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Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 5
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................................ 8
2.1 Evolutionary biology ..................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 Social psychology ........................................................................................................................ 10
2.3 Cultural differences ..................................................................................................................... 13
2.4 Gender differences ..................................................................................................................... 14
2.5 Corporate Altruism ..................................................................................................................... 15
2.6 Motivations ................................................................................................................................. 17
2.7 Summary & Research problem ................................................................................................... 21
3. Hypotheses........................................................................................................................................ 22
4. Research methodology, method & data ........................................................................................... 24
4.1 Sample......................................................................................................................................... 25
4.2 Experimental procedure ............................................................................................................. 26
4.3 Experimental limitations ............................................................................................................. 30
5. Results & Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 31
5.1 Altruism (Dictator game task) ..................................................................................................... 31
5.2 Demographical analysis .............................................................................................................. 32
5.2.1 Gender differences .............................................................................................................. 32
5.2.2 Age differences .................................................................................................................... 33
5.2.3 Income differences .............................................................................................................. 33
5.2.4 Years worked within the financial sector ............................................................................. 35
5.3 Perceived altruism (Scenario) ..................................................................................................... 36
5.4 Perceived vs. Actual altruism ...................................................................................................... 36
5.5 Motivations & Influences ............................................................................................................ 37
5.5.1 Scenario................................................................................................................................ 37
5.5.2 Dictator game task ............................................................................................................... 38
6. Limitations & Future Research.......................................................................................................... 40
7. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 44
8. References ........................................................................................................................................ 46
9. Appendices ........................................................................................................................................ 52
Appendix A Information Sheet....................................................................................................... 52
Appendix B Consent form .............................................................................................................. 54
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Abstract
Does professional employment within the financial sector impact altruism? Despite economic theory
modelling humans as rational, selfish, and always striving for utility maximisation, research often
supports the existence of altruism. Whilst initiating comparative investigations of altruism by
sectoral employment, this article focuses more specifically upon professionals working within
financial service companies. Accordingly, this study explores whether a difference exists in the
altruism levels exhibited between finance and non-finance professionals. 80 participants were
recruited (40 finance professionals, 40 non-finance professionals) to take part in this experiment. By
combining an interview with a hypothetical scenario, a dictator game task, and demographic
questions, this experiment examined both participants perceived and actual altruism levels. Dictator
game findings revealed finance professionals donated significantly less to their anonymous partners
than non-finance professionals, with the number of years spent working within the financial sector
being the largest influential factor on their behaviour. The participants income and gender were
also found to be influential, while their age was not. Commonly amongst both experimental groups,
participants perceived altruism levels were lower than their actual altruism levels. This article
concludes by confirming that finance professionals are significantly less altruistic than non-finance
professionals, acknowledging the studys contributions to altruism literature, and urging researchers
to further explore the different lines of investigation suggested.
1. Introduction
Why do humans engage in altruistic acts? With everyday behaviour filled with clear contradictions,
this appears to be one of the most complex unanswered questions about human nature. Humans
value honesty, yet still cheat (Ariely, 2012). We have the ability to behave selfishly, yet still engage in
altruistic activities...but does societal context vary which dominates human nature at what time?
(Kluver, et al., 2014, p.150). More importantly, what is altruism? Altruism is often described as a
form of unconditional kindness, where one behaves intentionally to benefit others, without the
expectation of reward, and possibly at cost to ones self (Neusner and Avery-Peck, 2005; Fehr and
Gtcher, 2000). Whilst Wilson (1975) defines altruism as self-destructive behaviour preformed for
the benefit of others (Michalski, 2003, p.342), Batson (1994) disagrees and provides further
granularity to altruism by distinguishing between helping and self-sacrificial behaviour. An act
cannot be defined as altruistic simply because the actor has suffered a cost, instead the behaviour
should have been intended to improve the welfare of the recipient (Batson, 1994). In order for the
act to be considered altruistic, the altruist should not expect to be the recipient of benefits or
recognition, nor should they expect an act of altruism in return. Although social and biological
perspectives may vary in their explanations or rooting of altruism, they both agree upon its existence
within humans.
Contrastingly, economic theory on human behaviour of resource transfer, takes an opposing stance,
constructing a behavioural model built upon preserving self-interest. This suggests that individuals,
referred to as Homo economicus, are rational, individually-orientated, and simply interested in
maximising their own well-being (Nyborg, 1999). Gintis (2000) further describes the outcome
orientated nature of Homo economicus as only being concerned about social interactions when it
affects their final consumption and wealth. This economics model often forms the bases for
neoclassical theory of a firm, suggesting individuals act rationally within a group of other rational
individuals, all independently acting upon available information to maximise their own utility (Kluver,
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2014, p.151). With finance professionals often thought to have individualist mentalities, and the
finance industry often being viewed as the pinnacle of self-interest, this research has chosen to focus
on the altruistic nature of those within the financial sector. Despite this homo economicus model
being commonly used in the world of business and finance, it has been subject to much criticism for
its rigid, uncompromising stance, and its lack of acknowledgment for all behaviours that do not
conform to the theory e.g. altruism. Anderson (2000, p.173) proposes that this is one of the only
theories that still functions across disciplines as a working assumption, even though it is
continuously discredited on empirical grounds. Research analysing both primary and secondary data
have advocated altruistic acts, and behaviours that deviate from the homo economicus individual.
Through conducting a dictator game experiment, Camerer (2003) found participants on average
gave away 20% of their endowment to their anonymous recipient. DeScioli and Krishna (2012) also
strengthened the argument against economic theory, finding dictators donated 36% of their
endowment, whilst the recipient only expected to receive 30%. Without exploring ones motivations,
charitable giving is also considered as a form of altruism. Upon analysing charity donation records
(i.e. secondary data), typical months in 2012 saw 55% of the UK population (approx 28.4million
adults) donate an average of 10 (NCVO & CAF, 2012). Nonetheless, economic theory disregards
these acts as abnormal deviants from human nature. When ones motivations are explored however,
researchers often challenge the intentions behind their altruistic behaviour before being considered
truly altruistic. Andreoni (1989) introduced the concept of impure altruism, proposing that even
through the act of giving, people obtain some utility. An example of this utility, termed warm-glow,
suggests that an individuals motivation for giving is due to this act evoking a sense of joy and
positive emotions within them.
