Review Journal

Delivering Transportation Infrastructure through

Public-Private Partnership- Planning Concerns
By Matti Siemiatycki
American Planning Association. Journal of the American Planning Association; winter
2010; Vol. 76, No. 1
Reviewed by Iman Sufrian
NPM 1206313974
A. BACKGROUND/INTRODUCTORY
Public-private partnership (PPPs) started to gained popularity with governments as
means of effectively delivering large-scale transportation infrastructure projects in the 1980s.
In recent years, several governments in some countries have designed special
government agencies, and departments designed to facilitate the growing application of
PPPS. Those countries are UK, Australia, Singapore, South Africa and Canada (Garvin and
Bosso, 2008). While in the US, twenty-three states have enacted special legislation to
enable PPPs on state transportation projects (Federal Highway Administration, 2009).
Therefore, one can conclude that the rise of PPPs has been among the most
important trends shaping public service delivery (Sagalyn, 2007), as a strategy to stimulate
economic growth and create jobs, ameliorate environmental problems, and promote social
equity through having high quality urban infrastructure.
Controversies around the PPPs implementation
There are controversies regarding the adoption and implementation of PPPs in order
to deliver public service infrastructure. Those who support the adoption and implementation
of PPPs to introduce private financing, competition, and market forces into the procurement
of public infrastructure have several advantages. Those advantages are:
PPPs can lead projects being built sooner that they would be if entirely paid for by
governments;
PPPs can reduce projects lifecycle costs through greater innovation;
PPPs introduce more accountable decision making;
PPPs reduce the potential for construction cost escalations that have consistently plagued
infrastructure mega-projects (Deloitte Research, 2006; GAO 2008; Levy 1996).
However, there are also critics regarding the adoption and implementation of PPPs in
delivering public service infrastructure. Those who criticize PPPs strategy argues that:
PPPs are an expensive and inefficient method of delivering infrastructure and :
PPP can undermine the capability of government to plan for public interest (Shaoul,
Stafford,and Stapleton 2006; Stapleton, Shaoul, Stafford and Arblaster 2004).
The author of this article tries to fulfil following objectives:
To develop a set of criteria on which to evaluate the procedural, spatial, design, public
policy, and political implication of these PPPs from a planning perspective, and then to
examine whether their proposed benefits are matched by real-world experiences
To examine whether claims about benefit of delivering public infrastructure through PPPs
are matched by real-world experience
B. METHODOLOGY
The author of this paper conducted a wide literature review other researches about
PPPs. Based on literature review, the author of this paper then proposed a set of an ex ante
criteria from planning perspective to examine and to evaluate PPPs projects in particular the
DBFO PPPs partnership.

Based on the literature review, the author of this paper then used the proposed
criteria to examine and to evaluate DBFO partnership in general. The proposed criteria then
applied to examine and to evaluate three selected DBFO projects as case studies. Those
selected projects were: the Croydon Tramlink in London, UK; the State Route 91 toll lanes in
Orange County, CA; and the Cross City Tunnel in Sydney, Australia.
Based on the examination and evaluation results of those three selected projects the
author of this paper then drew conclusion about the implementation of those projects and
finally propose suggestions that would benefit the future implementation of future PPPs
projects , in particular those use the PPPs DBFO model.
C. JOURNAL CONTENT
Mention the major results of the study (use past tense).
State what the author of the study learned.
1. A Brief History of Infrastructure Delivery Partnership
The author cited the U.S Federal Highway Administration report in 2009 mentioning
the variety of models of PPPs according to how responsibility was divided to each party.
The variety of PPPs model were Design-Bid-Build (DBB), Design-build (DB), Design-BuildFinance-Operate (DBFO) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO).
The author of this article stated that though both the design-bid-build (DBB) and
design build (DB) were PPPs, both have long histories as methods of delivering public
infrastructure and reserve the greatest authority and responsibility for the public sector
partner. In contrast, the design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) and build-own-operate (BOO)
models gave more control and risk to the private sector/private partner. In this article, the
author focused on the DBFO model.
Traditionally, DBB model that assigned the public sector primary responsibility
(Yakowenko, 2004). In the mid-1980s, government around the world began experimenting
the BOO model as a way to raise funds for new projects and improve the efficiency of
service provision. However, this strategy experienced strong citizen and political opposition
to complete infrastructure privatization, and the level of benefits and service quality varied
(Gomez-Ibanez, 1996; Gomez, Ibanez and Meyer, 1993; Sclar 2001).
Britain pioneered the implementation of new model that bundled facility design,
construction, financing, and operation into a single long term concession in the early 1990s.
This model is called DBFO model. This model became an important model to deliver large
public sector transportation and this model claims to achieve benefits by introducing greater
competition into project planning processes and harmonizing the interest, rewards, and risk
of both public and private partners through a long term contractual agreements (Grimsey
and Lewis 2005).
According to Deloitte Research Report (2006), Britain was still the most active for
PPPs in the world and had also developed the most sophisticated institutional, legal,
regulatory and business structure to support the expansion of DBFO model. However, some
countries including Australia, Spain, South Korea, Ireland, Canada, France, China, and
Brazil were moving up to what was called as market maturity curve in acquiring DBFO model
on transportation sector. While in the US, there had been a relatively small but growing
number of transportation projects were being delivered through DBFO partnership as the US
Government found DBFO partnership were more expensive compare to self-financing
method.

