LE1LA

ANALYSIS

HAAPARANTA

AS T H E M E T H O D

DISCOVERY:

SOME REMARKS

OF LOGICAL
ON FREGE

AND HUSSERL
I.

I N T I~,() D L J ( ' T 1 O N

There are not too many philosophers who have tried to give a natural
explanation for the miracles of nineteenth century logic. We know that
a radically new Iogic came into being in those days. But little, if
anything, has been said about the incentives of these innovations.
Hans Sluga and Gottfried Gabriel have stressed and worked on the
historical perspective of that remarkable period, and I have tried to
give an answer to the question, as rar as Frege's logic is concerned,
but much can still be done. ~
If we wish to solve this interpretational puzzle, it is useful and quite
instructive to try to find out how the pioneers of modern logic and the
philosophers of logic in the nineteenth century did what they did. That
is, we taust Iook for the methods which guided their logical studies.
This interpretational task amounts to giving a methodological reconstruction of the work of nineteenth century logicians. This paper is an
attempt to find out the methods which Frege and Husserl followed in
their logical studies.

2.

i]us~,El~,l,S

t)UESTIt)N

Edmund Husseri's thought lends itself easily to the framework of the

philosophicai tradition introduced by Immanuel Kant. His main works
in the field of logic bear Kantian labels in their very titles. His trilogy
of logic consists of the book entitled Logische Untersuchungen I-II
(1900-1901), the first volume of which he calls Prolegomena zur reinen
Logik, Formale und Transzendentale Logik (1929), and Erfahrung und
Urteil (1939), which was posthumously completed and published by
Ludwig Landgrebe. The nature of Husserl's thought is preparatory.
Originally, his philosophy was mainly negative in the sense of being
extremely critical of certain psychologistic and naturalistic tendencies
in philosophy, especially in philosophy of logic and mathematics, to
which he had earlier adhered himself. After the critical period, Husserl

Synthese 77 (1988) 73-97.

1988 by KluwerAcademic Publishers.

74

LEII.A

HAAf'ARANTA

\,\

\,

started with serious preparations for a positive approach, but he d'id~

not have time for realizing his project in all its details. To repeat
Maurice Natanson's metaphor, Husserl is a man who saw the promised
land, but was not able to come to it and cultivate itfEven if Husserl attached his philosophy to Kantian themes, he was
convinced that he had to raise heavy criticism against Kant's ideas. He
blmes Kant for having failed to achieve a "pure" theory of knowledge, which would be free from all naturalistic elements, such as
psychological and anthropological assumptions. No more is he
satisfied with neo-Kantians' developments, which he calls transcendental psychology. 3
Husserl's correction to Kant's transcendental philosophy consists of
two basic remarks. First, there is Kant's alleged psychologism. Psychologism was a popular doctrine among logicians and mathematicians in the nineteenth century. Psychologistic logicians, such as Jakob
Fries (1773-1843), Friedrich Beneke (1798-1854), John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873), Christoph Sigwart (1830-1904), Wilhelm Wundt (18321920), Benno Erdmann (1851-1922), and Theodor Lipps (18511914), assumed that logical laws are psychological laws of human
thoght-and hence natural laws. In the psychologistic view, logical
concepts, such as the concepts of plurality, relation and possibility,
became understood in terms of the psychological origins of those
concepts. 4 In his early writings, Husserl spoke in favour of psychologism, for example, in his book Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891),
which Gottlob Frege, the devoted antipsychologist, heavily attacked
in 1894. 5 In the very end of the nineteenth century, Husserl gave up
the psychologistic doctrine and turned to antipsychologism, which his
Logische Untersuchungen preaches for.
The main starting-points for Husserl were Bernard Bolzano, Hermann Lotze, and Franz Brentano, to whom Husserl pays homage in his
Logische Untersuchungen. 6 Bolzano (1937) had introduced Stze an
sich and Vorstellungen an sich, which he regarded as neither existing
in space and time nor depending on our mental acts. 7 Hence, Bolzano
distinguished the proposition itself from our thinking of it and acknowledged a specific realm of ideal objects, for which he did not
admit proper existence, though. Lotze, for his part, considered being
and validity to be two senses of actuality (Wirklichkeit) and distinguished between the being of concrete things and the validity of abstract objects. For him, validity was a way of being independent of

A N A L Y S I S AS T t t E MF~'FHOD OF I . ( ) ( ] i ( ' A L D I S C O V E R Y

75

subjective mental acts. ~ Brentano, for his part, distinguished between mental acts and their objects, which have intentional inexistence in those acts but which need not have any real existence. 9
Husserl adheres himself to these ideas by making a distinction
between the real and the ideal. He states:
There is an essential, quite unbridgeable difference betwen sciences of the ideal and
sciences of the real. The former a r e a priori, the latter empirical. The former set forth
ideal general laws grounded with intuitive eertainty in certain general coneepts; the
latter establish real general laws, relating to a sphere of fact, with probabilities into
which we have insightfl

Husserl observes that once the distinction between the ideal realm and
the real realm is acknowledged,we quite naturally come to see one
crucial problem. This problem constitutes the other half of Husserl's
criticism against Kant. Husserl maintains that since Kant did not make
the distinction between the ideal and the real, he failed to ask orte
important question. Since Kant did not assume any world of ideal
objects of thought, he could not ask: " H o w can we have an access to
these objects? ''11
In the Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Husserl is explicit in
stressing the importance of Kant's theories concerning the H u m e a n
problem, which include his doctrine of transcendental synthesis and of
transcendental abilities in general. Husserl praises Kant's questions
concerning our knowledge and its presuppositions, but he blames
Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logicJ 2
Kant took Aristotelian logic to be a complete system, which needs no
major corrections. All we can do for what he calls general logic is to
make it more elegant; the proper task of this logic, which is to expose
and prove the formal rules of all thought, had already been accomplished, in Kant's view.13 Hence, Kant asked how pure mathematics is possible, how pure, natural science is possible, and how
metaphysics as natural disposition and as science is possible, 14 but he
did not ask how logic as science is possible. Husserl believes that if
Kant had distinguished between the ideal and the real realm, it would
have occurred to him to ask such an epistemological question.
Hence, Husserl concludes that both Hume and Kant realized the
transcendental problem of the constitution of the world, that is, the
real realm, but they failed to see the corresponding problem concerning the constitution of the ideal objects such as the judgements and

76

LEII.A HAAPARANTA

the categories which belong to the sphere of reason and which logic is
interested in. In other words, Kant did not make his analytic a priori a
problem. 15
Husserl's question in his logical work can thus be formulated in
three ways:
(1)
(2)
(3)

How can we have knowledge of the realm of ideal objects?

