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For the former Mexican drug lord, see Ivn Velzquez ers from Arab countries and Central Asia. Saudi AraCaballero.
bia provided nancial support. Hundreds of thousands of
Not to be confused with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
people were forced to ee to United Front-controlled territory, Pakistan, and Iran.[33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42]
The Taliban and their allies committed massacres against
The Taliban (Pashto: libn students), alternately spelled Taleban, is an Islamic fundamentalist po- Afghan civilians, denied UN food supplies to 160,000
starving civilians and conducted a policy of scorched
litical movement in Afghanistan. The movement originated in the early 1990s, but was not fully unied un- earth, burning vast areas of fertile land and destroying
of homes during their rule from 1996
til its 1994 capture of Kandahar. Under the leadership tens of thousands
[43][44][45][46][47][48][48]
to
2001.
of Mohammed Omar, the movement spread throughout most of Afghanistan, sequestering power from the
Mujahideen warlords. The Afghan people's weariness
of corrupt and despotic tribal leaders led to considerable
favorability for the Taliban, leading to the 1996 establishment of a central government. As the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Afghan capital was transferred to
Kandahar, and majority control of the country was held
from September 1996 until its demise in December 2001.
Even at its peak, formal diplomatic recognition of the Talibans government was acknowledged by only three nations: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Mohammed Omar remained supreme commander
and spiritual leader of the Taliban until his death in 2013.
Mullah Akhtar Mansoor was elected as his replacement
in 2015.[26]
After the September 11 attacks, the Taliban were overthrown by the American-led invasion of Afghanistan.
Later it regrouped as an insurgency movement to ght the
American-backed Karzai administration and the NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The
Taliban have been accused of using terrorism as a specic
tactic to further their ideological and political goals. According to the United Nations, the Taliban and their allies
were responsible for 75% of Afghan civilian casualties in
2010, 80% in 2011, and 80% in 2012.[49][50][51][52][53][54]
1 Etymology
HISTORY
Due to the sudden initiation of the civil war, working government departments, police units or a system
of justice and accountability for the newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form.
Horric crimes were committed by criminals and individuals inside dierent factions. Rare ceaseres, usually negotiated by representatives of the Islamic States
newly appointed Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud, President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and later President Burhanuddin Rabbani (the interim government), or
ocials from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days.[59] The
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar received operational, nancial and countryside in northern Afghanistan, parts of which was
military support from Pakistan.[60] Afghanistan expert under the control of Defense Minister Massoud remained
Amin Saikal concludes in Modern Afghanistan: A His- calm and some reconstruction took place. The city of
tory of Struggle and Survival:
Herat under the rule of Islamic State ally Ismail Khan also
witnessed relative calm.
Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakMeanwhile, southern Afghanistan was neither under the
through in Central Asia. ... Islamabad could
control of foreign-backed militias nor the government in
not possibly expect the new Islamic governKabul, but was ruled by local leaders such as Gul Agha
ment leaders... to subordinate their own naSherzai and their militias.
tionalist objectives in order to help Pakistan
realize its regional ambitions. ... Had it not
been for the ISIs logistic support and supply of
2.2 Beginnings
a large number of rockets, Hekmatyars forces
In 1991, the Taliban (a movement originating from
would not have been able to target and destroy
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-run religious schools for Afghan
half of Kabul.[61]
2.3
3
In a bid to establish their rule over Afghanistan, the Taliban started shelling the capital in early 1995. Amnesty
International, referring to the Taliban oensive, wrote in
a 1995 report:
This is the rst time in several months
that Kabul civilians have become the targets of
rocket attacks and shelling aimed at residential
areas in the city.[72]
The Taliban, however, suered a devastating defeat
against government forces of the Islamic State under
the command of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The Talibans
early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of defeats that resulted in heavy losses which led analysts to
believe that the Taliban movement as such might have
run its course. Pakistan, however, started to provide
stronger military support to the Taliban. On September 26, 1996, as the Taliban with military support by
Pakistan and nancial support by Saudi Arabia prepared
for another major oensive, Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul to continue anti-Taliban resistance in
the Hindu Kush mountains instead of engaging in street
battles in Kabul. The Taliban entered Kabul on September 27, 1996, and established the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. Many analysts like Amin Saikal describe
the Taliban as developing into a proxy force for Pakistans
regional interests.[61][68][72][76][77][78]
In the beginning the Taliban numbered in the hundreds, were badly equipped and low on munitions.
Within months however 15,000 students arrived from the
madrassas in Pakistan. The Talibans rst major military
activity was in 1994, when they marched northward from
Maiwand and captured Kandahar City and the surrounding provinces, losing only a few dozen men. When they
took control of Kandahar in 1994, they forced the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided
over a situation of complete lawlessness and atrocities.
