Criminallaw Garcia

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CRIMINAL INTENT
l (INTENT TO KILL)
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* De Guzman,
Ro Jr. vs. People G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014
r homicide is the intent of the offender to
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The essential element in frustrated or attempted
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akill
the victim immediately before
with the infliction of injuries.
Borthesimultaneously
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Intent
to
kill
is
a
specific
intent
that
State
must
allege
in the information, and then
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evidence, as differentiated from a general
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criminal intent, which isb
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill,
being a state of mind,o
by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e.,
Rofisthediscerned
the acts and conduct
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter.
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In Rivera v.a
People, we considered the following factors
to determine the presence of
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intent to kill, namely:
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(1) the means used by the malefactors;
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(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
o before, during, or immediately after the killing of
(3) the conduct of the malefactors
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the victim; and
rthe motives of the
n which the crime was committed and
(4) the circumstances
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aunder
B the motive of the
accused. We have
also considered as determinative factors
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s
Cwords he uttered at the time of inflicting
offender and the
the injuries on the victim.
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lintent to kill was present. We
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Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that
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concur with them. Contrary to the petitioners submission,
the wounds sustained by
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Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a
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nand used a knife in his assault on Alexander.
fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded
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The medical records indicate, indeed,
that Alexander sustained two stab B
wounds,
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specifically, one on his upper left C
chest and the other on the left side of his
s face. The
petitioners attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing e
such wounds,
lto kill. There is
thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent
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also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexanders chest being sufficient
to result into his
o
death were it not for the timely medical intervention. With the State
R having thereby shown
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that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution
that should produce the
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felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes
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independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention
accorded to Alexander, he was
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properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
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ARTICLE 5
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* Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
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As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this estafa
case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value
of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the
members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of
first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose
Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard
on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
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After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds
the following: There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today,
based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can
be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
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ART. 5 . Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which
are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.
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The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to
render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
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legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any
penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make
that act punishable by law through legislation.
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The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is
already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of
the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the
said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper
penalty.
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There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on
the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would
be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of
the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed
imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not
cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law.
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An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is
that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal
Protection Clause. The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here
and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
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(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
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(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only;o
and
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(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
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According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental
Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
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distinctions as P10,000.00 may have
been
substantial
in
the
past,
but
it
is
not
so today,
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which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who
l commit estafa
involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however,
this is no longer
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achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive
the same penalty as
Rorequisite;
someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second
and, the IPR
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violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time
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the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
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Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares thee
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incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
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clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the
thing
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subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses
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questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate
an power to
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent
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legislate laws. Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress.
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In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes
which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section
68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is
merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.
The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit,
especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court
should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the
Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
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Pursuanth
to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let aB
Copy of this Decision be furnished the
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President
the Department of Justice. Also, let a
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copy of this Decision be furnished the President
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of Representatives.
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ATTEMPTED RAPE vs. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
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* Cruz vs. People GR#166441
October 8, 2014
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The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction
between attempted
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rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted
rape requires such intent; the
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felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct
overt
acts of the offender establish
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the intent to lie with the female.
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However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape
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without proof of his erectile penis beingh
in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
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e knowledge
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The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal
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is defined simply as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman,
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which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape.
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In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable
of consummating the sexual
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act touches the external genitalia of the female. In People
v. Campuhan, the Court has
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defined the extent of touching by the penis in rape in h
the following terms:
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[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
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contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis
ocase.
on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this
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There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched
the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely strokedn
the external
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surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. xxx Thus,
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a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any
showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
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petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia
rwhen she freed herself from his clutches and
n his hands and mashing her breasts
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awith
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet,
inferring from such circumstances that rape, and
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no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his
s her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained
C lust for and lewd designs towards
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l double interpretation, as Justice Recto put in People v.
equivocal, or susceptible of
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Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention
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to cause rape as the
particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had
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he been allowed
her to continue, and to have sexual congress
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nbyseduction
felony like simple
(if he should employ deceita
to have her yield to him) could also
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be ultimate
felony.
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If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute
rape, did they constitute acts of
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lasciviousness? It is obvious that the fundamental
difference between attempted rape
o
and acts of lasciviousness is the offenders
intent to lie with the female. In rape,
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intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts
nrape is committed, therefore, whenar
of lasciviousness. Attempted
the touching of
a
the vagina by the penish
is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The
intent
to penetrate
B
is manifest only through
s of consummating the
C the showing of the penis capable
sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. e
Without such showing, only
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the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
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o did not directly manifest his intent
His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts
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to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing
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penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with
B
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her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness
and lust for her. Pursuant to Article 336 of the
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Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, was
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rape.
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CONSPIRACY
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* People vs. Morilla G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014 a
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The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.C
A conspiracy exists when two or more s
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide l
to e
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commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.
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Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended
nin the illegal
is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved
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transportation of dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced. In conspiracy, it need not
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be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from
the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this
case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla
conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs.
Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon
to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police
operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to
open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the
police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in
conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with
the mayor. His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks
and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the
said vehicle likewise bears no merit. Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in
flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles.
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* Peopleh
vs. Dadao, et.al. G.R. No. 201860 JanuaryB
22, 2014
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With regard to appellants assertion that the
negative
result of the paraffin tests that were
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conducted on their persons should be considered
b as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can
only declare that such a statement is o
misguided considering that it has been established in
jurisprudence that a paraffin test isR
not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It
rAlfemio Malogsi
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should also be noted that, according
to the prosecution, only Eddie and
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held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin
Bnot comewhileas aMarcelino
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Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does
surprise
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that the latter two tested negative for powder burns because
ethey were never accused of
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having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence on record
has established that all four
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accused shared a community of criminal design. By their
o concerted action, it is evident that
they conspired with one another to murder PionioR
Yacapin and should each suffer the same
criminal liability attached to the aforementioned
act regardless of who fired r
the
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a
athat
weapon which delivered the fatal wounds
ended the life of the victim.
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C on the principle of criminal conspiracy
In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated
and its
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ramifications in this manner:
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There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
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commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the
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plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felonyaand forthwith decide to pursue
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it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators
is made criminally liable
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for the crime actually committed by any one of them.
In
the
absence
of
any
direct
proof,
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the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
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commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design,
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concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted
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the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability,
the act of one is the act of all.
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As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery,
which was alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the
offense to murder. This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was
properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at
issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.
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r is present when the offender commits any
n and again, we have declared that treachery
a
aTime
of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
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tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
s might make. Furthermore, we have also held that the
C the defense which the offendedeparty
essence of treachery is thatl
the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
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and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
o
chance to resist orR
escape. In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was
killed carried alln
the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. r
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SELF-DEFENSE
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* Dela Cruz vs. People G.R. No. 189405 November
l 19, 2014
b
There is no question that petitionero
authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey.
R Court
What is left for determination by this
is whether the elements of self-defense exist to
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exculpate petitioner from the
acriminal liability for Homicide. Bar
hof self-defense are the following: (1)s unlawful aggression on
The essential requisites
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e employed to prevent or
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
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repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
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resorting to self-defense. In other words, thereo
must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of
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inflict severe wounds upon the assailant n
by employing reasonable means to resist
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the attack. Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal
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liability, it is well settled that when he invokes
the same, it becomes incumbent upon
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prove by clear and convincing evidence
e of himself.
Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's defense is sorelylwanting. Hence,
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his petition must be denied.
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First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's
contention that unlawful
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aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against
him. Unlawful aggression
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is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden, unexpected or
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imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating
action.
There
is
aggression,
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only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. The peril sought l
toe
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be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. In the case at bar, other
than petitioners testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show thato
Jeffrey
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condescendingly responded to petitioners questions or initiated the confrontation before
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the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot
a
but failed an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life. Even assuming
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originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore,
arguendo that the gunB
danger may have s
in fact existed, theimminence of that danger had already ceased the
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moment petitionerdisarmed
Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After
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petitionerb
had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to
speak o
of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the
RTC,Rpetitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but
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a
arefused
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In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted
C that he wrested the gun fromesthe victim. From that point in time until the victim
l took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful
shouted guard, guard, then
b
aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away.
o that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from
Therefore, even assuming
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the victim, then
fact remains that it ceased when ther
gun was wrested away by the
accused from
aggression ceases, the defender
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athe victim. It is settled that when unlawful
B
no longerh
right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and
s SCRA 620). A person making a defense
C has anyis committed
not self-defense
(Peo Vs. Tagana, 424
e
has no more right to attack an aggressor
lwhen the unlawful aggression has ceased
b
(People vs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).
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In addition, there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big
r an impression
nhead. The prosecution witnesses maintained
fire extinguisher on petitioners
a
a
that Jeffrey used the same
to shield himself from petitioner who was
then in possession of
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the gun, a deadly weapon.
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Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated
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Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably
commensurate to the nature
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and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought R
to avert. As held by the Court in People v.
Obordo:
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Bvictim,
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Even assuming arguendo that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the
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accused-appellant likewise failed toC
prove that the means he employed to e
repel Homer's
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punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking
self-defense
b
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.
o
Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched himR
and was trying to get
something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed
the victim with his
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hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer
and
inflicting
a wound on a
a
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B
vital part of the victim's body was unreasonable and
unnecessary considering that,
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as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim
C used his bare fist in throwing ae
punch at him. Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be
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rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.
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The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC,
thus:
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The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The
gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the
alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means
employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98). It was the
accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the
victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly
weapon. Under the circumstances, accuseds alleged fear was unfounded. If petitioner had
honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite any
obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also
immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at
the floor where the shooting incident happened.
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We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling
with Jeffrey, and in the end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four
times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus: with
regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
an
Ch
s
e
l
r
a
B
b
o
R
* Guevarra vs. People G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014
an
Ch
r
a
B
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts
for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to
show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended
by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense. Of all the
burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict
real imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be proven
first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense.
s
e
l
b
o
Ch
an
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just
passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was
suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took
place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the
petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken
coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the
gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the
nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners
did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
fact, the real aggressors.
h
C
an
s
e
l
r
a
B
b
o
an
h
C
Ro
e
l
b
r
a
BG.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015
* People vs. Sevillano
s
e
By invoking l
self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds
b
which killed
the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing
oin self-defense. In Razon v. People, this Court held that where an accused admits
was done
R
the killing, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing
r from his admission that he killed the victim.
n otherwise, conviction would follow
a
aevidence;
BRPC, the following elements must be present in order
h
Under
Article
11,
paragraph
1
of
the
C that a plea of self-defense mayebesvalidly considered in absolving a person from criminal
l
liability:
b
First. Unlawful
Aggression;
Ro
r to prevent or repel it;
n
a
aReasonable
Second.
necessity of the means employed
B
h
CThird. Lack of sufficient provocation onethespart of the person defending himself.
l
b
Appellants version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to
