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ASSIGNMENT NO.

4- CASE DIGESTS
JAYSON ABABA

Carmen DanaoMalana, Maria DanaoAcorda, Evelyn Danao, FerminaDanao, Leticia


Danao And Leonora Danao, The Last Twoare Represented Herein By Their Attorney-InFact, Maria DanaoAcorda,
- Versus BenignoTappa, Jerry Reyna, SaturninoCambriAnd Spouses Francisco And Maria Ligutan
G.R. No. 18130; September 17, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages against respondents alleging that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated
in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Petitioners inherited the subject property from AnastacioDanao
(Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig
to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo
agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might
need it.
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the
subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent
materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject
property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the
same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the LupongTagapamayapa of
Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents
asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting
their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious,
falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property;
nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus, petitioners were
compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title. However,
such complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No.
7691, amending Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less
than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their
Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title;
the accionreivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from
respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It
reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the
assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject
property was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the
RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They
reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action
to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there was
no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a
single Complaint. And even if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners
maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their
Complaint.
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion. It clarified that
their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack
of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article
1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be
brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies,
which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in
relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions,
where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or Rule 63, Section 1 (declaratory relief) is properly invoked in the instant case.

HELD:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No.
02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of
the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was
filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before
the LupongTagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of
an accionpubliciana or
an accionreivindicatoria,
not
a
case
for
declaratory
relief. An accionpubliciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty. An accionreivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over
the real property as owner.
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accionreivindicatoria. Jurisdiction
over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject
property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an
action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of
jurisdiction.
Planters Development Bank vs. James Ng, et. al.
G.R. No. 187556
May 5, 2010
Facts: James Ng and his brother Anthony (respondents) obtained loans from petitioner
amounting to P25,000,000.00 to secure which they mortgaged two parcels of land situated in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and covered by TCT Nos. 79865 and 79866 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City.
Respondents failed to settle their loan obligation; hence, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage before Notary Public Stephen Z. Taala.The Notice of Auction Sale
scheduled the sale of the properties covered by the mortgage at the Main Entrance of the Hall of
Justice Building in Quezon City.The Notice was published in Metro Profile, a newspaper of
general circulation.
The highest bidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a Certificate of Sale
that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
As respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within one year, petitioner filed an exparte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, lodged before RTC-QC, Branch 77.
In the meantime, respondents instituted an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale,
Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage, raffled to RTC-QC, Branch 221 which issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties and
committing any act of dispossession that would defeat respondents right of ownership.
RTC-QC, Branch 77 denied the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, it filed, before this
Court, the present petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law, in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the denial of the issuance of the writ of possession is valid
Held: It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure as well as
the sale of the property covered by the mortgage cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance
of a writ of possession. Any such questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding as in
fact, herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory
Note and Deed of Mortgage.
The court a quo denied the issuance of the writ as it credited respondents opposition to
petitioners petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

By crediting respondents opposition, Branch 77 of the court a quo pre-empted its co-equal
branch, Branch 221, to which jurisdiction over respondents annulment petition was laid, from
determining the merits of respondents claim-basis of said petition.
Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed
or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the
certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; x xx
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy.
Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period, entitlement to
the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial
function.
The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity
of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until the foreclosure sale is annulled, the
issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.
In fact, even during the period of redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of right to a writ of
possession provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale is
shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law. More so
when, as in the present case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in the
purchaser.
In fine, it was grievous error for QC-RTC, Branch 77 to deny petitioners motion for the issuance
of a writ of possession.

G.R. No. 160208; June 30, 2008


RAFAEL R. MARTELINO, BARCHELECHU S. MORALES, ROSELYN S.
CACHAPERO, REYNALDO R. EVANGELISTA, CESAR B. YAPE, LEONORA R.
PARAS, SEGUNDINA I. IBARRA, RAQUEL G. HALNIN, ZAMORA I. DIAZ, and
ARTHUR L. VEGA,*
Petitioners,
- versus
NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND,
Respondents.

