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SUBJECT:-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
( Marks 80)
Case-1
(12 Marks)
Boves and his followers are not the only critics of McDonalds. Leftists, anarchists, nationalists, farmers,
labour unions, environmentalists, consumer advocates, protectors of animal rights, religious orders and
intellectuals are equally critical of the fast food chain. For these and others, McDonalds represents an evil
America. Within hours after US bombers began to pound Afghanistan in 2001, angry Pakistanis damaged
McDonalds restaurants in Islamabad and an Indonesian mob burned an American flag.
McDonalds entered India in the late 1990s. On its entry, the company encountered a unique situation,
Majority of the Indians did not eat beet but the companys preparations contained cows meat. Nor could the
company use pork as Muslims were against eating it, This left chicken and mutton. McDonalds came out with
Maharaja Mac, which is made from mutton and McAloo Tikki Burger with chicken potato as the main
input. Food items were segregated into vegetarian and non-vegetarian categories.
Though it worked for sometime, this arrangement did not last long. In 2001, three Indian businessmen settled
in Seattle sued McDonalds for fraudulently concealing the existence of beef in its French fries. The company
admitted its guilt of mixing miniscule quantity of beef extract in the oil. The company settled the suit for $10
million and tendered an apology too. Further, the company pledged to label the ingredients of its food items,
and to find a substitute for the beef extract used in its oil.
McDonalds succeeded in spreading American culture in the East Asian countries. In Hong Kong and Taiwan,
the companys clean restrooms and kitchens set a new standard that elevated expectations throughout those
countries. In Hong Kong, childrens birthdays had traditionally gone unrecognised, but McDonalds introduced
the practice of birthday parties in its restaurants, and now such parties have become popular among the public.
A journalist set forth a Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention based on the notion that countries with
McDonalds restaurants do not go to war with each other. A British magazine, The Economist, prints an yearly
Big Mac Index that uses the price of a Big Mac in different foreign currencies to assess exchange rate
distortions.
Questions
1. What lessons can other MNCs learn from the experience of McDonalds?
2. Aware of the food habits of Indians, why did McDonalds err in mixing beef extract in the oil used for fries?
3. How far has McDonalds succeeded in strategising and meeting local cultures and needs?
CASE - 2
LATE MOVER ADVANTAGE?
(12 Marks)
(TOYOTA)
Though a late entrant, Toyota is planning to conquer the Indian car market. The Japanese auto major wants to
dispel the notion that the first mover enjoys an edge over the rivals who arrive late into a market.
Toyota entered the Indian market through the joint venture route, the partner being the Bangalore based
Kirloskar Electric Co. Known as Toyota Kirloskar Motor (TKM), the plant was set up in 1998 at Bidadi near
Bangalore.
To start with, TKM released its maiden offer Qualis. Qualis is not a newly conceived, designed, and brought
out vehicle. Rather it is the now avatar of Kijang under which brand the vehicle was sold in markets like
Indonesia.
Quails virtually had no competition. Telcos Sumo was not a multi-utility vehicle like Qualis. Rather, it was a
mini-truck converted into a rugged all-purpose van. More importantly, Toyota proved that even its old offering,
but decked up for India, could offer better quality than its competitor. Backed by a carefully thought out
advertising campaign that communicated Toyotas formidable global reputation, Qualis went on a roll and
overtook Tata Sumo within two years of launch.
Sumo sold 25,706 vehicles during 20002001, compared to a 3 per cent growth over the previous year,
compared to 25,373 of Qualis. But during 20012002, it was a different story. Quails had been clocking more
than 40 per cent share of the market. At the end of Sept 2001, Qualis had sold over 25,000 units, compared to
Sumos 18000 plus.
The heady initial success has made TKM think of the future with robust confidence. By 2010, TKM wants to
make and sell one million vehicles per year and garner one-third share of the Indian market.
The firm is planning to introduce a wide range of vehiclesa sub-compact, a sedan, a luxury car and a new
multi-utility vehicle to replace Quails. A significant percentage of the vehicles will be exported.
But Toyota is not as lucky in China. Its strategy of late entry in China seems to have back tired, In 2005, it
sold just 1,83,000 cars in China, the fastest growing auto market in the world. Toyota ranks ninth in the
market, far behind Volkswagen, General Motors, Hyundai and Honda.
Toyota delayed producing cars in China until 2002, when it entered a joint venture with a local company, the
First Auto Works Group (FAW). The first car manufactured by Toyota-FAW, the Vios, failed to attract much of
a market, as, despite its unremarkable design, it was three times as expensive as most cars sold in China.
