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Withdrawal causes Japanese prolif and an Asian arms race
Malyshev 15 (Michael, 2007 World Nuclear University Fellow, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, Has studied at the Moscow Military Institute, American
University, Georgetown University and the National Defense Intelligence College in
Washington, D.C., Nuclear latency and the future strategic Environment, March
2015, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/nuclear-latency-and-the-future-strategicenvironment/SI83_nuclear_latency.pdf)
Japan, the Republic of Korea
engage in
most of the
stages of the cycle: mining and milling;
conversion; enrichment; fuel fabrication; and spent fuel management,
including the ability to separate out plutonium in processes associated
with reprocessing. With such experience, a country harbouring an
entrenched sense of existential insecurity, having a long history of clashes
with its neighbours and seeking to gain more regional dominance and
international prestige could make a proliferation decision to weaponise
Among these countries, theres a smaller set of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) with established nuclear programs (Canada,
Romania, etc.). They

many or

, Brazil,


. Nuclear

watchdogs and other entities, including intelligence services, must remain vigilant. Arguably, the easiest bet for most potential proliferants would be to focus on assembling a gun-type uranium-based nuclear device, even though, as
North Korea has demonstrated, pursuing both uranium and plutonium routes in parallel is entirely possible. A basic gun-type device would be a far cry from a miniaturised and elegant thermonuclear warhead thats light and compact
enough for long-distance delivery atop a ballistic missile or in a bomb that a fighter-bomber could drop, but the lowest qualifying hurdle will nonetheless be cleared. A long-range capability is simply not always necessary. In tight
regional quarters, such as the Middle East, geopolitical archrivals may be separated by just a few hundred kilometres, and seeking a means of intercontinental delivery isnt such a high priority. Decisions to proliferate Proliferants
seeking to become NWS will negotiate the obstacle course from device to weapon to delivery systems to operationalization, including strategy and doctrine according to their own threat perceptions, the amount of breathing
room afforded by the international community, their freedom of access to raw materials, the availability of expertise, their industrial production capabilities and their financial resources. However, given todays international
nonproliferation and counterproliferation regimes, as well as the national intelligence capabilities that a number of major powers can bring to bear, any significant steps to develop nuclear weapons are bound to be detected
eventually. From a strategic standpoint, therefore, every potential proliferant nation has to undertake a careful cost - benefit analysis and realise that therell be hefty downsides to such a decision once the cat is out of the bag. As
the Indian nuclear program has shown, it may not be out of the bag for a while. Secretive and highly compartmented, the program delivered the desired results while alerting very few along the way. Just the same, this secrecy-based
approach required the Indians to overcome a few bumps in the road that probably wouldnt have been there if the effort had been overt (for example, policy planning was unaware of technical issues, training was ad hoc to the point
of being cryptic, there were additional hurdles with platformweapon integration that had to be cleared, and so on). The circumstances in which any new entrant into the nuclear club will make a momentous decision to abandon the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may vary, but any such move will almost certainly have high reputational costs. A rather recent example is instructive. When Ukraines Minister of Defence, Valeriy Heletey, suggested in September
2014 that his country might have to build these weapons to curb the unfolding Russian aggression, several senior US Government officials made their disapproval clear. Most pointedly, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Rose Gottemoeller said in a December 2014 interview that for Ukraine, the consequences of such a policy reversal would have been catastrophic. 7 East Asian actors So, what states should be of most concern

East Asia is home to two interesting cases

Japan and
Korea Entangled in a mesh of bilateral and trilateral
suspicions and general regional mistrust underpinned by decades of
historical animosity, the neighbourhood is fertile ground for producing the
next NWS
to Australia from the standpoint of nuclear weapons breakout potential?
the Republic of

of nuclear latency


. The continuing USROK negotiations to renew the original 1974 123 Agreement may herald an overall push by South Korea to gain greater autonomy in making decisions about the direction and

advancement of its nuclear technologies and know-how. 8 The current agreement limits its nuclear program to an open-ended fuel cycle. The main obstacle that complicates reaching the successor agreement has to do with the two
countries diverging views on the proliferation resistance of two dual-use technologies: pyroprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and enrichment of US-supplied uranium. This disagreement has a thorny diplomatic dimension as well.
South Koreans believe that theyve earned a spot among the most reliable partners of the US. Yet they see that the US isnt giving the ROK a consideration congruent with such a self-image. In fact, South Korean negotiators have
been incredulous that the US granted enrichment and reprocessing rights to neighbouring Japan, while being firmly unwilling to extend the same privileges to South Koreas nuclear industry. In addition to technical concerns about
pyroprocessing and fears that the considerable commercial potential of enrichment services may lead to their unruly expansion and to lax enforcement of nonproliferation standards, the US may have worries about South Korean
public opinion on the issue of weaponisation of nuclear technologies. Unlike in Japan, where that countrys sense of nuclear allergy manages to keep the issue close to the political fringe, popular views in South Korea about building

Its the only NNWS that sits on about 10 tons of separated
reactor-grade plutonium, which could be used to make nuclear weapons
it still possesses several hundred kilograms of weapons-grade
plutonium that it received from the US and the UK
the nations own nuclear deterrent capability are more mainstream. Analysts have noted that more than half of the ROK population continues to support the nuclear weapons idea. 9

has a slightly different

proliferation problem to work through.

. Even

more troubling,

in the past

use in fast reactor

. 10

Japans neighbours continue to pedal these facts internationally and paint a variety of potential scenarios based on fear and zero-sum thinking. While the neighbours may have an ulterior motive to oversell their case, Japans
plutonium policies do, in fact, create nonproliferation concerns. Another aspect many informed observers point to is that, while Japan doesnt have a mainstream constituency for the bomb, it seems to have given insufficient
consideration to regional security implications of domestic decisions about its nuclear fuel cycle choices. 11 False predictions about Japans future as an NWS have a long history. 12 Regional challenges and crises in East Asia evolve

Should Japan
decide to build the bomb to feel more secure, it could end up knocking
the dominos down in a completely undesirable direction. China, North
Korea and Russia
are all likely to perceive
such a move with great apprehension. Japans current security safeguard,
the USJapan Security Treaty, has worked well for over 50 years. Barring
massive US troop withdrawal from the
region , Japans more likely to continue, as it has, beefing up its
conventional defence forces and enhancing its theatre missile defence
system capabilities
If theres one factor that could build up a
and persist, but dont cross the line into the territory of an existential threat to Japan. Public opinion polls consistently show little support for a major overhaul of Japans non-nuclear posture.

(with which Japan still has no formal peace treaty, but has a very public unresolved territorial dispute)

a long

series of acute regional crises, in which the US shows an undeniable lack of commitment to Japans needs, or a

. Confidence and credibility

nuclear weapons constituency in either country, its their loss of

confidence in the
US nuclear umbrella
stated and restated availability of a

to shield them from acts of aggression by a neighbour and to deter a further

escalation of hostilities. As Russias annexation of Crimea and escalation in eastern Ukraine have shown, there are limits to how much value some nation-states put on cornerstones of international law in a crisis. Few have questioned

A credibility problem continues

Americas extended nuclear deterrence commitments often
ring hollow and require a healthy dose of regular joint exercises , show-offorce flyovers and the whole panoply of less extravagant strategic
So far, this courtship ritual
has worked for both Japan and the ROK
the two US allies have
voiced legitimate concerns about
reliability of the current arrangement with the US. If those
concerns were to become grave
could the nuclear-proliferation-isunacceptable mantra be put aside to make a special exception
the nobility of goals and clarity of proclaimed benefits of nonproliferation policies, but will that consensus last much longer?

to plague

the international nonproliferation regime.

, including strong statements of unwavering support from high offices across Washington DC.

. The international community hasnt needed to test the disputable virtues of tolerable proliferation in

Northeast Asia, despite the fact that

, on a few occasions,

effectiveness and

for either of the two countries (for example, if North Korea starts conducting nuclear tests every six months, escalates its

inflammatory rhetoric and continues with regular provocations along the border and close to territorial waters of the ROK),

? The slippery-slope argument and

the nuclear weapons usability paradox 13 will weigh heavily over whoever has to ponder this dilemma. Defence analysts may need to reassess the pros and cons of implementing a NATO-like nuclear sharing arrangement in East
Asia, whereby the US puts its non-strategic nuclear weapons in those countries, as opposed to relying on its long-range assets deployed on the American mainland and on Guam. However, that option wont come without a hefty
price. It wouldnt be cheap to ensure proper physical protection of the arsenal against aggressive attempts at infiltration, sabotage and theft by operatives from across the Korean border.

Nuclear war
Cimbala 15 (Stephen J. Cimbala, Ph.D. in Political Science @ the University of
Wisconsin, Madison, is a professor of Political Science @ Penn State Brandywine.
Nuclear Weapons and Anticipatory Attacks: Implications for Russia and the United
States, 16 March 2015,
If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia,

the Americans and

Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one anothers
military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that
might influence the decision for or against war . Another consideration, relative to
nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies
shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical
experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass
destruction may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural
and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor
subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis . The spread of nuclear
weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated
mosaic of possibilities in this regard . States with nuclear forces of variable force
structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into
a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural cross-currents contributory to the
possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may
seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances .
Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for
all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the
nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part because
the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer
exists but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or
global respect.6 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery
systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible
then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition,

adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing

disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of
intercontinental range to strike at one anothers vitals, but short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially
strategic effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China;

The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces
of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning
and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily
be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over
the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional
ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain
weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first-strike
vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures
for rapid , and possibly mistaken , retaliation . This potpourri of possibilities
challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the
part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the
geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the 20th century) to an
Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).7 This would profoundly
shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now pass ,
and so on.

on account of the emergence of the Revolution in Military Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.8 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-

The spread
of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the
obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare . For theorists, the
argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with
international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be
less sustainable than hitherto.10 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons
scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.9

and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states
more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states nuclear forces are second-strike
survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear
weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo-oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore slow and peaceful

These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear

proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the first nuclear age
roughly corresponding to the Cold War.11 Pessimists who predicted that some 30 or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of
the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of
nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe . The military and security agenda of the
Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Unionespecially with
regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike
capability and the deterrence rationality according to American or allied Western
concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war elsewhere .12 In addition,
powers favoring nuclear containment in general may fall short of disagreement in
specific political cases. As Patrick M. Morgan has noted, there is insufficient agreement among
states on how serious it (nuclear proliferation) is and on what to do about it.13
change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions.

TPP is top of the agenda---Obamas in a balancing act to
ensure passage
Yong 12-20 - US Bureau Chief for The Straits Times
(Jeremy, TPP ratification a top priority in 2016: Obama, Straits Times,
US President Barack Obama will make ratification of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) free trade pact a top legislative priority next year, as he
continues to push back against the notion that he will be a lame duck in
his final year in office. Speaking at a traditional year-end press conference, the
President acknowledged that getting things done in an election year will always be
challenging, but pledged to seize whatever opportunity he gets. "I plan on doing
everything I can with every minute of every day that I have left as
president to deliver on behalf of the American people," he said at the White House
on Friday. "Since taking this office, I've never been more optimistic about a year
ahead than I am right now. And in 2016, I'm going to leave it all on the field,"
he said, using a sporting term meaning to give one's all. One opportunity he sees
is the 12-nation landmark free trade pact that covers some 40 per cent of global
gross domestic product. It was signed in October and now needs to be ratified by
the legislatures of the 12 countries. The deal is opposed by a majority of those in
the President's party, including all three Democratic presidential candidates. Mr
Obama again emphasised the benefits the deal will have for Americans
even as he acknowledged the challenges that lay ahead. "There are both
proponents and opponents of this in both Democratic and Republican parties, and
so it's going to be an interesting situation where we're going to have to
stitch together the same kind of bipartisan effort in order for us to get it
done," he said.

