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Koha Digest # 145


Date: 16 April 1997




There was only about a half an hour left, and the Albanian and Serb participants of the New
York Round Table were about to leave the three days long discussion without a joint
communication, i.e. only with an explanation that they met, they talked and that they reached
no agreement. Some American observers, visibly disappointed, whispered:

"Same as in Dayton". It was as in Dayton, without Holbrooke. The truth is that this week in
New York, Albanians and Serbs agreed just a few times and disagreed just too many times.
The positions are distant, and it would be an illusion if they weren't. This crisis is also lasting
too long and it is too deep to have things different. Nevertheless, small steps forward were
made in New York.

First, as expressed in the communique, both parties agree that there is no more need to
convince each other on the need to give up on our political stands. Albanians have the right to
defend their option for independence as much as the Serbs can insist on their option.
Secondly, any future negotiation must start without prior conditioning nor prejudice on the
final status of Kosova, and this means that all options on Kosova are possible, including its
independence. The negotiation process can't be developed without the mediation of the
international community, was one of the conclusions of this round table. Thirdly, as a
transitory phase, the parties agree that passing-over the power to the majority must be
achieved, protecting meanwhile the rights of the peoples that in numbers make up a minority.
And, all of this within the Helsinki frame of the borders.

Well, some one could say that this is a non-obligatory round table and that, if all these points
were acceptable for Albanians, for example, they are not achievable.

As direct result of the talks in New York - no. Moreover, it was not the intention and neither
could it be expected that an NGO, as the organizer of the meeting, would be the guarantor of
implementation. The purpose, maybe invisible till the end of the meeting, was to find out the
points on which the common principles of Albanians and Serbs can be developed, so
tomorrow they would be used in the negotiations.

Perceived thus, it could be said that the future Albanian and Serb participants would not need
to go back at the beginning and explain all they did before they came to these common points.

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
And the ruling Serbian party? It was not present and can't feel obliged. It is true, as much as it
is true that the round table was closely followed by the officials of the American
administration, who have repeated many times that the outer wall sanctions depends
exclusively on Kosova. The ruling party must take this document and all what is to come this
year very seriously.

Next steps? Hard to predict. The round table will cause internal commotion in the Serbian life
(the opposition coalition is about to fall apart), and it could happen that the effects will be the
same in the Albanian life. Stagnation in talks can happen, but it could also easily happen that
the Serbian party will become much more interested but also forced by the international
pressure to continue them.

The options are open, and the cynic would add - same as the solution for Kosova: open on
this side and the other side...



by YLBER HYSA / Prishtinë

The round table, in New York, was the event that fully captivated
the attention of the kosovars and the wide opinion, the analysts
and the media.

The meeting was announced long ago, and then it was postponed due
to the electrifying situation in Serbia after a several months'
long demonstrations. The chosen timing proper, following
Milosevic's Lex Specialis, the pre-electoral Serbia and the
pyramidal debacle in Albania, found Kosova a "suitable" place in
the American agenda.

And while on the Albanian side there were doubts on who will and
who will not go, and who should be invited and reinvited, the
situation was solved just before the meeting started, on the
Serbian side there was a continuous hesitation till the last
moment, when the ruling SPS decided not to participate in the

There were different interpretations on how this decision, a very

strange one, was made. It seems that besides the pre-electoral
marketing, the American approach towards Serbian political
parties contributed to the withdrawal of the socialists from the
New York table. "Zajedno's" representatives were received even
by Albright and Cornbloom, whereas the ruling party was aiming
at sending high representatives (maybe Sainovic and Milutinovic)
to New York, but the condition was that they should be received
by Albright and have other meetings at the American

administration, a request that has apparently been rejected by
the Americans.

Aware of all these combinations, Milosevic's party maybe has

decided to play the game inside - where voting takes place and
where the power is won. This is why all that criticism against
the opposition and why were Zajedno's representatives proclaimed

The internal side of the problem, Serbian or Albanian, deserves

a thorough analysis.

