A Conceptualization of Social Action

Author(s): S. K. Khinduka and Bernard J. Coughlin

Source: Social Service Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 1-14
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30015183
Accessed: 24-12-2015 15:50 UTC
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of
Conceptualization

Social

Action

S. K. Khinduka
Washington University

Bernard J. Coughlin
Gonzaga University

Despite numerous writings, the concept of social action still remains vague and
elusive. An attempt is made here to define social action as a strategy of limited social
change at the intermediate or macro levels of society that is generally used in
nonconsensus situations and employs both norm-adhering and norm-testing modes
of intervention. The scope of change, the use of power, and the strategies of change
are the three crucial characteristics of social action explicated in this paper.

A review of the history of social work shows that commitment to

social action in one form or another has always characterized
the profession. While it waned under the spell of psychoanalysis and the constraints of a repressive political climate, it never
completely vanished.1 The past decade saw both a reassertion of
this commitment and experimentation with hitherto less frequently
employed, more vigorous styles and strategies. Predictably, voices of
caution are now seeking to restore the earlier low-profile mode of
social action to social work.2
It is safe to say that, whatever its direction, form, or popularity in a
given period of political history, social action is here to stay, and
therefore one task that social work and allied disciplines face is to
define and delineate it, develop its knowledge base and skill components, and relate it to the other knowledge, value, and skill components of the profession. This article attempts to contribute to this end
by proposing a definition and analyzing three related major concepts
with a view to obtaining greater insight into the nature of social action. The definition and analysis are first placed in historical perspective by a synopsis of the literature on social action.
1
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Social Service Review

The Social Action Literature

The writings on social action, with some notable exceptions, are replete with articles that are ideological in tone and rhetorical in style.3
They usually propose a social goal and then invite, stimulate, encourage, or sermonize the reader to pursue it through a series of related
actions. Rossi, for example, after analyzing some studies on the location of power in communities, exhorted social workers to fill "empty
cells in the power structure of many American communities" and in
particular to get closer to those politicians who support the ideology
of social welfare.4 After chiding social workers for being "inconspicuous for much too long around the committee rooms, state legislatures,
and halls of Congress," Ribicoff summoned them to participate in the
political process by creating a climate of public opinion favorable to
welfare programs.5 He advised against taking an all-or-nothing attitude and emphasized writing to one's representatives and appearing
before' legislative committees. Similarly, Cohen explained to a social
work audience the intricacies of the political process and stressed the
need to participate in it skillfully in order to obtain public support for
social welfare measures.6
While the literature of this genre is largely prescriptive in nature, it
has the merit of bringing before a professional audience the experience and insight of those who have spent years in the study or practice
of politics. Although such contributions are usually bereft of major
theoretical analysis, they keep the profession in touch with the makers
of social policy.
In another vein, there are articles that attempt to define and identify stages in the social action process. Hill's paper in 1951, typical of
many papers through the 1940s and 1950s, marked off five elements
in the process: researching the problem; planning a solution; enlisting public support; presenting the proposal to those with authority
for adoption; and enforcement or execution of the new policy.7
Solender's article a few years later is cast in the same mold. He defines
social action as "a process of individual, group, or intergroup endeavor, within the context of social work philosophy, knowledge, and
skill."8 He then lays out a process consisting of three methods: research, on the basis of which certain recommendations are made;
organized advocacy of a public policy and gaining support for the
policy; and direct efforts to influence policymakers through such action as letter writing, testifying, conferencing, and soliciting the support of public officials.9
A third type of writing seeks to explore the nature of social action in

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A Conceptualization of Social Action

