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Young
Nordic Journal of Youth Research
Copyright 2008
SAGE Publications
(Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi and Singapore)
www.sagepublications.com
Vol 16(2): 15383
10.1177/110330880801600203
Abstract
The article explores the circumstances influencing family formation in Slovenia.
Public opinion surveys in Slovenia have shown that young people have high aspirations regarding family life. These findings, however, stand in sharp contrast
to demographic indicators, that is, delayed parenthood and a low birth rate. The
qualitative analysis comprised both the personal factors, such as family lifestyles
identified by young people as being desirable and the role of the family in their
plans for the future, as well as structural factors affecting the starting of a family
(housing, employment, etc.) and the problems and obstacles accompanying this
process. One crucial finding is that personal factors rather than structural constraints are a key barrier to family formation.
Keywords
childbearing, family formation, gender, life course, Slovenia, young adults
154
ata from public opinion research among Slovenian youth clearly indicate
that family is highly ranked by young people (Ule and Kuhar, 2003). For
instance, young people express desires both for starting a family and for having
children. However, and in a surprising contrast to these desires, the young do
not display any attitude that can be understood as unfavourable to the current
low level of birth rate in Slovenia. Since these findings stand in sharp contrast to
demographic indicators in Slovenia, we employed subtler, qualitative research
methods, that is, focus groups and interviews, in order to find a better explanation
for the discrepancy between highly-ranked desire for family and children and the
low level of birth rate. This article thus explores the circumstances surrounding family formation, placing emphasis on the status passage to parenthood in
Slovenia.
Slovenia has one of the lowest fertility rates1 in Europe (1.26 in 2005). A low
fertility rate is not specific to Slovenia alone, but is nowadays common to several
European countries.2 In particular, it is typical of Mediterranean countries (cf.
the Mediterranean model: Cavalli and Galland, 1995; Cordon, 20063) and postsocialist countries. The group of countries with very low fertility rates, far below
the replacement level, includes all southern European countries, the majority of
the recently acceded EU states, as well as Austria and Germany.
This trend can be considered the result of two intertwined social and cultural
processes: one involves the growing importance of individual identity and its
close connection with intimacy and life politics (Giddens, 2000), and the other
the changing meaning of youth, adulthood, and the transition to adulthood. Many
authors refer to these trends as a second demographic transition.4 In the 1960s, it
set in motion similar trends towards de-standardization of life-courses, traditional
family forms and values in all developed industrial nations (Lesthaeghe, 2001).
The life experiences of people living in western Europe, and even more so
of those living in eastern Europe, have changed radically since the beginning of
the 1990s. These changes are related to the overall process of modernization of
European countries underpinned by intense globalization and individualization
processes, restructuring of the labour markets accompanied by an increasing demand for a specialized, flexible, educated workforce, and measures arising from
social policies which nearly everywhere in Europe prolong the period of young
peoples dependence on their families of origin.
Young people in post-socialist countries in particular are confronted with risks
that were unknown to the generation of their parents. The majority of changes
in the process of transition from a planned society to one based on the market
economy occurred within a relatively short period of time, so the mainstays that
once ensured more or less reliable and predictable transitions to adulthood have
become uncertain and obscure. The increasingly widespread neo-liberal stress on
the role of the market, the growing importance of personal initiative, self-reliance,
and a feeling of responsibility for ones own life have taken root and opened up
new options which, however, come with certain risks. The individualization of
risks in both eastern and western Europe means that situations that once triggered collective or political action are now interpreted as unfortunate individual
life stories that can be resolved only by the person affected, and only through
individual action (Ule, 2004). Accordingly, it is primarily young people who
are critically dependent, both materially and emotionally (and much more so
than in the previous system), on family support, especially in their transition to
adulthood.