The things that needs to be mentioned at the beginning, and this

has been repeated by the Albanian participants, is that they were
unique in their postures on self-determination and independence
of Kosova, also implying that there are different ways to reach
this final goal. They also said that independence is not a
condition to start the conversations. On the contrary, the
Albanian side stressed that the solutions should be found in a
long-term process, and Serbs seem to have agreed on that, as well
as the organizer, which is evident from the final document from
this meeting. The document also stresses the need to develop a
long-term process with the presence of the third party and the
conclusion was that the next meetings should take place in
Prishtina or Belgrade.

In fact, the demonstrated unity of the Albanian side, is a new

cohesion element, that can be used in the domestic kosovar plane
in a near future. And, this cohesion comes after the serious
cracks that occurred in the Albanian political corps. Unless the
electoral situation, currently being announced in Kosova,
surpasses fair-play...

On the other hand, the Serbian side was decisive in its

conviction that Kosova must remain in Serbia and offered
different modalities that were defined in an autonomy, but agreed
to the ascertainment that the solution of Kosova's problem needs
a long time, i.e., needs a process. The Serbian opposition,
facing a unique posture of the Albanians and the pressure of the
domestic political scene, found itself under double pressure -
and thus no "compromise" solution was expected to come from it's
representatives. On the other hand, Albanians were also facing
double pressure - facing the Serbian "Kosova remains in Serbia"
posture and the American posture that Albanians should
participate in the Serbian elections in order to oust Milosevic.
And it seems that this was one of the points on which Americans
exerted pressure: participation in Serbian elections and removing
Milosevic from power, on institutional grounds. And only
afterwards, in a more democratic Serbia, find a durable solution
in a process.

But it seems that this strong pressure was lifted at the
beginning, when it became obvious that it would not lead towards
an effective agreement, having in mind the totally opposite
postures of the parties (as Draskovic himself declared), then the
points that would eventually offer a common stand to set a frame
to continue with the talks. This, though, doesn't mean that the
previous tactics has been given up on.

Anyhow, the final document comprised in three points, stating

that Kosova is a serious problem that needs urgent solution; that
the mistrust of the respective parties can't be eliminated
without the presence of the international engagement and
assistance and that the solution can be found only through
dialogue, without preconditions and prejudice on the possible

The generalized document, which more or less reflects, in

principle, the American postures and Albanian and Serb common
points - counts on a long-term, unconditional process that will
assure an interim phase that will lead towards a durable
solution. And to come to this, the document says,
"democratization of Serbia" and "democratization of Kosova" are

This, depending on how it will be achieved, also depending on how

decisive the two parties are to implement it and how much will
the guarantor insist on it, is not a bad interim solution. On the
contrary, it seems that the only good thing in New York was that
it was proven that the agreement can't be reached "in one meeting
and with one signature" - as one of the participants declared.
This whole approach opens the Kosova question in two aspects:
strategic and tactic. The second one refers to the transitory
solution that implies the measures of understanding, the solution
of segmentary problems, i.e., going back to normal - as stated
in the document, going towards democratization.
The long term aspect is the strategic side of the problem and it
refers to the solution of the Kosova status which is
automatically linked to the Helsinki principles. Apart from the
aspect of international law, this is also linked to the long-term
strategic aspect of the regulation of the long-term interests in
the Balkans.

Anyhow, it seems that Kosova has slowly opened the question of

its internationalization in New York, although the problem still
contains a lot of "tactical" elements in it. In fact, this was
the first time that the Kosova issue became internationalized.
Although this was "a Dayton without Holbrooke".


"The first item on the agenda was the presentation of the

postures of the two sides. Apart from the joint ascertainment
that the situation in Kosova is serious and that can't be
tolerated for long, the other articulations remain totally
opposite. The models for the solution of Kosova's problem were
also offered. Kosova's representatives, unanimously, asked to
find the solution through a referendum - for Kosova's
independence and self-determination remain the main precondition
for the solution of Kosova's problem. On the other hand, the
Serbian side insisted that the tension should be lifted, but it
also insisted that Albanians should give up on independence".