somewhat more analytical terms. Fitch, for example, in one of the first
articles on social action to appear in the Social WorkYearBook, wrote:
"Social action is not only concerted as opposed to individual action but
it involves legal methods as opposed to illegal, and objectives that are
social in character or effect as opposed to those that are anti-social."10
Wickenden relates social action to policy and social change. It is "that
aspect of organized social welfare activity directed toward shaping,
modifying, or maintaining the social institutions and policies that collectively constitute the social environment."" The social actionist
works in the social policy arena, but his potential for affecting policy is
greatly conditioned by broader processes of change. "Those who seek
to influence social change must, therefore, relate their strategy to this
historical process. They cannot assume an easy formula approach to
effective social action but must adapt their activity to the particular
evolutionary phase in which their problem lies."12 Wickenden thus
places social action squarely in the field of social policy, and at least
flags its relationship with social change. Thursz, likewise, links social
action and social policy. "It is usually aimed at the individual or oror its
for policy legislation
ganization with responsibility
administration."13
Dunham, in his recent work, divorces social action from any specific
value commitment and goal orientation. Social action is the "public
promotionof a cause, measure, or objectivein an effort to obtain support or
official action."14There is considerable difference between Dunham's
formulation of 1958 and that of 1970. The earlier statement viewed
social action as reform aimed at improving social conditions, operating within the framework of societal laws and norms, and using such
conventional tactics as persuasion, public education, propaganda, and
pressure groups to achieve "socially desirable" objectives.'5 The more
recent statement allows for any goals of change, and any methods,
whether or not socially acceptable, including conflict. Thus, he distinguishes two forms of social action: (1) procedural or political social
action, which is "carried on through established parliamentary or
formal organizational procedures," and (2) direct action, which usually implies greater physical and emotional involvement of the parby a militant spirit and deep
ticipant, often accompanied
commitment.'16
Rothman sees social action within the context of power and the
struggle over community resources. He proposes three ideal-typical
models or orientations within a broad definition of community organization: community development, social planning, and social
action."7 These models rest on different assumptions about the nature of social reality as well as the task of the change agent. They have
different goals, different concepts about community structure, use

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Social Service Review

different change strategies, and prescribe different practitioner roles.

They take different orientations toward the power structure, the public interest, and the client population. The social action model "presupposes a disadvantaged segment of the population that needs to be
organized, perhaps in alliance with others, in order to make adequate
demands on the larger community for increased resources." Its goals
are "basic changes in major institutions or community practices," for
it seeks a "redistribution of power, resources, or decision-making in
the community
and/or changing basic policies of formal
organizations."18
Paull develops the same concept: social action refers to "those organized and planned activities that attempt to influence the social
distribution of status, power, and resources."19 Power and the redistribution of resources are the central concerns; specific goals,
methods, auspices, and outcomes are incidental. He, more than
others, links the study and analysis of social action to the theory of
social conflict, particularly as it is developed by Coser.20 For Paull, the
key concepts are power and conflict, and social action is associated
with movements that seek to influence the allocation of societal resources.
The recent contributions of Perlman and Gurin21 and Ecklein and
Lauffer22 follow essentially the Rothman conceptualization. Although
they employ the concept of organization as the framework for studying all forms of community work and social planning, they too see a
change in power relationships and resources or redressing a power
imbalance as the central focus of social action.
A review of these and other formulations23 leads to two conclusions. First, while many of the earlier writings on social action hardly
advanced beyond the hortatory and descriptive, recent contributions
are more analytical and attempt to link social action to social science
concepts. Second, there is no agreement on what would seem to be
some of the basic characteristics of social action. While Fitch considers
it "legally permissible action ... for the purpose of furthering objectives that are both legal and socially desirable,"24 Dunham maintains
that its objectives and methods may be either legal or illegal.
Rothman's definition requires culturally approved goals and values,
such as social justice and democracy, but Paull and Dunham do not
consider them intrinsic to social action. While Wickenden relates social action to the historical process of evolutionary change, to which
the social actionist must adapt his activities, Paull sees it as an instrument for determining the course of history. There are other recurring differences as to its goals, limits, and methods and the compatibility of some social action tactics with the code of ethics of professional social workers.

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A Conceptualization of Social Action