The Taliban also took over a border crossing at Spin Baldak and an ammunition dump from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In the course of 1994, the Taliban took control of
12 of 34 provinces not under central government control. Militias controlling the dierent areas often surrendered without a ght. Omars original commanders were
a mixture of former small-unit military commanders and
2.3
madrassa teachers. [66][67][68][69][70]
At the same time most of the militia factions (Hekmatyars Hezb-i Islami, Dostums Junbish-i Milli and Hezbi Wahdat) ghting in the battle for control of Kabul
were defeated militarily by forces of the Islamic States
Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. Bombardment
of the capital came to a halt and the Islamic State initiated measures to restore law and order to the capital.
Massoud furthermore tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and
democratic elections. Ahmad Shah Massoud, known as
the Lion of Panjshir, had been named the Afghan who
won the Cold War by the Wall Street Journal and had defeated the Soviet Red Army nine times in north-eastern
Afghanistan. Hoping for the Taliban to be allies in bringing stability to Afghanistan, Massoud invited the Taliban to join the consolidation process and to contribute
to stability. Unarmed, Massoud went to talk to a Taliban leaders in Maidan Shar to convince them to join
the initiated political process, so that democratic elections could be held to decide on a future government for
Afghanistan.[40][71][72][73][74][75] The Taliban declined to
join such a political process. When Massoud returned
unharmed to Kabul, the Taliban leader who had received
him as his guest was killed by other senior Taliban for
failing to execute Massoud while the possibility had presented itself.
HISTORY
On August 1, 1997 the Taliban launched an attack on Pakistan has been accused of continuing to support the
Sheberghan the main military base of Abdul Rashid Dos- Taliban since 9/11, an allegation Pakistan denies.[37][38]
tum. Dostum has said the reason the attack was successful was due to 1500 Pakistani commandos taking part and
2.3.2 Anti-Taliban resistance under Massoud
that the Pakistani air force also gave support.[99]
In 1998, Iran accused Pakistan of sending its air force
to bomb Mazar-i-Sharif in support of Taliban forces
and directly accused Pakistani troops for war crimes at
Bamiyan". The same year Russia said, Pakistan was responsible for the military expansion of the Taliban in
northern Afghanistan by sending large numbers of Pakistani troops some of whom had subsequently been taken
as prisoners by the anti-Taliban United Front.[100][101]
During 2000, the UN Security Council imposed an arms
embargo against military support to the Taliban, with
UN ocials explicitly singling out Pakistan. The UN
secretary-general implicitly criticized Pakistan for its military support and the Security Council stated it was
deeply distress[ed] over reports of involvement in the
ghting, on the Taliban side, of thousands of non-Afghan
nationals. In July 2001, several countries including the
United States, accused Pakistan of being in violation of
Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, former enemies, created the United Front (Northern Alliance) against the Taliban that were preparing oensives against the remaining areas under the control of
Massoud and those under the control of Dostum. The
United Front included beside the dominantly Tajik forces
of Massoud and the Uzbek forces of Dostum, Hazara
troops led by Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq and Pashtun
forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul
Haq and Haji Abdul Qadir. Notable politicians and
diplomats of the United Front included Abdul Rahim
Ghafoorzai, Abdullah Abdullah and Masood Khalili.
From the Taliban conquest of Kabul in September
1996 until November 2001 the United Front controlled
roughly 30% of Afghanistans population in provinces
such as Badakhshan, Kapisa, Takhar and parts of Parwan,
Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman, Samangan, Kunduz, Ghr
2.3
cause popular consensus, general elections and democracy worldwide. At the same time he was very wary not
to revive the failed Kabul government of the early 1990s.
Already in 1999 he started the training of police forces
which he trained specically in order to keep order and
protect the civilian population in case the United Front
would be successful.[40][121][122] Massoud stated:
The Taliban are not a force to be considered invincible. They are distanced from the
people now. They are weaker than in the past.
There is only the assistance given by Pakistan,
Osama bin Laden and other extremist groups
that keep the Taliban on their feet. With a halt
to that assistance, it is extremely dicult to
survive.[123]
Ahmad Shah Massoud, 2001
6
While Massoud united the Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbeks
as well as some Pashtun commanders under his United
Front command, the famed Pashtun commander Abdul
Haq received increasing numbers of defecting Pashtun
Taliban as Taliban popularity trended downward. Both
agreed to work together with the exiled Afghan king
Zahir Shah. International ocials who met with representatives of the new alliance, which Pulitzer Prize
winner Steve Coll referred to as the grand PashtunTajik alliance, said, Its crazy that you have this today ... Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara ... They were
all ready to buy in to the process ... to work under the
kings banner for an ethnically balanced Afghanistan.
