Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance

Author(s): Jan Aart Scholte

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Global Governance, Vol. 8, No. 3 (JulySept. 2002), pp. 281-304
Published by: Lynne Rienner Publishers
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800346 .
Accessed: 07/03/2012 14:31
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Lynne Rienner Publishers is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Global
Governance.

http://www.jstor.org

Global Governance 8 (2002), 281-304

Civil Society and Democracy

inGlobal Governance
JanAart Sch?lte
ivil society" has moved center stage in current discussions
of
recent
And
well
it
do
after
the
globalization.
might
high-profile
events of Seattle, Davos, Washington, Melbourne, Prague, Porto
and Genoa. Many observers are asking, with varying
Alegre, Quebec,
blends of curiosity and indignation: Who are these people anyway? Why
should we give them time and attention? What right do they have to
interrupt?and even obstruct?the governance of global relations?
This article considers these questions of legitimacy against yard
sticks of democracy. Effective governance is regulation that achieves
not only efficiency and order, but also public participation and public
accountability. In building governance for expanding global spaces in

the contemporary world, technocratic criteria have to date received far

more attention than democratic standards. This article addresses the
more neglected side of the equation by exploring the potentials and lim
itations of civil society as a force for democracy in global governance.
are the implications of civil society mobilization
for democ
in
observers
have
celebrated
the rise of
racy
global governance? Many
a
as
civic1
activism
boon
for
while
have
others
many
global
democracy,
as
a
decried it
bane. Yet these assessments?both
positive and nega
tive?have
tended to rest on littlemore than anecdote and prejudice. To
be sure, recent years have brought important research on civil society
What

governance.2 However, none of this work has focused pri

marily, explicitly, and rigorously on the question of civil society and
democracy in global governance.
This article elaborates a possible framework of analysis and on this
and global

basis

suggests that civil society activism offers significant possibilities

to reduce themajor democratic deficits that have grown during recent
decades in the governance of global relations. Given this promise, these
experiments in new forms of public participation, consultation, repre

the
sentation, and accountability should be pursued further. However,
democratic benefits of civil society engagement of global governance
do not flow automatically:
theymust be actively nurtured. Moreover,

281

282

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

civil society has the potential to detract from as well as add to democ
racy in the ways that global affairs are regulated. So we do well to ap
proach this subject with both optimism and caution.

I develop this general argument below in four main steps. In the

first section, I present working definitions of key concepts and lay out a
framework of analysis. In the second section, I set out the shortfalls of

democracy in current governance of global spaces. In the third section,

I suggest various ways that civil society can promote democracy in
global governance. In the fourth section, I point to ways that civil soci
ety can fail to realize its democratic promise or, stillmore worrying, can
in some cases actually undermine democracy in global governance.
The operative word in the last two sentences is a tentative "can," as
opposed to a definite "does." This article identifies a set of assessment

criteria thatmight guide further studies of civil society and democracy

in global governance. Only a framework of evaluation and general hy
potheses are suggested here. Much more empirical investigation is re
quired before we can draw firmer conclusions regarding the relationship

that has prevailed?and

could prevail?in
practice between civil society
and democracy in the governance of global spaces.3

Framework

of Analysis

concept in the title of this article?civil

society, democracy, global,
is heavily contested. No attempt is made here to re
and governance?
solve these disputes, and many readers will indeed take issue with the

Each

positions adopted in this discussion. However, explicit working defini

tions are needed to lend clarity and internal coherence to the argument.
Civil

Society

theWorld Economic Forum (WEF), with a member

In themid-1980s,
some
of
900
global companies, took the initiative in promoting the
ship
launch of the Uruguay Round of trade liberalization
talks. Concur

against World
rently, rubber tappers and indigenous peoples mobilized
In
Bank-sponsored
development projects in the Brazilian Amazon.
1995 over 30,000 women attended an NGO forum in Beijing alongside

on Women.
Conference
Three years later,
the
summit
in Birming
encircled
of
7
(G-7)
protesters
Group
ham, U.K., to demand the cancellation of poor-country debts. What are
we saying when we lump these diverse activities together under the
name of civil society?
the UN's

60,000

Fourth World

fanAart Sch?lte
of civil society have varied enormously
Meanings
theoretical
place,
perspective, and political persuasion.4
century English political thought, the term referred to the
present-day usage tends to contrast civil society and the

283

across time,
In sixteenth
state, whereas
state. Hegel's

nineteenth-century notion of civil society included themarket, whereas

current concepts tend to treat civil society as a nonprofit sector. Writ

ing in the 1930s, Gramsci regarded civil society as an arena where class
hegemony forges consent, whereas much contemporary discussion iden
tifies civil society as a site of disruption and dissent.
In this article, I engage with ideas of civil society less as they have

appeared in the history of political thought and more as theymight con

tribute to a theory of contemporary globalization and governance. This
is not to deny the historical importance of traditional Western liberal
and Marxist notions of civil society, but to suggest that the concept re

quires adaptation in relation toworld politics of the twenty-first century.

The aim is to examine talk of civil society in present-day policy discus
sions and to sharpen it analytically to give a clearer understanding of

insight of this kind might in turn con

tribute to the construction of improved global governance.
With this objective inmind, "civil society" is taken here to refer to
a political space where voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape
current circumstances.

Greater

the rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life. "Rules" in
this conception encompass specific policies, more general norms, and
deeper social structures. Thus, civil society actions may target formal
directives (such as legislation), informal constructs (such as many gen
der roles), and/or the social order as a whole. The "aspect of social life"
that concerns us here is the governance

of global realms.
To be sure, the lines dividing voluntary activities from official and
market practices can blur. For example, some civic associations may as
sist in the implementation of official policies or engage in commercial
some govern
activities to fund their advocacy campaigns. Moreover,
ments and companies may sponsor nonprofit bodies to serve as front or
ganizations. However, "pure" civil society activities involve no quest
for public office (so excluding political parties) and no pursuit of pecu
niary gain (so excluding firms and the commercial mass media).

the perspective adopted here, civil society can encompass

many sorts of actors: academic institutions, business forums,5 clan and
kinship circles, consumer advocates, development cooperation initia
From

tives, environmental movements, ethnic lobbies, faith-based associa

tions, human rights promoters, labor unions, local community groups,
peace movements, philanthropic foundations, professional bodies, relief
organizations, think tanks, women's networks, youth associations, and

284

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

more.

In particular, this conception of civil society stretches much wider

than formally organized, officially registered, and professionally ad
ministered NGOs.
It also spans more than pressure groups that lobby to
promote certain special (self-)interests.
and wherever voluntary associations?of

Civil

society exists whenever

whatever kind?try deliber

ately tomold certain governing rules of society.

