COMMUNICATION THEORY AND LINGUISTIC THEORY

V. B. Kassevich
(St. Petersburg, Russia)
(// The Speaker and the Listener: A Linguistic Personality, Text, Problems of Learning.- SPb.,
2001.- P. 70-75)
The present small report does not claim to resolve global problems concerning the relation
between the linguistic theory, or linguistics, and the communication theory. Leaving alone the
available answers, not all the questions associated with these fields can be explicitly stated now.
To begin with, it should be mentioned that, apparently, the treatment of linguistics as linguistic
theory will not be generally sustained. So far it has been widely assumed that language is a
static system, "competence", taking into account a system of rules of linguistic units' structure sentences, word phrases (groups, constituents), words, etc. There is certain logic in
postgenerativism's denial of the concept of "a rule", so significant in early periods of
generativism's development, as well as in turning to the concept of "constraint" instead: rules
suggest a dynamic approach, approach in terms of linguistic units' construction, whereas
constraint points rather to structure concepts - to "what does not occur" in language.
However, in postgenerativism - in its Minimalist Program - there appear simultaneous ideas about
relationship between competence and "performance", when phonetic and logic forms are
regarded as interfaces leading to systems responsible for instructions for both articulatoryperceptual and cognitive-interpretive mechanisms respectively (see, f.e., Kassevich, 1998). In
other terms, in postgenerativism, unlike generativism, an outflow into speech activity is allowed.
This concept is of a crucial importance. Insisting on the static character of a language system
model, on its supplementation by speech activity rules, may lead the system to becoming
conceptually imperfect, defective: designing a working, dynamic system, a linguist will build the
system lacking this most important property. Speech activity rules concerning language system
functioning should be an integral part of the language model developed by a linguist. From these
results the equation of linguistics and linguistic theory is formulated above.
Speech activity is a system of actions aimed at speech production and perception; within the
framework of this activity information exchange occurs. Communication, in its turn, is most
frequently defined as "the process of information exchange" (Glushkov, 1979: 255). There
springs up a fair question: what is the correlation between the general communication theory
(which has been much spoken about recently) and linguistics as the linguistic theory?
On the one hand, the notion of communication is seemingly wider than the notion of speech
activity, because communication apparently includes the fields beyond speech activity - such as
linguistic manipulation, argumentation, non-speech sign vehicles, etc. (for more details, see
below). On the other hand, communication is narrower than the field of linguistics, if we presume
that the general theory of linguistics comprises the language system theory, the theory of
speech activity as system functioning, and the theory of text as a product of this functioning.
The most adequate approach to elucidation of the correlation between the two fields and,
respectively, two theories, is, evidently, functional: if we proceed from functions, then the
linguistic theory - linguistics - studies linguistic means, the process of their use, and the product

of this process while communication theory deals with the purpose of linguistic and nonlinguistic means' usage as well as the result achieved by relevant processes. At this point an
intersection field can be traced, which we will not dwell on: first and foremost it is the speech
activity theory in linguistics, and the theory of illocutionary and perlocutionary forces in
particular. An essential difference should be mentioned (which stems from the preceding):
conceptually, linguistics may construct abstract models, independent of the question whether
they are adequate to their natural prototype, but the communication theory uses as its basis the
modeling of dynamic relations in society, between people, and, in consequence, can in no way
digress from "the human factor" (the word phrase of questionable semantics but in widespread
use).
Since the study of speech activity is in the focus of the communication theory yet, though at a
specific viewing angle, "communicatology" could arm itself with an array of linguistic concepts:
speech typology (Kholodovich, 1967), and the concept of the so-called linguistic existence
(Konrad, 1959), and the dialog theory, starting from Yakubinsky's pioneer works, the text theory,
its semantic aspects especially, let alone the mentioned above theory of speech acts.
The dialog theory (not sufficiently developed, admittedly) is of particular importance. The
communication theory is object-centered, it is not concerned with monologs addressing space
simply because they do not create a communication field. Communication is always dialogical;
its subject (addressant) generates a text in a wide sense, that is, including verbal and non-verbal
components in order to change the informational state of a certain object (addressee), either
individual or, more often, plural and consequently his behavior. Respectively, the addressant
should have maximum of information on the addressee: he cannot expect to change an unknown
object, a "black box" method would hardly be profitable here. The more adequate and detailed
an object- addressee model is, the less effort should be directed to providing feedback, because
a reliable model makes it possible to predict accurately enough the effect of communicative
efforts. From this results the relationship between the communication theory and the deservedly
gaining popularity reflexive control theory based precisely on economy of effort for feedback
signals' retrieval through predictability of the controlled object's reactions.
The two aspects of speech activity - speech production and perception - prove to be equally
relevant to the communication theory, which expands substantially the contents of both. As it
was mentioned above, dealing with speech production a researcher of communication should
analyze not only verbal, but also paraverbal text components. In an ordinary speech contact
such components are facial expressions, gestures, poses, more detailed than in traditional
linguistic analysis attention to intonation and other suprasegmental text parameters. A variety of
speech tempos typical of different etnolinguistic communities should be taken into consideration.
In connection with this we can't but note once again that a switchover to patter of many of our
TV- and radio journalists actually excludes from communication act considerable groups of
Russian viewers/listeners, unable to adapt the unusual speech tempo (compare Kassevich,
1996).
Among the aspects of speech production relevant to communicative analysis there are also its
rhetoric characteristics. Rhetoric can be defined as a complex of means designed to provide
perlocutionary effect of a statement (text). Whereas in a literary text this effect is aesthetic in
character, in oratorical, publicist and propaganda texts rhetoric devices are at the same time
means of informational compression (or, by contrast, of the text redundancy, pleonasticity
increase) and listener's incentive to look at the offered information through information of some
different kind apt to be aesthetically and emotionally marked. To illustrate, the use of metaphor