Ever since the early 1990s, youth research in Slovenia has been revealing truly
radical changes in the life trajectories of individuals and in transitions between
individual life stages: youth has been extended, and the patterns of transition to
adulthood have become more plural and no longer predictable (Ule, 1996, 1998;
Ule et al., 2000; Ule and Kuhar, 2002a; Ule and Miheljak 1995). Increasing numbers
of young Slovenes, especially young people with higher education and those
living in cities, pursue the kinds of life patterns that can be described as choice
biographies (Du Bois Reymond, 1998). The life pathways of the mid-1980s generation of young people in Slovenia were more linear, less diverse, less complex
and less dynamic (Ule, 1988). These changes are similar to those in other European countries (cf. Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Merino and Garcia, 2007; Pais, 2000).
As a result of the changing meaning of youth, adulthood and the transition
to adulthood, starting a family is becoming a less and less self-evident stage in
young peoples life trajectories. This most significant rite of passage in the human
life course is increasingly associated with the notion of crossing the Rubicon.
Parenthood is no longer perceived as either an obligation or destiny it has
become a carefully deliberated decision. Family and children may represent a
paramount value, but the fertility rate nevertheless remains very low. Young
people (and young adults) consider family and children to be a sign of the good
life and of authenticity but choose to delay marriage and parenthood. The
reasons underlying this trend are complex, multiple and interconnected. The
increasingly important concept of self-identity has become strictly connected
with intimacy and life politics (Giddens, 2000). In fact, a child (but not children) is considered to be an expression of the fulfilment of ones identity
while being, of course, also the natural expression of life as a couple (BeckGernsheim, 2002).
155
156
fertility rate has been falling consistently since the 1980s. In 1955, it was 2.52
children per woman; at the beginning of the 1980s, it fell below the magic level
of 2.0 children per woman; by the mid 1980s it was 1.7, and by 2005 it had
fallen even further to 1.26 children (Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Office of the
Republic of Slovenia, 2006) (Table 1).
It should be noted that in Slovenia there was no childlessness among a certain
part of the female population past their reproductive years in generations born
after the Second World War, as was the case in other developed European countries (approximately 20 per cent), which seems to be a stable plateau in the
West following the contraceptive revolution of the early 1960s (Hakim, 2003).6
According to the Family and Fertility Surveys 1995, voluntary childlessness in the
generations born between 1956 and 1975 was below 10 per cent among both
men and women in many European countries,7 except in Belgium and Austria,
where 14 per cent of men and 10 per cent of women were certain they did not
want to have children. In Slovenia and Latvia, voluntary childlessness in this generation is less than 1 per cent among men and women (Hakim, 2003).
In contrast to results obtained for other European countries (Hakim, 2003), not
one of the recent public opinion surveys in Slovenia indicated that respondents
did not want to have children. For example, data from the Youth 2000 research
project in Slovenia (Ule and Kuhar, 2002b) show a strong disposition to have
children. Less than 2 per cent of 1629 year-olds stated that they did not intend
to have children. In the age range 26 to 29 inclusive, 44.9 per cent of those
polled (58.7 per cent of women and 25 per cent of men) actually have children.
By cross-referencing the answers to the question about children and data on
education, we were able to establish that young men and women up to 29 years
old who have children are, on average, less educated than those who still do not
have children. People from urban areas have significantly fewer children than
those from non-urban areas.
National public opinion surveys and representative studies of youth in the
1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century actually indicated a great implosion
towards family life in comparison with the representative youth survey in Slovenia
for 1985 (Ule, 1988; Ule and Miheljak, 1995; Ule, 1996; Ule et al., 2000; Ule and
Kuhar, 2002b; Slovenian public opinion surveys: SJM 1992/1, SJM 1993/2, SJM
1995/2, SJM 1999/3, 2003/2, 2004/2). The various value measurement scales
show that family and family life became, along with friendship and health, the
most important values for young people8. According to opinion surveys, young
Slovenes wish to have their own families; they have high aspirations regarding
children and demonstrate no anti-parenthood attitudes.