o to be untenable. We agree with the lower courts
stab him was found by the lower court
R
conclusion. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the
r the moment
n of that danger had already ceased
part of the victim, the imminence
a
a
appellant was able to h
wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there
B was no longer any
unlawful aggressionC
to speak of that would justify the needsfor him to kill the victim
e still persists in attacking
or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an accused
l
his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. The fact
b
that the victim suffered many stab wounds in the o
body that caused his demise, and the
R
nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It
r
demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to endn
a
a the life of the victim.
B
h
TREACHERY
s
C
e
l
* People vs. Feliciano, Jr., et.al. G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
b
o
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the R
offense committed against
Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage
of its superior strength
r
a
an incorrectly
and with the aid of armed men. The appellate court, however,
ruled out the
B
presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.h
s
C
e
It has been stated previously by this court that: [T]reachery is present when the offender
l
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms inbthe
oto the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
R
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
n
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,a
deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no
h
chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered,
Ctwo elements must
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.
s
e
l
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused -appellants, ruled that
contrary to the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular,
they ruled that although the attack was sudden and unexpected, [i]t was done in broad
daylight with a lot of people who could see them and that there was a possibility for the
victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the
victims. This reasoning is clearly erroneous.
Ch
b
o
R
an
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where
they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival
fraternity men. The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes
and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a
situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for
them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a
minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help
them until after the incident. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no
opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.
an
Ch
s
e
l
r
a
B
b
o
R
r
n
a
a
It should be remembered
that the trial court found that there was
conspiracy among the
B
h
accused-appellants and
s Conspiracy, once proven,
Cthe appellate court sustained this finding.
has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, e
regardless of their degree of
l is proved, all of the
participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy
b
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless
of the extent and character of
o
their respective active participation in the R
commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the r
act
n
a
a
of one is the act of all.
B
h
s
Cthat the malefactors conspired andeconfederated
Verily, the moment it is established
l the accused
in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
b
conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate
o of each of the
nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation
R
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
r
n
a
a
B
The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose
from a single incident wherein
h
s
the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats
and
lead
pipes,
all
in
agreement
to
C
e
do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and
l
take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent tobkill
oof the
was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all
R
accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore,
immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered byn
a the victims to
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
xxx xxx xxx
r
a
B
determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether
the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
s
e
l
b
o
TheR
Court upholds Matibags conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, as
r of Murder, which is defined and penalized
n Matibag is charged with the acrime
acharged.
under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended.
In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution
B
h
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the
s
C must
accused killed him or her; e
(c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned inlArticle 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not Parricide or
b
Infanticide.
o
Rthe RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
Under Article 14
of
r
n
crimes against
the person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof
a
a
B without risk to himself arising
which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution,
h
s make. In People v. Tan, the Court
from C
the defense which the offended party might
e
explained that the essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack, without the
lperson
b
slightest provocation on the part of the
attacked. In People v. Perez, it was
o
explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The
Rbe appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so
qualifying circumstance may still
r
unexpected that the deceased
anhad no time to prepare for his orBheradefense.
h was able to prove that Matibag,s who was armed with a
In this case, the prosecution
C
e and shot him on the
gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched
l
chest. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and
b unexpected manner by which
it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan too
defend himself, adding too that he
was unarmed. Matibag also failed to prove that R
a heated exchange of words preceded the
incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any
impending attack from his assailant. The
r
n
a
a
deliberateness of Matibags act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the
B to
h
moment of execution. As the RTC aptly
pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined
s
C that he had an axe to grind when ehe confronted
effect such dastardly act, considering
lBased on these
Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded handgun.
b
findings, the Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.
o
R
* People vs. Joel Aquino G.R. No. 201092 January 15, 2014n
r
a
a
B
According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder,h
the following must be established:
(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him;C
the killing was with the attendance of s
e
any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
l
b
the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
o
R
Contrary to appellants assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the
nthe offender
killing of Jesus. We have consistently held that treachery is present when
a
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
* People vs. Daniel Matibag G.R. No. 206381 March 15, 2015
s
e
l
r
a
B
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. On this point, we
quote with approval the Court of Appeals discussion of this aspect of the case, to wit:
b
o
TheR
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting
depriving him of anyr
real chance to defend himself. Even when the
n was victim,
a
avictim
forewarned of the danger
to his person, treachery may still be
B
since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
s himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that
Ch appreciated
impossible for the victim to defend
e
Jesus was stabbed by the group
the lateral part of his body while he was under the
lsimplyonleaving
b
impression that they were
the place where they had [a] shabu session.
o
Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle,
Rhigher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his
his head is usually
rside car. Hence, there was no
n
torso exposed
to the passengers who are seated ina
the
a
way for Jesus
to even be forewarned of the intended
of his body both from the
Bhim.stabbing
h
people
seated
in
the
side
car
and
those
seated
behind
Thus,
the
trial courts finding of
s
C
e
treachery should be affirmed.
l
b
However, in contrast to the pronouncements
of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, we cannot consider abuse
Rofosuperior strength as an aggravating circumstance in
r strength
nwhen the circumstance of abuse ofasuperior
this case. As per jurisprudence,
concurs with treachery, a
the former is absorbed in the latter.
Since there is no
B
h
aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua,
s Code, it being the lesser
C 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
in accordance with Article
e
l of murder which is reclusion
penalty between the two indivisible penalties for the felony
b
perpetua to death.
o
R
TREACHERY & ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
r
n
a
a
Sr. & People G.R. No. 190912 January 12,B
2015
* Fantastico & Villanueva vs. Malicse,h
s
C
ethe offender
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when
l
b
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods,
or forms in the
o
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the
R make. The essence of
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
r
n
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
a
a
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
B
h
resist or escape. For treachery to be considered,Ctwo elements must concur: (1) the s
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity toe
lor
defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately
b
consciously adopted. From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident
was
o
spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The incident,
which
R
happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that the
petitioners
n
consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. Therea
is no treachery
h
where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
provocative act of the victim.
s
e
l
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, thus: In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that
Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house
of the former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or
tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando Rolly Villanueva hit the victim on the
head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the
victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs
and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The said
injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's house. When
he kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of the injuries is proven by victim's
testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers
were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also
drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength.
Ch
b
o
R
an
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
an
Ch
s
e
l
r
a
B
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim." The
evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that
they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked." The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
b
o
R
an
Ch
DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
Ch
an
r
a
B
s
e
For the resolution of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of our l
Decision dated 9
b
July 2014,2 which affirmed the conviction of accused appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco
o2014, the Officer-infor the murder of Elizabeth Palmar. in a Letter dated 21 September
R
Charge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that
accused-appellant died on
r
n
14 July 2014, as evidenced by the attached Death Certificate
issued by NBP Medical Officer
a
a
B
III Ruth B. Algones, M.D. Owing to this development, the
Court now addresses the effect of
h
s
death pending accused-appellants appeal with regard
to
his
criminal
and
civil
liabilities.
C
e
l
b
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:
o
R
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
an
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
* People vs. Consorte G.R. No. 194068 November 26, 2014
r
a
B
(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
s
e
l
b xxxx
o
R
In People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that:
ar of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
an Death of the accused pendingBappeal
s liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
liability as well as the civil
Ch
e
Regalado, in this regard,
"the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
l
his criminal liability
band only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense o
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." In the case
R
at bar, accused-appellant
died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for
r Court. As such, it therefore
n
reconsideration
is still pending resolution by the
a
a
becomes necessary for us to declare his criminal
B liability as well as his civil liability
h
ex delicto to have been extinguished by hissdeath prior to final judgment.
C
e
l
ARTICLE 100
b
o
* Lumantas vs. Calapiz GR#163753
R January 15, 2014
r
n
a
It is axiomatic that everya
person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.
Bdoes not necessarily
h
Nevertheless, the acquittal
of an accused of the crime charged
s
extinguish his civil C
liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,
the Court elucidates on the
e
two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as onl
the different effects of acquittal
b
on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
o
R
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability
r
n
of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not
the
a
a
author of the act or omission h
complained of. This instance closes theB
door to
civil liability, for a person who
has
been
found
to
be
not
the
perpetrator
of
any act
s
C
e
or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act orl
omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if
b
any, which may be instituted must be based on groundso
other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in RuleR
111 of the Rules of Court.
r
n doubt on the guilt of
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
a
a
the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
B
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt h
from civil liability which may be s
C
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
e
l
b
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state whether
o
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely
R
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall
n
a not exist.
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not
prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the
criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
s
e
l
Ch
b
o
R
an
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of

conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining
and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere
preponderance of evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for
insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainants recovery of civil
liability should be through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
r
a
B
s
e
l
b
* Daluraya vs. Oliva G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
o
R
The sole issue advanced for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in
r his acquittal in the criminal
ncivilly liable for Marina Olivas deathadespite
finding Daluraya
a
case for h
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
B on the ground of insufficiency of
s
evidence.
C
e
lis also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused
Every person criminally liable for a felony
b
o not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In
of the crime charged, however, does
R
Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law
and their concomitant effects on
follows:
ar
anthe civil liability of the accused, as B
h
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effectsson the civil liability of the
C
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accusede
not the author of the act or
l isliability,
civil
for a person who has
omission complained of. This instance closes the door tob
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held
o
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict,
civil
liability
ex delicto is out of the
R
question, and the civil action, if any, which may
r
n be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This isathe situation contemplated in Rule 111 a
of the
B
h
Rules of Court.
s
C
eof the accused.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt
l
b
he is not
In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
o
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In
R
Dayap v. Sendiong, the Court explained further:
r
n
a
a
a judgment against him on the
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude
B
h
civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal
action
does
not
carry
with
it
the
s
C
e
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
l
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability ofbthe
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
is not
o
R based
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action
on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the finaln
judgment in
a may arise
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.
s
e
l
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. In case of an
acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Ch
b
o
R
an
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
Dalurayas acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to
establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear
and categorical when the MeTC declared that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused
precisely committed the crime charged against him.
an
Ch
s
e
l
r
a
B
b
o
R
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the
RTC, that Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily
call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Dalurayas evidence on
the civil aspect. Records disclose that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist in view of
the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the
crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as
non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
an
Ch
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
R
r
n
* Geroche vs. People G.R. No. 179080 November
a
a 26, 2014
B
h
The Court adopts the findings of fact
and
conclusions
of
law
of
the
CA.
In
their
testimony
s
C
edenied that he
before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche
l
was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU
members. In
b
holding such positions, they are considered as public officers/employees.
Ro
r
nsame. Under Article 128 of
As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the
a
a
the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (two
B
[2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6]h
years) if Violation of Domicile be s
C
committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a e
l
crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. In this
b
case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at nighto
and, in
addition, they took away with them his airgun.
R
n
a
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
r
a
DIRECT ASSAULT with
B MURDER
s G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014
e
* People vs. Estonilo
l
b
On theo
offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they
R be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There
should
r contra la autoridad o sus agentes under
n two modes of committing atentados
a
aare
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed the second
B
h
form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force,
s upon a person in authority or his agent; the
C or serious intimidation or resistance
e
lsaid person was performing his duties or on the occasion
assault was made when the
b
of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority
o
or his agent, thatR
is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
assault the offended
r or an agent of a person in
n party as a person in authority
authority. a
a
B
h
s Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer,
In thisC
case, Floro was the duly appointed District
e
Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. l
But contrary to the statement of the RTC that
b
there was direct assault just because Floro
was a person in authority, this Court clarifies
o
that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was,
R
in reality, made by reason of the performance
of his duty as the District Supervisor. When
rfor that matter,
n
the assault results in the killing
of that agent or of a person in authority
a
a
there arises the complexh
crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
B
s
C
e
ARTICLE 218: FAILURE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT
l
b
* Lumauig vs. People G.R. No. 166680 July 7, 2014o
R is that he was not reminded of his
The central aspect of petitioners next argument
r
n
a
a
unliquidated cash advances. The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article 218
Bpublic
h
does not require the COA or the provincial
auditor to first make a demand before the
s
officer should render an account. It C
is sufficient that there is a law or regulation
e requiring
l
him to render an account.
b
o
The elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 ofR
the Revised Penal Code
are:
r
n
a
a
B
(1) That the offender is a public officer whether
in the service or separated
h
s
therefrom;
C
e
(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
l
b
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA
or
o
to a provincial auditor; and,
R
(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account
should be rendered.
an
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
Bsettled in Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan where we ruled that prior
The question has been
s is not necessary to hold an accountable officer liable for
demand to liquidate
e
violation of l
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Since petitioner received the subject
b
cash advance
sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to liquidate the same on or before
o
January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated
the R
cash advance within two months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20,
r the subject cash advance only on June 4,
n
In the case at bar, petitioner liquidated
a
a1995.
2001. Hence, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of
B
h
s six years before settling his accounts.
C Article 218 because it took himeover
l
xxx xxx xxx
b
o
In malversation ofR
public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of
the funds misappropriated
may be considered a mitigating
circumstance being
r
n
a
a
analogous to voluntary surrender. Although this case does not involve malversation of
BCode but rather failure to render an
h
public funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
sArticle found in the same Chapter), the
Cunder Article 218 (i.e., the succeeding
account
e
l or full restitution of the funds that were
same reasoning may be applied to the return
b
previously unliquidated in considering the same as a mitigating circumstance in
favor of petitioner.
Ro
r
RAPE OF A MENTAL RETARDATE
a
an
B
h
G.R.
No.
196315
October
22,
2014
* People vs. Cataytay
s
C
e
l
In People v. Caoile, we differentiated the terms deprived
of reason and demented, as
b
follows: The term demented refers to a person whoo
has dementia, which is a condition of
R
deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former
r
n madness, or insanity. On the otherahand,
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy,
a
the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted toBinclude
h
those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA,
who was
s
C
clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified
e as a person
l
who is deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.
b
o with any of the
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
R
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