"We faced an experienced political team and also the pressure of

our American hosts - as you know this posture is that our
question is that of a minority and that it is an issue to be
solved inside of Serbia. We were pressured to become part of the
new political process in Serbia, to enable the opposition to come
to power, and then to see what can be done. Those were two very
difficult days, but we have come to an important victory. We
managed to talk openly and say all we have in mind without
getting angry at one-another. The most important thing is that
we have come closer, although we still remain in totally opposite


"The discussions were very tolerant and they took place in a very
civilizing atmosphere, although the postures are, unfortunately,
totally opposite. The Serbian side insists that the Kosova
question can be solved only with democratic methods in a
democratic Serbia. In that kind of Serbia, Albanians would enjoy
all the rights, including political and religious, as well as the
right to gain territorial autonomy within Serbia, of course. I
have called them to interrupt the boycott of everything that
comes from Serbia and help us build a new Serbia, in which all
citizens would have the same rights".



by BESIM ABAZI / Prishtinë

Only a few days remain before the mandate of the non-constituted

parliament expires. In fact, this is it's second mandate, for as
we all remember on 24 May last, Dr. Rugova extended it's mandate,
an extension which was accompanied by a lot of medial noise made
by the different "opposition" parties. Then, Dr. Rugova had
extended the mandate, promising that in a very short period of
time, the Parliament would be constituted. But, this didn't
happen and Rugova has insistingly repeated the posture that "this
will be done as soon as the conditions are created". Meanwhile
the non-constitution of the Parliament was justified with: "we
are careful not to provoke the very serious situation in Kosova".
As regards the celebration of new elections, Rugova has declared
that "the time will come when we will take that decision". But,
the time is coming closer and the political leadership has still
not a clear idea on what to do. Some of the parties, in a way,
have already started their pre-electoral campaigns. What's more,
some of them are using this time to proclaim the establishment
of new branches and sub-branches throughout Kosova.
Thus, the discussions on the elections have "thrown" different
initiatives to the surface, out of which, the most outstanding
seems to be that of Adem Demaçi. He has asked Dr. Rugova to start
the procedure for the immediate constitution of the parliament
and give up on the elections, because without the constitution
of this parliament, there are no conditions to call for new
elections. On this occasion, Demaçi stated that he would take
over the responsibility to do the job, under the condition that
Rugova and LDK help him out. In this prism, he suggested that if
the parliament is constituted, then it's mandate should be
extended, it's speaker should be appointed, Rugova's presidential
mandate would be extended too and finally that "a vice-president
of the Republic would be appointed".

In the PPK, they believe that steps for the constitution of the
parliament of Kosova should be undertaken by all means, so the
parliament can then undertake the determined juridical
activities, to prevent the interruption of juridical continuity,
for there is no one that can convoke the free elections. In case
the elections are organized, the PPK " would analyze the
circumstances and they would act accordingly", however they still
have no clear idea on the matter. At the PPK, they tell us that
Demaçi has expressed the determination of his party to take over
the responsibility for the constitution of the parliament of
Kosova to Dr. Rugova. This responsibility could grow bigger
knowing that it would cause the reaction of the Serbian side.
"This possibility shouldn't be excluded, because Serbia is
unpredictable and such an action could incite Serbia to
radicalize the situation even more in the sense of increased
repression, including arrests, terror and other violence", claim
at the PPK.

Nevertheless, the move is now on the "fragile giant", who has

been meeting the Albanian political subjects in the past couple
of days. First he met the "ally parties" (Albanian Christian-
Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Social-Democratic Party
/ Bokshi's wing). Another separate meeting was that with the
(frozen) Peasants' Party of Kosova. Here, Rugova asked Hivzi
Islami to "melt" his position and activate his party again.
Political analysts evaluate that this was a thoroughly thought
step by Rugova, who is again preparing himself to win the
elections, in case they are celebrated. Moreover, by
strengthening and approaching his allies, he is maybe even
planning to challenge his own party, which is quite shaken by the
internal splits.