The dictator game is a commonly used experimental technique when quantitatively measuring
altruism (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; 1998; Jakiela, 2013). This one staged
experiment is essentially a money distribution task, where the participant (who plays the role of the
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dictator) decides on the money split with their, often anonymous, partner. There are many different
variations to this experiment e.g. naming a charity as the recipient of the donation as opposed to an
anonymous partner (Eckel and Grossman, 1996); however the level of altruism exhibited is generally
determined by the amount donated by the dictator. Of course the dictator can also choose to keep
all the money for themselves, thereby supporting economic theory. The dictator game will form the
basis of this studys experimental technique.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature, and
analyses its applicability to the current study. Section 3 proceeds to specify the hypotheses for this
current study, followed by a thorough explanation of the methodology, method, and data collection
techniques in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results of this experiment, with section 6 analysing
the studys limitations, and looking ahead for potential future research. The paper concludes in
section 7.
2. Literature Review
Is economic theory of human behaviour correct in stating that individuals are selfish rational beings?
Are humans only interested in maximising their own well-being? Clearly this view contradicts the
mere existence of altruism, let alone pure altruism. The opposing views held towards altruistic
behaviour have arrived at an apparent impasse, and appear unable to overcome it due to altruism
being an aporia. Altruism is often referred to as an aporia since questioning ones true motivation is
indeterminate (Benson, 2011).
There are many well documented, and possibly some undocumented, cases of egotistical or deviant
behaviour of finance professionals. Former presidential candidate John McCain even attributed the
2008 Global Financial Crisis to greed, corruption, and excess, as Wall Street treated the American
economy like a casino (Salsman, 2009). With several countries around the world still feeling the
strain from this crisis, it is of public opinion that the financial demise was as a result of corporate
greed and the working professionals within this sector. Due to causes of the financial crisis being
partly attributed to capitalism and inherent greed (Salsman, 2009), it is essential to investigate
altruism, and to what degree it is expressed by professionals within the financial sector, in
comparison with those who are not. Moreover, the gravity of exploring altruism within finance is
further apparent when evaluating where modern finance roots its theories of value from. According
to De Bondt (2008), there are 2 benchmark assumptions, beautiful people, and beautiful markets.
The concept of beautiful people depicts individualistic actors who use all available information to
make rational decisions, in striving for utility maximisation. Beautiful markets assume competitive,
yet perfect markets. This leaves no room for rational arbitrage, as value equals price i.e. Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH). With the roots of finance based around homo economicus beings, this
study into altruism within finance could provide further evidence for the need to update and extend
the homo economicus view on human nature.
Although a limited amount of research studying altruism in helping professions (e.g. medical
treatment or clergy professions) have been conducted (Blaikie, 1974; Saks, 1995; Burks, et al., 2012),
altruism is yet to be studied between professions, in non-helping sectors. This current study has
revealed a gap within altruism research thus far, as comparative analysis through professional
sectors as a whole is not widely reported on. This report will focus on the finance industry as a broad
sector, and aim to uncover whether the levels of altruism demonstrated by finance professionals
differ to those outside of the financial services sector. Due to the insufficient amount of literature
researching altruism in the financial sector, this literature review is conducted in an indirect manner.
It proposes to explore opposing perspectives of altruism, and gain insight on differences in altruistic
behaviour displayed, including their possible motivational drivers.
would prosper against tribes mainly compiled of selfish individuals, who would eventually go extinct
(Okasha, 2013).
Hamilton (1964) later developed group selection into the inclusive fitness theory (kin selection),
identifying 3 components within the evolution of altruism as being: the cost to the altruist, the
benefit of the recipient, and the genetic relatedness of the two. Hamilton stated that the ability for
the altruism gene to spread through natural selection was contingent on the benefits (in terms of
reproductive fitness) outweighing the cost of the altruistic act (Okasha, 2013). This suggests the
altruist discriminates towards relatives who share the same gene pool in order to increase the
number who carry this gene into the next generation. This is further supported by Wilson (2005),
who studied worker insects with zero reproduction (sterile), concluding that true altruism is
positively correlated to relatedness (Foster, Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006).
When addressing altruistic behaviour through an evolutionary perspective Trivers (1971, p.35)
asserts that the models take the altruism out of altruism. It is argued that altruism through the
evolutionary perspective cannot be described as pure altruism, as they appear to be of genic selfinterest. Nevertheless, evolutionary biologists stress that biological altruism is not to be likened to
the everyday, vernacular sense of the concept (motivating intentions), but instead, in relation to the
fitness consequences of the behaviour (Okasha, 2013).
the social perspective argues that society nurtures an individuals predisposition to assist others
through processes of positive reinforcement, internalisation, and role modelling (Michalski, 2003,
p.343).
The relational models theory suggests humans cognitively create different types of relationships,
which serve for different functions. Distinctions made include: authority relationships based on
unbalanced power, trade relationships founded on reciprocity, and communal relationships based
on meeting each others needs (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). In line with this theory, DeScioli and
Krishna (2012) systematically tested the relational distinctions. Associations with communal
relationships was found to markedly influenced altruistic behaviour, finding 55% of participants
donated their endowment in the high-need condition, in comparison to only 28% in the low-need
condition. This can be argued to have an association to the evolutionary concept of kinship, as
altruistic behaviour was found to be more prevalent in high need communal relationships. These
findings however were believed to be predominantly dominated by context effects (i.e. the
participants degree of hunger) rather than the communal relation. Upon testing asymmetrical
authoritative relationships, results showed authority ranking to be influential in altruistic decisions
with 62% of dictators donating in high authority ranking conditions, compared to only 26% in the low
ranking conditions (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). Fiske (1992) also specified that the expectations of
how one distributes their resources differ depending upon their relationship; with Braas-Garza, et
al. (2010) finding people in dictator games give more money to friends than strangers.
In contrast, the social preferences model suggests no differentiation is made between types of
personal relationships, power relationships or trade. This model is often been used to understand
the constructs of altruistic behaviour, by which an individual values the others payoffs, i.e.
incorporating self-interest with altruism (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). Individual social preferences are
believed to offer insight into many economic situations such as political support for redistributive
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social programmes, charitable giving, team production etc. (Jakiela, 2013, p.208). This model extends
to suggest that altruism may vary dependent both on the individuals payoff and the potential
payoffs that the recipient is exposed to, dependent on the altruists decision (DeSioli and Krishna,
2012). When considering the social preference model, if an individual is valuing payoffs before
acting, can their behaviour be categorised as an act of pure altruism? This model is also believed to
be limited due to its failure to include the impact of situational factors and contextual/framing
effects on altruistic behaviour. The first experiment, on communal relations, conducted by DeScioli
and Krishna (2012) contradict this models prediction. High generosity was witnessed in the
anonymous condition, even though the participants knew that the cues were hypothetical, and
would therefore not be receiving a payoff.
Secondary data clearly supports the flexibility of an individuals altruistic nature when faced with
different situations. In the analysis of 2012 charity donation figures in the USA, although giving
totalled $316.23 billion, this was 8.2% below the total giving of 2007 (Charity Navigator, 2013). This
shows the reduction of general altruism on a mass scale, doubtlessly due to the constraints of the
widespread financial crisis. This situational change also saw individuals alter the direction of their
altruistic behaviour towards charitable sectors they felt were currently more in need (e.g. food
banks and human services, as opposed to arts, and environment charities) (Charity Navigator, 2013).