Despite these survey results in favour of parenthood, the cohort of women
born at the end of the 1960s was the last to give birth to at least one child in entirety (Obersnel-Kveder et al., 2001). Since then, around 20 per cent of women
still do not have a child at the age of 34. In a comparative study of European countries, Tomas Frejka and Grard Calot (2001) state that the basic general trend of
1.71
2.11
1.42
1991
1.34
1992
1.34
1993
1.32
1994
1.29
1995
1.28
1996
1.25
1997
1985
1980
1.23
1998
1.21
1999
1.26
2000
1.21
2001
1.21
2002
1.2
2003
1.25
2004
1.26
2005
157
158
159
160
home is smallest in the Nordic and Atlantic countries and greatest in southern
European countries. This holds true for both men and women.
In all countries, more young women than men leave their parental homes.
However, there exist significant differences among countries: Sweden has the
lowest percentage of young people living with parents (10 per cent of women
and 10 per cent of men), while Italy has the highest (61 per cent of men and
57 per cent of women). Among the new EU members, the three most northern,
Baltic countries (particularly Estonia and Latvia) show the lowest percentages of
1834 year-olds living in parental homes (from 3037 per cent); next is a very
homogeneous group composed of Central European countries with percentages
between 46 per cent and 48 per cent. The new members, considered as a
group, are very close to the group of southern European countries with high
percentages of young people living in parental homes. However, even within
this new member group, there exist huge and consistent differences between
Central European and Baltic countries. In this group, Slovenia has the largest
percentage of young people living in parental households in addition to the
European record holder Malta, where 67 per cent of young people between
18 and 34 years of age live with their parents (Mandic, 2007).
Only one-fifth of young Slovenes between 25 and 29 years of age, already living
with their partners/spouses, have their own apartment (Statistical Yearbook,
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2006). The housing supply is deficient in Slovenia, especially in the capital Ljubljana. In Slovenia, this problem is
especially pronounced because of the culture of housing ownership. More than
90 per cent of apartments and houses are privately owned (Kos, 2002). Slovenia
is among the countries with the lowest rental housing supply and one in which
this supply was reduced during the transition phase (through privatization and
denationalization of socially-owned rental apartments) it fell from 33 per cent
of the total housing supply in 1990 to only 9 per cent in 2003 (Mandic and
Gnidovec, 1999). The prices of new apartments and parcels of land are relatively
very high (even in comparison with other big European cities) and are still
increasing. Accordingly, protracted living in the parental home in Slovenia can
be understood as fall-out from the housing reform during the transition phase,
which radically reduced the public rental sector.
On the other hand, the findings of youth studies (Ule, 1996; Ule et al., 2000;
Ule and Kuhar, 2002b) indicate that the relations between growing children and
parents in Slovenia are exceptionally supportive and of relatively high quality10.
The majority of young Slovenians report that they are well provided with parental
emotional and instrumental support. Young people can enjoy quite a high level
of everyday freedom, even while living with parents. Less than a fifth of young
people do not feel good at home or wish for greater parental support (Ule
and Kuhar, 2002b). The importance of mothers has grown in particular; they act
as exceptionally important therapists and alleviators of stress and conflict with
the outside world. Apart from being the main adviser, comforter and assistant,
the mother is also the best friend to her children (Ule et al., 2000). The departure
and independence of children cause emotional stress for the parents, since they
have not yet adjusted to the changes in life courses either. Among the reasons
leading young people to delay leaving home is that they do not want to hurt
their parents, who fear an empty family nest (Ule et al., 2000).
Accordingly, the reasons for prolonged living with parents are both objective
(prolonged schooling, difficulty in finding jobs, that is, attaining economic independence, grappling with the demands of the work environment, housing problems, etc.) and subjective (comfortable and inexpensive living, material and
emotional security, a high level of freedom and autonomy at home, friendly
relations with parents, etc.) (Ule and Kuhar, 2003).