FINANCE

CORPORATION

and

HOME

FACTS:
The case stemmed from the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with urgent prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed before the RTC
of Caloocan City, by petitioners against the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), herein respondents, and Sheriff
Alberto A. Castillo.Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing loans from respondents who
directly released the proceeds thereof to the subdivision developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc.
(Shelter).
However, Shelter failed to complete the subdivision according to its representations and the
subdivision plan. They were thus compelled to spend their own resources to improve the
subdivision roads and alleys, and to install individual water facilities. Respondents, on the other
hand, failed to ensure Shelters completion of the subdivision. Instead, respondents ignored their
right to suspend amortization payments for Shelters failure to complete the subdivision, charged
interests and penalties on their outstanding loans, threatened to foreclose their mortgages and
initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino. Hence, they prayed that
respondents be restrained from foreclosing their mortgages.
Moreover, petitioners specifically sought a declaration from the RTC that their right as house and
lot buyers to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to fully develop the subdivision also
applied to respondents who released their loans directly to Shelter; and that during the
suspension of payment, respondents should not assess them accrued interests and penalties.
Petitioners further prayed that they be allowed to pay their housing loans without interest and
penalties.
In its June 17, 1998 Order, the RTC set the preliminary injunction hearing, On July 9, 1998, the
RTC ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents from
foreclosing the mortgages on petitioners houses.The writ was issued on July 14, 1998.
On August 10, 1998, the NHMFC filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Petition on
the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over its person or over the subject matter of the case.

In dismissing the case, the RTC ruled that the issue of non-completion of the subdivision should
have been brought before the HLURB. It also ruled that no judicial declaration can be made
because the petition was vague. The RTC assumed that the subject of the petition was Republic
Act No. 8501 or the Housing Loan Condonation Act of 1998 which was cited by petitioners. But
the RTC pointed out that petitioners failed to state which section of the law affected their rights
and needed judicial declaration. The RTC also noted that, as stated by petitioners, respondents
still foreclosed their mortgages, a breach of said law which rendered the petition for declaratory
relief improper. The proper remedy was an ordinary civil action, the RTC concluded
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE.
Whether declaratory relief is not the proper remedy
HELD
Yes, declaratory relief is not the proper remedy.
under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or
violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order,
regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. In this case, the petitioners had
stated in their petition that respondents assessed them interest and penalties on their outstanding
loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the
notice of extra-judicial sale and threatened to foreclose the mortgages of the other petitioners, all
in disregard of their right to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to complete the
subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one thing: petitioners had already suspended paying
their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual suspension of payments defeated the
purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed right to suspend
payment, for their guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the action
for declaratory relief because its subject initially unspecified, now identified as P.D. No. 957 and
relied upon -- correctly or otherwise -- by petitioners, and assumed by the RTC to be Rep. Act
No. 8501, was breached before filing the action. As we said in Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:
. . . The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where
the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action
for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the
action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already
accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to
explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order

DARIO
vs
176 SCRA 84
Status and Characteristics
Creation, Reorganization, and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

MISON

FACTS: On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3,
"DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY
THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL
CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A
GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION. Among other things, Proclamation No. 3
provided:
SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people
to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all
iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in
her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy
resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she abolished the
BatasangPambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety
and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government
reorganization had generated, and prescribed several grounds for the separation/replacement of
personnel.
Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986: WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil
service, it is necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said
constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and performance
meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and to ensure that only those
found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated from the government service.
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on
the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.
The Presidents Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We quote,
in part: Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered
that there will be no further lay-offs this year of personnel as a result of the government
reorganization.
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING

THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for
the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive
Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. On the same date, Commissioner
Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from
removals under the above Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed
several notices to various Customs officials.
A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of
separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board
while others went to the Civil Service Commission. The first thirty one mentioned above came
directly to this Court. The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394
Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the
reinstatement of the 279 employees. On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the
Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil Service
Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. On October 20, 1988,
Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court.
On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the
resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees. On January 6, 1989,
Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commissions Resolution in this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 127, which provided for the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs is valid
RULING: Yes. There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government
reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs by mandate not only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various
Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority
under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted that under the present
Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a government reorganization may be
legitimately undertaken, subject to certain conditions.
RATIO:Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
(11)
TOMATIC ARATUC VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