Taking a cognitive approach, DeScioli and Krishna (2012) continue to explain that due to framing
effects; altruistic decisions are not only driven by explicit payoffs, but also by implicit payoffs (e.g.
cues given in the task description). This explanation is supported by Braas-Garza (2007), who found
participants donate a larger proportion of their endowment when the recipient is said to be relying
on the dictator. Eckel and Grossman (1996) echo this by stating that altruistic behaviour is context
dependent, with dictator game experimental findings supporting this. When controlling recipient
identity, results found subjects on average donated 10.6% to their anonymous partner, compared to
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a donation of 31% when the recipient was described to be a charity (American Red Cross). Clear
contextual effects may go some way to explain variations found in public giving between different
charitable causes/sectors. Hoffman, et al., (1994) controlled how the dictator obtained their
endowment, and found that participants gave less money to their partners, when their endowment
had to be earned. Social distance was additionally identified as influential in ones altruistic
behaviour. Bohnet and Frey (1999) created 3 main comparative degrees of identification
(anonymous, 1-way identification, and 2-way identification), finding participants altruistic behaviour
diminished as social distance increased.
Although these social models have their differences, social psychologists commonly argue that all
economic transactions are social due to the fact that they take place in various types of relationships
(DeScioli and Krishna, 2012).
giving, in comparison to only 3% donated to international affairs in the USA (CAF, 2006). Draguns
(2013, p.2) suggests that there must be a threshold for altruism that varies culturally, especially
between individualistic and collectivist societies, as what may seem completely selfless and heroic in
one, may appear as a mundane, involuntary action in another.
Due to methodological variations in experimental design, results from analysing gender differences
in altruism have been largely inconsistent. Bolton and Katok (1995) conducted dictator game
experiments and concluded there to be no gender differences. A number of empirical studies over
the years have found no gender differences in empathic or altruistic responding (Boice and
Goldman, 1981; Oswald, 1996; Rodgers and Klotz, 1994). After reviewing over 30 studies, Maccoby
and Jacklin (1974) also determined that women were not more empathic than men. It is possible
however, that unclear experimental instructions may have contributed to variations in gender
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differences analysis, with participants possibly interpreting the same initial question differently. For
example, some experiments required participants to recall how often they have helped others in the
past. This ambiguous design exposes answers to a degree of subjectivity. This is due to initial gender
differences when determining what to categorise as helping behaviour, even before being able to
analyse differences in the quantitative amount stated (Oswald, 2000, pp.545-546).
Nonetheless, Western society generally deems women to be more altruistic and empathic than men
(Oswald, 2000, p.545), and the existence of gender differences is further supported through the
analysis of charitable donations in non-experimental environments. When controlling for variables
such as background, income levels and age, regardless of marital status, women are significantly
more likely to donate than men, support more charities, as well as give larger amounts (Piper and
Schnepf, 2007).
As a form of supplementary analysis, this study will also interpret the experimental findings to
explore if any gender difference, in donation amounts, were observed.
On an individual employee level, researchers have investigated ways in which the company can
affect an employees altruistic behaviour. Studies have found that employees altruistic levels
increase when employer-employee ethical values are more congruent (Goodman and Svyantek,
1999), contract expectations are better fulfilled (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002), and when firms create a
positive work environment by implementing good ethical values (Valentine, et al., 2011, p.513). It is
suggested that these factors, as well as career satisfaction, play a role in employee motivation to
behave more altruistically, due to the development of a stronger psychological contract (Valentine,
et al., 2011, p.513). The altruistic, or homo economicus, nature of individuals as a whole can
additionally have large effects on a variety of corporate and economic issues e.g. the optimal design
of institutions and contracts, the analysis of incomplete contracts, allocation of property rights etc.
(Henrich, et al., 2001, p.73).
In relation to firm level monetary funding donations, government legislation allows income tax
deductions, for the value of the charitable donation. These tax breaks also allows companies to
avoid capital gains taxation on donated properties/assets that have appreciated in value (Cordes,
2011). Intentions behind these financial donations are thereby often doubted. Apart from tax
breaks, other potential sources of motivation include, essential profit maximisation opportunities,
symbolic capital through public relations, and the agency-cost problem leading managers to try and
maximise their own utility (i.e. bonuses) by taking major risk with money that isnt theirs (Henderson
and Malani, 2008). The financial advantages, as well as the perceived benefits to brand reputation,
has led many to maintain that, due to the rewards received, and lack of net loss/cost of welfare to
the company, these acts of philanthropy however beneficial to the recipient are not truly
altruistic. On the other hand, some researchers believe that social and economic goals maybe
integrally connected, thereby allowing the philanthropy to be a source of competitive advantage, as
well as public good (Henderson and Malani, 2008).
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Although this report will not be delving into corporations acts of philanthropy as an output of
altruistic behaviour, it shall aim to measure altruistic behaviour within the corporate world on a
more individual level. By capturing the levels of altruism displayed by professionals within the sector
(as opposed to corporate entities), this study attempts to provide some indication about the nature
of those who are behind the corporate decisions. Comparing their results to non-finance
professionals should be able to give the findings an extra dimension, when trying to attribute
behavioural traits of those within the financial sector, or contribute to explaining factors behind
questionable decision they may make.
2.6 Motivations
What drives people to behave altruistically? More specifically, do individuals help for selfless or
selfish reasons? Many different factors such as identification, reciprocity and social distance have
been suggested as potential motivators for helping behaviour (Trivers, 1971). Research also confirms
the influence of gratitude, as well as acknowledging its sensitivity to the cost and benefits linked to
altruistic behaviour (McCullough, et al., 2008).
Analysis of both experimental primary data, and charitable-giving secondary data, clearly supports
altruisms flexible nature when faced with situational differences, however fails to pinpoint ones
motivations for such behaviour. Batson (2011) stresses the importance of motivation when defining
altruism as a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing anothers welfare, however
does not specify the significance of behaviour. Nevertheless, ones motivation and behaviour should
go hand in hand. After all, altruistic intentions cannot be recognised as such until put into action,
whilst actions cannot be considered altruistic if they were unmotivated and unintended (Draguns,
2013, p.2). The key to differentiating an act of pure altruism, from one of self-interest, is through
determining the behaviours goal-directed drive. However, due to questions of ones true motivation
being often deemed as indeterminate, Benson (2011) proceeds to describe altruism as an aporia.