Criteria for Evaluation PPPs from a Planning Perspective

Even though PPPs became popular around the world in providing public service
infrastructure, the benefit of PPP had been intensely scrutinized and debated in many
scholarly articles from disciplinary perspective including public administration, political
science, engineering, finance, business, and project management as well as in government
and industry reports and media stories. However, there had been only few examination of
infrastructure PPPs through the planning disciplinary (Miraftab 2004; Sagalyn, 2007;
Siemiatycki 2006, 2007) with its particular emphasis on preparing the physical, spatial, social
and environmental future of places (American Planning Association, 2009).
The author of this article proposed nine criteria particularly relevant to planners
evaluation whether transportation projects should be delivered through DBFO and BOO
PPPs. This criteria are also relevant for academics and policymakers for conducting postimplementation evaluation. The first six criteria were appropriate to short terms concerns,
and the last three criteria were appropriate to long term. Based on each defined criteria, the
author of this paper also proposed definition of success/indicators of each criteria.
Short Term Concern Criteria
1. Will it (the DBFO partnership) tap new money for infrastructure?
According to (Vining and Boardman, 2008, many governments experienced shortage of
fund to finance new infrastructure project expenditure due to its reluctance to make new
debt or to raise taxes. Therefore, PPPs and in particular the DBFO model would provide
financing that would allow a heavily indebted or fiscally conservative governments earlier
than if they funded those projects entirely through traditional government sources (Allen,
2001; GAO, 2008). Despite of that, other researchers found that raising fund privately to
pay for infrastructure does not contribute to a reduction of public debt ( Hodge and
Greve, 2007; World Bank 2007). Therefore the use of DBFO model to finance new public
infrastructure cannot be seen as a solution to reduce public-sector debt (Quiggin; 2004).
The indicator/definition of success of this criteria is whether over one third of total capital
costs came from private sources.
2. Will it damage or weaken System wide planning?
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Since governments experience budget constraint or budget limitation, government have