An active political orientation is key to this conception of civil so
ciety. Some contemporary analysts speak of civil society as covering
any social activity that occurs outside of official bodies, political par

ties, firms, and households. However, themore focused concept adopted

here excludes those voluntary associations
(for example, many recre
ational clubs and service NGOs)
that do not involve conscious attempts
to shape policies, norms, and structures in society at large. Thus, civic
than equivalent to?a
activity is here regarded as only part of?rather
so-called third sector of nonofficial and noncommercial activities.
In terms of aims, advocacy campaigns in civil society diverge widely

between conformist, reformist, and transformist strategies. Conformists

are those elements in civil society that seek to uphold and reinforce ex
isting norms. Such groups may attempt to improve the operation of ex

isting rules or tomanipulate established regimes to their advantage, but

lobbies, pro
they pursue no change in the rules themselves. Business
fessional associations, and philanthropic foundations have often (though
far from always) fallen into the conformist realm. Reformists are those
civil society entities thatwish to correct what they see as flaws in ex

isting regimes while leaving underlying

groups have
example, social-democratic

social

structures intact. For

rejected liberalist economic

policies without challenging the deeper structure of capitalism. Many
consumer associations, human rights groups, relief organizations, and
trade unions have promoted broadly reformist agendas. Meanwhile,
transformists are those civil society associations
that aim for a compre

change of the social order (whether in a progressive or a reac

tionary fashion). These parts of civil society are frequently termed "social
movements." They include anarchists, "dark green" environmentalists,
hensive

fascists, radical feminists, pacifists, and religious revivalists, with their

respective implacable oppositions to the state, industrialism, liberal val
ues, patriarchy, militarism, and secularism.
The conception of civil society adopted here also encompasses con

siderable cultural diversity. In earlier Lockean, Hegelian,

and Grams
cian formulations, civil society related toWestern politics in a national
context. However,
talk of "civil society" today circulates all over the
world and is sometimes applied to political practices (like kinship net
works inAfrica and the Civic Forums at the local level inThailand) that

JanAait Sch?lte

285

derive largely from non-Western traditions.6Moreover,

in contemporary
civic
associations
often
in
and
operate
politics,
global spaces as
regional
well as in local and national contexts. Conceptions
of civil society need
to be recast to reflect these changed circumstances.

Democracy
Like

civil society, democracy has known many meanings

and instru
in different times and places. Ancient Athenian democracy was
one thing, while modern liberal democracy is quite another. Represen
tative democracy is one model, while radical plural democracy is quite

ments

another. Deliberative

mocracy

democracy
is quite another. National

is one approach, while agonistic de

democracy is one construction, while

cosmopolitan democracy is quite another.

Yet a common thread runs through all conceptions of democracy: it
is a condition where a community of people exercises collective self
determination. Through democracy, members
of a given public?a
demos?take
decisions that shape their destiny jointly, with equal rights
and opportunities of participation, and without arbitrarily imposed con

straints on debate. In one way or another, democratic governance is par

ticipatory, consultative, transparent, and publicly accountable. By one
or another, democratic governance rests on the consent of
mechanism
the governed.

Thus, democracy as a general condition needs to be distinguished

from liberal-national democracy as a particular historical and cultural
form of "rule by the people." Democracy
is constructed in relation to

context and should be reconstructed when that context changes. As is

argued at greater length later in this article, contemporary globalization
constitutes the sort of change of situation that requires new approaches
to

democracy.7

The more particular question at hand here is:What role can civil
society play in a reconfigured democracy for global governance? Much

recent civil society mobilization has responded to democratic deficits in

prevailing patterns of globalization. At the same time, these civil soci
ety activities have prompted many?participants
to ask at a deeper level what democracy means
practiced in a globalizing world.

and observers alike?

and how it should be

Globality
The democratizing potentials of civil society are being evaluated here in
respect of the governance of global relations. However, more precisely,

286

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

is the "global" quality of global relations? In a broad sense, glob

alization designates a growth of connections between people across the
in a more specific fashion
planet, but globality can also be conceived
that opens up distinctive insights into contemporary world affairs.8
This perspective identifies globalization as deterritorialization or, to
be more precise, a rise of "supraterritoriality." Along these lines, glob
a realm that
ality refers to a particular kind of social space?namely,

what

substantially transcends the confines of territorial place, territorial dis

territorial spaces are mapped
tance, and territorial borders. Whereas
in terms of longitude, latitude, and altitude, global relations transpire in

the world as a single place, as one more or less seamless realm. Glob
ality in this sense has a "transworld" or "transborder" quality. A supra
territorial phenomenon can appear simultaneously at any location on

earth that is equipped to host it and/or can move more or less instanta
neously between any points on the planet.
Countless conditions in today's world manifest globality. For ex
electronic

finance and climate

the whole
change encompass
mass
Telecommunications
and
media
electronic
planet simultaneously.
move anywhere across the planet instantaneously. Many goods are man
ufactured through transborder production processes, and countless more
are distributed and sold through transworld markets. Surrounded by
global symbols and global events, current generations think of the
planet as home farmore than their forebears did.
ample,

When globalization
is understood along these lines?that
is, as a
transformation of social geography?then
it becomes clear that the
trend has mainly unfolded during the past half-century.9 The world of
1950 knew few or no airline passengers, intercontinental missiles, satel

lite communications, global monies, offshore finance centers, computer

networks, or ozone holes. The scale of transborder production and mar
kets was likewise a small fraction of its current proportions. When glob

ality is defined in terms of supraterritoriality, then its current scale and

recent growth are historically unprecedented.

This is by no means to argue that the old geography of territorial

spaces no longer matters. On the contrary, territorial locations, territorial
identities, and territorialgovernments continue to exert very significant in

fluences. The point is not that globality has taken over from territoriality,
but that territorialityno longer has themonopoly on social geography that
it exercised fiftyyears ago. We no longer live in a territorialer society.
Rather, territorial spaces now coexist and interrelatewith global spaces.
Contemporary globalization has also not encompassed all of human
ity to the same extent. In terms of regions, North America, Northeast

JanAart Sch?lte

287

and Western Europe have acquired considerably more global con

the planet, urban centers
nectivity than the rest of the world. Across
have generally become much more enmeshed in global networks than
rural areas. In class terms,managers, professionals, and wealthy people
have on the whole inhabited global spaces farmore thanmanual work

Asia,

ers and the poor. In terms of gender, multiple studies have shown that
tend to be online much more than women.

men

Nevertheless, having made these key qualifications, we can still say

that globality is important. It involves a different kind of social space,
one that has expanded to very substantial proportions in contemporary
history. Moreover,
geography is deeply interconnected with other di
mensions of social relations: culture, ecology, economics, politics, psy
a reorganization of social space?
chology, and time. Globalization?as
is therefore likely to both reflect and promote shifts in other social
structures, including those of governance.

