Civil Procedure Case Digests '08-'09

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)
Jurisdiction
VILLENA vs. PAYOYO (April 27, 2007)
FACTS: Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena,
entered into a contract for the delivery and installation of kitchen
cabinets in Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered
within 90 days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. A
downpayment was paid. Another contract was entered into for the
delivery of home appliances and Villena also paid the downpayment.
Villena faled to install the kitchen cabinets and deliver the appliances.
Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against Villena. Petitioner posits that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum
of money in the amount of P184,821.50 which is below the
jurisdictional amount set for RTCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES, RTC has jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdiction
of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But,
where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose
subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by
the RTCs.
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.
The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a
sum of money with damages, is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation; thus, one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The
allegations therein show that it is actually for breach of
contract. A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for
specific performance or rescission of contracts.
An action for
rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific
performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The averments in the complaint
show that Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund
of the downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the
obligation to deliver the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets
subject of the contracts. While the respondent prayed for the refund,
this is just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or
cancellation of the contracts.
Petition DENIED.
(Jazzie Sarona )
LARANO vs. SPS. CALENDACION (June 19, 2007)
FACTS:
Larano owns a parcel of riceland.
Petitioner and
respondents executed a Contract to Sell. Downpayment of P 500,000
of the P 5M purchase price was made.
Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of the
riceland was transferred to respondents under the condition that they
shall account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland to
petitioner. Respondents, however, failed to pay the installments and
to account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland.
Petitioner sent respondents a demand letter to vacate but such
demand went unheeded. Petitioner filed a complaint against the
respondents for unlawful detainer before the MTC, praying that
respondents be directed to vacate the riceland and to pay
P400,000.00 per year from September 1998 until they vacate, as
reasonable compensation for the use of the property, P120,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses. Respondents
alleged that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint failed to allege that a demand to pay and to vacate the
riceland was made upon them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.
RULING: NO, it is not for unlawful detainer. Jurisdiction in
ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the
complaint.
The test for determining the sufficiency of those
allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to
possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause
of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in
possession.
Petitioner, as vendor, must comply with two requisites for the

purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay
the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to
Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and
vacate within the periods specified in Section 2 of Rule 70, namely: 15
days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings.
Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation
of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically
render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the
giving of such demand must be alleged in the complaint;
otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
What is clear is that in the Complaint, petitioner alleged that
respondents had violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However,
the Complaint failed to state that petitioner made demands upon
respondents to comply with the conditions of the contract the
payment of the installments and the accounting and delivery of the
harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day period granted
respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period mandated
by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not
have jurisdiction to hear the case.
Petition DENIED.
(Jazzie Sarona )
BAUTISTA vs. MAG-ISA VDA. DE VILLENA (Sept. 13, 2004)
FACTS: A parcel of land was originally owned by Caluag. The original
tenant-tiller of this land was Aquilino Villena, husband of respondent.
The tenancy relationship dated back to 1946 and continued even after
the demise of Aquilino through his surviving spouse, Susana. Upon
the instruction of Caluag, the house of Susana was transferred to the
subject lot, because Caluag had given Susana a portion thereof with
an area of 1000 square meters as home lot and seedbed. Since then,
Susana had been in peaceful possession thereof until 1987 when a
case for ejectment was filed against her by petitioners.
Petitioners argue that no tenancy relationship exists with respect
to the subject lot, since the property is a residential and not an
agricultural land. They further contend that even on the assumption
that a tenancy relationship existed, the CA erred in considering the
area as respondents home lot. According to them, a home lot should
be constituted on the farm that the lessee is tilling, not on the
residential lot of the landowner. For these reasons, they claim that
jurisdiction lies with the regular courts, not with the DARAB.
ISSUE: Whether or not this case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
HELD: YES, it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB.
For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
DARAB.
The instant case involves the tenancy rights of respondent
against petitioners. Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute
cognizable by the DARAB. Respondent was a tenant of petitioners
predecessors.
Respondents rights as an agricultural lessee are therefore
enforceable against Maria Lopez and Lorenzo Caluags transferees,
herein petitioners.
There is no legal basis for petitioners restrictive interpretation of
the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Its jurisdiction encompasses all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of all agrarian laws.
A home lot is incident to a tenants rights. The right to retain
or remove it is therefore an agrarian dispute that should be
resolved by the DARAB. Having situated the home lot on the
subject lot since 1957, respondent can be ejected therefrom only for
cause or upon proof that the tenancy relationship has already been
severed. Petitioners should prove before the DARAB their grounds for
ejectment.
Petition DENIED.
(Jazzie Sarona )
OMICTIN, vs.COURT OF APPEALS (January 22, 2007)

FACTS:Private respondent George I. Lagos was charged with the
crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He filed a motion to suspend
proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a
pending petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
involving the same parties. The trial court denied respondent's motion
to suspend proceedings. The CA granted the motion to suspend
proceedings. The SEC case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC implementing the Securities
and Regulation Code (Republic Act No. 8799) enacted on July 19,
2000, vesting in the RTCs jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes.
ISSUE:Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the

suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the
intra-corporate controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.
RULING:Yes. A prejudicial question is defined as that which
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. Here, the case which was
lodged originally before the SEC and which is now pending before the
RTC by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is
based. Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intracorporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of private
respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner
before the RTC of Makati.
ISSUE:Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
RULING: Yes.Likewise, by analogy, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues raised by
petitioner particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis--vis Saag (S)
Pte. Ltd., as well as the question regarding the supposed authority of
the latter to make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper
subjects for the determination of the tribunal hearing the intracorporate case which in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong,. These
issues would have been referred to the expertise of the SEC in
accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not
been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong. Strictly speaking, the
objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the
court. The court cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where
the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and
services in determining technical and intricate matters of
fact. While the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative
tribunal, the Court believes that the circumstances in the instant case
do not proscribe the application of the doctrine, as the role of an
administrative tribunal such as the SEC in determining technical and
intricate matters of special competence has been taken on by
specially designated RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799. Hence,
the RTC where the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary
jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention relating to the
status of the domestic corporation, Saag Phils., Inc., vis--vis Saag
Pte. Ltd.; and the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the
domestic corporation, the determination of which will have a direct
bearing on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in place of
the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal competence to
decide intra-corporate disputes.
(Norliza Mamukid )
RIVERA vs. DEL ROSARIO

HELD: Respondents paid docket fees as assessed by clerk of court
but was later found incorrect. They should only pay the deficiency
and jurisdiction is not automatically lost.
(Kahlil Elbanbuena )
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK VS. HON. JUDGE REYNALDO ROS
August 07, 2007
FACTS:Private respondent Rosemoor Mining and Development
Corporation filed an action for damages, accounting, release of the
balance of the loan and machinery and annulment of foreclosure sale
against
petitioner
before
the
RTC
of
Manila.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the private respondent's
complaint on the ground of improper venue. Consequently, the
private respondent amended its Complaint, this time praying for
Accounting, Release of the Balance of the Loan and Damages.
The RTC of Manila issued an Omnibus Resolution denying the same
for lack of merit.
Private respondent filed a Second Amended Complaint, dropping
Lourdes Pascual as plaintiff and impleaded the officers of the
petitioners as defendants. Private respondent filed another action for
Injunction with Damages before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
The filing of the above mentioned case prompted the petitioner to file
a second Motion to Dismiss before the RTC of Manila on the ground
of forum shopping. The Manila RTC denied the second Motion to
Dismiss for lack or merit.
A third Motion to Dismiss Civil Case was filed by the petitioner with the
Manila RTC this time raising the issue of jurisdiction. The Manila RTC
denied petitioner's third Motion to Dismiss Civil Case on the ground
that petitioner was already estopped to raise the issue. Court of
Appeals affirmed the Manila RTC Orders.
ISSUE:Whether or not an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory
order
RULING:No appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, may
be taken from an interlocutory order. In case of denial of an
interlocutory order, the immediate remedy available to the aggrieved
party is to file an appropriate Special Civil Action for Certiorari under
Rule
65
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the
commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or
matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. A "final"
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented on the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains
to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which
among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course,
to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to
use the established and more distinctive term, "final and executory."
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and
does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
"interlocutory" e.g., an order denying motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Rules, or granting of motion on extension of time to file a
pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which
is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may
not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
Since an Order denying a Motion to Dismiss does not finally
dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed
until the final adjudication thereof by the court, then such
order
is
merely
interlocutory
in
nature.
We find occasion here to state the rule, once more, that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and
therefore not appealable, nor can it be subject of a petition for
review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The
ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go
to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
from the final judgment.
As a general rule, an interlocutory order is not appealable until after
the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would
delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts.
However, we have ruled that certiorari is an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse jurisdiction and
(2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and
the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is in estoppel to question the
jurisdiction of the Court.
RULING:Yes."Unlike Manchester, however, were the jurisdictional
issue arising from insufficiency of the docket fee paid was seasonably
raised in the answer of the defendant in the trial court, in this case,
the issue is being raised for the first time. Petitioner submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court without question. It filed a counterclaim
seeking affirmative reliefs, and actively took part in the trial. A party
who voluntarily participates in the trial cannot later on raise
the issue of the Court's lack of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the said [petitioner] filed their counter-claim
seeking affirmative relief and then filed a motion to dismiss without
raising the issue of non-payment of docket fees. And when plaintiff's
witness Dra. Lourdes S. Pascual was presented on direct examination
the said [petitioner] did not object and participated in the proceedings.
It is only when the said witness was to be cross examined that the
issue of non-payment of docket fees was raised. Clearly, the said

[petitioner] [is] in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the Court.
petitioners motion for extension. There is no abuse, much less grave

abuse, of discretion, to speak of.
(Norliza Mamukid )
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a Motion to Dismiss at the

earliest opportune time to raise the issue of the court's lack of
jurisdiction, more so, that this issue is susceptible to laches.
Petitioner's failure to seasonably raise the question of
jurisdiction leads us to the inevitable conclusion that it is
now barred by laches to assail the Manila RTC's jurisdiction
over the case.
(Norliza Mamukid )
PILIPINO TELEPHONE V. DELFINO TECSON
RIVERA vs. RIVERA