How can we rely on what Iogic claims?
How can we justify the analytic a priori truths?

These formulations have simple connections. For what gives us knowledge of the realm of ideal objects, primarily of thoughts, that is, of the
structure of thoughts and of the inferential links between thoughts, is
precisely the science of logic, and Husserl thus asks how we can rely
on that sciencet Moreover, since logical laws are essentially analytic a
priori, Husser! asks how we can rely on the analytic a priori claims
which logic offers to us.
3.

THE

PHILOSOPHI('AL

SOURCE

OF THE

QUESTION

Husserl asked the question which Kant did not ask, and tried to do
what K a n t did not do, namely to lay the epistemological foundations
of logic. But what was actually the philosophical source of the question concerning how logic as science is possible?
If we believe that the history of logic can be reconstructed as a
Kuhnian science, hence, that the question of foundations arise in logic
when the reeeived framework is threatened, we quit naturally see the
nineteenth century as a revolutionary period in logic. Aristotelian
logic was losing ground in those days, and new formal developments
arose. What this period noeded, then, was either a justifieation for the
old logic or a justifiction for those new suggestions. It thus needed
someone who would answer the question concerning the possibility of
logic as science. Hence, Husserl's question was necessitated by the
new developments of logic in the nineteenth century. Husserl himself
remarks:
. . how could such a logic [scientific logic] become possible while the themes belonging
to it originally remained confused? ~6

From Galilei and Descartes to Kant, philosophers had sought for a

firm foundation for modern natural science, for mathematics and even

ANALYSIS

AS THE

ME'FHOD

OF

I.OGI('AL

DISCOVERY

77

for metaphysics. Logic, however, remained untouched even by those

who wished to change the old beliefs like George Boole (1854), who
argued that "it may, perhaps, be permitted to the mind to attain a
knowledge of the laws to which it is itself subject without its being also
given to it to understand their ground and origin". ~7
The foundational crisis was not the most perspicuous reason for the
question concerning the possibility of Iogic as science. The question
arose as a natural conse'quence of the various confrontations within
logic and philosophy of logic in the nineteenth century. As we saw in
HusserFs case, it arose from a philosophical position which postulated
a specific realm of abstract objects like thoughts which logic speaks
about. If this kind of realm is assumed and acknowledged, it is quite
natural to ask how we can have knowledge of this realm, that is, how
we can rely on logic which is supposed to speak about this realm.
But why does anyone want to assume such an objective realm? The
objectivity of the field of interest of logic was probably necessitated by
a psychological or anthropoiogical interpretation of Kant's transcendentalism, as represented by such logicians as Fries and Erdmann, for
example. In addition to the empiricist tradition, psychologism in logic
had a natural connection with I4ant's transcendentalism, for the transcendental structure of human thought was easily construed as a
psychologicat structure, which is typical of the human race. If one
wanted to save transcendental logic from this kind of reading, one had
better regard the transcendental structure as the structure of some
objective realm.

4.

THE

MATERIALITY

OF

LOGIC

If the content of l'ogic is pushed into a specific realm outside the

psychological sphere, logic becomes more material than it was in
Kant's view. Kant's transcendental logic was, of course, material, but
it was material basically.in the sense that it showed us the form of our
phenomenal world. As Kant says, his general logic deals only with the
f o r t s of thought and eliminates all content of knowledge, whereas his
transcendental logic excludes only the modes of knowledge which
have empirical content but preserves the content of knowledge by
being interested in the relation of knowledge and objects, j8 But what
transcendental logic represents is the formal a priori machinery which

78

L E II~,A I t A A P A R A N T A

is a presupposition and an inescapable conceptual element of our

experience.
When a specific logical source of knowledge was acknowledged, the
form of human thought - and, hence, the form of our world - was
objectified as the forms of abstract objects called thoughts. Such
philosophers as Bolzano, Lotze, and Frege thus assumed that phenomenal objects do not suffice to give us logical concepts as such.
What we need in addition to those objects is knowledge of the
logical realm, which is different from the realm of objects which have
effects on our senses and also different from the realm of psychological events.
In a certain sense, however, Kant had the same epistemological
problem as Husserl, for his transcendental deduction can be read as
being motivated by a search for a firm foundation for our logical
concepts. For Kant, those concepts are justified when they are found
by means of transcendental analysis starting from judgements. Kant
believes that a judgement has priority over its constitutive concepts
and that the only use which the understanding can make of concepts is
to judge by means of t hem. 19 Kant thinks that in order-to reach the
pure categories of understanding, we must start with judgements,
which show them to us.
Even if Frege postulates the realm of abstract objects, he assumes
that there is a safe methodological solution to the epistemological
problem of how we can rely on the science which tells us something
about this realm, that is, how we can rely on logic. Frege's solution
was the same as Kant's. Hence, even if the realm of thoughts becomes
a strange realm for us in Frege's view, the method of finding the
structure of thoughts remains the same as the method of finding their
structure, if that structure were merely inside our heads and in objects
of experience. This method, which Frege relies on, is precisely the
method of analysis. Frege teils us that, in order to find the correct
logical concepts, he starts from judgements. 2
In addition to psychologism, Frege also wished to safeguard himself
from the view which was represented by such logicians as Boole and
Schrder who started to make new developments in formal logic and
paid little, if any, attention to transcendental logic: Frege relied on the
idea that logic ought to learn something from mathematics, but he was
not one of those logicians who thought that by copying mathematics
logic could take a firm and fruitful course. Frege's model was arith-

ANALYSIS

AS THE

METHOD

OF

LOGICAL

DISCOVERY

79

metic only to the extent that he wished to use exact symbolism. He, of
course, wished to serve mathematics by means of his symbolism, but
an equally important point in his logic was to write down the philosophy which transcendentalists and logicists preached for.
In the mainstream of nineteenth century logic, logic was basically
understood materially, and formal logic was a kind of parasite.
The materiality of logic meant various things. (1) Logic was material
in the sense that it was assumed to speak about the objects of the
world. Kant's transcendental logic was material in this sense in a
peculiar way, as we noticed above. Hegelian logic was naturally
material, since it sought to mirror the historical development of
reality. (2) Logic was material in the sense of being transcendental,
that is, being a picture of the a priori conditions of human thought. (3)
Logic was material in the sense that it was assumed to speak about the
objects of the abstract realm, that is, to convey thoughts, which were
considered objective. (4) Logic was material in the sense that it was
assumed to mirror the strueture of the psychological realm. Both
psychologists and non-psychologists kept logic close to epistemology.
This is the position in which they dittered from most of those who
suggested new formal developments for logic.
Accordingly, logicists acknowledged the objective realm of applicability of logic in order to safeguard logic from psychologism, which
even arose from Kant's transcendentalism. This does not mean that
Kant went into the trap of psychologism but - as I argued above - that
Kant's transcendentalism could easily be interpreted psychologistically. Neo-Kantians and logiists did not want to make logie metaph'y~
sical in Hegel's sense. Therefore, the only alternative that was then
left for them was to stress the role of the realm of thoughts. But
because of this objectivity of thoughts the question of how we can rely
on logic became pressing. No more could we say like psychologists or
even like Kant that we have direct access to the structure of thought.