Meaning of Social Action

Scanning critically the litany of definitions that history hands down on
any human behavior makes one pause to add yet another. Our hope,
nevertheless, is that the following conceptualization will contribute to
clarifying and refining the nature of social action. We mean by social
action "a strategy to obtain limited social change at the intermediate
or macro levels of society which is generally used in nonconsensus
situations and employs both 'norm-adhering' and 'norm-testing'
modes of intervention."25 Three concepts are fundamental to this
definition: the scope of change, the use of power in effecting and
resisting change, and the change strategies employed.
The scopeof social change.--Since social action is essentially a method
of effecting or preventing social change, the single most important
concept in its study is social change, which may be defined as a process
of "significant alterations in the structure and functioning of determinate social systems."26 As change occurs at various societal levels, it
is necessary to identify the specific level where the strategy of social
action is uniquely usable.
Many otherwise useful conceptualizations of social action fail to do
this. Kotler, for example, defines social action as "the undertaking of
collective action to mitigate or resolve a social problem." Elaborating
the definition, he says that it includes five elements, the first of which
is cause, "a social objective or undertaking that change agents believe
will provide some answers to a social problem."" Causes are of three
types, ranging from helping the individual victims of social problems,
to disciplining institutions that cause or perpetuate them, to revolutionary causes that aim to eliminate those institutions. The other
elements in Kotler's typology-change agency, change target, channels, and strategy-vary depending on the cause that the social actionist pursues. While Kotler's is a clear framework for analyzing
social action, the scope of change encompassed by his definition is so
broad that any group effort to alleviate a social problem fits the
definition. It does not distinguish social action from community development, social planning, or social policy, or even from such disparate endeavors as group work and revolution.
We think that no single type of planned change can address itself to
any and all causes and targets of change. Radcliffe-Brown's distinction between two major types of social change is instructive.28 There
are the minor, day-to-day adaptations and adjustments in behavior
that are more or less necessary for the persistence and survival of any
group or organization; and there are those large-scale changes, generally preceded or accompanied by crises, that result in the alteration

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Social Service Review

or transformation of basic societal structures.29 For our purposes,

however, Radcliffe-Brown's distinction needs further refinement.
There is an interstitial area of change that goes beyond the daily
modifications of individual, interpersonal, small-group, and organizational behavior but stops short of fundamental and radical transformations in the social structure. There is both empirical and conceptual advantage, it seems, in reserving the term "social action" for that
collective effort whose end is neither behavioral change of individuals
and small groups nor radical and total change in the basic structure
and institutions of the society. The social action episodes that proliferated in the 1960s are examples of efforts that aim at some
significant but limited change in social institutions. While the goals are
neither interpersonal nor group change and the means are not
therapeutic, neither are the goals the creation of entirely new social
structures nor are the means revolutionary. The merit in defining
social action in this way would seem to be that it assists theorists and
practitioners in more sharply focusing their formulations and interventive skills. Unless the scope of social action is delimited, conceptual
clarity will continue to be elusive and disciplined training in practice
skills will probably remain an unachievable educational goal.
Figure 1 presents the scope of change envisioned by social action.
This conceptualization distinguishes social action as a method of
change from casework, group work, and other internal administrative
and organizational efforts to modify behaviors, relationships, and
practices of individuals, families, groups, and agencies; it also distinguishes it from revolutions that aim to transform the entire social,
economic, and political structure. The purpose of distinguishing social action from revolution is not to shunt off revolution from the
attention of the student of social action or to pronounce it as necessarily less desirable a goal or less efficient a strategy than social action.
The purpose is simply to point out the essential difference between
the two. Identifying this difference helps one to understand the
meaning, purpose, limits, and possibilities of social action.
Smelser's distinction between value-oriented and norm-oriented
movements is apropos. The former challenge a society's fundamental
philosophy, assumptions, and goals; the latter seek only to improve
the fit between administrative arrangements and accepted goals.30
With this distinction, social action is norm-oriented rather than valueModifications
in individual
interpersonal
behavior

Changes in organizational arrangements, social

policy, and distribution
of resources

Basic transformation in the

social
structure

Arena of Social Action

FIG. 1.-The

social change continuum

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A Conceptualization of Social Action