such as a Soviet cliche "trudovaya vakhta" (labor duty) on the one hand, substitutes an extended
statement saying that labor for the welfare of Motherland is equivalent to honorable mission of a
warrior guarding his companions-in-arms and/or peaceful citizens; on the other hand, this
metaphor calls for pathetic attitude to labor (as it is so highly valued) and development of
enthusiasm of creative labor. "Force-pumping" of epithets and predicates (the Party is mind,
honor and conscience) naturally raises text's pleonasticity and contributes to the force increase
of corresponding concepts (in the meaning attributed to this term by Bebee) (see Bebee, 1985).
In an equivalent manner standard argumentation schemes are important in the processes of
speech production. These schemes possess etnolinguistic specificity. From pioneer works by
Luriya it is known, for example, that traditionalist community representatives are insensitive to
formal logic laws (what is, generally speaking, not identical with the statement about "savage's"
pralogical thinking (see Kassevich, 1996); they cannot conclude a common syllogism of the type
In the Far North, where there is always snow, bears are white. The New Land is in the Far North.
What color are bears there? A common answer is that a respondent has never been to the New
Land and, therefore, cannot say what the bears are like there. Consequently, for the texts
addressed to traditionalist community representatives' comprehension, argumentation based on
formally logic schemes will be ineffective; in this case, references to precedents, authoritative
texts and personalities, the use of tropes, etc. are required.
Language structures proper, conveying various logic constructions, may also have idioetnic
specificity. For example, in some languages (mostly with SOV word order), given cause and effect
relations' expression, the effect precedes the cause more often, and a general scheme of a
corresponding syntactic structure is as follows: "S is (not) P. If we ask why, the answer isbecause
Q". This does not mean that another expression of the given semantics is impossible, but the
presented scheme is more effective rhetorically.
Recent trends are to consider PR - public relations as a supplement to the communication theory
(compare: Pocheptsov, 1999). In Russian educational institutions PR-specialists have already
been trained for rather a long time; their educational programs are based mostly on the study of
communication technologies.
It should be mentioned that for a comparably short period of time the term PR has undergone
noticeable transformations. Originally, in the English-speaking countries, where the term arose, it
was meant for the following situations. When a military unit was quartered in some settlement or
near it, a post of Public Relations Officer was introduced by the unit's command. His tasks
included contacts with the local authorities and population representatives, explanation of
necessity for the unit to stay in that locality, examination of complaints about inconveniences
and damages caused by some servicemen, etc. Firms, shops, enterprises, and other structures
introduced services of that kind.
As we can see, PR in those cases was directed to the creation of a positive "image" of
servicemen, firm employees, etc., but it was still very far from the actually "agitprop"
(propaganda) appearance PR has acquired in our time. In modern PR its "black" variety stands
out sharply focusing on informational extermination of political or economic opponents; naturally
enough there appear information killers (the same as PR-killers), etc. The profession of a socalled spindoctor is slightly closer to the traditional interpretation of PR; he is called to correct,
"treat" for unfavorable informational situation; for example, by appropriate information measures
to do away with undesirable consequences of this or that politician's incautious statements.

In these varieties of PR (in fact, there are much more of them), a language component is
undoubtedly present, but the study of relevant texts applies to linguistics no greater than the
literary critic analysis of works of art.
It does not follow from this that PR texts are akin to literary works of art, but still there is certain
nearness. PR texts are intentionally official, utilitarian, whereas a literary text is, according to
Stepun (Stepun, 1999: 257), an autonomous "aesthetic cosmos". Its autonomy tells on the fact
that transient, "walkthrough" characters are not very typical for literary texts (detective stories
are an exception), while PR-serials with repeated characters, heroes and antitypes, are rather
normal. Affinity in texts can be seen through their rhetoric - in the use of similar stylistic means.
One more variety of PR texts is an advertisement; in advertising industry the object centering is
expressed very saliently. Standing apart is e-PR, PR in computer environment, and first of all in
the Internet.
Linguists and "communicatologists" may and should cooperate, although to this time their
contacts have been rather sporadic.
Translated into a linguistic model (JACOBSON 1963), the communication process conceived in this way could
include the following elements: transmitter, message, receiver, context, code and channel. According to
GHIGLIONE (1988), the subjects are regarded here asideal, transparent and possessors of a common
communication code. These then are the necessary conditions for bringing about communication, which is
understood as the transmission of information. [4]
Following this model, the first theories of mass communication all tended to see the public as an
undifferentiated and substantially passive entity upon which it was possible to exert direct influence. As Elihu
KATZ and Karl LAZARSFELD (1955) noted,
"the image of the mass-communication process entertained by researchers had been, firstly, one of 'an
atomistic mass' of millions of readers, listeners and movie-goers, prepared to receive the message; and,
secondly (...) every message [was considered] as a direct and powerful stimulus to action that would elicit
immediate response" (p.16). [5]
From this model, which recalls in certain ways the idea of the subject seen as a mere responder to stimuli
emphasized in the psychological field by the "first" behaviorism, there emerged the model proposed by Harold
LASSWELL (1927, 1935). Even if dated, it undoubtedly constitutes a point of reference in the area of masscommunication studies. The model of the so-called five W's of LASSWELL (Who says, What, to Whom,
through Which channel, with What effect) went on to constitute a scheme widely shared in descriptions and
analyses of the media communication process. [6]

LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION
9.1 Communication as transportation of messages
We have seen that linguists like to think of linguistic items as having fixed and stable properties, among other things inert,
literal meanings. This way of looking at linguistic phenomena as objects is coupled with a very popular model of
linguistic communication, i.e. the one which portrays the communication process as the conveyance of a message, or, in
other words, some kind of transportation of a certain, fixed message from the speaker to the listener, a transfer of given
thoughts and feelings as if these thoughts and feelings were independent of and prior to the "encoding" and "decoding"
processes in communication. This view is associated with the metaphor that meanings are objects (VII.1):

