Chapter 1

The Early History of Automated

Dedu tion
Dedi ated to the memory of Hao Wang
Martin Davis
Se ond readers: Peter Andrews, Wolfgang Bibel, Alan Robinson, and
Jorg Siekmann.

Contents
1 Presburger's Pro edure . . . . . . . . . .
2 Newell, Shaw & Simon, and H. Gelernter
3 First-Order Logi . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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HANDBOOK OF AUTOMATED REASONING

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Edited by Alan Robinson and Andrei Voronkov

2001 Elsevier S ien e Publishers B.V. All rights reserved

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5
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12
15

The Early History of Automated Dedu tion

With the ready availability of serious omputer power, dedu tive reasoning, espe ially as embodied in mathemati s, presented an ideal target for those interested in
experimenting with omputer programs that purported to implement the \higher"
human fa ulties. This was be ause mathemati al reasoning ombines obje tivity
with reativity in a way di ult to nd in other domains. For this endeavor, two
paths presented themselves. One was to try to understand what people do when
they reate proofs and to write programs emulating that pro ess. The other was
to make use of the systemati work of the logi ians in redu ing logi al reasoning
to standard anoni al forms on whi h algorithms ould be based. Ea h path onfronted daunting obsta les. The di ulty with the rst approa h was that available
information about how reative mathemati ians go about their business was and remains vague and ane dotal. On the other hand, the well-known unsolvability results
of Chur h and Turing showed that the kind of algorithm on whi h a programmer
might want to base a theorem-proving program simply did not exist. Moreover, it
was all too obvious that an attempt to generate a proof of something non-trivial
by beginning with the axioms of some logi al system and systemati ally applying the rules of inferen e in all possible dire tions was sure to lead to a giganti
ombinatorial explosion.
Ea h of these approa hes has led to important and interesting work. Unfortunately, for many years the proponents of the two approa hes saw themselves as
opponents and engaged in polemi s in whi h they largely spoke past ea h other.
One problem was that whereas they appeared to be working on the same problems,
they tended to dier not only in their approa hes, but also in their fundamental
goals. Those whose method was the emulation of the human mathemati ian tended
to see their resear h as part of an eort to help understand human thought. Those
who proposed to use the methods of mathemati al logi tended to see the goal as
the development of useful systems of automated dedu tion. Ultimately, the most
su essful developments in orporated insights deriving from both approa hes.
For a brief a ount of the history of the developments in logi that provided the
ba kground for resear h in this eld see [Davis 1983 . An interesting a ount of
the two approa hes and their mutual intera tion an be found in [Ma Kenzie 1995.
The volume [Siekmann and Wrightson 1983 is a useful anthology of the prin ipal
arti les on automated dedu tion to appear in the years through 1966.

1. Presburger's Pro edure

In 1929, M. Presburger had shown that the rst-order theory of addition in the
arithmeti of integers is de idable, that is he had provided an algorithm whi h
would be able to determine for a given senten e of that language, whether or not
it is true. In 1954, Martin Davis programmed this algorithm for the va uum tube
omputer at the Institute for Advan ed Study in Prin eton. As was stated by Davis
[1983
Sin e it is now known that Presburger's pro edure has worse than exponential
omplexity, it is not surprising that this program did not perform very well. Its

Martin Davis

great triumph was to prove that the sum of two even numbers is even.