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Is the giver in giving, or the partner in cooperating not acting in a way that, while
seeming to sacrifice, maximises that individuals fitness, status, prestige, or
security? Is what appears on the surface to benefit others or the common good
indeed selfish? (Benson, 2011, p.195).
Batson, et als (1981) empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that individuals are more likely to
engage in pure altruistic behaviour out of concern, by taking the perspective of the individual in
need. It is suggested that this empathetic concern in turn creates an altruistic motivation. Sanderson
(2010) supports the empathy-altruism hypothesis with evidence from a study where participants
were provided with 2 research tasks, which they had to allocate to themselves and another student
(1 task was more desirable than the other). Participants were split into 2 groups, a control group,
and a group that had to complete a perspective-taking exercise before allocating tasks. Findings
revealed 75% of the control group assigned themselves the more desirable task, compared to only
42% of the perspective-taking condition. Results support the notion of altruism motivated by
empathy.
Impure altruism pertains to explanations of motivation that are associated with psychological
egoism. Psychological egoism is a concept, in support of the homo economicus model of human
nature, suggesting that even in an act that appears altruistic, no matter how noble or beneficial it
may appear to others, humans are always motivated by their ultimate goal of self-interest (Batson,
1991). The aporia of altruism and concept of psychological egoism are well described by Graebers
(2001) fictional dialogue:
Q: If people only act to maximise their gains in some way or another, then how
do you explain people who give things away for nothing?
A: They are trying to maximise their social standing, or honour, or prestige that
accrues to them by doing so.
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Generally, such self-benefits are grouped into 3 main classes; reduction of aversive arousal, fear of
punishment for not helping, and desire for reward (Sanderson, 2010, p.488). Despite the fact that
the individual is still engaging in an act of helping, it cannot be defined as pure altruism as these 3
classes suggest the individual is motivated by personal, internal benefits. Similarly the negative-state
hypothesis suggests that individuals engage in altruistic behaviour in an attempt to improve their
own state. Cialdini, et al. (1973) proceeds to argue that altruism increases when an individual is in a
state of temporary negativity, as the altruistic behaviour is self-gratifying and helps to improve their
low mood state (e.g. guilt or depression) (Baumann, et al., 1981, p.1039). This is due to altruism
being affected by cognition, emotions and mood (Cialdini, et al., 1982). The negative-state
hypothesis has however been hotly contested. Batson (1989) challenged this hypothesis when his
experiment found that between high and low empathy participants, high-empathy participants were
more likely to behave altruistically. Since high-empathy subjects were not in a negative state, results
indicated that other factors were involved in their motivation, instead of reducing ones negative
state.
Questions about an individuals intentions have also lead to the idea of reciprocal altruism, with
Trivers (1971) suggesting gratitude to be a motivating factor in facilitating reciprocal altruism.
Altruism and reciprocity are often concepts used in the same likening, however should not be
confused. Whilst an act can only be deemed purely altruistic if it is selfless and not done with the
expectation of any form of repayment, reciprocal actions do expect something in return. The notion
of reciprocity is based around unofficial social norms where individuals respond to friendly actions in
a nicer more cooperative manner. Similarly when responding to hostile actions, individuals are
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frequently more nasty and sometimes brutal (Fehr and Gtcher, 2000). This current study is only
concerned with investigating altruism.
It is evident that the distinction between pure and impure altruism is not whether the individuals
own welfare was increased by their behaviour or not, but rather whether their intention behind
their behaviour was to maximise the welfare of the recipient, or their own. Finding a way to identify
these driving intentions is the current predicament. Batson, et al. (1981, p.291) alternatively
proposed that motivations for helping need not be completely or even majoritively altruistic in order
for it to have an altruistic component, since ones motivations may often be a combination of
altruism and egoism. Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994, p.104) also echo this proposal by stating a
behaviour can still be defined as altruistic even if it is not purely altruistic, and recommending
altruism to be viewed on a continuum with some acts being more altruistic than others.
Though definitions of altruism may show slight variations over the years, they all insist that an act of
helping, in an attempt to pursue self-gain, cannot qualify as altruistic (Krebs and Van Hesteren, 1994,
p.104). Defensively Batson, et al. (1981) propose that an increase in own welfare, e.g. through
feelings of satisfaction or relief, may actually be an unintended by-product of the altruistic
behaviour, as oppose to its goal, thereby still making the behaviour altruistically motivated. The
question of motivation behind ones altruistic behaviour appears to be a cyclical scientific debate.
Acknowledging altruism and egoism to be motivational concepts, Batson, et al. (1981) attributed the
difficulty and current inability, in providing evidence to conclude the debate, to being unable to
observe motivation directly. Only the output of behaviour is observable, with motivational
explanations being subjective.
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3. Hypotheses
Taking the studys main focus and research question into consideration, the following hypotheses
have been derived.
H0: No comparative difference will be found in the altruism levels displayed between finance
professionals and non-finance professions.
Holding the expectation that non-finance professionals will show higher signs of altruistic behaviour,
this study aims to disprove the null hypothesis.
H1: Finance and non-finance professionals will display differing levels of altruism.
As there is no previous literature within this field, expected findings are deduced through various
other sources, as opposed to being founded upon previous results. Therefore, this non-directional
hypothesis states a difference will be found between the 2 experimental groups, but does not
specify how they will differ.
H2: Finance professionals will display lower levels of altruism than non-finance professionals.
Although both groups of participants are expected to show signs of altruistic behaviour, this study
expects finance professionals to exhibit lower levels of altruism, displayed by donating less money to
their anonymous recipient. As discussed in previous sections, this expectation is built upon
perceptions of finance professionals having individualist mentalities, and the financial sector being
depicted as greedy, self-interested and corrupt. Much of the characteristics attributed to the
financial industry and their employees are in line with the homo economicus model. This report is
22
interested in exploring this further. Unfortunately, uncontrollable external economic factors, such as
the 2008 global financial crisis, may still be influential on participant behaviour. As this is not a
longitudinal study, and an experiment of this kind was not conducted before the crisis, this report
will be unable to decipher to what degree (if any) this will affect donation amounts allocated by
participants.
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4.1 Sample
The population of this study consists of those who do and do not work within the financial sector,
forming 2 experimental groups identified as Finance Professionals and Non-Finance Professionals.
The criteria used to classify participants as Finance Professionals was identifying if they were
currently working within a financial services company, with a company office located in the financial
district of London/the Square Mile. This study chose not to recruit participants who work within the
finance department of non-finance related companies (e.g. market research, retail, healthcare etc.).
This was in an attempt to maintain consistency, due to the belief that overall, office culture and
personalities may differ between financial and non-financial service companies. No additional
criterion was placed on these participants in terms of specifying which sub-sector they work in (e.g.
trader, analyst, corporate banker etc). As this is the first experiment to comparatively analyse
altruism by professional sectorspecifically the financial sectorthe population selected for
sampling was intentionally left broad. This study sought a general investigation of finance
professionals working within the financial district as a whole, allowing scope for further research to
expand on these findings (e.g. only using finance professionals and comparing them by sub-sector).