Governance
So we come to the fourth often vague and widely contested concept in
the title of this article. Like "global-speak,"
talk of governance is a new
addition to the vocabulary of politics. The contemporaneous
advent of
the two terms is not accidental. Globalization?a
reconfiguration of so
a
cial space?has
gone hand in hand with
reconfiguration of regula

tion.10Where we used to speak of government, it is now suitable to

speak of governance.
The territorialist geography of old was deeply intertwined with a
statistmode of regulation. Social relations unfolded almost exclusively
in territorial frameworks (especially countries and their subdivisions),
and regulatory arrangements were made to match (especially through

national and local governments). The epitome of territorialist regulation

was sovereign statehood, where a centralized public authority apparatus
in principle and also largely in practice?supreme,
exercised?both

comprehensive, unqualified, and exclusive jurisdiction over a desig

nated territorial space and its inhabitants.
Now that,with globalization, many social relations substantially tran
scend territorial geography, territorialist governance has become imprac
ticable. National and local governments are quite unable by themselves to
effectively regulate phenomena like global mass media, global ecological
problems, global arms trade, and global finance. Transborder flows can
not be tied to a strictlydelimited territorial space over which a statemight
endeavor to exercise unilateral full control. Moreover, globalization has

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

288

also loosened some important cultural and psychological underpinnings of

sovereign statehood. Supraterritorial networks have given many people
loyalties (for example, along lines of class, gender, and transborder eth
nicity) that supplement and in some cases override state-centered nation
alism. In addition, many people in the contemporary globalizing world

increasingly ready to give "supraterritorial values" related

to, say, human rights and ecological integrity a higher priority than state
sovereignty and the associated norm of national self-determination over a

have become

territorial homeland.

stressed earlier, this is not an argument about the demise of the

(territorial) state. However, we have seen the demise of stat/sm as a
As

mode

of regulation. Governance?a
collectivity's
steering, coordina
and
control
mechanisms?now
involves
much more than
tion,
clearly
the state.11 Contemporary governance
is multilayered.
It includes im
portant local, substate-regional, suprastate-regional, and transworld op
erations alongside and intertwined with national arrangements. More
over, governance has in recent decades
increasingly worked through
as
as
well
In
instruments.
this situation, regulatory au
private
public
more
has
become
decentralized
and diffuse.
thority
considerably
The governance

of global relations shows these poststatist features

one thing,much regulation of global flows oc
For
particularly starkly.
curs not through unilateral state action, but through intergovernmental
consultations and coordination. Some of thismultilateralism
transpires
at theministerial level?for example, inmeetings of the G-7 and sum
In addition?albeit
with a much lower pub
lic profile?significant
interstate collaboration in global governance oc
curs through transgovernmental networks of technocrats (in economic,
environmental, judicial, and further policy areas).12
Steering of global relations has been permanently institutionalized
in suprastate agencies with both regional and transworld coverage.

mit conferences of theUN.

Much

of this alphabet soup is well known: BIS, EU, IMF, Mercosur,

and others.13 More than 250 such bodies are
NATO, OECD, UN, WTO,
active today. Of course, "suprastate" does not mean "nonstate," in the
sense that these institutions have gained full autonomy from national
more powerful states?continue
to
governments. States?especially
exert considerable

influence over regional and transworld governance

arrangements. However, suprastate mechanisms have also acquired ini
tiatives and impacts that elude close and constant monitoring and con

trol by national governments.14

In addition, some regulation of global flows has devolved to substate
bodies at provincial and municipal
levels. For instance, transborder

JanAart Sch?lte

289

companies now arrange much of their investment with local governments.

To take another example,
substate
authorities
have developed
considerable direct transborder collaboration to combat global criminal

networks. On such occasions, global governance is also local governance.

Finally, it should be noted that significant regulation of global rela
tions has come to reside in the private sector.15 This privatization of

is evident, for example, in various Internet rules, many

governance
telecommunications
standards, several global environmental agree
ments, certain codes of conduct for humanitarian assistance, and multi

ple aspects of transworld finance. Thus, governance of supraterritorial

spaces also entails more than government in the sense that it involves
private as well as public arrangements.
tiers as well as both public and private
Encompassing
multiple

spheres, global governance is proving to be anything but a "world gov

ernment." The model of the centralized public regulatory apparatus has
not been?and
shows no signs of being?transposed
from the national

arena to a planetary realm. Instead, global relations are regulated in a

"poststatist" fashion that has no single center of authority.
With the above conceptual clarifications in hand, we have some pa
rameters for a study of "civil society and democracy in global gover

nance."

politics

It says something about the fluid condition of contemporary

that each of the words in an article's title requires rudimentary

to
explication. The first two terms?civil
society and democracy?need
be substantially rethought, whereas the other two?globality
and gover
new altogether. Politics at the start of the twenty-first cen
nance?are
is
different.
indeed
tury

Democratic

Deficits

in Global

Governance

of global spaces is not only different, but also lacks demo

cratic legitimacy. On thewhole, current arrangements to regulate global
communications, global conflict, global ecology, global markets, global
money and finance, global organizations, and global production rest?
at best?on
very limited explicit consent from the affected populations.
Governance

In each area of global policy, public participation

bility are generally weak.

and public accounta

So it is no exaggeration to say that contemporary globalization has

provoked a crisis of democracy.16 This crisis derives from two major
structural problems, which are in turn reflected in a host of institutional
deficiencies.

These points are elaborated

below.