5.

TRANSCENDENTAL

LOGIC

AND

THE

IDEA

OF

CALCULUS

The distinction between material and formal logic came up in a new

form within nineteenth century formal developments. In the late
nineteenth century, there were two ways of thinking about logic, in
Frege's view. Some logiians~ 13oole, for example, f~cussed on

80

LEILA

HAAPARANTA

developing a Leibnizian calculus ratiocinator, that is, on presenting a

formal calculus, which only gives the rules of logical inference. 21 On
the otber hand, Frege thought that while Boole restricted his project
to developing a calculus, Peano's logic was a Leibnizian lingua
characterica, a proper material language.22Frege argued that bis
Begriffsschrift was both a language and a calculus. 23 He thought that
his conceptual notation was both an attempt to present the rules of
logical inference and an attempt to give a conceptual representation
of the universe. In this way, be believed to have caught the sensible
core of Leibniz's idea of a universal language. 24 For Leibniz's ideal
language was meant to be a mirror of the world so that its symbols and
the relations of those symbols would correspond to the elements of the
universe and the relations of those elements. Moreover, Leibniz
assumed that this very correspondence would be the basis of reliable
logical reasoningY
The idea of a Leibnizian universal language is put forward by Frege
in the 'Preface' of the Begriffsschrift, which also contains a reference
to Trendelenburg's exposition of that idea. 26 In bis article 'ber
Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen Charakteristik' Trendelenburg
suggests that philosopbers ought to construct a Leibnizian universal
language on the basis of Kant's epistemological ideas. Trendelenburg
praises Kant's distinction between the conceptual and the empirical
component of thought and takes his study of the conceptual component to be a continuation of Leibniz's project. He also mentions
Ludwig Benedict Trede, who in an essay 'Vorschige zu einer nothwendigen Sprachlehre' (1811) had tried to construct a Leibnizian
universal language by keeping in mind what Kant does in bis transcendental logic. According to Trendelenburg, Kant improved Leibniz's idea by emphasizing the codification of formal concepts in the
universal language and by leaving the empirical concepts aside. Trede
regards this kind of limitation of the Leibnizian project as necessary,
because, as human beings, we are not able to have knowledge of all
the empirical properties of objects and hence not able to designate all
empirical concepts in an ideal notational system. Frege followed Kant
and Trede in that he paid more attention to formal concepts and less
attention to empirical concepts.
Even if Frege seems to ~rely-on Leibniz's th0ught, be differs from
hirn in o n e important respect. Frege states that the term Begriffsschrift
which he was most likely to adopt from Trendelenburg - is mislead-

ANALYS1S

AS THE

METHOD

OF LOGICAL

DISCOVERY

81

ing, since he does not start from concepts but from judgements. He
also remarks that in this respect his conceptual notation deviates from
similar creations of Leibniz and his followers.27 However, his conceptual notation does not deviate from what Kant suggested. As we saw
above, Kant's thesis is that a judgement has priority over its constitutive concepts. Hence, Kant thinks that if we want to reach the
pure categories of understanding, we taust start with judgements,
which show them to us. What Kant himself does in his Critique of Pure
Reason is first to present the table of judgements and then to proceed
to the table of categories. 28 Kant starts with complete judgements and
comes up with the components of judgements, which are sensations,
forms of intuition, and the c0ncepts of pure understanding, that is,
logical concepts. Frege follows Kant's recommendation and example.
He writes:
In fact, it is orte of the most important differences between my way of thinking
{Auffassungsweise} and the Boolean way - and indeed I can add the Aristotelian way that I do not proceed from concepts but from judgements. 29

Frege starts his analysis with judgements and comes up with his basic
logical concepts, such as the concepts of object, function, conditionality, negation, generality, and identity, which constitute his new
language. If we assume that Frege's logic - and primarily his firstorder logic, which he considers his basic innovation,3 - is meant to be
a mirror of the forms of thought and of the world into which we have,
as Kant would say, ernbedded those forms, we can ascribe to it an
important epistemological role. Fregean first-order language is based
on the idea that objects are considered in the framework of judgements and judgements are constituted by empirical concepts, which
are signified by Greek letters, and by logical functions like conditionality, negation, generality, and identity. The only way in which
we can use these concepts is to form thoughts and judge by means of
them. 31

6.

now

TO D,I~COVER

THE

TRUE

LOGIC

We saw above that the starting point of Frege's analysis is a complete judgement. By analyzing judgements, Frege arrives at his basic
concepts which he presents by means of his symbols. These primitive

82

LEILA

HAAPARANTA

logical functions determine the truth-value of the whole thought in

which their senses are components. For example, ' - ~ ' stands for the
True if the argument '~' stands for the True, otherwise it stands for
the False, and ,__.._~_a~ ( a ) , stands for the True if for every argument
the value of the function '@(~)' stands for the True, otherwise it stands
for the False. 32 Hence, Frege assumes that we know the conditions
under which a thought is true if and only if we know what the
primitive components of the corresponding sentence mean, and that
we reach these meanings, and hence the truth-conditions, by analyzing
the thought which is acknowledged, that is, which is judged. In
Frege's view, the so-called truth-conditional semantics is a simple
consequence of his method of analysis. Frege takes a judgement to be
a complete construction which we must analyze in order to find out
under what conditions it is realized, that is, under what conditions the
thought which is acknowledged is true. But Frege does not teil us how
he has found his basic components, that is, the constitutive concepts of
judgements, step by step; he. only presents those concepts to us in
judgements. If he had revealed the steps of his analysis, he would have
given us an answer to the question concerning how he actually
discovered bis conceptual notation. I have tried to show elsewhere
that Frege followed l_~ibniz's, Kant's and Trendelenburg's recommendations when he constructed bis Begriffsschri[t, that Frege's
method of discovery was transcendental analysis and that what he
discovered was a kind of transcendental logic. 33
In the 'Preface' of the Begriffsschrit Frege makes a distinction
between the way of coming to think of a proposition and the way of
justifying a proposition. He takes the former way to depend on each
person's psychological facts and the latter way to be determined by the
proposition itself, independently of ohr private minds. Since logical
laws are propositions, Frege thus comes to distinguish between the
discovery of a logical law and the justification of that law. The
distinction between our psychological steps to logical laws and the
objective proofs of those laws amounts to the distinction between the
logic and the method of discovery and the logic and the method of
justification in "the science of logic". Frege regards the problem of
discovery as a psychological problem but takes the logic of
justification to be a proper interest of logic itself. The above quotation
from Boole shows that Boole is ready to defend a somewhat similar
position. For hirn, it is not the task of logic to find out how we have