oriented action. Whatever its locale-an organization, city, state, or

nation-it seeks to modify or reform existing priorities, policies, and
practices of the target system, not to overthrow the system's existing
structures and institutions. It is not a strategy for overhauling an
entire social structure.
This discussion raises the question of the social actionist's social
philosophy. Is he "left" or "right," "radical," "conservative," or "liberal"? These are squashy words. Whatever he is, he is clearly not the
"radical" actionist of Boguslaw, who recently classified social action
into two categories. Liberal social action takes place "within a frame of
reference that accepts the basic institutions of a society in approximately their existing form." The radical actionist "does not accept the
basic institutions of a society in their existing form" and aims to
change them.31 The former is social-change behavior within existing
institutions; the latter strives to change the nature and rules of the
economic and political game. Most social actionists would fall within
Boguslaw's "liberal" category.
But these terms do not have a fixed and uniform connotation. If
the social actionist is viewed against Lenski's conservative-radical
typology, we would perhaps come to a different conclusion. Although
accord among them is hard to come by, conservatives usually regard
the existing system of distribution of rewards and privileges as essentially just, while radicals believe it unjust. Lenski presents the main
assumptions underlying each world view.32 The conservatives harbor
a distrust of man's basic nature. They stress the need for institutions
of social control. Society is viewed as a system with its own needs
which receive priority over needs of constituent members. Inequality
is seen as inevitable since it derives from innate differences among
men as well as from social consensus. Coercion plays
minor role
in inequality. Moreover, inequality is only a minoronly.a
cause of social
conflict. Rights, according to the conservatives, are acquired by diligence and delegation by others. Law and the state are seen as organs of
the total society to promote the common good. The concept of class is
used mainly as a heuristic device to call attention to aggregations of
people with certain common characteristics.
The radicals, on the other hand, take a diametrically different position on practically every issue. While taking an optimistic view of
human nature, they deeply distrust institutions of social control. For
them society is primarily a setting within which struggles occur and
which affects the outcome of the struggles. Inequality is not seen as
inevitable; it results from coercion, and is a major cause of social
conflict. Rights are acquired through force, fraud, and inheritance
because law and the state serve as instruments of oppression employed by the ruling classes for their own benefit. Finally, the radicals
believe that classes are social groups with distinctive interests that

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Social Service Review

inevitablybring them into conflict with other groups having opposed

interests.
These two individual types (i.e., conservative and radical world
views) suggest three generalizations. First, most social actionists do
not share the assumptionsof conservatives.Second, to the extent that
radicalismstands for fundamental change, most social actioniststend
to sympathize with a philosophy of radicalism. Third, most social
actionists, however, do not fully accept radicalism. Although
dissatisfied with the existing distribution of resources, they do not
seek equity through a revolutionary change in the social structure,
nor do they regard all laws as oppressive instruments of the ruling
classes. In certain situations all they seek is vigorous enforcement of
existing legislation; in others, they campaign for the enactment of
new laws.
The use of
second major consideration in social action is
power.--A
the role of power.
One cannot intelligently engage in social action
without understandingthe location and distributionof power, including its legitimate form, authority, in the relevant intermediate or
macro social system. Whether one seeks to effect or obstruct a proposed change, a key requirement is power-the generalized abilityto
affect behaviors of individuals,decisions of organizations,policies of
major institutions,and the distributionof resources in a community.
But power is differentially distributed within any organization or
community. Some individuals have more, others less. The
questions-which group has more and when, and which group has
less and why?-have resulted in a recurring debate among social scientists in which the ideology, methodology, and disciplinary
affiliationof the investigatorseem to play a major role in influencing
final answers.
In general, there are two schools of thought about where power is
located in American society. One sees major decisions resting ultimately in the hands of a small group that controls the distributionof
resources; this is the elitist position. Another maintainsthat power is
widely distributed, that there is not one but many elites, and that a
group's influence on a given decision depends on the nature of the
issue at hand; this is the view of the pluralists.Recently,evidence and
persuasive arguments have been advanced to suggest that the distributionof power in Americancommunities lies somewhere between
these two extremes.33
These schools of thought offer the social actionist not answers but
suggestive insights. As he uses them, he needs to recognize a number
of factors. First, the matter of the distribution of power is an empirical, not an ideological, question. One may well believe and hope that
there are many competing power centers; or one may believe and be
shocked at the idea of a massive centralization of power in the United

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A Conceptualization of Social Action