290

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

Structural Problems
first of the two main structural problems in contemporary con
structions of democracy
is the disjunction between supraterritorial
and
territorial
self-determination.
While many social relations
spaces
have gained a substantial global dimension, practices of democracy
most
have largely failed to keep pace. On thewhole, people?including
as
to
to
look
the
sole
site
for
demo
government
politicians?continue
cratic governance. Yet even if territorial (national, regional, and local)

The

for regulating global spaces were maximally democratized,

still not be enough. The state, being territorially grounded, can
not be sufficient by itself as an agent of democracy vis-?-vis global re
are not adequate to bring
lations. Territorial democratic mechanisms

mechanisms
itwould

transborder actors and flows under the collective

they affect. Democratic

control of the people

cannot be derived from dem

global governance
ocratic government alone.
The second structural problem relates to the changing contours of
the demos under contemporary globalization.17 Territorialist geography
and statist governance tended to exist in tandem with a nationalist struc

ture of community. In other words, people identified their demos in na

tional terms, and democracy meant self-determination for the nation.
Yet globalization has loosened the links between territoryand collective
destiny. The growth of supraterritorial flows has encouraged individuals
to identify their "people" inmultiple fashions in addition to the state
nation. As a result, contemporary world politics involves communities

that include substate and transstate ethnonations (including indigenous

peoples) and a host of transborder solidarities (for example, along lines
of class, religion, and sexual orientation). Moreover, globalization has
arguably encouraged some growth of cosmopolitan bonds, where people
identify the demos in terms of humanity as a whole (for example, in
disaster

relief operations and tellingly named "human rights" advo

Yet
conventional theories and mechanisms of democracy tend to
cacy).
define "the people" only in territorial-state-nation terms.
Institutional

Deficiencies

structural problems are evident in democratic deficits that pervade

all institutional sites of the governance of supraterritorial spaces. In terms
of states, for example, even governments with top democratic credentials

These

have generally given limited publicity to their activities in respect of

have on the whole conducted
global governance. State bureaucracies
sparse if any consultation of the public or its elected representatives

JanAart Sch?lte

291

about policies on global issues. Only infrequently have governments

held popular referenda on these matters. Election debates and the pro
grams of political parties have usually accorded only marginal attention
to issues of globalization
and its governance. National
representative
have generally exercised only lax oversight of their state's in

bodies

volvement

inmultilateral

conferences,

transgovernmental networks, and

suprastate agencies.
Democracy has been stillmore diluted in intergovernmental gover
nance mechanisms. For example, theG-7 is a major force of global eco
nomic management, but it gives a seat to only a handful of states whose

collective population amounts to around 10 percent of humanity. Mean

while, transgovernmental networks of technocrats have operated almost
completely outside the public eye and democratic scrutiny. These offi
cials have

concluded

countless multilateral

memorandums

of under

standing that bypass traditional procedures of treaty ratification.

Suprastate institutions have tended to hold even flimsier democratic

credentials than national governments.18 The BIS, NATO, and theOECD,

like theG7, exclude most of the world's states frommembership, even
though their rulings can have transworld impacts. Although theWTO
includes over 140 states as members, nearly a third of them have no

permanent representation in Geneva, and the capacities of many other

delegations are severely overstretched.19 The IMF and theWorld Bank

have almost universal state membership;

however, the quota regime
means that the five largest shareholder states between them today hold
40 percent of the vote. At the lowest extreme, meanwhile,
twenty-three
states of francophone Africa together hold just over 1 percent of the
vote.20 At theUN, the principle of one state-one vote in theGeneral As
sembly is hardly satisfactory as a democratic formula, giving China and
Saint Lucia equivalent weight. The veto of the five permanent members
of the Security Council also has no democratic justification.

legislatures are not the answer to these democratic deficits.

one
or two regional governance frameworks have acquired a
Although
elected
representative assembly, it is not practicable to trans
popularly
to
this
model
transworld institutions. For one thing, hundreds of
pose
millions of would-be global citizens are not equipped to vote inworld
scale competitive multiparty elections;
they have never heard of the
Global

and modus
concerned, let alone understand their mandates
circles
have
Established
little
interest
in creating
ruling
operandi.
transworld assemblies; nor do they face significant public pressure to
move in this direction. Moreover,
transworld political parties like the
Liberal and Socialist Internationals are not set up to conduct interconti
nental election campaigns for global parliaments; nor have proposals to
agencies

292

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

form a "global opposition party" against prevailing global policies at

tracted any significant following.21 We also lack technical means such
as electoral rolls and tallying mechanisms
to undertake planetary bal
lots. In addition, no broadly acceptable formula for representation on a

scale is available: political cultures across the planet are far too
on this matter. Furthermore, as already
to reach consensus
nature
the
of
the
noted,
global demos is so multifaceted and fluid that
it is not clear who should be represented in popular assemblies
for
transworld governance institutions.

world

diverse

We might look to local democracy through substate governments to

right some of the deficits of public participation and public accounta

Indeed, following the principle of sub

bility in global governance.
more
of
sidiarity,
regulation
supraterritorial flows might be devolved to
local bodies than is currently the case. However, global spaces cannot
as
be effectively governed through district councils alone. Moreover,

experience has all too often shown, there is nothing inherently demo
cratic about local government. Global players can cut clandestine deals
to
with a local ruling clique that is no more accessible or accountable
the public than themost

remote of suprastate agencies.

The governance of global spaces is obviously democratically defi
cient when it comes to private regulatory mechanisms. Nonofficial
for
mulators and implementers of rules like the International Accounting
Standards Committee

Policy Group, and the

Standards Institute (ETSI) have no pro
European
visions for public participation or consultation. Bodies like Social Ac
countability International (SAI), the Internet Corporation forAssigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), and Moody 's Investors Service face no
(IASC),
Telecommunications

the Derivatives

public accountability if and when their regulatory activities cause dam

age. As for public transparency, most people (including many demo
cratically elected representatives) have not even heard of private sites of
global governance.
Hence, from local to global levels, and in private as well as public
spheres, the regulation of supraterritorial realms is riven with democratic
deficits. Contemporary global spaces are not democratic spaces. Global

governance is not democratically legitimate. We do not have a situation

where the governed have accorded the right of rule to existing regimes.
Is this to say that "global democracy" is an oxymoron? Do we con
au
cede that the governance of supraterritorial spaces is unavoidably
thoritarian? Or are alternative mechanisms
available to advance public
participation and public accountability in global governance? More par
ticularly, inwhat ways and to what extent might civil society contribute
to this end?

JanAart Sch?lte
The Democratic
Given

the democratic

Promise

of Civil

293

Society

deficits

outlined above and the inadequacy of

that increasing
them, it is understandable
numbers of citizens have considered civil society as a way to enhance
in
public participation, consultation, transparency, and accountability
uneven
to
Across
the
extents?
continents?albeit
global governance.
state mechanisms

to resolve

business

forums, community associations, NGOs, religious institutions,

think tanks, and trade unions have turned their attention to themanage
ment of globalization. Although the scale of this activity and the power
of these actors can be exaggerated,22 it is clear that civil society makes
an

impact.23

But what are we

to make of this influence in terms of advancing

The
democracy?
following paragraphs summarize six potential contri
butions. Then the next section lays out various challenges to the real
ization of these potentials. As noted before, the purpose of this discus
sion is to identify general assessment criteria rather than to calculate
actual outcomes in specific cases.

