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By.
Mohammed Khalid
Department of Evening Studies
Panjab University, Chandigarh.
mdkhaliedchd@yahoo.com
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victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and opposed punishing Japan at the post-
World War II Tokyo trials.1 India vehemently opposed Dutch action in Indonesia and did
not allow the refueling of Dutch planes which were being used to quell the freedom
movement there.2 The organization of Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi in 1949,
taking interest in organizing the Bandung Conference in 1955 are only a few of many
efforts India made to redevelop economic and political relations with the region as a
whole.
However, all the efforts made by India to befriend the countries of Southeast Asia
did not bring desired results. The countries of Southeast Asia did not show keenness to
keep India on their foreign policy priority.3 They were more inclined to develop
economic ties with Japan, and Korea. The presence of a large number of Chinese
populations in many of these countries and its dominating presence also kept them
diplomatically engaged with China.4 Philippines and Thailand became part of US
sponsored military alliance called South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
part of Western alliance system. India’s Southeast Asia policy lost further momentum
after the Sino-Indian border conflict of September 1962. Indo-Soviet Peace and
Friendship Treaty of 1971 made these countries --especially Indonesia and Malaysia--
skeptical of India’s commitment to the policy of non-alignment. The nuclear tests
conducted by India in 1974, launching of a new Joint Service Command, based in
Andaman and Nicobar Islands,5 and recognition of Vietnamese installed Kampuchean
regime of Heng Samrin made India unpopular with the countries of Southeast Asia. So,
during the Cold War period, India and Southeast Asia did not have preferential relations.
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changing world order. India started moving toward Southeast Asia to build strong
economic, strategic and political ties, and on the other, Southeast Asian countries, leaving
aside their past inhibitions, began moving closer to India. These moves between them can
be seen in the context of numerous politico-strategic and economic realizations brought
about by the end of the Cold War in international relations.
Change in India’s attitude can be attributed to many reasons. The open door
policy adopted by China during 1980s had given it a quantum jump making it an
emerging economic giant in Asia. In contrast; India still followed Fabian Socialist
policies of Nehru era. China regarded this region as its natural sphere of influence and
had started asserting political, economic and military influence there. Under the force of
circumstances -domestic and international- India had also to liberalize its economy to
compete with China and other international market forces in the region.7 At the time Cold
War came to an end, India was going through the worst balance of payment crises in its
independent history. In the absence of a strong political party governing the country it
was facing frequent change of governments and these governments lacked vision and will
to formulate long term policies. Rising inflation, government subsidies, high interest
rates, and a concomitant decline in overseas remittances during the latter half of the
1980s had contributed to overall decline in India’s economy. There was a substantial rise
in non-productive expenditure. For example, defence expenditure had risen from 15.9
percent in 1980-81 to 19 percent in 1990-91. Subsidies grew from 8.5 percent in 1980-81
to 11.4 percent in 1989-90.8 The percentage of trade in relation to Gross National Product
(GNP) fell from 12.4 percent in 1984-85 to 11 percent in 1988-89. The rise in oil prices
following the Gulf War of 1990-91 also caused a 21.9 percent rise in the import bill.9
These moves compelled India to open up to the world economy.