2. Newell, Shaw & Simon, and H. Gelernter

The propositional al ulus is the most elementary part of mathemati al logi , dealing as it does with the onne tives : ^ _  . Its treatment onstitutes Se tion A
of Part I (37 pages) of Whitehead and Russell's Prin ipia Mathemati a, their monumental three volume eort purporting to demonstrate that all of mathemati s an
be viewed as a part of logi . Their treatment pro eeds from ve parti ular formulas, that may be alled axioms or primitive propositions to whi h are applied the
expli itly stated rule of modus ponens or deta hment1 and impli it rules permitting
substitutions for propositional variables and repla ing dened symbols using their
denitions. Newell, Shaw and Simon set themselves the problem of produ ing a
omputer program that emulates the pro ess by whi h a person might seek proofs
in the propositional al ulus of Prin ipia. Although the formalism is simple enough
so that su h a program would be feasible, the pro ess requires enough ingenuity
that the problem was hardly trivial.
In Newell, Shaw and Simon's [1957 report on experiments with their \Logi
Theory Ma hine," (developed around the same time as Davis's Presburger program)
the authors are very expli it about their goals:
Our explorations . . . represent a step in a program of resear h . . . aimed at developing a theory . . . and applying [it to su h elds as omputer programming and
human learning and problem-solving

Although it would be di ult to laim that this work has helped very mu h with
su h an ambitious agenda, it did provide a paradigm employed by many theoremprovers developed later, and this was surely its lasting in uen e. Among the te hniques made expli it were forward and ba kward haining, the generation of useful
subproblems, and seeking substitutions that produ e desired mat hes.
The authors emphasize that their program is \heuristi " rather than \algorithmi ," and this purported distin tion has given rise to mu h dissension and onfusion. In this ontext, \heuristi " seems to mean little more than the la k of a
guarantee that the pro ess will always work (given su ient spa e and time). The
algorithm they ontrast with their own pro edure is the \British Museum algorithm" by whi h all possible proofs are generated until one leading to the desired
result is rea hed. Indeed, the authors seem to have been unaware that Post's proof
of the ompleteness of the Prin ipia propositional al ulus using truth tables had,
in ee t supplied a simple algorithm by means of whi h a demonstration by truth
tables ould be onverted into a proof in Prin ipia [Post 1921.
Wang and Gao [1987 presented a Gentzen-style proof system for the propositional al ulus designed for e ien y. Unlike the program of Newell et al, Wang's
system is omplete: for any input, pro essing eventually halts, yielding either a
1 A tually

Whitehead and Russell's tenden y to onfuse obje t and meta-language led them to
state this onfusingly as \Anything implied by a true proposition is true." But this lapse is not
important for the present dis ussion.

The Early History of Automated Dedu tion

proof or a disproof. The simple examples that are expli itly listed in Prin ipia,
in luding those that stumped the Logi Theory Ma hine, were easily disposed of.
Although Wang seems not to have quite understood that produ ing an e ient
generator of proofs in the propositional al ulus was not what the Logi Theory
Ma hine designers were after, they did leave themselves open to Wang's riti ism
by giving the impression that the absurd British Museum algorithm was the only
possible \non-heuristi " proof-generating system for the propositional al ulus.
Like the propositional al ulus, the elementary geometry of the plane an be
spe ied by a formal system for whi h an algorithmi de ision pro edure is available.
This is seen by introdu ing a oordinate system and relying on the redu tion of
geometry to algebra and Tarski's de ision pro edure for the algebra of the real
numbers. However, unlike the ase of truth table methods for the propositional
al ulus, this method is utterly unfeasible. Although theoreti al onrmation of this
did not ome until mu h later, it was already apparent from Davis's experien e with
the mu h simpler Presburger pro edure. Herbert Gelernter's Geometry Ma hine is
very mu h in the spirit of Newell at al. A lue to Gelernter's orientation is provided
by his statement [Gelernter 1959:
. . . geometry provides illustrative material in treatises and experiments in human problem-solving. It was felt that we ould ex hange valuable insights with
behavioral s ientists . . .

Te hni ally, in addition to the repertoire of The Logi Ma hine (ba kward haining, the use of subproblems), the geometry ma hine introdu ed two interesting
innovations: the systemati use of symmetries to abbreviate proofs and the use of a
oordinate system to simulate the arefully drawn diagram a student of geometry
might employ. This last was used to tip o the prover to the fa t that ertain pairs
of line segments and of angles \appeared" to be equal to one another, and thereby
to guide the sear h for a proof.