"Meanings are objects. Linguistic expressions are objects. Linguistic expressions have meanings (in them). In
communication, a speaker sends a fixed meaning to a hearer via the linguistic expression associated with that meaning.
On this account it is possible to objectively say what you mean, and communication failures are matters of subjective
errors: since the meanings are objectively right there in the words, either you didn't use the right words to say what you
meant or you were misunderstood." (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:206)
The view that communication is basically a transfer or transportation of fixed messages shows up in many disguises,
under several different but related metaphors. One such metaphor is involved in "the bucket theory" of meaning
"Words, like little buckets, are assumed to pick up their loads of meaning in one person's mind, carry them across the
intervening space, and dump them into the mind of another" (Osgood 1979:213)
Common to this and many other theories of linguistic communication is the view that words, sentences, and other
expressions are containers loaded with meaning (content); words are, in other words, meaning-full (sic!). Reddy, in an
interesting paper (1979), treats the matter under the name of the conduit metaphor, a frame of thinking which implies that:
"(1) language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person to another; (2) in writing and
speaking, people insert their thoughts and feelings in the words; (3) words accomplish the transfer by containing the
thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others; and (4) in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings
once again from the words." (Reddy 1979:290)
Reddy points out that the conduit metaphor underlies many common English ways of talking about linguistic
communication; it is deeply rooted in our (Standard Average European) culture and hence very difficult to free oneself
from. Here are a few expressions that show how we have conventionally and inadvertently become accustomed to the
conduit metaphor in our everyday language:2)
(1) Try to get your thoughts across better
(2) Whenever you have a good idea practice capturing it in words.
(3) Try to pack more thoughts into fewer words.
(4) The lines may rhyme, but they are empty of both meaning and feeling.
(5) Can you actually extract coherent ideas from that prose?
(6) He writes sentences in such a way as to seal up the meaning in them.
(7) His words carry little in the way of recognizable meaning.
(8) Please pay attention to what's there in the words.
Another metaphor for basically the same perspective on linguistic communication is one which is particularly familiar to
linguists, psycholinguists and communication theorists; it construes the communication process as a series or recodings, or
mechanical translations, of the same message with a certain fixed meaning. Accordingly, this has been termed the
translation theory of speech communication (Garrett 1975, Linel1 1982a). In short, the theory says this. For some reason,
a speaker comes up with a certain "idea" or "thought" which he wants to communicate to someone else. This "message" is
therefore encoded in the speaker's brain into, say, patterns of neural activity which travel along nerve paths down to the
various speech organs, where the message is translated or recoded into articulatory movements, which in turn give rise to
a new form of representation, i.e. acoustic sound waves. These waves convey the message to the hearing organs of a
listener, and there it is translated again into new codes. After a number of additional recodings, the message is finally
regained in approximately its original form, when it reaches the listener's brain or mind.

The theory just sketched is obviously inspired by Shannon and Weaver's classical model of technical information transfer.
It recurs in almost every introductory textbook on linguistics or speech communication (e.g. Denes & Pinson 1963). I
have given it couched in basically physical terms, but essentially the same type of translation-theoretical approach
permeates generative psycholinguistics, where, instead, scholars prefer to talk about abstract mental representations
corresponding to the constructs of linguistic competence theory. Thus, the message is there automatically processed
through a series of purportedly "linguistically significant" representations. For example, the production processes may be
explained as a linear sequence of translations of the same utterance via representations such as the following:
(e.g.)
Semantic

Deep-structural Shallow- ~

representation representation structural

representation

Surfacerepresentation representation PHONETIC SIGNAL

Exactly what "stages" are included in this series of translations naturally depends on the particular theory espoused. But
the general outline is the same; although early ("remote") representations may be very different from late ("superficial")
representations, they still "represent" the same message unit (usually a sentence, VI.1) with the same fixed meaning.
The process of perception and comprehension would, at least according to the most naive theories, be essentially a
translation in the reverse direction.
Proponents of such models of speech communication naturally admit that the whole process may be disturbed by "noise"
in several ways. But the idealized version of the model clearly implies that one and the same fixed message gets across
without distortion. If we assume that this model is reasonably adequate, then it follows that we should concentrate our
efforts of linguistic analysis on studying the message at that particular stage, where it is most easily accessed, i.e. in the
observable products (the phonetic behavior). It is thus assumed that the meaning of what is said can be gained simply by
applying a linguistically correct analysis to these linguistic products. This is the view of the autonomous linguistic
message once again.
Two examples of translation-theoretical models in psycholinguistics and phonetics.
THE SPEECH CHAIN
(from Denes x Pinson 1963:4)
IDEA
| SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION |
| UNDERLYING SYNTACTIC REPRESENTATION |
TRANSFORMATIONAL RULES RULES |
| SURfACE SYNTACTIC REPRESENTATION |

| PHONETIC REPRESENTATION |
"A possible information-flow model of speech production" (from Cooper 1980:298)

The translation model is a thoroughly misleading and inadequate model as applied to speech communication in face-toface interaction. It grossly underestimates the complexity of the social interplay between speaker and listener, and of their
interaction with the surrounding situation:
"This model of communication objectifies meaning in a misleading and dehumanizing fashion. It influences us to talk and
think about thoughts as if they had the same kind of external, intersubjective reality as lamps and tables." (Reddy
1979:308)
Translation models are inadequate for all sorts of meaningful communication between human beings; contrary to what
these models suggest, we always take into consideration the productive and interpretive activities of senders and
receivers3) situated in social contexts. However, it seems that the conduit or translation metaphors are less inaccurate as
applied to communication by written messages. Indeed, it is obvious that the whole frame of thinking is inspired by such
communication; someone writes a letter or a book, sends it away to an addressee/receiver (or a group of receivers), who
will read it. The written text has to be relatively explicit and relatively autonomous in various ways. Although the reader
too must rely on various expectations and background knowledge, he is normally strongly guided by the text in his
interpretive activities. Thus, the whole process reminds us to some extent of a mechanical transfer or transportation of a
message.4)
The reasons why this model cannot be exploited in the explanation of spoken dialogues are many. Most of them have
already been discussed. Let me sum up a few points.
First, the situational interpretations relevant to speaker and listener are never equal to the linguistic meaning associated
with the utterance itself; any interpretation goes beyond the linguistic meaning which in itself is vague and allusive
(VII.1,5).
Secondly, there is no complete linguistic meaning nor any fully developed intended interpretation in the mind of the
speaker before the utterance has been compiled and its outer form has been determined; many aspects of meaning are the
result of the verbalization process itself (Linell, forthcoming.), and some interpretations are clearly discovered only after
the verbalization (VII.5).
Thirdly, there are no uniquely correct situational interpretations; both speaker and listener may, e.g. vary in their depths of
intention and understanding (VII.5). Any interpretation is in principle inherently negotiable and extendible, i.e. there are
no fixed meanings being transferred in communication.