Facts:
Petitioners are independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim BatasangPambansa who
had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan. They complained of alleged
irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del
Sur, and eleven towns in Sultan Kudarat, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the
returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. The Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of petitioners, declaring all eight KBL
candidates elected.
Appeal was taken by the petitioners to the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winners. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging that the
COMELEC committee grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON certiorari is the proper remedy
Ruling:
This is as it should be. A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist
even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the
law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived
at without rational deliberation. While the effects of an error of judgment may not differ from
that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their nature ought to be left
for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the
Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent
arbitrariness.
We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be
and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing contentions
of the parties in this cases.
EMELINDA ABEDES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Sometime in 1996, respondent ReliaQuizonArciga filed an action before the RTC of Pasig
City against Wilfredo, husband of herein petitioner EmelindaAbedes, seeking support for her
daughter, Dannielle Ann Arciga. A Decision was therein rendered, declaring Wilfredo the natural
father of Danielle Ann. Wilfredo was similarly ordered by the RTC of Pasig City to support
Danielle Ann. A writ of execution was issued. Unfortunately, the Sheriff's Return showed that no
personal property of Wilfredo could be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. Later, a real property
was discovered to be allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo in the Province of Tarlac.
Herein petitioner filed a Third Party Claim. Petitioner alleged that the property belongs
exclusively to her, and Wilfredo had no present and existing right thereto. Therefore, it may not

be utilized to satisfy the judgment rendered against her husband Wilfredo. Notwithstanding the
adverse claim, a Notice of Sheriff's Sale was made announcing the sale to the public and to the
highest bidder. For such purpose, a public auction was scheduled. Petitioner filed a Complaint
for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO which was also granted.
The RTC of Tarlac City opined that the property is petitioner's paraphernal property. As her
exclusive property, it may not be made liable for the obligations of Wilfredo. Even assuming that
the property is part of the conjugal partnership, it may not be held liable for the support of
Danielle Ann who is an illegitimate child of Wilfredo. Hence, the RTC enjoined respondent
Sheriff RonbertoValino from conducting the public sale of the property. However, CA reversed
the decision. Abedes filed a motion for reconsideration raising issue of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper
Held: No. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. An appeal by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment complained of,
while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. We have underscored that the
remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In the case at bar, the Resolution of the
appellate court which denied reconsideration of its Decision was received by petitioner on 2
August 2005. She had until 17 August 2005 within which to perfect her appeal. However, none
was made. Instead, she comes to this Court via a petition for certiorari in an effort to salvage her
lost appeal. Evidently, appeal was available to petitioner. It was also the speedy and adequate
remedy under the circumstances. Petitioner was unable to show that there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petition is dismissed.

G.R. NO. 165001

January 31, 2007

NEW
FRONTIER
SUGAR
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY and EQUITABLE PCI
BANK, Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS: New Frontier Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
raw sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell
due, petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with
Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation. RTC issued a Stay Order appointing Manuel B. Clemente as rehabilitation
receiver, ordering the latter to put up a bond, and setting the initial hearing on the petition.