The economic ascendance of East Asia and China had made India to watch and
emulate its Southeast Asian neighbours. Manmohan Singh, who became Finance Minister
and the architect of the Indian Economic Reforms, had been Secretary General of the
South Commission of the UN in Geneva from 1987 to 1990. He had often repeated that
Korea and India had the same GDP per capita in the 1950s and that South Korean model
of economic growth could be emulated. In September 1995, he declared, “the economic
policies of India take into account the dynamism of this region (Asia-Pacific), which shall
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soon be the tiger-economy of the world. We want to be participant in this process”.10
Gautam S. Kaji, one of the Managing Directors of the World Bank had also expressed in
April 1995 that, “Certainly, the East Asian nations are still grappling with some of the
same problems as India, albeit on a lesser scale. But they have demonstrated that with the
right commitment, it is possible to move very far. With the same kind of commitment, I
am convinced that there can be an “Indian Miracle”.11 India drew inspiration from the
East Asian path of development and become more closely associated with this region in
economic terms. This desire was officially expressed by Narsimha Rao, the Prime
Minister of India in 1994 during his visit to Singapore. He said:
“The Asia Pacific could be the springboard for our leap into the global market
place…I am happy to have had this opportunity to enunciate my belief in this
vision of a new relationship between India and the Asia-Pacific from Singapore,
which I consider the geographic and symbolic centre of the Asia-Pacific. I trust
this vision will be realized… and that the next century will be a century of
partnership for us all”.12
Under the unfolding new economic order India had less economic interests in the
Middle East. Although India possesses business interests in that region and provides
labour, and professionals to the Middle East, the relationship had been more of a
dependence on the oil and remittances. Politics of Islam was exploited by Pakistan
through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and tended to work against India’s
interests. Moreover, geo-political instability and the lately emerging threat of terrorism
also dissuaded India from undertaking worthwhile financial investments there. Southeast
Asia was politically more stable than the Middle East and had a common stand and
concern about the lethal and negative impact of growing terrorist networks, many of
which had emanated from the Middle East. The economies of Southeast Asia --due to
their rapid growth-- were an attractive and better option for India.13 It was thus natural for
India to have an alternative which Southeast Asia provided.
Strategically, also India had to devise a policy --called the Look east policy-- to
engage and create good relations with its immediate eastern neighbours. Growing
proximity between China and Myanmar and concomitant support to the insurgent groups
of India’s northeast;22 Chinese economic and military cooperation and use of some
islands of Myanmar as a strategic observatory;14 possible basis for the activities of the
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Northeast insurgent groups in Thailand and the Philippines; underground arms market of
Cambodia which was becoming an important source of arms for the insurgent groups;
compelled India to take care of its national security which could be threatened from the
East. Chine’s gaining of economic and military foothold in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri
Lanka was another point of concern for India.15 Therefore it was absolutely necessary to
seek the cooperation of governments of these countries in dealing with such threats.
India, being a trading nation could ill afford to tolerate unsafe Sea Lanes of
Communications (SLOCs) around its shores. With the rise in trade and commerce,
dependence on shipping overwhelmingly increased and it became essential to make
maritime trade routes safe.16 India also needed to collectively tackle human smuggling,
pollution, accidents, possible closure of choke points, territorial disputes, arms and
narcotics trade and piracy in the high seas. As a matter of fact, contraband trade of arms
and ammunitions from Cambodia and heroine from Thailand and illegal immigration
from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka in Andaman and Nicobar have been major
concerns for India. There were also apprehensions of the ISI and LTTE infiltration in
sparsely inhabited islands of the Andaman and Nicobar for their illegal activities.17 This
underlined the need for closer naval and military ties with the countries of Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Disappointing pace of regional integration through
SAARC due to usually strained relations between India and Pakistan was another reason
for India to look East. So, these concerns became the factors behind India’s foreign
policy towards Southeast Asia after the Cold War.
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they became convinced of the veracity of Indian economic reforms of 1991 and in 1992
granted India the status of “sectoral dialogue partner” for tourism, commerce,
investments, and science and technology. The same year India formally launched the
Look East policy.20 In the second half of 1992 Foreign Secretary was made direct in
charge of Eastern region. In October 1995 Secretariat for Economic Affairs in the
Ministry of External Affairs declared that ASEAN is at the heart of our reworked
strategy. Due to continuous efforts India was given the status of a “full dialogue partner”
of ASEAN in 1995.
From 1992 onwards, successive Indian Prime Ministers visited these countries
regularly accompanied by large business delegations. In 1992 Narsimha Rao visited
Indonesia and in 1993 to Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and South Korea.