r
a
an
B
h
xxxx
s
C
e
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
l
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission ofbthe
crime.
Ro
n
Since the accused-appellants knowledge of AAAs mental retardation
was alleged in
a
the Information and admitted by the former during the trial,h
the above special
qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death
C should have been
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.
s
e
l
RAPE COMMITTED BY A RELATIVE
b
o
R
r sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives with
n prosecutions evidence is based on the
aThe
appellant and his common-law partner.a
AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of
B
h
14 May 2009, and while appellants wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant
s but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After
C undressing her. AAA tried to estruggle
l and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis
undressing her, appellant kissed
b
into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep
o
leaving AAA crying.R
At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter
apologizing for n
what happened and begging her not to tellr
on his wife. The letter reads:
a
a
B kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay.
Ne! Sorryh
Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan
Sana C
po wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na sisAte Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman
emuna to pag tapos mong basahin.
ang pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki tapon
l
b
o
SC Ruling:
R
r
Upon a careful evaluation a
ofn
the case, we find her testimony hasaestablished
all the
elements of rape required
under
Article
266-A
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
First,
appellant
B own brother as the
h
had carnal knowledge
of
the
victim.
AAA
positively
identified
her
s
C
eappellant inserted his penis
assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that
l
into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force
and intimidation to satisfy his
b
lust. At this juncture, we quote with approval the ruling
of
the Court of Appeals on this
o
point:
R
r
n
a
a
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required
B
h
in rape cases is relative; when applied,
it need not be overpowering or irresistible.
s
That it enables the offender to C
consummate his purpose is enough.
e The parties
relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluatinglthe existence of
b
the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may
not suffice when
o
the victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age.
R
r
n
In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that
amount of force sufficient to
a
a
B
consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time
of the incident, AAA was only 14
h
s
years old. Considering the tender years of the offended
party
as
compared
to
the
accusedC
e
appellant who was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the
l
b
arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation
is
o all
not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired result,
R
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
an
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
* People vs. Joson G.R. No. 206393 January 21, 2015
MARITAL RAPE
s
e
l
r
a
B
* People vs. Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
b
o
R
an
More particular to the present case, and perhaps the laws most progressive proviso is the
2nd paragraph of Section 266-C thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
r
a
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
B
h
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the
soffender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
C
legal husband who is the
e
l the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
offended party shall extinguish
b
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is
o
void abinitio. R
r uses the term man in
Read together
with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly
a
an
defining rape,
it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353B
penalizes the crime without regard
h
s
to theC
rapists legal relationship with his victim.
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that
e
rape, as a form of sexual violence, existsl
within marriage. A man who penetrates her
bwill commit sexual violence upon her.
wife without her consent or against her
o
As above discussed, the definition R
of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape,
r the victim is
n
as traditionally known; (b) a
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that
where
a
the perpetrators own spouse.
The single definition for all three forms
of the crime shows
B
h
that the law does notC
distinguish between rape committed in wedlock
and those committed
s raped
e
without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women
by their husband
l
and those raped by any other man alike.
b
o
RAPE through SEXUAL ASSAULT in relation to R
RA 7610
r
n
a
a
* Ricalde vs. People G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015
B
h
s
Rape under the second paragraph ofC
Article 266-A is also known as instrument
e or object
rape, gender-free rape, or homosexual rape. The gravamen of rapelthrough sexual
assault is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or b
anal orifice, or any
o
instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice.
R
r
n
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that
a penis was inserted into his
a
a
B
anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being
inserted into his anal orifice. This
h
s
contradicts petitioners earlier statement in his appellants
brief
that
[a]lthough
it
is
true
C
that the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape l
in e
b
cases where the victim remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically
examined, still, it bears stressing that in the instant case, the private complainant o
testified
R
that the accused-appellants penis fully penetrated his anus. The trial court also quoted
n in [his]
portions of the transcript of XXXs testimony in that he felt something was inserted
a
anus.
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted
into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual
assault was committed:
s
e
l
Web
find it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular
o
or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
R instrument
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require AAA to
rthat was inserted into her vagina would be
the instrument or object
a
an identify
contrary to the fundamental tenets
B of due process.
h
s
C
e
xxx xxx xxx
l
b
People v. Bonaagua o
considers a womans private organ since most if not all existing
R
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can
r slightest penetration to the
n when the victim is a man in thatathe
apply by analogy
a
victims anal orifice consummates the crime of
through sexual assault. The
Brape
h
gravamen of the crime is the violation of
the
victims
dignity. The degree of
s
C
penetration is not important. Rape is an assault
e on human dignity.
l
b
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM with HOMICIDE
o
R
* People vs. Dionaldo G.R. No.n
207949 July 23, 2014
r
a
a
h
the Court is, however, constrainedB
to modify the ruling of
The foregoing notwithstanding,
s
the RTC and the CA, C
as the crime the accused-appellants have
committed
does not, as the
e
records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and
l Serious Illegal Detention, but
b
that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in
view of the victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which o
was (a) specifically charged in the
R
Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case.
r
n
a
a
Notably, while this matter was not among
the issues raised before the Court, the
same
B
h
should nonetheless be considered in
accordance
with
the
settled
rule
that
in
a
criminal
s
C
e review, and
case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide openlfor
the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may
be found in the
b
appealed judgment.
Ro
r
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on Decembern
31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article
a
a
267 of the same Code now provides:
B
h
s
C
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shalle
l
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
b
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
o
R
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days;
n
a
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
s
e
l
b
o
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
R
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
r in the commission of the offense.
n
above-mentioned were present
a
acircumstances
B
h
s as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
the victim is killed or dies
C When
e
subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
l
b
o
The Court further elucidated
R in People v. Mercado:
rtwo separate heinous crimes
In Peoplen
v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of
a
a
of kidnapping for ransom and murder committed
B on July 13, 1994 and sentenced
h
to death. On appeal, this Court modified s
the ruling and found the accused guilty of
Cthe special complex crime of kidnapping
e for ransom with murder under the