Plan costs political capitaltheres bipartisan consensus in

favor of expanded presence in Japan
Welsh, 13 -- Budget & Management Research Graduate Intern,
City of Baltimore, MPA Candidate at @ University of Baltimore
(Emmanuel M., Transforming the U.S.-Japanese Alliance, Towson Journal of
International Affairs, VOL. XLVI, NUMBER 1,
Alterations have already been made to U.S. troop presence in Japan, which
provides a good starting point for analyzing the need for U.S. presence to adhere to
the core principles of the security agreement and also to maintain U.S. interests in
the region. In April 2012, both governments agreed to the reduction of U.S. forces in
Okinawa, years after public polling in Japan found strong support for the reduction
of U.S. presence in the region. The troops are being redeployed to Hawaii, Guam,
and Australia, which lessens U.S. presence in East Asia while conforming to the

Obama administrations Asia strategy.61 Such strategic planning--with Americas fi

scal situations in mind--is vital to any responsible defense policy. There have
been strong voices from both side of the aisle who do not believe that such
reductions will be beneficial to the U.S. interests in Asia and its
partnership with Japan. In fact, some advocate strengthening the existing
security alliance. Richard Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state in
the Bush administration, and Joseph Nye, the former assistant defense
secretary for international security affairs under the Clinton administration,
published a report that calls for the need for greater security alliance with
Japan as part of a renewed U.S. strategy in Asia.62 Yet some of the suggestions
that these two well-respected diplomats are proposing would continue Japanese
dependence on U.S. security forces for their own defense. This is contrary to the
direction in which the Japanese people and its government are moving. There has
also been bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress about the need to
maintain a robust military presence in East Asia via U.S. military
involvement in Japan. Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona and his partys
2008 presidential candidate, said: The Asia- Pacifi c regions growing role in the
global distribution of power requires us to consistently review and update plans for
the U.S. militarys role in the region.63 Congruently, Senator Jim Webb, Democrat
of Virginia and a member of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations
Committee said the following during an opening statement in a subcommittee
hearing on U.S. Asia policy: We cannot reengage properly in Asia without a
strong alliance with Japan. Senator Webb, who served as Navy secretary under
the Reagan administration, has been adamant about the need for a strong
military alliance with Japan and recently wrote a letter with Senator Carl
Levin, a Michigan Democrat and chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, questioning the decision of the Defense Department to
relocate 9,000 Marines from Japan to Guam.64 While Senators, McCain,
Levin, and Webb remain strong proponents of a militarily -robust U.S.Japan security alliance, the changing culture in Japan and the U.S. calls for the
reconsideration of the level of commitment that the U.S. should bear.65

TPP reverses protectionism---solves conflict escalation

Boskin 10-30 - professor of economics and senior fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University
(Michael, Trans-Pacific Partnership: the case for trade, The Guardian,
Past experience reinforces the view that, ultimately, voluntary trade is a
good thing. Extreme protectionism in the early 1930s, following an era of
relatively free international trade, had devastating consequences,
ultimately setting the stage for the second world war. As the MIT economist
Charles Kindleberger showed, Americas Smoot-Hawley tariff, in particular,
helped to turn a deep recession into a global depression. Even before the

war was over, major powers convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to
establish a new international trade and finance regime, including the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Through a succession of lengthy and difficult global
negotiations the so-called GATT rounds tariffs were steadily lowered for an
increasing variety of goods. As a result, global trade grew faster than world GDP for
most of the postwar period. After five years of talks, a wide-ranging trade deal is
close between Pacific rim countries which could have long-reaching
economic consequences. Here is what you need to know about the TPP Read
more Virtually all economists agree that this shift toward freer trade greatly
benefited the worlds citizens and enhanced global growth. The economists
Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer estimate that, in general, trade has a sizeable
positive effect on growth. At a time when growth is failing to meet
expectations almost everywhere, the TPP thus seems like a good move. To
be sure, because tariffs in the TPP member countries are already low (with some
exceptions, such as Canadas tariffs on dairy products and Japans on beef), the net
benefit of eliminating them would be modest (except for a few items that are very
sensitive to small price changes). But the TPP is also expected to reduce nontariff barriers (such as red tape and protection of state enterprises); harmonise
policies and procedures; and include dispute-settlement mechanisms. Though
the TPPs precise provisions have not been made public, political leaders in the
member countries predict that the deal, once ratified and implemented, will add
hundreds of billions of dollars to their economies and bolster employment. Smaller
and developing economies will probably gain the most, relative to size,
but everyone will benefit overall. Other important outcomes are not included in
these calculations. The alternative to liberalising trade is not the status quo;
it is a consistent move away from openness. This can occur in a number of
ways, such as the erection of non-tariff barriers that favor domestic incumbents at
the expense of lower-priced potential imports that would benefit consumers.
Moreover, it is much easier to build mutually beneficial trade relationships
than it is to resolve military and geopolitical issues, such as combating the
Islamic State or resolving tensions in the South China Sea. But strong
trade relationships have the potential to encourage cooperation or, at
least, discourage escalation of conflict in other , more contentious areas .
Still, there are some legitimate concerns about the TPP. Some worry that it could
divert trade from non-member countries or undermine the moribund Doha round of
multilateral trade negotiations (though 20 years ago, the North American Free Trade
Agreement had the opposite effect, kick-starting the Uruguay round). Given all of
this not to mention renewed attention to national borders, owing to contentious
immigration issues, such as the influx of Middle Eastern refugees in Europe the
TPPs ratification is far from certain, especially in the US. The concentrated
interests that oppose the agreement may turn out to be more influential than the
diffuse interests of all consumers. That would be a major loss . Allowing
existing protectionist trade barriers to remain in place or worsen would
not only deprive citizens in TPP countries of higher incomes; it would also
deal a damaging blow to international cooperation .

The impact is global war

Griswold 11 Daniel Griswold is the director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. (Free Trade and
the Global Middle Class, Hayek Society Journal, Volume 9, http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf)

Our more globalized world has also yielded a peace dividend. It may not be
obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza
Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a
more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped
sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the
retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have
played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19 th
century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to
bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with
Britains neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with
France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries
that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20 th century, President Franklin
Roosevelts secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a
way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had
witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I.
Hull believed that unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade
barriers and unfair economic competition, with war. Hull was awarded the 1945
Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free
trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and
globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend
not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade
has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become
more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out . War in a
globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also
ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy.
Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more
than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and
Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the
peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that
reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region
has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has
reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production
and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies
develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial
assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In
contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less
important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their
national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them
peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is
harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century
was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the
ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade
between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall
Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers,
France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what
was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market
was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant
to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan
must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war
between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable.
Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts
around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the
conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments
sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from
1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: EritreaEthopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in
2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil
wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo,
Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the
Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005
report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides
and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per
conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the
world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence
that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind
the good news the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and
peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them but expanding trade and
globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a
chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of
Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their
level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom,
including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country
will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric
analysis, he found that, Making economies freer translates into making countries
more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict
prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn,
Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon
Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that trading nations cooperate more and fight
less. In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be
involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for
peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic
form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because
democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the worlds two most conflictprone regions the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa are also the worlds
two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring
from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If
we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim

children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those
societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S.
initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as
Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An
even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to
products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real
job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is
less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and
globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than
they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological
fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human
beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in
such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade
and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and
civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil
conflict and war.

1NC Okinawa
Northeast Asia only includes the northernmost prefectures of
Nyamtseren 2001 PhD, Editor Mongolian Development Research Center
(Lhamsurengiin, The Role Of Japan In Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation And
Relations Between Japan And Mongolia, Economic Research Institute for Northeast
Asia (ERINA), Niigata and Japan Foundation)
Northeast Asia is a subregion promising great positive changes as the world enters
the 21st century. At present, the term Northeast Asia is defined only on
the basis of territorial considerations . Thus it includes the three provinces
of Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang ), the DPRK, the ROK, Mongolia,
Far Eastern Russia, and the ten prefectures of the northern coastal part of
Japan .

Okinawa/Taiwan are Southeast Asia

Huang 1972 Southeast Asia Mosquito Project, Department of Entomology,
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. (Yiau-Min, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
Inst., vol. 9, no. 1)
The term Southeast Asia as used in this review does not exactly correspond to
any of the world mosquito fauna areas as defined by Belkin (1962). It comprises
the following area: The Ryukyu Islands (Amami, Okinawa, Miyako, Ishigaki,
Iriomote), Taiwan, The Pescadores, Hainan, China (South of the Yangtze
Kiang), The Philippines, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Indonesia (the
eastern boundary is essentially that of Lee & Woodhill (1944) as shown in Lees
Atlas of Mosquito Larvae), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, The Andaman
Islands, The Nicobar Islands, Burma and Assam. This area falls
approximately within 11 degrees South to 27 degrees North Latitude and
87 to 130 degrees East Longitude (MAP I).

VIOLATION: the plan removes presence from Okinawa

Precision---Physical geography is the most precise starting
point---defining regions based on political characteristics is
Limits---defining by nation-states blows the lid of the topic--stretches to include US, Central and South Asia
Extra T---voting aff can only endorse topical action---any other
endorsement through the ballot gives them extra solvency and
destroys neg ground

1NC Guam Shift

The plan causes military presence to shift to Guamits normal
means because of the new Asia Pivot strategy
Hayden 10/9 (Shannon, Vice News, The US Is Reshuffling All its Game Pieces on the Asia-Pacific
Chessboard 10/9/15. https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-is-reshuffling-all-its-game-pieces-on-the-asia-pacificchessboard)

The Pentagon's announcement identifying the US Marine Corps units that

would relocate from Okinawa to Guam was the next step in a multi-year
plan to redistribute US forces in the Asia-Pacific. Most US troops in the
Asia-Pacific are currently based in Japan and South Korea, and is a holdover from
World War II and the Korean War. But it's been half a century since those arrangements were put in place, and US
defense policymakers have been keen to look at different configurations
geared toward present and future, not historical, threats. The presence of US forces on
Okinawa has always been a sensitive political issue for Japan. Located 1,000 miles south of Tokyo, Okinawa is a
Japanese prefecture and hosts roughly 26,000 of the total 47,000 US troops stationed in the country. Tensions
between Tokyo and Okinawa have been a major factor in US force redistribution. "The genesis of this plan [to move
Marines to Guam] came from Japanese domestic politics," said Mira Rapp-Hooper, a senior fellow at the Center for a

Obama's "pivot to Asia" has called for a US

military presence in the Asia-Pacific that is "geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable." The move from
Okinawa to Guam meets all three requirements. However, adjusting for an "evolving
New American Security. President Barack

security environment in the Asia-Pacific" is also a nice way of saying the US is taking China's growing capability and
confidence into account. China's growing capabilities include anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operations, which are
specifically geared at combating attempts to project power (i.e. US power) into the region. While A2/AD (and the US
response) is a giant can of worms (and beyond the scope of this article), the implication is that the US has to start

US military
planners are looking south from Korea and Japan toward the East China
Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan, and thinking about what threats are most likely.
thinking anew about how it positions itself in the region and how it wants to operate in future. So,

The impacts in Guam will be even worse no SOFA or political

Vine 15 David Vine, PhD, associate professor of anthropology at American
University (Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the
World, American Empire Project, 8/25/15, Metropolitan Books, 8/25/15, ISBN:
1627791698, pg. 83-96)

At the urging of the military after the war, the government maintained its
control over possessions once called colonies, including Guam, American Samoa,
the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as territories of the United States. These
islands have neither full independence nor the full democratic rights that
would come with incorporation into the United States. They highlight how,
even in the twenty-first century, our base nation still relies on the perpetuation of
colonial relationships, albeit under new guises and with new vocabulary. From the militarys
perspective, Guam and the other territories offer unmatched autonomy. This is not
Okinawa , Major General Dennis Larsen told a reporter at Guams Andersen Air Force

Base. This

is American soil in the midst of the Pacific. Guam is a U.S.

territory. We can do what we want here , and make huge investments
without fear of being thrown out.6 A TINY FOOTNOTE AT THE CENTER OF POWER The
ability to do whatever it wants without fear of eviction and with greater ease than
in the fifty states is a major part of why the military likes Guam so much . Located
some eight thousand miles from Washington, D.C., Guam is about one fifth the size of Rhode Island, the smallest of

At one point, military facilities took up nearly 60 percent of the

island; today, they still account for almost 30 percent . (For comparison, the military
controls just over 15 percent of the military-dominated city of Norfolk, Virginia).7 Andersen Air Force
Base occupies the northern part of Guam, including some of its longest
and most beautiful beaches. Naval Base Guam occupies Apra Harbor, one of the largest in the
the fifty states.

western Pacific, along the southwest coast, where Guams second-largest village once stood. Across the island, the
Air Force and Navy also control a patchwork of ordnance depots, communications facilities, housing developments,

bases host (or have the ability to host) the most sophisticated
and powerful weaponry in the militarys arsenal, including nuclear attack submarines,
and annexes. Both of the main

aircraft carriers, F-15s, F-22 stealth fighters, Global Hawk surveillance drones, and B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers.8

as with
Okinawa, many refer to the entire island as a single base . As the University of Guam
Many consider Guam among the most important military bases in the worldand tellingly,

professor Michael Bevacqua puts it, Guam has the paradoxical nature of being [considered] a tiny, insignificant

few in the fifty

states ever think about this island. For the people of Guam this means
dealing with daily reminders of their marginalization . When some of Guams politicians
footnote to the United States while sitting at the center of American power.9 Indeed,

visited Washington, D.C., officials from the Department of the Interiorthe federal department that oversees Guam
asked for their foreign passports.10 A student at the University of Washington told me he received a call from
the registrars office asking about converting Guams currency into dollars. (Like the rest of the United States, Guam
uses the U.S. dollar.) Online retailers frequently refuse to ship to Guam because its an international destination.
Even seemingly trivial limitations such as being barred from voting on TV shows So You Think You Can Dance and

residents of Guam are also barred from

voting for U.S. president, have no Senate representation, and can elect
only a nonvoting member of the U.S. House. People on Guam joke that when theyre flying
back to Guam from Hawaii or the continental United States, their rights vanish when they cross
the International Date Line .
American Idol echo more consequential exclusions:

1nc general
T reduce
INTERP: Reduce means a net decrease
Public Law 87-253
(Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, 97th US Congress, Sept 8, 1982, Lexis)
E) Prior to approving any application for a refund, the Secretary shall require
evidence that such reduction in market- ings has taken place and that such
reduction is a net decrease in marketings of milk and has not been offset by
expansion of production in other production facilities in which the person has an
interest or by transfer of partial interest in the produc- tion facility or by the taking
of any other action. which is a scheme or device to qualify for payment.