3. First-Order Logi
Unlike the ases of propositional logi and elementary geometry, there is no general
de ision pro edure for rst-order logi . On the other hand, given appropriate axioms
as premises, all mathemati al reasoning an be expressed in rst- order logi , and
that is why so mu h attention has been paid to proof pro edures for this domain.
Investigations by Skolem and Herbrand in the 1920s and early 1930s provided the
basi tools needed for theorem-proving programs for rst-order logi [Davis 1983 .
In 1957 a ve week Summer Institute for Symboli Logi held at Cornell University was attended by almost every logi ian working in the United States. Many
of the more theoreti ally in lined resear hers from the nearby IBM fa ilities were
also present; FORTRAN, a brand-new innovation in programming pra ti e was unveiled. After dis ussions with Gelernter, the logi ian Abraham Robinson was led to
give a short talk [Robinson 1957 in whi h he pointed to Skolem fun tions and \Herbrand's theorem" as useful tools for general purpose theorem-provers. He also made
the provo ative remark that the auxilliary points, lines, or ir les \ onstru ted" as

Martin Davis

part of the solution to a geometry problem an be thought of as being elements of

what is now alled the Herbrand universe for the problem.
The rst theorem-provers for rst-order logi to be implemented based on Herbrand's theorem employed a ompletely unguided sear h of the Herbrand universe.
Instead of using Skolem fun tions to deal with instantiations, variables were repla ed by parameters; so the program had to provide a apability for keeping tra k
of dependen ies among these parameters. Tests for truth-fun tional satisability
used either simple truth table al ulations or expansion into disjun tive normal
form. Not surprisingly, these programs were apable of proving only the simplest
theorems. Among the rst of these programs, that by Gilmore [1960 served as a
parti ularly useful stimulus for further investigations.
In his later ommentary, Prawitz [1983a explained that the development of new
proof pro edures and ompleteness proofs for rst- order logi together with the
availability of omputational resour es tempted him to be ome involved in implementing su h a pro edure. He adopted a modied form of the method of semanti
tableaux, and formulated his own high level algorithmi language in whi h the pro edure ould be written. The detailed implementation was a omplished by Prawitz,
Prawitz and Voghera [1960. Despite being based on an up-to-date underlying logi al system, this program suered from the same limitations as Gilmore's.
Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam noted that Gilmore's program failed on some
rather simple examples be ause of its relian e on expansions into disjun tive normal
form for satisability testing. This led them to the optimisti (and in retrospe t
rather naive) on lusion that the la k of ee tive methods for testing large formulas of the propositional al ulus for satisability was the main obsta le to be
surmounted. Although their interest in algorithms for what ame to be known as
the satisability problem was only be ause they wanted to use su h methods as part
of a proof pro edure for rst-order logi , they se ured support from the National
Se urity Agen y, to spend the summer of 1958 working on this problem. In their
unpublished report to the NSA [Davis and Putnam 1958, they emphasized the use
of onjun tive normal form for satisability testing. The spe i redu tion methods
whose use together have been linked to the names Davis-Putnam are all present in
this report. These are:
1. The one literal rule also known as the unit rule.
2. The armative-negative rule also known as the pure literal rule.
3. The rule for eliminating atomi formulas
4. The splitting rule, alled in the report, the rule of ase analysis
The Davis-Putnam paper usually ited [Davis and Putnam 1960 was written a
year later. The proposed pro edure would a ept as input a formula that had been
prepro essed by rst using Skolem fun tions to eliminate existential quantiers and
then expanding the formula into onjun tive normal form. Many theorem-provers
(in luding some that have been very su essful) have used this approa h. Satisability testing was to be arried out using rules 1,2,3 above, and it was noted that
an example that stumped Gilmore's program ould easily be done by hand omputation. When George Logemann and Donald Loveland attempted to implement

The Early History of Automated Dedu tion

the program they found that the rule for eliminating atomi formulas (later alled
ground resolution) whi h repla ed a formula
(p _ A) ^ (:p _ B ) ^ C
by