A criterion specifying participants neither to work, nor have a higher educational background within
the area of finance was used to categorise participants into the Non-Finance Professionals group. In
an attempt to strengthen the population validity of this experiment, and to allow for further
demographical analysis, no age or income restrictions were imposed onto the selection criteria. To
achieve equal gender representativeness, this study recruited 20 males and 20 females for each
experimental group.
Using a combination of convenience and random sampling, 80 participants were sampled in total,
with both experimental groups consisting of 40 participants each. A sample of 80 was chosen to
allow for stronger significance testing. In line with the search criteria, convenience sampling was
used when selecting which offices and companies to conduct the experiments in, as they were the
25
companies the researcher was able to gain access to. However, to minimise sampling bias, and to
ensure for the generalisability of the results, random sampling was used when recruiting the
participants within these companies. Participants in the Finance Professionals group, were
recruited from 4 financial services companies, and took part in their respective offices; Deutsche
Bank, Bloomberg LP, Deloitte, Lloyds Banking Group. Participants from the Non-Finance
Professionals group were specifically chosen according to their selection criteria, with the study
taking place in a mixture of open and closed spaces.
26
part in the study. The experiment was split into 3 parts; a short interview containing a mixture of
open and closed-ended questions, a practical independent scenario and task, and finally a few
demographic questions for analytical purposes. The experimental room was arranged so there were
envelopes laid out in numerical order on a table by the entrance. Envelopes were numbered 1-40 for
the Finance Professionals group and 41-80 for the Non-Finance Professionals group. Each
envelope contained a scenario sheet (appendix C), and a smaller brown envelope inside (identically
numbered to its corresponding white envelope) containing the dictator game task (appendix D) and
10 1 coins. An empty box was placed on the other side of the room for participants to place their
envelope in upon completion. This experiment chose to use real money (GBP) in order to increase its
external validity, and observe less artificial behaviour.
Upon entry into the experimental room, each participant was instructed to randomly pick up 1 of
the large white envelopes on the table before taking a seat. The 1st part of the study asked 11
questions in relation to culture, personality, and stress, but responses collected were not analysed
(appendix E). For the purpose of this study, part 1 consisted of bluffer questions, created in line with
the apparent topic, to make sure participants were unaware this experiment was investigating
altruism. It was imperative that the participants had no knowledge of the true nature of the study as
it could have led to either a conscious or sub-conscious modification of their behaviour through the
influence of demand characteristics, or social-desirability effect.
After completing part 1 of the study, participants were then given brief insight and explanations
about the 2nd part of the study (appendix E) before the experimenter left the room. The participant
was first instructed to read and complete the scenario sheet inside the random envelope they had
selected at the beginning of the study. The scenario created was a hypothetical situation where the
participant had to decide if they were willing to donate a percentage of their hypothetical sign-on
bonus. The percentage that they may/may not have allocated in this scenario was analysed as their
perceived altruism level. Next participants opened the small brown envelope and read the dictator
27
game task inside. The dictator game task was presented and worded in such a way so participants
would not be aware that their altruistic natures were being studied. Nonetheless it was the
monetary amount donated from this task that represents the level of altruism demonstrated by the
participant. As altruism requires context for individuals to feel the cause is worthy of a donation
(Eckel & Grossman, 1996), the paper inside the brown envelope informed participants that the
unknown participant in group b, who was also doing the same task, was not allocated any cash for
task participation. Inside each envelope were 10 1 coins, and the paper continued to read if
participants were willing to anonymously donate any of this 10 cash, to donate it into the brown
envelope and place it in the box at the back of the room. Taking inspiration from Jakiela (2013), the
wording of this experiment intentionally created enough ambiguity for participants to assume that
the 10 in the envelope was their money to keep, however this was not explicitly stated. In order to
test true altruism, it was important for participants to believe the 10 would be theirs to keep,
because this means any donation they make will be negatively affecting their net income for the
task. Although the sole aim of altruism isnt for the act to be costly to the giver, using real money
(that participants think will be theirs to keep) avoids participants yielding higher altruism levels, due
to not feeling a real connection with the money, or a sense of gain/loss. This also increases the
experiments ecological validity as it allows the settings within the study to be more relatable to the
real outside world. The anonymity of each dictators paired-partner (the participant conducting the
same task in the alternate group) is essential, not only to remove potential preferential helping
behaviour by the dictator, but also as the paired-partner in this experiment is fictional and does not
exist. The complete anonymity of this study (including the anonymous donation recipient) ensures
that participant cannot be receiving, or expecting to receive, any type of direct reward, in return for
their donation. Their potential benefit through indirect reward however, cannot be controlled by
anyone bar the individual. On the other hand questions remain as to whether these indirect rewards
can substantially be described as a benefit. The experimenter was not present in the room for the
28
part 2 of the study to avoid the possibility of observer effects and experimenter effects altering the
participants behaviour and thereby biasing the results collected.
The experimenter returned to the room for part 3 of the study to gather the participants
demographic information (appendix E). For supplementary analysis, this study additionally reports
for demographic distinctions/similarities found in relation to the participants behaviour, but will not
be analysing reasons why they may exist. The study concluded by asking the participant what they
thought this study was a better measure of (full interviewer script found in appendix E). This was
asked as a precautionary measure; since knowledge of the studys true nature may alter the
participants behaviour, making them more or less generous than they normally would be.
Consequently, the results of any participant that associated the study with greed, altruism, or
anything of the like, would be withdrawn from the analysis. For the purpose of this report, the
participants motivation behind their behaviour is simply secondary information. Nevertheless for
additional insight, participants are asked to anonymously share their motivations/influences behind
their behaviour after the experiment had been completed.
This study took approximately 15 minutes with each participant, and all participants were debriefed
(appendix F) either by email or given a printed sheet to read. This study used human participants to
collect primary data, as well as initially incorporating minor elements of experimental deception,
therefore conducting a full debrief was essential. This debrief detailed the true nature of the study,
explaining why this study is important and why the deception was necessary, and provided the
experimenters contact details for the purposes such as reading this report, seeking counselling, or
withdrawing their data. Despite the ethical concern of deception, taking part in the experiment did
not result in any psychological distress, harm or embarrassment for the participants, which was
further controlled for by the anonymity and confidentiality of the data collected. In addition, all
experimentation took place after being granted ethical approval from the E&M Research Ethics
Panel (appendix G).