ANALYSIS

AS THE

METHOD

OF

LOGICAL

DISCOVERY

83

arrived at the logic we have; instead, what a logician must do is to

proceed from the evident logical laws to more complex logical laws
and thus to justify the laws which are not evident to us.
Even if Frege excludes the problem of discovering logical laws from
the field of logic, he takes notice of the method of discovering the only
true logic in the sense of a logical language. In Kant's terms, Frege
thus seems to be interested in the method of discovery of material, or
transcendental, logic but throws the method of discovery of general
logic into psychology. According to Frege, a logician must leave the
grammatical concepts aside and try to get an insight into the correct
logical concepts. His conceptual notation is precisely meant to be a
language which is constituted by these concepts. For Frege, the task of
finding the correct logical concepts which constitutes the logical
language is a proper task of a logician, not of a psychologist. Hence,
Frege states that his method of discovering the true logic is the
analysis of judgements. Frege thus believes that there is a true logic of
discovery by means of which we can find "the formula language of
pure thought".
7.

THE

IDEA

OF

PHENOMENOLOGY

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Husserl has outlined his

studies in the epistemological foundations of formal logic. After that,
he sets out to work on the phenomenological method. 34 Phenomenology is usually characterized as a field of philosophical studies which
is interested in the essential structures of experience. Phenomenology
is also a specific method, a method of "bracketing", which implies an
effort to exclude all historical and existenfial presuppositions and to
contemplate the pure consciousness itself. The phenomenological
method is transcendental in the sense that, when we use it, we attend
to our experiencing of an object, not to the object itself. We must not
say anything about what may or may not be outside the immanent
realm. Instead, we study the role of consciousness in the construction
of the world. In this sense, phenomenology is transcendental philosophy. For Husserl, transcendental phenomenology is the pure and
radical form o[ transcendental philosophy.35
In the last decades, philosophers have compared Husserl's phenomenology with Frege's semantic ideas. 36 Since Frege and Husserl had
largely a common historical background formed by Leibniz, Kant,

84

LEILA

HAAPARANTA

Bolzano, Lotze, and Brentano, it is no surprise that their common

background is also reflected in similar ways in some of their views. For
example, they both think that we cannot step beyond our cognitive
capacities in order to consider objects as detached from our conceptual systems, Frege assumes that between a name and an object there
is always a Sinn, a conceptual component, through which the object is
presented. 37 Husserl has his noemata, through which we perceive
objects, in his view. 38 Frege criticizes the correspondence theory of
truth, because it seems to presuppose a step beyond the limits of
language, that is, a possibility of comparing a sentence and reality,
which he takes to be absurd. 39 Husserl, for his part, claims that a
transcendence which would dispense with a connecti0n with my
sphere of actual perception on principle would be nonsense. 4
Instead of detecting these parallelisms, I shall try to show that
phenomenology was required by Husserl's studies in the epistemological foundations of formal logic. Therefore, in order to throw light on
Frege's and Husserl's philosophical doctrines concerning Sinn ,and
Bedeutung, and noema and object, respectively, we taust first find out
their views of logic, which lie behind these specific philosophical
doctrines. Hence, as far as Husserl is concerned, our task will be to
follow his steps from the manifest of the foundational studies in logic
to the practice of phenomenology.4~
8.

HOW TO JUSTIFY

THE

OLD LOGIC

In his three logical works Husserl first outlines and then starts to
realize his programme, by means of which logie is meant to take the
firm course of seience. Husserl assumes that the principles of logic
need the uncovering of the genesis of judgements. 42 This means that
Husserl sets out to discover the sources out of which logical concepts
and the ideal laws of logic arise The starting point of his studies is a
judgement. 43 He states:
Judgements as the finished products of a "constitution" or "genesis" can and must be
asked about their genesis. 44

Husserl's first step is thus the step from complete judgements back to
the concepts which constitute these judgements. Like Frege, he relies
on Kant's recommendation when choosing the starting point of his
analysis. He also stresses, by referring to Bolzano and others, that the

ANALYSIS

AS THE

METHOD

OF LOGICAL

DISCOVERY

85

judgements must be considered to be ideal objects. Moreover, he

writes:
If experience itself is a c c o u n t e d as j u d g e m e n t in the broadest sense, then the theory of
experience is to be characterized as itself the first and most f u n d a m e n t a l j u d g e m e n t
theory. 45

This passage expresses even greater dependence on Kant's thought.

For Kant describes objects of experience in such a way that he takes
them to be constructed out of intuitions which are interpreted through
the categories of understanding.46 Besides being compounded out of
intuitions and concepts, objects of experience taust present themselves
to us as judgements, since in Kant's view we cannot make use of
concepts in any other way than by judging by means of them.
Husserl's first step from judgements to the concepts which constitute
them is thus typically Kantian.
Husserl's second step is the step from logical concepts to the origins
of those concepts. He teils us that he seeks to show that the origin of
such ideas as negation, relation, and possibility, for example, is in
' predicative experience". 47
Two things may wrry us here. First, Husserl wishes to reach the
origins of the logical vocabulary, which sounds psychologism.
Secondly, he seems to connect the foundational stdies of logic with
the account of experience, which also sounds psychologism. He goes
as far as arguing the following:
Logic needs a theory of experience - in order to be able to give scientific information
about the legitimating bases, and the legitimate limits, of its A priori, and consequently
about its own legitimate sense:48

I shall discuss the first question here and return to the second question
later in this essay.
Hence, isn't Husserl's motto "back to origins" psychologism, after
all? Hussefl himself warns us of confusing the psychological presuppositions of the knowledge of a logical law with the logical presuppositions of that law. He makes much of the distinction between
psychological dependence, and hence psychological origin, and logical
demonstration and justification.49 In the contexts in which he stresses
this distinction, he seems to mean the distinction between the way of
coming to think of a logical law, that is, the discovery of a logical law,