Late start was not the only problem. There were other lapses too. Toyota assumed the Chinese market would
be similar to the Japanese market. But Chinese market, in reality, resembled the American market.
Sales personnel in Japan are paid salaries. They succeeded in building a loyal clientele for Toyota by providing
first-class service to them. Likewise, most Japanese auto dealers sell a single brand, thereby ensuring their
loyalty to it. Japan is a relatively a well-knit country with an ethnically homogeneous population. Accordingly,
Toyota used nationwide advertising to market its products in its home country.
But China is different. Sales people are paid commissions and most dealers sell multiple brands. Obviously,
loyalty plays little role in motivating either the sales staff or the dealers, who will ignore a slow selling product
should a more profitable one turn up. Besides, China is a large, diverse country. A standardised ad campaign
will not do. Luckily, Toyota is learning its lessons.
Competition in the Chinese market is tough, and Toyotas success in reaching its goal of selling a million cars
a year, by 2010, is uncertain. But, its chances are brighter as the company is able to transfer lessons learned in
the American market to its operations in China.
Questions
1. Why has the late corners strategy of Toyota failed in China, though it succeeded In India?
2. Why has Toyota failed to capture the Chinese market? Why is it trailing behind its rivals?
Case -3
(10 Marks)
new products could take four to five years. In addition, Unilever was handicapped by a high-cost structure
from the duplication of manufacturing facilities from country to country and by the companys inability to
enjoy the same kind to scale economies as P&G. Unilevers high costs ruled out its use of competitive pricing.
To change this situation, Unilever established product divisions to coordinate regionai operations. The 17
european companies now report directly to Lever Europe. Implicit in this new approach is a bargain: The 17
companies are relinquishing autonomy in their traditional markets in exchange for opportunities to help
develop and execute a unified pan-European strategy.
As a consequence of these changes, manufacturing is now being rationalised, with detergent production for the
European market concentrated in a few key locations. The number of European plants manufacturing soap has
been cut from 10 to 2, and some new products will be manufactured at only one site. Product sizing and
packaging are being harmonised to cut purchasing costs and to pave the way for unified pan-European
advertising. By taking these steps, Unilever estimates it may save as much as $400 million a year in its
European operations.
Lever Europe is attempting to speed its development of new products and to synchronise the launch of new
products throughout Europe. Its efforts seem to be paying off: A dishwasher detergent introduced in Germany
in the early 1990s was available across Europe a year latera distinct improvement.
But history still imposes constraints. Procter & Gambles leading laundry detergent carries the same brand
name across Europe, but Unilever sells its product under a variety of names. The company has no plans to
change this. Having spent 100 years building these brand names, it believes it would be foolish to scrap them
in the interest of pan-European standardisation.
Questions
1. What strategy was Unilever pursuing before its early 1990s reorganisation? What kind of structure did the
company have? Were Unilevers strategy and structure consistent with each other? What were the benefits of
this strategy and structure? What wore the drawbacks?
2. By the 1990s, was there still a fit between Unilevers strategy and structure and the operating environment
in which it competed? If not, why not?
3. What kind of strategy and structure did Unilever adopt in the 1990s? Is this appropriate given the
environment in which Unilever now competes? What are the benefits of this organisational and strategic shift?
What are the costs?
CASE 4
(6 Marks)
Questions
1) Is gross domestic product per capita a useful indicator of International competitiveness in the EU?
2) Is it fair to point the blame for the EUs poor international competitiveness at inflexible labour markets,
regulated goods and services markets, and a general lack of competition? What alternative explanations might
be suggested?
3) What appears to be the problem with the EUs banking sector?
4) Is the number of patents registered a useful indicator of superior International competitiveness? Why do
you think the USA does well in this area?
5) Should the EU consider more targeted intervention in the form of subsidies or strategic trade policy?
Group -B
Case 5
(20 Marks)
Over the years, Li & Fung executives have been continually looking for new suppliers in different countries.
After collecting market information, they identify the most promising vendors and then visit their factories to
verify the information furnished by them. After a tie-up has been finalised, Li & Fung educates the supplier on
procedures for making bids, placing and accepting orders, ensuring quality control and releasing payment. In
many cases, Li & Fung staff work closely with the supplier to improve the manufacturing and quality
assurance processes. Monitoring of supplies reduces progressively with the passage of time.
