemerle(cited fn.4), II: 44-50,and Haldon (cited fn.4), pp. 41-43.
7 See
Ostrogorsky(cited fn.2), pp. 272-76.
8 Lemerle(cited fn.4), III : 43-70.
9 For earlierevidencefora similar
system,see Haldon (cited fn.4), pp. 41-65.

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622

WARRENT. TREADGOLD

to believe that any will be discoveredin the future.As with many

theproblemofthe
problemsconcerningtheseventhand eighthcenturies,
lands
can
now
be
what
military
only usefullyapproachedby determining
thesituationwas beforeand afterthosecenturies,and usingour meager
knowledgeof events in the interimto conjecturewhat happened in
between.
In the sixthcentury,ordinaryimperialsoldiersreceivedample cash
allowancesthathad graduallyreplacedissuesin kindof food,uniforms,
arms,mounts,and fodder.A roughbut reasonableestimatehas putthese
allowances at 30 nomismataa year.10Since another rough but reasonable estimatehas put the cost of basic sustenancefora Byzantine
soldierswerepresumably
familyat 17 nomismataa year,sixth-century
wellable to supporttheirhouseholdsand providetheirequipmentout of
theircash pay.11Though some had privatesources of income as well,
except among the border troops (limitanei) these were if anything
discouragedby the statebecause theytendedto distractthe men from
theirduties,and certainlywerenotunderstateprotection.12
By theninth
century,on the otherhand, ordinarysoldiersreceivedcash pay of one
nomismaforeach year of serviceup to theirtwelfthyear,and twelve
nomismataa year thereafter,
paid at intervalsrangingfromone to six
but
not
all
of
the
soldiersof thethemesreceivedrationsin
Some
years.13
kind while on campaign, though not at other times.14Since all the
soldierswerestillsupposedto supplytheirown equipmentand thebasic
cost of livingseemsto have remainedat about thelevelof 17 nomismata
per familya year,middleByzantinesoldiersmusthave had some source
of supportotherthan theirpay.
How, then,did theylive? That all of themdid manage to keep body
but many did
and soul togethersomehow requiresno demonstration,
10 E. Stein,Studienzur Geschichtedes
Reiches(Stuttgart,1919), p. 155.
byzantinischen
the gold paymentrequiredto
This figureis based on the amountof theaurumtironicum,
compensatethe state for maintaininga soldier, which was 25 to 30 nomismata; see
A. H. M. Jones,The Later RomanEmpire,284-602(Norman,Oklahoma, 1964), p. 432.
11
32 (1932): 299,
"Lhne und Preisein Byzanz," Byzantinische
Zeitschrift
Ostrogorsky,
speaks of a livingwage of 10-15follesa day, or about 17-26nomismataa year(with 180
follesto the nomismain earlyByzantinetimesand no workon Sundaysor holidays).Cf.
Jones(citedfn. 10), p. 447, who putsthecost of a soldier'srationsat 4 to 5 1/2nomismata
a year(not includingequipment,clothing,or lodgingforhim,or anythingforhis family).
12 See Jones
(cited fn. 10), pp. 678-79.
13 See
Treadgold (cited fn. 1), pp. 19-21, where I base my discussion on Ibn
VI (Leyden,
Arabicorum,
Khurddhbih,trans.M.J. de Goeje, BibliothecaGeographorum
1889),pp. 84-85.
14 See Haldon
(cited fn.4), p. 45 and fn.73.

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MILITARY LANDS AND IMPERIAL ESTATES