9.2 The functions of language

Linguists tend to have rather definite preferences for certain theories of linguistic meaning and communication, as we
have seen. Attached to these theories are certain implicit evaluations of which communicative functions are most
important and most characteristic of language.
In this broad overview we may distinguish between functions along three different dimensions. First of all, one should
single out the dialogic functions in social interaction from the monologic functions in thinking and other kinds of
intraindividual communication. This point will be further discussed in IX.3-4. It may be recalled that the conditions on
written communication are such that both communicating parties may be said to use language in a monologic fashion.

Secondly, it is possible to focus on the different interacting factors of the communication process and discern the
following four aspects:
a) focussing-on the sender: the expressive functions. What is communicated is, under this aspect, seen as expressions of
the sender's beliefs, views, feelings, attitudes, volitions, needs etc. Naturally, some of these are unconscious to the sender
and thus not intended by him.
b) focussing on the receiver: the evocative functions. Communication is here seen as directed towards evoking certain
reactions on the receiver's part. What is conveyed serves to make him perceive or understand something, have certain
feelings and attitudes, or perform a certain action.
c) focussing on the subject matter, i.e. on the imaginary or objective reality that the message refers to:
the referential functions. We are then concerned with how communication is used to refer and describe, to analyze, argue
about, and explain things in the world.
d) focussing on the relation between sender and receiver: the social functions. From this point of view communication
serves to establish and maintain social contact between the communicating parties. A great deal of oral discourse takes
place simply because social situations and conventions require it, perhaps because one feels obliged to avoid an
embarrassing silence. Some speak of thephatic function of language (Malinowski 1949:315).
Thirdly, we shall relate communication to different psychological dimensions of the communicating parties. There seem to
be at least three different aspects:
a) the cognitive functions which have to do with knowledge, beliefs, and intellectual understanding. From the expressive
point of view communication may be seen as expressing the views and beliefs of the sender, and in an evocative
perspective communication is viewed as directed towards arousing beliefs, conveying information and bringing about
understanding. Since cognitive activities always have some "intentional objects" - they always "are about" something in
the world that the parties believe or want each other to believe - the cognitive and referential functions are heavily
intertwined and are seldom kept properly distinct.
b) the emotive functions; in communication the sender ex presses his feelings, attitudes, emotions and desires, and this
may also evoke the corresponding states and activities in the receiver.
c) the practical functions; much communication is used for guiding the behavior of the receiver, i.e. the messages are
conveyed in the hope of arousing a readiness in the receiver to act in certain ways. For obvious reasons, practical and
evocative functions often go together. But the sender may also use language for the purpose of planning and guiding his
own actions; in that case language is used monologically, and the sender simultaneously plays the part of receiver.
Most linguistic messages are multifunctional, although many are specialized in various ways so as to stress certain
particular aspects. However, the actual state of affairs is rather inadequately reflected in most theories of linguistic
meaning, which are very much focussed upon the cognitive and referential aspects. These are the properties which are
most independent of particular senders and receivers, and the medium of written communication very strongly emphasizes
precisely these aspects. The aim behind certain types of texts is very much to describe reality as explicitly as possible and
to display the lines of argumentation as clearly as possible (III.1). The ideal is often to pursue description, explanation and
argumentation in such a way that they appear to be independent of the views of the author (cf. legal and scientific texts).
In spite of the fact that such objectives are typical of certain forms of written communication, there is also a wide-spread
belief that language in general is primarily directed towards the cognitive and referential functions of communication.
All this means that little attention is paid to those functions which often dominate in face-to-face interaction. That is, the
expressive, evocative and social functions, i.e. those which are directly related to the communicating subjects, tend to be
neglected, and the same holds for the emotive and practical aspects, as opposed to the cognitive side. Notice that these
functions are quite dependent on the context at large, on nonverbal communication and prosody (cf. VI.2).

We only need to take a short look at contemporary work in linguistic semantics to see that only cognitive and referential
functions are really considered to be of fundamental linguistic importance. This is, as was just pointed out, in full
agreement with the written language bias. It also squares well with the emphasis on individuals and monologues rather
than social interactions and dialogues that is typical of much of American psychology and linguistics, and perhaps of
Western culture in general).
American academic psychology has always had a distinct bias towards individual psychology. This is also true of
psycholinguistics, both the variant inspired by generative linguistics and the more recent information processing theories
in "cognitive science". One may also recall Chomsky's view that language is primarily a means for the expression of
thought. The utilization of language in communicative dialogues is to Chomsky more or less an accidental phenomenon
(Chomsky 1975:56 ff.). Thus, language is consistently seen as a means for storing, representing, transmitting
(transporting) knowledge, not as an ingredient in people's social interaction. Since writing is monological rather than
dialogical, this is exactly what we should expect.
Among those scholars who have thought deeply about the written language perspective in our Western culture is Walter
Ong. Here are two pertinent passages:
"Because our concept of what words are is so tied up with a feeling for words as written or printed, a basic difficulty in
thinking about words today is our tendency to regard them largely or chiefly or ideally as records."
"Once we can get over our chirographic-typographic squint here, we can see that the word in its original habitat of sound,
which is still its native habitat, is not a record at all. The word is something that happens, an event in the world of sounds
through which the mind is enabled to relate actuality to itself. To understand more fully what this implies, we must
examine in some detail what an oral-aural culture in general is like." (Ong 1974:167-8)
The functions of words in oral cultures are of course very much emotive and practical. As an additional point, which is not
merely a curiosity, one might note here that "primitive" cultures often regard speech as magic. Words have a magical
function; one can bring about things by the spell of words; nature and other people may be changed (Ong op.cit.:168-9).
"Primitive man commonly feels that one can use words to hurt people as one can use an arrow or a spear; hence various
magic formulas." (Ong 1974:168)
Since literate culture so strongly de-emphasizes the magical aspects (excepts for certain obvious cases such as rituals and
other 'performative' uses), we seem to have become blind to these aspects of oral communication. After all, people still
frequently exploit the magic of words, in attempts at enticing, flattering, offending, hurting etc. There is always an
element of magic in (true, full-blown) communication, especially in face-to-face interaction, when a speaker - by means
of words and non-verbal signals - makes things happen with the listener, when he induces thoughts, images, feelings,
moods, and volitions in the listener's mind. Moreover, if we turn to children's play with words, we can see the indissoluble
relation between language and social and physical reality. In (symbolic) play children pretend that things happen, they
make things happen in the concrete world of play, and this they bring about by the mere use of words (Strmqvist 1980).