86

LEILA

HAAPARANTA

and the justification of that law. As we saw above, Frege had already
condemned the study of psychological origins of logical laws as a
branch of logical studies before Husserl, and he had done this in the
same way as Husserl.
But Husserl is interested in the origins. However, he denies that he
means psychological studies by bis studies of origins. His starting point
is experience, which he construes as judgements, and he is interested
in the phenomenological, not the psychological or historical, origin of
those judgements. 5 He observes that the fundamental concepts of
logic are, of course, familiar to us and they are at our free disposal.
But he is not interested in how mankind has produced them psychologically or how we again and again produce them in our minds. 1
What does he mean by his phenomenological analysis of logical laws
and concepts, then, if not the psychological analysis?
Husserl is explicit in his choice of a method. He tells us that bis
method is the phenomenological or transcendental analysis, which
differs from psychological analysis. He also extends the use of his
method behind the logical concepts by taking bis second step from the
basic logical vocabulary to the origin of that vocabulary. He regards
his analytical method as a method of diret intuition, an insight into
the essence of such concepts as "concept", "proposition', etc. 52
Husserl starts with judgements, fixes the primitive logical vocabulary
of those judgements, and finally tries to get an insight into the
phenomenological origin of this vocabulary. Iris project is parallel to,
even if more extensive and more explicit than that of Frege's. It is
more extensive in the sense that Husserl wishes to step behind the
logical vocabulary, and it is more explicit because Husserl formulates
the steps of bis analysis.
However, Husserl's logical vocabulary differs from that of Frege's,
since his prirnary aim is to study the epistemological foundations o f
traditional logic. He does not try to find any new logical concepts but
he mainly seeks to establish the categories which had been known to
philosophers from the days of Aristofle. These categories include the
concepts of substance, accidence, relation, negation, the categories of
modality, etc. Husserl does not seek to create any new logic, but he
mainly tries to lay the epistemological foundations of the old logic.
But he regards this task as important in order that the logic which is to
come could step along the path of science.

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9. FIND1NG THE ORIGINS

Husserl's book Erfahrung und Urteil, which was published posthumously, was meant to take the step from the logical concepts to
their phenomenological origins along the lines that were drawn in the
Logische Untersuchungen and in the Formale und Transzendentale
Logik. This analysis finally comes up with the concept of life-world
(Lebenswelt), which was central in Husserl's later philosophy.
Husserl first reduces all judgements to ultimate judgements, which
are judgements about absolute objects. In this way, he also reaches the
absolute properties and relations. The absolute objects which Husserl
calls judgement-substrates are his basic individuals. The ultimate
judgements are predicative, they are judgements about these ultimate
individuals. They are thus constituted by the distinction between
objects and predications like Frege's simple judgements. In his Formale und Transzendentale Logik Husserl writes:
The lowest level reached by tracing back the clue of sense-genesis brings us, as we
already know, to judgements about individuals.53

In Erfahrung und Urteil we can read the following:

Original substrates are...individuals, individual objects, and every thinkable judgement ultimately refers to individual objects, no matter how mediated in a variety of
ways.54

This is one of the senses in which Husserl takes logic to be material.

Logic speaks about something; it relates to the sphere of individuals.
This is what Husserl means by bis claim that logic presupposes
experience. Husserl's basic substrates are phenomenal, and judgements are, in the last analysis, judgements about these phenomenal
objects.
In the Formale und Transzendentale Logik Husserl suggests that the
judgement-substrates do not contain any judgement-syntaxes.56 But if
the basic individuals, which logic concerns, have no internal structure
which we could analyze further, then the rest of the components of
judgements serve to give the form for those individuals. Hence, all
analysis should stop at the judgement-substrates.
But Husserl does not stop at the structure of a predicative judgement. In the Erfahrung und Urteil his further task is specified as
follows:

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Out task is thus a clarification of the essence of the predicative judgement by means of
exploration of its origin. 57

To go behind the predicative judgement is to construct a theory of

prepredicative experience. The phenomenological theory of judgement is precisely meant to analyze this experience in which the
ultimate substrates are given as self-evident. 58
The final object of Husserl's analysis is thus the act of prepredicative judgement, in which human logical activity appears in its
elementary form. In Husserl's view, this act of prepredicative judgement is "objectifying turning-toward", an act which picks up an
object in perception as its object. 59 Husserl thinks that every act of
predicative judgement is based on this prepredicative experience. 6 In
this way, Husserl analyzes categorical judgements. 61 The form of
categorical judgements will thus be explained by the distinction between the object, which in prepredicative experience is an object of
perception, and the determination of this object in this prepredicative
perceptive experience. Husserl states:
It would be the task of further investigation to carry out a similar genetic derivation for
the other forms of judgement as weil. The theme of our investigation, accordingly, is the
categorical judgement which is based on perception.62

He also points out:

.. the structures of perception are taken into consideration only to the extent that it is
necessary to understand how, on the basis of sensuous perceptive experience, logical
operations, with their logical formations, are established; how, on the basis of perception, categorical objects, circumstantial and general objectivities, are produced through
logical spontaneity:63

The study of prepredicative experience is what Husserl means by his

genealogy of logic. 64 He wishes to show that the origins of such
concepts as unity, plurality, negation, relation and possibility lie in
prepredicative experience. Consequently, in his view, all complex
judgements can be traced back to ultimate judgements, which are
about basic individuals. The ultimate judgements are based on prepredicative judgements, which are acts of perception. Hence, in order
to reach the origins of logical concepts, Husserl taust analyze the very
acts of perception.
One example of Husserl's procedure is in order. Let us consider the
category of negation. Husserl analyzes it as a modification of eon-

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sciousness, which arises when we partially cancel something that we

have assumed. If we see a red ball and if it then turns out that the
other side of the ball is green, we cancel the prepredicative judgement
that the ball is red, as far as the other side is concerned. T h e partial
canceUation, "This is not red", is the origin of the logical concept of
negation. This means that Husserl considers the logical category of
negation to be deeply rooted in our basic perceptual activities. 65
Husserl's analysis has a number of implications. First, he comes to
argue that the world of basic individuals i s not a collection of individual objects in the sense of independent atoms. Husserl comes to
think that the worlcl which is pregiven to us has already been subject
to logical operations. H e writes:
T h e world is n e v e r given to us as other than the world in which we or others, whose
store of experience we take over by communication, education, and tradition, have
already been logically active, in j u d g e m e n t and cognition. 66