623

muchbetterthanthat.In his Tctica,Leo VI (886-912) tellsa strategus

intendingto go on campaign,"You shall selectsoldiersfromtheentire
themeunderyourcommandwho are . . . rich,so thatthey,whenengaged
in theirown militaryserviceon an expedition(thatis, in theassemblage
of the army), have at their own homes others workingtheir land
and able to supplycompletelythemilitary
(yecopyoCvia)
equipmentofa
soldier. . . .'n 5 Leo's wordsimplythatsomeofthesoldierson therollsofa
themewerenot thiswell off(since otherwisestrategiwould have needed
no warningto choose others)but show thata numberof themwere.The
only source of income Leo takes into account is land, which for the
better-off
soldierswas workedby "others"- whetherrelatives,tenants,
hiredhands,or slaves.The tenth-century
AnonymousVri warnsthatall
the soldiers of a theme should be musteredand drilled frequently,
because otherwise,"selling their militaryequipment and their best
- thus
horses,theywill buy oxen and other equipmentfor farming"
land
on
which
to
use
oxen
and
tools.16
that
had
farm
assuming
they
Thoughit has been suggestedthatthesoldiersmighthave had income
fromsome othersource than land, to my knowledgeno evidenceof a
middleByzantinethematicsoldierwithanothersort of incomehas yet
beenbroughtforward.The armywas large: 120,000menofwhomall but
24,000 were in the themes,accordingto an apparentlyreliableArab
reportof the mid-ninthcentury.17Since from every indication the
economyof the empirewas based on agricultureto an overwhelming
extent,no othermeansis likelyto have been available to provideforso
and tradewerenegligible,
manysoldiers.In comparisonmanufacturing
especially outside Constantinople,where the thematictroops were
stationed.Besides, the state could scarcelyhave allowed a soldier to
practiceany occupation that made him impossibleto locate on short
notice formustering,a considerationthat seems to exclude herdsmen
and travelingmerchants.Some soldierscould conceivablyhave been
fishermen,millers,ferrymen,blacksmiths,or innkeepers,but such
15

'Ek^^tj 8 axpaxic&xaarcrcavxxoCrcoa B^ato, ... ercpou,axe axo,

v x> rceSxq),
fyouvv xfj ai)vaycoyf|xo (poaaxou el xf|v iav axpaxeav axokounvou, xew v xo ioi oikoi xpou xo yecopyouvxa,Ka x rcp
xo axpaxubxouxopr|yvuva|ivoi)... Leo VI, Tctica,IV. 1,ed.
rcapxia|ivrcXiaiv
in PatrologiaGraeca 107,697D-700A.
16 ...
rcavorcXav
Kai xo paxou rcrcou
rceurcokovxe
oac
xf^vyap rcoXeniKTiv
vouvxaiKai xkXa x rcpyecopyiavrcixf]eia... IncertiScriptorisSaeculi IX Liber
de Re Militari,ed. R. Vri (Leipzig, 1901),eh. 28, p. 48.
17 See
Treadgold (cited fn. 1), pp. 16-18 and 107-108. The total is given by Ibn
Khurddhbih(cited fn. 13), p. 84.

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624

WARRENT. TREADGOLD

soldiersmusthave been exceedinglyrare,and probablywould have had

farmlandas well.Some, in theinfantry
at least,mighthave been tenants
or farmhands,
but onlyifthestatecould have been surethattheywould
not be evictedor dismissed,and thusleftunable to supportthemselves
and impossibleto locate formustering.
As has been seen,forthemid-tenth
centuryConstantineVII specifies
thateverycavalryman,or marineof the threenaval themes,had land
valuedat a minimumof fourpounds of gold (288 nomismata)and other
marineshad land valued at a minimumof two pounds of gold (144
of a nomismaper modiusof
nomismata).At thepriceof three-quarters
first-classarable that Ostrogorskyestablishedas an average, the minimumholdingfora cavalrymanor thematicmarinewould have been
equivalentto 384 modii and that forany othermarine to 192 modii.
DocumentsfromMt. Athosindicatethat30 modiicould be an adequate
Thereforecavalrymenand marines,withat least
holdingfora family.18
six to twelvetimesthismuchland,mustall have been welloffenoughto
have others at home to do theirfarmworkfor them- indeed, their
holdingswould have been too largeforthemto cultivateby themselves.
They were,in the words of Leo VI's Tctica,"rich" (eurcopoi).Indeed,
the cloga of Leo HI assumes a legal definitionof a "rich" man
(euTcopo)as one with propertyworth at least two pounds of gold,
preciselythe minimumset by ConstantineVII formarinesoutsidethe
naval themes.19
The poorer soldiers must have been among the infantry,
who apoutnumbered
the
in
some
three
to
one
the tenth
cavalry by
parently
Even ifan infantryman
neededto workhisown land,he could
century.20
still serve in the garrisonof a fort in time of invasion and go on
Such soldiersdid
campaignsbetweenthetimesof sowingand harvesting.
not need the expensiveequipmentof a cavalrymanor marine. They
would have been those,evidentlythe majority,who receivedrationsin
kind fromthe governmentwhile on campaign, and did not have to
supplytheirown. For them,thenecessaryminimumof land would have
beenonlywhattheyneededto supporttheirfamiliesand to providethe
modest arms and armor of an infantrysoldier.They would therefore
probablyhave neededsomewhatmorethan 30 modii,perhapsabout 50
18 See Treadgold
(citedfn. '}rpp. 55-57 and especiallyfn.222.
19 This definitionfollowsfromthe
penaltyforseduction,whichis one pound of gold if
theseduceris "rich" and halfhis fortuneiftheseduceris poorer;Zepos (citedfn.5), II : 57.
20 In the ninthand late
eighthcenturythe ratiowas apparentlyfourto one; Treadgold
(cited fn. 1), pp. 29-30 and 79-81.