Senior diplomat and Afghanistan expert Peter Tomsen
wrote: The Lion of Kabul [Abdul Haq] and the Lion
of Panjshir [Ahmad Shah Massoud] ... Haq, Massoud, and Karzai, Afghanistans three leading moderates,
could transcend the Pashtunnon-Pashtun, north-south
divide. The most senior Hazara and Uzbek leader were
also part of the process. In late 2000, Massoud ocially
brought together this new alliance in a meeting in Northern Afghanistan among other things to discuss a Loya
Jirga, or a traditional council of elders, to settle political
turmoil in Afghanistan. That part of the Pashtun-TajikHazara-Uzbek peace plan did eventually materialize. An
account of the meeting by author and journalist Sebastian
Junger says: In 2000, when I was there ... I happened to
be there in a very interesting time. ... Massoud brought
together Afghan leaders from all ethnic groups. They ew
from London, Paris, the USA, all parts of Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India. He brought them all into the northern
area where he was. He held a council of ... prominent
Afghans from all over the world, brought there to discuss
the Afghan government after the Taliban. ... we met all
these men and interviewed them briey. One was Hamid
Karzai; I did not have any idea who he would end up being
... [95][122][124][125][126]
In early 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud with ethnic leader
from all of Afghanistan addressed the European Parliament in Brussels asking the international community to
provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan.
He stated that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda had introduced
a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the
support of Pakistan and Bin Laden the Taliban would not
be able to sustain their military campaign for up to a year.
On this visit to Europe he also warned that his intelligence
had gathered information about a large-scale attack on
U.S. soil being imminent. The president of the European
Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, called him the pole of liberty in Afghanistan.[127][128][129][130]
On September 9, 2001, Massoud, then aged 48, was the
target of a suicide attack by two Arabs posing as journalists at Khwaja Bahauddin, in the Takhar Province of
Afghanistan. Massoud, who had survived countless assassination attempts over a period of 26 years, died in a
helicopter taking him to a hospital. The rst attempt on
Massouds life had been carried out by Hekmatyar and
HISTORY
2.4 U.S.-led
NATO
invasion
of
Afghanistan,
Taliban overthrow
and insurgency
Main article: War in Afghanistan (2001present)
2.4.1 Prelude
After the September 11 attacks on the U.S. and the
PENTTBOM investigation, the United States made the
following demands of the Taliban,[135]
1. Deliver to the U.S. all of the leaders
of Al-Qaeda
2. Release all foreign nationals that have
been unjustly imprisoned
3. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats,
and aid workers
4. Close immediately every terrorist training camp
5. Hand over every terrorist and their supporters to appropriate authorities
2.4
6. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection
The U.S. petitioned the international community to back
a military campaign to overthrow the Taliban. The U.N.
issued two resolutions on terrorism after the September
11 attacks. The resolutions called on all states to "[increase] cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism and
specied consensus recommendations for all countries.
The Security Council did not authorize military intervention in Afghanistan of any kind, and nowhere in the U.N
resolutions did it say military operations in Afghanistan
were justied or conformed to international law. Despite
this, NATO approved a campaign against Afghanistan as
self-defense against armed attack.[136][137]
The Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salem Zaeef, responded to the ultimatum by demanding convincing evidence that Bin Laden was involved in the attacks, stating our position is that if America has evidence and proof, they should produce it. Additionally,
the Taliban insisted that any trial of Bin Laden be held
in an Afghan court. Zaeef also claimed that 4,000
Jews working in the Trade Center had prior knowledge
of the suicide missions, and 'were absent on that day.'"
This response was generally dismissed as a delaying tactic, rather than a sincere attempt to cooperate with the
ultimatum.[138][138][139][140][140][141][142][143]
On October 7, less than one month after the September 11 attacks, the U.S., aided by the United Kingdom,
Canada, and other countries including several from the
NATO alliance, initiated military action, bombing Taliban and Al-Qaeda-related camps.[147][148] The stated intent of military operations was to remove the Taliban
from power, and prevent the use of Afghanistan as a
terrorist base of operations.[149]
The CIAs elite Special Activities Division (SAD) units
were the rst U.S. forces to enter Afghanistan (noting
that many dierent countries intelligence agencies were
on the ground or operating within theatre before SAD,
and that SAD are not technically military forces, but civilian paramilitaries). They joined with the Afghan United
Front (Northern Alliance) to prepare for the subsequent
arrival of U.S. Special Operations forces. The United
Front (Northern Alliance) and SAD and Special Forces
combined to overthrow the Taliban with minimal coalition casualties, and without the use of international conventional ground forces. The Washington Post stated in
an editorial by John Lehman in 2006:
HISTORY
What made the Afghan campaign a landmark in the U.S. Militarys history is that it
was prosecuted by Special Operations forces
from all the services, along with Navy and Air
Force tactical power, operations by the Afghan
Northern Alliance and the CIA were equally
important and fully integrated. No large Army
or Marine force was employed.[150]
On October 14, the Taliban oered to discuss handing
over Osama bin Laden to a neutral country in return for
a bombing halt, but only if the Taliban were given evidence of bin Ladens involvement.[151] The U.S. rejected
this oer, and continued military operations. Mazar-iSharif fell to United Front troops of Ustad Atta MohamDevelopment of a then-small Taliban insurgency up until 2006,
mad Noor and Abdul Rashid Dostum on November 9,
the year which saw an escalation in Taliban attacks
triggering a cascade of provinces falling with minimal resistance.