to take account this condition as an important factor in determining strategic
transportation plan priorities (Taylor, 2000). On the other side, private financing of
infrastructure through PPPs gives private financiers and investors influence over
investment decisions (Daniels and Trebilcock, 1996, Siemiatycki, 2006). Moreover, Some
researchers also mentioned that private investors with significant capital (the author
proposed to be at least one third of the projects capital costs), have an incentive to
require that proposals be viable before approving them (Flyvbjerg,Bruzelius and
Rothengatter, 2003). However, Siemiatycki (2006) stated that the involvement of private
financing for public investment could create a distortion to regional planning priorities,
because private sectors priority was to favor projects with the greatest investment return
trough user fee, not social benefits. Moreover, Ortiz and Buxbaum (2008) also stated that
delivering projects individually, each as a stand-alone PPPs, might weaken government
planners efforts to plan strategically for an integrated transportation system.
The indicator/definition of success of this criteria is whether private sector influenced
project selection, so that it did not follow regional planning priorities.
3. Will it spur Project-level Innovation?
At the individual project scale, a method of bundling project design, construction, longterm operation and financing into a single PPP is primarily aimed to encourage ongoing
innovation that will increase project benefits and cut lifecycle costs. The competition
among firms to win the project is driven by profit maximizing motives over an extended
operating period. This motive is thought to provide a strong incentive for an innovation
(Daniels and Trebilcock, 1996; Deloitte Research, 2006). Efficiencies can be achieved
through a variety of mechanisms: applying new technologies, applying a successful
methodology from abroad, tight employee management, and even lower employee
wages (Federal Highway Administration; 2009; Levy, 1996).
The indicator/definition of success of this criteria is whether PPP model contributed to
innovative project designs or cost recovery mechanisms that enhanced project benefits
4. Will it limit worthwhile community involvement and consultation?
Several studies showed that community involvement and consultation in infrastructure
investment are worthwhile as an important element to making the public planning
accountable, gaining support from citizen for a project and improving the policy outcomes
of the specific initiatives (Flyvbjerg et. al., 2003; Innes and Booher, 2004). Illsley (2003)
stated that the meaningful community involvement and consultation can be achieved
through several ways : predictable decision making processes ; open access to key
documents and data; fair opportunities for stakeholders to provide input into plans; and a
transparent and accountable system of integrating stakeholders contribution into final
decision that are made. Despite its logical idea, some researchers doubts the ability of
such DBFO-partnership to allow such high level of transparency to achieve meaningful
community involvement (Daniel and Trebilcock, 1996; Quiggin, 2004; Siemiatycki, 2007).
Hodge (2004) mentioned that during project planning, parties involved in the project
withhold the key details about the project design, toll levels, funding arrangement and
noncompetition clauses because such information is regarded as commercially
sensitive information therefore those information were kept confidential. Once the project
is operational, the contractual term of the partnership can limit the feedback of
community to influence the ongoing facility management.
The author used three indicators/definition of success of this criteria. Those indicators
were as follows:
a. Whether planning process followed a standardized, transparent, competitive
tendering process
b. Whether key financial, project design, and contractual documents were released
during the planning phase
c. Whether PPP contract supports meaningful public involvement in ongoing facility
management
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5. Will the project be within budget and on time, meet traffic forecast and deliver desired
community benefits?
The success of transportation infrastructure projects are measured by whether those
projects are delivered on time and within budget and whether they achieve their traffic
forecasts and performance specification. Those indicators are widely used by scholars,
governments and independent auditor in evaluating the success of transportation
infrastructure projects. In reality, many large transportation infrastructure projects
experience underestimated costs, construction times, and overestimation of traffic users,
overestimated projection of economic development and environmental benefits they
would provide (Flybjerg et al., 2003; Pickrell, 1992). PPPs are proposed as a key
strategy to solve these problems since private financiers are believed to have better risk
management since they provide significant capital at stake (Flybjerg et al., 2003).
The author used four indicators/definition of success of this criteria. Those indicators
were as follows:
a. Whether actual delivery costs within the forecasted budget
b. Whether project opened before or on the expected date
c. Whether, after 3 years, traffic the project carried met or exceeded forecasted levels
d. Whether project delivered the expected community benefits
6. Will supply and demand risks be transferred to the private partners?
Another primary reason for choosing the DBFO PPP model is to transfer risk to private
partner. While the standard measures of success for an infrastructure projects are
primarily whether cost overruns or revenue shortfalls occur, a successful DBFO project
also focused on identifying which partner would bear the cost should those unexpected
event really occurred (Quiggin, 2004).
In conventional public-sector-led model of delivering infrastructure, the costs of most type
of risk are covered by the government agencies and taxpayers. In contrast, the DBFO
PPPs method enables the potential to transfer certain supply and demand related risks to
private partner with the greatest incentive and ability to manage those risks. As the
consequence, transferring risk is often accompanied by a cost premium, and the types of
risks shifted to the private partners on transportation projects are those related to