HELD: Unlawful detainer case is still under the jurisdiction of the
MeTC even if there was an assertion of ownership. Lower courts
adjudication of ownership is only provisional.
SEA POWER vs. CA
HELD: From NLRC to SC not valid. Petition should be Rule 45 to CA.
Rule 65 to SC only if there is grave abuse of discretion
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ASCOT HOLDINGS
October 19, 2007
FACTS: After the Philippine Airlines (PAL) was privatized, Land Bank
purchased from the National Government PAL shares. Minority
stockholders in PR Holdings filed a case with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), seeking the distribution of PR Holdings
shares of stock in PAL to its stockholders in proportion to their equity.
Land Bank, along with PNB, DBP, AFP-RSBS and GSIS, have the socalled put-option to sell their PAL shares of stock to respondents and
the latter are obligated to buy the same at Five Pesos (P5.00) per
share on the sixth year after the effectivity of the Stockholders
Agreement. Instead of honoring the Stockholders' Agreement,
respondents filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint against Land
Bank, PNB, DBP, GSIS, AFP-RSBS and the Republic of the Philippines,
praying that they be released from the obligation to buy the PAL
shares of petitioner and other defendants therein at P5.00 per share,
as earlier agreed upon under the Stockholders' Agreement, on ground
of alleged radical change in the conditions prevailing at the time the
said agreement was entered and the present. .
Trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. Trial court denied Land
Bank's motion for reconsideration. Therefrom, Land Bank decided to
go to the CA on a petition for review. For the purpose, it filed with the
CA, a motion for extension of time to file the intended petition for
review. The motion was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:Whether or not the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before the trial court toll the reglementary period to appeal the
judgment
RULING:No. It is beyond quibbling that the assailed Judgment in
Civil Case was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its special
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies under R.A. No. 8799.
Civil Case was, therefore, governed by the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing IntraCorporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799, as well as A.M. No. 049-07-SC of this Court prescribing the mode of appeal from decisions
of the RTC in intra-corporate controversies.
Under Section 8(3), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799, motion
for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for reopening of trial are prohibited pleadings in said cases. Hence, the
filing by petitioner of a motion for reconsideration before the

trial court did not toll the reglementary period to appeal the
judgment via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. As a consequence, the CA
has no more jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review which
Land Bank intended to file before it, much less to grant the motion for
extension of time for the filing thereof.
The prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner with the trial court did not suspend the period to
appeal the RTCs Judgment . Consequently, that
Judgment became final and executory 15-days thereafter.
When petitioner filed a motion for extension to file a petition for
review in the CA one hundred twenty four (124) days after it received
the RTC Judgment, there was no more period to extend. Given
these undeniable facts, the CA cannot be faulted for denying
HELD: A contract of adhesion per se is not inefficacious. Respondent

also secured six contracts, and therefore cannot be said to have no
opportunity to read and go over the terms and conditions of the
contracts.
Rule 4 Venue of Actions
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION vs.ALBERT LIM
October 5, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint
against respondent for a sum of money. The trial court issued an
Order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioner's
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
RULING: No. In personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an
action either in the place of his or her residence or the place where the
defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue
which could be in a place where neither of them resides. Corollarily,
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
instances when the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a claim, thus:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and

objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded
in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a
court may not dismiss an action m otu proprio on the ground
of improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the
court may dismiss an action m otu proprio on the basis of the
pleadings.
(Norliza Mamukid )
Rule 5 Summary Procedure
LUCAS vs. FABROS January 31, 2000
FACTS: Gloria Lucas charged respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros with
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion.
Complainant alleged that Judge Fabros issued an Order in an
ejectment case granting the plaintiff's MFR of the Order which
dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at
the Preliminary Conference.
Complainant averred that it is elementary, under the Rules of
Summary Procedure that an motion MFR is prohibited, but respondent
judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion. She added that,
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in
open court that the case is governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure; the judge ordered the revival of the case.
Further, complainant alleged that the actuations of the respondent is
in blatant disregard of the established rules on procedure, and it is an
instance where the doctrine of IPSA LOQUITOR may once again may
be applied by the Court to discipline judges.
Respondent Judge Fabros maintained that she could not be guilty of
gross ignorance of the law as she knows that a motion for
reconsideration of judgment is a prohibited motion in an ejectment
case. She explained that although there is already a judgment
dismissing the case, she granted the plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration in the interest of justice since the reasons stated in the
motion for reconsideration are meritorious.
ISSUE: WON Judge Fabros erred in granting the MFR
RULING: No. As a rule an MFR is a prohibited pleading under Section
19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however,
applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one
rendered on the merits.
As held by the Court in an earlier case: "The motion prohibited by this
Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered
by the court after trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of
dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to
appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment

on the merits after trial of the case.
Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the
prohibited pleading contemplated under the present Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave
abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving
due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present
complaint.
(Lendl Floyd Montes )
Rule 7 Parts of a Pleading
PONCIANO vs. PARENTELA May 9, 2000
FACTS: Respondents Ildefonso and Leonora Clamosa filed a
complaint for a sum of money against petitioners Claro and Gloria
Ponciano for unpaid cost of labor and materials incurred by them in
repairing petitioner's house. Petitioners filed their answer with
compulsory counterclaim, claiming that they have paid the total
contract price agreed upon; that despite this, the work of
respondents was defective; and that respondents abandoned the
renovation before it was completed.
The trial court ordered that petitioners counterclaim be stricken off
for failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which
requires an affidavit of non-forum shopping for all initiatory pleadings
in all courts. Petitioners filed an MFR which the trial court denied.
ISSUE: WON an answer which asserts a compulsory counterclaim
must include a certificate of non-forum shopping, and if so, whether
or not the dismissal of such compulsory counterclaim by the trial
court due to the absence of such certification has the effect of a
dismissal with prejudice so as to bar the party from re-filing such
compulsory counterclaim.
RULING: No. This very same issue was confronted in the case of
Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 8 wherein we held that the
above-quoted provisions of administrative Circular No. 04-94 do not
apply to compulsory counterclaims. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Vitug explained that:
It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, is to curb the
malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. The
language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended
to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party
asserting a claim for relief.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the counterclaims pleaded
by petitioners in their answers are compulsory in nature. The filing of
a separate action by petitioners would only result in the presentation
of the same evidence as in Civil Case No. TM-601. Proceeding from
our ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital, petitioners need not file
a certification of non-forum shopping since their claims are not
initiatory in character, and therefore, are not covered by the
provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Rule 9 Effect of Failure to Plead
Philippine Banking Corporation v. CA
HELD: As a rule, proceedings already taken should not be disturbed.
Where a witness of the plaintiff was presented while the
defendant was declared in default, and the order of default was
subsequently lifted, it is within the trial courts decision to reopen the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff and allow the defendant to
challenge the same, by cross-examining the plaintiffs witnesses or
introducing countervailing evidence.
RULE 10 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES, INC.,
January 13, 2004
FACTS: The Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money against herein respondents on the basis of Letters of
Guarantee it issued in favor of the PNB as security for various credit
accommodations extended by PNB to respondents.
During the hearing, petitioner presented as its witness its treasury
department manager who testified that the amount of P19M was paid
by it to the PNB to cover the principal loan and interests, as
guaranteed by petitioner. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to

Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule
10 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to amend its Complaint.
Acting on the motion to amend, the trial court dismissed the case
without prejudice on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action. On petition for review on certiorari, the CA likewise
dismissed the petition on the ground that the real purpose of petitioner
in asking the trial court for leave to amend its complaint was not
ostensibly to make the complaint conform to the evidence presented,
as petitioner alleges, but to introduce a cause of action then nonexisting when the complaint was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court and the CA erred in dismissing
the case instead of granting Petitioners Motion to Amend.
HELD: Yes.
It should be stressed that amendment was sought after petitioner had
already presented evidence, more specifically, the testimony of
petitioners Treasury Department Manager. It is settled that even if the
complaint be defective, but the parties go to trial thereon, and the
plaintiff, without objection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute
the particular cause of action which it intended to allege in the original
complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet
the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined as fully and as
effectively as if it had been previously joined by the most perfect
pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Evidently, herein respondents failure to object to the evidence at the
time it is presented in court is fatal to their cause inasmuch as
whatever perceived defect the complaint had was cured by the
introduction of petitioners evidence proving actual loss sustained by
petitioner due to payment made by it to PNB.
Thus, the contention of respondents that the amendment would
introduce a subsequently acquired cause of action as there was none
at the time the original complaint was filed, is untenable.
( Sahara Alia Silongan )
Rule 13- Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other
Papers
ALFONSO vs. ANDRES October 4, 2002
FACTS: The original case involved a complaint for accion publiciana. It
was decided against herein petitioners in favor of the spouses Andres,
now the respondents. On July 15, 1997, a copy of the decision was
served upon petitioners. On July 17, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of
Appeal, without the assistance of counsel and without payment of the
docket and other lawful fees. On July 21, 1997, the RTC granted the
notice of appeal.
On August 25, 1997, respondents herein, through counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss petitioners appeal, citing Section 1(c), Rule 50 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 9, 1997, the trial court
dismissed the motion and directed petitioners to pay the proper fees to
cure the technical defect. On the same date, petitioners paid the
subject fees.
Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Upon a review
of the records, which included the proofs of payment of the docket
and appeal fees, the appellate court nevertheless resolved to dismiss
the appeal.
ISSUE: WON the payment of docket and other lawful fees within the
period for perfecting an appeal is mandatory and WON petitioners
have shown sufficient reason for the relaxation of what otherwise
should be a stringent application of the rule
RULING: At the outset, it should be stressed that failure to pay the
appellate docket and lawful fees is a serious matter affecting the
courts jurisdiction. Time and again, we have consistently held that
"the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory
for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory."
Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege; thus, appeal must be
made strictly in accordance with provisions set by law. The payment of
appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but
an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.
However, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such requirement,

this Court has also held that "the strict application of the jurisdictional
nature of the above rule on payment of appellate docket fees may be
mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest
of justice." Hence, we resolve the second issue. Has petitioners
presented any sufficient or satisfactory reason for the relaxation of
the rules?
We note that at the time petitioners filed said notice of appeal on July
17, 1997, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure had then very recently
taken effect on July 1, 1997. Indeed, as averred by petitioners in the
present case, at the time of the filing of the notice of appeal, the
changes introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure were yet
novel, and even judges and lawyers needed time to familiarize
themselves with the rules intricacies. The trial court acknowledged
this fact when it resolved to grant the appeal, and favorably
considered a liberal application of the rules in the meantime.
Also material is the fact that petitioners were not assisted by counsel
when they filed their notice of appeal. Indeed, it appears that on
August 20, 1997, petitioners former counsel made formal the
withdrawal of appearance from this case. We also note that
petitioners were not informed by the trial court that the docket fees
were already due at that time. This failure of the trial court might
have stemmed from the recency of the rules. Hence, fairness bids us
not to take this circumstance against petitioners.
(Lendl
Floyd Montes )
Rule 14 - Sumons
GOMEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO AND
MARIANO TROCINO GR NO. 127692, 18 March 2004
FACTS: Sometime in 1975, spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino
mortgaged 2 parcels of land to Dr. Yujuico in Cebu City.
The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed.
Respondent-spouses Trocino sold the lands to petitionerspouses, who in turn redeemed the lands from the mortgagee.
However, the spouses Trocino refused to deliver the titles to
petitioner-spouses. Thus, spouses Gomez sued spouses Trocino for
delivery of the titles.
The husband Trocino died before the suit was filed, thus his
children, including Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino, were
impleaded in the suit.
Summons was served, and it was only received by Caridad
Trocino in behalf of the children.
The trial court rendered judgment against the spouses Trocino
and their heirs.
Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the annulment of the
judgment of the RTC with the CA, alleging that no jurisdiction was
acquired over them.
At that time, Adolfo Trocino was a resident of Ohio, USA while
Mariano Trocino was a resident of Talibon, Bohol, and both were not
found in Cebu City at the time summons was served.
ISSUES:
1. What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner of
the service of summons should be based?
2. Was there a valid service of summons?
3. If personal service were impossible to comply, what should have
been done?
RULINGS:
1. The action was an action in personam. While it is a real action
because it affects title to or possession of land, it does not
automatically follow that the action is one in rem.
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages.
A real action is one affecting title to real property or for the recovery
of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of
his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the
thing itself, instead of against the person.
The present case is an action in personam, because it is an action
against persons, on the basis of their personal liability of non-delivery
of titles. Thus, personal service of summons upon the private
respondents is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.
2. There was none.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by

handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him. In substituted service, it is mandated
that the fact of impossibility of personal service should be explained in
the proof of service.
Where the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court,
personal service of summons within the State is essential to acquire
jurisdiction over his person. An exception was accorded in Gemperle
v. Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-residents
wife, who was a resident of the Philippines, was held valid, as the
latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case
filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot
of the first case.
In an action in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
provided the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although
summons must be served upon the defendant for purposes of due
process.
Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident and not found in the
Philippines, and:
1. the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
2. the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in
the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest;
3. the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in
the property located in the Philippines; or
4. the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines,
summons may be served extrajudicially by:
a. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
b. publication, also with leave of court; or
c. any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
The manner of service of summons must be distinguished between
Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino. Since Adolfo Trocino is a resident
of a foreign country, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person and validly try and decide the case against him; the action
being in personam.
Mariano Trocino is a resident of Bohol and not of Cebu City. Thus,
summons must be served on him personally, or through substituted
service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such
impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed,
should be explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and
circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in
the proof of service or Officers Return. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
3. Inasmuch as the sheriffs return failed to state the facts and
circumstances showing the impossibility of personal service of
summons upon spouses Trocino within a reasonable time, spouses
Gomez should have sought the issuance of an alias summons. Under
Section 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, alias summons may be issued
when the original summons is returned without being served on any or
all of the defendants. Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they
should now bear the consequences of their lack of diligence.
MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, vs.
JACKSON TAN G.R. No. 131724. February 28, 2000
FACTS: Millenium Corporation executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of respondent Jackson Tan to secure payment of
petitioner's indebtedness to respondent. Subsequently, respondent
filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage. Summons and a copy of
the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd
Cinches, described in the sheriff's return as "a Draftsman, a person of
sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the highest
ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation, to
receive processes of the Court."
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
there was no valid service of summons upon it, as a result of which
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked
Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that service on
Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is
not one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be served
and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.
Petitioner also sought the dismissal of the complaint against it on the
ground that it had satisfied its obligation to respondent when the latter
opted to be paid in shares of stock under the following stipulation in

the mortgage contract (affirmative defense of payment).
ISSUES: I..WON service of summons upon a mere draftsman who is
not one of those upon whom summons may be served in case of a
defendant corporation as mentioned in the rules is valid. II. WON the
inclusion of another affirmative relief in a motion to dismiss abandons
and waives the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant therein also pleaded under prevailing law and
jurisprudence.
HELD: Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is
notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby, the
court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the
defendant is corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of
summons be made upon the corporations president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive
and that service of summons upon one who is not enumerated
therein is invalid. This is the general rule. However, it is settled that
substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other than
those mentioned in the above rule may be justified.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated
the requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons
by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the
summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person
served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must
be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the
person on whom the summons was actually served. The third
requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the
purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites
were fulfilled. With respect to the third, the appellate court held that
petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof
that it received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is,
however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually
turned over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In
contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there
was direct evidence, such as the admission of the corporation's
officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is
allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the
corporation through the person on whom summons was served. We
hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance,
actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service
of summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some
person or means other than the person actually served, the service of
summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the
present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the
person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an
employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is
nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman
employed by the corporation. M
Second. We now turn to the issue of jurisdiction by estoppel. Both the
trial court and the CA held that by raising the affirmative defense of
payment and by praying for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss,
petitioner in effect waived its objection to the trial court's jurisdiction
over it. We think this is error.
Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals settled
this question. The rule prior to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a
motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for dismissing the action other
than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This rule no longer holds true.
Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be
unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La Naval: Jurisdiction over
the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary
appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion,
however, of affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an
estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
(Karla Deles )
Rule 15 - Motions
NORRIS v. Judge PARENTELA, JR.
GR NO. 143216, 27 February 2003
FACTS: On April 4, 1977, private respondents purchased a lot from
the government. However, through fraud, spouses Kalugdan had the
title over the lot cancelled, and a new title was issued in their name.
They then sold the lot to petitioner Norris.
On August 27, 1997, private respondents sued for the
annulment/cancellation of titles and damages with the RTC against
Norris. Summons was served upon Norris through substituted service.
Norris failed to answer, and RTC declared her in default and decided
the case against her.
On April 30, 1999, Norris, assisted by a neophyte lawyer, filed a
petition for relief from judgment. However, this petition was not
certified against forum shopping. RTC dismissed the petition.
Norris moved for reconsideration. However, this motion was only
addressed to the clerk of court and not to all parties. The motion was
denied by RTC.
On November 8, 1999, Norris filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA under Rule 65. However, petitioner did not attach a certified
true copy of the orders appealed from, nor did it show the material
dates of the receipt of the said orders. Thus, CA dismissed the petition
and the subsequent motion to reconsider.
ISSUES:
1. Was the petition for relief from judgment proper?
2. Was the motion to reconsider the RTC decision proper?
3. Was the petition for certiorari proper?
4. What is the effect of these failures to comply with the procedural
requirements?
RULINGS:
1. No. SC Circular 04-94 requires that complaints and other initiatory
pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals must be accompanied by a certification against
forum shopping. Norris petition is one of the said pleadings because it
is a new petition where a party seeks relief based on grounds different
from those in the original case, namely, fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence.
2. No. Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that
notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned. Notice
addressed to the clerk of court and not to the parties does not suffice
as notice to all. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing to
the adverse party is nothing but a mere scrap of paper and the clerk of
court does not have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the
attention of the presiding judge.
3. No. The certified true copy of the orders subject of the appeal
must be attached to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The
failure to show the material dates when Norris received the copy of the
said orders prevented the Court of Appeals from determining whether
the petition was filed on time or not.
4. The failure to comply with these requirements was fatal the case of
Norris. While in certain instances, the Court allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, it never intended to forge a weapon for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
ALVAREZ v. Judge DIAZ
AM No. MTJ-00-1283, 3 March 2004
FACTS: Spouses Garcia sued petitioner Alvarez for forcible entry
before the MTC of Quezon City.
MTC Judge Diaz decided against Alvarez and ordered him and his
co-defendants to vacate the premises and pay damages to spouses
Garcia.
Plaintiff spouses then moved to execute the decision of the MTC
because there was no perfected appeal nor payment of the
supersedeas bond to stay the decision.
The motion was worded as follows:
The Clerk of Court
MTC Branch 37
Quezon City
Kindly include this motion in your calendar for February 3, 1998at
8:30 in the morning during which the matter and parties may be
heard.
Sgd. C.A.L.
Atty. Leao, counsel for plaintiff spouses, personally delivered

the motion for execution to the counsel of Alvarez. The court granted
the motion.
ISSUE: Should the judge have acted upon the motion for execution?
RULING: No. Even if there was no perfected appeal nor payment of
the supersedeas bond, respondent Judge should not have granted
plaintiffs Motion for Execution because it was fatally defective.
Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that the notice of
hearing, to be stated in the motion, shall be addressed to all parties
concerned and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which
must not be later than 10 days after the filing of the motion.
It is well-settled that any motion with a notice of hearing that is not
addressed to all parties is a mere scrap of paper which should not be
accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance.
If personal service of the motion was made upon Alvarez counsel,
then proof of service thereof consisting of any of the following should
have been presented to the court, together with the Motion for
Execution:
Section 13. Proof of service. xxx [1] a written admission of the
party served, [2] the official return of the server, or [3] the affidavit
of the party serving containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service xxx.
None of the above was presented. Thus, in accordance with Section
6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which mandates that no written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof
of service thereof, the motion for execution should not have been
acted upon by Judge Diaz.
(Kahlil
Elbanbuena )
BACELONIA, et al v. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
BOLOS, et al GR NO. 143440, 11 February 2003
FACTS: Petitioners filed a motion to be dropped as defendants from
the civil case involving quasi-delicts, as their other co-defendants
have admitted responsibility to the accident.
On January 10, 2000, the trial court denied the motion and
proceeded to schedule the reception of evidence.
On January 31, 2000, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts order denying their motion and set
the date of hearing thereof on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 am.
The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. Petitioners
elevated the denial before the CA. The CA affirmed the trial courts
decision.
ISSUE: Was the denial by the trial court of the motion for
reconsideration, proper?
RULING: Yes. Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides
that the notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be
later than 10 days after the filing of the motion. However, the date
of hearing was scheduled beyond the period, or later than February
10, 2000.
On December 7, 2001, a hearing was conducted on the Motion

for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
On January 8, 2002, trial court denied the motions, on the ground
that the motion for reconsideration did not contain a notice of hearing.
Respondent elevated the denial before the CA.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
requirement on notice of hearing has been substantially met.
ISSUES:
1. Was the motion for reconsideration proper?
2. Did the petitioner have the opportunity to be heard?
RULINGS:
1. Yes. Even though respondent failed to include a notice of hearing in
its Motion for Reconsideration filed on the very last day of its appeal
period, petitioner was able to oppose the issues raised in the Motion
for Reconsideration.
As a rule, a motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by
the other party at least 3 days before the date of hearing unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
The three-day notice requirement is not intended for the benefit of the
movant but to avoid surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse
party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the
motion before a resolution by the court.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to
have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert
the grounds upon which it is based.
2. Yes. It appears that the trial court gave petitioner ten days within
which to comment on respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was able to point out not only that the Motion was defective
for not containing a notice of hearing, but also to ventilate its
substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and of the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, under the
circumstances of this case, the purpose of a notice of hearing was
served.
Rule 16 Motion to Dismiss
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS and EULOGIO MANANQUIL, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court
of Makati and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 106922
April 20, 2001
FACTS: After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d etat, the DOJ
headed by Franklin Drilon, requested for investigation of Juan Ponce
Enrile for his alleged participation in the said coup. The Prosecutors
issued a subpoena to Enrile with an order to submit his counteraffidavit to the letter-complaint. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit,
Enrile filed a Petition for Summary Dismissal of the charge against him.
Significantly, the above provision uses the mandatory term, must in

fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for
hearing.
On February 27, 1990, the Team of Prosecutors filed before the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on Information charging private
respondent with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and
frustrated murder. Enrile then filed a complaint accusing the
petitioners of bad faith in filing the information for rebellion complexed
with murder and frustrated murder.
A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision

of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which
merits the attention and consideration of the court.
(Kahlil Elbanbuena)
On October 9, 1990, Drilons group filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure

of the Complaint to state a cause of action. They claimed that there
was no allegation of any actionable wrong constituting a violation of
any of the legal rights of private respondent.
JEHAN SHIPPING CORPORATION v. NATIONAL FOOD

AUTHORITY GR NO. 127692, 18 March 2004
On October 8, 1991, respondent trial court issued an Order denying

the Motion to Dismiss and requiring petitioners to file their answer and
to present evidence in support of their defenses in a full-blown trial
inasmuch as the defense of good faith and immunity from suit does
not appear to be indubitable. Drilons motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence this petition.
FACTS: The trial court decided in favor of Petitioner and against