29
Subject-subject interaction was also controlled for by making sure those who have, and those who
are yet to, part-take in the study are not housed in this same room. This further precaution
minimised the risk of participants exchanging ideas/details about the experiment, to avoid demand
characteristics or social desirability effects influencing their behaviour (i.e. donation).
Both descriptive and inferential statistics will be used to analyse data collected from this study. The
main statistical analysis used for both altruism and perceived altruism, is an independent-groups
one-tailed t-test. This parametric test compares differences of mean donation amounts between
experimental groups, revealing whether the difference found is significant or not. Additionally,
measures of central tendency is be reported for, as well as conducting 1-way between groups
ANOVA tests when conducting demographic analysis for age, income, and number of years within
finance. All statistical testing will be conducted on SPSS using a 95% significance level (p<0.05).
31
difference=22.5%), and by the monetary value of the mean donations made (mean
difference=1.33). In spite of these differences, both groups commonly did not make donations
above 5. This threshold of 50% suggests that although those who donated behaved altruistically,
their altruistic nature did not extend to the extent of increasing their recipients welfare above their
own. Whichever way these results are analysed, they are in clear support of both H1 & H2.
4.00
3.50
Donations ()
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Finance Professionals
Male
Non-Finance Professionals
Female
Fig 1
33
professionals, suggesting the degree to which income brackets is accountable for variances in mean
donations is fairly large. This is seen to be more so than age or gender have been. Mean donations
were significantly different within both finance professionals (p=0.003), and non-finance
professionals (p=0.034), with post-hoc comparisonsusing Tukey HSD testfinding the greatest
statistically significant difference to be within finance professionals between the brackets <20,000
and >50,000 (p=0.002).
4.00
3.50
Donations ()
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
<20,000
Non-Finance Professionals
>50,000
Fig 2
As previously mentioned, no selection criteria was imposed upon income. As a result a wide
variation was found when comparing income earned by participants in the 2 groups, with double the
amount of participants earning <20,000 in the non-finance group (n=12), and more than double the
amount of finance professionals earning >50,000 (n=7). This could be attributable to salaries
generally being larger within the financial sector, or the lack of sector specification for non-finance
professionals within this study. Nonetheless the small number of non-finance participants within the
upper income brackets may have impacted the lack of significance found between brackets in posthoc comparison. To draw on further comparisons, the ANOVA test was run again after condensing
the 5 income brackets into 3 (conjoining the lower 2 and the upper 2 brackets) (appendix K). Post-
34
hoc Tukey HSD test found a strong significant difference between the upper and lower income
brackets (p=0.013).
4.00
3.50
Donations ()
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
<1
1-3
3-5
5-8
Number of years worked in finance
8-11
>11
Fig 3
Findings showed an overall significant difference between groups (p=0.0003), and more specifically a
significant difference in donations when comparing those working within finance for <1yr, with the
remaining 4 brackets >3yrs (appendix L). Donations of participants working within finance 1-3yrs
were the only bracket that did not significantly differ from other brackets. An equally large
significant difference was found when comparing those working <1yr to those working 8-11yrs and
>11yrs (p=0.001; mean difference=3). Interestingly, the mean donation of those working in finance
35
for less than 1yr (M=3.71, SD=1.89, n=7) was greater than the overall mean donation of non-finance
professionals (M=3.05, n=40), however the considerably smaller sample size must be noted.
36
The 2 experimental groups were then combined (n=80), and analysis comparing perceived and
actual altruism was conducted at an overall level. Comparisons showed that participants perceived
themselves to be 35.8% less altruistic than their actual altruistic behaviour showed them to be.
Findings showed there to be a significant difference (p=0.0002) between perceived altruism
(M=14.69, SD=15.165), and actual altruism (M=23.88, SD=15.791).
5.5.1 Scenario
Although this study initially anticipated that external economic factors, such as the Global Financial
Crisis, could possibly affect participants donation amount, it did not anticipate that decisions made
37
in the initial scenario would be effected by the general negative perceptions of corporate firms
today. Participants stated that the greed and selfish nature associated with their perception of
corporations affected their behaviour negatively; citing that they felt it was the firms responsibility
to have enough funds to provide for the new recruits. Although this view was held by participants in
both experimental groups, this response was more prevalent within non-finance professionals, and
clearly displayed to be influential in their decisions. Nonetheless, non-finance professionals more
commonly cited that they were able to identify with the scenario, as some of them were asked to
voluntarily take a slight annual pay cut in order to avoid the redundancy of work colleagues. This was
never mentioned as an influential factor amongst finance professionals, presumably since financial
service companies did not implement such schemes.
finance professionals groups, showing that the most common donation was 0 and 3 respectively.
One finance professional suggested had they conducted their task outside of their working
environment (e.g. their home), the result from their task may have differed. Insightfully, this
participant proposed this may hold true for other participants also, as they are aware of many
professionals that have different personas when in and out of work. Non-finance professionals on
the other hand, mostly suggested influences relating to empathy. Responses commonly showed
feelings of identification, stating their task felt realer than their scenario, with their actions aiming to
reflect their desire to aid the unjust situation. A handful of participants between both groups also
stated that their answer to the task was partly influenced by their earlier answer to the scenario (i.e.
allocating 20% in the scenario influenced them to give 2 in the dictator game).
39
40
As identified earlier, this study purposefully took a broad approach in recruiting participants, but
after conducting the demographic analysis it is clear that this study offers many different directions
for future research to explore. When studying finance professionals, the most prominent factor
found to affect their donation amount was the number of years they had spent working within the
financial sector. Future research should aim to explore this further by only sampling finance
professionals, and using the number of years worked within finance as an independent variable, to
distinguish the experimental groups. This could pinpoint the critical turning period of altruistic
behaviour (if one is found at all). Similarly, feedback also revealed that finance participants felt they
had become more selfish over the years, suggesting they would have previously conducted the task
differently. This alternatively provides inspiration to conduct a longitudinal study. For example, a
longitudinal study could test candidates on their 1st day within the financial sector, and then conduct
a similar dictator game task on these individuals approximately 3years later. 3years is the suggested
time frame since the largest mean difference was found between the <1 and the 1-3 year brackets
(mean difference=1.339). Alternatively, the study can chose to test participants on multiple
occasions within a time frame longer than 3years.
When isolating demographic factors, participants annual income appeared to correlate with their
altruistic nature. Future research could choose to use the income brackets of finance professionals
as the independent variable and scrutinise this further. Additionally, finance professionals generally
earn higher salaries (in relation to other sectors), and tend to deal with large sums of money on a
day-to-day basis. Thus, the 10 used in the dictator game may have appeared insignificant. It would
be interesting for future research to recognise this, and test it further, as many different approaches
can be taken. Such approaches include replicating this study, but using larger sums of money e.g.