Prime Minister again visited Singapore in 1994 and Malaysia in 1995. These visits
provided many opportunities to interact with policy makers in the countries of Southeast
Asia. India participated for the first time at the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) of
ASEAN in Jakarta in July 1996 and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which deliberates
on the security and political concerns of the Asia Pacific.21 India tried after 1999 for a
summit level relationship with ASEAN. At the 7th ASEAN Summit, held in November,
2001, at Darussalam (Brunei), the organization decided to upgrade its relations with India
to Summit level, which culminated in the first ASEAN-India summit. Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India, explained the scope and substance of India's
emerging relationship
The first phase of the Look East Policy focused on developing commercial
relations and institutional links with and in the second phase India aimed at political
partnership, physical connectivity through road and rail links, free trade arrangements,
and defence cooperation. During this phase India strived to build strategic partnership by
holding joint naval exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and even Thailand,
Myanmar, Philippines and Vietnam through joint naval exercises. Annual naval exercise
‘Milan’ symbolizes regular interaction and cooperation between the navies of India and
Southeast Asian countries.22 India also signed MoUs on defence cooperation, provide
training to MiG-29 fighter pilots, supply spare parts and service these air crafts.
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This new shift in foreign policy was multi dimensional. Under the policy, India
initiated measures to develop ASEAN level cooperation and individual relations with
these countries. Two other measures in this regard include the Mekong-Ganga
Cooperation Project and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation).
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(Cambodia), Bangkok (Thailand), Vientiane (Laos), Chiang Mai (Thailand), Yangon and
Mandalay, Kalemyo (Myanmar), Tamu, Dhaka and Calcutta (India). India has already
taken up the building of road linking Tamu (Manipur) to Kalemyo, a key communication
junction in the center of Myanmar.24 This connectivity will prove fruitful in promoting
border trade between India’s northeast with the adjoining Myanmar and the Mekong
region countries. Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative has therefore become a pillar of
India’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in recent years.
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knowledge, rural community development, small and medium scale enterprise,
construction, environment, information and communications technology,
biotechnology, weather & climate research, natural disaster mitigation &
management. Agreed, “to create a BIMSTEC free trade area, year-long Plan of
Action on tourism, establishment of BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce…”
The BIMSTEC has indirectly met the aspirations of some of the smaller
countries of South Asia which have been clamouring for a large economic and political
space in a world of rapid global integration. This can be seen another Indian effort to link
itself with the heart of ASEAN through Myanmar and Thailand. As China and Pakistan
do not belong to the Bay of Bengal Community, India is in a more comfortable position
to play unchallenged leader of this formation. The BIMSTEC brings together 1.3 billion
people comprising 21 percent of the world population, a combined GDP of 750 billion
US dollars and has the potential of 43 to 59 billion dollar trade annually.
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improved. Air connectivity could also be considered when the need arises. Potential
Sectors in this regard are IT, tourism, mine & minerals, gas, oil, downstream industries,
education and health services, etc. The NEC is in the best position to take a holistic view
at the regional level and catalyzes the implementation of Government policies in liaison
with the concerned Ministries”.27
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percent stake in Myanmar's A1 and A3 blocks in the Shwe field in the Bay of Bengal but
a proposed natural gas pipeline to India has been jeopardized by an agreement between
Rangoon and PetroChina.30
To date, foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia has not played as
significant a role in India’s economic development as it has in China. It is believed that
India’s policy on FDI has been restrictive and tends to concentrate in the service and IT
sectors, which are often less capital intensive than the manufacturing sector. India is still
considered a protected market with higher tariff rates. India is a democratic country and
has to deal with different kind of political systems prevalent in the countries of Southeast
Asia. The differences in the systems of governance sometimes create hic-ups between the
leadership of India and the countries of Southeast Asia. For Example, Continuous
military rule in Myanmar and Thailand some times puts India in a tight spot as, should it
prefer its national interest or support the pro-democracy movement there. The slow down
is also as to the East Asian economies have yet not fully recovered from the economic
crises of late 1990s and the economic recession of 2009. India’s build up of naval base in
Andaman has become a subject of considerable concern and debate among the countries
of Southeast Asia. Indonesia and Malaysia have particularly shown their concern about a
naval base at Grand Nicobar. Malaysia has questioned the rationale behind India’s
expansion, of Joint Service Command. Similarly, when India tested its nuclear weapons
at Pokhran in 1998 there were strong reactions from the countries of the region. Such
constraints have thwarted the integration process between India and these countries.