(A _ B ) ^ C

used too mu h RAM. So it was proposed to use instead the splitting rule whi h
generates the pair of formulas
A

The idea was that a sta k for formulas to be tested ould be kept in external
storage (in fa t a tape drive) so that formulas in RAM never be ame too large.2
Although testing for satisability was performed very e iently, it soon be ame
lear that no very interesting results ould be obtained without rst devising a
method for avoiding the generation of spurious elements of the Herbrand universe
[Davis, Logemann and Loveland 1962.
During the same years, Hao Wang was attempting to apply some of the more
sophisti ated work that had been done in proof theory and on solvable ases of
Hilbert's Ents heidungsproblem to automati dedu tion programs. He announ ed
a omputer program that proved all of the theorems (about 400) of Whitehead
and Russell's Prin ipia Mathemati a of rst-order logi with equality [Wang and
Zhi 1998, Wang and Zhi 1998. However, this apparently momentous a hievement
in automating dedu tion was (as Wang himself pointed out) possible only be ause all of these theorems an be brought into prenex form with the simple prex
8 : : : 89 : : : 9. Wang on luded that:
The most interesting lesson from these results is perhaps that even in a fairly
ri h domain, the theorems a tually proved are mostly ones whi h all on a very
small portion of the available resour es of the domain. ([Wang 1963 p. 32)

Prawitz's [1960 in uential paper taught the growing automated dedu tion ommunity that unne essary terms in the Herbrand expansion ould be avoided by using
algorithms that did not generate elements of the Herbrand universe until needed.
Most later progress was based on this key insight. Prawitz's pro edure worked by
obtaining expansions into disjun tive normal form before repla ing variables by
2 Unfortunately

both pro edures using rules 1,2, and 3 and pro edures using rules 1,2, and 4
have been alled the \Davis-Putnam pro edure" in the literature; the rst is generally onsidered
for worst ase analysis while it is the se ond that is ordinarily implemented.
Wolfgang Bibel has kindly pointed out to me that the \rule for eliminating atomi formulas"
otherwise known as \ground resolution" was rst proposed in A. Blake's dissertation in 1937 and
(in its dual form) was also mentioned by W.V. Quine in 1955 under the name \ onsensus rule".
For further information, see [Bibel 1993. Otherwise, as far as I know, the other rules mentioned
o urred for the rst time in [Davis and Putnam 1958.
It should also be mentioned that rules 2 and 4 were found independently by Dunham, Fridsal
and Sward [1959. They emphasized that a program based on these rules performs very ee tively
without using \heuristi " devi es.

10

Martin Davis

elements of the Herbrand universe. The algorithm thus generated disjun tive normal forms of in reasing length seeking one with the property that some substitution
from the Herbrand universe would yield a truth-fun tionally unsatisable formula.3
Sin e this ondition amounts to ea h disjun tive lause in luding a pair of literals
of the form `; :`, it an be formulated as the need to satisfy a system of equations
in the parameters of the expansion.4
Prawitz's pro edure was a great improvement over what had been done previously
be ause no spurious elements of the Herbrand universe were generated. Unfortunately, the huge expansions into disjun tive normal form that would be generated
by all but the simplest problems made it lear that, at least as presented, this
was still an unsatisfa tory pro edure. However, it ontained the seminal idea of
sear hing for substitutions that would transform pairs of literals into negations of
one another. Moreover if existential quantiers are eliminated in favor of Skolem
fun tions at the outset, instead of systems of equations, one has the simple problem
of unifying pairs of terms.
In his survey paper, Davis [1963 proposed
. . . a new kind of pro edure whi h seeks to ombine the virtues of the Prawitz
pro edure and those of the Davis-Putnam pro edure.