Currently, Li & Fung has a network of 44 offices in 30 countries. The company has access to some 7,500
suppliers and works with as many as 2,500 of them of any given time. Li & Fungs global network is
summarised in Table 16.2.
Li & Fungs product range now includes fashion accessories, festive products, furnishings, garments, giftware,
handicrafts, home products, sporting goods, toys, and travel goods. Tables 16.3 and 16.4 give details of Li &
Fungs business growth in the past five years.
At the start of the new millennium, Li & Fung has strengthened its Internet initiatives. The companys recently
launched website, Iifung.com is expected to help Li & Fung offer customised service to even small customers.
A web page provides a three-dimensional picture of the basic product along with choice of fabric, The website
allows a high degree of customisation at little extra cost. Buyers can choose buttons, pockets, and logos.
Li & Fung is a good illustration of what a small company in an emerging market can achieve in terms of
globalisation in a short span of time. In the early 1990s, Li & Fung was a trading company, dependent heavily
on China for sourcing its export Items. By the start of the new millennium, LI & Fung had put in place a global
network.
One reason for Li & Fungs rapid global expansion in the 1990s has been pressure from US and European
retailers to cut costs by moving to cheaper sourcing locations. This has prompted the company to move into
South Asia and Africa. Another globalisation driver has been shortening product lifecycles. Central American
arid Mediterranean operations help Li & Fung to serve the US and European markets much faster. Li & Fungs
global expansion is also a direct outcome of the companys intent to add more value to its trading activities.
Li & Fung has frequently extended its sourcing network to access new low cost locations. While developing a
new base, Li & Fung takes into account factors such as proximity to customers, wage levels, and
manufacturing capabilities. The major issues it had faced, are hiring local staff, developing new vendors,
dealing with local government bureaucracies, and coming to grips with local cultures. Typically, new
operations take some time to generate profits because they involve greater supervision and travel costs. As it
has expanded its overseas network, U & Fung has found itself dealing with a multitude of national trade
restrictions. With textiles being one of its most important products, the Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA) has
proved to be a major stumbling block. Under the MFA, each lower cost country is given an annual quota of
textile products it can export to higher cost countries. Governments of exporting countries, in turn divide these
quotas among different players. Over the years, Li & Fung has accumulated large quotas for different items
and for different countries.
The acquisition of Inchcape Marketing Services for $200 million in June 1999 has created an opportunity for
Li & Fung to emerge as a regional distribution power-house.
Not all of Li & Fungs attempts to enter new markets have been successful, the most spectacular failure having
taken place in Japan. The companys attempts to form a strategic alliance with consumer goods wholesaler,
Doshisha failed, for several reasons. Li & Fung did not accept the ambiguity of Japanese contracts. It also
could not come to terms with the unwillingness of Japanese retailers to take responsibility for overstocked
goods. William Fung has explained it away as a cultural problem: They (Doshisha employees) said: Why
should we go work with Li & Fung when I have this guy who goes drinking with me every Friday in Osaka?
In 1999, Japan represented only one per cent of Li & Fungs sales.
By the 1980s Hong Kong had become a relatively expensive and uncompetitive manufacturing location,
compared to other countries in South East and East Asia. In the transistor radio business, Hong Kong faced
intense competition from Taiwan and Korea. The situation prompted Li & Fung to improve efficiency and cut
costs by reconfiguring its value chain. The company began to send kits containing components to China for the
labour-intensive assembly process. The assembled transistors were then brought back to Hong Kong for
inspection and testing. Li & Fung replicated the strategy for Barbie dolls. It did the design work and prepared
the moulds in Hong Kong. The moulds were shipped to China, for plastic injection, painting, and tailoring of
the dolls clothing. Hong Kongs well-developed banking system facilitated efficient letter of credit negotiation
while its status as a regional shipping centre helped in the distribution of products around the world.
By the 1990s, Li & Fungs value chain configuration across countries had become even more sophisticated.
For a typical garment order from a retailer in the West, Li & Fung would decide to buy yarn from say, a
Korean producer, but do the weaving and dyeing in Taiwan. It would source zippers from the Chinese plants of
leading Japanese companies such as YKK. Based on quotas and cost of labour, Li & Fung would then decide
where the production of garments would take place. To reduce dependence on a single production point, the
order would typically be distributed among different factories with in the country (see Tables 16.5 and 16.6).