construction cost overruns, delays in opening the facility, facility availability and
operational performance, and sometimes the unachieved predicted traffic volumes
( Deloitte Research, 2006; Hodge, 2004).
The indicator/definition of success of this criteria is whether government need not cover
either rising construction costs or financial losses from low traffic volume, outside of
contract stipulations.
Long term concern
7. Will DBFO Contract terms Constrain Future options?
The planners should take into account the possibility of the long term contractual
arrangement between DBFO partners limits the flexibility of future decision makers to
respond to changing conditions and make plans that best meet evolving public interest
(GAO, 2008). To be more specific, international experience shows that the terms of many
DBFO concession agreements include clauses that prevent governments from
influencing the size and frequency of toll escalations, upgrading adjacent facilities that
would potentially harm the revenue generating capacity of the private operator or
demand the private operator to implement more environmentally sustainable practices as
those opportunity is available (GAO, 2008; Ortiz and Buxbaum, 2008).
The author used two indicators/definition of success of this criteria. Those indicators were
as follows:
a. Whether government is able to make changes to infrastructure service levels, service
quality, an toll or fare rates
b. Whether government is able to plan for new adjacent infrastructure projects as if they
controlled the PPP facility
8. Will PPPs (in particular DBFO model) deliver value for public money?
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Some countries such Britain, Australia, and Canada, uses systematic value for money
assessments to conduct an ex ante evaluation of PPP projects. In such approaches, the
complete lifecycle cost of a proposed PPPs project is compared with the conventional
public sector procurement model. Value for money is achieved if the PPPs model has
lower lifecycle cost that the comparator when differential cost of construction, operation,
public sector oversight, financing and risks are considered (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005;
Quiggin, 2004).
However, this analysis failed to address the critics of DBFO PPPs critics that reverse to
many studies of DBFO around the world which stated that DBFO public partners pay
high transaction costs associated with structuring and monitoring partnership
arrangements (Gavin and Bosso 2008 ; Vining and Bourdman, 2008), significant cost
premium to ensure projects are delivered on time and on budget (Stapleton et al., 2004) ,
large cost escalations during project planning (Siemiatycki, 2007), borrowing cost that
significantly exceed those available to governments (Quiggin, 2004), and excessively
high rates of return to the private investors (Shaoul et. al., 2006).
The author used two indicators/definition of success of this criteria. Those indicators were
as follows:
a. Whether PPP is less expensive than having designed, built and operated a
comparable projects through traditional public methods
b. Whether Concessionaire is highly profitable during the operation period
9. Will Conflict Between the Partners Threaten Project Success?
Jacobson and Choi (2008) identified the important factors that contributed to successfully
delivering public works through a partnership between a public sector client and a private
sector client concessionaire. Those factors were: open communication and trust,
willingness to compromise and to collaborate, and respect. In spite of that, international
experience showed that frequent and long lasting conflicts often arise between parties
involved over the setting of tolls, service quality, and the planning of new competing
facilities. Many partnerships ended in bankruptcy or government buyout before the
contracts were up. (Gavin and Bosso, 2008; Vining and Boardman, 2008).
The author used three indicators/definition of success of this criteria. Those indicators
were as follows:
a. Whether relationship between concessionaire and elected officials in amicable over
long-term operating contract
b. Whether disputes over interpretation of contract are settled through alternatives to
legal challenges
c. Whether partnership lasts to the end of the contracted period with the original
concessionaire
Case study of DBFO model
Based on the criteria mentioned above, the author of this paper tried to explore whether the
theoretical benefits of delivering transportation infrastructure through DBFO PPPs were
matched the real-world experience by examining three selected case study projects. Those
projects were Croydon Tramlink, UK, SR 91 Express Toll Lanes, US and Cross City Tunnel,
Sydney, Australia.
The selection of those three projects were based on following reasons:
a. Each of the three projects had varied circumstances for case process and outcome
therefore each projects had different starting points. The SR 91 toll lanes was
considered as a highly successful project. In contrast, the cross city tunnel was seen as
having many deficiencies, while the Croydon Tramlink was initially considered as having
a mixed result. This variation enable the author to examine the factors that contribute to
projects success or failure in the short term and trace how projects outcome change
over time from three different stating points.
b. Those three projects were selected because of the availability of data regarding the
project planning process and system performance, as well as community and political
responses to the ongoing operation of the facility.
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c. Each of the case were planned and delivered in countries that are different stages on
the PPP market maturity curve for the transportation sector (Deloitte Research, 2006).
Britain and Australia were both very experienced at delivering DBFO PPs and have
substantial institution in place to procure projects using such a model. The US had
carried out fewer DBFO partnerships in the transportation sector, and its legal and
governance mechanisms relating to DBFOs were not fully formed.
The summary of the evaluation result of the three case study projects based on proposed
set of criteria and more specifically each indicator of each criteria were seen at below table:
a. Comparison of case studied on short them criteria (1-6)