Nevertheless, it was precisely now, in times when the

Albanian/Serb round table was taking place that he summoned the
LDK parliamentarian group. At the beginning, he asked the members
to present their opinions and postures about the "chances to
constitute the parliament and to proclaim the new elections". He
also asked the MPs to "reiterate the general determination on the
solution of Kosova's problem". The harsh debate lasted two days,
but no final decision was taken, because a large part of MPs
claimed that "the new elections would make no sense and that
there is no one that can actually call them. All legal deadlines
have expired. If the constitution of the parliament eventually
takes place, then all bodies would be constituted, all MPs and
Rugova would give oath and finally the new elections could be
called or the mandate of the actual parliamentarians would be
extended again".

However, a large number of LDK's MPs is "skeptical" when it

regards the constitution of the parliament. At the same time,
they express their fear that on May 25, Kosova will have no more
legitimate bodies, and such a situation would crete complete
anarchy that "would bring to the surface too many leaders and
parallel subjects and institutions".

Dr. Rugova is working on finding a "solution" and in this sense,

he said that he would also meet with the other parliamentarian

But, it seems that the most important role will be that of the
"friends" from the world, i.e., the United States, that have
already declared that they will not support the Kosovar
elections, but will "accept the reality that would eventually be
created". However, the friends seem to have exerted too much
pressure on the Albanian participants of the round table in New
York, trying to persuade them for participation in the Serbian



by ARTAN PUTO / Tirana

Last week's most important event was the meeting set by Berisha
with all parties that make up the coalition government. The topic
of discussion was the new constitution. This has been an
unexpected initiative taken by the president, who thought that
this was the best time possible to elaborate the new constitution
of Albania. Since 1991, Albania is being administered by a
package of laws called "The Main Constitutional Provisions".
There was an attempt to elaborate the new constitution of
Albania, but this proposal was rejected in a referendum in 1994.
President Berisha took this initiative almost two months before
the celebration of the elections. Following the invitation of the
president, this was the best moment for all the parties united
around the Government of National Reconciliation that have proven
to have very good cooperation to finalize this mission. But in
general, all parties but Berisha's Democratic Party and the small
Party of the Social-Democratic Union, rejected his idea. The
decisions converged on the idea that the most important issue now
was the stabilization of the situation in the country, securing
the public order, the beginning of the ALBA operation and
preparing the country for new parliamentarian elections.

According to them, the situation is not suitable yet, because the

country is still under the state the emergency. Moreover, there
is not much time to elaborate the constitution, as well as its
public discussion that would take place on the whole of the
Albanian territory. There are also some technical reasons that
were stressed by different political parties - that the actual
parliament has no moral right to elaborate a new constitution
because, according to them, it was formed following the '96
electoral fraud.

Another technicality is that the president's initiative can't be

achieved because the parliament, based on the decision of the
opposition parties, must be dissolved one month before the
elections. Thus, it can't have any constitutional prerogatives,
and even less such important competencies such as is the
elaboration of the constitution. On the other hand, it has been
one month since the new government was established. The media in
Tirana, although very much restricted, published different
opinions on the activities of this government. According to the
Socialists' newspaper, "Zëri i Popullit", the Government of
National Reconciliation is the only chance and satisfaction that
leads the country to the new elections and the only solution to
escape anarchy and chaos that Albania is facing actually.