In November 2001, before the capture of Kunduz by
United Front troops under the command of Mohammad
Daud Daud, thousands of top commanders and regular
ghters of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, Pakistani InterServices Intelligence agents and military personnel, and
other volunteers and sympathizers in the Kunduz airlift,
dubbed the Airlift of Evil by US military forces around
Kunduz and subsequently used as a term in media reports, were evacuated and airlifted out of Kunduz by
Pakistan Army cargo aircraft to Pakistan Air Force air
bases in Chitral and Gilgit in Pakistans Northern Areas.[113][152][153][154][155][156]
By 2009, a strong resistance was created, known as Operation Al Faath, the Arabic word for victory taken from
Main article: Taliban insurgency
the Koran,[163][164][165] in the form of a guerrilla war. The
Before the summer 2006 oensive began, indications ex- Pashtun tribal group, with over 40 million members (in-
3.1
Massacre campaigns
cluding Afghans and Pakistanis) had a long history of resistance to occupation forces, so the Taliban may have
comprised only a part of the insurgency. Most postinvasion Taliban ghters were new recruits, mostly drawn
from local madrasas.
In December 2009, Asia Times Online reported that the
Taliban had oered to give the US legal guarantees
that it would not allow Afghanistan to be used for attacks on other countries, and that the US had given no
response.[166]
2.4.4
Targeted killings
2.5
Goals
9
they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or
to Mullah Omar himself. These are the same type of
war crimes as were committed in Bosnia and should be
prosecuted in international courts, one UN ocial was
quoted as saying. The documents also reveal the role of
Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings. Bin
Ladens so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for masskillings of Afghan civilians. The report by the United
Nations quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab ghters carrying long knives used for slitting
throats and skinning people. The Talibans former ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, in late
2011 stated that cruel behaviour under and by the Taliban
had been necessary.[39][44][45][170]
In 1998, the United Nations accused the Taliban of denying emergency food by the UNs World Food Programme
to 160,000 hungry and starving people for political and
military reasons.[171] The UN said the Taliban were
starving people for their military agenda and using humanitarian assistance as a weapon of war.
On August 8, 1998 the Taliban launched an attack on
Mazar-i Sharif. Of 1500 defenders only 100 survived
the engagement. Once in control the Taliban began to
kill people indiscriminately. At rst shooting people in
the street, they soon began to target Hazaras. Women
were raped, and thousands of people were locked in containers and left to suocate. This ethnic cleansing left an
estimated 5,000 to 6,000 dead. At this time ten Iranian
diplomats and a journalist were killed. Iran assumed the
Taliban had murdered them, and mobilized its army, deploying men along the border with Afghanistan. By the
middle of September there were 250,000 Iranian personnel stationed on the border. Pakistan mediated and the
bodies were returned to Tehran towards the end of the
month. The killings of the Diplomats had been carried
out by Sipah-e-Sahaba a Pakistani Sunni group with close
ties to the ISI. They burned orchards, crops and destroyed
irrigation systems, and forced more than 100,000 people
from their homes with hundreds of men, women and children still unaccounted for.[91][118][172][173][174]
3.1
Massacre campaigns
10
of people from the Shomali Plains and other regions con- Taliban commanders freed women that were being held
ducting a policy of scorched earth burning homes, farm by Arab members of al-Qaeda in a camp.[177]
land and gardens.[48]
Human tracking
11
3.4
12
IDEOLOGY
issues, expressed support for the movement on purely eth- 4.3 Explanation of ideology
nic grounds.[210]
The author Ahmed Rashid suggests that the devastation
Like Wahhabi and other Deobandis, the Taliban do not
and hardship of the Soviet invasion and the following peconsider Shii to be Muslims. The Shia in Afghanistan
riod inuenced Taliban ideology.[216] It is said that the
consist mostly of the Hazara ethnic group which totaled
Taliban did not include scholars learned in Islamic law
almost 10% of Afghanistans population.[211]
and history. The refugee students, brought up in a totally
The Taliban were averse to debating doctrine with other male society, not only had no education in mathematics,
Muslims. The Taliban did not allow even Muslim re- science, history or geography, but also had no traditional
porters to question [their] edicts or to discuss interpreta- skills of farming, herding, or handicraft-making, nor even
tions of the Qur'an.[212]
knowledge of their tribal and clan lineages.[216] In such an
The Taliban strictly enforced its ideology in major cities environment, war meant employment, peace meant unlike Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar. In rural areas the Tal- employment. Dominating women simply armed maniban had little direct control, and promoted village jirgas, hood. For their leadership, rigid fundamentalism was a
so it did not enforce its ideology as stringently in rural matter not only of principle, but also of political survival.