b. Comparison of case studies on long term criteria (7 9)

Implication for Planning

Based on the comparison and contrast the result of the three case studies the author then
tried to reflect on the short and long term implication of delivering projects through PPPs
DBFO model.
Short Term Implication
According to the author of this paper, in the short term, planners had a clear interest in
supporting projects delivery and finance models that facilitate the provision of socially
beneficial infrastructure as quickly as possible, although in practice such decision are
often made by politicians. This is shown by the fact that the above three case studies of
DBFO partnership had effectively raised over US$ 1 billion up front for new
transportation facilities even though one have to take account the fact that the decision
made during a period of relatively easy access to private capital. Had these project used
other method, it would have been more difficult to raise fund from public sector (raising
tax or issuing new public debt).
However, the quick decision on financing issue did not mean the projects progress were
quicker from conceptual planning to operation compare to more conventional
procurement strategies. Negotiating contracts and arranging private financing took a
lengthy process.
Based in three project cases, the private sector involvement on project financing and
delivery did not appear to have significantly distorted the governments regional planning
objective or investment priorities. Each of these projects had been a government priority
long before it was selected for implementation as a PPP.
Regarding the implementation of innovative technical and cost recovery models, the
three case study projects showed that innovation may, but not necessarily, result in
project design or cost recover model that elevated social benefit or lower lifecycle costs.
In all three cases, even though standard public meetings were held, opportunities were
provided for written comments, and public enquiries were conducted, informed public
input was limited by participants withheld key contractual details, including
noncompetition clauses, toll rate escalation schedules, and concession payments.
The private partner in two out of three projects suffered heavy financial losses due to
revenue shortfall. However, those three projects had risk transfer mechanism included in
the DBFO contract so the public sector was not financially responsible. This is significant,
since the conventionally delivered infrastructure projects, government had consistently
covered the escalating project costs and revenue shortfalls from the public budget.
Long Term Implication
While the short-term performance of the DBFO was fairly mixed, over the longer term,
each of the projects experience a similar set of challenges, regardless of their early level
of success or the maturity of the national market for PPPs.
Adopting noncompetition clauses and formalizing relationship between the public and
private sector with contracts had significant impacts on future spatial and infrastructure
planning, limiting government flexibility to respond to changing conditions and public
feedback about facility management.
In particular, the DBFO PPP arrangements highlighted conflicts in planning objectives,
demonstrating that maximizing private returns was sometimes, but not always, congruent
with government social or environmental policy. For example in Orange Country, the
noncompetition agreement prevented government from constructing popular new
highway capacity, that was likely to increase emissions, while also preventing local
officials from continuing to discount tolls for high occupancy vehicles, a policy that was
likely to be socially environmentally beneficial (OCTA, 2008). In Croydon, the regional
transportation agency was unable improve Tramlink service to make it more attractive to
existing and potential users without paying substantial fees to the private operator.

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The inclusion of restrictive contractual clauses was fundamentally related to the