The idea, also noted by Dunham and North [1962, was that by the \pure literal
rule" from the Davis-Putnam pro edure (Rule 2, above), substitutions an help to
render a onjun tive set of disjun tive lauses unsatisable only if they su eed in
transforming a literal from one of these lauses into the negation of a literal in
another lause. A theorem-proving program based on these ideas was written by
D. M Ilroy at Bell Laboratories and was improved and orre ted by Peter Hinman.
The program in luded an implementation of the ordinary uni ation algorithm
[Chinlund, Davis, Hinman and M Ilroy 1964.
Merely the existen e of this volume makes it abundantly lear that automated
reasoning is a thriving eld with a huge literature. The bimonthly publi ation The
Journal of Automated Reasoning is devoted entirely to this eld. If one event an be
pinpointed as marking its emergen e as a mature subje t, it would be the publi ation [Robinson 1965b in whi h J.A. Robinson announ ed the resolution prin iple.
[Robinson 1965b was Robinson's se ond paper in the area, and it is helpful in tra ing his thought to begin with the rst [Robinson 1963. He began with the basi
framework of Davis-Putnam: existential quantiers eliminated in favor of Skolem
fun tions and onjun tive normal form. He noted Prawitz's te hnique for avoiding
spurious elements of the Herbrand universe and Davis's survey paper. Evidently
Davis's sket h of his proposed pro edure was insu iently lear, and Robinson
wrote:5
3 This

a ount is not quite a urate be ause in Prawitz's paper matters are expressed in terms
of nding a proof rather than a refutation. So what he a tually did is pre isely the dual of what
is stated above.
4 As pointed out to the author by G
erard Huet, this same use of equations o urs already in
Herbrand's [1930, p. 145 thesis.
5 In the interest of larity, the referen e numbers in this quote were repla ed by the numbers in
the present bibliography orresponding to the same papers.

The Early History of Automated Dedu tion

11

Davis [1963 has therefore proposed a way of exploiting Prawitz' powerful idea
while avoiding Prawitz' disasterous use of normal forms{in mu h the same way
that the te hniques of Davis and Putnam [1960 avoid the use of normal forms
whi h aused Gilmore's [1960 program to be unable even to solve [an easy problem. From the few remarks at the end of [Davis 1963 it does not yet seem
lear just how Davis will pro eed, and one waits with great interest his further
resear hes along these lines.

The rest of the paper has a number of interesting omputer proofs generated by
using the Davis-Putnam \one literal lause" rule, and, when that fails, requiring
the user to pre-spe ify the elements of the Herbrand universe needed to obtain a
proof. Finding these elements was onje tured to be \the really ` reative' part of
the art of proof- onstru tion."
Robinson's method of resolution introdu ed in his highly in uential [1965b revolutionized the subje t. Robinson found a single rule of inferen e, easily performable
by omputer, that was omplete for rst- order logi . Using resolution required no
separate pro edure for dealing with propositional al ulus. Starting with the usual
pre-pro essed onjun tive set of disjun tive lauses, Robinson's te hnique was to
seek all possible \uni ations" that would make it possible to express the set of
lauses as
(` _ A) ^ (:` _ B ) ^ C
where ` is a literal that doesn't o ur in C . This yields the \resolvent"
(A _ B ) ^ C
whi h after (A _ B ) is \multiplied out" yields a new set of lauses that is unsatisable just in ase the original set was. This was similar to Davis's proposal
[Davis 1963, Chinlund et al. 1964, in seeking uni ations that generate omplementary literals. It diers not only in not requiring separate truth fun tional testing,
but also in not requiring, as part of the input, spe i ation of the number of instan es of ea h lause to parti ipate in the nal proof. [Robinson 1965b is striking
for its ombinatorial simpli ity, as well as for the sheer mathemati al elegan e of the
presentation. Unfortunately, as soon be ame apparent, the bare resolution method
ould easily produ e many thousands of lauses without rea hing a proof. Finding
a proof using resolution be omes the problem of providing riteria for the order in
whi h resolutions are to be sought. Early attempts to ut down the sear h spa e
were Robinson's own elegant hyperresolution [Robinson 1965a, and the strategies
of unit preferen e [Wos, Carson and Robinson 1964 and set of support [Wos, Robinson and Carson 1965.
The three de ades sin e the rst implementations of resolution have seen an
outpouring of resear h devoted to automated reasoning systems. While some of
the most su essful are based on resolution, others have pro eeded in dierent
dire tions. For further information, the reader is referred to the other arti les in
this volume.

