XI.

LEGITIME
B. Who are entitled to legitimes: Compulsory heirs. Arts. 887, 902
Rosales v. Rosales, 148 SCRA 69
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and
ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated
gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales
Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing
their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial
court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the
trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as
against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir
can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the
Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The
relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children
who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter
by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same
share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles
her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation.
The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to
1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State
as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughterin-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it
would have so provided in the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article
887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in
Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,
shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect
to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject
matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of
the Civil Code, viz

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which

the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom
his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation
as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir.
Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is
their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass
upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 III Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines 461, 1979 ed.
2 Articles 978 to 1014.
3 Art. 887 (3), Civil Code.
4 71 SCRA 262, 265 L-42257, June 14, 1976.

A. Restrictions regarding the legitime. Arts. 904, 872, 905-907, 1347

Santiago v. Santiago, et. al., G.R. 179859, August 9, 2010

THIRD DIVISION
IN
RE: PETITION
FOR
PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT
OF
BASILIOSANTIAGO,

G.R. No. 179859

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and BERSAMIN,
CLEMENTE SANTIAGO,
DEL CASTILLO,*
Petitioners,
ABAD,** and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
- versus ZOILO
S.
SANTIAGO,
FELICIDAD
SANTIAGORIVERA,
HEIRS
OF
RICARDOSANTIAGO, HEIRS
OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO,
HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA
SOCO,
ANANIAS
SOCO,
URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES Promulgated:
SOCO
AND
HEIRS
OF August 9, 2010
CONSOLACION SOCO,
Oppositors.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to
Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia
Lomotan.Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the
mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias,
Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano,
Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all
surnamedSantiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein
petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.[1]
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan[2] a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed
as SP No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the
RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN,
IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking
mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:

xxxx

c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at

mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop
at lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang
Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang
palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar
at Clemente; ngunit ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa
lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic],
sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa
aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang
panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop
ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at
Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20)
taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at
pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping
kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin
lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na
kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay
maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at
pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila
ding kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia
Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo,
Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang parepareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan ng
pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong
(20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma.
Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng
nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba
pang mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o
salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)[3]

The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and

his first wife, were, on their motion, allowed to intervene.[4]

After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting,

Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, [5] the probate court
approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of
deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of title indicated
therein.[6] Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in
Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.[7]
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention[8] with the
probate court, alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a certain
Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios will violates
Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.[9]
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its
previous approval of the Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in
Accordance with the Will.[10]
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint
for completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 562-M-90,[11] against the heirs of the second and third marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially
maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilios will because their
legitime was reduced.[12] They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and
appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and
Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the
properties from the time of Basilios death up to the time of the filing of Civil
Case No. 562-M-90.[13]
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of
legitime) in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals,
by Decision of January 25, 2002,[14] annulled the decision of RTC-Branch
17, holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-

Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the
probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case No. 562M-90.[15] Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is
hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let the Decree of
Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.[16] (emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)

Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts

decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
155606, which this Court denied.[17] The denial became final and executory
on April 9, 2003.[18]
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of
the second marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10)
a Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for
Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees.[19] Citing the earlier
quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged that:
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject
properties should be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and
Clemente Santiago expired on September 16, 1993.
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
should have ceased as such administrator[s] way back on September
16, 1993 and they should have transferred the above said titles to the
named legatees in the Last Will and Testament of the testator by
then. Said named legatees in the Last Will and Testament are no[ne]
other than the following:
xxxx
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have
also rendered an accounting of their administration from such death of
the testator up to the present or until transfer of said properties and its
administration to the said legatees.

x x x x[20]

Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:

1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their
names to [the] Honorable Court and to transfer the same in
the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and
Testament, to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)
2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of
subject properties, including any and all improvements
thereon, to said legatees.
3) To render an accounting of their administration of said
properties and other properties of the testator under their
administration, from death of testator Basilio Santiago
on September 16, 1973 up to the present and until
possession and administration thereof is transferred to said
legatees.[21]

Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the
Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will,
and with the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the
properties involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated.[22]
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be
transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of
administration only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,
[23]
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of
Titles in the Names of the Legatees dated October 3, 2000 filed by
some heirs of the testator Basilio Santiago xxx is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma.
PilarSantiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago are hereby DIRECTED, as
follows:
a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their
names to this Honorable Court and to transfer the same in
the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and
Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak
na 2.) Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano
7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all
named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of
subject properties including any and all improvements
thereon, to said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject
properties, including any and all improvements thereon, to
said legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the
above-mentioned estate of the testator or all the above said
lots including the rice mill, animal feeds factory, and all
improvements thereon from August 14, 1978 up to the
present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how
the parties may actually partition or adjudicate all the above
said properties including the properties already in the name
of all the said legatees xxx.
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are
hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effects
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786],
T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No.
7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-249176 (RT-46293)
[Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the names of
Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma.
Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad
Santiago, Eugenia Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde
Santiago.

Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is

hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effect
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the names of
Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu
thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene
Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila,
Ma. Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco,
dated December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[24]

Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed
and terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that
subject properties cannot actually be partitioned until after 20 years
from the death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore,
clear that something more has to be done after the approval of said
Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution. The testator Basilio
Santiago died on September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can
only be filed after September 16, 1993. Movants cause of action
accrues only from the said date and for which no prescription of action
has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present
probate proceeding which is continuing in character, and
terminates only after and until the final distribution or settlement
of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance with the provision
of the will of the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers
only to the accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate of the
deceased for the period covering from the date of the filing of the
petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And
in the said August 14, 1978 order it does not terminate the appointment
of petitioner[s] Ma. PilarSantiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix
and administrator, respectively, of the estate of the deceased
particularly of those properties which were prohibited by the testator to
be partitioned within 20 years from his death. Since then up to the
present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the executor
and administrator of the estate of the deceased and as such, they are
required by law to render an accounting thereof from August 14,
1978 up to the present; there is also now a need to partition and

distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition period to do so has

elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)[25]

Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for

reconsideration,[26] which the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal
to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.

[27]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court,

hence, the petition[28] which raises the following grounds:
I.
CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE
ITSELF
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING
ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING
THE SAME PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC AS IT AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS
NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN
C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
II.
GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL
THE COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE
ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING
THE
RTCS
ORDER
TO
TRANSFER
THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004 TO
THE NAMES OF CECILIA LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA.
PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA,
CLEMENTE AND CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO.
[29]
(emphasis in the original)

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the
earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606)
constitutesres judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of
the present petition for review) fails.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b)
and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. [30] The first, known as
bar by prior judgment, proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action.
[31]
The second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.[32]
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the
present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the
reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present
petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the termination of
administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the legateesheirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of
claim, demand or cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No.
155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of
parties, conclusiveness of judgment cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards the
issue on oppositors supposed preterition and reduction of legitime, which
issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the present
petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors
only. The records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the
decision of the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro
forma parties.

Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate

court in CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of
Basilio should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to
prohibit the interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilios
estate and does not pertain to respondents supervening right to demand the
termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their
names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting
respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and
for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary
continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order that approved the accounting,
partition and distribution of Basilios estate. As did the appellate court, the
Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become final pending
the whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this
case, would culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the
prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in
Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that no one is to
own the same.
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he
intended the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names
for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs
in common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa
aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon
ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na
mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang itoy walang
magmamay-aribagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang
magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa

paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x x x x [33] (emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is

subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]s
contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles
494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the
prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for
twenty (20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the
indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it would be
contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period
expressly mandated by the Civil Code x x x x[34]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Additional member per Special Order No. 875 dated August 2, 2010 in view of the sick leave of absence
of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion.
**
Designated as Additional Member, per Special Order No. 843 (May 17, 2010), in view of the vacancy
occasioned by the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.
[1]
As narrated in the Last Will and Testament of Basilio Santiago; Vide: Joint Record on Appeal, p. 12.
[2]
Then the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
[3]
Joint Record on Appeal, pp. 15-17.
[4]
Records, pp. 89.
[5]
Id. at 97-102.
[6]
Id. at 108.
[7]
CA rollo, p. 228.
[8]
Records, pp. 271-275.
[9]
Article 979: Legitimate children and their descendants succeed to the parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child.
Article 980: The children of the deceased shall always inherit, from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Article 981: Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
[10]
Records, p. 380.
[11]
Rollo, p. 302.
[12]
Records, p. 421.
[13]
Id. at 423.
[14]
Penned by Justice Candido Rivera with the concurrence of Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Juan
Q. Enriquez.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 304-305.
[16]
Id. at 308.
[17]
Id. at 309.
[18]
Id. at 312.
[19]
Records, pp. 390-396.
[20]
Id. at 393-394.
[21]
Id. at 394.
[22]
Id. at 409-415.
[23]
Id. at 824-847.
[24]
Id. at 846-847.
[25]
Id. at 623.
[26]
Id. at 629-647
[27]
CA rollo, pp. 221-239, Decision of February 23, 2007, penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Reynato C. Dacudao and Arturo
G. Tayag.
[28]
Rollo, pp. 34-60.
[29]
Id. at 46-47.
[30]
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.-The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to

have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
[31]
Chris Garments Corp. v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 167426, January 12, 2009, 576 SCRA 13, 21
citing Oropeza Marketing Corp. v. Allied Bank, G.R. No. 129788, 393 SCRA 278, 287 (2002).
[32]
Id. at 21-22 citing Heirs of Rolando Abadilla v. Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, 494 SCRA 675, 686 (2006).
[33]
Joint Record on Appeal, p. 16.
[34]
CA rollo, pp. 234-235.