10,000 instead of 10, and comparing mean percentage donations. Alternatively, applying the
different amounts used in the dictator game as the independent variable, and comparing the mean
percentage donations of the different experimental groups. Taking a different approach when
narrowing down the participant sample, future studies may choose to focus on comparing specific
41
professional sectors to one another. Some may assume the social sector to be the most altruistic,
whilst others may assume those in the media and broadcasting sector will show less altruistic
behaviour. A large comparative study, sampling participants from a variety of different sectors, may
help develop an altruism continuum scale for sectoral employment.
When scrutinising experimental methodology, this study appeared to limit participants endowment
decision to 1 increments, in the dictator game task. Through analysing percentage allocations from
the scenario, participants were found to exercise their unrestricted opportunity to use 5%
increments (e.g. allocating 25%). Similarly future research can implement this into the dictator game
task by supplying 50p coins, rather than 1 coins, thereby allowing participants a greater range of
donation choice. When examining the scenario, both experimental groups displayed lower levels of
perceived altruism, than the actual altruistic behaviour they later exhibited. Apart from the
previously mentioned influential possibilities, questions are raised as to whether participants lacked
empathetic concern due to their recipient being described as Candidate Z. Would participants have
empathised more with the scenario if Candidate Z was given a randomly identifiable name? If so,
would this have resulted in a higher percentage allocation? Future research could test this by
replacing Candidate Z with a well recognisable name, and comparing the results of perceived
altruism. Extending this concept of perceived altruism, future research could also look to compare
perceived and actual altruism levels on a deeper level. As this comparison was not the main focus of
this study, only a basic comparison was drawn upon.
Finally, this article proposes that only using dictator game experiments to test altruism is a limitation
in itself. The majority of altruism literature implements the dictator game as its method of collecting
results, but this study raises concerns about the dictator games content validity. Although monetary
donations are identified as a form of altruistic behaviour with the dictator game demonstrating
this form very well it does not define, nor encompass all aspects of altruism. As a result, this form
of testing should not be used to such a disproportional amount. Future research could gain better
42
insight by investigating other acts of altruism (incorporating relevant observations or testing), and
possibly combining/comparing this with dictator game results. While researchers such as Oliner
(2002) and Smolenska and Reykowski (1992) investigated altruism without implementing the
dictator game experiment, their results are limited by the extremity of the setting, since results were
based on individuals that rescued others during the holocaust. Distinctions however, should be
made between altruism and other helpful or self-sacrificial behaviour, as not all grand acts of
heroism may be purely altruistic (Mattis, et al,. 2009).
43
7. Conclusion
Against the homo economicus concept, this study aimed to capture levels of pure altruism by using
the experiments complete anonymity to limit any identification, affection or gratitude from the
recipient, due to the potential benefits this may give the dictator. Moreover, it experimentally
compared levels of pure altruism (as well as perceived altruism) between finance and non-finance
professionals. As expected, findings revealed finance professionals to be less altruistic than nonfinance professionals, with factors such as income, gender, and years worked within finance
impacting donation decisions.
This study opposes the homo economicus concept, derived from economic theory, and instead
proposes that human nature is better illustrated by mile Durkheims more developed homo duplex
model. This model is able to encompass both the selfish and altruistic nature of humans, by
suggesting individuals move back and forth between 2 levels/phases. The individual state, and the
collective state. Originally developed in 1915, this model may initially appear outdated; however
Ehrenreich (2006) and Kluver et al. (2014) explain how homo duplex applies to modern society and
the corporate world. While the individual lower state refers to ordinary experiences, with one
pursuing their own goals, it recognises humans have social emotions that connect them with others,
whilst acknowledging these cultivated relations will essentially be beneficial to the individual in the
long-run. The collectivist state manifests through relationships, binding the individual to the social
entity as a whole. These 2 states are interlinked by uppers and downers, which symbolises contexts,
activities, or behaviours that initiate the change in state (Kluver, et al., 2014). Kluver et al. (2014,
pp.152-153) then continue to explain how corporate organisations facilitate level changes through
team building retreats, parties, and encouraging cohesion both in and out of work, which in turn
enhances altruism and compassion. This model takes a social approach to altruism, suggesting that
behaviour is influenced by its social environment.
44
This current study contributes to the field of altruism by beginning comparative investigations of
altruistic behaviour through professional sectors, creating a path for other researchers to further
analyse, examine and compare sectoral employment, along with their demographic variations. This is
beneficial to the world of altruism literature in a variety of different directions. For example
identifying which sectors have the highest/lowest amount of altruistic employees, or discovering a
cause and effect relationship between altruistic nature and an individuals long-term line of work etc.
Specifically to the financial industry, this research can provide valuable insight into the nature of
finance professionals, as well as aid in attributing contributing factors and explanations for deviant
behaviours they may display (e.g. taking unnecessary risks in order to gain larger bonuses, at the
possible expense of their clients fund). Furthermore, this study concludes to disagree with De
Bondts (2008), financial theory of beautiful people. The altruistic behaviour displayed across both
experimental groups suggests that individuals do not always strive for utility maximisation, or act in a
perfectly rational manner.
45
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51
9. Appendices
Appendix A Information Sheet
for the 3rd section for another short interview simply asking some demographic questions. Overall,
this study should take approximately 15mins.
What are the possible risks of taking part?
Depending on the length of time each participant takes to complete the 2nd section of the study,
there might be slight delay in the length in time the study takes.
Will my taking part be kept confidential?
Upon analysis all data is completely anonymous, so the participant can NOT be linked to their data at
any given time. All information provided will be kept completely private and confidential.
How is the project being funded?
This research project is being Self-funded
What will happen to the results of the study?
All data will be averaged to see a general trend and then compared accordingly. These results will
then used in my final report. Should you wish to read a copy of the final report, it can be sent out to
you upon request.
Who should I contact for further information?
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact me using the
following contact details:
Name: Hiwot Alemayehu
Email: Hiwot.alemayehu@kcl.ac.uk
Please complete this form after you have read the Information
Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.
Title of Study: Altruism in the Financial Sector
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research
must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions
arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the
researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent
Form to keep and refer to at any time.
Please tick
or initial
Please tick
or initial
1. *I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated [INSERT
DATE AND VERSION NUMBER] for the above study. I have had the opportunity
to consider the information and asked questions which have been answered
satisfactorily.
2. *I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
at any time without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be
able to withdraw my data up to 15th August 2014.
3. *I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes
explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in
accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998.
54
6. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and understand
that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and approved by a research
ethics committee. (In such cases, as with this project, data would/would not be
identifiable in any report).
7. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I
wish to receive a copy of it.
8. I agree NOT to discuss the details of the interview, and the individual task.
__________________
__________________
Name of Participant
Date
__________________
__________________
Name of Researcher
Date
_________________
Signature
_________________
Signature
55
Scenario 17:
You, and candidate Z have just been newly employed into your dream roles by company X.