12

Martin Davis

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Holldobler.
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Bell Laboratories.
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edition, published in 1960. Reprinted as [Davis 1983a.
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Math.', Vol. XV, pp. 15{30. Reprinted as [Davis 1983b.
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Bibel W.

The Early History of Automated Dedu tion

13

[1930, Re her hes sur la theorie de la demonstration, PhD thesis, University of

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Prawitz D. [1960, `An improved proof pro edure', Theoria 26(2), 102{139.
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`Automation of Reasoning. Classi al Papers on Computational Logi ', Vol. 1, Springer Verlag,
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Prawitz and Voghera 1983.
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Originally published as [Prawitz et al. 1960.
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Talks Presented at the Summer Institute for Symboli Logi ', Institute for Defense Analysis.
2nd edition, published in 1960. Reprinted as [Robinson 1983a.
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and G. Wrightson, eds, `Automation of Reasoning. Classi al Papers on Computational Logi ',
Vol. 1, Springer, pp. 74{76. Originally published as [Robinson 1957.
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Computer Mathemati s 1, 227{234. Reprinted as [Robinson 1983b.
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ACM 12(1), 23{41. Reprinted as [Robinson 1983 .
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Springer, pp. 416{423. Originally published as [Robinson 1965a.
Robinson J. [1983 , A ma hine oriented logi based on the resolution prin iple, in J. Siekmann
and G. Wrightson, eds, `Automation of Reasoning. Classi al Papers on Computational Logi ',
Vol. 1965, Springer, pp. 397{415. Originally published as [Robinson 1965b.
Herbrand J.

14

Martin Davis

[1983d, Theorem-proving on the omputer, in J. Siekmann and G. Wrightson,

eds, `Automation of Reasoning. Classi al Papers on Computational Logi ', Vol. 1, Springer,
pp. 372{383. Originally published as [Robinson 1963.
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3(1960), 220{234. Reprinted as [Wang 1983a.
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eds, `Automation of Reasoning. Classi al Papers on Computational Logi ', Vol. 1960, Springer
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Robinson J.

The Early History of Automated Dedu tion

15

Index

armative-negative rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Bibel, Wolfgang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Blake, A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

haining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 7
Chur h, Alonzo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
onjun tive normal form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Davis, Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 8, 10{12

Davis-Putnam pro edure . . . . . . . . . . . . 8{10
disjun tive normal form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
Dunham and North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Dunham, Fridsal, and Sward . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Ents heidungsproblem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

rst-order logi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

one literal rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 11

Post, E.L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Prawitz, Dag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8{10
Prawitz, H
akan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Presburger, M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Prin ipia Mathemati a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 9
propositional al ulus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
pure literal rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10
Putnam, Hilary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Quine, W.V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11
Robinson, Abraham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Robinson, J.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11
rule for eliminating atomi formulas . . 8, 9
rule of ase analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Russell, Bertrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

set of support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Skolem fun tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 10
Skolem, T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
splitting rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
subproblems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7

Tarski, Alfred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Turing, Alan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Gerard Huet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Gelernter, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Geometry Ma hine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Gilmore, P.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
ground resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Herbrand universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8{11
Herbrand's theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8
Herbrand, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Hinman, Peter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
hyperresolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Logemann, George . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Logi Theory Ma hine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Loveland, Donald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

M Ilroy, D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Newell, Shaw and Simon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

uni ation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11

unit preferen e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
unit rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Voghera, Neri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Wang, Hao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 9
Whitehead, A. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6