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MILITARY LANDS AND IMPERIAL ESTATES

625

modii,worthabout halfa pound of gold (36 nomismata).But iftheydid

have such lands, whydid ConstantineVH's novel not mentionat least
thisminimumforthe lands of the infantry?
were
The answeris probablythatby thetimeofthatnoveltheinfantry
alreadyprotectedby a novel of Romanus I (920-44). Romanus's law
beginswithmeasuresto protectthe lands of all smallholders,whichif
sold in violation of certain legal requirementswere to be returned
withoutcompensationto the purchasersubject to a limitationof ten
declaresthat"all themilitary
years.In itslastsection,thenovelexplicitly
lands" (rcviax axpaxicoxiKaKxf'[iaxa)thathad been purchasedwithin
the last thirty
yearshad to be restoredwithoutcompensation,"unless,
even
after
thealienationan amountremainsto thesoldierthat
perhaps,
forthe supportof the new obligationto serveof the man
is sufficient
doing the militaryservice."21
On inconclusivegroundsLemerlehas questionedthedatingof thislast
has
provisionto 922, as theheadingof thelaw states,whileOstrogorsky
defendedthedate.22But even ifthe truedate is somewhatlaterthetext
does seem to be the work of Romanus I, and so no later than 944.
the"poor" soldiersamongthe
itis concernedwithpreventing
Apparently
amount
of land thattheyneeded to
minimum
the
from
selling
infantry
supportthemselvesand to providetheirmodestequipment,thusbecoming tenantsor hiredhands,whose incomeand place of residencewould
be uncertain.If a "rich" soldiersold offland in excessof thisminimum,
however,the state was not necessarilyconcerned.The later law of
ConstantineVII went further,and attemptedto preventthe "rich"
soldiersof the cavalryand marinesfromsellingso much of theirland
thattheywould be forcedto do theirown farmworkand leftunable to
providetheirown rationsand heavyequipment.If theysold offland in
excess of the minimumrequiredto performtheirduties,the state was
as "militaryland." Thoughin
concernedonlyiftheirland was registered
the past the recordsof this land had evidentlybeen incomplete,now
so thateach
guidelineswereestablishedforcompletingthe registration,
minimum
four
have
a
of
marine
would
or
thematic
pounds'
cavalryman
worth,and each othermarinea minimumof two pounds' worth.
21 ... ei
aov
xoaoxov xaxpaxixi] Ttepi-iuTivexai,
'ir' dpa Kai uex xr'vktcotigiv
x axpaxeuouevcpnp xf|vxfjva axpaxea aaxaaiv apice.Zepos (citedfn.5), I :
198-204(quotation on p. 204). Note that the "soldier" may supply anotherto "do the
service."
22 Lemerle
(citedfn.4), 2: 265-66; Ostrogorsky(cited fn.2), p. 273, fn. 1.