Taliban leaders repeatedly told Rashid that if they gave
areas.[213]
women greater freedom or a chance to go to school, they
would lose the support of their rank and le.[217]
4.2
Bamyan Buddhas
4.4 Criticisms
The Taliban were criticized for their strictness toward
those who disobeyed their imposed rules. Many Muslims complained that most Taliban rules had no basis in
the Qur'an or sharia. Mullah Omar's title as Amir alMu'minin was criticized on the grounds that he lacked
scholarly learning, tribal pedigree, or connections to the
Prophets family. Sanction for the title traditionally required the support of all of the countrys ulema, whereas
only some 1,200 Pashtun Taliban-supporting Mullahs had
declared Omar the Amir. No Afghan had adopted the
title since 1834, when King Dost Mohammed Khan assumed the title before he declared jihad against the Sikh
kingdom in Peshawar. But Dost Mohammed was ghting
foreigners, while Omar had declared jihad against other
Afghans.[221]
Another criticism was that the Taliban called their 20%
tax on truckloads of opium "zakat", which is traditionally
limited to 2.5% of the zakat-payers disposable income
(or wealth).[221]
5.2
Organization
13
5.1
Overview
5.2 Organization
The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to
ocials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes,
and weapons. We want to live a life like the
Prophet lived 1400 years ago, and jihad is our
14
6 ECONOMY
1998 had control of the major airports and border crossings which allowed them to establish a monopoly on all
trade. By 2001 the per capita income of the 25 million
population was under $200, and the country was close
to total economic collapse. As of 2007 the economy
had begun to recover, with estimated foreign reserves
of three billion dollars and a 13% increase in economic
growth.[110][185][235][236][236][237][238]
leases, policy statements, or hold regular press conferences. The outside world and most Afghans did not even
know what their leaders looked like, since photography
was banned.[232] The regular army resembled a lashkar
or traditional tribal militia force with only 25,000 men (of
whom 11,000 were non-Afghans).
Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a
"madrasah education. Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who left their administrative posts to ght when needed. Military reverses that
trapped them behind lines or led to their deaths increased
the chaos in the national administration.[233] At the national level, all senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats were replaced with Pashtuns, whether qualied or
not. Consequently, the ministries by and large ceased
to function.[231]
Under the Transit treaty between Afghanistan and Pakistan a massive network for smuggling developed. It had
an estimated turnover of 2.5 billion dollars with the Taliban receiving between $100 and $130 million per year.
These operations along with the trade from the Golden
Crescent nanced the war in Afghanistan and also had
the side eect of destroying start up industries in Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid also explained that the Afghan
the largest ofThe Ministry of Finance had neither a budget nor qual- Transit Trade agreed on by Pakistan was [239][240][241]
cial
source
of
revenue
for
the
Taliban.
ied economist or banker. Mullah Omar collected and
dispersed cash without bookkeeping.
Between 1996 and 1999 Mullah Omar reversed his opinions on the drug trade, apparently as it only harmed kars.
The Taliban controlled 96% of Afghanistans poppy elds
5.3 Conscription
and made opium its largest source of taxation. Taxes on
opium exports became one of the mainstays of Taliban
Main article: Taliban conscription
income and their war economy. According to Rashid,
drug money funded the weapons, ammunition and fuel
According to the testimony of Guantanamo captives be- for the war. In the New York Times, the Finance Minister
fore their Combatant Status Review Tribunals, the Tal- of the United Front, Wahidullah Sabawoon, declared the
iban, in addition to conscripting men to serve as soldiers, Taliban had no annual budget but that they appeared to
spend US$300 million a year, nearly all of it on war. He
also conscripted men to sta its civil service.[234]
added that the Taliban had come to increasingly rely on
three sources of money: poppy, the Pakistanis and bin
Laden.[241]
Economy
7.1
Pakistan
International relations
During its time in power, the Taliban regime, or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: the United Arab Emirates,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, all of which provided substantial aid. The other nations including the United Nations recognized the government of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan (parts of whom were part of the United
Front (Northern Alliance) as the legitimate government
of Afghanistan.