It is therefore to conclude that different measures India has taken to expand its
relations with the countries of Southeast Asia have been significant and have born fruits
but also suffer form certain constraints as well.
References:
1. India Rediscovering East Asia, 24 October 2007, See at
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=706&language_id=1
2. The Communiqué released by Press Information Bureau on 23 December said that in
view of the military action taken by the Dutch Government against the Republic of
Indonesia, the Government of India has decided to suspend the right of KLM in or across
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India…No fuel will be issued to KLM aircrafts at Indian airports with affect from 1a.m.
(IST), 24 December 1948. Cited in Poplai, S. L: India 1947-50: External Affairs, OUP,
1959, p. 10.
3. Pattanayak, Satya R, “India as an Emerging Power”, India Quarterly, vol. LXIII, no. 1,
Jan-Mar 2007, p. 91.
6. Sikri, Rajiv, “ India’s Foreign Policy Priorities in the Coming Decade”, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper No. 25, September 25, 2007. p. 1; Rusi, Alpo M:
Dangerous Peace: New Rivalry in World Politics, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado,
1997, pp. 11-34; and Vivekanadan, B: In Resrospect: Reflections on Select Issues in
World Politics, Lancer’s Books, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 160-177.
10. Sakhuja, Vijay, “Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication”,
Strategic Analysis, vol. XXV, no. 5, August 2001, pp. 689-702.
11. Address to a gathering of Indian Finances in Bombay, see, Kaji, G. S, “What East
Asia has Achieved, India too can Emulate”, The Times of India, April 13, 1995.
12. Cited in Rao, V. V. Bhanoji, “India and Southeast: New Partnership”, in, Prakash, S
(et. al.): India and ASEAN, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1996, p. 254
13. Kuan. Eric Koo Peng, “India's Look East Policy: Analytical Perspectives from the
Political, Economic and Military Lenses”, October 19, 2005, see at
http://www.whatsindia.com/editorials/wis20051019indiaslooksestpolicy.htm.
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14. The Chinese support to insurgents in the northeast came early in the 1960s and
continued through the 1970s. It was in Yun'an that the Naga fighters were trained in arms
and guerrilla tactics and they were also taught Maoism. With the Chinese support the
Naga insurgency became stronger and more intense with better tactics and modern
weapons. Apart from the Nagas, the Chinese also extended moral and material support to
the Mizo and Meiti insurgents by arranging for their training in guerilla warfare in
training centers of Yunan province and Lhasa. See, Sarin, V. I. K: India's North-East in
Flames, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, p. 105; Datta, Sreeradha, “Security of
India's Northeast: External linkages”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 24, no. 8, November 2000,
pp. 1495 - 1516; Nardi, Dominic J, “Cross-Border Chaos: A Critique of India’s Attempts
to Secure its Northeast Tribal Areas through Cooperation with Myanmar”, SAIS Review,
vol. XCXVIII, no.1, Winter-Spring 2008, pp. 161-171.
15. Kumar, Ashwini, “Sino-Indian Relations: Issues and Irritants”, Punjab Journal of
Politics, vol. XXVII, no. 1, January 2003, p. 103.
16. About 95 per cent of India’s trade is by sea, and sea lanes are of vital importance to
India for unimpeded flow of its merchandise trade. Presently, India’s trade interactions in
the East may be lesser relative to those with the West, but is growing at a very rapid pace.