However, it must be admitted, this opinion is also shared by the
majority of the opposition parties, staring from the Social-
Democrats, the Democratic Alliance and especially the Republican
Party. All of them agree that the government should be helped
to come to the elections and the development of the conditions
for the normal implementation of the humanitarian action.
Although the other media also supported the activities of the new
coalition government, they and "Rilindja Demokratike" in
particular, also criticized the government of the socialist Fino.
For the ruling media, it is easier to qualify the current
government as "a government headed by a socialist" than call it
a coalition government. They also accuse Fino for having hired
people that belonged to the previous regime. They also state that
the government is not fulfilling its obligations, for the largest
part of Albania's territory is outside its control. Further on,
they are very suspicious of the relations that the government has
established with the southern committees, to which the media
refers to as illegal and rebel committees, probably taking their
requests for Berisha's resignation as a starting point. It is
very hard to expect the parties that have until recently been
separated by barricades, understand national reconciliation as
they should.

The first phase of the Alba operation has started with the
arrival of two Italian navy ships that brought in the first
soldiers. An officer told us that the European troops expected
to arrive are welcome to Albania. The incidents that will happen
are a consequence of the conflicts between rival bands that could
cause a conflictive situation. But, in no way can these be caused
by the Albanian regular troops. Albania has finally become a
European problem. And, all of this has been commented in Tirana
as "...if Europe doesn't deal with us, we'll deal with it".



by ISO RUSI / Shkup

Last weekend, daily "Vecer" published an article titled "A

Political or Police Newspaper", asking itself and its readers who
owns the (relatively) new and only private newspaper, "Dnevnik".
The reason for it's publication is not even concealed: "In the
past couple of days, the editors of the Dnevnik daily refer to
themselves as to historical heroes of journalism. They probably
have arguments for this: The newspaper started being published
one year ago, it comes out every day, at a very high circulation
and at a very low price. At first sight, "Nova Makedonija", that

publishes "Vecer", seems not to be able to bare the competition.
Dnevnik is being sold at two prices: 5 denars (0,20 DEM) if sold
by call-porters and 10 denars when sold at press booths, which
has increased its circulation to 60 thousand copies, consequently
drastically reduced the circulation of Vecer.

An ordinary citizen will find it hard to understand how can this

newspaper survive, knowing that the printing of one issue costs
3,5 denars and that 90% of the circulation is sold by call-
porters. The plain logic explains that the only thing achieved
is actually a loss in substance. Unless this is the so called
"pyramidal press" - meaning that its publication will continue
as long as there is fresh cash.

However, Vecer's article also puts a series of open questions.

First of all, the initiative for the publication of this
newspaper: "...it is known that the idea for the establishment
of the journal, the composition of its editorial board and its
financial construction was elaborated and defined by the cabinet
of the then Minister of Interior, Ljubomir Frckovski. And this
is something that no one, even Frckovski, denies."

On the occasion when this journal started its publication, "Nova

Makedonija" stressed this same fact, even publishing the proof
that one of the owners and the editor in chief of the new
newspaper, had been beaten by the police (in the events in Reçicë
e Vogël, when his jaw was broken) and who was then reportedly a
human rights activist (who insisted that his case wouldn't be
revealed to the public). He was allegedly rewarded by Frckovski
by first accompanying him to the World Conference on Crime in
Cairo, and later with the employment of his wife in the MIA.
Thus, Vecer, asks a direct question: "Is Dnevnik a result of
Frckovski's evaluations, personal will and spite as minister of
interior and the determined political group around him, or is
this a reward for his professional services in the past". Further
on, it is said that Frckovski is also the "selector of the
editorial board" (two of the owners, the editor in chief andone
of the editors used to work in the Macedonian version of
"Komunist", and later worked in "Nova Makedonija" and "Vecer").
And again, linked to the finances: the political bazaar qualifies
Frckovski and the then minister of Finances, Jane Milovski as the
main architects that enabled the foundation of "Dnevnik" - by
allowing it to use budget money. And again, a rumor stating that
Frckovski and Milovski split just because of the money. In fact,
the matter is that they suggested the cuts in the subsidies meant
for Vecer and increased the ones for Dnevnik.