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162
Gender roles
Ever since the early 1950s, Slovenia has had a tradition of relatively high participation of women in the workforce and therefore a dual earner model, with both
partners working full time11 and with unequal share of tasks (Jogan, 2000). Among
the post-socialist countries, Slovenia is unique in that womens participation in
the labour market has not decreased since transition. In Slovenia, the majority
ernic
of mothers go back to full-time work after maternity leave (Stropnik and C
Istenic, 2001).
According to research studies conducted since 1977, the distribution of roles
and relations in the family is rather traditional (Ule and Kuhar, 2004). As the
Research design
To highlight subjective experiences and meanings attached to the processes
of family formation, the decision to have children, and family and childbearing
163
164
(3) What do you think are the advantages of family life and of having
children?
(4) How do you imagine your partnership life at the age of 35?
(5) Do you anticipate having a child at some stage in life?
(6) If yes, how many children do you intend to have? What is your ideal
number of children?
(7) If not, why not?
(8) When do you think is the best time to have a child?
(9) What are the necessary preconditions for having a child?
(10) What are the specific factors that are postponing your decision to have
a child?
On average, the focus groups discussions lasted from an hour-and-a-half to two
hours. Each session was audio-taped. Following the sessions, transcripts were
created for each discussion. We reduced transcripts to individual snippets (one
per speaker per utterance), with a snippet being defined as the smallest meaningful statement. From our transcripts, we created a databank of 3014 valid snippets.
Finally, we created a coding scheme that was applied to all snippets. When coding
focus group transcripts, we followed conventional content analytic guidelines,
for example, creating precise operational definitions of all categories used and
reliability checks to ensure that all snippets were coded in similar ways. The
findings reported here derive primarily from our analysis of these snippets.
165
166
However, young adults do not imagine the formation of a family as their life task
or a destiny accepted for the good of the nation, the state, norms or morality. The
family for them means primarily a means of emotional fulfilment and represents
an institution that functions as a personal support and social network. In deciding
to have a family, young people make the choice between the advantages provided
by family life (with children), and the advantages of single life (without a stable
partnership and children).
Family offers security. (Male 11)
You are not alone; there is always someone you can turn to. (Female 12)
The most frequently cited advantages of family life were having someone with
whom you can share your life, a feeling of security, trust and intimacy. Intimacy
and a secure and loving relationship are generally considered to be preconditions
for parenthood. At the same time, focus group participants pointed out that partnership and parenthood demand relational work, a lot of mutual attention and
mutual affection, which over time may become strenuous and time consuming.
Among female students and among women with university education, we identified an attitude indicating that it seems entirely acceptable for them to have
a child without having a partner (that is, the conscious decision to be a single
parent). For example, one participant was talking about having a child even without having a steady relationship with a man.
If I dont find a partner, and I feel I could give something to a child, if I feel
financially safe, and if I can bring my work home, then I would have a child even
without a partner. (Female 7)
Here the biological clock is not such a restriction, since there is always the
possibility of adoption. (Female 8)
167
168
According to our findings, the most important structural factors affecting the
decision to have children are:
(1) Secure employment
Today a person doesnt have a sense of security. You work, but you dont
know if youll have a job tomorrow. (Male 19)
Young people have problems with finding employment; it is not right that
we can get only short-term employment which is then prolonged on and on.
(Female 3)
(4) The possibility of coordinating work, career and family life: This
precondition was particularly stressed by women, although young
adults in general complained that jobs were very demanding. The
majority of organizational work patterns have an adverse effect
on (potential) family life (for example, weekend work, shift work,
overtime, fixed-term contracts). The experience of intensified
workloads and demands has an important impact on the timing of
parenthood and family size. Two full-time jobs, especially ones with
inflexible hours, are difficult to sustain.
Yesterday after I finished work I didnt even have the energy to cook dinner or
think about what to cook. Its the same every day. So its impossible to have a
child, too. (Female 17)
As an employee, you must prove successful or you will be overtaken by
competitors who are always close on your heels. If you want to be successful,
you have to make sacrifices for your job. (Male 7)
The exploration of young adults family and childbearing orientations has shown
that personal factors are at least as important as structural constraints. The participants mentioned most frequently the following personal preconditions: (1) a
feeling of maturity; (2) readiness for the role of parent in both partners (decision
to take responsibility for a family and children, and overcoming the fear of losing
independence and personal autonomy); (3) quality of personal life (the feeling
of self-realization and having a comfortable life); (4) good relationship between
partners (stable partnership); (5) the perceived fair distribution of housework.
