PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, AS THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF OPAL PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS (SPVAMC), INC.

, Petitioner,
vs.
MERCEDES CORPUZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT VALENTINA CORPUZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
On October 4, 1974 respondent Mercedes Corpuz delivered her owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) 32815 to Dagupan City Rural Bank as security against any liability she might incur as its cashier. She later left
her job and went to the United States.
On October 24, 1994 the rural bank where she worked cancelled its lien on Corpuzs title, she having incurred no
liability to her employer. Without Corpuzs knowledge and consent, however, Natividad Alano, the rural banks
manager, turned over Corpuzs title to Julita Camacho and Amparo Callejo.
Conniving with someone from the assessors office, Alano, Camacho, and Callejo prepared a falsified deed of sale,
making it appear that on February 23, 1995 Corpuz sold her land to one "Mary Bondoc" for P50,000.00. They caused
the registration of the deed of sale, resulting in the cancellation of TCT 32815 and the issuance of TCT 63262 in
Bondocs name. About a month later or on March 27, 1995 the trio executed another fictitious deed of sale with "Mary
Bondoc" selling the property to the spouses Rufo and Teresa Palaganas for only P15,000.00. This sale resulted in the
issuance of TCT 63466 in favor of the Palaganases.
Nine days later or on April 5, 1995 the Palaganases executed a deed of sale in favor of spouses Virgilio and Elena
Songcuan for P50,000.00, resulting in the issuance of TCT 63528. Finally, four months later or on August 10, 1995
the Songcuans took out a loan of P1.1 million from petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) and, to secure payment,
they executed a real estate mortgage on their title. Before granting the loan, the PNB had the title verified and the
property inspected.
On November 20, 1995 respondent Corpuz filed, through an attorney-in-fact, a complaint before the Dagupan
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Mary Bondoc, the Palaganases, the Songcuans, and petitioner PNB, asking for
the annulment of the layers of deeds of sale covering the land, the cancellation of TCTs 63262, 63466, and 63528,
and the reinstatement of TCT 32815 in her name.
On June 29, 1998 the RTC rendered a decision granting respondent Corpuzs prayers. This prompted petitioner PNB
to appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). On July 31, 2007 the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the
motion for its reconsideration, prompting PNB to take recourse to this Court.
ISSUE:
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not petitioner PNB is a mortgagee in good faith, entitling it to its
lien on the title to the property in dispute.
RULING:
Petitioner PNB points out that, since it did a credit investigation, inspected the property, and verified the clean status
of the title before giving out the loan to the Songcuans, it should be regarded as a mortgagee in good faith. PNB
claims that the precautions it took constitute sufficient compliance with the due diligence required of banks when
dealing with registered lands.
As a rule, the Court would not expect a mortgagee to conduct an exhaustive investigation of the history of the
mortgagors title before he extends a loan. 1 But petitioner PNB is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a bank. 2 Banks are
expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals in dealing with lands, even registered ones, since the
business of banks is imbued with public interest.3 It is of judicial notice that the standard practice for banks before
approving a loan is to send a staff to the property offered as collateral and verify the genuineness of the title to
determine the real owner or owners.4

One of the CAs findings in this case is that in the course of its verification, petitioner PNB was informed of the
previous TCTs covering the subject property.5 And the PNB has not categorically contested this finding. It is evident
from the faces of those titles that the ownership of the land changed from Corpuz to Bondoc, from Bondoc to the
Palaganases, and from the Palaganases to the Songcuans in less than three months and mortgaged to PNB within
four months of the last transfer.
The above information in turn should have driven the PNB to look at the deeds of sale involved. It would have then
discovered that the property was sold for ridiculously low prices: Corpuz supposedly sold it to Bondoc for
justP50,000.00; Bondoc to the Palaganases for just P15,000.00; and the Palaganases to the Songcuans also for
justP50,000.00. Yet the PNB gave the property an appraised value of P781,760.00. Anyone who deliberately ignores
a significant fact that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person cannot be considered as an innocent
mortgagee for value.6
The Court finds no reason to reverse the CA decision.