This means the plan must explicitly preclude intra-regional

Kentucky Ct of Appeals 84
(Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, Lexis---sex edited)
No one quarrels with the appellants' argument that HN3 the city has the power to
transfer or even discharge employees at will. The right to do so, however, is
restricted by Statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The language of KRS
90.360(1) above is quite clear in prohibiting reduction in grade of a classified
service employee of the City except for cause and after a hearing upon appropriate
written charges. In interpreting identical language concerning prohibition against
reduction in grade provided for in KRS 95.450(1), our former Court of Appeals stated
in Schrichte vs. Bornhorn, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 683 (1964): . . . we are of the opinion that
the term 'grade' means rank, whereas it appears that the appellant interprets it
more broadly as job classification. Obviously by the use of the word 'reduce,'
the Statute envisages a verticle scale. If a [person] is transferred without a
loss in pay from one job category to another with comparable authority, his
classification is changed, but his grade is not reduced.

VIOLATION: The plan does not mandate relocation from the

---LIMITS---there are endless permutations of start- and endpoints for a transfer aff impossible to predict them
---GROUND---mandated relocation is essential for predictable
DA links---otherwise, aff determines troop end-points in
response to the 1nc.
---PRECISION---we chose regions instead of countries. That
models military doctrine.
Sutton 15 PhD in Art History, Professor @ U Northern Iowa
(Elizabeth, Capitalism and Cartography in the Dutch Golden Age, p. 16)
Visscher's news maps were often unabashedly militaristic, purposefully lauding
Dutch conquests against their Spanish, Portuguese, or later, Rnglish enemies.
Deliberate visual organization continues to facilitate and project possession and
power, as in the National Geospatial Agency's US Command Centers map, where
the thick black lines divide how the US military sees its control over the world
(figure 1). The world is divided into regions labeled under a particular
commanding unit of the United States military, which in turn, has a chain
of command. Certainly military control is integrally linked to economic control, not
unlike a government's collection of taxes, districting of schools and voters, or in
otherwise organizing the spaces of people's lives into a legible and surveillable

1nc CP
The United States should maintain its military presence in
Northeast Asia by modifying all military presence on the island
of Okinawa to a prepositioned joint sea base in the territorial
waters of Okinawa. Only authorized military personnel may be
permitted aboard.
The United States should expressly prohibit sea base
personnel from returning to Okinawa.
The counterplan is plan-minus---it doesnt reduce
Public Law 87-253
(Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, 97th US Congress, Sept 8, 1982, Lexis)
E) Prior to approving any application for a refund, the Secretary shall require
evidence that such reduction in market- ings has taken place and that such
reduction is a net decrease in marketings of milk and has not been offset by
expansion of production in other production facilities in which the person has an
interest or by transfer of partial interest in the produc- tion facility or by the taking
of any other action. which is a scheme or device to qualify for payment.

Seabasing is key to assurance and is preferred by local

Parker 10 Commander in US Navy, Federal Executive Fellow @ Brookings
(Gregory, Seabasing Since the Cold War, Brookings,
In the arc of instability, seabasing makes more sense. Yemen and Somalia, for
example, increasingly warrant close American scrutiny, both as a combined threat
to the maritime commons and as sources of terrorist aggression against the
homeland. Addressing the problems in such countries could begin with an alliance
of the commons approach that works to prevent piracy, water-borne terrorism, and
smuggling. A sea base off the coast could build on operational successes by
providing humanitarian supplies and development assistance. Special
forces and small Marine units would be available as necessary for surgical
raids, and aircraft and missiles could be used for surgical strikes.
Partnership navies could plug into the sea base and add capability
incrementally. The U.S. presence ashore could remain small, reducing
American visibility and preventing widespread animosity. And U.S.
amphibious resources could still be reassembled to provide the maximum assault
capability for the rare instance in which greater force is needed. Such a seabasing
construct does not preclude land basing, which proceeds apace in locations like
Bahran and Diego Garcia and via informal partnerships in countless littoral locations

like India, Singapore, and the U.A.E. Forward basing continues to be important and
relevant, but it is evolving in the less-stringent manner envisaged by the places,
not bases philosophy of the Rumsfeld years rather than via formal, long-term
agreements. 58 In short, sea bases are not taking the place of land bases but are
instead bridging the gap between them. Not all alliance members may agree
on the geostrategic context that underpins an agreements objectives.
Japan, for example, has long historical ties to the United States and has
been a key strategic partner in the Western Pacific for decades. But the
acrimonious debate over the Marine Corps base on Okinawa has revealed
widespread Japanese public opposition to the hosting of U.S. forces. The
furor has persisted even after Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama resigned following a
failure to renegotiate the 2006 Japan-U.S. basing agreement.59 The nature of
bilateral relation with Japan depends heavily on the geostrategic context
within which it is viewed. Previously a cornerstone of anti-Soviet containment
efforts, it is now a cornerstone of a neo-containment policy against Chinese
aggression, in which case U.S. forces in Japan are essential. Alternatively,
an alliance of the commons approach focused more on littoral stability
would suggest that Japan serves primarily as a base for U.S. forces whose focus is
on matters further east, and the Japanese are therefore justified to at least
renegotiate the size of the U.S. presence. Both geostrategic contexts
argue for a continued U.S.-Japan alliance, but the exact context has
important implications for the specific nature of bases and force
structure. Yoichi Funabashi, the Asahi Shimbum editor in chief, examined these
two contexts and, while he acknowledged the possibility a resurgent Chinese threat,
he argued that the best approach to the greater region was through a multilateral
structure for maritime stability in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and
that such a pact needed to evolve from being against something to one that is
for something. 60 This is consistent with an alliance of the commons framework.
The decision regarding U.S. basing cannot stand alone; it cannot be understood
apart from the broader geostrategic context. In Funabashis words, Incorporating
the base issue within the process of constructing a new vision for the
alliance will be crucial. The question now is how to go about creating that new
vision.61 If a new vision of Pacific alliances is imminent, then a new vision for
seabasing will necessarily have to follow . But the clues are already there, and
the U.S. need not wait until the ink is dry on a new world order before devising the
ways and means to support it. Multilateralism, plug-and-play, and modular
scalability are the clear and emerging themes. As such, they must guide not
only foreign policy but acquisition as well. Here the results are mixed.


1nc impact
Nuclear war causes extinction that outweighs the aff
Cerutti 14 (Furio, Professor of Political Philosophy emeritus at the University of
Florence and Adjunct Professor at the Scuola superiore SantAnna, Pisa. In the last
fifteen years, Cerutti has been aVisiting Professor at Harvard, the Universite de
Paris 8, the Humboldt Universit at zu Berlin, the London School of Economics and
Political Science,(China Foreign Affairs University), Beijing, and Stanford University
in Florence. Beyond the publications quoted in this article, Cerutti has written widely
on the political identity of the Europeans and the legitimacy of the European Union
(last publication: Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union,
ed. with S. Lucarelli and V. Schmidt, Routledge: London 2011), Humankinds First
Fundamental Right: Survival, Constellations, 2014)
given the existence of
global threats
endanger the life of humankind as a civ- ilized species right to survive
should be asserted as its first
fundamental right .
is not
just philosophical but legal as well

This articles main thesis1 is that,

at least two

, nuclear weapons and climate change,

, its

human or rather

The sense of

To substantiate this thesis, I shall go through six argumentative steps:


1. Why begin with global threats.

2. Why survival

is the leading category in this field, and how it interplays with justice. 3. What interest humankind has in its survival, and why it should be protected as a right. 4. Why regard humankind rather than all indi- viduals as a
possible actor. 5. Why speak of a fundamental rather than human right, and how to constitutionalize this right. 6. How two developments in international law after 1945 can contribute to support the argument I have been
sketching. ** 1. If philosophical thinking starts with being amazed at something in the world (Platos ), my in- terest in the present matter2 was first stimulated by the pre-philosophical amazement I always felt in seeing
that in the now enormous human rights discourse (both in politics and academia) so much care is dedicated to the single individuals, and so wide-ranging designs of a cos- mopolis to come are based on their rights. Yet

nobody seems to take note that the life of all present and future
individuals could be annihilated
It is like insisting
on first debating the rights of a ships
passengers instead of taking
action in the light of the fact that the ship is already taking in seawater
from a leak

These dangers are

philosophically significant because they tell something about human
by a nuclear war or up- set by catastrophic developments of climate change.
third- class

(climate change is already happening) and also risks to hit a mine that is floating around and would send it along with all passengers and crew straight to the ocean depths (by thinking and acting

timely, leaks can be filled, mines detected and swept away, all ac- tions that would put the care for third-class passengers

on a firmer ground).

, the only ones who have become able to destroy their own race, as well as about modernity: the possibil- ity of self-destruction sets an end to this era, opens a new one, which can only vaguely be termed post-

modern,4 and requires an updated rewriting of the Dialectics of the Enlightenment. It is also politically significant as it challenges present politics to restructure itself by ex- tending its attention to the far future, something which is

challenges like nuclear weapons

and climate change
everybody on earth and
they would destroy human civilization

not possible within the boundaries of modern politics because of its narrow time structure.5 In a more precise language, I term
(con- sidered in themselves, while nuclear proliferation is but a subphenomenon)



global (in a very specific sense) because they are lethal and planet-wide,

can be reasonably addressed only by the near totality of coun- tries and peoples. They would not wipe out biologically humankind,

although this cannot be excluded in case of an all-out nuclear war; but

:6 not a set of values, but the set of

material and cultural tools (agriculture, communications, trans- portation and trade) that allow unspecialized animals like the humans to survive and to thrive. It is clear that my thesis presupposes a revised scale of relevance
among the issues requiring and stimulat- ing theoretical investigations: in my philosophical view global threats have a greater relevance and are intellec- tually more challenging than the issues suggested by the medias headlines
(present wars, terrorism, group and minority rights in the US, multiculturalism in Canada or Australia, immigrants in Europe, or, more recently, the crisis of the global economic system). As a reflection upon the deeper longue dure e

determinants of human- itys fate, political philosophy should not necessarily espouse the agenda suggested by current politics and journalism and, instead, seek its own independent as- sessment of the state of the world as part of

the shifting of
Theory to pure normativity has favored
exclusive attention on intersubjectivity
as if challenges to politics
and civilization caused by systemic imperatives such as the nuclear threat
and climate change) were beyond the grasp of critical inquiry
the self- centered normative approach
be restructured to address the challenges for humankinds survival
its business; this is a critical attitude that cannot be implemented without a philosophical view on history (not to be con- fused with a revival of the grand narratives). Besides,

most of

the emergence not just of worldviews based on the predominance of Sollen, but also of

and its troubles;

. What I am attempting in this article is to

address an issue such as human rights that is typical of

mentioned and to show how it

In this attempt I am

driven by the intent to debunk the layer of denial (or repression in pshychoanalyti- cal sense) that, more intensely after the end of the Cold War, has removed the nuclear threat from the philosoph- ical reflection on modernity and
has later prevented cli- mate change from entering the main agenda of Critical Theory. There is also an epistemological aspect in this: a critical Zeitdiagnose, or an informed assessment of where history has taken us to in our post-

critical theorists seem to

be reluctant to address the philosophical issues raised by global
challenges, not to mention their complete denial
of the meaning of nuclear weapons. It is as if Critical
had accepted a tacit division of labor in which
modern times is not possible without first taking what hard science has to say about the threats for humankind very seriously.7 With rare exceptions,

beginning with Horkheimer and Adorno in the Fifties and Sixties (when Mutual

Assured Destruction became a real possibility)

, despite its claim to be a gen- eral assessment of our civilization,

its competence is restricted to social justice

and the damaged subjectivity

starting from problems and threats that

come up as physical events and are accounted for by hard science has the
advantage that philosophy can work on them without first engaging in a
complicate and doubt- ful theorizing about how the world should be

literature on
justice and climate change misses the point
we have
to motivate our interest in existence
we should assume responsibility for future

(in continuation of its original being rooted in the Marxian critique of political economy)

Karl Jaspers or Gu n
ther Anders.