l
last paragraph of Article 267, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
b
x x x This amendment introduced
in our criminal statutes the concept of special
o
complex crime of kidnapping
with
murder
or homicide. It effectively eliminated the
R
distinction drawn by the
between those cases where r
the killing of the
n courtssought
a
apurposely
kidnapped victim was
by the accused, and those
where the killing
B
hnot deliberately resorted to but wass merely an afterthought.
of the victim was
C
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person e
kidnapped is killed in the
l
the killing was purposely
course of the detention, regardless of whether
b
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed o
under Art. 48, nor be treated as
R
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the
r
last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended
a
anby RA No. 7659.
Bfor the
h
fact
that
the
kidnapping
was
committed
Thus, further taking into account the
s
C
e from
purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction must be
modified
l
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime
of Kidnapping
b
for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death.
Ro
r
ROBBERY with HOMICIDE
a
an
B
h
* People vs. Balute G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015
s
C
e
In People v. Ibaez, the Court exhaustively explained that [a] special complex crime l
of
b
robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason,
or
on
o
the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
the
Rproperty
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
aornintimidation
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
s
e
l
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the]
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or
on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery
or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime.
Ch
b
o
R
an
r
a
B
s
e
l
b
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the prosecution was able
o
to establish the fact
that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latters mobile
R
phone, and thereafter,
r despite surgical and medical
n shot him, resulting in his death
intervention.a
a
B
h
C vs. Orosco G.R. No. 209227 March e25,s2015
* People
lArticle 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
b
Robbery with homicide is defined under
amended, which provides in part:
Ro
r Penalties. Any
n against or intimidation of persons
Art. 294. Robbery with
violence
a
a
person guilty of h
robbery with the use of violence againstB
or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
s
C
e
lwhen by reason or on occasion
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
b
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the
o
robbery shall have been accompanied
R by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.
r
n
a
a
B
h
The elements of the crime of robbery
with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal
s
C or intimidation against persons;
property is committed with violence
(2) the
elucrandi;
l
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo
and
b
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic
sense) is committed.
Ro
r
n
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or a
on the occasion of robbery if it
a
B
is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape
of the culprit; (b) to preserve
h
s
the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery
of
the
commission
C
e
of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime.
l
b
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to o
commit
R
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
n may
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide
a
take place before, during or after the robbery.
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as
appellant and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her
money. The earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount
and asked for the correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim
kept her earnings. To verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the
victim let them enter the store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbed her.
s
e
l
b
o
R
r
n however, argues that if he hadacommitted
any offense, it was only robbery since
aAppellant,
Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed the
B
h
victim.
s
C
e
l
We disagree.
b
o by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in
The evidence presented
R
conspiracy withn
his co-accused. Appellant and John Doe
rfirst engaged the unsuspecting
victim in a verbal
altercation until she allowed them toa
enter the store. Upon getting inside,
a
Baround her neck while appellant held
they heldh
the victim with John Doe wrapping his arm
s the two of them, John Doe stabbed
C at the back. With the victim pressedebetween
her hands
her once in her chest before releasing her.l
Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the
b
money placed at the altar inside the store
and fled together with John Doe and the two
o
lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy
R in the perpetration of robbery and killing of
between appellant and his co-accused
r
the victim.
a
an
Bkilling of the victim to
h
It must be stressed C
that appellant played a crucial role in the
s
e while John Doe grabbed
facilitate the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands
l
her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim
without any means of defending
b
herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest.
Having
acted in conspiracy with
o
his co-accused, appellant is equally liable for the
of Yap. As we held in People v.
Rkilling
Baron: The concerted manner in which the appellant
and his companions perpetrated r
the
n
a
a
crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide
B part
h
takes place by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery, all those who took
s
C crime of robbery with homicideewhether they
shall be guilty of the special complex
l an endeavor
actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was
b
to prevent the killing.
o
R
There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant
attempted to prevent the
r
n
killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed
by
the
appellant and his coa
a
B
accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracyh
that the act of one is the act of all,
the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As aC
result, the criminal liabilities of the s
e
appellant and his co-accused are one and the same. In sum, the CA did not err in affirming
l
b
the conviction of appellant for robbery with homicide.
o
R
QUALIFIED THEFT
n
a
* People vs. Nielles G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal
property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with
intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners consent; 5) that it was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6)
that it was done with grave abuse of confidence.
s
e
l
b
o
R
r Private complainant testified that Accusedncorrectly found by the appellate court:
a
aAsappellant
took the amount of P640,353.86 from her without her consent by failing to turn
B
h
over the amount she collected from the formers sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen
s the same to Private Complainants account which
C (15) personal checks and deposited
e
however, all bounced for thel
reason account closed. The taking of the amount collected by
b
Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to
o
Private Complainant.
Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further,
R
the unlawful act
rwithout the use of violence or
nwas accomplished by Accused-appellant
intimidation a
against persons, [or] of force upon things
as the payment to her of the said
a
B
amount was
voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors
as she was known to be
h
C with the collection of payments. es
entrusted
l that made the same as qualified theft was
b
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence
o testified that as a cashier, her functions and
also proven. Accused-appellant herself
R
responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits
rpayment for the
and withdrawals in behalf a
of n
Private Complainant. Moreover, when a
the
purchase orders or gift h
checks becomes due, she would fill up the
four (4) blank checks
B
given by the sub-guarantor
Complainant. It is
C with the knowledge and consenteofsPrivate
beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes
into possession of the
l
monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposedb
in her by her employer, as in the
instant case.
o
R
ESTAFA under ARTICLE 315(2)(a) & SYNDICATED
r
a
an ESTAFA
B
* People vs. Tibayan G.R. No. 209655 h
January 14, 2015
s
C
e 4, Article
l
The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants. Item 2 (a), Paragraph
b
315 of the RPC provides:
o
R
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any means
r
n
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
a
a
B
h
s
xxxx
C
e
l
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulentb
acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
Rofraud:
n to possess
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending
a
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
s
e
l
Ch
b
o
R
an
rbusiness, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other