(1) Many young people between 23 and 33 openly stated that they did not
feel sufficiently mature for parenthood.
But we are still children ourselves! (Female 2)
I have a feeling that I myself am still a child, that Im not fully formed yet
and that I cannot take upon my shoulders a responsibility such as children.
(Female 4)
We are emotionally immature, and thats how we want to stay as long as
possible, up to 30 or even later. (Male 1)
I dont want to give up my standard of living for children Im quite spoilt,
and Id rather not have children. (Male 19)
(2) Participants themselves pointed out that young people today are
no longer prepared to make sacrifices and to take on (additional)
responsibility for a family and children.
Our generations are like that: a lot of parties, irresponsibility we dont know
about self-denial. (Male 2)
If you have children, every day is the same; you cannot truly switch off even for
one day. (Female 2)
Ill have a family when Im ready for it when I have exploited all the advantages;
because once you are married and have a child it is a different life. Its not like
this life now, when you can take risks and do nonsense. (Female 5)
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170
(5) Young women underlined that they expected their partners to help
them with domestic chores and in looking after children, since they
do not intend to be as burdened as their mothers.
Today women no longer accept doing all the chores ourselves. (Female 23)
Its good that they introduced fathers leave. (Female 29)
Young men expressed in principle a willingness to share work in the private
sphere; the majority would not choose this sharing on their own, but they are
aware that this is a necessity if they want to have a satisfactory relationship with
their partner.
Today women decide to have a child or not. And you do not have much choice
but to help with household chores. (Male 11)
I will share household chores with my partner, depending on who has time
and who prefers to do the work. I do not advocate the traditional division of
labour what is important is collaboration of partners. (Male 2)
Id take two or three hours to be with the child after work, and also during the
night, and the question is solved. A woman has more work, even if she is not a
housewife in the traditional sense of the word. (Male 9)
A large number of young people who (still) do not have children are afraid of the
great responsibility undoubtedly associated with modern parenthood. They felt
the bringing up of a child exacts a lot of time and energy.
Children are a really, really great responsibility. (Male 5)
Children cause your life to take too great a turn: you are put on the side track, and
the child takes the main track. (Male 15)
Everything revolves around the child from morning to night. (Female 19)
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172
Women expect men to expand their roles. We could identify friction among the
male and female participants as a result of ever-greater gender equality.
The problem lies with women women want a career, want to move in step
with men; women are not interested in having children; men have fewer problems
regarding children. I dont know any man who is against having a child if his steady
partner wants it. (Male 18)
It was interesting that the majority of women believed that they could freely
choose the age at which to give birth. There was a high level of trust among
women in modern medicine and modern artificial insemination procedures at
more advanced ages if they cannot conceive naturally.
CONCLUSIONS
Precisely because of the new dimensions of parenthood, new relations and
motives, the psychological desire to have a child is accompanied by dilemmas,
doubts and obstacles that make parenthood a difficult project, and for some
even unattainable. On the one hand, an individualized society creates a wish
in both genders to have their own lives, and a wish to attain self-realization,
autonomy and freedom. All this seems to contradict the readiness to assume responsibility for children. The decision to have a child causes doubts like Will
I be capable? and worries about whether everything will be fine. In a modern
partnership, caring for children is no longer a taken-for-granted responsibility of
one partner. Another important hindrance when making the decision to have a
child involves the greater demands connected with the bringing up of children,
socialization, time distribution and finances. In modern society, parenthood has
become a more responsible task and it is precisely this increased responsibility
that represents a burden and an obstacle when facing the decision to have a
child.