9.3. Thought and expression: Content and form

Translation theories of linguistic communication suggest a separation between the content and the expression of the
linguistic message. Early in the process of utterance production we find the thoughts and "representations" which directly
encode or are even equal to the content of the message, and only later the whole message gets transformed into phonetic
behavior; the message, and its meaning, is given an outer form. The comprehension process is essentially the reverse; the
listener starts with the expression and ends up with the content. These theories are legion in the overwhelming majority of
books and articles dealing with utterance production and perception within modern psycholinguistics, but the general

ways of thinking are old; the theory of utterance production just sketched may be associated with, among others, Wilhelm
Wundt (Gardiner 1932, Blumenthal 1970).
There are three elements in the philosophy underlying translation theories of utterance production (and comprehension)
that are worth discussing in this context:
a) the thesis that speech, or linguistic products in general, are nothing but expressions of thoughts and ideas,
b) the thesis that content and form may be ripped apart as two independent phenomena,
c) the thesis that messages and their meanings or interpretations are mental entities, i.e. things existing in the inner world
of our minds (though they presumably have physical substrates in our brains).
Although these theses are interrelated, we shall here deal with them separately.
It is a popular conviction that the process of saying something meaningful involves two steps first the speaker comes up
with and elaborates an idea or thought, and then he expresses this idea linguistically in a verbal utterance. As a general
theory of discourse production, this is wrong, however, because speakers elaborate their messages through the
verbalization process itself, i.e. form and content are created simultaneously. On the other hand, there are of course cases
when speakers have prepared their utterances carefully and when they in fact express ideas that have been conceived in
advance. An academic lecture or a solemn speech are good examples. In fact, the "translation theory" (IX.1) of discourse
production is part and parcel of classical rhetoric, which analyzes the whole process into the discovery and arrangement of
ideas ("invention, disposition), the discovery of appropriate expressions ("elocution"), and then the memorization and
actual delivery of the speech (e.g. Beaugrande & Dressler 1981:15). But the most obvious application of the theory under
consideration concerns the expression of messages in writing. Many final written products are very well prepared, and
they may appear to be quite careful and explicit expressions of consciously intended messages. (Yet, not even these
meticulously compiled texts "contain" their interpretations (cf. VII.6)). The study of such written products may lead the
scholar's thinking onto wrong paths. He may forget that he is only analyzing the final product of a long series of trials and
errors, in which the author only gradually managed to elaborate his points adequately.
A more serious error is committed by the linguist, if he believes that the mere analysis of final written products could
provide a theory of how thought and language interact in spoken discourse. It is simply misleading to regard speech only
as "the use-of articulate sound-symbols for the expression of thought" (Gardiner 1975:17). This theory was criticized
earlier in VI:1, when I discussed the traditional definition of the sentence as "the expression of a complete thought. In
face-to-face interactions we do not find so much of the expression of complete thoughts (cf. quotation from Gardiner in
VI.1). On the one hand, thoughts are elaborated and accomplished through, not before, the interaction. On the other hand,
we must not put emphasis only on the intellectual side of language; in addition to the referential and cognitive aspects, we
have the expressive, evocative, social, emotive and practical aspects which often dominate in spoken dialogues (9.2).
Our second point is one which has already been touched upon in IX.1; thoughts and meanings are often assumed to exist
prior to, as it were independent of, the linguistic expressions that encode them in communication. In other words, thought
and language are considered to be autonomous and mutually independent in a sense; meanings can be discussed in
isolation from their corresponding expressions, the same meanings can be expressed in many ways and in entirely
different languages, and, conversely, the same linguistic expression can be used with entirely different meanings.
Language, in the sense of an expression system, is assumed to be an autonomous, uncontroversial "outer form"; linguistic
expressions are seen as containers, empty by themselves but in various communication situations filled with content to be
transmitted. Thus, this fits the translation or transportation metaphors in communication theory (9.1).
It is quite obvious that the theory just sketched is extreme and unacceptable also in the eyes of most linguists, who do,
after all, a & it a relation of n solidarity" between the form and content of linguistic signs. Nevertheless, it lurks behind
many popular descriptions in linguistic textbooks; we have that, e.g., translation theories of communication are legion
there. It is fascinating to speculate over the historical origins of these ideas. It seems to me that one possible source may in