7.1
Pakistan
15
Koranic students who had studied at madrasas set up
for Afghan refugees, usually by JUI. Maulana Fazal-urRehman, JUIs leader, was a political ally of Benazir
Bhutto. After Bhutto became prime minister, Rehman
had access to the government, the army and the ISI,
whom he inuenced to help the Taliban.[253]
Pakistans ISI supported the previously unknown Kandahari student movement, the Taliban, as the group conquered Afghanistan in the 1990s.[254][255][256]
Human Rights Watch writes, Pakistani aircraft assisted
with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat operations in late 2000 and ... senior members of Pakistans intelligence agency and army were involved in
planning military operations.[257] Pakistan provided military equipment, recruiting assistance, training, and tactical advice.[258] Ocially Pakistan denied supporting the
Taliban militarily.
Author Ahmed Rashid claims that the Taliban had unprecedented access among Pakistans lobbies and interest groups. He also writes that they at times were able to
play o one lobby against another and extend their inuence in Pakistan even further.[259] By 199899, Talibanstyle groups in Pakistans Pashtun belt, and to an extent in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, were banning TV and
videos ... and forcing people, particularly women, to
adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life.[260]
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the U.S.
operation in Afghanistan the Afghan Taliban leadership
is claimed to have ed to Pakistan where they regrouped
and created several shuras to coordinate their insurgency
in Afghanistan. On February 8, 2009, U.S. commander
of operations in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal and other ocials said that the Taliban leadership was
in Quetta, Pakistan, though the Pakistani government, an
ocial U.S. ally, denied this.[261]
A range of ocials inside and outside Pakistan have
stepped up suggestions of links between the ISI and terrorist groups in recent years. In fall 2006, a leaked report by a British Defense Ministry think tank charged,
Indirectly Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting terrorism and extremism--whether in London on 7/7
[the July 2005 attacks on Londons transit system], or in
Afghanistan, or Iraq. In June 2008, Afghan ocials accused Pakistans intelligence service of plotting a failed
assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai; shortly
thereafter, they implied the ISIs involvement in a July
2008 Taliban attack on the Indian embassy. Indian ocials also blamed the ISI for the bombing of the Indian
embassy. Numerous U.S. ocials have also accused the
ISI of supporting terrorist groups including the Afghan
Taliban. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said to
a certain extent, they play both sides. Gates and others suggest the ISI maintains links with groups like the
Afghan Taliban as a strategic hedge to help Islamabad
gain inuence in Kabul once U.S. troops exit the region.
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta Admiral Mike
16
Mullen in 2011 called the Haqqani network (the Afghan
Talibans most destructive element) a veritable arm of
Pakistans ISI. He further stated, Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan
are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US
soldiers. [36][36][262]
7 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
and 2 bomb making factories of terrorists were destroyed in North Waziristan Agency as the operation
continues.[272][273][274]
7.4
al-Qaeda
17
Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar asked the Tehriki-Taliban Pakistan in late 2008 and early 2009 to stop
attacks inside Pakistan, to change their focus as an organization and to ght the Afghan National Army and
ISAF forces in Afghanistan instead. In late December
2008 and early January 2009 he sent a delegation, led by
former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Abdullah Zakir, to persuade leading members of the TTP to put aside
dierences with Pakistan.[278]
Some regional experts state the common name Taliban
may be more misleading than illuminating.[276] Gilles
Dorronsoro, a scholar of South Asia currently at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Wash- Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir interviewing al-Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, November 2001.
ington says:
The fact that they have the same name
causes all kinds of confusion.[276]
The so-called Brigade 055 was also responsible for massacres against civilians in other parts of Afghanistan.[39]
As the Pakistani Army began oensives against the Pak- From 1996 to 2001, the organization of Osama Bin
istani Taliban, many unfamiliar with the region thought Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become a virtual state
incorrectly that the assault was against the Afghan Tal- within the Taliban state.