The stricter the requirement for optimal care for children is, the more demanding are the material preconditions for parenthood. This tendency is today
noticeable among all social classes. With the increase in demands associated with
the role of the parent and the birth of a child, a new pattern of decision making
has been emerging the conscious decision to have life without children. The
motive behind such a decision may be other projects that fulfil ones life, a career,
uncertain partnerships, a feeling of uncertainty, fear or even love for children.
This gives rise to a unique spiral of events: the fewer children are brought to life,
the more care is devoted to existing children, the more is invested in them, the
more precious they are and the more demanding parenthood becomes. The more
important and precious a child is, the more people fear the enormous tasks and
duties associated with parenthood.
The results of the qualitative research helped us to explain the gap between
the perception of the family as a high value, on the one hand, and the delay in
forming ones own family, on the other. In this research we highlighted the
structural constraints and personal barriers that prevent young people from
fulfilling their family aspirations. The crucial finding of the focus group segment
of the research is that personal factors are a key barrier for the majority of respondents. There is, however, one trend that seems to be universal: all or at least
most of the aforementioned conditions must be necessarily present for young
people to decide to have a child. The focus groups pointed out differences in
family orientation between urban and non-urban environments and also between
participants with higher and lower levels of education. For young adults from
non-urban areas, especially those less educated, the formation of their own family
is a value and an area of life to which they attach more importance than their
more educated peers and those living in large towns and cities. The concept of
family has a stronger symbolic significance for the former.
Non-urban young adults who are single and childless provide an excuse by
arguing that they have not found the right partner yet. In non-urban environments, there is no mention of a lack of time or energy for children, despite the
fact that many of those people work several shifts and have a full working day,
or more than an eight-hour shift. There is also much less talk about immaturity or
not being ready for the responsibility. Young people from non-urban areas, on
the other hand, did not talk about the possibility of investing in themselves, and
there was practically no mention of any desire to travel the world. They have or
presuppose greater parental help when having children than is available to their
counterparts in urban areas.
One of the most significant findings of the research is that the delayed establishment of family and late parenthood is directly related to the increasing need
among young women for individual planning of a personal life course and free
decision-making. For modern women, the maternal role is an emotional one rather than a mission. Actually, in Slovenia, it is primarily young women who delay
having children for an increasingly longer period. They have been achieving
higher educational levels and they show considerable desire to assert themselves
both professionally and personally. According to the statistical indicators, they are
better educated than their male colleagues, have more freedom and opportunities
than their mothers had, and they were brought up in an emancipatory spirit.
Education, work and careers are means of preserving their independence and
important components of their identity. They underlined that they expected
their partners to help them with domestic chores and in looking after children,
since they do not intend to be doubly burdened as their own mothers were.
If family policies in Slovenia continue to idealize the two-parent family as a
value, accepting the unequal division of labour within it instead of doing more
173
174
APPENDIX
Table 1 Focus group 1 in Ljubljana, 10 January 2002, 10.3012.30 hrs
Gender
Age
Female 1
23
Female 2
Female 3
23
24
Female 4
25
Female 5
Female 6
25
26
Female 7
Female 8
27
28
Work/Educational Status
Studying. Working through student
job agency.
Studying.
Studying. Working through student
job agency.
Studying.
Studying.
Studying. Working through student
job agency.
Studying and working.
Studying and working.
Partnership Status
Single
Single
Has had a partner for four
years, LAT
Has had a partner for one
year, LAT
Single
Has had a partner for two
years, LAT
Single
Single
Age
Work/Educational Status
Male 1
Male 2
Male 3
Male 4
23
24
24
25
Male 5
Male 6
Male 7
26
27
27
Male 8
27
Male 9
29
Studying.
Studying and working.
Studying.
Studying. Working through
student job agency.
Studying and working.
Studying.
Studying and working. High
school degree.
Studying. Working through
student job agency.
Studying and working.
High school degree.