. The rest of the real world is left to a purely Hobbesian (and later Luhmannian) reading, or to the perception of side-figures such as

A last epistemological remark:

, however socially generated,

according to a general normative theory. This ad hoc theorizing shows the ability or inability of a philosoph- ical view to come to terms with problems that are of paramount importance to everybody, not

just to the prac- titioners of Schulphilosophie.

2. I have explained elsewhere9why survival rather than justice is the leading category of a philosophy of global threats.

now thriving

that before we look for ways to establish justice between generations,


and wellbeing, or rather in the existence and wellbeing of humankind.10 While survival of humankind is what

best defines our problematic situation, when it comes to the normative aspect I believe that

rather than do justice to them; talking responsibility I move from its most elementary

manifestation, the responsibility parents take on for their children. Justice as fairness comes in when we

have to fight back generational nepotism: it is wrong for any generation to spoil the environment without regard to the consequences in the future, far that it may be, that is not just out of respect for those that may harm our
children and childrens children. Out of elementary fairness, as expressed in the Golden Rule, we cannot deny parents of the, say, twenty-fifth century the chance to bear and educate their children in decent conditions. Now,
survival is a Hobbesian category, as such it sounds like an anathema to critical thinking, just as most categories stemming from the tradition of politi- cal realism do. Since under global threats present and future humankind is really
endangered in its survival, it is however hard to see the rationale of denying the fact because the name comes from the enemys vocabu- lary. More importantly, there is an essential difference: Hobbes survival regards the individual
and is there- fore self-centered and adversarial (in common parlance, mors tua vita mea), while humankinds survival as a moral and political goal is by its own definition an uni- versalistic feature. More on this later. A much talkedabout issue in this context is the so- called identity problem, which I am however inclined to dismiss. If it means the doubtfulness of any engagement in favor of future generations because we do not know if they will exist (we could
decide to stop procreating), the problem is surrounded by an air of futility: there is no imaginable decision process that could effectively lead to a total procreation stop. On the other hand, if only a few humans were alive in the far
future, this would be enough of a reason for our engagement. Of course future humanity could never be born because meanwhile the planet may have been burnt out by an asteroid (natural precariousness of human life) or an all-out
nuclear war (man-made precariousness). Neither type of precarious- ness can however be a reason not to endorse the interest of future generations in survival, because reducing that precariousness is exactly the engagements
telos. The other aspect of the identity problem the non-identity of posteritys values and preferences with our own, or their indeterminacy is not relevant to our case, be- cause the goal for whose attainment we are called to
save or sacrifice something for their survival has to do with their sheer survival (in an indispensably civilized framework, as explained above) rather than with our own and the posteritys moral configuration; in other words, there is
no paternalistic attitude in it. In a fairly different meaning, closer to social rather than moral (analytical) theory, identity comes up in an- other sense. Assuming responsibility for (or, for that matter, being fair to) future generations
is not just an altruistic attitude. Not in the sense that we can do as well do so by acting on egoistic grounds: were this the main reason to take action, we were justified to limit our effort to the less costly adaptation policies instead
of funding the restructuring of the economy necessary for mitigation, the only way-out from global warming for generations of the far future. To be true, addressing the limitation of global warming or the neutralization of nuclear

doing what we
can for the survival of humankind can give ourselves reassurance that our
individual life
is meaningful
because doing
so helps us shed our isolation as single individuals or single generation
and become partners in a wider transgenerational covenant of solidarity
weapons requires wide-ranging undertakings that can be justified only on grounds of a moral attitude towards future generations rather than of our enlight- ened self-interest. But

(also seen in the context of our gen- erations)

beyond the limits of our own existence on earth,


That the interest to live and to raise children in de- cent conditions we attribute to future generations ought to be translated into a right is not self-evident. It is not simply that we should abstain from transforming every reasonable
claim into a right, and instead reserve this category for the essentials that make the associated life of individuals in the polity possible and acceptable ac- cording to each evolutionary stage.11 More importantly, doubts may also
arise as to whether it is wise to translate any goal of social and political struggles into a right, that is to juridify it instead of focusing on the underlying conflict dynamics and the participation of the conflict- ing parties. In general I
share this preoccupation, and have misgivings at any inflationary expansion of the hu- man rights catalogue. On the other hand, moral rights that do not translate into legal rights12 are politically pointless or at least much less
significant than the rights enshrined in a legal order. Also, our case is different, and the issues we are confronted with are more radi- cal than the worries with juridification; this is all the truer, since the establishment of a right to
survival for humankind would require a long and fierce political and intellectual battle in the first place. First of all, does the right of humanity to survival qualify as a (basic or human) right? Before we proceed, let us note that
humankinds survival is not a good like civil liberties, which is completely at the disposal of human beings; instead, it can depend on the orbits of asteroids and other NEOs.13 The right of humankind to survival should therefore be
read as a short for the right of humankind, including future people, to have all previous generations doing their best to ensure their sur- vival and protect them from man-made threats. In this version, we are clearly afar from the
confusion between rights and goals criticized by Dworkin14 (3.1 in the chapter on Difficult cases), the causation of the good at stake (survival) being elusive, or not completely nor (in the case of climate change) undoubtedly
human; also the content of the right is not a physical state, but rather the behavior influencing it. In a manifest way, this also identifies the rights indispensable correlate, that is the duty of the relevant actors (individuals and
institutions) to refrain from behaviors that are likely to cause harm to that good. Whether or not this claim can translate into a right should be investigated from two points of view, those of its structure (a) and its bearer (b). a. As
for structure, three of Feinbergs15 four crite- ria for being a right are already met (to have a content, a holder and an addressee). The fourth, the source of validation, gradually emerges from the argument I am unfolding. Frydman
and Haarscher also list four condi- tions, of which three are already present (titulaire, objet, opposabilite ) even if more remains to be said about the first one; while the fourth condition (sanction) shall be discussed below in the
framework of the constitu- tionalization problem.16 Finally, let us look at the stan- dard distinction of negative and positive rights, which Shue rightly believes to be substantially untenable. This is also true in our case, because the
behavior of in- dividuals and institutions, which humanity is entitled to expect, according to the new right, can be imple- mented either by abstaining in single cases from using or possessing nuclear weapons and emitting excessive
GHGs or by establishing new institutions (a global En- vironmental Protection Agency, say) and strategies (for example, technology transfer from advanced to develop- ing countries to help the latter rein in global warming). What
would be acknowledged would be the right, not the policies that according to time and circumstances are devised for its realization. Does this new right share with the other fundamental or human rights the need to be founded in
a conception of the human, such as those focused by Donnelly on dignity, by Meyers on moral agency and by Frydman and Haarscher on autonomy?17 Not properly, or not di- rectly. Humanitys right to survival is a meta-right rather

this right is the pre-condition for making all other rights possible
human rights can only apply to a living
humankind, but not to a republic of insects and grass
The meta-right as a pre-condition has to be un- derstood in the
moral sense: no foundation of morality
makes sense if
it cannot rely on the respect of the fundamental right s of those

harmed by our acts and omissions

global challenges, which have received
so little attention in the mainstream philosophy of the last decades, have
indeed philosophical implications capable of undermining the
attitude in moral and political theory
than being the first right and sharing the same founda- tion with the others.18 Therefore, its foundation is for- mal rather than rooted in a substantive view of what is human:

. It is their Bedingung der Mo

glichkeit, to put it as Kant might have done. Not only in the trivial but sturdy physical sense that

(Jonathan Schell on the state of the earth after a large

nuclear war19).


or legality (except in a totally positivistic view of the latter)

(poor populations al- ready

affected by global warming, future generations

as victims of nuclear war or extreme climate change)

. Here I mean moral-

ity at large, regardless of its being based on a conception of the right or the good. In other words, the two


; I mean the attitude to think of the foundations of moral- ity and polity as if the man-made (modern) world in which

they operate had not been substantially altered by humankinds newly achieved capability to destroy itself and/or the planet. Let us make a further step on the road that leads to uncouple, as far as it goes, the foundation of a new
right of paramount importance from a substantive conception of the human an effort aimed at protecting it from the uncertain or frail fate of such conceptions. On the one hand, as a meta-right to individual-only human rights, the
right to survival does not imply a choice among substantive values; this right does not refer to a partic- ular conception of what is good for future generations, as it only wants to ensure for them existential condi- tions that are an
indispensable basis for their members to pursue whatever idea of the good, of liberty and self- realization they may choose. On the other hand, survival is indeed referred not to the mere biological fact, but to the survival of
humankind in decent, civilized condi- tions, taking civilization in the meaning explained in 1. Alone, as I explained above, this qualification is not an added axiological component (civilization as a sys- tem of values), as it rather
relies on the analytical view that some technical and cultural features of civilization are essential to the life of the human species. There is a last aspect to be examined with regard to the structure or nature of this right: its
emergence not from a shift in the doctrine of human rights, but as a response to a new situation in world history, in which survival goods (a livable atmosphere in the first place) that were so far tacitly taken for granted turn out to be
no longer guaranteed, but more and more endangered. As such, this new right reconnects to what we know about individual human rights, that is that they come up as a response to perceived threats and build an evolving
whole.20 b. Let us now come to the question of the rights bearer. It is humankind, defined as the generality of the living individuals along with those who will be born. There are three possible objections to this proposition. First,
it seems to be self-evident that the notion of a human right for the so defined humankind cannot be subject to the classical liberal objection that bearers of such rights are individuals, not groups.21 Humankind is not an exclusive and
self-contained group opposed to others (at least until we do not have our first contact with dwellers of other regions of the universe), nor is it meant here to represent particular sets of values. Between the two meanings of
humanity as species (Artbegriff) and as regulative notion of a community cemented by shared values and goals (Zielbegriff)22 I am referring to the first one; it is now becoming philosophically sig- nificant because not even its

biological existence can be taken for granted under man-made threats. Humankind is not a hypostasis detached from the individuals, as in the case of the community or das Volk, as it rather means the totality of the living
individuals of any given generation including (a) their potential to generate fur- ther human beings and generations and (b) their knowl- edge that the latter will exist and probably suffer. This reflexive notion of humankind raises a
problem, but remains open to different ethical choices: indifference towards future generations, responsibility for them, and obligations assumed in their favor. 4. A second question is: why should we speak of humankind instead of
limiting ourselves to the more sober expression all present and future individuals? There is first a lexicological advantage, in as much as we thus use one word instead of connecting two by an and. This better conveys the sense
that the bond of solidarity based on the responsibility for the elementary living conditions of posterity makes present and future individuals one community in this sole, thin sense in- deed, which does not try to conceal the deep
fractures existing between contemporaries within the present and the successive generations of this community. The very inclusion of future people into humankind is not an act of inclusive kindness towards them, but is rather
made compelling by the lethal threats that past and present people have projected into the life of posterity, in an amount unprecedented in history. Lastly, introducing humankind as a bearer of rights highlights that the right of the
individuals to be alive and free can be enjoyed only in the middle of a larger community, which makes the claim of human rights possible and helps to im- plement them. In times of economic globalization and global threats, we have
come to know that this com- munity is the whole humankind, not just nations. All this however does not alter the truth that who is entitled to vindicate the right to survival is not humanity as a hypostasis, but every individual either
living or not yet born very much like what happens with individual human rights, whose constitutional formulation makes them enjoyable for every citizen who will in the future be born under the same Constitution. Third comes
the standard objection: it does not make sense to endorse obligation towards future people, since, if men and women agree to stop reproduction, those people might never be born. I have already dismissed this as a futile mental
experiment. It could further be argued, though, that future generations might turn out to have moral standards totally different from ours. Yet, the possibility that posterity will be not amenable to our moral world is not huge
enough to release us from any responsibility towards them. We can still under- stand, and to an extent share, the moral problems raised by the Bible or the Greek classical tragedy of millen- nia ago and should not easily assume that
our fellow humans of the year 3000, dwellers of a planet spoiled by global warming, will be morally so hugely different from us. Finally, let me anticipate here one of the legal con- siderations that will be developed later on. Any
right- establishing text (but I am now referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR 1948) works with the basic formula everyone has the right to etc.23 The validity of the claims is limited only by the spatial extension of the law: a right established by the French Constitution may be thought to be valid universally, but is legally protected only on French territory, while the rights mentioned in the UDHR apply by definition to the entire world
where humans live. This can be dubbed spa- tial universalism, while establishing a right of present and future humanity to survive is tantamount to adding a time universalism. In other words, this makes explicit that the right of
everyone to a just international order (UDHR 1948, Art. 28; more below) also holds for the everyones of the year 3000. This may have always been tacitly intended by the law, the only time limit ly- ing in the possibility that the law
is at some point in the future dismissed by another law canceling or expand- ing those rights. In a present like ours, in which it has become known that the future is no longer guaranteed to be essentially homogeneous (with no
radical change in the physical and anthropological life conditions) to the present and the past, it has become necessary to openly establish a linkage between our obligations and the rights of future generations, as far as existential
issues are concerned; a link that will likewise apply to them as soon as they become the present generation. So far, I have clarified the moral and, to a lesser extent, legal reasons for introducing the notion of hu- mankind as right
bearer. I will now stress that the hu- mankind discourse in this article remains political rather than moral. It is not necessary here to rerun the history of the humankind/humanity notion; it is enough to remember that its denial has
been a stronghold in the battle of value nihilists (Nietzsche) and realist thinkers (Oswald Spen- gler, who dismissed it as a zoological notion, and more extensively Carl Schmitt in Schmitt 1976, particularly 6). As self-contained
units (such as the Westphalian system states) were deemed to be the only sustainable and legitimate polities, any reference to humanity was seen as toothless or manipulative, as a noble universalis- tic alibi for particularistic
interests.24 Setting aside this sort of criticism, which mistakes the ideological use of the term for its very substance, we know that humanity, as a good-will aspiration of philosophers, poets and re- ligious men, could not be
regarded as a political notion because only non-voluntaristic communities can be re- garded as political. They alone allow for binding and effective decisions, whereas any partner can at any time and according to its convenience

planetary lethal threats

such as nuclear war or disastrous climate change have the potential
strength to forge all relevant political actors into one community
who received the push to unite from the threats to their life and limbs
because they are all put in danger, and
because they have to act
This is a possibility, not an
inevitable process
withdraw from mem- bership in humanity or other large associations based on just good will. This can now be expected to change, because