CANLAS VS. CA
FACTS:
The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for which he is the registered owner. He
secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of land for the security of
the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in question
after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the
said foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent
and L and R corporation entered into a compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured another year for
the said properties. Included in the stipulations were the attorneys fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private
respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and
secure the attorneys fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and private respondent
executed a document to redeem the parcels of land and to register the same to his name.
Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to his name but without prior notice, the
properties were already registered under the petitioners name. The private respondent calls for a review and for the
court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties consolidated by the
redemption price he paid for said properties. The private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the
Court of appeals which ruled over the same.
ISSUE: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.
RULING:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to
extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00
attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have tempered his demand for his
fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to
"conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that
lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a
matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own
client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for
money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily,
we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his liability for payment of the properties. To
hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must
then set off their obligations against the other.

AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF HINIGARAN, movant-appellee,

vs.
ESTANISLAO YULO YUSAY, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:
July 20, 1952, Rafaela Yulo executed in favor of the movant a mortgage for P33,626.29, due from her, her mother,
sisters, brothers, and others, which amount she assumed to pay to the movant. A motion was presented to the court
by the movant demanding the surrender of the owner's duplicate certificate of title that he may annotate said
mortgage at the back of the certificate. Estanislao Yusay, a part owner of the lot, opposed the petition on the ground
that he is owner of a part of the property in question; that the granting of the motion would operate to his prejudice, as
he has not participated in the mortgage cited in the motion; that Rafaela Yulo is dead; that the motion is not verified
and movant's rights have lapsed by prescription. Finally it is argued that his opposition raises a controversial matter
which the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon. Margarita, Maria, Elena and Pilar, all surnamed Yulo, joined the
oppositor Estanislao Yusay, raising the same objections interposed by Yusay.
The existence of the mortgage is not disputed, and neither is the fact that the mortgagor Rafaela Yulo is part owner of
Lot No. 855 of the Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra. The oppositors do not dispute that she is such a part owner, and
their main objection to the petition is that as part owners of the property, the annotation of the mortgage on the
common title will affect their rights.
ISSUE:
WON as part owners of the property, the annotation of the mortgage on the common title will affect their (Yusay)
rights.
RULING:
The court held that even if the ownership of the deceased Rafaela Yulo over the portion of the lot in question and the
validity of the mortgage are disputed, such invalidity of the mortgage is no proof of the non-existence of the mortgage
nor a ground for objecting to its registration, citing the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. Maxima Tinoco Vda. de
Cruz, et, al., 95 Phil., 818; 53 Off. Gaz., 2804.
In his Brief before this Court, counsel for appellants argue that the mortgage sought to be registered was not
recorded before the closing of the intestate proceedings of the deceased mortgagor, but was so recorded only four
months after the termination of said proceedings, so that the claim of movant has been reduced to the character of a
mere money claim, not a mortgage, hence the mortgage may not be registered. In the first place, as the judge below
correctly ruled, the proceeding to register the mortgage does not purport to determine the supposed invalidity of the
mortgage or its effect. Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract or instrument is sought to be
inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title
covering the land subject of the deed, contract or instrument.
The registration of a lease or mortgage, or the entry of a memorial of a lease or mortgage on the register, is not a
declaration by the state that such an instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in land; it is merely a declaration that
the record of the title appears to be burdened with the lease or mortgage described, according to the priority set forth
in the certificate.
The mere fact that a lease or mortgage was registered does not stop any party to it from setting up that it now has no
force or effect. (Niblack, pp. 134-135, quoted in Francisco Land Registration Act, l950 ed., p. 348.)
The court below, in ordering the registration and annotation of the mortgage, did not pass on its invalidity or effect. As
the mortgage is admittedly an act of the registered owner, all that the judge below did and could do, as a registration
court, is to order its registration and annotation on the certificate of title covering the land mortgaged. By said order
the court did not pass upon the effect or validity of the mortgage these can only be determined in an ordinary case
before the courts, not before a court acting merely as a registration court, which did not have the jurisdiction to pass
upon the alleged effect or validity
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositors-appellants. So ordered.

DE BARRETO vs VILLANUEVA
FACTS: Rosario Cruzado sold all her right, title, and interest and that of her children in the house and lot herein
involved to Villanueva for P19K. The purchaser paid P1,500 in advance, and executed a promissory note for the
balance. However, the buyer could only pay P5,500 On account of the note, for which reason the vendor obtained
judgment for the unpaid balance. In the meantime, the buyer Villanueva was able to secure a clean certificate of title
and mortgaged the property to appellant Barretto to secure a loan of P30K, said mortgage having been duly
recorded.