fact be found in linguists' traditional work with translations between various languages. The ideal here is of course to keep
the content constant over different languages; linguistic expressions would then seem to be only the outer appearance.
However, translators and interpreters of course know that, in practice, translations are never semantically identical.
Translation is a creative reformulation with clear effects on the content. Yet, for various reasons the assumptions of
autonomy are more motivated as far as written language is concerned. If we consider spoken dialogues with its
bewildering richness of signals, impulses, stimuli and responses, intentions and expectations that are partly private and
partly mutually shared and mutually ascribed to one's interlocutor, then it seems that the idea of semantically equivalent
expressions is very far-fetched indeed. Meanings and interpretations are created through the activities of verbalization and
social interaction themselves.
I have argued that the written language bias in linguistics has promoted the idea of an autonomy of language. However,
we have seen that this idea occurs in two rather different forms which seem to lead up to a serious contradiction. On the
one hand, we have just seen that arguments have been made for the autonomy of linguistic expression with respect to
linguistic meaning (and vice versa). On the other hand, we found in VIII.10 that the idea of language as an autonomous
and primary force in mental life has engendered the hypothesis of linguistic determinism, which in fact assumes the link
between expression and meaning to be very stable and rigid indeed. Thus, these ideas seem to be entirely inconsistent.
However, attempts have been made, e.g. in generative linguistics, to reconcile the two opposing views. Thus, this theory
assumes, on the one hand, that linguistic expressions as surface structures are very indirectly related, to thought and
meaning (the autonomy of linguistic expressions), while, on the other hand, deep structures, or semantic representations,
are very closely related to thinking (which amounts to a specific variant of linguistic determinism). The thesis of the
autonomy and independence of language is therefore taken to an extreme in Chomskyan linguistics (cf. also V:5-6, X).
The third main point of this section is the idea that meanings are mental things in the minds of language users. In VIII.3 I
suggested how such a conclusion may be arrived at. That is, the argument there was concerned with images that had to do
with expressions (sound images), but similar arguments can be made as regards meaning. The philosophical problems
would also be much the same.
The "intentional objects" of thoughts and verbal utterances, i.e. that which we think or talk about, are, after all, usually
extralinguistic phenomena in the physical and/or social reality around us. For example, if someone thinks of or talks about
Big Ben in London, then it is the "real" Big Ben which is the intentional object, not an image of Big Ben or any other
mental object in the speaker's mind. It is another matter that any given speaker at any given occasion must talk about Big
Ben under a certain aspect, which means that the speaker always "contributes" something to the way he thinks or talks
about it6). On the face of it, the most puzzling phenomenon about thinking and talking may be the fact that we can use
non-existing things as intentional objects. Suppose we think about a unicorn; where is the intentional object of such a
cognitive act? Some may be tempted to answer that the unicorn is a mental thing that exists in the subject's mind.
However, in my view this leads to unsolvable problems. The only reasonable answer is that, to the best of our knowledge,
no real counterpart of such an intentional object exists. In other words, our question was wrongly put. This is not to deny
that the act of thinking is real enough, or that we have a subjective experience of seeing a unicorn in our "inner eye n . The
important thing is to distinguish between acts of thinking and speaking (and conditions, schemas, background knowledge
etc involved in such acts), and the intentional objects of these activities; the latter may be objectively non-existing just as
an image according to optical theory may be only virtual.

9.4. Social and individual aspects of language.

It is characteristic of Wundt and a long tradition in linguistics (IX.t) that the direct associations between thinking and
meaning, on the one hand, and linguistic form on the other are cut off. Thoughts are assumed to exist independent of and
prior to language; first we think and organize meaning, then we speak and transfer the message! But this is not the only
unfortunate separation in traditional linguistic philosophy; another separation, inherent in e.g. Saussure's distinction
between language and parole, is that between the social and individual aspects of language and its use:

"En separant la langue de la parole, on separe du meme coup: 1 ce qui est social de ce qui est individuel; 2 ce qui est
essentiel de ce qui est accessoire et plus ou moins accidentel." (Saussure 1964:30)
In this theory, "language stands in opposition to utterance in the same way as does that which is social to that which is
individual" (Volosinov 1973:60). On the one hand, we have the social system of stable signs, i.e. la langue, on the other
hand we have the individual's use of this language, which is then conceived of as a more less accidental use of ready-made
units, i.e. words and phrases with fixed meanings.
Such a theory is entirely inadequate as a background for understanding spoken dialogues. Communication in normal
speech situations is an inherently social enterprise, a complex interaction in which the various moves of the agents
involved can never be understood from a purely individual perspective. Nor can the social aspects be entirely relegated to
the domain of prefabricated social rules (la langue and the like). Speakers and listeners participate in social interaction,
and so do writers and readers, although in a much less conspicuous way. In fact, if we consider written communication,
Saussure's attempt to derive the social/individual distinction from the underlying differences between language and the
use of language, becomes much more natural. Both writer and reader normally work alone, thus seemingly performing
individual (monologic) activities, and in doing so, they apply the rules of a language system that is socially shared and
normatively standardized to a greater extent than is the case in speech communication. Thus, Saussure's abstract
objectivism7) (as regards his conception of la langue) and his view of linguistic performance reflect a bias towards
written language, in spite of his own ardent defense of the primacy of spoken language (see V.2).

9.5. Semiotics
Semiotics is usually defined as the study of signs. Communication is necessarily based on various forms of signing and
signaling, and semiotics is therefore, at least potentially, of vital interest for communication theory.
It is customary and appropriate to distinguish between the European tradition of semiotics founded by Saussure and an
American variant going back to Ch. S. Peirce. Saussurean semiotics (or semiology, as his term was) has been deliberately
based on structuralist models of language structure. It is therefore no wonder that this kind of approach to communication
is strongly ly biased by the written language perspective in linguistics.
What is perhaps most characteristic of Saussurean semiotics is the conception of a sign as an association of two thing-like
phenomena, expression and content. The linguistic sign, we recall, was construed as a more or less stable combination of a
mental representation of the sound signal (image acoustique) and a "concept", and the latter is also a mental representation
of some kind. This seems to be a generalization at a somewhat more abstract level of how linguistic expression and
meaning are sometimes represented in the written medium; the expression is given as a graphic word (or a combination of
such words), and the meaning is portrayed, if possible, as a picture of the thing(s) meant.
The philosophical difficulties inherent in the theory of mental representations and images have already been alluded to.
But there are other features of Saussurean semiotics which are rather unsatisfactory, especially when applied to
communication through face-to-face interaction. The most obvious flaw is the neglect of the communicators, the sender
and the listener. Whereas American semiotics does comprise also the pragmatic dimension, Saussurean semiotics does not
really tackle the problems of dynamic interaction in communication. It is an approach which entirely focuses on the
underlying system of signs, and this is never sufficient if we want to understand communication, i.e. the use of signs-for
various purposes in different situations. Accordingly, classical European semiotics tends to describe communication as an
exchange of various stable signs (cf. communication as a transportation of fixed messages).
To be sure, there are semiotic approaches which are less tied to extreme structuralism. As we have already noted, Peirce's
pragmatist semiotics seems better equipped to tackle the interplay of signs and symbols in face-to-face communication.
Unlike Saussurean semiotics it is not an extension of linguistic modes of analysis, but is based on more behaviorally
oriented traditions in American philosophy.