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626

WARRENT. TREADGOLD

Grantedthismuch,and thatin theninthand tenthcenturiesvirtually

all soldierssupportedthemselvesprimarily
fromland holdings,theexact
natureof these"militarylands" stillremainssomewhatobscure.From
the time of ConstantineVII's novel onwards,legislationassumed the
principlethatmilitarylands were held in returnformilitaryservice.If
theywereinheritedor receivedas gifts,theobligationto providea soldier
wentwiththem.If theyweredivided,theobligationto providea soldier
was divided proportionallyamong the new owners.If the lands were
confiscatedin a lawsuitor fellvacant,the statehad a rightto reassign
themto someone who would also assume the obligationto providea
soldierthatwentwiththem.23But, as Lemerleand othershave pointed
lands
out,thislegislationis not by itselfsufficient
proofthatthemilitary
wereheld in returnforserviceearlierthan the tenthcentury,muchless
- wheneverthatwas.
fromthe beginning
The alternativeis to assumethatbeforethetenthcenturysoldiershad
a hereditaryobligation to serve combined with independentincome,
and
evidentlyfromland. As long as a soldier'splace on themuster-rolls
his land werepassed on togetherto his heir,thequestionof whetherthe
two werelegallyconnectedis not a veryimportantone in practice,and
evidence
probablyraisesa pointtoo subtleforour scantycontemporary
to resolve.But thequestionbecomessignificant
forwhatit impliesabout
theoriginof themilitarylands. If theywereoriginallyprivateholdings,
the soldiersmay be consideredas privatelandholderssaddled withan
hereditary
legal obligationto serveor to providea soldier.If themilitary
landswereoriginallypublic,thesoldiersmaybe consideredas hereditary
tenantson public land, doing militaryserviceor providinga soldierin
lieu of paying rent. By the tenthcentury,the soldiers' legal position
tenantson publicland. Whether
closelyapproximatedthatof hereditary
thiswas trueearlierlargelydepends on our answerto the questionof
wherethe militarylands originallycame from.
Anyanswerto thisquestionshould take intoaccountthatthearea of
the militarylands would have been enormous. For the mid-ninth
century,by assuminga minimumof 384 modiieach forthecavalryand
I haveestimatedthe
thematicmarinesand 50 modiieach fortheinfantry,
militarylands at a minimumof some twelvemillionmodii, perhapsa
tenthof the cultivatedarea of the empire.24Such an estimateis onlya
23 See the discussionin Haldon
(cited fn. 4), pp. 41-65, on the situationin the tenth
century(though,as will appear, I have reservationsabout his remarkson the earlier
period).
24
Treadgold(cited fn. 1), pp. 62-63.

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MILITARY LANDS AND IMPERIAL ESTATES