a
B similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money
or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:
an
Ch
r
a
B
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is
committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang
nayon(s), or farmers associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public.
s
e
l
b
o
R
an
Ch
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as
defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is
committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
an
r
a
B
h
sof inducing
C
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICIs modus operandi
e
lreturned with a
the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be
b
very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43
o
Under such lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to
infuse funds into TGICI.
R
However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from
r
n the start that TGICI is
operating without any paid-up capital and has no cleara
trade by which it can pay the
a
assured profits to its investors, they cannot comply with
htheir guarantee and had to simply B
abscond with their investors money. Thus, the CAC
correctly held that accused-appellants, s
e
along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme,
l
b
resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
o
R
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by newn
investors. Its
a
organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
s
e
l
b
o
R
an
Ch
r
a
B
claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the
perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage
investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate
business. It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long
as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to
sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger
pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea
behind this type of swindle is that the con-man collects his money from his second or
third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.
r
a
B
s
e
In this light, it is clear that alllthe elements of Syndicated Estffa, committed through a Ponzi
b
scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
o
comprising more than
five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false
R
pretenses andn
representations to the investing public
- in this case, the private
ropportunity
complainantsa- regarding a supposed lucrative investment
with TGICI in order
a
B
to solicit h
money from them; ( b) the said false pretenses and representations were made
prior C
to or simultaneous with the commission s
of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private
e
complainants invested their hard earned
l money into TGICI; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of TGICI ended b
up running away with the private complainants'
investments, obviously to the latter's o
R prejudice.
r
ESTAFA under ARTICLE 315(2)(d)
a
an
B
h
* People vs. Villanueva
G.R.
No.
163662
February
25,
2015
s
C
e
l
We affirm the conviction.
b
o
Article 315, paragraph 2( d), of the Revised Penal Code
R provides:
r
n
a
a
Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
B
h
means mentioned hereinbelow xx
x:
s
C
e
l
xx xx
b
o or fraudulent acts
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
R
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud:
r
n
a
a
B
xx xx
h
s
C
e
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
l
b
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amounto
of the
R amount
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
n receipt of
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from
a
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
s
e
l
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: ( 1) the
offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of
said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.
The deceit should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be
prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.
b
o
R
an
Ch
r
a
B
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie

evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
r
a
B
s
e
All the elements of estafa l
were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva,
b
who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she
ois no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the
had purchased. There
R
assurance of Villanueva
that they would be funded upon
r presentment. It is clear that
Madarang would
the pieces of valuable jewelry to
a
annot have parted with and entrusted
B gave such assurance to her. The
Villanueva
whom she barely knew unless Villanueva
h
s the checks were dishonored upon
Celement was likewise established because
second
e
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or
the account was already closed. The
l because
b
third element was also proved by the showing
that Madarang suffered prejudice by her
failure to collect from Villanueva the balance
Ro of P995,000.00.
r
BIGAMY
a
an
B
h
* Santos vs. Santos G.R.
No.
187061
October
8,
2014
s
C
e
l
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death obtained by
b
extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment.
An
affidavit
of
reappearance
is not
o
the proper remedy when the person declared
Rpresumptively dead has never been
absent.
r
n
a
a
h
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when
the Regional Trial Courts judgment, B
order, or
s
C
resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
efor relief (or
l
other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. The
b
grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
o
R
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of n
a spouse for four consecutive
r
years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse
that the absent spouse is
a
a
B
already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second
marriage during the subsistence
h
s
of another marriage. The Family Code also provides
that
the
second
marriage
is
in
danger
C
of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus: le
b
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article o
shall be
R
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
nmarriage or
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
a
declaring it void ab initio.
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
r
a
B
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of
any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
s
e
l
b
o
R words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy
In other
nterminating the subsequent marriageabyrmere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of
aofreappearance
is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the
B
h
present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
s in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
C dead. A subsequent marriage contracted
e
declaration of presumptive l
death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
b
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
oprior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
Marriages contracted
R
generally considered
r marriage contracted in
n bigamous and void. Only a subsequent
good faith isaprotected by law. Therefore, the party
who contracted the subsequent
a
marriageh
in bad faith is also not immune from B
to declare his subsequent
s an actionagainst
C void for being bigamous. Theeprohibition
marriage
marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage still applies.
l
b
ARTICLE 365: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
Ro
r
* Gonzaga vs. People G.R. No.
195671 January 21, 2015
a
an
B in voluntarily, but
h
Reckless imprudence,
as
defined
in
Article
365
of
the
RPC,
consists
s
C
e damage results by reason
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
l
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
b performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employmento
or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
R persons, time and place.
r
n
a
a
In order to establish a motorists liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it
B
h
must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence
s
C of. To constitute the offensee of reckless
and the injuries or damages complained
loperation of a
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
b
motor vehicle a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.
o
Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within
the meaning of reckless
R
driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice
of a course of action which
r
n
injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger
to
others involved, or with
a
a
B
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger toh
any reasonable person. Verily, it is
the inexcusable lack of precaution or consciousC
indifference to the consequences of s
e
the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence
l
and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whetherbthe
private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
Ro
ndriving very
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelios act of
a
fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
s
e
l
r
a
B
to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry.
Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy.
Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction
where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is
indicative of imprudent behavior. Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver
slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another
vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Consequently, the Court
finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the
wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened,
thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the
material damages resulting therefrom.
Ch
b
o
R
an
s
e
l
b
o
r
a
B
an
Ch
r
a
B
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision
was Rogelios reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or
absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which
imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give.
s
e
l
b
o
R
an
Ch
r
a
B
Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means
in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the
time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.
s
e
l
b
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory
testimonies presented by the
o
prosecution and the defense on this matter. Considering
however, that Cherry herself
R
admitted that the victims were first loaded
on the Land Cruiser before they were
r
n
a
a
transferred to Kgd. Dadivass vehicle, the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelios claim that he
B to go
h
tried to extend help to the victims, but when
he started the engine with the intention
s
Cvehicle had no brakes. Hence, in imposing
to the hospital, he discovered that the
the proper
eof Article
l
penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph
365
b
of the RPC should not be considered.
o
R
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to
r
n
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage
to Property under
a
a
B
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC, ah
complex crime. Article 48 of the
s
RPC provides that when a single act constitutes
Ctwo or more grave or less gravee
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
lto
b
penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting
Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. o
R
n
a
h
C
e
l
b
Ro
xxx xxx xxx

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* Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

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* Guevarra vs. People G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014

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Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

DEATH OF THE ACCUSED

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(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

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Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of

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RAPE COMMITTED BY A RELATIVE

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* People vs. Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

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rbusiness, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other

In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

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been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie

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