Li & Fungs value chain configuration across different countries has enabled it to reduce the time between
obtaining orders and their execution. With customer tastes rapidly changing, retailers in the west have six or
seven seasons a year. As a result, the business has became time sensitive. Li & Fung has attempted to build
excellent
POLITICAL AND CIVIL LIBERTIES AROUND THE WORLD
Activities done in-house
Activities outsourced
Design
Raw material and component sourcing
Engineering
Production
Production Planning
Quality Control
Testing
Logistics
rejected. Li & Fung has attempted to differentiate itself from its competitors by its ability to locate raw
materials and components. Trading staff have detailed Information on where the cheapest raw materials and
the materials such as embroidery, electronic components, and plastics are available. Li & Fungs suppliers
benefit from this information network.
Unlike many trading companies, which are divided on the basis of geographic regions, Li & Fung is divided
into divisions that are focused on a single customer or a group of customers.
Li & Fungs divisions are small, entrepreneurial, and empowered to take all. the relevant merchandising
divisions that go into coordinating a production programme for a customer, When Li & Fung acquires a large
customer, it often creates a separate division to serve the customer. For a smaller customer, an existing division
is assigned the responsibility, but usually with a dedicated team.
The divisional system aims to achieve quick compliance with the customers design, quality, shipping, and
invoicing needs.
Li & Fung has made each product group; executive responsible for one country, to make him or her sensitive
to local needs.
While allowing divisions to operate with a great deal of autonomy, Li & Fung has tightly centralized some
functions. A standardized and fully computerized information system allows headquarters to keep track of
orders and their execution. Financial controls are stringent, - especially in the case of working capital. The
Hong Kong headquarters centrally manages cash flows. All letters of credit come to Hong Kong for approval,
LI & Fungs day-to-day activities are handled by product group managers. Together with the top management,
they constitute the Policy Committee of 30 people. The committee typically meets every five to six weeks and
discusses various important issues such as ethical practices of suppliers and country of origin regulations. The
committee not only formulates policies hut also prescribes operating procedures to implement them.
Questions
1) In what way has operations management let competitive advantage to Li & Fung?
2) How effective is Li & Fungs value chain configuration? Ineffective? Discuss.
CASE 6
(20 Marks)
reference point for integrating and coordinating their domestic and international marketing activities. Thus, the
selection of market, mode of market, entry type of market presence, allocation of resources and overall
marketing strategy need to be consistent with and supportive of the companys long-term strategic objectives
and goalsa philosophy shared by Wipro.
GLOBAL
MARKETING
IN
WIPRO
AND
ITS
ANTECEDENTS
Foreign and domestic marketing are similar in that the purpose is to create and manage profitable exchange
relationships between an organisation amid its markets. This is done by satisfying the needs or wants of a
particular market more effectively and efficiently than the competitors. However, Wipro believes that this idea
is misplaced and cites three important aspects or factors that differentiate international marketing from
domestic marketing:
Legal systems
Management styles
Nature of competition
In Wipros case. the decision to go global was the outcome of forced circumstances rather than a planned
strategy. In other words, Wipro was not a proactive player. In retrospect, their strategies appear to be consonant
with three basic marketing philosophies, which we now describe.
1.
The
Market
Extension
Philosophy
In the initial stages of internationalising their operations. Wipro did not pay much attention to the specific
needs of foreign clients. They believed that they could satisfy the needs of their clients by providing similar
services as in the domestic market. Foreign markets were primarily viewed as outlets for surplus capacity. The
underlying assumption was that they are primarily interested in service availability at low cost.
2.
The
Multidomestic
Market
Philosophy
This concept builds on the belief that (a) different foreign markets can make significant contributions to the
company in the long run: (b) efficiency can be achieved if the foreign marketing activities of the firm were
integrated and coordinated in a way that accentuates the companys competitive advantages.
A company adopting the multidomestic market orientation assumes foreign marketing opportunities to be as
important as the domestic marketing opportunities. Basically, this approach has been the result of better
awareness that improved market performance was possible by integrating and coordinating foreign market
activities and experience in exploiting advantages. Thus the marketing strategy was differentiated to fit each
markets needs, given tis characteristics or peculiarities.
3.
The
Global
Marketing
Philosophy
Wipro has recently setup a global R&D centre in Bangalore. The objective is to have a dedicated team of
professionals catering to international marketing needs because of the vast potential of business opportunities
available. Their current strategy is in broad conformity with the global marketing philosophy. It is a systems
approach to international and domestic marketing. The strategy focuses on synergising market opportunities,
domestic and foreign so as to maximize joint profits or any other performance variable that is consistent with
the overall corporate objective. Essentially the whole world is viewed as a single market and opportunities are
selected by means of portfolio assessment and exploited in a way that is consistent with strategic objectives.