One of petitioners creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion
to Exclude Property, alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can
no longer operate because it has no assets left. Respondent bank also alleged that the financial
statements, schedule of debts and liabilities, inventory of assets, affidavit of general financial
condition, and rehabilitation plan submitted by petitioner are misleading and inaccurate since its
properties have already been foreclosed and transferred to respondent bank before the petition
for rehabilitation was filed, and petitioner still owes respondent bank deficiency liability.
RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and dismissing the case.Petitioner
filed an Omnibus Motion but this was denied by the RTC. Petitioner then filed with the CA a
special civil action for certiorari, which was denied by the CA by sustaining the findings of the
RTC that since petitioner no longer has sufficient assets and properties to continue with its
operations and answer its corresponding liabilities, it is no longer eligible for rehabilitation. The
CA also ruled that even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be
corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA was a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it as improper,
appeal being an available remedy.
RULING: No. The CA did not err in upholding the RTCs dismissal of the petition for
rehabilitation in view of the fact that the titles to petitioners properties have already passed on to
respondent bank and petitioner has no more assets to speak of, specially since petitioner does not
dispute the fact that the properties which were foreclosed by respondent bank comprise the bulk,
if not the entirety, of its assets.
The Interim Rules was enacted to provide for a summary and non-adversarial rehabilitation
proceedings. This is in consonance with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case, which is
aimed to be resolved expeditiously for the benefit of all the parties concerned and the economy
in general.
As provided in the Interim Rules, the basic procedure is as follows:
1) The petition is filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court;
2) If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court shall issue
a Stay Order, which shall provide, among others, for the appointment of a Rehabilitation
Receiver; the fixing of the initial hearing on the petition; a directive to the petitioner to
publish the Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines once a week for
two (2) consecutive weeks; and a directive to all creditors and all interested parties
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission) to file and serve on the debtor a
verified comment on or opposition to the petition, with supporting affidavits and
documents.
3) Publication of the Stay Order;

4) Initial hearing on any matter relating to the petition or on any comment and/or
opposition filed in connection therewith. If the trial court is satisfied that there is merit in
the petition, it shall give due course to the petition;
5) Referral for evaluation of the rehabilitation plan to the rehabilitation receiver who shall
submit his recommendations to the court;
6) Modifications or revisions of the rehabilitation plan as necessary;
7) Submission of final rehabilitation plan to the trial court for approval;\
8) Approval/disapproval of rehabilitation plan by the trial court;
In the present case, the petition for rehabilitation did not run its full course but was dismissed by
the RTC after due consideration of the pleadings filed before it. On this score, the RTC cannot be
faulted for its summary dismissal, as it is tantamount to a finding that there is no merit to the
petition. This is in accord with the trial courts authority to give due course to the petition or not
under Rule 4, Section 9 of the Interim Rules. Letting the petition go through the process only to
be dismissed later on because there are no assets to be conserved will not only defeat the reason
for the rules but will also be a waste of the trial courts time and resources.
The CA also correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special
civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an
original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of
the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an
original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court
prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice
of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to
the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the
alleged errors.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs VILMA ALMENDRAS y ZAPATA ET. AL.


(G.R. NO. 145915 April 24, 2003)
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Almendras were arrested by the PNP NARCOM of Calamba,
Laguna for selling Shabu at the Mountain View Resort Restaurant in Pansol between the hours
of three to six in the morning of June 18, 1998.

The prosecution rested its case and reception of defense evidence was then set for for
May 12, 13, and 17, 1999.
On May 10, 1999, defense counsel move for leave to a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence
and the admission of said Demurrer with alternative prayer for bail. The trial court denied the
Demurrer to Evidence and ruled that what is material in a prosecution for sale of an illegal drug
is proof that both the marked money and the shabu were presented in open court.
The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court gravely abused its
judicial disretion in denying their demurrer to evidence and their prayer for bail.
On March 20, 2000, defense counsel moved to suspend proceedings of the trial court
pending the final disposition by the Court of Appeals on their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Mandamus.
The trial court resumed and promulgated its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced to death.
ISSUE:
Whether trial court erred in proceeding to resolve the case without awaiting the resolution
of CA in the appellants petition for certiorari?
RULING:
The case for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction, which
was filed by the defense counsel with the CA to assail the trial courts denial of their demurrer to
evidence, did not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary
periods involved in the proceedings.
Settled is the rule that to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of
certiorari proceedings, there must be restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from
the appellate court directed to the lower court. There was none in the instant case.
Case remanded to the trial court for reception of defense evidence.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EDGAR D. GUSTILO, Presiding Judge, Branch 28,
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, NANCY
L. TY, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER, PILAR D. ONGKING,
ELIZABETH H. PALMA, DOLLY W. LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO, ADD
INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., respondents.