The trade with China has increased from US$ 1 billion in 1998 to 13.6 billion in 2004
and reached about US$ 20 billion by 2007. Indo-ASEAN trade grew from US$ 7 billion
in 1997 to US$ 13 billion in 2004 and further to be about US$ 30 billion by 2007. See,
Kundu, Swati Lodh. “Asian Surge in India Trade”, Asia Times, 28 May, 2005;
Kuppuswamy, C. S, “ASEAN Economy-Dominated by China? South Asia Analysis
Group, Paper 1184, December 10, 2004.
17. Khurana, G.S, “Shaping Security in India’s Maritime East: Role of Andaman &
Nicobar”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 30, no. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, p. 171.
18. The economic reforms undertaken by India during the 1991-94 included:
Devaluation of the rupee by 30 percent against the US dollar; raising the ceiling of
foreign ownership to 51 per cent and higher in some instances, with partial repatriation of
capital at market rates on a 60:40 basis; removal of restrictive controls on the import of
most items and lowering the tariffs; abolition of internal licensing system in all but 18
industries; preparation for sale in principle of up to 49 per cent of the government’s share
in state enterprises; floating of the rupee on trade account in 1993; reduction of excise
duty; reform of the financial sectors; a substantial reduction in the rate company taxation
in 1994. See, Gordon, Sandy: India’s Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and
Beyond, St. Martin Press, New York, 1995, p. 121; Mukherji, Rahul: India’s Economic
Transition: The Politics of Reforms, OUP, New Delhi, 2007.
19. Grare, Frederic, “India and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, in Grare, Frederic and
Matoo, Amitabh (eds.): India and ASEAN: The Politics of India’s Look East Policy, op.
cit., p. 125.
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20. Grare and Mattoo, op. cit., p. 11; Ram, A. N, “India’s Look East Policy: A
Perspective”, in, Kesavan, K.V (ed.): Building A Global Partnership: Fifty Years of Indo-
Japanese Relations, Lancer Books, New Delhi, 2002, p. 8.
21. Thomas, A. M, op. cit., p. 301
22. MILAN is an institutionalized biennial event to engage the navies of the Southeast
and South Asia in mutual cooperation at sea and in harbour. See Annual report 2006-07,
Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 2006, p. 32; Jayant, V, “Indian
Navy Planning Strategic Command for Far East”, The Hindu, December 26, 2000
23. Jayant, V, “The Mekong Ganga Initiative”, The Hindu, October 28, 2000; also see,
Baruah, Amit, “Looking East”, Frontline, vol.17, Issue 24, Nov. 25-December 8, 2000,
pp. 49-50.
24. India had upgraded the 160 km long Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo highway in 2001 and
indented to maintain it for the next six years. There is an ongoing project for construction
of a trilateral highway from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand to Bagan in
Myanmar, the progress of which is being reviewed regularly by the foreign ministers of
the three nations. See, Kuppuswamy, C. S, “India’s Look-East Policy: More Aggressive,
Better Dividends”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1663, 3 January, 2006.
25. Suryanarayan, V, “India’s Look East Policy”, World Focus, vol. 20, no. 10-11-12,
Oct.-Dec. 1999, pp. 55-57; Rao, P.V, “India and Regional Cooperation: Multiple
Strategies in an Elusive Region”, in Rao, P.V (ed.): Indian and Indian Ocean: In The
Twilight of the Millennium, pp. 122-151.
26. “BIMST-EC Summit Declaration”, World Focus, vol. 25, no. 9, September 2004, p.
23; Bhasin, Avtar Singh (ed.): India’s Foreign Relations–Documents 2004, Geetika
Publishers, New Delhi, 2005, p. 916; Morris, Peter, “Grouping to Check China’s
Influence”, Asia Times Online, 11 February, 2004.
27. Prime Minister Manmohan singh’s Address to the North Eastern Council, New Delhi,
12th April, 2005. See at, http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm.
30. Lundholam, Gideon, “Pipeline Politics: India and Myanmar, Power and Interest”,
News Report, 10 September 2007, see at http://www.pinr.com/reportt?ac=view_report
&report_id=679.
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