The services provided by Wipro are:
IT Services
Product design
Solutions
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPPORTUNITIES
The assessment process in Wipro consists of identifying, analyzing and selecting additional marketing
opportunities that meet the firms strategic objectives and create competitive advantage. Assessment enables
development of new marketing strategies and objectives and helps in the implementation and control of
marketing effort.
Types of Assessment
(i) Market entry assessment
Issues:
a) What is the nature and potential size of the market?
b) What is the political and economic climate prevalent in the market? (PEST analysis)?
c) What are the legal issues?
Increasingly using their overarching corporate strategy as a reference point for integrating and coordinating
their domestic and international marketing activities. Thus, the selection of market, mode of market entry, type
of market presence, allocation of resources and overall rnarketing strategy need to be consistent with and
supportive of the companys long-term strategic objectives and goalsa philosophy shared by Wipro.
GLOBAL MARKETING IN WIPRO AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
Foreign and domestic marketing are similar in that the purpose is to create and manage profitable exchange
relationships between an organisation and its markets. This is done by satisfying the needs or wants of a
particular market more effectively and efficiently than the competitors. However, Wipro believes that this idea
is misplaced and cites three important aspects or factors that differentiate international marketing from
domestic marketing:
Legal systems
Management styles
Nature of competition
In Wipros case, the decision to go global was the outcome of forced circumstances rather than a planned
strategy In other words, Wipro was not a proactive player. In retrospect, their strategies appear to be consonant
with three basic marketing philosophies, which we now describe:
1. The Market Extension Philosophy
In the initial stages of internationalising their operations, Wipro did not pay much attention to the specific
needs of foreign clients. They believed that they could satisfy the needs of their clients by providing similar
services as in the domestic market. Foreign markets were primarily viewed as outlets for surplus capacity. The
underlying assumption was that they are primarily interested in service availability at low cost.
2. The Multidomestic Market Philosophy
This concept builds on the belief that (a) different foreign markets can make significant contributions to the
company in the long run; (b) efficiency can be achieved if the foreign marketing activities of the firm were
integrated and coordinated in a way that accentuates the companys competitive advantages.
A company adopting the multidomestic market orientation assumes foreign marketing opportunities to be as
important as the domestic marketing opportunities. Basically, this approach has beer the of better awareness
that improved rnarket performance was possible by integrating and co-ordinating foreign market activities and
experience in exploiting advantages. Thus, the marketing strategy vas differentiated to fit each markets needs,
given its characteristics or peculiarities.
3. The Global Marketing Philosophy
Wipro has recently setup a global R&D centre in Bangalore. The objective is to have a dedicated team of
professionals catering to international marketing needs because of the vast potential of business opportunities
available. Their current strategy is in broad conformity with the global marketing philosophy. It is a systems
approach to international and domestic marketing. The strategy focuses on synergising market opportunities,
domestic and foreign so as to maximize joint profits or any other performance variable that is consistent with
the overall corporate objective. Essentially the whole world is viewed as a single market and opportunities are
selected by means of portfolio assessment and exploited in a way that is consistent with strategic objectives.
The services provided by Wipro are:
IT Services
Product design
Solutions
the overall corporate objective. Essentially the whole world is viewed as a single market and opportunities are
selected by means of portfolio assessment and exploited in a way that is consistent with strategic objectives.
The services provided by Wipro are:
IT Services
Product design
Solutions
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPPORTUNITIES
The assessment process in Wipro consists of identifying, analyzing and selecting additional marketing
opportunities that meet the firms strategic objectives and create competitive advantage. Assessment enables
development of new marketing strategies and objectives and helps in the implementation and control of
marketing
effort.
Types of Assessment
(i) Market entry assessment
Issues:
(a) What is the nature and potential size of the market?
(b) What is the political and economic climate prevalent in the market? (PEST analysis)?
(c) What are the legal issues?
(d) What are the resource requirements?
(e) What are the logistic requirements?
Wipro follows a four-step entry assessment procedure, which is illustrated below (refer to Chart 1).