First, in terms of possible positive impacts, civil society contributes

to democratic global governance by giving voice to stakeholders. Civic
bodies can provide opportunities for concerned parties to relay informa

tion, testimonial, and analysis to governance agencies. In particular, civil

society associations can open political space for social circles like the
poor and women, who tend to get a limited hearing through other chan
nels

In this way,
(including constitutional representative assemblies).
civic activism can empower stakeholders and indeed shift global poli
tics toward greater participatory democracy.
Second, civil society can enhance democracy in global governance

through public education activities. Effective democracy depends on an

can raise public awareness
informed citizenry, and civic associations

and understanding of transworld laws and regulatory institutions. To

this end, civil society groups can prepare handbooks and information
kits, produce audiovisual presentations, organize workshops, circulate

newsletters, supply information to and attract the attention of themass

media, maintain listservs and websites on the Internet, and develop cur
riculum materials

for schools and institutions of higher education.

Third, civil society can fuel debate in and about global governance.
Democratic
rule rests in part on vigorous, uninhibited discussion of di
verse views. Inputs from civil society can put a variety of perspectives,
and proposals into the policy arena. For example, civic
methodologies,

groups have been instrumental in generating and publicizing debate about

the so-called Washington
in global economic governance.
Consensus

294

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

issues, advocated qualitative assess

They have also raised ecological
ments of poverty, advanced alternative conceptions of human rights, op
posed landmines, and promoted schemes of debt reduction in the South.
Thanks to such contributions, policy discussions can become more crit
ical and creative. In addition, if openings for dissent are as necessary

as securing of consent, then civil society can offer impor

tant sites for objection and challenge.
can increase the public transparency of
Fourth, civic mobilization
Pressure
from
civil society can help bring regulatory
global governance.
frameworks and operations into the open, where they become suscepti
ble to public scrutiny. Often citizens are not aware what decisions are
taken in global governance, by whom, from what options, on what
to democracy

grounds, with what expected results, and with what resources to support
implementation. Civic groups can also interrogate the currently popu
lar official rhetoric of "transparency" by asking critical questions about
what is made transparent, at what time, in what forms, through what
channels, on whose decision, forwhat purpose, and inwhose interest.

Fifth, civil society might promote democracy in global governance

by increasing the public accountability of the regulatory agencies con
cerned. Civic groups can monitor the implementation and effects of

policies regarding global relations and press for corrective measures

are adverse. Civil society bodies can take griev
when the consequences
ances with the performance of global regimes to auditors, ombudsper
sons, parliaments, courts, and themass media. To take one specific ex
ample, civic actors have agitated for?and
subsequently participated

policy evaluation mechanisms for theWorld Bank and

in?independent
the IMF. Through a democratic accountability function, civil society as
sociations can push authorities in global governance to take greater pub

lic responsibility for their actions and policies.

Together, the preceding five enhancements
ter a sixth and more general basis of democratic

of democracy can fos

rule: legitimacy. Legit
that an authority has a

imate rule prevails when people acknowledge

right to govern and that they have a duty to obey its directives. As a re
sult of such consent, legitimate governance tends to be more easily,
more productively, and more nonviolently executed than illegitimate au

thority.Engagement between civil society and regulatory mechanisms

can?if it gives stakeholders voice, bolsters public education, promotes
the
debate, raises transparency, and increases accountability?enhance
to
can
that
citizens
accord
Civil
offer
respect
global governance.
society
a means

for affected publics to affirm that global governance arrange

should guide?and
where necessary constrain?their
behavior.
can
a
civil
also
for
the
Likewise,
space
society
provide
expression of

ments

fanAart Sch?lte

295

discontent and the pursuit of change when existing governance arrange

are regarded as illegitimate. Thus, we have recently witnessed
concerted civic opposition to the OECD-sponsored
Multilateral Agree
ment on Investment (MAI), the proposed Millennium Round ofWTO

ments

talks, and countless IMF/World Bank programs.24

Finally, before closing the positive side of this balance sheet, we
should note that civil society engagement of global governance can also
have spin-offs for the democratization of territorial governance. For ex

ample, a number of development NGOs and think tanks that lobby for
global debt relief and socially sustainable structural adjustment have gone
on to scrutinize public finances in national and local governments. For
their part, women's movements

have often used global laws and institu

the state along gender lines.25 Like

tions in their efforts to democratize

wise, many human rights advocates have drawn on global instruments to

press for greater respect of democratic liberties in national politics.26
In sum, civil society offers considerable opportunities to democra
tize the governance of global relations. Of course, as the following sec
tion emphasizes, the above positive potentials cannot be realized in the
absence of deliberate efforts and adequate resources, together with vig
or even antidemocratic, elements and
ilance against nondemocratic,

in view of the
practices. Yet the possible gains are such?particularly
democratic
deficits described
earlier and the impracticability
of
we should welcome
transworld parliaments?that
the current rise of
civic activism on global governance and work tomaximize
its contri
butions to a democratic

Democratic

global polity.

Challenges

forCivil

Society

set out the democratic

promise of civil society engagement of

there remains the challenge of fully re
global governance
those
in
practice. Indeed, the returns to date, al
alizing
possibilities
often
and
though
noteworthy
important, have been relatively modest on
thewhole. The numbers of civil society associations and initiatives that

Having

in principle,

tackle issues of global governance have certainly mushroomed

in recent
decades, but in absolute terms the levels of mobilization have remained
limited. The vast majority of today's prospective global citizens have
not participated in civil society activities regarding global governance.

In addition, many of the civic groups that have addressed global gover
nance have not given priority to?or sometimes even been conscious
of?the
implications of their work for democracy. Hence, much more
effort, resources, and awareness will be needed if civil society is to

296

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

effect a more substantial

guably we have witnessed

of global governance. Ar
the
only
early stages of a long-term project.
Yet the challenges involve more than expanding a movement;
they
also relate to improving existing civil society practices regarding the
democratization of global governance. For one thing, civic associations
democratization

may underperform with respect to the six potential contributions iden

tified in the preceding section. Worse
still, civil society activity may
sometimes actually violate the criteria and be positively harmful to
democracy. Thus, there are problems both of unfulfilled promise and of
the possible

obstruction of democratic processes.

Regarding the first of the six benchmarks, for example,

civil society
might not give voice to all stakeholders in global governance, or might
do so very unevenly. If civil society is to make a full contribution to
democratic rule of global spaces, then all interested parties must have
preferably equal opportunities to participate. Otherwise,
civil society can reproduce or even enlarge structural inequalities and
arbitrary privileges connected with age, class, gender, nationality, race,
of social
religion, urban versus rural location, and so on. Hierarchies
power can operate in civil society just as in other political spaces. Civil
access?and

society is itself a site of struggles to be heard.