627

guideline,butgivessome idea of theamountof land involved.Obtaining

thismuchland would not have been an easy task.
As forthetimeat whichlands would have been neededto supportthe
shortof cash during
army,Heracliusis knownto have been extremely
the Persian invasion, when he discontinued the grain dole at
Constantinople(618) and borrowedan immensesum fromthe church
(622), even meltingdown some of the decorationsof St. Sophia.25
During the fewyearsbetweenhis defeatof the Persians(628) and the
onset of the Arab invasion(633), Heraclius seems to have been barely
able to meethis armypayroll,to judge fromthejustificationone of his
agentsgave forcuttingoffthepay of some Arab auxiliariesin 631 : "The
emperorcan scarcelyprovidethe soldierswiththeirpay- how much
lessthesedogs?"26AftertheArab invasion,fullpaymentof theimperial
soldiersin cash mustquicklyhave becomeimpossible.It mustthenhave
been replacedas a methodof supportingthesoldierseitherby some form
of the systemof militarylands or by some othermethodwhich,cash
beinglacking,would also presumablyhave involvedland. Whichland?
Having men who alreadyhad land serveas soldierswould not have
been a promisingoption.The previouslands of soldiers,mainlythoseof
would practically
thelimitaneiwho had longbeen settledon thefrontier,
districtsfell,firstto thePersiansand
all have been lostwhenthefrontier
Avars, then to the Arabs and Slavs. Conscriptinglandownersin the
payingtheman inadequatewage,and askingthem
remainingterritories,
to support themselveswould seem impracticaland even dangerous,
because they would have been inexperienced,unfit,and unwilling
soldiers,liable to desert,mutiny,and revolt. Besides, the names of
Byzantinearmy units, some of which are attestedearly, show their
withthedivisionsof the armyof the sixthcentury.Not only
continuity
derivefromtheold mobilearmies,but evenin
did thethemesthemselves
the tenthcenturytheirdivisionsretainedsuch ancientdesignationsas
Theodosiaciand Vctores.21The bulk of Heraclius's armysurelyconsistedof soldierswithdrawnfromtheirold posts in the East, Armenia,
and Thrace. Heracliushad soldiers,thoughtheywereno doubt reduced
in numbers.His problemwas how to supportthem.
25 On the loan, see
Theophanes,ed. de Boor, pp. 302-303; on the dole, see Chronicon
Paschale, ed. Bonn, p. 711.
26 'O
eaTcxn(lyi xo aipaticoxai coai pya, Tiaco nXXov (read neov
withTafel and AnastasiusBibliothecarius)xo Kuai totoi; Theophanes,ed. de Boor,
pp. 335-36.
27 See ConstantineVII, De Ceremoniis,ed. Bonn, 663.
p.

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628

WARRENT. TREADGOLD

John Haldon has recentlyconjectured"a process by which regular

soldierswerebilletedmoreor less permanently
(althoughthismaynever
have been the original intention)throughoutthe region which they
garrisoned,and by whichtheyacquiredtheirown propertiesand settled
down."28Large-scalebilleting,
a well-attested
practicein earlyByzantine
times,would have been a logical recoursefor Heraclius as long as he
hopedto restoretheempire'sformermilitaryposition.But aftertheArab
conquest of Syria Heraclius does not appear to have entertainedany
illusionsthatthelosses weretemporary,
and neither,probably,did most
otherByzantines.29Permanentbilletingof tensof thousandsof soldiers
would have amountedto a largeand perhapsunsupportabletax on the
unfortunatelandownerschosen and would have been far fromconvenientforthe soldiers.It would have been a desperateand unpopular
would takeonlyifit had no other
measure,of thesortthata government
choice.Further,itis difficult
to see how,evenovertwoor threecenturies,
thousandsof soldierswith no land to startwithand veryscantypay
could have acquired holdingsworthfourpounds of gold each. It is also
hard to understandhow theirholdinglands of thatvalue came to be a
custom,and how a large part of these lands came to be registeredas
"militarylands." Though such considerationsdo not excludeHaldon's
hypothesis,
especiallyas a partialexplanation,theygivegood reasonto
look fora more satisfactory
one.
Others have suggestedthat the governmentsettledthe soldiers on
vacantland in Asia Minor,whichwould thushave beenconfiscatedfrom
itsformerowners,absentor not,and assignedto thesoldiersas military
estates.30Confiscationmaywellbe partoftheanswer.The civilwarwith
Phocas and the Persianinvasionsmusthave leftHeracliuswitha good
deal of land whose owners had died, fled, or been expropriatedfor
stressesthatvacantland needsa
supportingPhocas. But Haldon rightly
good deal of work to bringit back into production,and, unless the
formerownershad lefttenantsbehind,soldierson active duty would
have been hard put to derive any income fromsuch grants.31That
enough land to supporteverysoldierwho needed supportcould have
been obtained in this way seems highlyimprobable.Of course, the
governmentcould have confiscatedlarge amounts of occupied land
28 Haldon
(cited fn.4), pp. 74-79.
29 See A.N. Stratos,
Byzantiumin theSeventhCentury,II: 634-41 (Amsterdam,1972),
pp. 73-74.
30 See Lilie
(cited fn.4), pp. 312-13.
31 Haldon
(cited fn.4), p. 74.