The most serious attack is by all means linking "Dnevnik" with

the unclarified attempt against President Gligorov's life: "It
was the period in which minister Frckovski had been harshly

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criticized by the media, when he resigned and his resignation was
not approved, when the majority of his opponents and enemies
thought that this was the end of his career. Since the moral
responsibility for the biggest crime in the country relied on
him, making intelligent moves was something that would be
expected from an intelligent, explosive and impulsive politician.
So, he invented a newspaper that would defend him. And, as soon
as the newspaper started being published, one of the first
articles published referred to the health of the President, that
surprisingly survived and what's more, resumed his functions. For
a long time, this newspaper claimed the incapability of the
President for office and implied that he should retire. Stressing
an unidentified opinion, "Vecer" further speculates that
"Dnevnik" is an informal organ of a group within the SDLM and
that government that does not share Crvenkovski's opinions.
The third supposition is that "Dnevnik" is a filial of some parts
of the MIA, so the opposition parties and their leaders are
secretly denounced.

Another ascertainment is hidden behind the suppositions on who

is financing the magazine (Soros, international organizations or
a local organization under the strong influence of Frckovski's
ministry of foreign affairs): "Whatever the case, `Dnevnik' is
neither a "dead infant" nor a "deflated balloon" or a "dead
party" (as Frckovski referred to some events).

In the public and secret propaganda which makes it impossible to

preserve the power, `Dnevnik' replied in it's Monday issue, in
an editorial signed by Editor in Chief, Branko Gerovski. Starting
from the fact that the author of Vecer's article is anonymous and
that in those cases whatever is said represents the viewpoint of
the author, Gerovski addresses his message to Stojan Nasev,
Editor in Chief of Vecer, Pande Kolemisovski (director of Nova
Makedonija) and Branko Crvenkovski (since one third of the shares
of Nova Makedonija belong to the state).

He first accuses them that they are trying "to impose the
spectacular theory on the attempt against Gligorov and the
alleged responsibility of Frckovski, Milovski, Guner Ismail, Saso
Ordanovski and the editors of "Dnevnik". The Editor in Chief asks
the premier a public question: "Are your real intentions to
discharge Frckovski and Milovski and then start the

The same day, the government reacted with a communique against

"some articles published in the press that in an unnecessary way
implicate several ministers, the premier and the government. The
government reiterates that it absolutely rejects all speculations
and constructions, fully respecting the editorial politics of
each newspaper".

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The reaction of the government only corroborated what has been
discussed in the public since long ago. The people have it all
clear - "wherever there is smoke - there is fire". After
listening to the prime-minister's promise that he wouldn't spare
anyone implicated in the TAT affair (a pyramidal scheme worth 112
million DEM), thus announcing the reconstruction of the
government and the eventual anticipated elections, the public
started rumouring on the departure not only of the implicated but
also the other ministers. This list includes all those that are
said to be related to `Dnevnik'.

An indicative coincidence is the discharge of the assistant

interior minister, as well as the head of the "bugging"
department of the police, for their alleged participation in many
financial affairs and fraud. However, it is very hard to say that
these people have been discharged, especially knowing that they
were immediately taken over by Frckovski's ministry of foreign
affairs, the very same day they stopped working for MIA!

"Vecer's" attack, "Dnevnik's" counterattack and the "TAT affair",

which has not been clarified yet, can only be considered as the
first clashes of "the struggle for power" among three fractions
inside the SDLM. The announced reconstruction of the government
(that should replace five ministers) and which had to take place
before Crvenkovski's visit to Bonn and his meeting with Kohl, has
been postponed for at least one week. At the same time, Frckovski
has intensive activities receiving high officials and visiting
Brussels and Paris. The premier is obliged by his promise given
to the Parliament and Frckovski is not the type of many who will
give up so easily.



by BEQË CUFAJ / Stuttgart

In a very short time, Germany, i.e., its government didn't

"support" the Albanians two times. The paradox is linked to the
biggest Albanian loss and the "skipping" as they say here, of the
German foreign politics, since WW II.

The first overlook has to do with Albania and the other one with
Kosova Albanians.