, not unlike Hobbes



if they really want to fight back those dangers.

actual and

, as there are

enough counter-forces that impede those Hobbesian threats to fully make hu- mankind one political community: fear, the protecting passion, does no longer work as smoothly as in Hobbes model of Leviathan.25 Nor is the potential
contained in global challenges supposed to generate a world state as its only outcome: practicing survival policies, who- ever the actors may be, is more important than a uni- fied state-like structure in charge of doing so. Nonetheless

all this is enough to use humankind in a political sense

, as something that is a potential constituency rather

than a fragmented multiplicity of individuals and states. 5. Why a fundamental rather than a human right? The distinction between human and fundamental is not univocally worked out in the literature.26 In the vocab- ulary I am
using here, human rights are seen as a philo- sophical concept and a moral (deontological) precept, while fundamental rights are those positively acknowl- edged in a legal order, entrusted to political and institu- tional processes for
their implementation, and claimable in courts this last feature being more problematic. Putting on humankinds survival the label of a funda- mental right avoids leaving it in a philosophical limbo as a regulative idea,27 and gives it
a better defined political and legal nature; this is more adequate to the character- istic of survival as something endangered by political decisions (or the lack thereof) and requesting a political solution by a given deadline (the next
few years if we want to try to keep the temperature increase expected by 2100 under two degrees). If humankinds survival is acknowledged as a funda- mental right, it follows that it should be constitutional- ized, that is inserted
in new and old (and aptly modified) Constitutions as well as in a new version of the Univer- sal Declaration of Human Rights; as such, it could be referred to as highest guidance in international treaties aimed at implementing it
rather than being enshrined in a specific survival treaty. In constitutional law, a development in this sense is already taking place, in as much as either the rights of future generations to a safe environment or our responsibility
towards them in this regard or the imperative to preserve the environ- ment (without mention of the future generations, but implicitly to their benefit) have been affirmed in consti- tutional amendments of the last two decades in
countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, but also Burkina Faso and Burundi. Having rights or being protected by the legally defined responsibility of the previous gener- ations is however not the same thing, and with regard
to humankinds survival I would point at its stronger formulation as a right: it is more binding, while the ob- jections against endowing future generations with rights can be easily argued against. Just because it is conceived in favor
of those who cannot yet uphold their interest, this right should be protected against cancellation by a sort of Ewigkeitsklausel as in Art. 79.3 of the German Grundgesetz.28 A right to survival is more specific and more stringent than
the right to a safe environment be- cause it derives from lethal and global challenges that affect the very core of the polity, protection, rather than from a generic care for a balanced relationship to na- ture or from a diffuse feeling of
benevolence for the posterity. In national or regional Constitutions, the acknowl- edgment of this right could be accompanied by the establishment of corresponding institutions, promoting the implementation of the new right; it
could be for example an ombudsman29 for future generation as a (countermajoritarian)30 authority protecting their inter- ests against damages resulting from new legislation, and endowed with the power to send it back to the
legislative rather than to veto it straight away.31 Not to be underes- timated are the difficulties that would arise in striking a very delicate balance on two levels: in general between the interests of present and future generations,32
but also between parliaments or executives, which act under the pressure of their constituencies, and the members of the ombudsman authority, who remain nonetheless contem- poraries of the former rather than being appointed
by the latter for all too natural reasons. The same difficulty would affect the national courts in which the new fundamental right, as jus cogens principle, should be made claimable at the initiative of institutions such as the
ombudsman or of advocacy groups representing a significative number of citizens in a referendum-like counting procedure. In international courts,33 the interest of future generations should be represented by an ombudsman to be
established at the UN as well as at regional associations of states such as the EU or Mercosur. A point however that remains open to further discussion has been raised in the de- bate on socio-economic or solidarity rights, which
may have some affinity with the right to survival: theoreti- cally, Frank Michelman has made clear that the status of a norm as constitutional law ought not to be con- flated with the question of its availability for judicial
enforcement.34 In practice, conflicts are easily possi- ble between the courts sentencing on the states failure to implement those rights and the vain or overbearing nature of these sentences on a matter that is political rather
than judicial. 35 This is true in our case as well: the attainment of a new international order without national possession of nuclear arms or a carbon-free reordering of the world economy are goals for policy-making, not something
that can be attained in courts. In this frame- work, however, courts are not jobless: sentencing the nuclear-armed states for their failure in implementing art.VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),36 or the US of the Bush
years for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and failing to cut emissions is a typical judicial matter, as the two cases would regard the break of treaty obligations or the failure to cease doing some- thing harmful, not to bring about
something good.37 Finally, two more fundamental objections could be raised against the idea of a legal protection of the inter- est of future generations. It could be argued that what would be represented (in a time-universalistic
mode) is not the interest of future generations, but rather the interest of a particular fraction of the present ones, dis- guising itself as standard bearer of those people to come. On the one hand this should be taken into account as
critical point of view in the public debate on those inter- ests. On the other hand, this criticism, strictly speaking, would also delegitimize such an ancient principle of Roman and Western law as the protection of the child. In morality it
would affirm a radical skepticism that denies the possibility of slipping into another persons clothes and acting from a non-egoistic stance. This can be obviously upheld, but at the price of the disappear- ance of morality as well as of
the polity, which is in any case and among other things a solidaristic association. A second problem, which is more difficult to deal with, is that we do not know as a general piece of knowl- edge what the interest of future
generations is; whereas in the case of legal protection of the child we share a generally accepted knowledge of his or her future in- terest (to remain healthy, to get sufficient education, to be free to make the best of him/herself).
What the real life conditions and the presumable vital interests of fu- ture generations will be can only be tentatively argued from what the several branches of natural and economic (e.g. demography) science are able to tell us
about what is likely to remain constant in physical and cultural anthropology and what is likely to be most endangered. As such, it is important that moral and political theory renew their relationship to the natural sciences after a
time of reciprocal disdain between the two. While sci- ence cannot by itself draw an encompassing picture of future life under global threats, philosophy should learn from science what those future problems are likely to be and
elaborate on them, instead of reflecting on the future of humanity by just moving from the doctrines of past philosophers or relying on the hearsay about it based on media reports or the philosophers personal divinations. 6. My
philosophical proposal to fill a hole in human rights discourse and legislation by introducing a first or meta-fundamental right of humankind to survival and positivizing it in national, international and world law38 resonates with two
legal developments. The first related to humanity, the second to human rights. The latter resonates with the novelties in constitutional law men- tioned in 5. The first one began in 1970 as the UN General As- sembly adopted
Resolution 2749, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, con- taining the notion of a common heritage of mankind; it was originally introduced to protect the seabed and ocean floor and later the
moon and other celestial bod- ies from exploitation by powerful countries against the interest of the developing ones.39 In the 1990s, the competing and thinner concept of common concern of mankind emerged, as in the
Convention on Bio- diversity of 1992; nonetheless it can be said that hu- mankind has become a notion contained in binding in- ternational law and referred to indivisible (climate) and divisible (seabed, ocean floor, moon) objects,
and that this has happened as an answer to problems and chances generated by huge technological advancement. In another corner of legal development, it could be argued that the logical structure, so to speak the norma- tive
algorithm of the UDHR norms the aforemen- tioned everyone has the right . . . implies that hu- mankind, not just single individuals, is to be the bearer of those rights, even if the collective singular is not used. Turning to a
more substantive level, we could go as far as to say that the legal protection of humankinds survival was implicitly enshrined as early as 1948 in the UDHR and later in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
as well as the In- ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 1966. Art. 28 UDHR (ev- eryone has the right to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Decla- ration can be fully realized) could be rethought in the direction of institutions bound to implement for every- one, now and in the future, the right to life (Art.3 UDHR, Art. 6 ICCPR), the right to an adequate standard of liv- ing
incl. adequate food (Art.11 ICESRC)40 as well as the right of the family to be protected (Art.10 ICESRC), a right that would be denied to families of the posterity bound to live under insufferable environmental condi- tions (cf. above

be ignored
create an appropriate and stable environment for what can really bring
about a change, that is educational and political struggles,

hu)mankind has thus ceased to be just a concept used by

the notion of a transgenerational chain of parents). While the different binding strength of the several

legal formulations

(treaty, covenant, convention, declaration)

, it remains clear that le- gal documents do not advance by themselves the cause of humankinds survival, except if they can be effec- tively referred to in a court of justice; but

the former aiming at a change in the political


To sum up, (

and theologians, whose presence in international law was merely philo- sophical, if not rhetorical, as in the Preamble to the UN Charter of 1945. Though not explicitly endowed with rights in

the documents quoted above, the humankind of the common heritage doctrine is an important prece- dent in the direction, suggested by this article, of in- troducing this new legal actor. When looking at the implementation of the
rights that can be attributed to it, the other legal novelty of the common but dif- ferentiated responsibility41 of individual actors, such as countries, should also be brought to bear. This is important when it comes to distributing the
burden of the duties corresponding to those rights which is in- deed one of the major issues in the debate following the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change of 2009. In any case, the legal acknowledgment of a common
responsibility for the global commons is a further step in designing humankind as a juridical notion. This article is policy-oriented in the peculiar sense of a constitutional policy that will require decades, if ever, to become the
subject of debate and even longer to be legally implemented. Impulses in this direction are cer- tainly not be expected from the world of politics, but rather from the scientific community (provided a now utopian sounding
collaboration of physics, philosophy and legal theory materializes) or from scattered sen- tences of national and international courts, particularly in environmental matter.42

society would help


Support from civil

Finally, the authors suggestion as to how to read this proposal: it has a clearly cosmopolitan (or better: cosmopolitical) character, not however in the sense of

cosmopolitanism as a general doctrine of government/ governance. It is rather generated by tools coming from realist thought: new threats as source of new rights, and lethal and planetary threats to the survival of hu- mankinds
civilization as drivers towards a new level of legal protection.