Respondent in a civil case for the collection of a sum of money.
On October 2, 2001, Petitioner filed a motion for execution of
judgment.
On October 16, 2001, Respondent moved to reconsider the
decision. It filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on
November 12, 2001.
On November 9, 2001, the trial court held in abeyance the
resolution on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal pending the
motion for reconsideration by respondent.
On November 15, 2001, Petitioner opposed respondents motion
for reconsideration.
Going now to the crux of the petition, Drilons group contend that the
complaint sets forth no cause of action against them. They allege good
faith, regularity in the performance of official duties and lack of
ultimate facts constituting an actionable wrong. On the other hand,
Enrile argues that a cause of action has been sufficiently pleaded and
that the defenses of good faith and performance of official duties are
best disposed in a judicial hearing.
ISSUE: The main question in the instant petition is whether the

allegations in the complaint sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold
Drilons group liable for damages.
HELD: The petition of Drilons group is granted.
Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismissmust
appear on the face of the complaint itself, meaning that it must be
determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none
other. The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious
to have escaped respondent judge's attention. Paragraph 14 of the
complaint which states:
xxx
xxx
xxx 14. The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of
plaintiff for a non-existent crime had severely injured and besmirched
plaintiff's name and reputation and forever stigmatized his stature as
a public figure, thereby causing him extreme physical suffering,
serious anxiety, mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation."
is a mere conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of
ultimate facts. It does not, therefore, aid in any wise the complaint in
setting forth a valid cause of action against the petitioners.
However, we hold that the said allegations still fail to
maintain a cause of action against Drilons group. To
reiterate, a cause of action exists if the following elements
are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. 29 In the case at bar, we fail to see any
right of the Enrile supposedly violated by the petitioners.
Nowhere in the statute books is a prospective accused given
the right to be notified beforehand of the filing of an
information against him. Likewise, the withdrawal of the
information and the subsequent re-filing of the same do not
constitute an actionable wrong inasmuch as the filing or refiling of an information lies within the discretion of the
prosecutor who must act independently of the affected
parties.
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a
cause of action is to set up this defense in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the
facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited
to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and
inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend
to conclusion or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of
fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice."
Private respondent claims that an appeal or an original action
for certiorari is not the proper remedy for a defendant whose
motion to dismiss has been denied by the trial court for the
reason that the order does not terminate the proceedings,
nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties. In its
decision affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to
dismiss, the appellate court sustained this contention.
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rule
admits of an exception. Thus, where the denial of the motion
to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as in
the case at bar, the aggrieved party may assail the order of
denial on certiorari. A wide breadth of discretion is granted in
certiorari proceedings in the interest of substantial justice and to
prevent a substantial wrong. In the Drilon case, we also held that the
denial by the trial court of the motion to dismiss of herein petitioners
based on the same grounds as in the instant petition constituted
grave abuse of discretion for the reason that "this (private
respondent's baseless action) would unjustly compel the petitioners to
needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden
the court with one more futile and inconsequential case." 32 The
appellate court therefore erred in not ruling that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion when the latter refused to
dismiss the case as against herein petitioners, notwithstanding the
obvious insufficiency of the complaint against them.
(Techie Silva )
FIDEL DABUCO, etc. petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND GABI MULTI PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, REPRESENTED BY MARIA QUISUMBING
ALVAREZ AND COL. SOLOMON DALID, RET., respondents.
G.R. No. 133775 January 20, 2000
FACTS: The Lazarrabal family were the registered owners of the
properties, subject matter of this case.
In 1991, on different occasions, the subject properties were sold to the
Ruben Baculi, Editha Belocura, Lira Puno, Rafael Lapuz, Ladrioro
Montealto, Joel Masecampo, Delsa N. Manay, Ilderim Castaares,
Maria Theresa Puno, [and] Jill Mendoza. On June 27, 1994, GABI
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, a registered non-stock, non-profit
cooperative filed a civil complaint against DABUCO, et al. who were
found residing and/or tilling the subject properties. The trial court
issued a TRO enjoining Dabuco, et al. to desist from further
development of GABIs properties. The trial court then lifted the TRO
upon failure of GABI to prove its title over the properties. Dabuco et al.
filed their answer alleging that GABI had no personality to sue since
they do not appear to be buyer of the properties neither were the
properties titled in its name. Dabuco filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action, GABI has no personality to sue and
lack of jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the case. GABI appealed
to the CA and the decision was reversed.
The success of this petition rests on the validity of the dismissal by the
trial court. Petitioners assert that there was sufficient reason to dismiss
the action below on the ground that GABI had no cause of action
against petitioners. They also aver in the alternative that the Complaint
by GABI was properly dismissed on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action.
As a preliminary matter, we wish to stress the distinction
between the two grounds for dismissal of an action: failure to
state a cause of action, on the one hand, and lack of cause of
action, on the other hand. The former refers to the
insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the
insufficiency of factual basis for the action. Failure to state a
cause may be raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16,
while lack of cause may be raised any time. Dismissal for
failure to state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of
an action. Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the trial court on the ground
of lack of cause of action was proper.
HELD: The dismissal by the trial court was not proper.
We note that the issue of sufficiency of GABI's cause of action does
not appear to have been passed upon by the appellate court in its
assailed decision.
It appears that the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that
GABI was not the owner of the lands or one entitled to the possession
thereof, and thus had no cause of action. In dismissal for lack of cause
of action, the court in effect declared that plaintiff is not entitled to a
favorable judgment inasmuch as one or more elements of his cause of
action do not exist in fact.
Because questions of fact are involved, courts hesitate to declare a
plaintiff as lacking in cause of action. Such declaration is postponed
until the insufficiency of cause is apparent from a preponderance of
evidence. Usually, this is done only after the parties have been given
the opportunity to present all relevant evidence on such questions of
fact.
We do not here rule on whether GABI has a cause of action against
petitioners. What we are saying is that the trial court's ruling, to the
effect that GABI had no title to the lands and thus had no cause of
action, was premature. Indeed, hearings were conducted. And the
view of the Court of Appeals was that such hearings were sufficient.
The Court disagrees with the appellate court's ruling. The hearing of
July 27, 1994 was on the propriety of lifting the restraining order. At
such preliminary hearing, the trial court required GABI to produce
Certificates of Title to the lands in its name. GABI admitted that it did
not have such Certificates, only Deeds of Sale from the registered
owners.
Anent petitioners' thesis that dismissal of the complaint by the trial
court was proper of failure to state a cause of action, we, likewise, find
no valid basis to sustain the same.
Dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action

is provided for by the Rules of Court.
In dismissal for failure to state a cause, the inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The test is
whether the material allegations, assuming these to be true, state
ultimate facts which constitute plaintiff's cause of action, such that
plaintiff is entitled to a favorable judgment as a matter of law. The
general rule is that inquiry is confined to the four corners of the
complaint, and no other.
This general rule was applied by the Court of Appeals. Said court
stated:
Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is

clearly indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing.
The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect.23 Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was
firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the
inclusion of the phrase "in the discretion of the Court", apart from the
retention of the word "may" in Section 6, in Rule 16 thereof.
Thus, no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts
doorstep for not hearing petitioners affirmative defense.
(Sahara Alia Silongan )
It is a well-settled rule that in determining the sufficiency of the cause

of action, ONLY the facts alleged in the complaint and no others,
should be considered. In determining the existence of a cause of
action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be
considered. If the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint may be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed [ sic ] by
defendants-appellees.
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted

by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA,
and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA
UNGOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P.
ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA,
NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA,
CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]
There are well-recognized exceptions to the rule that the allegations

are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face
of the complaint. There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of
allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts which are
inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document included in
the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not
confined to the complaint if there is evidence which has been
presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the course
of hearings related to the case.
FACTS: On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will
but left a widow, children and a paramour with children too. The first
family discovered that the Paramour Teodora executed
an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim
involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in
Dagupan City and executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
Moreover, GABI did not have sufficient chance to prove its allegation
of ownership. Thus, the conclusion that GABI's allegation of
ownership is false and that its complaint stated no cause of action,
appears to be without basis.
In sum, as appears from the available records, the Court of Appeals
was correct in ruling that the dismissal by the trial court of GABI's
complaint was incorrect. The case should, therefore, proceed to trial
where the parties may adduce evidence to support their claims and
defenses.
(Techie Silva )
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
FACTS: After Alfonso Orfinadas death, his legitimate family
discovered that the Petitioner (the paramour and her children)
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person
with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds
issued Certificates of Titles in their favor. The Respondents also found
out that the Petitioners were able to obtain a loan from the Rural
Bank by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject
of the extra-judicial settlement. Hence, the Respondents filed a
Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement
of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage
and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Damages
against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the
Register of Deeds.
The Petitioners filed their Answer, raising among others the
affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-ininterest but rather the Estate of Alfonso in view of the pendency of
the administration proceedings. They filed a Motion to Set Affirmative
Defenses for Hearing on the aforesaid ground, which the lower court
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in denying the
Petitioners motion to set the case for preliminary hearing on their
affirmative defense.
HELD: No. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary
hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court.
This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of
the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense,
and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion
to dismiss had been filed.1
1 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It is Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which reads:
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed

a Petition for Letters of Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of
administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be
issued to him.[8]
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid
complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of the
contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties
originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero[10] and that the
titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the
decedent had managed to register them in his name.[11] Petitioners
also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real
parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in
view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.[12] On April
29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for
Hearing[13] on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order dated June 27, 1996,
on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-ininterest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be
appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its
reconsideration but the motion was likewise denied.
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as
CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.[17] Petitioners averred that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order
which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that the proper
party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent
and not the respondents.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dated January 31,
1997, stating that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when
he denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in
view of its discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. If no motion to dismiss

has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may
be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the
court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had
been filed.
The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to
the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the
answer. (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE: Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the

rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement
of the administration proceedings.
HELD: Yes they have legal standing.
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion
to set the case for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense
that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent
and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a
preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of
the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper
venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word may in the provision is
clearly indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing.
The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect.[23] Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding
was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with
the inclusion of the phrase in the discretion of the Court, apart from
the retention of the word may in Section 6,[24] in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower
courts doorstep for not hearing petitioners affirmative defense, it
cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the
respondents as heirs to bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without
doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent. The provision in turn is the
foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to
the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of
law.[25]
Even if administration proceedings have already been
commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules
on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3[26] and Section 2,
Rule 87[27] of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v.
Young,[28] this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to
represent the rights and properties of the decedent under
administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,[29] while permitting an executor or
administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased,
do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These
rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate
have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been
appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait
for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if
the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to
protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the
meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the
decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence
recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or
administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;[30] and
(2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in
the act complained of[31] and he is made a party
defendant.[32] Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek
judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as
compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not
more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is
either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties
himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to
sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of
administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being
when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the
order of the lower court, recourse to this Court is not warranted.
(Techie Silva )
MA. CARMINIA C. ROXAS v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS
G.R. No. 139337
August 15, 2001
(issue: dismiss order not final)
FACTS: Carminia Roxas filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband,
Jose Antonio F. Roxas with application for support pendent lite for
their four(4) minor children. The case was with the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City presided by Judge Rolando C. How. But the
petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said RTC Branch 257 a Notice of
Dismissal dated November 20, 1997 without prejudice, pursuant to
the provision of Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, considering that summons has not yet been served and no
responsive pleading has yet been filed.
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was refiled on November 25, 1997. It was raffled in due course to Branch
260 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City presided by Judge
Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
Judge Bautista-Ricafort received evidence on the application for
support pendente lite . The private respondent and her counsel, Atty.
Alberto Diaz, participated in that proceedings by conducting an
extensive cross-examination of the petitioner. The trial court then
issued its Order dated May 13, 1998 declaring the proceedings on the
application for support pendente lite terminated and deemed
submitted for resolution.
Jose Roxas refused to comply with the Judges order for support. He
hired a new lawyer and field a temporary stay execution of the orders.
The appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings
of the trial court for the reason that the certificate of nonforum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior
filing of Civil Case No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How
and the dismissal thereof without prejudice. The decision of the
appellate court elaborated the reasons for the granting of the petition,
to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
While a complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a

notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer
(Sec. 1, Rule 17), there is however a need to state the fact of
prior filing and dismissal thereof in the certification on nonforum shopping, in the event the complaint is refiled, as in
this case. This must be so in order to prevent the plaintiff or
principal party from invoking Section 1 of Rule 17 in the hope
that, if and when refiled, the complaint will be raffled to a
more sympathetic judge.
The CA then ordered the annulment case should be returned
to Branch 257 of the RTC of Paraaque City, to which it was
originally raffled.
ISSUE: In other words, if a case is dismissed without prejudice upon
the filing by the plaintiff of a notice of dismissal pursuant to Section 1
of Rule 17, before the service of the answer or responsive pleading,
would the subsequent re-filing of the case by the same party require
that the certificate of non-forum shopping state that a case involving
the same issues and parties was filed and dismissed without prejudice
beforehand? Would the omission of such a statement in the certificate
of non-forum shopping render null and void the proceedings and
orders issued by the trial court in the re-filed case?
HELD: It is our considered view and we hold that the proceedings and
orders issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort in the application for support
pendente lite (and the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in
the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered
null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of nonforum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without
prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same parties
and issues.
Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, it has been held
that a party cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision
has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has
brought before the courts. Forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other. For the principle of res
judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the
merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is
10
final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter
and causes of action.
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-0523 which was the first case
filed and raffled to the sala (Branch 257) of Judge How. The
dismissal without prejudice of the complaint in Civil Case No.
97-0523 at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 15
considering that it was done before service of answer or any
responsive pleading. The dismissal does not amount to litis
pendencia nor to res judicata . There is no litis pendencia
since the first case before Judge How was dismissed or
withdrawn by the plaintiff (herein petitioner), without
prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To
use the wording of that rule, Judge Hows order is one merely
"confirming the dismissal" of the complaint by the plaintiff
(herein petitioner). Neither is there res judicata for the
reason that the order of dismissal was not a decision on the
merits but a dismissal "without prejudice".
Private respondent is also estopped in questioning the
proceedings and orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort. He tacitly
acknowledged the validity of the proceedings and the orders issued
by the said trial judge by participating actively in the hearing on the
application for support pendente lite.
For a party to be adjudged guilty of forum shopping in the
trial courts, a motion to dismiss on the ground of either litis
pendencia or res judicata must be filed before the proper trial
court and a hearing conducted thereon in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
same ground cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari
before the appellate court while the main action in the trial
court is still pending for the reason that such ground for a
motion to dismiss can be raised before the trial court any
time during the proceedings and is not barred by the filing of
the answer to the complaint.
The petition for certiorari in the case at bar on the ground of alleged
forum shopping in the trial court is premature for the reason that
there is an adequate and speedy remedy available in the ordinary
course of law to private respondent, i.e ., a motion to dismiss or a
motion for reconsideration on the ground of either litis pendencia or
res judicata before the trial court. But private respondent did not file
such a motion based on either of said grounds. And where the ground
is short of res judicata or litis pendencia , as in the case at bar, the
Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction when it granted the petition for certiorari filed
by herein private respondent. The trial court should have been given
an opportunity to rule on the matter of alleged forum shopping in
consonance with the hierarchy of courts.
(Techie Silva )
Rule 18 Pre-Trial
TIU vs. MIDDLETON July 19, 1999
FACTS: The present petition arose from a Complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of real property. The court a quo sent a
Notice of Pre-trial Conference, stating in part: "The parties are
WARNED that witnesses whose names and addresses are not
submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial."
In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner averred that he would be presenting 6
witnesses, but he did not name them. After the pre-trial conference,
the court a quo issued a Pre-trial Order stating that the petitioner
would present 6 witnesses and specifying the hearing dates for the
said purpose.
Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case,
presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came,
petitioner called Antonia Tiu as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule
18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondents objected, arguing that the
witness could not be allowed to testify because petitioner had failed
to name her in his Pre-trial Brief.
ISSUE: Can Petitioner's Unnamed Witnesses Testify?
RULING: Yes. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy
disposition of cases. As earlier stated, pre-trial is essential in the
simplification and the speedy disposition of disputes. In light of the
objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it is
evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and
other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the
parties are given prior notice to this effect.
The Notice of Pre-trial Conference warned the parties that "witnesses

whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not
be allowed to testify at the trial." In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner
merely stated that he intended to present 6 witnesses
In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his
discretion to exclude the unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply
provided that "[t]he defendant will present 6 witnesses." It made no
mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they
were named.
Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only to the
pre-trial briefs, but also to the pre-trial order. Hence, the provision in
the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present 6 witnesses "shall
control the subsequent course of action."
Pre-trial* is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes.

Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the
pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the
synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the
trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from
testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed
witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial without the
consent of the parties affected.
VERA vs. RIGOR AND CA (August 10, 2007)
FACTS: Ernesto Rigor, respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court
a complaint for sum of money with damages against Dr. Emmanuel
Vera, petitioner. Respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioner
purchased from him a brand new Ultrasound Scanner, for
P410,000.00. Petitioner paid P120,000.00 as downpayment, leaving a
balance of P290,000.00. Despite respondents demand, petitioner
failed to pay the same.
In his answer, petitioner claimed that he received the machine on
a trial basis. However, when tested, its performance was
unsatisfactory. Moreover, the hospital where the machine was to be
installed has no funds. Respondent offered a new brand of
Ultrasound Scanner but it turned out to be an old model.
The trial court then set the pre-trial. During the pre-trial
conference, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement, hence,
the trial court terminated the pre-trial and set the case for initial
hearing. However, upon motion of respondents counsel, the trial was
reset to July 17, 1997. During the hearing on this date, the trial
court, upon manifestation of petitioners counsel, realized that
respondent failed to file a pre-trial brief.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint raising as
ground respondents failure to file a pre-trial brief.
The trial court issued a Resolution granting the motion and
dismissing the complaint.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case is dismissible for failure of the
respondent to file pre-trial brief?
RULING: The civil case should be dismissed for failure to file pretrial brief.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, Section 5 of the same Rule, and Section 7
mandatorily requires the parties to seasonably file their briefs and
failure to do so shall be cause for the dismissal of the action.
While the trial judge erroneously proceeded with the trial
conference, the fact remains that respondent did not file a pre-trial
brief. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 quoted above, such failure is a
cause for dismissal of the action. We have to emphasize that pre-trial
and its governing rules are not technicalities which the parties may
ignore or trifle with.
Obviously, since respondent did not file a pre-trial brief, it follows
that the trial judge failed to conduct the pre-trial conference in
accordance with Rule 18. In fact, he did not issue the required
pre-trial order stating the various matters which should have been
included therein. Indeed, the trial judge showed his ignorance of the
Rules, specifically Rule 18. And by failing to take appropriate steps to
enable the parties reach an amicable settlement, the trial judge
showed his gross inefficiency.
(Anthony Balagot )
VILLANUEVA vs. CA (2004)
FACTS:Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant
Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the latter on October 7,
1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely,
Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya
resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired
real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
11
Consolacion, Cebu. Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a

parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his
parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers
of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in
Mandaue City.
In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva,
wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate
son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of
the above-mentioned properties.
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties
of her own from which she could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore,
cannot walk anymore and they have to raise him up in order to
walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father
because they visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant
Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the
present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas
illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these
properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate
because at this time their father Nicolas was already senile and has a
childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that their father was
already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter
replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the
said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were
made by plaintiff, through her counsel, to the defendants, including
the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was
reached by the parties.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 16 February 1994 in
favor of Eusebia.
The appellate court dismissed Pacitas defense of prescription
and laches since she failed to have the issue included in the pre-trial
order after raising it in her answer with her co-petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pacitas defense of prescription and laches
are tenable?
RULING: The defense of prescription and laches are not tenable.
The determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars
the consideration of other questions, whether during trial or on
appeal.[6] Section 1 of Rule 9 covers situations where a defense or
objection is not raised in a motion to dismiss or an answer. What we
have before us is the exact opposite. Here, petitioners in fact raised in
their answer the defense of prescription and laches. However,
despite raising the defense of prescription and laches in their answer,
petitioners failed to include this defense among the issues for
consideration during the trial. The non-inclusion of this defense in
the pre-trial order barred its consideration during the trial. Clearly,
Section 1 of Rule 9 does not apply to the present case.
Pre-trial is primarily intended to insure that the parties properly
raise all issues necessary to dispose of a case.[7] The parties must
disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend to raise during the trial,
except those involving privileged or impeaching matters.[8] Although a
pre-trial order is not meant to catalogue each issue that the parties
may take up during the trial, issues not included in the pre-trial order
may be considered only if they are impliedly included in the issues
raised or inferable from the issues raised by necessary
implication.[9]The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by
the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they
themselves agreed to the same.[10]
Petitioners argue that in past instances we have reviewed
matters raised for the first time during appeal. True, but we have
done so only by way of exception involving clearly meritorious
situations.[11] This case does not fall under any of those exceptions.
The fact that the case proceeded to trial, with the petitioners actively
participating without raising the necessary objection, all the more
requires that they be bound by the stipulations they made at the pretrial.[12] Petitioners were well aware that they raised the defense of
prescription and laches since they included it in their
answer. However, for reasons of their own, they did not include this
defense in the pre-trial.
Able counsels represented both parties. We see no claim that
either counsel erred or was negligent. This could only mean that
petitioners counsel chose to waive, or did not consider important, the
defense of prescription and laches. Petitioners are bound by their
counsels choice. Other than arguing that it is allowable to raise the
issue for the first time on appeal, we have no explanation from
petitioners why they suddenly decided to change their mind. Parties
are not allowed to flip-flop. Courts have neither the time nor the
resources to accommodate parties who choose to go to trial
haphazardly. Moreover, it would be grossly unfair to allow petitioners
the luxury of changing their mind to the detriment of private
respondents at this late stage. To put it simply, since petitioners did
not raise the defense of prescription and laches during the trial, they
cannot now raise this defense for the first time on appeal.
(Anthony Balagot )
Rule 22 Computation of Time
BPI VS CA and Jimmy Go (June 28, 2006)
FACTS: Petitioner, Far East Bank and Trust Company, granted a total
of eight (8) loans to Noahs Arc Merchandising (Noahs Ark, for
brevity). Noahs Ark is a single proprietorship owned by Mr. Albert T.
Looyuko. The said loans were evidenced by identical Promissory Notes
all signed by Albert T. Looyuko, private respondent Jimmy T. Go and
one Wilson Go. Likewise, all loans were secured by real estate
mortgage constituted over a parcel of land. Petitioner, claiming that
Noahs Ark defaulted in its obligations, extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage. The auction sale was set on 14 April 1998 but on 8 April
1998 private respondent filed a complaint for damages with prayer
[for] issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking [to]
enjoin the auction sale. [I]n the Order dated 14 April 1998 a
temporary restraining order was issued and in the same order the
application for Preliminary Injunction was set for hearing [i]n the
afternoon of the same day (Rollo, p. 142).2
In an order3 dated April 15, 1998, Judge Victorio extended the
TRO for another 15 days, for a total of 20 days.
Private-respondent then filed a bond as required by the order.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforementioned order
which motion was denied in the Order dated 30 July 1998 on the
ground that the extrajudicial foreclosure was premature as to four (4)
promissory notes.
After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied .
The Court of Appeals partially denied the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
were properly issued by the Judge?
RULING: The TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction were not
properly issued by the Judge.
The issuance of the TRO was, on procedural grounds, irregular.
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;

exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person

sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown
by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the
matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue
a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. Within the said twenty-day
period, the court must order said party or person to show
cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted,
and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
Judge Victorio, in an order dated April 14, 1998, issued a TRO for
five days, then, in an order dated April 15, 1998, extended it for fifteen
more days, totaling twenty days. However, in the first order, Judge
Victorio excluded Saturdays and Sundays; and in the latter order he
added legal holidays to the exclusions. As quoted above, a TRO is
effective only for a period of twenty days from notice to the party
sought to be enjoined. The rule does not specify that the counting of
the twenty-day period is only limited to working days or that
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are excluded from the twentyday period. The law simply states twenty days from notice. Section 1,
Rule 22
It is clear from the last sentence of this section that non-working
days (Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) are excluded from the
counting of the period only when the last day of the period falls on
such days. The Rule does not provide for any other circumstance in
which non-working days would affect the counting of a prescribed
period. Hence, Judge Victorio exceeded the authority granted to lower
courts, in Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he excluded
non-working days from the counting of the twenty-day period.
(Anthony Balagot )
12
Rule 23 Depositions before action or pending appeal
Rule 25 Interrogatories to Parties
JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC vs. Spouses

MANGUDADATU August 16, 2004
ELENA S. ONG vs. FRANCISCO V. MAZO, ET AL.

June 4, 2004
FACTS: A deposition upon oral examination of the petitioners former

counsels was taken by the petitioner, which was opposed by the
respondents. The Deposition was intended to prove that JLI had not
received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New
Trial. On appeal, the CAruled that petitioner could no longer avail
itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had
already been terminated. It ruled that between the denial of a lawyer
and the certification of a postmaster, the latter would prevail.
FACTS: After filing her Answer in the Complaint for Damages against
her, the Petitioner served written interrogatories upon respondents
and filed a "Manifestation and Omnibus Motion" seeking, among other
things, an order from the trial court directing respondents to answer
the interrogatories. The trial court, however, denied the motion to
compel respondents to answer the interrogatories upon the ground
that it constituted a "fishing expedition" which would be more properly
ventilated in a pre-trial conference.
ISSUE: Whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the
circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion.
HELD: The CA erred in declaring that the taking of the depositions of

petitioners witnesses was improper.
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject
of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been
served.
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a
deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before
trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may
be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without
the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In
Dasmarias Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the taking of the
witnesses testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual
presence at the trial.
Thus, depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of
any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that
limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can
be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of
executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of
fact have become numerous or complicated.
Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the
summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has
been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists.
Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or
an interlocutory proceeding, under the circumstances specified
hereunder:
Section 4. Use of Depositions. -- At the trial or upon the hearing of a
motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition,
so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against
any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one
of the following provisions:
xxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used
by any party for any purpose if the court finds: xxx (2) that the
witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers
from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it
appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition.xxx
HELD: Yes.
The SC finds that the orders disallowing petitioners written
interrogatories are patently erroneous, hence, the resort to certiorari is
warranted.
This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment
of the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules
24 to 29 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,31 it held:
. . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial - should discover
or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only
those known to them individually, but also those known to their
adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should
not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal
possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules
24 to 29.
The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes of
discovery -- depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions -without much court intervention since leave of court is not necessary
to put into motion such modes after an answer to the complaint has
been served. The rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes
of discovery is that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the
adverse party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite
the trial of the case.
Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories
answered by his opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise
that the interrogatories were a "fishing expedition," is to disregard the
categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of fishing expedition can
no longer provide a reason to prevent a party from inquiring into the
facts underlying the opposing partys case through the discovery
procedures.
Rule 30 - Trial
UMALI-PACO vs. QUILALA (October 15, 2002)
HELD: The rules require that, where the reception of evidence is
delegated to the clerk of court, he or she must also be a member of
the bar. Neither agreement by parties nor their acquiescence can
justify its violation.
Rule 31 Consolidation or Severance
HONORIDEZ vs. MAHINAY (August 12, 2005)
The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the abovecited Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro
Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place
of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion
to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that
the trial courts Decision was not yet final. As previously explained,
despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition
can still be properly taken.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of a

mortgage deed and for damages, with an application for a TRO and/or
injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale of the subject parcel of land.
Petitioners alleged that they mortgaged said parcel of land to Jocelyn
Sorensen and that the mortgage deed imposed an unconscionable
interest of 5% per month.
We note, however, that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioners
depositions. In its Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed - against all other evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion for
New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latters
counsels. Despite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove
convincingly its denial of receipt.
Thereafter, Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the

same parcel of land was earlier mortgaged to Felimon Suarez but they
were required to execute a deed of sale instead. They claimed that
when the secured obligation had matured, Sorensen offered to help
redeem the property and did pay the sum for such purpose. It was
after such payment that petitioners executed the mortgage in favor of
Sorensen.
During the course of the proceedings, Atty. Makilito Mahinay filed a
Motion to Intervene claiming that in an earlier case, he and petitioners
entered into a compromise agreement wherein he was given the
13
preferential right to buy the lot in issue in the event that petitioners
decide to dispose of it. Later on, he discovered that petitioners
executed a deed of sale over the same lot in favor of Suarez, thereby
prompting him to file an action for specific performance.
The subsequent action was decided in Mahinays favor, with the RTC
finding that the contract between Suarez and petitioners was a sale
and not an equitable mortgage, ruling that Mahinay is entitled to
redeem the lot from Suarez. This decision was affirmed by the CA and
became final and executory.
Petitioners and Sorensen opposed the motion for intervention and
then filed among others, a Motion for Consolidation claiming that the
redemption is a supervening event which rendered the decision
unenforceable and that the determination of whether such
redemption is a supervening event is a common issue in the case a
quo and in Civil Case No. CEB-16335.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in not consolidating Civil Case No.
CEB-23653 [with Civil Case No. CEB 16335]
RULING: No. Under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, only
pending actions involving a common question of law or fact may be
consolidated. Obviously, petitioners cannot make out a case for
consolidation in this case since Civil Case No. CEB-16335, the case
which petitioners seek to consolidate with the case a quo, has long
become final and executory; as such it cannot be re-litigated in the
instant proceedings without virtually impeaching the correctness of
the decision in the other case. Public policy abhors such eventuality.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final the issue or cause involved therein should
be laid to rest.
(Lendl Floyd
Montes )
Rule 32 Trial by Commissioner
ALJEM'S CORPORATION (LOGGING DIVISION) vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (March 28, 2001)
FACTS: Petitioner Aljem's Corporation Logging Division (Aljem) was
a joint venture entered into between petitioner's representative,
Pacifico V. Dizon, Jr. and private respondent (PR) Rudy Y. Chua.
Dizon served as the venture's president, while PR was its vicepresident. The parties initially agreed upon a 55-45 sharing, which
they later modified to 50-50.
On August 11, 1992, PR sued petitioner for a sum of money and
for damages. In his complaint he alleged, among other things, that
according to the financial report prepared by a CPA commissioned by
him, the logging operations of the joint venture earned an income of
P3,659,710.07 from January to August 1990. But despite repeated
demands by him for the payment of his 50% share of the income,
petitioner refused to pay him his share.
In its answer, petitioner alleged that PR's auditor bloated the
joint venture's net operating income for the year 1990 to
P3,659,710.07 and that the correct amount, as found by petitioner's
accountant, was only P2,089,141.80.
During the pre-trial conference of the case, the parties agreed to
refer the case to a commissioner. For this reason, Leonora B. Cainglet
was appointed commissioner by the trial court and ordered to conduct
an audit of petitioner's accounting records.
On March 26, 1993, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion,
alleging that there were discrepancies concerning sales, depreciation,
and interest between the audit report and the report of its
(petitioner's) auditor.
On May 27, 1993, petitioner filed its comments and objections to
the commissioner's report.
On December 6, 1993, the trial court issued an order confirming
the commissioner's report and adopting her findings of facts and
conclusions as those of the court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that the commissioner did not observe
the mandatory requirements of Rule 33, sections 3 and 5 of the 1964
Rules of Court relative to the conduct of hearings before the
commissioner. MFR was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the audit report should not be admitted by the trial
court on the ground that commissioner merely based her report on
her interview of the parties and did not hold any formal hearing.
determined. This would not be possible were the commissioner merely