Although little systematic research has examined patterns of partic
ipation in contemporary civil society mobilization regarding global gov
ernance, casual observation suggests troubling degrees of skewed ac

cess. Campaigners
in general?and
their leaders in particular?have
from middle-aged
drawn disproportionately
and
adults, professional
Northern
Christian
countries, whites,
propertied classes, men,
heritages,
and urban dwellers. On the whole, civil society engagement of global
governance has seen the privileged claim to speak for the subordinated,
often with only limited if any direct consultation of the would-be
stituents. Even membership associations may offer their followers

con

little

opportunity for participation beyond the payment of subscriptions. Un

fortunately, many activists have not regarded such situations as prob
have
lematic. Some advocates
(particularly among Northern NGOs)
even dismissed criticisms on these points with rather cavalier declara

tions that civil society associations are not, and do not need to be, rep
resentative.27 Yet failures to include are failures to empower.
In another possible restriction of voice, civil society engagement of
global governance can rest on an overly narrow cultural base. In partic

ular, there has been a tendency for civil society activism on global
regimes inmuch of the South and the former communist-ruled countries
to be dominated byWestern-styled, Western-funded NGOs
led byWest
ernized elites. For all that such campaigners might criticize prevailing

fanAart Sch?lte

297

conditions of global governance, they often have stronger cultural affini

ties with global managers thanwith local communities. Thus, NGOs and
civil society bodies may?perhaps
other professionalized
quite uninten

grassroots groups that could give better voice to

tionally?marginalize
the diverse life-worlds that global governance affects. In this vein, Bud
dhist, Hindu, and Islamic associations have often experienced greater
difficulty in acquiring a voice in the politics of global governance than
(implicit or explicit) Judeo-Christian roots. If civil
its full contribution to enabling public participation
in global governance, then full recognition?and
effective negotiation?
of theworld's cultural diversity is required.
can also fall short with respect to their
Civil society associations
those groups with
society is tomake

second democratizing potential, that of public education about global

governance. Some of these failings occur through oversight, when civic
groups devote all of their energies to behind-the-scenes
lobbying of reg

their information and in

ulatory bodies and neglect to communicate
to
the
wider
Other
sights
shortcomings arise when civil society
public.
disseminate
flawed
organizations
knowledge. For example, activists

may misconstrue

global governance.

operandi of the institutions of

may also lack economic literacy, legal
understanding, scientific expertise, statistical

themandates

and modus

Campaigners

knowledge, sociological
training, and other relevant competences to be effective public educa
can be tempted to manipulate
tors. Advocates
public opinion with
score
to
in
data
order
and
inaccurate
sloppy argument
points in their im
to argue that civic
mediate political contests. This is by no means

groups should uncritically accept official truths and orthodox research

methods, or that they should acquire the highest formal qualifications,
or that they should aspire to (unattainable) political neutrality. However,
it is to affirm that civil society associations have a democratic respon
sibility to construct and spread public knowledge of global governance
with the same sort of care thatwe demand of official agencies.

the third aspect of democratization highlighted earlier,

Regarding
civil society might fail to adequately fuel debate about global gover
nance. In particular, civic activists can?even
contrary to their inten
tions and self-perceptions?become
co-opted, compromising their po
tential to promote plural views and provide space for dissent. For
example, civic groups may come uncritically to render services to gov
ernance agencies or take funds from them. Campaigners may meet of
ficials in a continual

stream of convivial exchanges without ever laying

for action. Certain civil society campaigners may even
to work for regulatory institutions that they have previ

down deadlines
"cross over"

ously challenged.

Some

civic associations

have engaged

in what

they

298

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

call "critical cooperation" with global governance institutions; however,

beyond a certain point the critical element becomes diluted and eventu

ally lost altogether.28 Indeed, advocates must stay vigilant that official
institutions do not co-opt the language of civil society critique, subtly
recasting it to their own purposes. Such captures of discourse may have
occurred in recent history when global agencies have repackaged rhet
oric of "sustainable
"good

development,"

"social

capital,"

"participation,"

and

governance."

Apart from failing fully to stimulate debate, civil society associa

tions that deal with global governance issues can in some cases actively
constrain discussion and suppress dissent. After all, civil society is not
an intrinsically virtuous space. It includes destructive elements such as

racists, ultranationalists, and religious fundamentalists who seek to deny

in civil
the democratic rights of others. In addition, some professionals
are
so
to take
with
their
that
refuse
they
society
impressed
"expertise"
a
within
civic
views
the
association,
seriously. Also,
leadership or
lay
on
A civil so
culture
constraints
debate.
group
may impose peremptory
can
run
be
with
authoritarianism
just as a
ciety organization
top-down

political party, a company, or an official bureaucracy.

On the criterion of enhancing public transparency, civil society
might fail tomeet standards of openness in its own activities. Indeed,
processes within civic bodies can be quite opaque to
decision-taking
even some insiders. Moreover, civil society organizations
outsiders?or
can employ underhanded tactics in the pursuit of their aims. Civic bod
ies may neglect to publish financial statements, staff lists, and declara
tions of objectives, let alone full-scale reports of their activities. Alter

such
natively, civil society groups may be reluctant to publicize
information when the law requires that they provide it.
Of course, an undemocratic environment may compel certain civil
to work in the shadows. For example, full trans
society associations
civic
groups would not have served democracy in the case
parency by

of the global anticolonial

struggle. Likewise,
"illegal" trade unions in
Indonesia understandably met IMF officials in 1998 behind the back of

the authoritarian Suharto government.29 However,

the need for confi
can
as
be overplayed in civil society
elsewhere, and activists
dentiality
must resist the temptations of unjustifiable secrecy that seduce many
who aspire to political influence.
Civil society engagement of global governance faces further chal
lenges when it comes to democratic accountability. Some civic associa
tions have an elected governing council, but others have a self-selected

that are active on global governance

leadership. Many organizations
issues survive on private grants that are subject to little if any public

fanAart Sch?lte

299

oversight. Several voluntary codes of conduct for civil society organi

zations have appeared in recent years in response to accountability con
cerns, but they have as yet seen little implementation.30

Of course, official agencies can maintain accountability mechanisms

with respect to civic associations. Thus, states may require formal regis
tration and submission of accounts by civil society groups, with sanc

tions including fines and disbandment if the organizations breach the

law. At the suprastate level, several regional and global institutions have
employed accreditation procedures to determine the legitimacy of civic
bodies. However, oversight by states individually is often ineffective as
regards transborder associations, and multilateral arrangements tomoni
tor civil society associations are poorly developed. Moreover, accounta
bility to governance agencies can sit uneasily with civil society's demo
cratic role of challenge and dissent, especially when (as is often the case)
the official institutions in question have poor democratic qualifications.
in some cases ac
All of the preceding challenges can qualify?and
tually undermine?the
of global governance.

legitimacy of civil society engagement

initiatives can sometimes fail tomaximize

democratic

Civic

public participation, consultation, debate, transparency, and accountabil

ity, and civic activities can sometimes actually work against those ends.
In addition, civil society associations can possibly subvert other demo
cratically legitimate policy processes. For example, in their efforts to se

cure special interests in the governance of global relations, lobby groups

can bypass?and
state processes.
thereby compromise?democratic
In short, then, civil society is not inherently a force for democracy
any more than the public sector or themarket. Given the potential prob
lems surveyed above, we do well to balance enthusiasm for civil society

engagement of global governance with due caution. Much can go right,

but much can also go wrong. It is therefore quite proper to demand of
civic associations
that they not merely assert?but
also demonstrate?
their democratic

credentials.