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MILITARY LANDS AND IMPERIAL ESTATES

629

arbitrarilyand assigned it to the soldiers.But such a measure would

again have been a desperateone, of the sort that a governmentwould
adopt onlyif it had no betterchoice.
If Heracliushad decidedto give his soldiersland grants,however,he
would not have needed to look for vacant land or to resort to
confiscation.He alreadypossesseda substantialportionof theempire's
or slaves,
land whichwas in production,mannedby tenants,farmhands,
and distributedwidelyover the empire'sprovinces,includingthose of
Asia Minor. The land was in theimperialestates.The survivingfigures
fortheirextentare veryscattered,but show thatthe estateswerelarge.
In the fifthcentury,imperialestatesaccounted for 18.5 percentof the
area of the province of Africa Proconsularis,15 percentof that of
Byzacena,and 16 percentof the cityof Cyrrhusin Syria. In the sixth
century,imperialestatestook up over half the land of the provinceof
Cappadocia I, whichwas, of course,a regionthatwas not permanently
lostto theArabs.32These overallfiguresare preservedby chance; other
attestationsshow thatimperialestateswerespread all over the empire,
and Asia Minor was no exception.
To be sure,theimperialestateswereleased to variousentrepreneurs,
and these
sometimesfor fiveyears,sometimesheritablyin perpetuity,
renterswould have been unhappyat beingevicteden masse.But eviction
fromimperialestatesbeforethe lease was up was not uncommon,and
was oftenlegal if the state receiveda higherbid for the rent.33The
servicein
soldiersassignedsuchlandscould thenhave done theirmilitary
under
a
kind
of
land
rent-free
lieu of rent,receivingthe
perpetual,
hereditarylease instead of whateverwages theyno longerreceived.If
imperialland was not available in some places where soldiers were
needed,privatelandholderscould have been forcedto accept imperial
lands elsewherein exchangefortheirown holdings,leavingtheirland to
be assignedto soldiers.
Justas the statehad kept recordsof its imperialestates,so it would
lands. But in theseventhand eighth
havekeptrecordsofthenewmilitary
centuriesthe imperialbureaucracymusthave functionedless efficiently
of course, were vital to the empire's
than usual.34 The muster-rolls,
defense,and had to be kept fairlyaccurately.The cadastersof taxable
land werealso importantto assure collectionof the annual land taxes.
32 Jones
(cited fn. 10), pp. 415-16.
33 Jones
(cited fn. 10), pp. 416-19.
34 See
Treadgold,"The Revivalof ByzantineLearningand the Revivalof the Byzantine
State," AmericanHistoricalReview84 (1979): 1259-66.

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630

WARRENT. TREADGOLD

But if the state knew from the muster-rollswho had an hereditary

militaryobligationand fromthecadasterswherehis land was, it could
locateand punishhimifhe did not serveas he was orderedand bringthe
specifiedequipment,so thatan exactrecordofhow muchof his land was
"militaryland" and how much had been acquired later as private
propertywould seldomhave been necessary.If overtheyearstheledgers
came to be incomplete,"custom" (which would virtuallyhave meant
"common law") would stillhave dictatedthat soldierswere not to sell
land theyneededto performtheirduties.By thetenthcentury,however,
populationpressurewas apparentlycausingsoldiersto sell offtheirland,
and up-to-dateledgersand specificlegislationbegan to be needed. For
these,ConstantineVII providedin his novel in a reasonablyequitable
manner.Quite possiblytheminimumof fourpounds' worthof land fora
cavalrymanwas approximatelythe amount of the originalgrantto a
cavalrymanin the seventhcentury.
Though the foregoinghypothesisinvolvesconsiderablespeculation,
one facttendsto corroborateit. By theninthcentury,
theonce sprawling
imperialestateshad shrunkdrastically.As late as thesixthcentury,they
are frequently
mentionedin the sourcesand particularlyin legal texts,
and weresupervisedby a largedepartmentheaded by a seniorofficial,
the comes reiprivatae.35By the ninthcentury,on the otherhand, the
imperialestatesare seldommentionedin thesourcesand are supervised
by the Great Curator,who rankedthirty-sixth
among thirty-nine
high
officialsand was concernedwithpalaces and hospicesas well as estates,
whichwere administeredby his subordinatecuratorsof the estates.36
The imperialestatesspecifically
attestedbetweentheseventhcenturyand
themid-ninth
werein theimmediatevicinityof Constantinople,around
the nearbycityof Tzurulum,around Cromna in Paphlagonia, around
Athens,and on Chios.37