to interview the parties. Where controversial questions are involved,
such as whether certain items must be allowed or disallowed, an
adversary proceeding is particularly indicated. That is why the last
sentence of 3 says that "The trial or hearing before him shall proceed
in all respects as it would be held before the court." For the fact is that
the commissioner substitutes for the judge, and whatever the judge
can or cannot do, the commissioner also can or cannot do.
Consequently, if a judge cannot decide a question without hearing the
parties on oath or affirmation, neither can the commissioner.
Since the proceedings before the commissioner were null and
void because of the denial of due process to petitioner, the nullity of
the proceedings can be raised at any stage of case. It was error,
therefore, for the trial court to approve the commissioner's report over
the objection of petitioner.
(Bhing Doquilla )
Rule 34 Judgment on the Pleadings
MENESES vs. SECRETARY (October 23, 2006)
FACTS: Petitioners were co-owners of a rice land which was
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries by virtue of P.D. No. 27. Petitioners
filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation.
The farmer-beneficiaries, the Land Bank of the Philippines-Land
Valuation and Landowners' Compensation III, the DAR Secretary, and
the DAR all filed their respective Answers.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Petitioners filed an MFR which was partially granted. Petitioners
thereafter filed a complaint for determination and payment of just
compensation with the DARAB which was dismissed on the ground
that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide valuation cases covered
by P.D. No. 27. Because of the foregoing dismissal, petitioners filed
with the RTC a motion to re-open and calendar case for hearing, which
was granted.
Petitioners were then scheduled to present their evidence. During the
hearing, the parties agreed as to the issue to be resolved "whether or
not the plaintiffs are entitled to just compensation as provided for in
R.A. No. 6657. (Respondents filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings).The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in sustaining the propriety of the motion
for judgment on the pleadings filed by respondents with the RTC.
RULING: Yes. Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that
a judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to render
an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading. The essential question is whether there are issues
generated by the pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings may be
sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief.
In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents definitely
tendered issues, as it made specific denials of the material allegations
in the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar
recovery by petitioners. Moreover, it was erroneous for the RTC to
require the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for
the LBP and the DAR Secretary to file the same since in the first place,
the latter are neither plaintiffs in the case nor counter-claimants or
cross-claimants.
What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary
judgment, a procedural device designed for the prompt disposition of
actions, which may be rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions on file show that, after a summary
hearing, there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact, except
as to the amount of damages, and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, and which may be applied for by either a
claimant or a defending party. This is obvious from the fact that
although the Answers raised issues, these were not factual ones
requiring trial, nor were they genuine issues, as the parties were able
to agree to limit the same to whether petitioners are entitled to just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 27.
(Lendl Floyd Montes)
HELD:
Sections 3 and 5 indicate quite clearly the necessity for a
formal hearing and the swearing of witnesses; otherwise, the
commissioner cannot determine factual questions which arise in the
course of his examination of the accounts. For this purpose, the
witnesses must necessarily be sworn in and offered for crossexamination by the parties so that the truth of any question may be
14
Rule 35 Summary Judgments

NARRA INTEGRATED CORPORATION, vs. CA and NC
INDUSTRIAL TRADE, INC. G.R. No. 137915. November 15, 2000
FACTS: Narra Integrated Corporation contracted from NC Industrial
Trade, Inc., manpower services and materials. For failure of Narra
Integrated Corporation to pay a balance of the consideration agreed
by them NC Industrial Trade, Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of
money and damages. NIC filed a third-party complaint against KyungIl Philippines, Inc.
The issues thus joined, the court a quo set the case for pretrial. Alleging that the answer filed by the defendant/third party
plaintiff did not tender an issue on account of the said partys
admission of the material allegations of the complaint and the
actionable documents attached thereto, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment. The defendant/third-party plaintiff interposed its
opposition thereto. Nevertheless, the motion was granted by the trial
court in the partial decision which is the subject matter of the instant
appeal
ISSUE: Was there a summary judgment or judgment on the pleading
rendered by the lower court?
HELD: At the onset, we note that the petitioner, as shown in its
assignment of errors, is guilty of the usual error of equating a
summary judgment with a judgment on the pleadings. While the
petitioner makes mention of the lower courts promulgation of a
judgment on the pleadings, we have gone over the records and it is
clear that what the trial court actually rendered was a summary
judgment.
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the
pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on
the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment
from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because
of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue. On
the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues
apparently exist i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding
which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or
specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the
answer but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham,
fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or
admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a
judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a
judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions,
or admissions.
As such, even if the answer does tender issues and therefore a
judgment on the pleadings is not proper - a summary judgment may
still be rendered on the plaintiff's motion if he can show that the
issues thus tendered are not genuine, sham, fictitious, contrived, set
up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial. The trial court can
determine whether there is a genuine issue on the basis of the
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits and/or counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court.
In the instant case, the answer submitted by the petitioner
appears on its face to tender issues. The question that must be
answered then is whether or not these issues are sham or fictitious so
as to justify a summary judgment? In answering this question, the
trial court may rely on the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and
documents submitted by the private respondent in support of his
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment These include the affidavits of
petitioners own General Manager and of private respondents
President and the Letter Contract between petitioner and private
respondent.
To begin with, petitioner, in its Answer, does not deny that it
entered into the letter-contract with private respondent for the supply
of labor, trader, tools, equipment and supervision necessary for the
installation of an electrical power distribution system, waste water
treatment plant, and catwalk railings and ladder. Neither did it
specifically deny the invoices issued by private respondent which
show the various amounts owed by it to private respondent. Finally,
petitioner did not dispute the unpaid balance which it still allegedly
owes private respondent.
Petitioner insists, however, that there are genuine issues raised
in its Answer which require a full-blown trial on the
merits. Specifically, petitioner claims that paragraphs 7 to 10 of the
Answer clearly allege that the project undertaken by respondent is
subject to the acceptance by the project owner, Kyung-Il Phils., Inc.
and/or by the petitioner, as General Contractor.
On these alleged special and affirmative defenses, we agree with

the trial court and the CA that, rather than tendering genuine issues,
these allegations merely give an unjustified reason for petitioners
failure to pay the undisputed balance owing to private respondent.
(Karla Deles )
Rule 36 Judgments, Final Order and Entry Thereof
ROSITA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, respondents (1996)
FACTS: Petitioner Rosita Domingo was one of the bona fide tenantsoccupants of an eighty-seven (87) hectare land located at Barrio
Baesa, Caloocan City then known as the Gonzales Estate.
Upon petition of the tenants sometime in 1947, the Republic of
the Philippines through the Rural Progress Administration (RPA)
instituted an action which was docketed as Civil Case No. 131 with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal for the expropriation of the
Gonzales Estate and its subsequent resale to the tenants thereof. The
court ruled in favor of the Republic and on appeal to this Court, the
said decision was affirmed.
The Republic of the Philippines thereafter acquired title over the
estate, administered by People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC). President ordered PHHC to sell a bigger portion of the estate
to persons other than the bona fide tenants-occupants of the estate.
On October 29, 1960, fifty-two (52) tenants-occupants of the
estate, petitioner included, filed an action to compel the Republic of
the Philippines through the PHHC to sell the entire estate to them
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 539 and the decision of the
Supreme Court in Civil Case No. 131.
On May 3, 1961, private respondent Araneta Institute of
Agriculture (AIA) filed a complaint in intervention on the basis of a
document
entitled
'KASUNDUAN
NA
MAY
PAGBIBIGAY
KAPANGYARIHAN HINGGIL SA ASYENDA GONZALES SA BAESA,
CALOOCAN RIZAL."
On November 28, 1961, AIA submitted to the lower court a
Compromise Agreement it entered into with 13 tenants-occupants of
the estate. The compromise states that the tenants sold their lot to
intervenor and the manner of payment thereof.
On December 23, 1961, the trial court approved the above
Compromise Agreement in a partial decision embodying the said
agreement.
On February 6, 1962, counsel for the tenants filed a motion for
immediate execution of the partial decision. The same was granted by
the court on February 23, 1962.
Petitioner filed a separate petition to annul the partial decision
approving their agreement.
On May 23, 1986, the lower court issued an order enforcing the
said decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is bound by the compromise agreement.
HELD: The petition is not impressed with merit.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent,
the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. Once an agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it
becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having
the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the
controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment.
Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal
from such judgment. The reason for this rule being that when both
parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request
that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, it is only
natural to presume that such action constitutes an implicit waiver of
the right to appeal against said decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
(Bhing Doquilla )
Rule 37 New Trial or Reconsideration
RIVERA vs. CA
HELD: If negligence of counsel were made a basis for new trial, there
would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be
employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.
15
Rule 38
Proceedings
Relief
from
Judgments,
Orders
or
Other
SPS. DELA CRUZ ETC v. SPS ANDRES

G.R. No. 161864 April 27, 2007
FACTS: Spouses Dela Cruz filed a complaint for annulment of title
and/or reconveyance with damages against spouses Andres and the
Director of Lands. Subsequently, petitioners, assisted by Atty. Rafael
Villarosa, filed with the CA a petition for review. The appellate court
dismissed the petition since the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead of petitioners in violation of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Then petitioners filed with the CA a petition for relief from judgment
praying that the dismissal of their petition for review be set aside
since the gross negligence of their previous counsel did not bind
them. The appellate court, however, denied their petition. It ruled
that petitioners were bound by the action of their counsel as well as
by his mistake or negligence.
ISSUES: Can petitioners avail of a petition for relief under Rule 38 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from a judgment of the CA due to
their counsels negligence when he signed the Certification of NonForum Shopping?
HELD: Petition is denied for lack of merit. A petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there
is no other available or adequate remedy. It may be availed of only
after a judgment, final order or other proceeding was taken against
the petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence.
While the law uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. The procedure in
the CA and this Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by
additional rules promulgated by this Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition
for relief in the CA.
Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment is subject
only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. In seeking to
reverse the appellate courts decision denying their petition for relief
from judgment by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy twice.
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to delve into the merits of this
petition, the same must still be denied. What petitioners counsel did
in this case was to attach an improper Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping to their petition for review with the appellate court. While
this omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not
amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the
proceedings below.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of
clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown. The
negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of
his day in court, the result of which is that he is deprived of his
property without due process of law. Thus, where a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be
said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to
be heard is the very essence of due process. Here, the case
underwent a full-blown trial. Both parties were adequately heard, and
all issues were ventilated before the decision was promulgated.
It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from judgment,
meritorious defenses must be accompanied by the ground relied
upon, whether it is fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence,
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, there being
neither excusable nor gross negligence amounting to a denial of due
process, meritorious defenses cannot alone be considered.
(Karla Deles )
Rule 39 Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

CITY OF ILIGAN V. CITY MANAGEMENT
HELD:
1. Normally, execution cannot be obtained until and unless:
a. the judgment has become final and executory;
b. the right of appeal has been renounced or waived;
c. the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having
been filed; or
d. having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the
records of the case have been returned to the court of origin
-- in which case, execution shall issue as a matter of right.
2. The ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending appeal
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate
court will not normally disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter
may be proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of
discretion.
DIESEL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. JOLLIBEE FOODS
CORP. G.R. No. 136805 January 28, 2000
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the