Hence, in Husserl's view, the presupposition of a judgement is the

world in totality, not any single individual, and this world is already
formed by our categories. 67 It is formed according to logical categories and typified according to different genera, kinds, etc. T h e most
general form in the world is " o b j e c t in general". 68 This world at which
he arrives in his later philosophy, when he performs his foundational
studies, Husserl calls a life-world. Our logical concepts are embedded
in out life-world, and Husserl seeks to locate them in this world by
means of his phenomenological studies.
What now becomes a problem for Husserl, who seeks for the first
basis of logic, is the construction of the life-world. Husserl assumes
that each individual which is given in experience has an internal
horizon, an internal structure, and an infinite external horizon, which
means its relations to co-given objects. 69 In his view, the world is a
possibility for us in the sense that it is not wholly actual at all times
but we can choose and thus actualize some interpretation of the "big"
world of all possibilities by determining it in some way. TM We can
choose a world, which is among the possible worlds, in the act of
perception and thereby we come to actualize one world.
But what is the final basis of logical laws and concepts that Husserl
finds in the life-world? Husserl is interested in the constitution of any
possible world, the essential form of a world in general, not of our
actual world. 7a This means that in his genealogy of logic he is in the

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last analysis interested in our ways of forming worlds, that is, in the
recipes that we follow in constructing a world. These recipes provide
the only way of constructing a world which is possible for consciousness. In contemporary logical terminology, this amounts to the claim
that the meanings of our logical words remain unchanged from orte
possible world to another.
This is Husserl's route back to Kant's transcendental logic. Like
Frege, Husserl comes to work on the analytic side of Kant's transcendentalism, since he begins with the result of Kant's transcendental
synthesis, which is a complete judgement, and then moves backwards
to the conditions under which the judgement is realized. Husserl first
seems to assume that the ultimate substrates are the basis of analysis.
In his latest philosophy, he steps behind the simple substrates, and
claims that the logical forms are already in the world whieh we have
and we cannot analyze them away from out individuals.72 According
to bis view, logical forms are not something to be added to perceptual
individuals but rather they express the structure which a world taust
exemplify in order to be a possible world for us. 73
We also noted above that, according to Husserl, our knowledge of
logical laws presupposes experience of individuals. This view can be
given a natural Kantian reading. As we saw, Husserl agrees with Kant
that understanding can use concepts only in judgements. It is most
likely that, at least to some extent, he also agrees with Kant that
concepts without intuitions are empty. TM In Husserl's view, logical
concepts would be empty without perceptual individuals, which is to
say that out knowledge of logical laws also presupposes our experience of individuals.
Consequently, Husserl wants to correct Kant's transcendental
philosophy by means of his phenomenological method, by which he
seeks an epistemological understanding of formal logic. But what
Husserl arrives at is the analytic part of transcendental logic, which is
tentatively developed in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Husserl
tries to show how we reach out basic categories, which we use in our
judgements and also in the judgements of formal logic. Therefore, bis
inquiry represents both transcendental logic and the study of the
epistemologieal foundations of what Kant calls general logic.
To conclude, Kant puts forward his table of categories of understanding, but he does not teil us how he has actually arrived at those
categories. Kant merely gives a few hints at his steps from bis table of

ANALYSlS

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91

judgements to his table of categories. Nor does he tell us how he has

discovered his basic distinction between individual representations,
which he calls intuitions, and concepts. 75 Frege, for his part, promises
to analyze judgements. But even if he gives us his basic concepts, he
does not reveal the phases of his analysis. He only hints at the direct
reflection of the structure of thought. Husserl takes it to be his task
to show the route from judgements and from the objects of experience
to the logical forms. In his later philosophy, he comes to study
prepredicative experience, in which he believes to find the origin of
logic.

10.

HUSSERL'S

ANSWER

How is logic as science possible, according to Husserl? Husserl argues

that if we acknowledge the ideal world - if we do not fail to notice it as
Kant does - the transcendental question concerning logic arises. H e
states:
. . the transcendental problem that Objective l o g i c . . , taust raise concerning its field of
ideal objectivities takes a position parallel to the transcendental problems of the science
of realities. 76

But the very same acknowledgement which raises the problem also
seems to provide us with an answer. If we postulate this world as our
thought-object, we also have direct access to it. Just as Kant's
categories are valid for the world because we have put them in the
world, similarly, we have knowledge of the objects of thought, since
we have made them ourselves. Husserl writes:
Is not each and every Objectivity with all the sense in which it is accepted by us, an
Objectivity that is winning or has won, acceptance within ourselves - as an Objectivity
having the sense that we ourselves acquired for it? 77

T h e r e is more to Husserl's answer, however. What Husserl wants to

say is that by contemplating consciousness in general, we receive the
essential intuition that it has, by definition, a certain structure, particularly an act-object structure, as Brentano has argued. This structure manifests itself in the fact that a judgement can be logically
split up into a substrate of which it is a judgement and that which is
judged in that judgement. Moreover, we can also objecfify the

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concepts by means of which we judge. This objectifying activity

belongs to the very nature of consciousness. T h e structure of judgement, which logic is interested in, thus mirrors the structure of pure
consciousness, and it has its origin in this transcendental structure.
Husserl claims that we have set these logical structures into the world;
we construct worlds according to the recipe of these structures. In the
world they occur as structures of experience. TM Moreover, Husserl
thinks that we could not have b e c o m e conscious of logic if we had not
objectified it, that is, put it into experience. T h e logical forms are
empty unless we embed them into the world of objects. In this sense,
Husserl bases logic on experience. What this amoants to is the claim
that formal logic is based on material logic, whictl offers a general
epistemological theory for formal logic. In addition to the meanings
that were given for material logic earlier in this paper, it now turns out
to have a new role in relation to formal logic. But since Husserl's
foundational studies prove to be a continuation of transcendental
logic, we are warranted to argue that e r e n Kant's transcendental logic
would have provided an answer to Husserl's question if Kafft had
noticed the question.
Husserl continues with one further question. H e asks: " H o w is a
theory of logical reason possible?" H e answers:
Such a theory is radically possible as the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of logical reason, within the
framework of transcendental p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a whole. 79

For Husserl, transcendental p h e n o m e n o l o g y is the final court. T h e r e fore, all questioning stops here.
11.