Partnership Status
Single
Single
Has had a partner for one year, LAT
Single
Has had a partner for three years, LAT
Single
Has had a partner for five years, LAT
Single
Has had a partner for four years, LAT
Table 3 Focus group 3 in iri (a small town in the rural area), 17 January 2002,
19.0020.30 hrs
Gender
Age
Work/Educational Status
Partnership Status
Male 10
22
Male 11
25
Male 12
Male 13
26
30
Male 14
32
Single
Has had a partner for four
years, LAT
Single
Has had a partner for five
years, LAT
Single
Table 4 Focus group 4 in iri (participants from nearby villages), 18 January 2002,
19.0020.30 hrs
Gender
Age
Female 9
23 Working. Secondary school diploma. Has had a partner for three years,
LAT
25 Studying.
Single
26 Studying. Working through student Has had a partner for two years,
job agency.
LAT
31 Working. Secondary school diploma. Has had a partner for four years,
LAT
32 Working. Secondary school diploma. Has had a partner for six years,
joint household for four years
32 Working. High school degree.
Has had a partner for six years,
LAT
Female 10
Female 11
Female 12
Female 13
Female 14
Work/Educational Status
Partnership Status
Age
Work/Educational Status
Female 15
26
Female 16
27
Female 17
30
Female 18
Female 19
31
32
Partnership Status
Has had a partner for nine years,
joint household for five years
Single
175
176
Age
Female 20
Female 21
Male 16
24
Female 22
26
Male 17
29
Female 23
29
Male 18
30
Male 15
Work/Educational Status
Partnership Status
Table 7 Focus group 7 in Murska Sobota (a smaller city in the rural region),
25 January 2002, 17.1018.30 hrs
Gender
Age
Female 24
Male 19
25 Studying.
31 Working. Secondary school
diploma.
28 Working. Secondary school
diploma.
29 Working. Secondary school
diploma.
30 Studying and Working. High
school degree.
33 Working. High school degree.
Female 25
Male 20
Female 26
Male 21
Partnership Status
Work/Educational Status
Age
Female 27
Female 28
24 Studying.
Single
27 Working. Secondary school diploma. Has had a partner for nine years,
LAT
28 Working. Higher education degree. Has had a partner for two years,
LAT
29 Working. Secondary school diploma. Has had a partner for ten years,
joint household for seven year
Female 29
Female 30
Work/Educational Status
Partnership Status
Notes
1 According to the Eurostat definition, the fertility rate is the mean number of children
that would be born alive to a woman during her childbearing years under the presumption of the current fertility rates (Eurostat, 32/2007).
2 The countries with the lowest fertility rates in 2005 include Poland (1.24), Slovakia
(1.25), Lithuania (1.27), the Czech Republic and Greece (both 1.28). The fertility rate
in some other countries is relatively high; for example, in 2005, this group included
France (1.92), Ireland (1.88), Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom (all 1.80)
(Eurostat, 32/2007).
3 For the southern countries, two main drawbacks contribute significantly to the explanation: the situation of young adults and of working mothers (Cordon, 2006). The
delay in entering reproductive life is closely related to the economic situation (labour
market) and the housing situation (in Spain, in particular, it is practically impossible
for young people to have a home of their own). Young women in this part of Europe
actually belong to the first generation of women aiming to stay in the labour force,
while their mothers are part of the last generation of women that lived according
to the old male-breadwinner model. The context is still not supportive for working
mothers, so young women are not prepared for the major effort involved in having
children. Besides, these countries are lagging behind the other European countries as
regards new forms of union and births outside marriage (Cordon, 2006).
4 The second demographic transition, a theory first proposed by Lesthaeghe and van
de Kaa and later developed by them (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Lesthaeghe, 2001; van de
Kaa, 1987) is the dominant theoretical approach in demography to recent family
changes. One of the central ideas of this approach is that economic progress allows
for self-realizing behaviour. However, the populations that score highest on postmaterialistic values do not have lower fertility levels. This framework has reached an
impasse when dealing with very low-fertility countries (Cordon, 2006).