Facts: Banco Filipino Filipino had reached the allowable limit in branch site holdings but
contemplated further expansion of its operations and Consequently, it unloaded some of its
holdings to Tala Realty. Banco Filipino thereafter leased the same branch sites from Tala Realty
which was conceived and organized precisely as a transferee corporation by the major
stockholderof Banco Filipino. After the issuance of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to TalaRealtys certificate of registration, the board of directors of Banco Filipino
authorized negotiations for the sale of some of its branch sites, through a Board Resolution with
other numerous real properties owned by the former being treated the same to the latter.
The instant case originated from the sale by Banco Filipino to Tala Realty of four (4) lots in
Iloilo City, covered and described in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and 62274, for two
million one hundred ten thousand pesos (P2,110,000.00) Tala Realty then leased them back to
Banco Filipino for a monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00) /for a period of
twenty (20) years and renewable for another twenty (20) years. The lease contracts of the other
branch sites sold to Tala Realty have substantially similar terms and conditions, except for the
amount of the rent.
Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill from Banco Filipino,
with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply thereto. Due to Banco Filipinos failure to
comply with TalaRealtys terms, the latter carried out its threat by filing numerous ejectment suits
against Banco Filipino This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995, an action for
recovery of real properties before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground of
breach of trust.
The court rendered judgment in favor of Tala Realty to wit;
A thorough and careful perusal was made by the undersigned Presiding Judge of
the arguments of opposing counsels, ventilated in their respective memoranda.
Opposing counsels cited the pertinent Supreme Court Circulars, provisions of the
Rules of Court and related Decisions of the Supreme Court in support of their
arguments.
After weighing the foregoing, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the
contention of the defendants in their motions to dismiss, etc., is meritorious.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the defendants separate motions to dismiss
are hereby granted Therefore, let this case be, as it is hereby Dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
the trial court denied Banco Filipinos motion for reconsideration.Banco Filipino received a copy
of said order of denial July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals dismissed
Banco Filipinos petition on the ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioners recourse to Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court is patently malapropos. Banco Filipinos failure to appeal by writ
of error within the reglementary period and its belated recourse to a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to
resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in failing to correct by certiorari the
dismissal order by the rtc and that respondent court gravely erred in ruling that a writ of error
should be the proper remedy instead of a petition for certiorari under rule 65
HELD: Banco Filipinos proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals is
an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.We
have said time and again that for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by reason of grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion, must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility.
Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipinos bare assertion that the Court of
Appeals rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.
The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the
Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari. This Court
has often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[36]
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco Filipinos
recourse to a special civil action for certiorariwas borne not out of the conviction that grave
abuse of discretion attended the resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply
because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 to
serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason therefor.
Banco Filipino from the order of the RTC, it filed its petition for certiorari some fourteen (14)
days after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Likewise,
when it filed its petition for certiorari before this Court, forty five (45) days have already
passed since the end of the fifteen (15) day reglementary period for filing an appeal to the
Supreme Court.

Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. There must be
exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules, we cannot find any such
exceptional circumstances in this case and neither has Banco Filipino endeavored to prove the
existence of any. Another elementary rule of procedure applies and that is the doctrine that
perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory,
and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to
entertain the appeal