Unfortunately , over the phone, the employer informs you that due to large unexpected budget cuts
in candidate Zs department, the company will be unable to pay candidate Zs sign-on bonus, whilst
you will still be receiving the advertised amount. Candidate Z is yet to be informed.
The employer suggests that if you were willing, they would be open to the suggestion of donating a
percentage of your sign-on bonus to candidate Z, as it is currently unknown for what period of time
candidate Zs department will be in this stage of difficulty. However the employer then stipulates
that if you were to agree to this, the donation would be made anonymous, and should candidate Z
decide to stay on this role, you can never tell them that their sign-on bonus was a donation from
you. It will simply appear to be a sign-on bonus paid by company X.
The employer then assures you that this is by no means obligatory, and guarantees that your
decision will not affect your position at the company, as this was an informal conversation, off the
record.
Question:
Would you be willing to donate a percentage of your sign-on bonus?
Yes
No
56
57
Study details
This study will be conducted in 3 parts:
o Part 1: Brief interview, conducted by interviewer (me)
o Part 2: Practical section, conducted individually. Enclosed within this envelope is
cash for task participation, and a scenario you must read in order to progress to the
3rd part of the study
o Part 3: Demographic questions for analytical purposes, conducted by interviewer
(me).
58
PART 1 - Interview
1. Which professional sector do you work in?
..............................................................................................................................
2. How many years have you been working within this sector?
<1
1-3
3-5
5-8
8-11
<11
Yes
No
British
Native
How so?
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
5. What is the highest level of your parents educational background?
Mother: ....................................................................................................
Father: ......................................................................................................
59
6. Out of a selection of low/medium/high, what levels of stress would you associate working
within your sector to?
Low
Medium
High
60
10. When feeling stressed whilst still in the office, what is a common thing you do to destress?
..................................................................................................................................................................
11. Different types of exercise are commonly suggested as forms of reducing stress. Do you do
any kinds of exercise? If so which ones? And how often weekly?
Exercises:..................................................................................................................................................
Weekly?....................................................................................................................................................
61
20-25
26-31
32-37
38-43
44-49
50+
Gender
Male
Female
Ethnicity
White
British
Irish
Other
African
Caribbean
Other
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Chinese
Other
62
White &
Asian
Other mixed
background
Please specify...................................................................................................................................
GCSE
A-Level
Bachelors
Masters
PHD
<20,000
20,000-30,000
30,001-40,000
40,001-50,000
>50,000
**FINAL QUESTIONS**
12. On a scale of 1-10, how well do you think this study measured stress, culture and
personality?
.................................
13. What did this study measure best?
..................................................................................................................................................................
63
Appendix F Debrief
Many thanks,
Hiwot Alemayehu
64
Dear Hiwot,
65
If you require signed confirmation of your approval please email crec-lowrisk@kcl.ac.uk indicating why
it is required and the address you would like it to be sent to.
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time to
ascertain the status of your research.
We wish you every success with this work.
With best wishes
Annah Whyton Research Support Assistant
On behalf of
E&M REP Reviewer
66
67
68
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71
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:
Donation
Tukey HSD
(I) Income
1
Mean
Difference (IJ)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
1.300
.701
.360
-.72
3.32
2.056
.716
.050
.00
4.11
2.250
.733
.032
.14
4.36
3.071
.755
.002
.90
5.24
-1.300
.701
.360
-3.32
.72
.756
.624
.745
-1.04
2.55
.950
.644
.585
-.90
2.80
1.771
.669
.083
-.15
3.70
-2.056
.716
.050
-4.11
.00
-.756
.624
.745
-2.55
1.04
.194
.660
.998
-1.70
2.09
1.016
.684
.579
-.95
2.98
-2.250 *
.733
.032
-4.36
-.14
-.950
.644
.585
-2.80
.90
-.194
.660
.998
-2.09
1.70
.821
.703
.769
-1.20
2.84
-3.071
.755
.002
-5.24
-.90
-1.771
.669
.083
-3.70
.15
-1.016
.684
.579
-2.98
.95
-.821
.703
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
.769
-2.84
1.20
72
73
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:
Donation
Tukey HSD
Mean
Difference (IJ)
(I) Income
1
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.450
.493
.890
-.97
1.87
1.050
.493
.230
-.37
2.47
1.350
.612
.202
-.41
3.11
2.083
.743
.059
-.05
4.22
-.450
.493
.890
-1.87
.97
.600
.514
.770
-.88
2.08
.900
.630
.614
-.91
2.71
1.633
.757
.220
-.54
3.81
-1.050
.493
.230
-2.47
.37
-.600
.514
.770
-2.08
.88
.300
.630
.989
-1.51
2.11
1.033
.757
.654
-1.14
3.21
-1.350
.612
.202
-3.11
.41
-.900
.630
.614
-2.71
.91
-.300
.630
.989
-2.11
1.51
.733
.840
.905
-1.68
3.15
-2.083
.743
.059
-4.22
.05
-1.633
.757
.220
-3.81
.54
-1.033
.757
.654
-3.21
1.14
-.733
.840
.905
-3.15
1.68
74
75
76
77
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:
Donation
Tukey HSD
.641
.317
-.60
3.27
2.314
.725
.033
.12
4.50
2.548
.689
.009
.47
4.63
3.000
.662
.001
1.00
5.00
3.000
.662
.001
1.00
5.00
4
5
Sig.
1.339
Mean
Difference
(I-J)
Std. Error
95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-1.339
.641
.317
-3.27
.60
.975
.706
.738
-1.16
3.11
1.208
.669
.476
-.81
3.23
-.27
3.60
1.661
.641
.128
1.661
.641
.128
-.27
3.60
-2.314
.725
.033
-4.50
-.12
-.975
.706
.738
-3.11
1.16
.233
.750
1.000
-2.03
2.50
.686
.725
.932
-1.50
2.88
.686
.725
.932
-1.50
2.88
-2.548
.689
.009
-4.63
-.47
-1.208
.669
.476
-3.23
.81
-.233
.750
1.000
-2.50
2.03
.452
.689
.985
-1.63
2.53
.452
.689
.985
-1.63
2.53
-3.000
.662
.001
-5.00
-1.00
-1.661
.641
.128
-3.60
.27
-.686
.725
.932
-2.88
1.50
-.452
.689
.985
-2.53
1.63
0.000
.662
1.000
-2.00
2.00
-3.000
.662
.001
-5.00
-1.00
-1.661
.641
.128
-3.60
.27
-.686
.725
.932
-2.88
1.50
-.452
.689
.985
-2.53
1.63
0.000
.662
1.000
-2.00
2.00
78
79
80