States and in local communities. In either case, the social actionist

must be prepared to test the belief and the notion objectively through
a rigorous analysis of evidence.
Second, it must be recognized that in a rapidly changing society
power configurations are constantly changing. Nothing can be more
misleading, therefore, than using yesterday's data as a basis for
today's conclusions. An emphasis on empirical evidence also includes
an insistence on current and recent evidence.
Third, it is unwise and risky to assume that the way power is distributed in one community is necessarily representative of the pattern of
power distribution in others. This may or may not be so. Although
there is a broad similarity among various communities, there are also
significant local variations which should be fully appreciated and considered.
Fourth, there is no single source of power. On the contrary, power
is achieved, consolidated, and augmented on the basis of a variety of
resources: money, votes, access to and control over information,
knowledge, expertise, leadership, position, numbers, organization,
status, loyalty of followers, prestige, political acumen, the communications media, strength of convictions and commitment, personal
charm and charisma, interpersonal, organizational, and interorganizational skills, support of other influentials, and so on. Although all
these sources of power are important, in a given social action situation
some will undoubtedly be more critical than others.
Fifth, the social actionist generally finds himself attempting to move
some of these sources of power from the "haves" to the "have-nots."
The power base of the "haves" is usually broad, recognized, established, and socially accepted. But the very idea of the have-nots having power shocks large segments of the society. In this uneven game
the challenge to the social actionist is not only to build a base of power
but, perhaps more importantly, to gain its social acceptance.
This introduces the crucial question of legitimacy. Action to redistribute societal resources and privileges needs legitimation. This is
done through reinterpretation of traditional values, norms, and customs, through legal structures based on rational agreements, through
the special personal appeal of leaders, or through a combination of
these approaches. Since significant social change is a proposal to redistribute society's resources and reorganize its stratification pattern,
the change will be opposed by those segments of the population that
profit most from existing social and economic arrangements and that
perceive the alteration as a reduction of their power. If, as Etzioni
puts it, the power to be at the top includes the power to keep others
away from the top,34 then measures that are seen as redistributive are
not likely to gain a broad consensus of support from those segments
of society that stand to gain more from the status quo than from its

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10

Social Service Review

alteration-be they social classes, professional or nonprofessional

groups, agencies, org4nizations, or institutions. Against this opposition, the social actionist faces the twin task of searching out possible
resources of power as leverage for the underprivileged and of building the case on which their legitimacy will be achieved.
Strategies of change.-How this is done, of course, is a matter of
strategy, and this is a third fundamental concept in social action.
Unlike community development and social planning, social action is
generally undertaken in the absence of either a popular or legislative
mandate. More often than not, there is little likelihood of gaining
consensus around the goals of change, which almost invariably involves some redistribution of societal resources. As a result, the social
actionist is pushed to abandon consensus and to pursue nonconsensus
styles of intervention.
Warren classifies purposive change strategies into three types: collaborative, campaign, and contest.35 Collaborative strategies are based
on the consensus approach to change; they assume the existence of a
rather unified community, homogeneous interests, agreement on social goals and means, and the probability of cooperation among the
major segments of the community. Anticipated opposition to change
is assumed not to be based on vested interests, but on misinformation,
ignorance, and general community apathy. Given these circumstances, the action plan is to weld a consensus through strategies of
rationality and education, persuasion and collaboration, the change
agent being principally an enabler or catalyst. In a perfect community, and around relatively minor issues even in an imperfect one, the
consensus approach seems to be more rational and more likely to
succeed. But where there is not a unified community, there is disagreement on values and issues, goals and priorities. And when
change is likely to affect diverse groups differentially and significantly
alter the prevailing power equation, consensus may be possible only
by sacrificing the original change goals. That is why the social actionist
follows the consensus model only when the assumptions on which it
relies obtain, and is willing to deviate from it entirely or in part when
those assumptions do not obtain and other change strategies are more
likely to succeed.
Campaign strategies assume a lack of agreement based primarily on
apathy and misinformation about significant issues. The change agent
seeks to gain the consent of the opposition through persuasion, using
such techniques as educational and publicity campaigns, letter writing, endorsement of prestige figures, propaganda, and public relations.
A readiness to use contest strategies is what primarily distinguishes
social action from other social work approaches to social change. Contest strategies assume a lack of agreement based on positive opposi-

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A Conceptualization of Social Action