CONCLUDING

REMARKS

Husserl's work was apparently purported to establish Aristotelian

logic. However, the analysis above seems to point to a new direction.
It seems as if from the philosophy of logic which Husserl presents for
traditional logic a completely new logic emerged which is close to our
Fregean logic. Moreover, besides hinting at an analysis of sentences
which resembles that of Frege's, Husserl comes even closer to our
contemporary logic than Frege does. After all, he comes to rely on the
idea of alternative models which was maintained by Boole and bis
followers. 8 Husserl's Kantian standpoint makes hirn limit our consideration to those possible worlds which are possible for our con-

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93

sciousness and restrict his interpretation for logical concepts to those

very worlds.
But unlike Frege, Husserl does not intend to construct a new
organon, but he seeks for the epistemological justification of the old
organon, that is, Aristotelian logic. Husserl reveals his steps from
complex judgements to ultimate judgements and finally to the origins
of logical concepts like plurality, negation, and relation which constitute judgement~. Husserl finds the origins of these concepts by
analyzing acts of perception, which he calls prepredicative judgements. He thinks that we can give an epistemological justification for
the concepts used by formal logic precisely by carrying out this kind of
transcendental analysis, hence that, as regards our logical concepts,
the method of justification is the same as the method of discovery.
Husserl asked how logic as science is possible. But what does this
question actuaUy amount to in terms of contemporary logic? It means
that Husserl challenged the view that the analytic a priori is unproblematic. That is, he sought a justification for logical concepts and also
for such laws of logic as the law of identity, the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. It is true that Husserl came to
establish the laws which were used by the logicians of his day by
referring to the essence of the activity of human consciousness. None
the less, his original question concerning the foundations of classical
logic was of importance from the point of view of twentieth-century
logical developments.
NOTES
1 See Hans D. Sluga: 1980, Gottlob Frege, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston
and Henley; and see also Sluga: 1984, 'Frege: the early years', in R. Rorty, J. B.
Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (eds.): 1984, Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 329-56; and 1987,
'Frege Against the Booleans', Notre Dame Joumal of Formal Logic 28, 80-98. For
Gabriel's views, see his 1984, 'Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value', The Philosophical
Quarterly 34, 372-76; and his 1986, 'Frege als Neukantianer', Kant-Smdien 77,
84-101. My philosophical reconstruction of Frege's conceptual notation can be found in
my (1985) book Frege's Doctrine of Being, Acta Philosophica Fennica 39.
2 Maurice Natanson: 1973, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, p. 9.
3 Edmund Hussed: 1913, Logische Untersuchungen I, Verlag von Max Niemeyer,
Halle, pp. 92-97. Cf. Marvin Farber: 1966, The Aims of Phenomenology, The Motives,
Methods, and Impact of Husserl's Thought, Harper and Row, New York, p. 7.

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4 Jakob Fries: 1819, System der Logik, Mohr und Winter, Heidelberg; and 1827,
Grundriss der Logik, Christian Friedrich Winter, Heidelberg; Friedrich Beneke: 1820,
Erfahrungsseelenlehre als Grundlage alles Wissens, Ernst Siegfried Mittler, Berlin; and
1842, System der Logik als Kunstlehre des Denkens 1-I[, Ferdinand Dmmler, Berlin;
John Stuart Mill: 1906, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and lnductive, Longmans
Green, New York and Bombay; Christoph Sigwart: 1873, Logik, Erster Band, Verlag
der H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung, Tbingen; Wilhelm Wundt: 1880, Logik, Erster
Band: Erkenntnislehre, Vertag von Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart; Benno Erdmann: 1923,
Logik, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin und Leipzig; Theodor Lipps: 1983, Grundzge der
Logik, Verlag von Leopold Voss, Hamburg und Leipzig. See Husserl's discussion on
psychologists in Logische Untersuchungen I, pp. 78-84 and pp. 125-54. Cf. also
Theodor Ziehen: 1920, Lehrbuch der Logik, A. Marcus and E. Webers Verlag, Bonn,
pp. 154-64.
5 See Edmund Husserl: 1970, Philosophie der Arithmetik, in Husserliana, Band XII,
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Boston, London, pp. 1-283, and Gottlob Frege: 1967,
'Rezension von E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Erster Band, Leipzig, 1891', in
Gottlob Frege, Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von I. Angelelli, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, Darmstadt, pp. 179-92.
6 Logische Untersuchungen I, pp. 219-27, and 1913, Logische Untersuchungen II,
Verlag von Max Niemeyer, Halle, pp. 364-70.
7 Bernard Bolzano: 1929, Wissenschaftslehre, Erster Band, hrsg. von W. Schultz,
Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, Section 19.
8 Hermann Lotze: 1874, System der Philosophie, Erster Teil: Drei Bcher der Logik,
Verlag von G. Hirzel, Leipzig, p. 507.
9 Franz Brentano: 1924, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I, hrsg. von O. Kraus,
Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, pp. 124-25. Brentano was Husserl's teacher in
Vienna. See Husserl's biography in E. P. Welch: 1941, The Philosophy of Edmund
Husserl: The Origin and Development of His Phenomenology, Columbia University
Press, New York, pp. xiii-xxiv.
~o Logische Untersuchungen I, p. 178; 1970, Logical Investigations 1, translation by I. N.
Findlay, Humanities Press, New York, p. 185.
1l 1929, Formale und Transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft, Verlag von Max Niemeyer, Halle, p. 234.
12 Formale und Transzendentale Logik, pp. 228-30.
t3 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in 1904, Kant's gesammelte Schriften,
Band III, G. Reimer, Berlin; 1929, Criaque of Pure Reason, translation by N. Kemp
Smith, The Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, B viii-ix.
t4 B 20-22.
15 Formale und Transzendentale Logik, pp. 229-30.
~6 Ibid., p. 158; 1969, Formal and Transcendental Logic, translation by D. Cairns,
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p. 178.
17 George Boole: 1916, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, on which are founded
the mathematical theories of logic and probabilities, in George Boole's CoUected Logical
Works, vol. II, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago and London, p. 12.
18 A 55/B 79-80.
19 A 68/B 93.