35 Jones
(cited fn. 10), pp. 412-17. See also M. Kaplan, Les propritsde la couronne
et de l'glisedans l'empirebyzantin(Ve -VIe sicles) (Paris, 1976).
36 N.
des IVe et Xe sicles(Paris, 1972),
Oikonomids,Les listesde prsancebyzantines
p. 318 and (forthe rank) p. 304.
37 For theestates
verynear Constantinople,see Ibn al-Faqih in E. W. Brooks,"Arabic
Lists of the ByzantineThemes,"Journalof HellenicStudies.21 (1901): 73; forTzurulum
and Chios, see Sevcenko(cited fn. 1), pp. 568-72(note the lateradditionsfromthe tenth
centuryon); forCromna and Athens(?), see G. Zacos and A. Veglery,ByzantineLead
Seals, vol. 1 (Basel, 1972), nos. 2421 and 3014. NicephorusI (802-11) confiscatedsome
churchlands, but quicklyset about disposingof themby forcedsale; Theophanes,ed.
de Boor, pp. 486-87.

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631

MILITARY LANDS AND IMPERIAL ESTATES

About 867 Basil I acquiredfromthePatriarchIgnatiusthelands of the

Mangana withtheirpalaces, whichwere also located in the immediate
vicinityof Constantinopleand wereused exclusivelyto supplyfood for
imperialbanquets.Acquisitionof thisprivateholdingof one man caused
sucha greatproportionalincreasein imperialland thatBasil putit under
an independentCurator of the Mangana, rankingjust afterthe Great
Curatorand havinghis own subordinatecuratorsof palaces and estates
oftheMangana.38Even underLeo VI, theprivateholdingsofthewidow
Danelis in thePeloponnesuswere,accordingto ConstantineVII, scarcely
smaller than the imperial estates.39Though Constantinemay have
exaggeratedsomewhat,the imperialestatesin the ninthcenturyplainly
had nothinglike the importanceof thosein the sixth.
By itself,the effectof the dislocations of the seventhand eighth
centuriesshouldhave been to increasethepercentageofimperialland by
allowingthecrownto confiscatetheholdingsof thosewho died without
heirs,fled,were captured,or rebelled.40If the proportionof imperial
land insteaddecreasedgreatly,as seems to be the case, the state must
have givenlargeamountsof its land away. It certainlydid not give the
land away because it did not need the rents.But what it needed more
than rentswas an army,supportedby whatevermeanscould be found.
Confiscationand billetingmay have been tried,but theimperialestates
are not likelyto have remaineduntouchedforlong.
The conjecturethat Heraclius, or perhaps one of his immediate
successors,cancelled the leases of most of the imperialestates and
distributedthemamong his troops explainsboth the disappearanceof
most of the imperialestatesand the appearance of the militarylands.
This conjectureis compatiblewiththe traditionalview of the originsof
thethemes,whichdespitetheattacksthathave been leveledagainstit is
of whathappenedin Byzantiumin
stilltheonlycoherentreconstruction
theearlyseventhcentury.
Hillsdale College

38 J.B.
Bury, The Imperial AdministrativeSystem in the Ninth Century (London, 1911),

pp. 101-102,correctedby Oikonomides(cited fn. 36), p. 318, who by notingthat the

Palace of Eleutheriuswas not originallyunderthe Curatorof the Mangana clears up the
obscuritymentionedby Bury.
39
TheophanesContinuatus,ed. Bonn, pp. 320-21.
40 Cf. Jones
(cited fn. 10), pp. 420-24.

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