iban of Mullah Omar which was not the case.[276]
Taliban-al-Qaeda connections were also strengthened by
The Pakistani Taliban were put under sanctions by U.N. the reported marriage of one of bin Ladens sons to
Security Council for terrorists attacks in Pakistan and the Omars daughter. While in Afghanistan, bin Laden may
2010 Times Square car bombing attempt.[277]
have helped nance the Taliban.[288][289]
7.3
Malakand Taliban
Malakand Taliban is a militant outt led by Su Muhammad and his son in law Molvi Fazalullah. Su Muhammad is in Pakistani government custody, however, Molvi
Fazalullah is believed to be in Afghanistan. In the last
week of May 2011, eight security personnel and civilians
fell victim to four hundred armed Taliban who attacked
Shaltalo check post in Dir, a frontier District of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, located few kilometers away from Afghan
border. Although, they have been linked with Waziristanbased Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the connection
between these two groups was of symbolic nature.[284]
7.4
al-Qaeda
18
7.5
7 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Iran
7.6
United States
The United States never recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan. However, Ahmed Rashid states that
the U.S. indirectly supported the Taliban through its ally
in Pakistan between 1994 and 1996 because Washington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and proWestern. Washington furthermore hoped that the Taliban
would support development planned by the U.S.-based
oil company Unocal. For example, it made no comment
when the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, and expelled
thousands of girls from schools. In late 1997, American
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright began to distance
the U.S. from the Taliban, and the American-based oil
company Unocal withdrew from negotiations on pipeline
construction from Central Asia.[307][308][309][310]
7.9
19
During 2008 the United Kingdom announced plans to pay 7.9 United Nations and NGOs
Taliban ghters to switch sides or lay down arms; the proceeding year the U.K. government supported negotiations A major issue during the Talibans reign was its relations
with the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental orwith the Taliban.[323][324]
ganizations (NGOs). Twenty years of continuous warfare
had devastated Afghanistans infrastructure and econ7.8 India
omy. There was no running water, little electricity,
few telephones, functioning roads or regular energy supIndia is one of the Talibans most outspoken critics. India plies. Basic necessities like water, food, housing and
did not recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and others were in desperately short supply. In addition,
instead maintained close strategic and military ties with the clan and family structure that provided Afghans with
the Northern Alliance so as to contain the rise of Tal- a social/economic safety net was also badly damaged.
iban during the 1990s. India was one of the closest allies Afghanistans infant mortality was the highest in the
of former Afghan president Mohammad Najibullah and world. A full quarter of all children died before they
strongly condemned his public execution by the Taliban. reached their fth birthday, a rate several times higher
Pakistan and Kashmir-based militant groups thought to than most other developing countries.[212][341][342]
have ties with the Taliban have historically been involved International charitable and/or development organisain the Kashmir insurgency targeted against Indian secu- tions (NGOs) were extremely important to the supply
rity forces.[325][326][327][328]
of food, employment, reconstruction, and other services.
In December 1999, Indian Airlines Flight 814 en route
from Kathmandu to Delhi was hijacked and taken to
Kandahar. The Taliban moved its militias near the
hijacked aircraft, supposedly to prevent Indian special
forces from storming the aircraft, and stalled the negotiations between India and the hijackers for days. The
New York Times later reported that there were credible
links between the hijackers and the Taliban. As a part of
the deal to free the plane, India released three militants.
The Taliban gave a safe passage to the hijackers and the
released militants.[329][330]
20
10
REFERENCES
million civilians, using "scorched earth" tactics to prevent announced support for President Karzais latest attempt
them from supplying the enemy with aid.[343][344][345]
to negotiate peace with the Taliban.[352][353][354][355]
Despite the aid, the Talibans attitude toward the UN
and NGOs was often one of suspicion, in place of gratitude or even tolerance. The UN operates on the basis of international law, not Sharia, and the UN did not
recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of
Afghanistan. Additionally, most foreign donors and aid
workers, were non-Muslims. As the Talibans Attorney
General Maulvi Jalil-ullah Maulvizada put it:
Let us state what sort of education the
UN wants. This is a big indel policy which
gives such obscene freedom to women which
would lead to adultery and herald the destruction of Islam. In any Islamic country where
adultery becomes common, that country is destroyed and enters the domination of the indels because their men become like women
and women cannot defend themselves. Anyone who talks to us should do so within Islams
framework. The Holy Koran cannot adjust
itself to other peoples requirements, people
should adjust themselves to the requirements
of the Holy Koran.[346]
Taliban decision-makers, particularly Mullah Omar, seldom if ever talked directly to non-Muslim foreigners, so
aid providers had to deal with intermediaries whose approvals and agreements were often reversed.[231] Around
September 1997 the heads of three UN agencies in Kandahar were expelled from the country after protesting
when a female attorney for the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees was forced to talk from behind a curtain so
her face would not be visible.[347]
When the UN increased the number of Muslim women
sta to satisfy Taliban demands, the Taliban then
required all female Muslim UN sta traveling to
Afghanistan to be chaperoned by a mahram or a blood
relative.[348] In July 1998, the Taliban closed all NGO
oces by force after those organizations refused to
move to a bombed-out former Polytechnic College as
ordered.[349] One month later the UN oces were also
shut down.[350] As food prices rose and conditions deteriorated, Planning Minister Qari Din Mohammed explained the Talibans indierence to the loss of humanitarian aid:
We Muslims believe God the Almighty will
feed everybody one way or another. If the foreign NGOs leave then it is their decision. We
have not expelled them.[351]
In 2009, a top U.N ocial called for talks with Taliban
leaders. In 2010, the U.N lifted sanctions on the Taliban,
and requested that Taliban leaders and others be removed
from terrorism watch lists. In 2010 the U.S. and Europe
8 See also
Colonel Imam
History of Afghanistan (1992present)
Opium production in Afghanistan
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
Taliban propaganda
Talibanization
United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crime
List of Taliban Leaders
9 Bibliography
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Rashid, Ahmed (2000), Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil
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Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-08340-8
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30
12
EXTERNAL LINKS
11
Further reading
Afghan Women and the Taliban: An Exploratory Assessment (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism The Hague 2014)
12
External links
Insurgency
Return Of The Taliban from PBS Frontline, October
2006
Held by The Taliban: A Reporting Trip Becomes a
Kidnapping from The New York Times, 20082009
Military Raids, Backing of Corrupt Government
Undermining Stated US Goals in Afghanistan
video report by Democracy Now!