Villanueva defaulted on the mortgage loan in favor of Barretto. The latter foreclosed the mortgage in her favor,
obtained judgment, and upon its becoming final asked for execution. Cruzado filed a motion for recognition for her
"vendor's lien" invoking Articles 2242, 2243, and 2249 of the new Civil Code. After hearing, the court below ordered
the "lien" annotated on the back of the title, with the proviso that in case of sale under the foreclosure decree the
vendor's lien and the mortgage credit of appellant Barretto should be paid pro rata from the proceeds.
1.
2.

Appellants insist that:

The vendor's lien, under Articles 2242 and 2243 of the new, Civil Code of the Philippines, can only become
effective in the event of insolvency of the vendee, which has not been proved to exist in the instant case; and .
That the Cruzado is not a true vendor of the foreclosed property.
Article 2242 of the new Civil Code enumerates the claims, mortgage and liens that constitute an encumbrance on
specific immovable property, and among them are: .
(2) For the unpaid price of real property sold, upon the immovable sold; and
(5) Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of Property."
Article 2249 of the same Code provides that "if there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific real
property or real rights, they shall be satisfied pro-rata after the payment of the taxes and assessment upon the
immovable property or real rights.
Held: Application of the above-quoted provisions to the case at bar would mean that the herein appellee Rosario
Cruzado as an unpaid vendor of the property in question has the right to share pro-rata with the appellants the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale.
Issue: Appellants argument: inasmuch as the unpaid vendor's lien in this case was not registered, it should not
prejudice the said appellants' registered rights over the property.
Held: There is nothing to this argument. Note must be taken of the fact that article 2242 of the new Civil Code
enumerating the preferred claims, mortgages and liens on immovables, specifically requires that. Unlike the unpaid
price of real property sold. mortgage credits, in order to be given preference, should be recorded in the Registry of
Property. If the legislative intent was to impose the same requirement in the case of the vendor's lien, or the unpaid
price of real property sold, the lawmakers could have easily inserted the same qualification which now modifies the
mortgage credits. The law, however, does not make any distinction between registered and unregistered vendor's
lien, which only goes to show that any lien of that kind enjoys the preferred credit status.
As to the point made that the articles of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits are applicable only
to the insolvent debtor, suffice it to say that nothing in the law shows any such limitation. If we are to interpret this
portion of the Code as intended only for insolvency cases, then other creditor-debtor relationships where there are
concurrence of credits would be left without any rules to govern them, and it would render purposeless the special
laws on insolvency.
Resolution on Motion to Consider (1962)
Appellants, spouses Barretto, have filed a motion vigorously urging that our decision be reconsidered and set aside,
and a new one entered declaring that their right as mortgagees remain superior to the unrecorded claim of herein
appellee for the balance of the purchase price of her rights, title, and interests in the mortgaged property.
We have reached the conclusion that our original decision must be reconsidered and set aside:
Under the system of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes enjoy a similar absolute preference. All the
remaining thirteen classes of preferred creditors under Article 2242 enjoy no priority among themselves, but must be
paid pro-rata i.e., in proportion to the amount of the respective credits. Thus, Article 2249 provides:
If there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific real property or real rights, they, shall be
satisfied pro-rata after the payment of the taxes and assessments upon the immovable property or real rights."

1.
2.
3.

The full application of Articles 2249 and 2242 demands that there must be first some proceedings where the claims of
all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as:
insolvency,
the settlement of decedents estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or
other liquidation proceedings of similar import.
This explains the rule of Article 2243 of the new Civil Code that