Felix Uy Chua vs. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 121438
October 23, 2000
FACTS:
Sometime in July 1984, a probate court allowed the sale of the lot located in Cebu for
P200,000.00 to the spouses Enriquez. Later, the spouses and Aida, the heir of the decedent,
agreed to rescind the said sale. On January 1988, the probate court again issued an order
allowing the re-sale of said lot, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the P200,000.00
already paid by the Enriquez spouses. On April 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale thereof was
executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private respondent, for P1,000,000.00 payable with a
down payment of P500,000.00 and the balance to be paid after the lot was cleared of squatters.
On July 1991, IntervenorSagrario Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the sale
alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of he decedent. He claimed that the lot
could be sold for P1.5 million pesos. Judge Abarquez held a conference in chambers attended by
Aida and her counsel Atty. Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos, counsel of Sagrario
Morelos, and Atty. Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who represented undisclosed clients
interested to purchase the land. During the conference, Atty. Cabilao revealed that he offered P2
million pesos for the lot with the seller undertaking the eviction of the present occupants, or P1.5
million with the buyer shouldering the expenses to clear the lot of its present occupants. Aida
objected to Atty. Cabilao's statement. She explained that the latter's offer was made only after the
sale to Sanchez was already approved by the court.
On August 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his Proposal to Purchase
the Property. In her comment and opposition to the proposal of Atty. Cabilao, Aida Morada said
that the court's order approving the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become final and
executory, and that she had bought the land from the administratrix in good faith and for value.
She added that she should not suffer whatever missteps were committed by the administratrix.
On November 1991, Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval of the sale and
declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he had earlier approved on the basis
that the Administratrix deliberately concealed from the Court the fact that Sanchez had extended

to her a loan of P300,000.00 before the execution of the Deed of Sale and that the said amount
was already deducted by Sanchez from the down payment of P500,000.00 where the procedure
jointly resorted to by the Administratrix and by Sanchez was tantamount to a foreclosure of their
loose mortgage agreement, a procedure that is not allowed to take place in a probate court.
Almost immediately after his order, Judge Abarquez also approved the proposal of Atty. Cabilao
to purchase the property for P1.5 million.
On January 1992, Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a counter-offer of P1.6
million, a hundred thousand pesos more than the amount offered by Atty. Cabilao. The motion
was denied in an order dated February 25, 1992. The court said that the Order approving the sale
to Atty. Cabilao had become final and executory and that the counter offer was not a compelling
reason for the court to vacate its order. As it turned out, the property was bought by Felix Uy
Chua, Roberto Iping Chua and Richard Uy Chua, the clients of Atty. Cabilao who are now
petitioners before this Court.
Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent Judges
Abarquez and Alio-Hormachelos abused their discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
they issued the questioned orders.
The appellate court granted the petition in favor of private respondent Sanchez and the Deed of
Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and reinstated. Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court held the proper remedy was to appeal under Rule 65.
Petitioners allege that the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45 under
which private respondent was already time-barred and the Court of Appeals should not have
taken cognizance of the petition. Petitioners misread the applicable law, Rules and precedents.

A special civil action for certiorari challenging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion may be
instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Both have original concurrent
jurisdiction. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While ordinarily, certiorari is
unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of
justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; (d) or when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As early as Crisostomo vs. Endencia, we
held:

". . . The remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an
appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having been lost with or
without the appellant's negligence, the court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or
decision which is the subject matter of the remedy."
The questioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to Sanchez after it approved the
sale and after its order of approval had become final and executory amount to oppressive
exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

(20) Solano
(21) Ingan
(22)
ROMYS FREIGHT SERVICE, vs. CASTRO
G.R. No. 141637
June 8, 2006
FACTS:
Private respondent Castro and Veloria were hired by petitioner as a mechanic and as a carpenter ,
respectively. Castro suffered a stroke while Veloria suffered an accident when the overheated
water coming from the radiator of a car he was repairing spurted onto his face, burning it.
Both received show cause letters requiring them to explain why they should not be disciplined.
Petitioner filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against Castro and charged Veloria for
qualified theft of the missing tools. Because of petitioners acts against them, both joined in
filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal against petitioner.
For its part, petitioner denied that private respondents were dismissed from their employment,
asserting that private respondents abandoned their work.
Executive Labor Arbiter
JesselitoLatoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay
private respondents the total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th month pay, backwages,
separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and attorneys fees.
Private respondents moved for the clarification of the decision, specifically on the award of
backwages in their favor. While the decision discussed their entitlement to backwages, it was not
included in the computation of the judgment award in the dispositive portion of the decision. The
labor arbiter, in his order, recognized his inadvertence and granted the motion. He amended the
decision and increased the award to P985,529.20 to include backwages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which, in its decision, reversed and set aside the labor arbiters
ruling. It found private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and dismissed their
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.3

Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were
constructively dismissed by petitioner.
The appellate court granted the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of the labor arbiter were
supported by substantial evidence, it should be respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner failed
to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing private respondents,
hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal.
The CA held that the respondents failure to report for work was for justifiable reasons and that
they had no intention to sever their employment. As a consequence, the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the NLRC.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct that the petition for certiorari of private respondents should have been
dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before filing the
petition for certiorari with the CA.
HELD:
Yes. SC affirmed the CA decision.
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. Private
respondents petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions.
The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private
respondents were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue
raised before the NLRC and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was
proper for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no motion for
reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.
The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The
phrase grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not encompass an error of
law. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties respective
evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.

The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include
the review of public respondents evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based
thereon. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions the affirmation
by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private respondents were illegally
dismissed, entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and
attorneys fees.

VANGIE BARRAZONA,
Petitioner,
versus
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and
SAN-AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by
RODRIGO CHUA TIU,
Respondents.
FACTS:
San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building located at Naguilian
corner Asin Road, Baguio City. VangieBarrazona, petitioner, has been leasing portions of the
building identified as Units 203 A and B at the second floor. The period of the lease is for two (2)
years, commencing July 15, 2001 and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly rental is P400.00 per
square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter for Unit 203 B.
Starting August 2001, petitioner defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to pay
despite demands by respondent. Thus, on May 14, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC, Branch
61, Baguio City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages.
On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others,
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations therein
clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Barroza, petitioner, filed the instant
Petition for Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Resolution
denying her Motion to Dismiss is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis.
On the other hand, respondent RTC Baguio City, in praying for the dismissal of the petition,
contends that (1) the complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is absolutely no
allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner from the premises; (2) petitioner should have first
filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari; and (3)

the assailed order denying petitioners motion to dismiss is interlocutory and, therefore, cannot be
the subject of a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether Motion for reconsideration should have been filed prior to filing certiorari;
(2) Whether denial of motion to dismiss which is an interlocutory order be subject of a
petition for certiorari

RULING:
(1) YES.
While the complaint is captioned Collection of Sum of Money with Damages, the
allegations therein show that respondents action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are
within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Hence, the RTC of Baguio has no jurisdiction over
the case.
While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non appeallable,
however, if the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition
are proper remedies from such order of denial.
In Time, Inc. v. Reyes, this Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held: The
motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent courts lack of jurisdiction to
entertain the action; and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or
prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the
basis of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(2) YES.
The Supreme Court cannot go along with respondents contention that petitioner should
have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of certiorari.
While the rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a
motion for reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order complained
of, however, such rule is not without exception.
The SC have, in several instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of a lower courts ruling, such as:
a. where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a patent nullity;

b. where the question is purely of law;


c. when public interest is involved;
d. where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; and
e. where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, as in this case

(24) Dayag
(25)
Militante vs. Court of Appeals
330 SCRA 318
Facts: Petitioner PiloMilitante is the registered owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,590 square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. The three parcels are
covered by TCT Nos. 53066-A, 53067 and 53068, all derived from TCT No. 71357 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Twenty-four (24) squatter families live in these lots.
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315expropriating forty (40) hectares of
land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. 70298, and 73960, and portions of
TCT Nos. 71357, 2017 and 2018.
The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that required the upgrading of
basic facilities and services and the disposal of the lots to their bona fide occupants in accordance
with the national Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Program and the Metro Manila
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP).It set aside P40 million as the maximum amount of just
compensation to be paid the landowners.
The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national government, undertook the
implementation of P.D. 1315 in 7 phases called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The properties
covered by Phases 1 to 6 were acquired in 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes
petitioners land, was not among those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979.
Proclamation No. 1893 declared the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform
Zone. Proclamation No. 1893 was amended by Proclamation No. 1967 which identified 244
sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
P.D. No. 1396 created the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and placed the NHA under
the supervision of said Department.Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatory functions
of the NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a quasi-judicial body
attached to the DHS.
Petitioner wrote the HSRC seeking a declaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land Reform
Program of the government. HSRC Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a certificate
declaring petitioners lots "outside the declared Urban Land Reform Zone."