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zo Gottlob Frege: 1964, Begriffsschrift und andere Au#tze, hrsg. von I. Angelelli,
Georg Olms, Hildesheim, p. 101, and 1969, Nachgelassene Schriften, hrsg. von H.
Hermes, F. Kambartel, und F. Kaulbach, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, p. 273.
21 'Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift', in Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften,
pp. 9-52.
z2 'ber die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', in Frege, Kleine
Schriften., p. 227.
23 See 'Uber den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', in Frege, Begriffsschrift und andere Aufstze, p. 98, 'ber die Begrittsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', in Frege,
Kleine Schriften, p. 227, and 'Anmerkungen Frege's zu: Philip E. B. Jourdain, The
development of the theories of mathematical logic and the principles of mathematics', in
Frege, Kleine Schriften, p. 341.
24 Frege, Begriffsschrift, 'Vorwort', p. xii.
25 See G. W. Leibniz: 1961, Die philosophischen Schriften von Gott[ried Wilhelm
Leibniz, Siebenter Band, hrsg. von G. I. Gerhardt, Georg Olms, Hildesheim, p. 184 and
p. 192, and G. W. Leibniz: 1961, Opuscules et fragments indits de Leibniz, edited by L.
Couturat, Georg Olms, Hildesheim, pp. 29, 152, 283.
z6 See Adolf Trendelenburg: 1867, Historische Beitrge zur Philosophie, Dritter Band:
Vermischte Abhandlungen, Verlag von G. Bethge, Berlin. Unlike Frege, Husserl does
not think highly of Trendelenburg's exposition, but takes it to be a superficial report on
what Leibniz had planned. See bis Logische Untersuchungen I, p. 221. See also my
article 'Frege and His German Contemporaries on Alethic Modalities', in S. Knuuttila
(ed.): 1988, Modern Modalities: Studies of the History of Modal Theories [rom Medieval
Nominalism to Logical Positivism, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 239-74.
27 See Trendelenburg, Historische Beitrge zur Philosophie, Dritter Band, p. 4, and
Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften, p. 273.
28 For Kant's route [rom judgements to categories, see Stephan Krner: 1982, Kant,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
29 Frege: 1972, 'ber den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', in Frege, Begriffsschrift und
andere Au#tze, p. 101 ; T. W. Bynum (tran. and ed.) Conceptual Notation and Related
Articles, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 94. I have used the translation "my way of
thinking" instead of "my mode of interpretation", which is used by Bynum.
30 Frege stares himself that the distinction between objects and functions is primary and
that this distinction yields the distinction between first-order and second-order functions. See his 1893, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, I. Band,
Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena, p. X.
31 Cf. Kant's procedure described in Krner,. Kant, p. 55.
32 Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I, Sections 31-32.
33 See my Frege' s Doctrine of Being.
s4 Hussed presents his method mainly in his 1928, Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie
und phnomenologischen Philosophie I, Verlag von Max Niemeyer, Halle. (First published in 1913.)
36 See Dagfinn FOIlesdal: 1958, Husserl und Frege, Asehehoug, Oslo. Cf. artieles in H.
L. Dreyfus (ed.) in coll. with H. Hall: 1982, Husserl: Intentionality and Cognitive
Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, and D. W. Smith and R. Mclntyre: 1982, Husserl and
Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, especially
Chapters IV-VII. See also J. N. Mohanty: 1982, Husserl and Frege, Indiana University

Press, Bloomington.

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37 See, e.g., Frege, Begriffsschrift, Section 8, 'ber Sinn und Bedeutung', in Kleine
Schriften, pp. 143-44, and Nachgelassene Schriften, p. 135.
38 See Husserl, ldeen I, Sections 88-94.
39 Frege, 'Der Gedanke', in Kleine Schriften, p. 343.
4o Husserl, Ideen I, Section 45.
41 For Husserl's logical intersts, see Marvin Farber: 1943, The Foundations of

Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, and Farber, The Aims of Phenomenology. Farber
remarks: "The problem of the 'founding of logic' was of central importance to Husserl,
and provided the initial motivation for the development of a universal phenomenological method". (The Aims of Phenomenology, p. 26). Cf. Farber, The Foundations of
Phenomenology, p. 503.
42 Formale und Transzendentale Logik, p. 190.
43 Note that Husserl does not make any distinction between thoughts and judgements as
Frege does.
44 Formale und Transzendentale Logik, p. 184; p. 208 (the English translation).
45 Ibid., p. 188 (the German text), pp. 211-12 (the English translation).
46 A 89/B 122, A 93/B 126, A 106, Prolegomena, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band
IV, G. Reimer, Berlin, 1903, pp. 253-283; translation by P. G. Lucas, Oxford,
Manchester University Press, 1953, Section 20.
47 Formale und Transzendentale Logik, pp. 183-86.
48 Ibid., p. 188; p. 211 (the English translation).
49 Logische Untersuchungen I, p. 75.
50 Ibid., p. 244.
.~i Formale und Transzendentale Logik, p. 160.
52 Logische Untersuchungen I, pp. 244-45.
53 Formale und Transzendentale Logik, p. 185; pp. 208-9 (the English translation).
54 Edmund Husserl: 1964, Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der
Logik, red. und hrsg. von L. Landgrebe, Claassen Verlag, Hamburg, p. 20; 1973,
Experience and Judgement: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, translation by J. S.
Churchill and K. Ameriks, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, p. 26.
55 Formale und Transzendentale Logik, p. 182.
56 Ibid pp. 180-81.
57 Erfahrung und Urteil, p. 1; p. 11 (the English translation).

58 Erfahrung und Urteil, p. 21.

59
60
61
62
63
64
6
66
67
68
69
70

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

pp. 62-64.
p. 68.
p. 70.
p. 70; p. 67 (the English translation).
p. 71; p. 68 (the English translation).
p. 37.
pp. 94-98.
p. 39; p. 42 (the English translation).
pp. 24-25.
pp. 35-36.
pp. 27-31.
pp. 33-35.

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71 Ibid., p. 50.
72 Ibid., pp. 75, 79. For the phenomenology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, see Merrill B.
Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka: 1986, Investigating Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, pp. 60-61.
73 Cf. Jaakko Hintikka: 1975, 'The Intentions of Intentionality', in The Intentions of
Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 192-222
(at pp. 199-200). See also Smith's and Mclntyre's discussion on Husserl's concept of
horizon and possible worlds in their Husserl and Intentionality, Chaps. V-Vf.
7.4 A 51/B 75, A 68/B 93.
7 See Irnmanuel Kant: 1923, Logik, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band IX, Walter
de Gruyter, Berlin und Leipzig, pp. 1-150, at p. 91. See also his Criaque o[Pure Reason,
A 320/B 376-77.
76 Forrnale und Transzendentale Logik, p. 233; p. 264 (the English translation).
77Ibid.
78 Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 36-37.
79 Forrnale und Transzendentale Logik, p. 236; pp. 267-68 (the English translation).
80 Professor Ilkka Niiniluoto called my attention to this.
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