Even if the 1ac seems morally sound --- you have obligation to
evaluate the consequences of the 1ac
Fettweis 13 Professor of IR @ Tulane
(Chris, The Pathologies of Power, p. 242-243)
Classical realists have long considered prudence, in Hans Morgenthau's words, "

the supreme virtue in politics."47 Their conception of the

term, and how it has traditionally been used in U.S. foreign policy, is similar to the dictionary definition: wisdom, caution, circumspection, and "provident care in the management of

would aim above all to minimize cost and maximize

benefits .49 It would strive to be rational, careful, and restrained , and it would not waste
national resources pursuing low-priority goals or addressing minor threats. Prudence is essentially the ability to weigh
potential consequences of alternative political actions. It demands that
the main criteria for any decision be a cost-benefit analysis, or an honest
attempt to assess the implications for the national interest. Although such calculations are by necessity uncertain
in a world where rationality is bounded and values unquantifiable, if policy makers were to value prudence above all other virtues they would by force of habit explain
and justify their decisions using a rational framework , with reference to reason and evidence
rather than emotion. Were prudence the defining virtue in policy debates, the ideal for which policy makers strive, it would quickly silence
the voices of fear, honor, glory, and hubris. The process of evaluation can never be
foolproof, but by insisting that it be at the center of decision making at the very
least prudence can make assumptions clear and offer a basis for evaluation absent in those
decisions driven by pathology. The evaluation of policy cannot be done
without recognition of cost. Simply achieving a goal - or winning - does not justify
action. To be considered rational, the other side of the ledger must be considered as well .
This may sound obvious, but a surprising number of scholars and analysts
judge foreign policies based solely on whether or not objectives are fulfilled.50
Neoconservatives in particular tend to ignore costs , assuming that the United States is capable of paying
virtually any price in the fight against evil. The war in Iraq, that exemplar of imprudence, was not
preceded by extensive projections of the likely price tag. When pressed, Bush administration officials repeatedly
deferred such discussions by denying such estimates were possible.5' At best, they were of secondary relevance. In the war's aftermath, the same
resources."48 Simply put, a prudent foreign policy

officials stress how much better the world is without Saddam rather than how much worse it is without those who gave their lives in removing him. Like realism itself,

prudence is hardly amoral. It merely demands a focus on the morality of

outcomes , not intentions . Actions that produce bad results are imprudent,
no matter how good the intent . On this, Morgenthau quotes Lincoln: I do the very best I know, the very best I can, and I mean to keep
doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make
no difference.2 Although the central criteria for prudent cost-benefit analyses must be the national interest, no abnegation of national ideals or international responsibility need follow.
Foreign humanitarian assistance is cheap, relatively speaking, and often carries benefits for donor and recipient alike. The entire operation in Somalia, during which as many as a quarter

focus on the outcome makes it clear that the Iraq war was a blunder of the
first order. Even if the intentions of the Bush administration were indeed good, it is hard to see
how the outcome can be said to be worth the cost. Thomas Ricks quotes a senior intelligence official in Iraq as
million lives were saved, cost U.S. taxpayers less than two billion dollars.53 More was spent every week at the height of the Iraq war. Qaddafi was removed for half that.

saying that the long-term American goal after the surge is "a stable Iraq that is unified, at peace with its neighbors, and is able to police its inter-nal affairs, so it isn't a sanctuary for Al
Qaeda. Preferably a friend to us, but it doesn't have to be."54 Presumably one could add the absence of weapons of mass destruction to this rather scaled-back list of goals, and perhaps
the continuation of the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf. In other words, if all goes well over the course of the next few years -and there is obviously no guarantee it will - Iraq might

The cost of this restoration of the virtual status quo ante will be at
least forty-five hundred American dead and some thirty thousand
wounded, at least a hundred thousand Iraqis killed and millions more
displaced, and up to as many as three trillion U.S. taxpayer dollars spent.55 The war inspired many young Arabs, such as Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, to join the ranks ofjihadi
look quite a bit like it did in 2003, only with a marginally more friendly dictator in charge.

terrorists, swelling the ranks of America's true enemies. Al-Asiri is currently the main bomb maker for "Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula," the group that operates out of Yemen and

decision to invade Iraq may well turn out to be the most imprudent action
continues to try to take down Western airliners, and he is considered the "most dangerous man in the world" according to many people who maintain such rankings.56

this country has ever taken. Another operation from the same year might serve as a counterexample to Iraq, a prudent foreign policy adventure
where the benefits outweighed the costs. The July 2003 intervention in Liberia may be little remembered, but that is partially because
around two thousand Marines to Monrovia and ended a siege during a particularly brutal civil war. Security returned to the capital and
in Somalia, die mission did not creep into nation building, proving that intervention need not be tainted by hubris. By October the civil
withdrew, having suffered no casualties and incurring little cost to the U.S. taxpayer. In the years since, Charles Taylor, the paragon of

it was such a success. The United States deployed

an unknowable number of lives were saved. Unlike
war had effectively ended and the Marines
the West African kleptocradc despot, was put on

No assessment of costs and

benefits can guarantee good decisions, of course. But by making
assumptions clear, by inculcating and rewarding a systematic evaluation of
alternatives, expectations can be assessed more rationally and decisions
rescued from emotion. If leaders work actively to minimize pathologies
and replace them with rational, fact-based beliefs, the odds of arriving at
rational conclusions rise. If prudence is the goal, therefore, the following should form the core of the foreign policy conventional wisdom: The world
trial at The Hague and the security situation in Liberia has improved markedly. The Marines have not returned.

is more peaceful than ever before. While no country is ever completely safe, the United States has few - if any - serious security threats.

War turns structural violence

Goldstein 1Prof PoliSci @ American University, Joshua, War and Gender , P.
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for
peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace,
work for justice". Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work
for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This
approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities),
but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book
suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way . War is not a product
of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause,
although all of these influences wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in
part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, "if you want peace, work
for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace .
Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of
individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe
suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most
important way to "reverse women's oppression " The dilemma is that peace work
focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral
grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the
main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

AT bare life
No bare life impact
Heins 5 - visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior
Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt
(Volker, German Law Journal No. 5, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?
According to this basic Principle of Distinction, modern humanitarian action is
directed towards those who are caught up in violent conflicts without possessing
any strategic value for the respective warrin g parties. Does this imply that
classic humanitarianism and its legal expressions reduce the lives of
noncombatants to the "bare life" of nameless individuals beyond the
protection of any legal order? I would rather argue that humanitarianism is
itself an order-making activity . Its goal is not the preservation of life
reduced to a bare natural fact, but conversely the protection of civilians and
thereby the protecti on of elementary standards of civilization which prevent
the exclusion of individuals from any legal and moral order. The same holds
true for human rights, of course. Agamben fails to appreciate the fact that
human rights laws are not about some cadaveric "bare life", but about the
protection of moral agency. 33 His sweeping critique also lacks any sense
for essential distinctions . It may be le- gitimate to see "bare life" as a juridical fi
ction nurtured by the modern state, which claims the right to derogate from othe
rwise binding norms in times of war and emergency, and to kill individuals, if nece
ssary, outside the law in a mode of "effec- tive factuality." 34 Agamben asserts
that sovereignty understood in this manner con- tinues to function in the
same way since the seventeenth centur y and regardless of the
democratic or dictatorial structure of the state in question. This claim
remains unilluminated by the wealth of evidence that shows how the
humanitarian motive not only shapes the mandate of a host state and
nonstate agencies, but also serves to restrict the operational freedom of
military commanders in democracies, who can- not act with impunity and
who do not wage war in a lawless state of nature.

Claims of a pervasive MIC are false
Crock 3 Specialist @ Washington Post
Stan, An All-powerful U.S. Military-industrial Complex Is Simply An Enduring Myth,
Orlando Sentinel, Lexis
While hardly anyone was watching, the American military-industrial
complex died. Sure, defense spending is soaring, and GIs are camping out in
globe-girdling operations. But most of the surge in spending is aimed at
operations and maintenance -- not at purchasing planes, ships and tanks.
America's arms merchants are in a long-term downward spiral.
Aerospace-defense employment is at its lowest level in 50 years. The number
of major weapons programs has shriveled to a handful. Though the nuclear
threat from North Korea and Iran may be rising, weapons procurement
budgets, adjusting for inflation, are half their Reagan-era highs. And the
collapse of the Soviet Union, technological advances and what passes for
fiscal responsibility in Washington conspire against an industry revival. The
industry's swoon can't be reconciled with the conventional wisdom that
the military-industrial complex -- the Iron Triangle of Pentagon brass,
defense contractors and key congressional committees -- can pursue its
interests impervious to external forces. To be sure, Lockheed Martin and
General Dynamics won't disappear. But the notion of an all-powerful
military-industrial complex is a vestige of the Cold War. As defense
concerns consolidated in the 1990s, the aerospace-defense industry work force
shriveled from 1.3 million in 1989 to 689,000 at the end of 2002 -- roughly the
number employed in 1953, according to the Aerospace Industries Association.
The industry has handed pink slips to 10 percent of its workers since
the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and more shrinkage is likely. Between
2002 and 2008, nearly half of the industry's work force -- what remains of the
Apollo program generation -- will be eligible for retirement. That could mean
the loss of unparalleled skill and experience -- and potentially America's
technological edge. The budget picture is similarly bleak. When Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld unveiled a $38 billion jump in the 2002 Pentagon
budget in mid-2001, it looked like salvation, but none of that increase went to
buy big weapons. Procurement, which had shrunk 30 percent since the end of
the Cold War, dropped another $1 billion. In 2003, spending on new weaponry
managed to bounce back a bit, rising by about $9 billion to $70 billion. A chunk
of that, however, merely reflects more realistic costs for existing programs.
The 2004 budget calls for just a 4 percent rise in weapons procurement. To
cope with a growing cash crunch for the Defense Department, a broad swath
of programs is under fire. The Pentagon has killed the Army's Crusader
howitzer and a Navy sea-based missile-defense system that Star Warriors had
high hopes for. Cuts in high-profile programs such as the Air Force's F-22
Raptor and the Army's Stryker armored vehicle are likely. Slashing these
programs might be wise, as the projected numbers of these weapons are
excessive, but it's a sign of the dollars dilemma that the decisions are driven

more by budgetary constraints than strategic requirements. Most

startling, beginning with the first Bush administration, more than 100 big
programs have stopped production, says Gordon Adams, a George
Washington University professor who oversaw national security accounts at the
Office of Management and Budget in the Clinton administration. Now, the Air
Force has just one major weapon system on the drawing board: the Joint Strike
Fighter. The Army also has only one: the Future Combat System. Meanwhile,
advances in technology suggest that future U.S. military spending can afford to
take a nosedive. When a $25,000 kit can turn a dumb bomb into a smart
bomb, generals ask how many targets one sortie can hit, not how many sorties
it takes to hit one target. With precision munitions, we don't need as many $80
million fighters or $2 billion bombers to achieve a given goal. All of this
suggests that the conventional wisdom about the clout of the defense
industry is no longer valid , if it ever was. Adams now argues (in an
unpublished paper for the Ford Foundation) that defense policy is explained
by a complex combination of factors: policy and strategy (an
assessment of the threats the nation faces); bureaucratic imperatives (the
military services care more about their assignments than buying weapons),
macro politics (as Republicans and Democrats vie over who is more
patriotic); and micro politics (as lawmakers try to serve their constituents'
needs). The formulation of national security strategy, thus, is far more
complicated than the conventional view that defense contractors
simply call the shots.

No security impact
Abrahamsen 5 (Rita, Department of International Politics, University of Wales,
Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear, Alternatives 30:1, AG)

The war on Iraq can be seen to demonstrate the willingness of the British
government to engage in illiberal acts to defend the liberal values of the
"international community," but it is important to note that the process of
securitization does not automatically dictate such spectacular responses. As
argued above, the process of securitization is gradual and incremental, and an issue
can move along a continuum of risk/fear without ever reaching the stage of
"existential threat" where it merits "emergency action" (as with Iraq). Instead,
most security politics is concerned with the more mundane everyday management
and containment of risk, and the securitization of Africa is thus entirely compatible
with the feeble response to the brutal and prolonged conflict in the DRC or the
Sudan. Rather than spectacular emergency politics or military action, securitization
is more likely to give rise to policies of containment or policing.

War causes patriarchy not the other way around

Workman 96 (Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, January
1996, pg. 6, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf)

With the loosening of the positivist/Realist hold on international relations and the
simultaneous rise of feminist analysis, intellectual space has been created to
address war in terms of the social relations of power between men and women.
This development places war within a broader patriarchal matrix, and has
helped to develop an understanding of war as one (obviously important)
manifestation of patriarchal violence. This development also has promoted a
more unassuming character with respect to the subject matter itself. The
concerns lies less with warfare or its destructive potential (although this
concern remains) than it does with the relationship between warfare and
the oppression of women. Primary concern, that is, rests less with war than
with the reproduction of patriarchy. This paper addresses the gender critique of
war directly. It argues that the gender critique of war has racked enough to be
able to identify a preliminary thesis regarding war and the reproduction of
patriarchy. The altered experiences and practices of war, combined with
the sometimes dramatic modifications in gender representation s
(through propaganda, literature etcetera), are considerable. War produces
cultural crises of gender, especially as it throws the historical contingency and
cultural arbitrariness of gendered constructs into relief. There is the suggestion
that through war traditional gendered constructs can modulate and unwind. An
emerging sense of cultural crisis revolving around gender shifts typically
accompanies both war and post-war periods. Indeed, much of the initial research
on gender and war, in view of the extensive shifts in representations and
practices during war, directly or indirectly explores the emancipatory effect of
war upon women. To the extent that war is contingent upon such gendered
constructs, constructs that the practice itself appears to threaten and endanger,
the relationship between war and gender might be said to be paradoxical. The
paradoxical dynamic between gender and war, however, is softened by the
profundity of the links between war and patriarchy. The gendering of
experiences during war, along with the restoration of traditional
gendered constructs after war, more than compensate for any warinduced sundering of the patriarchal tapestry. While the practice of war
suggests that it might encourage a rupture in the gendered fabric of society, it
overwhelmingly contributes to patriarchal reproduction . Questions
oriented around the emancipatory potential of war where women are concerned,
therefore, run the risk of losing a perspective on the overall role of modern
warfare in the reproduction of women's oppression. .