The day when the "On Duty" operation was going to be effectuated
in Albania, it is supposed that only a few people knew about the
"attack" of the German army on Albania, aiming at evacuating the

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German citizens that were threatened by the anarchy of Albanian
rebels. Only a couple of hours after the operation, the whole
German public was informed about it.

Even the most boulevardesque newspapers and TV programs which

usually never talk about politics, were enthusiastic in their
reports about the success of the German army. In the posterior
press conference of Defense Minister Volker Ruhe, the whole
action was revealed and it was said that this is the first
independent action of the German army undertaken on the territory
of another state - for humanitarian reasons. This is where the
posterior enthusiasm should be sought. The important thing is
that the German troops managed to land on foreign lands again.
USA, England or France did the same thing on the very same day -
but the coverage was minimal.

However, the TV images that proved the "difficulties" and

"demonstrations" of the army while evacuating the Germans, were
almost unnecessary, for the majority of the Albanian citizens
(rebels) helped them get into the military helicopters.
The reception of the threatened German citizens is another story,
as if no one wished to say that beside the embassy staff and some
German specialists, some of the evacuated were also Japanese and
Albanians with German citizenship, which seems to be irrelevant.
The most important thing was achieved. The effect of the
popularity of the army has increased and so have Ruhe's chances
to increase the military budget this year - not only for the
troops in Bosnia but also eventual events that would appear in
countries where similar crisis could happen. To be even more
convincing, the detail on the budget should be also related to
Kinkel's negation to the engagement of German troops in the ALBA

Anyhow, the most important thing is that Kohl's government

managed to take this military step and this can logically be
linked to President Herzog's visit to Japan and his reiteration
that "Germany and Japan should be able to soon join the other
five permanent members of the Security Council".

This can be evaluated as the first German "overlook".

The days when the debate on the repatriation of Bosnian refugees

had become a hot topic, there were to many people expressing
their opinion and criticism towards the capacity of the Lands to
organize their return.

And, the largest massive repatriation of asylum-seekers took

place in the modern history of Germany. Anyone who thought that
this return was related to those who were the main topic of
conversation, was wrong. Those were not Bosnians, but they were

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Kosovars - and it was only the next day that the minister of
interior of Wuertemberg, Schauble, that declared: "...after a
successful action of the police, 70 Yugoslav Kosovar refugees
were repatriated". Everything happened in the biggest secrecy.
In the morning, around 5 or 6 o'clock, all refugees were
collected in their homes. Later, they were taken to the airport
where the surprise called Serbian police was waiting for them to
transfer them back to Prishtinë - all of them. Only a couple of
hours after this action took place, the police communicated the
news about the experiment, in a very biased way.

Unfortunately, no one but the Green and some "pro-asyl"

organizations, that have no influence among the public, protested
against the undemocratic way in which these people were
repatriated. Naturally, no one is denying the hospitality the
refugees found in Germany. No one denies the high level of crime
among Albanians in the streets and underground of Berlin,
Frankfurt or Hamburg, but it is quite illogical and unjust that
instead of expelling the criminals, the authorities actually
split some families and repatriated part of them.

The dimensions and the success of this action could be called the
second "overlook" of the German government within the Albanian

As it regards the lack of reactions and the disinterest of the

German public on the repatriation of the Albanians and the
cooperation with Milosevic's regime, maybe we could use a quote
by Ralph Jordano, who in the debate about Wermacht's crimes
against Jews said that "Germans are lacking individual civic
courage, otherwise how can one explain that all remained silent
when the ghettos of Jews were established. And these ghettos were
visited by all, and all remained silent!"

The two of these facts, looked from a distance, can seem quite
peripheral in the over-all German politics. But it is more than
sure that both "overlooks" over the Albanian tragedies on one
hand and the lack of willingness of the Germans on the other
hand, maybe from the disappointment that the Albanians can't
settle themselves down, start a new phase in the new united
Germany's history, including its relations with the Albanian

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