11

tion to the change agent's proposal; a state of "issue dissensus" exists

in which neither cooperation nor persuasion is likely to succeed. The
contest must be joined. This is usually done by noisy and norm-testing
tactics such as nonviolent resistance, protests, boycotts, strikes, teachins, sit-ins, and demonstrations. In these situations the social actionist
clearly reinterprets, stretches, tests, or even violates existing norms.
This readiness to resort to norm-testing and confrontational tactics,
as evidenced in many recent episodes, has led to three erroneous
generalizations about the nature of social action. First, it is sometimes
assumed that norm-testing and norm-violating strategies are inherent
in all types of social action. This is a fallacy. One of the most common
types of social action is evidenced in the lobbies of legislatures and the
offices of governmental departments, where the effective tools are
knowledge, research, persuasion, negotiation, bargaining, and compromise. In many circumstances, to be successful, social action needs
no deviation from prevailing social or cultural norms.
Second, it is sometimes supposed that, since the social actionist
frequently employs contest strategies, he is committed exclusively to
them. As numerous examples show, this is not so. The selection of
strategies is a function of the social action goal and an analysis of the
objective situation. As we have suggested above, some situations rule
out contest strategies as ineffective. To distort what is only one
strategy into the totality of social action leads only to confusion and is
counterproductive on two scores: it fosters a fetishism for contest
strategies which in certain circumstances are doomed to fail, and it
converts actual and potential allies into unsympathetic and even hostile critics.
This tendency to equate social action exclusively with contest
strategies results perhaps from a third equally erroneous assumption,
namely, that social action is essentially a derivative of the conflict
theory of society. Whether one accepts Coser's conception of
conflict-"a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power
and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize,
injure or eliminate their rivals"36-or Mack's-"opposition or antagonistic struggle, the aim of which is the annihilation, defeat or
subjugation of the other person or group"37-neither definition fits
social action. To be sure, in social action there is frequently conflict of
sorts, but rarely is its aim or intensity such as to "injure," "eliminate,"
"annihilate," or "subjugate" the opponent.
Just as the social actionist employs both norm-adhering and normviolating strategies, his social philosophy and theoretical starting
point are neither the "consensus" or "integration" model of society
nor the "conflict" or "coercion" model. Dahrendorf's analysis of these
models explicates the following sets of assumptions on which each
model rests.38 According to the consensus-integration model, every

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Social Service Review

society is a relatively persistent, stable, well-integrated structure of

elements; and every element has a function, that is, it renders a contribution to its maintenance as a system. Essentially, every functioning
social structure, then, is based on a consensus of values among its
members. According to the conflict-coercion model, however, social
change is ubiquitous, and each society, at every point, is subject to the
processes of social change. Social conflict, too, is ubiquitous, since
every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict. Moreover,
elements in the society contribute not to the maintenance but to the
change of the system. Finally, society, according to the conflict model,
is based on the coercion of some of its members by others.
The social actionist's world, perhaps like the world in general, is
"Janus-headed"; it is composed of both elements. Dahrendorf insists
on the complementary nature of these elements. Both models are
useful; neither is exclusively valid. In his words: "We cannot conceive
of society unless we realize the dialectics of stability and change, integration and conflict, function and motive force, consensus and
coercion.'"" Conflict per se does not necessarily lead to desired social
change. Coser has argued both that some conflicts can strengthen an
existing system, thus making it more viable, and that internecine
conflict among believers in the same cause may destroy their ability to
act rather than add to their capability to effect change in the social
system at hand.40 As Cohen says: "The two models are not genuine
alternatives: to say that a room is half-full is not to deny that it is
half-empty."41

Conclusion
We have attempted in this essay to contribute to the understanding of
social action as a professional behavior by sharpening its definition
and analyzing three major subconcepts of the definition. The
phenomenon has been with us a long time-scores of articles and
speeches have been devoted to it-but attempts to conceptually locate
it in social work practice and to tie it to its social science matrices have
been few. In summary, we have held that social action is a strategy of
social change, the locus of the intervention being some unit at the
macro or intermediate level: it is a strategy neither of behavior change
at the individual or group level nor of revolution. Planned social
action always involves an intelligent diagnosis and use of power in
organization and community change. And although the social actionist often finds himself testing existing social norms, he is not irrevocably committed to a conflict model of society. All societies en-

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A Conceptualization of Social Action

13

consensus-conflict; and
compass both worlds-integration-coercion,
social action uses both strategies-norm adhering and norm testing.