There are also some modern semioticians in Europe who have realized that utterances, texts or human acts in general
cannot be ascribed unique and stable meanings. Thus, Julia Kristeva (1969) stresses the manifoldness of interpretations;
she prefers to analyze texts in terms of acts and processes, or, more precisely, in terms of meaning-creating activities. The
production and assignment of meanings must be seen as praxis; the communicating parties work with the creation of
meanings and interpretations in the production of situated, (partially) shared understandings, they do not simply function
as passive sources and goals for a transportation of messages.
---------The communication functions[edit]
Main article: Jakobson's functions of language
Influenced by the Organon-Model by Karl Bhler, Jakobson distinguishes six communication functions, each
associated with a dimension or factor of thecommunication process [n.b. Elements from Bhler's theory
appear in the diagram below in yellow and pink, Jakobson's elaborations in blue]:
Functions
referential (: contextual information)
aesthetic/poetic (: auto-reflection)
emotive (: self-expression)
conative (: vocative or imperative addressing of receiver)
phatic (: checking channel working)
metalingual (: checking code working)[5]

One of the six functions is always the dominant function in a text and usually related to the type of text. In
poetry, the dominant function is the poetic function: the focus is on the message itself. The true hallmark of
poetry is according to Jakobson "the projection of the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection to the
axis of combination". Very broadly speaking, it implies that poetry successfully combines and integrates form
and function, that poetry turns the poetry of grammar into the grammar of poetry, so to speak. A famous
example of this principle is the political slogan "I like Ike." Jakobson's theory of communicative functions was
first published in "Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics" (in Thomas A. Sebeok, Style In Language,
Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1960, pp. 350377). Despite its wide adoption, the six-functions model
has been criticized for lacking specific interest in the "play function" of language that, according to an early
review by Georges Mounin, is however "not enough studied in general by linguistics researchers".[6]

----Introduction
When considering any model of communication, it is important to bear in mind that a model is merely a
conceptual framework that helps us to better understand particular features of a phenomenon, in this case
human communication. It is, of course, not the phenomenon itself but merely a representation of it. No model
can incorporate every aspect of the phenomenon it seeks to explain. There are many models of human
communication, including:
psycho-social models that focus on the relationship between our psychological states and the context of the
social (group) settings in which we communicate
cognitive neuropsychological models that attempt to explain human communication, and language in
particular, in terms of human cognition and the anatomy of the brain
linguistic models that focus on the grammatical rules that govern humans verbal communication
Transmission model
A discussion of all alternative models is beyond the scope of this article. However, here I shall discuss a socalledtransmission model of human communication known as The Communication Chain. This model is
underpinned byShannon and Weavers Information Theory (see Communication Theory) and highlights the
linguistic, physiological and acoustic mechanisms by which humans encode, transmit and decode meanings.
[This model is an extension of The Speech Chain, originally outlined by Denes and Pinson, 1973 (but see also
their updated discussion in Denes and Pinson, 1993).]
The Communication Chain

Figure 1. The Communication Chain (click for an enlarged image)

Three elements

The first thing of note is that there are three main links in The Communication Chain:
production
Production (shown in blue in the diagram) is the process by which a human agent expresses their self through
first deciding what message s/he wishes to communicate (cognitive level). They then plan and encode the
appropriate linguistic utterance to represent the concept (linguistic level) and, finally, produce this utterance
through the suitable co-ordination of the vocal apparatus (physiological level).
Production of a verbal utterance, therefore, takes place at three levels:
cognitive
linguistic
physiological
Production is sometimes referred to as expression.
transmission
Transmission (yellow in the diagram) is the sending of the linguistic utterance through some medium to the
recipient. As we are only concerned with oral verbal communication here, there is only one medium of
consequence and that is air, i.e. the spoken utterance travels through the medium of air to the recipients ear.
There are, of course, other media through which a message could be transmitted. For example, written
messages may be transmitted with ink and paper. However, because we are only concerned with the
transmission of messages that use a so-called vocal-auditory channel then transmission is said to occur at the
acoustic level.
reception
Reception (green) is the process by which the recipient of a verbal utterance detects the utterance through the
sense of hearing (physiological level) and then decodes the linguistic expression (linguistic level). Finally, s/he
then infers what is meant by the linguistic expression (cognitive level).
So, for example, the listener may first hear the sound sequence d o g. Subsequently, this is decoded and
its meaning checked: the listener recognizing this as referring to a domestic mammal related to wolves. Finally,
the listener must infer what is meant by the utterance. For example, a child who simply says dog may actually
mean something like, Look mummy, theres a dog in our garden. However, the totality of this meaning is not
encoded linguistically in the single word dog but has to be inferred by the listener.
Like the mirror image of production, reception also operates at the same three levels (in reverse order):
physiological
linguistic