general rule that only final judgment may be executed. An exceptional
execution must be founded on "good reason," which rest on sound
judicial discretion. The alleged financial distress of the prevailing
juridical entity is nor, by itself, a "good reason."
FACTS: DCCI instituted an action for the recovery of escalated
construction costs which it had allegedly incurred in the construction of
buildings owned by Respondent JFC. DCCI obtained a favorable
judgment from the RTC. However, contending that the RTC failed to
order payment of extra work done, DCCI filed a Notice of Appeal; and
a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. In said Motion, it cited as
"good reasons" its financial distress as a small business. The trial court
allowed execution pending appeal. And in view of both parties'
appeals, the trial court forwarded the original records of the case to
the appellate court for further proceedings.
CA directed the RTC to issue a writ of execution upon petitioner's
posting a bond, but afterwards it issued an order to stay execution
upon respondent's filing of a supersedeas bond.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in directing the stay of execution pending
appeal previously allowed by the lower court.
HELD: The CA may not be compelled to enforce a Special Order
issued by the trial court. The CA has its own separate and original
discretionary jurisdiction to grant or to stay execution pending appeal,
except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure
and in other cases when the law or the Rules provide otherwise.
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules states: Sec. 2. Discretionary execution. (a)
Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. On motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial
court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of
either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be,
at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before
the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution
pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order after due hearing.
The foregoing sections mean that after the perfection of the appeal
and the transmittal of the records, the trial court loses jurisdiction over
the case. Henceforth, it may no longer grant a motion for, or issue a
writ of immediate execution; to do so would be an abuse of discretion.
While it is true that the trial court granted the Motion of the petitioner
for execution pending appeal, it did not actually issue a writ of
execution, because the latter had failed to comply with the Special
Order proviso requiring the posting of a bond. Eventually, two separate
appeals filed by both parties were perfected, and the records of the
case were transmitted by the RTC to the CA. From then on, the trial
court lost jurisdiction to issue the said writ. When the petitioner asked
the CA for the issuance of the writ at the time, it thereby invoked the
original discretionary jurisdiction of the latter to grant execution
pending appeal.
16
ISSUE: WON there was good reason for the execution pending
appeal to be allowed.
The Court must stress that the execution of a judgment before its
finality must be founded upon good reasons. The yardstick remains
the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of
exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury
or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed
judgment be reversed later. Good reason imports a superior
circumstance that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse
party. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show "paramount and
compelling reasons of urgency and justice." Petitioner cites as good
reason merely the fact that "it is a small-time building contractor that
could ill-afford the protracted delay in the reimbursement of the
advances it made for the aforesaid increased-costs of construction of
the buildings."
Petitioner's allegedly precarious financial condition, however, is not by
itself a jurisprudentially compelling circumstance warranting
immediate execution. The financial distress of a juridical entity is not
comparable to a case involving a natural person such as a very old
and sickly one without any means of livelihood, an heir seeking an
order for support and monthly allowance for subsistence, or one who
dies.
Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not
outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and
executory judgments. Certainly, a juridical entity like petitioner
corporation has, other than extraordinary execution, alternative
remedies like loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to
address its precarious financial condition.
(Karla Deles
)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOURDES ABIERA
NILLAS January 23, 2007
FACTS: Respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for
Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). It was
alleged that the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental
rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14,
captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y
Otros. In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court,
adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in
favor of named oppositors who had established their title to their
respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time
immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. No responsive pleading was filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered its appearance and
simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to
appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent
proceedings. The RTC rendered a Decision finding merit in the
petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941
Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of
confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision. The OSG
appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main
that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed The
appeal was denied by the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of action to revive judgment had
already prescribed
RULING: No. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of
limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case." We fail to
understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that
after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may
not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for
this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five

years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not

applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition
or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After
the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership

is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had
been in possession of the land and the winning party desires
to oust him therefrom.
(Norliza Mamukid )
ISAAC VILLEGAS petitioner, vs. VICTOR LINGAN and
ATTY. ERNESTO CARREON respondents. G.R. No. 153839
June 29, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from DBP, the
petitioner constituted a REM over the said parcel of land in favor of
DBP. The said loan and mortgage was subsequently transferred by
the DBP to the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF). When the
petitioner failed to settle his loan, the REM constituted over the
property was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and,
as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such public auction, a
certificate of sheriffs sale was issued. By virtue of a power of attorney
(GPA) executed by petitioners wife, Marilou Villegas in favor of Gloria
Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF.
In 1996, Catral, by virtue of the same GPA, executed a Deed of
Sale in favor of respondent Victor Lingan.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Instrument
with Damages with the RTC against respondent. Petitioner argued that
the GPA executed in favor of Catral created a principal-agent
relationship only between his wife, Marilou as principal, and Catral, as
agent, and then only for the latter to administer the properties of the
former and that he never authorized Catral to administer his
properties, particularly, herein subject property. However, RTC
dismissed the complaint.
On appeal to CA, CA affirmed the decision of RTC and ruled that
when the redemption of the property had been made by Catral by
virtue of a GPA executed in her favor by Marilou, it follows that the
petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject property but his wife,
Marilou; that the issue as to whether the power of attorney was a
special or general one is of no moment because the petitioner was no
longer the owner of the property when it was sold; in other words, any
disposition of the property needs no power of attorney from the
petitioner himself.
ISSUE: Whether Marilou, the wife of the petitioner, as successor-ininterest, may validly redeem the property in question.
RULING: YES.
Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
SEC. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold.
Real property sold as provided in the last preceding
section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be
redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the
following persons:
(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest
in the whole or any part of the property;
The successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor referred to in
the above provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by
operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the property, or
his spouse or heirs.
Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at
expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or

given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year
from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale,

the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession
of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty
(60) days have elapsed and no other redemption
has been made, and notice thereof given, and the
time for redemption has expired, the last
redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and
possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor
shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the
date of the registration of the sale to redeem the
property.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption,
the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted
to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim
of the judgment obligor to the property at the time
of the levy. The possession of the property shall be
given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the
same officer unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the
property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed
and the records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said
right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired
17
ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment
obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of
redemption.
And where the redemption is made under a property
regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of
the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of
redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the
property.
Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the
right
to
sell
the
property
to
another.
(TeenTeen Pague )
Rule 40 Appeal from the MTC to the RC
NEYPES v. CA (Sept. 14, 2005)
HELD: The court now allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasijudicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
(Kahlil
Elbanbuena )
its author. Moreover, SC cannot see how the statement of Mr. Noli
Reloj that he read the article on "Code Red" can be construed as an
admission of liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion of the
lower courts that the appeal is dilatory rests on shaky ground.
ISSUE #2: W/N the filing of a bond can be considered a good reason
to justify immediate execution under Section 2, Rule 39.
RULING: In the case of Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled
that, to consider the mere posting of a bond a "good reason" would
precisely make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal
routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be
executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that
the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to answer for
damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat,
neither contemplated nor intended by law.
In fine, the rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by
the successful party is not a good reason for ordering execution
pending appeal, as "a combination of circumstances is the dominant
consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution, the
requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no
doubt for the protection of the defendant's creditor. Since we have
already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify
execution pending appeal, neither does the filing of a bond, without
anything
more,
justify
the
same.
(TeenTeen )
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC. (Manila), petitioner,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ALEX AND OPHELIA
TORRALBA, respondents.
G.R. No. 131109
June 29, 1999
FACTS: The RTC of QC rendered a decision in favor of spouses
Torralba in a civil case entitled "Spouses Torralba vs. International
School, Inc. (ISM) involving a complaint for damages due to the
death of plaintiffs' only son, Ericson Torralba while in the custody of
ISM and its officers.
ISM appealed to the CA. During the pendency thereof, the
spouses Torralba filed a motion for execution pending appeal before
the lower court on the grounds that the appeal is merely dilatory and
that the filing of a bond is another good reason for the execution of a
judgment pending appeal. In an order dated June 19, 1996, the lower
court granted execution pending upon the posting of a bond by the
spouses Torralba and the lower court issued a Notice of Garnishment
which was served to Citibank. On the other hand, ISM filed a MFR or
for approval of supersedeas bond.
However, the lower court denied ISM's MFR and authorized and
directed the Sheriff to encash the Citibank Manager's Check (bank
deposits of ISM) and to turn over the proceeds therefor after
deducting all legal fees and charges if any, to the plaintiffs or their
representative.
In view of the above order of the lower court, ISM filed a motion
to withdraw the superseads bond and filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA. However, CA dismissed the petition and found that
the grounds relied upon by the lower court in granting execution
pending appeal that the appeal taken by ISM is merely dilatory and
the filing of a bond constitute good reasons.
The CA agreed with the lower court that ISM's appeal appears
to be dilatory in view of its "virtual admission of fault when it adopted
the project" "Code Red" consisting of safety and emergency
measures, only after the death of plaintiffs-spouses Torralba's only
son"; and that the delay has already affected the plaintiffs-spouses
Torralba financially.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE #1: W/N the grant/issuance of writ of execution pending
appeal was proper.
Change will not come

if we wait for some other person or some other time.
We are the ones we've been waiting for. We are the change that we seek.
-Barack Obama
RULING: It must be stressed that private respondents-spouses

motion/application for an execution pending appeal was premised on
the following reasons: that the appeal was being taken for purpose of
delay and that they are filing a bond.
This Court has ruled in Ong vs. Court of Appeals that, where the
reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution
pending appeal cannot be justified. It is not proper for the trial court
to find that an appeal is frivolous and consequently to disapprove it
since the disallowance of an appeal by said court constitutes a
deprivation of the right to appeal. The authority to disapprove an
appeal rightfully pertains to the appellate court.
For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of
execution pending appeal, the Supreme Court cannot see how the
lower courts came upon the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or
negligence by ISM based on the exchange where ISM's swimming
coach Noli Reloj admitted that he read the school paper article
introducing "Code Red". As correctly pointed out by ISM, the article
was not an official statement of the school, but merely an opinion of
18

Civil Procedure Case Digests &#39;08-&#39;09

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Civil Procedure Case Digests &#39;08-&#39;09

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

Petitioner, as vendor, must comply with two requisites for the

OMICTIN, vs.COURT OF APPEALS (January 22, 2007)

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

ISSUE:Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the

RIVERA vs. DEL ROSARIO

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

issue of non-payment of docket fees was raised. Clearly, the said

petitioners motion for extension. There is no abuse, much less grave

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a Motion to Dismiss at the

PILIPINO TELEPHONE V. DELFINO TECSON

RIVERA vs. RIVERA

filing by petitioner of a motion for reconsideration before the

HELD: A contract of adhesion per se is not inefficacious. Respondent

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment

guaranteed by petitioner. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

However, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such requirement,

In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

opted to be paid in shares of stock under the following stipulation in

Second. We now turn to the issue of jurisdiction by estoppel. Both the

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

Atty. Leao, counsel for plaintiff spouses, personally delivered

On December 7, 2001, a hearing was conducted on the Motion

Significantly, the above provision uses the mandatory term, must in

On February 27, 1990, the Team of Prosecutors filed before the

A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision

On October 9, 1990, Drilons group filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure

JEHAN SHIPPING CORPORATION v. NATIONAL FOOD

On October 8, 1991, respondent trial court issued an Order denying

FACTS: The trial court decided in favor of Petitioner and against

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

ISSUE: The main question in the instant petition is whether the

FIDEL DABUCO, etc. petitioners, vs.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

Dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action

Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is

It is a well-settled rule that in determining the sufficiency of the cause

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted

There are well-recognized exceptions to the rule that the allegations

On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed

Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. If no motion to dismiss

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

ISSUE: Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the

MA. CARMINIA C. ROXAS v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

While a complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

The Notice of Pre-trial Conference warned the parties that "witnesses

Pre-trial* is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

Consolacion, Cebu. Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a

Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;

without hearing and prior notice to the party or person

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa 2008-2009)

Rule 23 Depositions before action or pending appeal

Rule 25 Interrogatories to Parties

JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC vs. Spouses

ELENA S. ONG vs. FRANCISCO V. MAZO, ET AL.

FACTS: A deposition upon oral examination of the petitioners former

HELD: The CA erred in declaring that the taking of the depositions of

FACTS: Petitioners filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of a

Civil Procedure Case Digests '08-'09

Civil Procedure Case Digests '08-'09