The claims or credits enumerated in the two preceding articles" shall be considered as mortgages or pledges of real
or personal property, or liens within the purview of legal provisions governing insolvency.
And the rule is further clarified in the Report of the Code Commission, as follows:
The question as to whether the Civil Code and the insolvency Law can be harmonized is settled by Article 2243. The
preferences named in Articles 2261 and 2262 (now 2241 and 2242) are to be enforced in accordance with the
Insolvency Law."
Rule
Thus, it becomes evident that one preferred creditor's third-party claim to the proceeds of a foreclosure sale (as in the
case now before us) is not the proceeding contemplated by law for the enforcement of preferences under Article
2242, unless the claimant were enforcing a credit for taxes that enjoy absolute priority. If none of the claims is for
taxes, a dispute between two creditors will not enable the Court to ascertain the pro-rata dividend corresponding to
each, because the rights of the other creditors likewise" enjoying preference under Article 2242 can not be
ascertained.
Held: There being no insolvency or liquidation, the claim of the appellee, as unpaid vendor, did not require the
character and rank of a statutory lien co-equal to the mortgagee's recorded encumbrance, and must remain
subordinate to the latter.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS vs LANTIN
FACTS:
Involved in this case is a duplex-apartment house on a lot covered by TCT No. 86195 situated at San Diego Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, and owned by the spouses Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan.
The duplex-apartment house was built for the spouses by private respondent Candido Ramos, a duly licensed
architect and building contractor, at a total cost of P32,927.00. The spouses paid private respondent the sum of
P7,139.00 only. Hence, the latter used his own money, P25,788.50 in all, to finish the construction of the duplexapartment.
Meanwhile, on December 16, 1966, February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, the spouses Tabligan obtained from
petitioner Philippine Savings Bank three (3) loans in the total amount of P35,000.00, the purpose of which was to
complete the construction of the duplex-apartment. To secure payment of the l2oans, the spouses executed in favor
of the petitioner three (3) promissory notes and three (3) deeds of real estate mortgages over the property subject
matter of this litigation.
On December 19, 1966, the petitioner registered the December 16, 1966 deed of real estate mortgage with the
Register of Deeds of Manila. The subsequent mortgages of February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, were
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila on February 2, 1967 and March 1, 1967, respectively. At the time of
the registration of these mortgages, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86195 was free from all liens and encumbrances.
The spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations. As a result thereof, the petitioner bank foreclosed the
mortgages, and at the public auction held on July 23, 1969, was the highest bidder.
On August 5, 1969, the petitioner bank registered the certificate of sale issued in its favor. On August 9, 1970, the
bank consolidated its ownership over the property in question, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Manila in the name of the petitioner bank.
Upon the other hand, the private respondent filed an action against the spouses to collect the unpaid cost of the
construction of the duplex-apartment before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, which case was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 69228. During its pendency, the private respondent succeeded in obtaining the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment, and pursuant thereto, had the property in question attached. Consequently, a notice
of adverse claim was annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86195.
On August 26, 1968, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 69228 in favor of the private respondent and against
the spouses. A writ of execution was accordingly issued but was returned unsatisfied.
As the spouses did not have any properties to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. 69228, the private respondent
addressed a letter to the petitioner for the delivery to him (private respondent) of his pro-rata share in the value of the
duplex-apartment in accordance with Article 2242 of the Civil Code. The petitioner refused to pay the pro-rata value
prompting the private respondent to file the instant action. A decision was rendered in favor of the private
Respondent.

ISSUE: whether or not the private respondent is entitled to claim a pro-rata share in the value of the property in
question.
RULING:
NO. The conclusions of the lower court are not supported by the law and the facts.
Concurrence of credits occurs when the same specific property of the debtor or all of his property is subjected to the
claims of several creditors. The concurrence of credits raises no questions of consequence were the value of the
property or the value of all assets of the debtor is sufficient to pay in fall all the creditors. However, it becomes
material when said assets are insufficient for then some creditors of necessity will not be paid or some creditors will
not obtain the full satisfaction of their claims. In this situation, the question of preference will then arise, that is to say
who of the creditors will be paid the all of the others
The proceedings in the court below do not partake of the nature of the insolvency proceedings or settlement of a
decedents estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex
apartment. It is far from being a general liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan spouses.
Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedents estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against
the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are
equally bound. Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or "other equivalent general liquidation must also
necessarily be a proceeding in rem so that all interested persons whether known to the parties or not may be bound
by such proceeding.
In the case at bar, although the lower court found that "there were no known creditors other than the plaintiff and the
defendant herein", this can not be conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present
their claims against the petitioner bank, claiming that they also have preferred liens against the property involved.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued in favor of the bank which is supposed to be
indefeasible would remain constantly unstable and questionable. Such could not have been the intention of Article
2243 of the Civil Code although it considers claims and credits under Article 2242 as statutory liens. Neither does the
De Barretto case sanction such instability.