AT Root Cause
Plan doesnt spillover---movements fail
Pettyjohn and Vick 2013 Stacie L. Pettyjohn is a political scientist at the
RAND Corporation and codirector of the Center for Gaming. Her primary
research areas include military posture, wargaming, internet freedom,
American foreign policy in the Middle East, and terrorism studies. Alan Vick is
a senior political scientist at RAND. (The Posture Triangle A New Framework
for U.S. Air Force Global Presence,
There is considerable evidence that the general publics views on U.S.
bases do not determine a host governments policy toward a U.S. military
presence. 149 For instance, public opinion polls in the Philippines in the years prior to 1991 regularly found that a majority of
those surveyed supported U.S. bases.150 Nevertheless, in 1991 the Philippine Senate failed to ratify a treaty that would have
extended U.S. basing rights, resulting in the expulsion of U.S. forces. There is, therefore, an imperfect correlation between public
opinion and host government basing decisions, which in part can be explained by the degree of agreement among elites about their

Realists have long argued

that the publics views on foreign policy can be manipulated because
these foreign affairs are not particularly important to normal people, they
have little knowledge about the issues, and their views frequently change.
The security consensus argument identifies the conditions under which
elites may be able to contain or influence public opinion on a U.S. military
presence. For more on public opinion, see Ole Rudolf Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition, Ann
nations relationship with the United States.151*****INSERT FOOTNOTE***** 151

Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2004; and Matthew A. Baum and Philip B. K. Potter, The Relationship Between Mass
Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 39, 2008,

When there is a strong security consensus , host nation

elites are able to contain anti-base movements that might emerge ,
preventing them from gaining enough traction to alter national policy . In
an effort to defuse anti-base movements, elites can use a variety of strategies, including
campaigns to shape public opinion or co-option. As long as elite solidarity
persists, enduring partners are likely to successfully minimize the impact
of anti-base movements, resulting in only small changes in basing policy
pp. 3965.*****END FOOTNOTE

(compared with severe limitations or the loss of access).152 Consequently, this is the most stable type of access relationship, and
therefore, ideally, the United States would only create strategic anchors at enduring partner bases. That is not to say that the
enduring partner may not grant the United States permission to use a base for a particular operation or that the relationship is
entirely trouble-free, but in general it offers the most secure type of peacetime access.

Root cause explanation fails

Morson 7 (Gary, Prof. of Slavic Studies, Russian Literature and History @
Northwestern, Anna Karenina In Our Time: Seeing More Wisely, 2007, pg. 152-154)
If Levin resembled so may intellectuals in his time and ours, he might seek
root cause (as we would call it today) of all these failures. Much as the
generals an historians satirized in War and Peace mistakenly seek the cause of
historical events in a single decision, an much as revolutionaries often reduce

the complexities of social ills to a single conspiracy or institution, so

intellectuals often view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by
a few simple underlying laws. It is just this habit of thought that feeds
utopianism, because if the diversity of evil an misery had a single cause,
then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing What could be
easier? Abolish private property, alter the way children are educated, pass
laws to regulate morals according to a given code, and evil will disappear or,
at least, radically diminish. Behold, I make all new things But Levin learns that
there is no single cause for what has gone wrong. Looking back on the
twentieth century, we may wonder whether the root cause of the worst
human misery is the belief that there is a root cause of human misery. In
fact, many things happen contingently, just for some reason. Friction When l.evin attends the elections, he tries to handle some business for his
sister, but discovers that somehow it cannot be done. In Dostoevsky, the reason would be "administrative ecstasy," the sheer delight bureaucrats
take in making petitioners cringe, plead, or wait. But nothing of the sort happens here, and the problem is not one of intent at all. No one has any
interest in thwarting Levin, so he cannot understand what goes wrong. When conspiracy theorists find they cannot accomplish something as easily
as expected, they typically ask cut bono? (who benefits?) ro discover the obstacle. Some person or group must have caused the failure. Defeat means
sabotage. This way of thinking presumes that behind every action there must be an intent, whether conscious or unconscious. Such a view rules out
the possibility that mere contingency or friction accounts for the difficulty. flic military theorist Carl von Clauscwitz deemed friction, in this special
metaphorical sense, an essential concept in understanding armies. Without using this word, Tolstoy regarded the same phenomenon as pertaining not
just to war but to everything social. "If one has never personally experienced war," Clauscwitz explains, one cannot understand in what difficulties
constantly mentioned really consist. . . . Everything looks simple; the knowledge required docs not look remarkable, the strategic options are so
obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the
difficulties become clear; but it is extremely difficult to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective.
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 'Die difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is
inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Clausewitz, 119) The unseen, all-pervading element: For Tolstoy, similar difficulties arise when
dealing with bureaucracy, introducing changes in agriculture, and implementing reforms. A Tolstoyan perspective is easily imagined today. Social
problems look so simple: people in underdeveloped countries are poor, so give their governments foreign aid; workers arc unemployed, so hire them
to perform needed government services; schools do not educate, so raise teachers' salaries; the state regulatory commission keeps energy prices too
high, so partially privatize the system: answers seem so obvious, but in practice reforms rarely have the intended effect. They produce unintended
consequences, which themselves have consequences; and, as Isaiah Berlin liked to point our, no one can foresee the consequences of consequences
of consequences. Experience may teach one to expect certain kinds of difficulties, but some can never be anticipated, lhcrc is always friction:
"Countless minor incidents the kind you can never really foreseecombine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far
short of the intended goal" (Clauscwitz, 119). No one is deliberately impeding Levin's efforts for his sister. By the same token, no one is trying to
thwart his agricultural reforms. Sabotage is out of the question. "All this happened not because anyone felt ill will toward Levin or his farm; on the
contrary, he knew that they [rhe peasants] liked him [and] thought him a simple gentleman (their highest praise)" (340). Friction defeats the
reforms. But where does this friction come from and how might one best deal with it? TTic Elemental Force 'Ihe bailiff and peasants recognize in
advance when a plan is bound to fail, and at lasr l.evin, instead of growing angry, pays artention to what they say: The bailiff listened attentively,
and obviously made an effort to approve of his employer's projects. But still he had that look Levin knew so well that always irritated him, a look of
hopelessness and despondency. That look said: " Ihat's all very well, but as God wills." Nothing mortified Levin so much as that tone. But it was
common to all the bailiffs he had ever had. They had all taken up that attitude toward his plans, and so now he was not angered by it but mortified,
and felr all the more roused ro struggle against this, as it seemed, elemental force continually ranged against him, for which he could find no other
expression than "as God wills." (165) Ihe elementalforce: this concept is central to both Tolstoy's great novels. Tolstoy uses a few similar terms for it.
In War and Peace, he refers to an elemental force shaping individual lives (W&P, 648) and to "the elemental life of the swarm" constituting the
cumulative effect of countless people's small actions governed by no overarching law. In Anna Karentna, he calls the elemental force a "brutal force"
when its outcome is cruel. Ihe rough equivalent of friction for Clause-witz, the elemental force applies more widely. Clauscwitz's explanation stops at

some plans arc more likely to fail

than others. In order to grasp the course of events more easily, we tend to
reduce the countless infinitesimal forces making up the elemental force to
a single cause . After all, it is impossible to enumerate innumerable actions. And
so historians and social scientists naturally look for some super-cause that
sums up all those small actions. They may presume laws or postulate
narrative neatness. Tolstoy relentlessly exposed the logical fallacies in both
forms of simplification, which, at some point, either assume what is to be
proven or proceed as if it were already proven . Historians, social
theorists, and biographers favor generalizations or symmetries permitting
a clear analysis or simple story . They find what they seek, their success
demonstrates not that complexity has been adequately explained but that when
a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be
discovered. In disciplines pretending to be social sciences, it is
repeatedly discovered that things are not as complex as they appear.
friction, but Tolstoy takes the elemental force as a starting point for understanding why

AT Focus on war trades off with SVio

Discussion of war does not displace focus on structural
violence it allows an injection of complexity that is not
Barkawi 12 Professor Politics at the New School for Social Research
(Tarak, Of Camps and Critiques: A Reply to 'Security, War, Violence' Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 41 No 1, p 124-130, SagePub)
A final totalising move in Security, War, Violence is the idea that the study of war should be subsumed under the category of
violence. The reasons offered for this are: violence does not entail a hierarchy in which war is privileged; a focus on violence
encourages us to see war in relational terms and makes visible other kinds of violence besides that
of war; and that the analysis of violence somehow enables the disentangling of politics from war and a proper critique of liberal violence.22 I have
no particular objection to the study of violence, and I certainly think there should be more of it in the social sciences. However, why and
how this obviates or subsumes the study of war is obscure to me. Is war
not historically significant enough to justify inquiry into it? War is a more
specific category relative to violence in general , referring to reciprocal organised violence between
political entities. I make no claims that the study of war should be privileged over that of other forms of violence. Both the violence of
war, and that of, say, patriarchy, demand scholarly attention, but they are
also distinct if related topics requiring different forms of theorisation and inquiry. As for relationality, the category of war is already inherently
relational; one does not need the concept of violence in general to see this. What precisely distinguishes war from many
other kinds of violence, such as genocide or massacre, is that war is a relational form of
violence in which the other side shoots back. This is ultimately the source
of wars generative social powers, for it is amidst the clash of arms that the truths which define social and political
orders are brought into question. A broader focus on violence in general risks losing this
central, distinctive character of the violence of war. Is it really more theoretically or politically
adequate to start referring to the Second World War as an instance of violence? Equally, while I am all for the analysis of liberal violence, another broad

we have far from exhausted the subject

of liberalism and war, an important area of inquiry now dominated by the mostly self-serving
category which would include issues of structural violence, I also think

nostrums of the liberal peace debates. What perhaps is most interesting about Aradaus remarks on violence is that she assumes we know what war is. So,
for example, she suggests that we attend to a continuum of violence in which war is considered alongside insurrections, revolts, revolutions, insurgencies,
rebellions, seditions, disobediences, riots and uprisings.23 Apparently, on her understanding, these other things are not war, even though most of them
typically involve reciprocal, organised violence. This is precisely to take as given the IR disciplinary view of real interstate war that underlies Correlates of
War and other mainstream work. This is the definition of war that I sought to critique in From War to Security, a critique Aradau has overlooked. I was
posing new questions and possibilities for the study of war, not proffering definitive answers about what war is and what it is not, or about where and
when it starts and ends. It is, I would suggest, Aradau who is most concerned about hierarchy and privilege, particularly in respect of perceived slights to
Critical Security Studies and her demand that any study of war be in dialogue with Critical Security Studies. In this, she overlooks the fact that, conceived
another way, with a more holistic vision of the community of relevant scholars, my article was already an engagement with critical inquiry into security
relations. Perhaps it was the opening rhetoric of my article that inspired Aradaus ire, my reference to partygoers from Copenhagen and Aberystwyth
dancing on graves, or my suggestion that contemporary wider agenda security scholars know rather less about the composition of carrier battle groups
than did their traditional predecessors.24 But does anyone seriously doubt that wider agenda scholars are less familiar with histories and sociologies of
wars and militaries than were the traditional predecessors, who even so still managed to overlook their significance? These passages were meant to serve
a very specific purpose, to denaturalise our images of the new and old security studies, and to open up the reader to the possibility that, with respect to

traditional nor wider agenda security studies are centrally interested in
war. Given the significance of war in the human past and present, and the
dire state of the study of war in the Anglo-American academy, this seems
to me a serious problem for critical thought.
the study of war, these fields of study share more in common than is conceivable within the current terms of debate.