31
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File:ANA_soldier_shows_opium_captured_in_an_alleged_Taliban_safe_house_in_Helmand.jpg
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8712299609/ Original artist: Karla Marshall
File:Afghan_Taliban_mujaheddin.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/5/5b/Afghan_Taliban_mujaheddin.jpg License: PD-US Contributors:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ckcenupvaaq5zeg.jpg Original artist:
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
File:Allah-green.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4e/Allah-green.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Converted to SVG from Image:Islam.png, originally from en:Image:Ift32.gif, uploaded to the English Wikipedia by Mr100percent on
4 February 2003. Originally described as Copied from Public Domain artwork. Original artist: ?
File:Basmala.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/Basmala.svg License: Public domain Contributors:
Own work Original artist: Creator: ( previous version Baba66)
File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original
artist: ?
File:Edit-clear.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The
Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist:
The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the le, specically: Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although
minimally).
File:Flag_of_Afghanistan.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/Flag_of_Afghanistan.svg License: CC0
Contributors: http://openclipart.org/detail/24112/flag-of-afghanistan-by-anonymous-24112 Original artist:
User:Zscout370
File:Flag_of_Hezbe_Wahdat.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7e/Flag_of_Hezbe_Wahdat.svg License:
CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: MrPenguin20
File:Flag_of_Jamiat-e_Islami.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f2/Flag_of_Jamiat-e_Islami.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work, vectorization of a JPEG draw by a afghan. Original artist: Falerstico
File:Flag_of_Taliban.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Flag_of_Taliban.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: The text is the Shahadah; compare Image:Flag of Jihad.svg, Image:Hamas ag2.png, Image:Flag of Saudi Arabia.svg Original
artist: Based on Taliban ag (Flag of Afghanistan 1997-2001) at FOTW (instead of direct copy of text from Saudi Arabian ag).
File:Flag_of_the_Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant2.svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ed/
Flag_of_the_Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant2.svg License: Public domain Contributors: This le was derived from: Flag of
Islamic State of Iraq.svg
Original artist: The Islamic State
File:Flag_of_the_National_Islamic_Movement_of_Afghanistan.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/7/7e/Flag_
of_the_National_Islamic_Movement_of_Afghanistan.svg License: Fair use Contributors: Made by MrPenguin20. Based on ag visible
here. Original artist: ?
File:GIs_burn_a_house_described_as_a_Taliban_safehouse.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/23/
GIs_burn_a_house_described_as_a_Taliban_safehouse.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: afghanistan Original artist: U.S. Army
photo by Sta Sgt. Justin Holley
File:Hamid_Mir_interviewing_Osama_bin_Laden.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/Hamid_Mir_
interviewing_Osama_bin_Laden.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: http://www.canadafreepress.com/ Original artist: Hamid Mir
File:Jameah_Darul_Uloom_Deoband.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/40/Jameah_Darul_Uloom_
Deoband.jpg License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Bakrbinaziz
File:KandaharHijacking.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/d/de/KandaharHijacking.jpg License: Fair use Contributors:
Unknown (possibly AP or government of India)
Original artist: ?
File:NATO_flag.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Flag_of_NATO.svg License: Public domain Contributors: www.nato.int Original artist:
Vectorized by Mysid and uploaded to Flag of NATO.svg
File:Neotaliban_insurgency_2002-2006_en.png Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/80/Neotaliban_
insurgency_2002-2006_en.png License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors:
Antonio Giustozzi: Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. Columbia University Press, New York
2009, ISBN 978-0-231-70010-8, S.2-4 Original artist: Sommerkom
File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?
Original artist: ?
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