Conclusion
This article has set the contemporary rise of civil society engagement of
global governance in the context of wider historical trends of globaliza
tion.While
the new geography has raised significant opportunities for
human betterment, ithas also posed major challenges for democracy. Ex
isting arrangements to govern global spaces suffer frommajor democratic
deficits, and prevailing theories and practices of territorial democracy do
not match the global mold.

300

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

In these circumstances, it is understandable

that growing numbers
of people have looked to civil society groups as a conduit for the
democratization of global governance. As indicated earlier, civic asso
ciations can provide platforms, advance public education, fuel debate,
increase transparency, promote accountability, and enhance the demo
cratic legitimacy of the rules that govern global relations. Positive in
terventions from adequately resourced and suitably participatory and
civil society groups can infuse global governance with
accountable

greater democracy.
To be sure, civil society does not offer a panacea for democratic
deficits in global regulation. The enhancement of civil society contribu
tions should be seen as one aspect of a multipronged strategy to democ

ratize global governance. Concurrently, we arguably need to construct a

firmer constitutional framework of suprastate law and regulatory bod
ies, such as a fully operative global human rights regime and a system of

formal independent evaluation of all transworld governance institutions.

In addition, democratic assemblies at local, national, and regional levels
should devote greater attention to global issues than they have done to

date. Hence, civil society should be regarded as a vital supplement to,

rather than a replacement of, formal political processes.
the responsibility formaximizing
civil society contribu
Moreover,
tions to democratic global governance does not lie wholly with civic as

sociations themselves. Official quarters and market circles must also

nurture their own will and capacity to receive positive civil society in
puts. For example, a socially responsible mass media could do farmore
to empower

citizens with information and analysis concerning global

governance. Meanwhile,
regulatory bodies must have relevant staff ex
pertise, adequate funds, suitable procedures, and receptive attitudes in
order to take advantage of the democratic benefits on offer from civil

society. All too often in the past, official circles have treated exchanges
with civil society as a public relations exercise. Or they have focused
their contacts on sympathetic groups to the exclusion of critics. Or of

out of hand civil society accounts

technocratic "expert" knowledge. Or they have expected
sults when relationships with civic associations generally
mature. The onus for corrective action on such problems
cial bodies rather than civil society organizations.
ficials have dismissed

that challenge
immediate re
need time to
lies with offi

This said, civic associations bear responsibilities, too. As this article

has stressed, the promises of civil society for democratic global governance
are not realized automatically. Civic associations can be underdemocratic,
or nondemocratic, or sometimes even antidemocratic. Activists must make
dedicated and sustained efforts to avoid these negative outcomes.

JanAart Schote

301

In sum, civil society involvement in the governance of global spaces

should be neither romanticized nor demonized. The potential contribu
tions and challenges outlined here provide a framework for sober as

sessments of performances to date and possibilities for the future. This

conceptual clarification may then help to achieve the greatest democratic
returns from civil society mobilization on questions of globalization. ?

Notes
JanAart Sch?lte is professor in theDepartment of Politics and International
Studies and associate of theCentre for the Study of Globalisation and R?gion
alisation at theUniveristy ofWarwick, UK. He is author of Globalization: A
Critical Introduction (Palgrave, 2000), coauthor of Contesting Global Gover
nance (Cambridge University Press, 2000), and editor of Civil Society and
Global Finance (Routledge, 2002).
1. In thiswriting, "civic" groups and operations are taken to be the actors
and activities in civil society.
2. For

example,

T. G. Weiss

and L. Gordenker,

eds., NGOs,

the UN,

and

Global Governance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996); P. Willetts, ed., "Con

science of theWorld" : The Influence ofNon-Governmental Organizations in
theUN System (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996); J. Smith, C.
and R.

Chatfield,

Pagnucco,

eds.,

Transnational

Social

Movements

and Global

Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); J.A. Fox and L. D.

Brown, eds., The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and
Grassroots Movements (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); M. Keck and K. Sik
kink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); P. Waterman, Globalization, Social
Movements and theNew Internationalisms (London: Mansell, 1998); J. Boli
and

G.

M.

Thomas,

eds.,

Constructing

World

Culture:

International

Non

governmental Organizations since 1875 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

1999) ; J.W. Foster with A. Anand, eds., Whose World Is It Anyway? Civil So
ciety, theUnited Nations and theMultilateral Future (Ottawa: United Nations
Association in Canada, 1999); R. Cohen and S. M. Rai, eds., Global Social
Movements (London: Athlone, 2000); R. O'Brien, A. M. Goetz, J.A. Sch?lte,
and M. Williams, Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic In
stitutions and Global Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000); A. M. Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational
Civil Society (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2000) ;R. A. Higgott, G. R. D. Underhill, and A. Bieler, eds., Non-State Actors
and Authority in theGlobal System (London: Routledge, 2000); M. Edwards
and J.Gaventa, eds., Global Citizen Action (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001);
S. Khagram, J.V. Riker, and K. Sikkink, eds., Restructuring World Politics:
Transnational

Social

Movements,

Networks,

and Norms

(Minneapolis:

Univer

sity ofMinnesota Press, 2002).

3. The present argumentbuilds on five years of general empirical research
regarding civil society and global (especially economic) governance. The analy
sis laid out here forms the conceptual startingpoint of a study across seven

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

302

countries, entitled Civil Society and Democracy in Global Economic Gover

nance, funded by theFord Foundation. The firstresultswill be available in2003.
4. Cf. J.L. Cohen and A. Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cam
bridge: MIT Press, 1992); K. Kumar, "Civil Society: An Inquiry into theUse
fulness of an Historical Term," British Journal of Sociology 44, no. 3 (Septem
ber 1993): 375-395.
5. This category includes both lobbies for specific industries (wheremar
ket and civil society often overlap) and umbrella associations, like the Inter
national Chamber of Commerce and the InternationalOrganisation of Employ
ers, that address broad policy questions.
6. Cf. C. Hann and E. Dunn, eds., Civil Society: Challenging Western
Models (London: Routledge, 1996). Indeed, some critics have suggested that
the very term "civil society" carries suchWestern cultural baggage thatother
terminology is needed to reflect and nurturepluralism in political practices.
7. For

other

arguments

making

the same

general

point,

see, for example,

D.