J.L. BERNARDO VS CA
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, the municipal government of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija approved the construction of the San
Antonio Public Market. The construction of the market was to be funded by the Economic Support Fund Secretariat
(ESFS), a government agency working with the USAID. Under ESFS "grant-loan-equity" financing program, the
funding for the market would be composed of a (a) grant from ESFS, (b) loan extended by ESFS to the Municipality
of San Antonio, and (c) equity or counterpart funds from the Municipality.
It is claimed by petitioners Santiago R. Sugay, Edwin A. Sugay, Fernando S.A. Erana and J.L. Bernardo Construction,
a single proprietorship owned by Juanito L. Bernardo, that they entered into a business venture for the purpose of
participating in the bidding for the public market. It was agreed by petitioners that Santiago Sugay would take the lead
role and be responsible for the preparation and submission of the bid documents, financing the entire project,
providing and utilizing his own equipment, providing the necessary labor, supplies and materials and making the
necessary representations and doing the liaison work with the concerned government agencies.
On April 20, 1990, J.L. Bernardo Construction, thru petitioner Santiago Sugay, submitted its bid together with other
qualified bidders. After evaluating the bids, the municipal pre-qualification bids and awards committee, headed by
respondent Jose L. Salonga (then incumbent municipal mayor of San Antonio) as Chairman, awarded the contract to
petitioners. On June 8, 1990, a Construction Agreement was entered into by the Municipality of San Antonio thru
respondent Salonga and petitioner J.L. Bernardo Construction.
It is claimed by petitioners that under this Construction Agreement, the Municipality agreed to assume the expenses
for the demolition, clearing and site filling of the construction site in the amount of P1,150,000 and, in addition, to
provide cash equity of P767,305.99 to be remitted directly to petitioners.
Petitioners allege that, although the whole amount of the cash equity became due, the Municipality refused to pay the
same, despite repeated demands and notwithstanding that the public market was more than ninety-eight percent
(98%) complete as of July 20, 1991. Furthermore, petitioners maintain that Salonga induced them to advance the
expenses for the demolition, clearing and site filling work by making representations that the Municipality had the

financial capability to reimburse them later on. However, petitioners claim that they have not been reimbursed for their
expenses.[1]
On July 31, 1991, J.L. Bernardo Construction, Santiago Sugay, Edwin Sugay and Fernando Erana, with the latter
three bringing the case in their own personal capacities and also in representation of J.L. Bernardo Construction, filed
a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance, and collection of a sum of money, with prayer for preliminary
attachment and enforcement of contractors lien against the Municipality of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija and Salonga, in
his personal and official capacity as municipal mayor. After defendants filed their answer, the Regional Trial Court
held hearings on the ancillary remedies prayed for by plaintiffs.[2]
On September 5, 1991, the Regional Trial Court issued the writ of preliminary attachment prayed for by plaintiffs. It
also granted J.L. Bernardo Construction the right to maintain possession of the public market and to operate the
same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of writ of attachment and the contractors lien proper?
HELD:
There is no contractors lien in favor of petitioners.
Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code enumerates certain credits which enjoy preference with respect to specific
personal or real property of the debtor. Specifically, the contractors lien claimed by petitioners is granted under the
third paragraph of Article 2242 which provides that the claims of contractors engaged in the construction,
reconstruction or repair of buildings or other works shall be preferred with respect to the specific building or other
immovable property constructed.
However, Article 2242 only finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e. when the same specific
property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and the value of such property of the debtor is
insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question of preference will arise, that is, there will be
a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. Fundamental tenets of due process will
dictate that this statutory lien should then only be enforced in the context of some kind of a proceeding where the
claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency proceedings.
This is made explicit by Article 2243 which states that the claims and liens enumerated in articles 2241 and 2242
shall be considered as mortgages or pledges of real or personal property, or liens within the purview of legal
provisions governing insolvency.
The action filed by petitioners in the trial court does not partake of the nature of an insolvency proceeding. It is
basically for specific performance and damages. Thus, even if it is finally adjudicated that petitioners herein actually
stand in the position of unpaid contractors and are entitled to invoke the contractors lien granted under Article 2242,
such lien cannot be enforced in the present action for there is no way of determining whether or not there exist other
preferred creditors with claims over the San Antonio Public Market. The records do not contain any allegation that
petitioners are the only creditors with respect to such property. The fact that no third party claims have been filed in
the trial court will not bar other creditors from subsequently bringing actions and claiming that they also have
preferred liens against the property involved.