allocation of risks between the partners. The private sector partner assumed traffic
volume risk, and in response, sought contractual assurance that would make it easier for
them to manage uncertainty that could undermine their investment.
For the public sector partner, however, restrictive contractual terms not only constrained
future planning, they were also a source of tension in the relationship between the
private and public partners, and with the citizenry. Regardless of whether the project was
initially successful or not, competing interpretation of the contract led to high profile
arguments between the partners and releasing unfavourable information about the PPP
contract term led to outcry from politicians and the public.
When the conflict arose, the significant costs associated with any compromise led each
partner and to vigorously protect their original position. Lawsuit and the threat of legal
actions between the public and private partners occurred in each of the three cases. As
the relations deteriorated further, each of the three original concessionaires sold their
franchises; two to government agencies and one to another private sector
concessionaire following the originals concessionaires bankruptcy. This ultimately left
governments holding significant long-term risk, an unexpectedly having to make major
investments, contrary to the objectives of the DBFO partnership model.
Some of the challenges observed in these three case studies are common to megaprojects
regardless of whether they are delivered through traditional or partnership methods. For
example, key planning document have been confidential, project construction costs have
risen, and traffic volume has been overestimated under both project delivery models.
However, the DBFO-style PPP creates new tention points, particularly because it limits
governments flexibility to respond to changing conditions over time.
Conclusions and Recommendation by the writer
Even when projects were considered successful by the conventional criteria of project
evaluation (which is largely determined by the quality of planning processes), the impacts on
system users and the environment, and the durability of the partnership might be still
uncertain. Based on the evaluation of the three selected case study projects, the author of
this paper proposed some recommendation. Those recommendations were as followed:
a. The planner needs to conduct a rigorous assessments of the merits of PPP projects
before they are begun. This should extend beyond assessing value for money to
consider the effects of using a DBFO-type PPP approach on the flexibility of current and
future planning, transparency and citizen engagement, and the equity and environmental
impact of toll rates.
b. Planners should develop strategies that preserve government flexibility to plan for future
community needs without violating the terms of contract. For example, American states
such as Florida and Texas have banned the inclusion of non-compete clauses in
transportation PPPs. Another approach would be to analyse the range of risk transfer
options before making a decision, comparing the benefits of transferring volume risk to
the private sector against the disadvantages of being bound by contractual terms that
restrict changes to the facility and may limit its integration into the wider transportation
network.
c. Planners should develop strategies to improving the quality of community engagement
and ongoing public participation in decision making, with the aim to build trust between
stakeholders and resolving conflict before they become unresolved. An essential step is
to increase transparency and to disclose important financial, technical and contractual
information, which has typically been withheld during the DBFO project planning
processes. Independent auditors general or comptroller should have expanded oversight
powers while DBFO projects are being planned. This could build public confidence that
decision making processes were fair and diverse concerns were considered.
d. Finally, public agencies should better collect and disseminate data on the outcomes of
large transportation infrastructure projects as a way to support learning from past
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experience. Government agencies should develop databases that compile both financial
and nonfinancial information on project performance.
Organization
The introductory paragraph summarizes the background information and purpose of the
research (specific questions the study researched).
Then, explain the methods that were used to investigate the research questions (use past
tense).
Mention the major results of the study (use past tense).
State what the author of the study learned.
Critique: A Critical Review and Assessment of the Article
Include a summary as well as your own analysis and evaluation of the article.
Know the article thoroughly.
Do not include personal opinions.
Be sure to distinguish your thoughts from the authors words.
Focus on the positive aspects and what the author(s) of the study learned.
Note limitations of the study at the end of the essay:
o Do the data and conclusions contradict each other?
o Is there sufficient data to support the authors generalizations?
o What questions remain unanswered?
o How could future studies be improved?

D. SUMMARY
Contribution of the paper
Based on above parts, it is concluded this articles has provided an adequate
framework on setting the criteria of evaluating PPPs in particular DBFO style PPPs.
This paper also gives important information about the
1.
Many subsequent research successfully applied and tested the prediction of the
models suggested by Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz. This article also review other
authors works that applied and tested the work of these three researchers works.
Most of other authors works that try to apply and test the models suggested by
George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz confirm the prediction of the
models. Eventhough, some attempts to test the prediction of the models suggested
by Akerlof did revealed some ambiguous results. For example a direct test carried
out by Bond (1982) on data from a market for second-hand small trucks did not
support the asymmetric information hypothesis. Chiappori and Salanie (2000)
examined whether individuals who buy car insurance car insurance with better
coverage have more accidents. They failed to find statistical support for such
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correlation as suggested by adverse selection and signalling model. The difficulty of

such tests is to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard problem;
another is that screening and signalling partially eliminate the effect of informational
asymmetries.
Moreover, the models suggested by those three authors were also successfully
applied in many other economic and social settings for example financial economics,
industrial organization. Recently, many insights from economics of information have
been incorporated into development economics. This phenomena can be seen as an
opportunity for further research in the development economics as well as other area
based on the theory of asymmetric information.
REFERENCES
Matti Siemiatycki, Delivering Transportation Infrastructure through Public-Private
Partnership- Planning Concerns, American Planning Association. Journal of the
American Planning Association; winter 2010; Vol. 76, No. 1
Pindyck, Robert S.; Rubinfeld, Daniel L., Microeconomics (3rd edition), Prentice Hall, 1996,
Varian, Hal R., Intermediate Microeconomics A Modern Approach (Fifth Edition), W. W.
Norton & Company, New York-London, 1999.

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