Notes
1. Herman Borenzweig, "Social Work and Psychoanalytic Theory: A Historical
Analysis," Social Work 16 (January 1971): 7-16; and Clarke A. Chambers, "Social Service and Social Reform: A Historical Essay," Social Service Review 37 (March 1963):
76-90.
2. Harry Specht, "The Deprofessionalization of Social Work," Social Work 17 (March
1972): 3-15; Harold Weissman, "The Middle Road to Distributive Justice," Social Work
17 (March 1972): 86-93; and Harold H. Weissman, "A Conservative Strategy for Social
Planning in the Seventies," Social WorkPractice, 1970 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1970), pp. 3-20.
3. See John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoricof Agitation and Control
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1971).
4. Peter H. Rossi, "Power and Politics: A Road to Social Reform," Social Service
Review 35 (December 1961): 359-69.
5. Abraham Ribicoff, "Politics and Social Workers," Social Work7 (April 1962): 3-6.
6. Wilbur J. Cohen, "What Every Social Worker Should Know about Political Action," Social Work 11 (July 1966): 3-11.
7. John G. Hill, "Social Action," in Social WorkYearBook, 1951 (New York: National
Association of Social Workers, 1951), pp. 456-58.
8. Sanford Solender, "Social Action," in Social Work Year Book, 1957 (New York:
National Association of Social Workers, 1957), p. 517.
9. Ibid., pp. 521-22.
10. John A. Fitch, "Social Action," in Social WorkYearBook, 1939 (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1939), p. 398.
11. Elizabeth Wickenden, "Social Action," in Encyclopediaof Social Work (New York:
National Association of Social Workers, 1965), p. 697.
12. Ibid., p. 700.
13. Daniel Thursz, "Social Action," in Encyclopediaof Social Work, vol. 2 (New York:
National Association of Social Workers, 1971), p. 1189. See also Daniel Thursz, "The
Arsenal of Social Action Strategies: Options for Social Workers," Social Work 16
(January 1971): 27-34, and "Social Action as a Professional Responsibility," Social Work
11 (July 1966): 12-21.
14. Arthur Dunham, The New Community Organization (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Co., 1970), p. 248.
15. Arthur Dunham, CommunityWelfare Organization: Principles and Practice (New
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), pp. 52-54.
16. Dunham, New CommunityOrganization, pp. 248-49.
17. Jack Rothman, "Three Models of Community Organization Practice," in
Strategies of CommunityOrganization, ed. Fred M. Cox et al. (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock
Publishers, 1970), pp. 20-36.
18. Ibid., p. 22.
19. Joseph E. Paull, "Social Action for a Different Decade," Social Service Review 45
(March 1971): 35.
20. Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956).
21. Robert Perlman and Arnold Gurin, CommunityOrganization and Social Planning
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972).
22. Joan Levin Ecklein and Armand A. Lauffer, CommunityOrganizers and Social
Planners (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972).
23. For other statements on social action, see Ernest B. Harper and Arthur Dunham,
"What Is Social Action: Selected Definitions," in CommunityOrganization in Action, ed.

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14

Social Service Review

Ernest B. Harper and Arthur Dunham (New York: Association Press, 1959), pp.
281-83; Donald S. Howard, "Social Work and Social Reform," in New Directionsin Social
Work, ed. Cora Kasius (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), pp. 159-75; and Benjamin E. Youngdahl, Social Action and Social Work (New York: Association Press, 1966).
24. John A. Fitch, "The Nature of Social Action," in Proceedingsof the National Conference of Social Work, 1940 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 488.
25. Bernard J. Coughlin and S. K. Khinduka, "Social Action: Strategies in Search of
Norms," in The Social Welfare Forum, 1972 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1972), p. 87.
26. Alvin Boskoff, "Social Change: Major Problems in the Emergence of Theoretical
and Research Foci," in Modern SociologicalTheoryin Continuityand Change, ed. Howard
Becker and Alvin Boskoff (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1957), p. 263.
27. Philip Kotler, "The Elements of Social Action," AmericanBehavioral Scientist 14
(May-June 1971): 694-95.
28. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, A Natural Scienceof Society(New York: Free Press, 1957),
p. 87.
29. Robert A. Nisbet, The Social Bond (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970), p.
321.
30. See Neil J. Smelser, Theoryof CollectiveBehavior (New York: Free Press, 1962);
and Guy E. Swanson, Social Change (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1971).
31. Robert Boguslaw, "Social Action and Social Change," in Handbookon the Study of
Social Problems,ed. Erwin O. Smigel (Chicago: Rand-McNally & Co., 1971), pp. 421-34.
32. Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1966), pp. 22-23.
33. William A. Gamson, "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," American
Behavioral Scientist 12 (November-December 1968): 15-21.
34. Amitai Etzioni, "Toward a Theory of Guided Societal Change," Social Casework
49 (June 1968): 335-38.
35. Roland L. Warren, Truth,Love, and Social Change (Chicago: Rand-McNally & Co.,
1971), pp. 16-25.
36. Coser, p. 8.
37. Raymond W. Mack, "The Components of Social Conflict," Social Problems 12
(Spring 1965): 391.
38. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 160-65.
39. Ibid., p. 163.
40. See Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: Free
Press, 1966).
41. Percy S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 170.

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