cognitive
Reception is often referred to as comprehension.
Let us now look more closely at each of these levels as they operate first for the agent and then the recipient.
Agent
cognitive level
When two people talk together, the speaker sends messages to the listener in the form of words. The speaker
has first to decide what he or she wants to say and then to choose the right words to put together in order to
send the message. We do not fully understand how people conceptualize, collect their thoughts and then
decide what they want to say. What we do know, however, is that these decisions are taken in a higher level of
the brain known as the cortex.
linguistic level
Suppose a child wishes to communicate to their mum that they have just seen a furry animal with four legs,
whiskers on its face, a tail at its rear and sharp retractable claws. Somehow the child has to encode this idea
into a form that is meaningful to mum. In English, the way one does this is to decide upon the word cat. The
child has, therefore, encoded a word at the linguistic level.
In order to select this word it is necessary that it is stored in the brain. One cannot choose something that it is
not available for selection. Each of us has a bank of words stored in our brains known as our lexicon. It is
built up over time and the items we store are different from person to person. The store is largely dependent
upon what we have been exposed to, such as the job of work we do, where we have lived, what our interests
and hobbies are, and so on. Whenever we need to encode a word we search this lexicon in order to determine
whether or not we already have a word for the idea we wish to convey.
Having selected an appropriate item from the lexicon it is usual, although not always necessary, to combine this
item with other words in order to construct a meaningful utterance. There is a difference between simply
uttering the word cat and the longer utterance I have just seen a cat. All languages have specific rules that
dictate which words may be combined with which other words and in what order. These rules are the grammar
of the language. Consequently, at the linguistic level, the agent must have access to a lexicon and a set of
grammatical rules.
physiological level
Once the linguistic encoding has taken place the brain sends small electrical signals along nerves from the
cortex to the mouth, tongue, lips, vocal folds (vocal cords) and the muscles which control breathing to enable
us to articulate the word or words needed to communicate our thoughts. To formulate the word cat, you must
articulate three sounds. The first is the consonant c, the second is the vowel a, and the third is the consonant
t. This production of the sound sequence occurs at what is known as the physiological level and it involves

rapid, coordinated, sequential movements of the vocal apparatus (breathing mechanism, larynx, and vocal
tract).
feedback loop
In order to produce clear and accurate speech the speaker must monitor his or her own speech production.
There are two main ways to achieve this:
Through sensory signals from the nerves that supply the surfaces of the tongue, lips, palate and other parts of
the vocal apparatus. The transmission of signals through the nervous system allows the speaker to monitor, for
example, where the various parts of the vocal apparatus are in 3-D space in relation to each other. This is
known as proprioceptive feedback.
Through auditory feedback. As we speak we are continually listening for any errors in our production and
making the necessary modifications. This is arguably the more important of the two types of feedback, as a
hearing impairment can often lead to communication problems.
Recipient
physiological level
When the speakers utterance (transmitted acoustically as a speech sound wave) arrives at the listeners ear it
causes his or her eardrum to vibrate. This, in turn, causes the movement of three small bones within the middle
ear. Their function is to amplify the vibration of the sound wave. One of these bones, the stapes, is connected
to a membrane in the wall of nerve bundle called the cochlea. The cochlea is designed to convert the vibrations
into electrical signals. These are subsequently transmitted along the 30,000 or so fibers that constitute the
auditory nerve to the brain of the listener. Again, this takes place at the physiological level.
linguistic level
The listener subsequently decodes these electrical impulses in the cortex and reforms them into the word or
words of the message, again at the linguistic level.
If the incoming signals are decoded into the single word cat, for example, the listener compares this with
other words in his or her own lexicon. The listener is then able to determine that the word is a proper word and
that it represents, in this example, the concept of a furry (domesticated) animal with four legs, whiskers on its
face, a tail at its rear and sharp retractable claws.
In order for a recipient to decode longer utterances and to interpret them as meaningful, he or she must also
make use of the grammatical rules stored in the brain. These allow the recipient to decode an utterance such
as I have just seen a cat as indicating that the event took place in the recent past, as opposed to an utterance
such as I will be seeing a cat which grammatically indicates that the event has not yet happened but will
happen some time in the future. Consequently, as with the agent, the recipient also needs access to a lexicon
and a set of grammatical rules in order to comprehend verbal utterances.
cognitive level

It is at this level that the listener must infer the speakers meaning. Let me explain what this means.
Suppose that you are at a train station and you overhear a passenger standing on the platform say to another,
Its gone. What do you understand to be the meaning of this utterance? Is the speaker referring to a train that
has left the station? If so, then the meaning of Its gone might be the train has left the station.
But what if this interaction occurred on a hot day and a wasp had flown at one of the passengers and had been
buzzing around their head. Perhaps the Its gone was intended as a remark to the unfortunate passenger that
signalled the wasp that was just this moment buzzing around your head has now flown away and you need no
longer be afraid.

The point is that a linguistic utterance can never convey all of a speakers intended meaning.
At best, a linguistic utterance is a sketch and the listener must fill in the sketch by inferring the meaning from
such things as body language, shared knowledge, tone of voice, and so on. Humans must, therefore, be able
to infer meanings in order to communicate fully.
Transmission
The agent and recipient are, of course, linked through the acoustic level.
The movements of the speakers vocal apparatus produce changes in the surrounding air. The atoms that
compose the air are rhythmically disturbed and each atom bumps into an adjacent one, which in turn bumps
into the next one, creating what is known as a speech sound wave. This radiates through the air from the
speakers mouth to the ear of the listener. The speech sound wave occurs at the acoustic level.
Cyclical nature of communication
Transmission models are frequently criticized on the grounds that they do not emphasize the interactive nature
of human communication.
Communication is a reciprocal social activity, with the roles of agent and recipient constantly alternating. At one
moment I may be the agent who is instigating a verbal utterance. Upon completion of the utterance, however, I
may then become the recipient, as the former recipient takes on the role of agent and responds verbally to my
immediately prior utterance. There is a constant interplay between the participants, with each taking turns at
either instigating a verbal utterance or acting as an attentive recipient. The participants act as both encoders of
linguistic meaning and decoders of linguistic sound, constantly interpreting and reinterpreting the messages.
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