Parties
Policies
Public opinion
Economic Environment
Infrastructure
Economic policies (GNP inflation, exchange rate)
Technology
Markets (customers, suppliers, competitors)
Legal Environment
Laws
Rules arid regulations
Practices
CUSTOMER AUDIT AT WIPRO FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
The International Business Division carries out the process of customer audit. The exercise, though complex,
gives them a clear profile about the potential or prospective customers. The evaluation is done on five basic
interrogatives.
1. What
benefits do the customers seek
factors influence demand
functions are provided by the product/service to the customer
are the important buying criteria
kind of product support services do the customers expect (post-sales)
2. How
do the customers buy
long does the buying process last
much are they willing to pay
do the customers use the product
does the product/service fit into their operations
3. Where
is the decision made
do customers seek information about the product
do customers buy the product
4. When
is the first decision to buy made
is the product repurchased
5. Why
do customers buy
do customers buy Wipro
Bargaining power of suppliers. Wipro does very little outsourcing for its projects, and hence this is not
perceived as a major threat.
Bargaining power of buyers. This is the biggest threat Wipro faces today. Presently, 50% of its revenue from
software exports is from customers like TANDEM, SUN, IBM, STRATACOM and NBC. Dependence on a
few major customers gives Wipro little scope for maneuvre. The company has made substantial in investments
in exclusive software development centres (SDCs) or SUN and TANDEM, as mentioned earlier, in the hope of
creating and maintaining a long-term business relationship. But with more and more exacting standards
emerging in the software industry because of the intense competition from the MNCs, Wipro has to continually
upgrade the quality of its work in order to justify their huge investments in SDCs.
Threat from substitute products/services. Currently, there is no major threat since the market is highly
segmented with different companies focussing on specialized areas of product development, a ready source of
competitive advantage. Wipros greatest strengths are technology and people, and they have managed to use
them successfully to execute major products for foreign clients like AT&T and STRATACOM. Figure 1
presents the major and minor threats facing Wipro.
Tables 1(a)(d) give data upto 1995. In Table 2 Wipros performance details upto 2000 are given
TABLE 1(a) International Business Division Performance
Year
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
Growth (%)
61
52
Exports
(Rs. Crores)
20
Middle East
Europe
Others
Total
6
4
1
31
19.5
13.0
3.0
1993-94
Region
Exports
(Rs. Crores)
32
11
6
1
50
North America
Middle East
Europe
Others
Total
1994-95
Region
Exports
(Rs. Crores)
40
10
17
9
76
North America
Middle East
Europe
Others
Total
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1992-93
(Rs)
160.000
150.000
200.000
190.000
Wipro
TISL
TCS
HCL-HP
1993-94
(Rs)
240.000
260.000
300.000
340.000
1994-95
(Rs)
350.000
375.000
400.000
540.000
Total sales
(Rs million)
Sales growth
(%)
Export
(Rs. Million)
Growth
(%)
1999-2000
1998-1999
1997-1998
1996-1997
1995-1996
23129
18308
14269
12630
11610
26
28
13
9
10506
6325
3917
2586
760
66
61
51
52
Table 2 summarises the performance of Wipro between 1995-96 to 19992000 in terms of sales, sales
growth, export, export growth and operating profit for the international software business. There has been
impressive export growth of 66%. The software exported stood at Rs 10,506 million in 1999-2000 showing an
operating profit of 18.5%.
RESEARCH ACTIVITIES AT WIPRO
The collection, analysis and dissemination of information is increasingly becoming a key factor in a firms
business agenda. Towards this end, a great deal of market research activities is undertaken to aid managers and
specialized work groups to make quick and effective decisions. Broadly, the activities undertaken by Wipro are
as follows:
Corporate Responsibility Research
Consumers right to know studies
Cross-national managerial studies
Corporate Strategy Research
Corporate business unit portfolio studies
Analysis_of strength of channel relationships
Analysis of shared costs of activities of business units
Resource studies
Economic and political trend analysis
Competitor studies
Market Research
Market potential studies
Market share analysis
Market characteristics studies
Distribution channel studies
Sales analysis
Competitor product studies
Marketing Research
Product/Service testing
Price elasticity studies
Branding studies
Questions
1. Do a SWOT analysis for Wipro in the Indian market context and discuss the appropriateness (or otherwise)
of its domestic strategy.
2. Are Wipros forays into the international markets with respect to entry, mode, etc. right? If not, what are the
alternatives you would suggest?
3. How can Wipros corporate strategy be kept flexible enough to adapt to increasing competition and
changing realities?
4. Attempt a technology road map for Wipro for the next five years Chart a course of strategy w.r.t. markets,
which the company can adopt.