With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on the
request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General Manager, sent a letter to Mayor
MacarioAsistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the families occupying petitioners
lots.
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the possibility of amicably settling the
eviction problem and/or to find out why a clearance should be issued or not for the removal/
demolition of all the illegal structures in the said property."The squatters did not attend the
meeting. In view of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division Manager,
Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the Department Manager, Resettlement
Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures on
petitioners property within three (3) months from receipt of the order. Clearance was also granted
for the relocation of the 24 families to the SapangPalay Resettlement Project.
The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated September 16, 1982, General Tobias inquired
from Mayor Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans of developing petitioners properties in the
Bagong Barrio Project. Mayor Asistio replied that "considering the said properties are private in
character, the City has no plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or underwrite the
development of said properties."
BBP Phase 7 was listed as among the priority projects for implementation under the governments
Community Self-Help Program.The NHA, through General Tobias, approved an emergency fund
of P2 million for the acquisition of petitioners lots. NHA started negotiations with petitioner.
Petitioner, through an authorized representative, made an initial offer of P200.00 per square
meter. The NHA made a counter-offer of P175.00 per square meter. Petitioner increased his price
to P1,000.00 and later to P3,000.00. NHA General Manager Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. informed
petitioner that NHAs maximum offer was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner, through his
lawyer.
Petitioner, through counsel, requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and
relocation of the squatters.
NHA General Manager Monico Jacob revalidated the demolition clearance and informed Mayor
Asistio that the NHA was making available enough serviced home lots in BagongSilang
Resettlement Project for the 24 families.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to
implement the clearance to eject the squatters on petitioners land. Carangdang claimed that
petitioners land had already been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315"
against the NHA and Carangdang.

The respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that petitioner failed to
overcome the presumption of the decrees constitutionality.Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of prohibition. Whether the petitioner is entitled
to a writ of mandamus
Held: Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Section 2 of Rule 65 provides:
"Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein.
x xx."
Prohibition is a preventive remedy.It seeks for a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from
continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to
desist from relocating the squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdangs
refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The
remedy for a refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus. Section 3, Rule 65 provides:
"Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the defendant."
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required
to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.He failed to discharge this burden. The records show

that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang
to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA demolition
clearance issued by General Tobias was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City.
The clearances revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico Jacob was likewise addressed to
Mayor Asistio.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamus is
premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. If superior
administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions are generally not
entertained.In the instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may
seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to
respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the Government Corporate
Counsel asserts that petitioner should have brought Carangdangs inaction to the attention of her
superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrative
set-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure to act.The General Manager, as Chief
Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of supervision over the operations and internal
affairs of NHA.

ENG VS LEE
FACTS:
Nixon Lees father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will,
which is now in the custody of petitioner UyKiaoEng, his mother. Nixon Lee filed, on May 28,
2001, a petition for mandamus with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
to compel his mother to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof
could be instituted.
Allegedly, Lee had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs
estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason.
KiaoEng traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for noncompliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. She denied that she was in custody
of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted
that photocopies of the will were given to Lee and to his siblings.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent Lees
evidence, petitioner KiaoEng demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
her custody the original holographic will.
She asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being
hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition and that they did

not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the
writ of mandamus.
RTC denied the demurrer but granted the same upon motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied and the case was dismissed.
Aggrieved, Lee appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which was denied or lack
of merit. However, it was granted when respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate
court amended its decision, granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and
ordered the production of the will anchored on the basis that this time respondent was able to
show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
KiaoEng moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Left with no other recourse
KiaoEng brought the case before the Supreme Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in denying
her motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy
RULING:
NO.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation
of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the
idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which
the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public
right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if

the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a
rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b]
that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private
contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a
public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right
against an individual The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public
and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to
the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual
modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a
legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by
equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the
court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here is the production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because
there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition.
The petition for review on certiorari was granted.

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