Archibugi and D. Held, eds., Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New

World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); and S. J.Rosow, "Globalisation as Dem
ocratic Theory,"Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2000):
a suggested
and T. Porter,

set of criteria

For

27-45.

Coleman

"International

see W. D.
globalization,
Globalisation
and Democracy:

for democratic

Institutions,

Assessing theChallenges," Global Society 14, no. 3 (2000): 388-390.

8. The following points are elaborated in J.A. Sch?lte, Globalization: A
Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), chap. 2.
9. More evidence to support this chronology is presented in Sch?lte,
Globalization,

chap.

3.

10. Earlier versions of the following points can be found in "The Global
ization ofWorld Politics," in J.Baylis and S. Smith, eds., The Globalization of
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 2d ed. (Oxford: Ox
fordUniversity Press, 2001), pp. 13-32; and Sch?lte, Globalization, chap. 6.
11. Cf.

J. N.

"Governance

Rosenau,

in the Twenty-First

Century,"

Global

Governance 1, no. 1 (winter 1995): 13-43; Commission on Global Gover

nance: Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995);
W. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? (Wash
ington,D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); M. Hewson and T. Sinclair, eds.,
Approaches toGlobal Governance Theory (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1999).
12. A.-M.

"Governing

Slaughter,

the Global

Economy

Through

Govern

ment Networks," inM. Byers, ed., The Role of Law in International Politics:
Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 2000), pp. 177-205.
13. The acronyms designate, respectively, theBank for International Set
tlements,

the European

Union,

the International

Monetary

Com?n del Sur (Southern Cone Common Market),

Organization,

the Organization

for Economic

Fund,

the Mercado

theNorth Atlantic Treaty

Cooperation

and Development,

theUnited Nations, and theWorld Trade Organization.

14. B. Reinalda and V. Verbeek, eds., Autonomous Policy Making by Inter
national Organizations (London: Routledge, 1998).
15. Cf. A.

C.

Cutler,

V. Haufler

and T. Porter,

eds.,

Private

Authority

in

International Affairs (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); K.

fanAart Sch?lte

303

Ronit and V. Schneider, eds., Private Organizations inGlobal Politics (London:

Routledge, 2000).
16. D. Held, Democracy and theGlobal Order: From theModern State to
Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); A. McGrew, ed., The
and Territorial Democracy
Transformation of Democracy? Globalization
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); P. G. Cerny, "Globalization and theErosion of
Democracy," European Journal of Political Research 36, no. 1 (August 1999):
1-26; B. Holden, ed., Global Democracy: Key Debates (London: Routledge,
2000); Sch?lte, Globalization, chap. 11.
17. The following points are elaborated in Sch?lte, Globalization, chap. 7.
See also D. Archibugi, D. Held, and M. K?hler, eds., Re-imagining Political
Community: Studies inCosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
18. Cf. R. Dahl, "Can InternationalOrganizations Be Democratic? A Skep
in I. Shapiro

tic's View,"

and C. Hacker-Cord?n,

eds., Democracy's

Edges

(Cam

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19-36; N. Woods, "Good Gov
ernance

in International

Global

Organizations,"

Governance

5, no.

1 (January

March 1999): 39-61; J.Bohman, "International Regimes and Democratic Gov

ernance: Political Equality and Influence inGlobal Institutions," International
Affairs 75, no. 3 (July 1999): 499-514; Coleman and Porter, "International In
J. S. Nye,

stitutions";

"Globalization's

Democratic

Deficit:

How

To Make

Inter

national InstitutionsMore Accountable," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 4 (July

August 2001): 2-6.
M. Krajewski, "Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional
19. See further
Perspectives ofWTO Law," Journal ofWorld Trade 35, no. 1 (February 2001):
167-186.

20. InternationalMonetary Fund, Annual Report 2000 (Washington,D.C.:

IMF, 2000), pp. 176-179.
21. W. P. Kreml and C. W. Kegley, "A Global Political Party: The Next
Step," Alternatives 21, no. 1 (January-March 1996): 123-134.
22.

Cf.

P. J. Spiro,

"New

Global

Potentates:

Nongovernmental

Organiza

tions and the 'UnregulatedMarketplace,'" Cardozo Law Review 18 (December

1996): 957-969; J.T. Matthews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (Jan
uary-February 1997): 50-66.
23. Cf. Florini, The Third Force; J.A. Sch?lte, "Civil Society and Gover
nance in theGlobal Polity," inM. Ougaard and R. Higgott, eds., Towards a
Global Polity? (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 145-165.
24.

Cf.

E.

Smythe,

"State

Authority

and

Investment

Security:

Non-State

Actors and theNegotiation of theMultilateral Agreement on Investment at the

OECD,"

in Higgott

et al., Non-State

Actors,

pp.

74-90;

M.

Kaldor

et al.,

"Seat

tle: December '99?" Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 1

(2000): 103-140; Special Issue on Globalization and Resistance, Mobilization
6, no. 1 (spring 2001); K. Danaher, ed., Democratizing theGlobal Economy:
The Battle Against the IMF and World Bank (San Francisco: Global Exchange;

Monroe,

Maine:

Common

Courage

Press,

2001).

25. Cf. H. Pietil? and J.Vickers, Making Women Matter: The Role of the
United Nations, 3d ed. (London: Zed, 1996).
26. T. Risse, S. C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).

304

Civil Society and Democracy inGlobal Governance

27. Multiple interviewswith the author.

28. J.G. Covey, "Critical Cooperation? Influencing theWorld Bank Through
Policy Dialogue and Operational Cooperation," in Fox and Brown, The Strug
81-119.
gle for Accountability,^.
29. Interview with the author. See also N. Field, "IMF Had Key Role in
Gaining Indonesian Labour Rights," Australian Financial Review, 19May
1999, p. 10.
30. T. Kunugi andM. Schweitz, eds., Codes of Conduct for Partnership in
Governance: Texts and Commentaries (Tokyo: United Nations University,
1999); J. Cutt and V. Murray, Accountability and Effectiveness Evaluation in
Non-Profit Organizations (London: Routledge, 2000); M. Edwards, NGO Rights
and Responsibilities: A New Deal for Global Governance (London: Foreign Pol
icyCentre, 2000).