5 In EU15, high fertility rates known as the baby boom following World War II were
maintained until the mid-1960s, and have since fallen everywhere (Lutz and Wilson,
2006).
6 Voluntary childlessness is childlessness that goes beyond infertility. The United
Nationssponsored World Fertility Survey concluded that primary infertility affects
only 23 per cent of women aged 2550 years (Vaessen, 1984).
7 Fertility and Family Surveys 1995 were conducted in the following ECE countries:
Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and also in Canada, the US and New Zealand.
8 Youth 85 (Ule, 1988) was carried out on a group of 538 young people in Slovenia
aged 1624 years; Youth 93 (Ule and Miheljak, 1995) on a group of 2345 secondary
school students; Youth 95 (Ule, 1996) on a group of 1829 students, Youth 98 (Ule
et al., 2000) on a group of 1687 students aged 1517 years, and Youth 2000 (Ule and
Kuhar, 2002b) on a representative sample of 1262 young people in Slovenia aged
1629 years.
9 In comparing life course structures, many authors refer to Esping-Andersens three
types of welfare capitalism, with its division into social-democratic (Nordic), conservative (Continental) and liberal (Anglo-Saxon) regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990),
and to his introduction of a fourth Mediterranean regime (Esping-Andersen, 1999),
implying diverse gender and social equality and extent of family support; or to
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Gallie and Paugam (2000), who split the conservative regime type into employmentcentred (Germany, France, Netherlands) and sub-protective welfare regimes (of
Mediterranean countries in the latter case, with its particular role of the family and
informal work), while they refer to the social-democratic regime as universalistic,
with social rights defined by citizenship status. Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Sonja
Drobnic (2001) extended this typology even further and introduced the former
state socialist welfare regime. See also Andreas Walther (2006), who has modified
and nuanced welfare state typologies by applying them more specifically to youth
transitions.
The intergenerational help and kinship networks in Slovenia are traditionally well
developed and very supportive, including childcare (Ule et al., 2003; Rener and vab,
2005).
There is no tradition of part-time work in Slovenia; such work is rarely available or
afford-able (slightly less than 15 per cent of active population worked part-time in
2005, predominantly disabled and older workers) (Labour Force Survey, 2006, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia).
Under socialism, there was formally no traditional division of labour by gender.
Slovenia had legislation that supported women as paid employees and mothers, predating that of Scandinavia. Womens labour was crucial to economic development,
and was encouraged by means of education, workplace social provision and state
guaranteed parental leave and benefits, kindergartens and nurseries, and laws about
marriage and the family that framed women as equal individuals. In public life, work,
studies, culture and politics, women had become (almost) equal, and they may have
felt (almost) equal. But in the private sphere, in partner relations, within the family
and the interpersonal arena, traditional ways of constructing men and womens roles
remained, by and large, untouched (Pascall and Lewis, 2004).
Slovenia has, even in the post-socialist period, one of the most generous family policies
in Europe. The parental leave (12 months) is one of the longest and most flexible in
Europe and is fully paid. Additional, generous family payments include financial aid at
the birth of a child, child allowance, large-family allowance and childcare allowance.
Pre-school childcare is also relatively well organized and subsidized, and there is a
choice of either public or private kindergartens. On the other hand, there are no
concrete measures that would essentially affect a traditional gender and life-work
balance.
According to official statistics, approximately half of the two million Slovenian population lives in urban areas, another half in non-urban areas (Statistical Office of the
Republic of Slovenia), but the countryside is also relatively developed and mostly
non-rural.
We also conducted four focus groups (34 participants) with people who were already
parents (Ule and Kuhar, 2002a), but in this article we decided to present only the
focus groups with people who were not (yet) parents.
References
Anketa o delovni sili 2006 (Labour Force Survey 2006). Ljubljana: Statisticni urad Republike Slovenije (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia).
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter and Drobnic, Sonja (eds) (2001) Careers of Couples in Contemporary Society: From Male-Breadwinner to Dual-Earner Families. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
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