Our ground impact isnt hypothetical speculation---reductions
from Okinawa have historically shifted inside the region AND
these relocations link turn the deterrence DA
Japan Times 14
(U.S. military transfers first air tankers to ease Okinawas burden,
Two U.S. military KC-130 air refueling tankers arrived Tuesday at the U.S. Marine
Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture in the first transfer under
a bilateral agreement to reduce the burden on Okinawa of hosting U.S.
bases. The long-delayed transfer will bring a total of 15 KC-130s to Iwakuni by
the end of August, along with approximately 870 U.S. military personnel and their
family members, according to the Iwakuni air station. It is the first time U.S.
units have been moved from Okinawa to another area in Japan. The U.S.
military has said it will fly the KC-130s based in Iwakuni to Okinawa to
conduct exercises in coordination with U.S. Marines there as necessary,
throwing into question how much the step will actually help reduce the
burden of the military presence in Okinawa, home to the bulk of U.S. bases in
Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has vowed to cut Okinawas burden and pledged
financial support, while ensuring a replacement facility will be built to relocate the
Futenma base within the prefecture despite staunch local opposition to the move.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said the KC-130 transfer is proof that
Okinawas burden has been steadily reduced, telling reporters that the
adminstration will continue to make further efforts. Located around 300 km
from South Koreas Busan, the Iwakuni base is considered strategically
important given the nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.
Currently, 53 military aircraft, including FA-18 Hornets, are deployed at Iwakuni, with
59 carrier-based aircraft to be moved there from the U.S. Navys Atsugi base in
Kanagawa Prefecture around 2017. Iwakuni has also become a hub for the MV-22
Osprey transport aircraft, which has a checkered safety record that remains a
source of concern for residents in areas around U.S. bases. Including the first batch
of 12 Ospreys that arrived in Iwakuni in 2012 before their deployment to the U.S.
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa, the U.S. military in Japan now
operates 24 of the tilt-rotor aircraft. An MV-22 Osprey flew to Atsugi on Tuesday to
transport U.S. military personnel, the first flight to the Tokyo metropolitan area,
before heading to Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture. The mayors of Ayase and
Yamato, cities in Kanagawa Prefecture that host the Atsugi base, had urged the U.S.
military to cancel the flight, citing safety concerns. Outside the base, anti-military
groups protested the first arrival of the Osprey and monitored the noise level. To
reduce training in Okinawa, Abe has said the government will call on the United
States to conduct half of the exercises using Ospreys outside the prefecture. Two
Ospreys that will be displayed at an aviation event in Hokkaido are expected to stop

at Yokota Air Base in Tokyo on Saturday for refueling. Tokyo and Washington agreed
on the transfer of the KC-130s in 1996, a year after anti-military sentiment spiked
due to the rape of a schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen in Okinawa. The Iwakuni
Municipal Government has repeatedly said the transfer of the KC-130s and the
relocation of the Futenma base in Okinawa should be linked if Japan and the United
States are to relieve some of the burden on Okinawa Prefecture. The local
government in Iwakuni decided to accept the KC-130 transfer just a week
before Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima approved the start of landfill work in late
December, a step necessary to move Futenma to a less-populated area.

Japan will want them to move to elsewhere on the mainland

Mizokami 11 writes on defense and security issues in Asia, particularly Japan.
He is the founder and editor for the blogs Japan Security Watch
(Kyle, Could Futenma relocate to mainland Japan?,
The Japanese government is reportedly looking at re-basing the U.S. Marine
Corps air base at Futenma, Okinawa. Several places are under
consideration. On Kyushu, the Hijudai Maneuver Area; on Honshu, Kita Fuji
and Higashi Fuji training grounds, and Ojojihara Maneuver Area; on
Hokkaido, Yausubetsu Maneuver Area.

Court of Appeal of California 93

(Paoli v. Civil Service Com, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1073, Lexis)
Of course, the Legislature's "modify" language should be interpreted
according to the case law then in existence. As we said in Larson v. Duca (1989)
213 Cal.App.3d 324, 329 [261 Cal.Rptr. 559], " 'The adopting body is presumed to
be aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof . . ..' " (Quoting In re
Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11 [694 P.2d 744].) "It is a generally
accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have
had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and
amended statutes in the light of such decisions . . .." (Buckley v. Chadwick (1955)
45 Cal.2d 183, 200 [288 P.2d 12], fn. omitted; accord, Estate of McDill (1975) 14
Cal.3d 831, 839 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874].) The 1943 Legislature chose
the judicially construed word "modify" not the word "reduce," and omitted
any confinement of that power to reduction or increase of the type of punishment
theretofore imposed when referring to a commission's power to review it.

Funding is the only barrier, not technology

Jean 8 Staff @ National Defense Magazine
(Grace, Marine Corps Makes Strong Pitch for Sea Bases ,
I think sea basing is probably the most revolutionary war fighting enabler
thats on the market today, said Amos, who expects that funding for the

program will be approved as early as 2010. Implementing the concept will be

difficult and expensive, he acknowledged. But the United States must pursue it
aggressively, he asserted. Other nations, including China, India, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, have proposed similar concepts. Why is it so difficult to
think you can bring a group of ships together, have the ability to move people and
equipment from ship to shore? he asked. Supporters such as Amos point out that
the sea basing concept is not quite as elusive as some might think. In the
opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom, expeditionary units of Task
Force 58 made their way 760 miles inland into Afghanistan. It was a
significant operation in that you had maneuver from the sea, said Amos.
Current Navy deployments known as global fleet stations are essentially sea
bases on a smaller scale, said Benes. These are combinations of different ships
that are engaged in a variety of missions in three theaters around the globe.
Were learning quite a bit on how to do this, he said. Amos asked that
industry invest in the technologies that will enable the concept and make it a reality
in the next five years. Its that critical, he said. This is what we need to get to
2025. But technology is not the greatest challenge, he said. The concept
requires financial commitment from the Defense Department and the military
services, he said. This is now beyond the bowels of the Pentagon.

We could seabase quickly 200 people worked for 13 days and

successfully created a sea base
Kuzilk 11
Kuzilk, R.. (2011, February). AMERICA'S NAVY: A 21ST CENTURY LEADER. All Hands,
(1127), 26-31. Retrieved November 21, 2011, from Research Library. (Document ID:
2313670081) jj. **Jake note - ELCAS-M is essentially a mobile pier system that can
be shipped to any location in the world and assembled within days of arriving. A
fully functional ELCAS-M is equipped with full-size cranes that offload equipment
from vessels (such as the Navy lighterage system) onto vehicles that move the
cargo ashore. It can be used to support a wide range of operations from wartime
missions where large quantities of equipment need to be moved ashore to
humanitarian missions where an entire port has been destroyed by a natural
ELCAS(M) is a unique capability in support of the Navys Sea Basing strategy. Sea Basing facilitates enhanced operational flexibility and the establishment
of maximum combat power ashore with minimum force protection requirements and an increased command and control capability from the sea. Sea
Basings advantage lies in the ability to move traditional landbased logistic functions to the sea. It affords the arrival, assembly, supply, sustainment and

During 2010, approximately 200 Reserve and active component

Seabees from Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB) 1, from Coronado, Calif., and ACB-2, from JEBLCFS,
worked nearly 60,000 hours in 12-hour shifts for 13 days straight to assemble the $60 million system.
The ability of our Sailors to deliver and assemble a massive, portable, improvised
pier emphasizes my belief that Sea Basing is a capability that the Navy brings to the
operation, whether combat-related or for humanitarian assistance , said Adm. John C. Harvey, Jr.,
commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command. It is a capability that we have here and now,
reconstitution from a port or airfield to units at sea.

Seabasing is exclusively seaborne---zero need for interaction

with the host country
Parker 10 Commander in US Navy, Federal Executive Fellow @ Brookings

(Gregory, Seabasing Since the Cold War, Brookings,

Somewhat counter intuitively, the usual debate about seabasing is all about
employing and supporting ground forces ashore. In that sense, seabasing is all
about the land. Of course, the Marines Corps identity is already tied to
operations from the sea, and the Marines have made amphibious landings their
central focus since the days of experimentation before World War II. Coming ashore
from the sea is not new. What is new, however, is the notion of not only
employing forces from the sea but also sustaining them from the sea,
providing all logistical support from the sea, and then returning (or
reconstituting) the forces to the sea following an operation. This freedom
from reliance on land would constitute a new capability, at least for large
numbers of ground forces, which have typically been replenished ashore
via large ports and land-based airfields or via supplies brought over the
beach. Seabasings ports and airfields, by contrast, would remain at sea.

Seabasing solves population backlash without alienating allies

Scoblete 13 editor of RealClearTechnology and an editor on RealClearWorld
(Greg, Future U.S. Bases in Asia Will Be at Sea,
As the U.S. turns its strategic eye toward the Pacific, it's facing a new set
of defense challenges. One of the major ones, according to Marine Lt. General
Terry Robling in an interview with AOL Defense, is sustaining a "persistent
presence" despite the massive distances involved yet without the traditional
land bases that could alienate key allies: Many of our partners in the
region do not want us to be the Uncle that visited and never returned
home. They want us engaged and present but not permanently based in
their countries. This means that seabasing and its augmentation is a
fundamental requirement . Another way the U.S. will resolve this potential
tension is to simply not call bases "bases," as C. Raja Mohan explains: Washington
is fully aware that full fledged military bases of the traditional kind
generate intense political opposition in host countries and is not worth the
unending political headache.

Disregarding foreseeable harm reifies structures of domination

McCluskey 12 JSD @ Columbia, Professor of Law @ SUNY-Buffalo
(Martha, How the "Unintended Consequences" Story Promotes Unjust Intent and
Impact, Berkeley La Raza, doi: dx.doi.org/doi:10.15779/Z381664)
By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of
law reform, the "unintended consequences" message helps update and
reinforce the narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm.

Justice is centrally a question of whose interests and whose harms should count, in
what context and in what form and to whom. Power is centrally about being able to act
without having to take harm to others into account . This power to gain by
harming others is strongest when it operates through systems and structures
that make disregarding that harm appear routine, rational, and beneficial or at least
acceptable or perhaps inevitable. By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and
structures with unquestionable "main effects," the "unintended consequences" story helps
affirm the resulting harm even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance. In considering
solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle is not that struggling homeowners' interests are
overwhelmingly complex or uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and
ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests count. The failure to criminally
prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty
about the harmful effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are skewed to

unequal effects of the prevailing policy response to the crisis are foreseeable and
obvious, not accidental or surprising. It would not take advanced knowledge of economics to
protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the clear harms to hosts of others.

readily predict that modest-income homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy
approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure protections for modest-income
homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy
actions likely to alleviate the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer advocates,
low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major changes in existing systems, or are
divided about the technical design of alternative programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against
fraud and racial discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change are often
excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies such as the Treasury Department and the
Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship
about financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been largely absent or
marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs widespread and severe inequality as

justice requires careful

attention to both harmful intent and to complex harmful effects . But the
concept of "unintended consequences" inverts justice by suggesting that
the best way to care for those at the bottom is to not care to make law more
attentive to the bottom. "Unintended consequences" arguments promote a
simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual
critique-the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the desire for more power is what
hurts most. Further, like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy of selfishness, that message
promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore their harmful
effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to care
about this harm, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think tank has recently made this
unforeseeable and largely inevitable, or even beneficial. Moreover,

moral message more explicit with an economic values campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of
economic equality is a problem of the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more

Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor

and justice ahead of service to financial elites should reject stories of
"unintended consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws
that have so effectively achieved the intention of making devastating
losses to so many of us seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial .


2nc ov
Nuclear domino theory is epistemologically sound and not
inherently securitized key to policy making and debates US
disengagement risks cascading prolif
Miller 14 - Frank Stanton Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy in the
Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies at
Brown University. PhD in Political Science from MIT and a research affiliate at the
MIT Security Studies Program
(Nicholas, Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?, 2/24/15,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2014.874189, MIT Press)
the nuclear domino
theory is historically valid ; both in Asia and the Middle East, numerous
states responded to emerging nuclear capabilities by pursuing nuclear
capabilities of their own to varying degrees. Second, the relatively slow
pace of successful proliferation is largely the result of effective policy
intervention, not a lack of reactive nuclear behavior. In particular, the United
States has played an important role in rolling back active nuclear
programs through sponsoring the NPT, sanctions, security guarantees,
technology denial, and military force. Third, there are multiple mechanisms
by which one states nuclear developments can spur nuclear ambitions in
another state, and only one is purely based on security; states often wish to offset or emulate
the prestige garnered by another states nuclear capabilities, and an
emerging regional nuclear power can also strengthen the political hand of
domestic elements that were already pushing nuclear weapons (perhaps for their own self-interested
reasons), tipping the balance in their favor. What are the policy implications that flow from these findings? On a
general level, the nuclear domino theory is in fact a valid basis for
policymaking . Moreover, the belief in the nuclear domino theory has been
instrumental in inspiring the policies needed to transform the theory into
a largely self-defeating prophecy . While the view of nuclear proliferation
(and nuclear dominoes) as solely based on security motivations is indeed
too limited, this is not a necessary component of the nuclear domino
theory . Rather than reject the nuclear domino theory as a heuristic useful
for prediction and policy prescription, scholars and policymakers should
continue to embrace it , albeit in more a nuanced form that allows for
multiple mechanisms of action and multiple motivations for proliferation .
The findings also hold implications for specific contemporary policy
debates such as the likely consequences of an Iranian nuclear arsenal . If
history is any guide, the Iranian acquisition of the bomb will cause regional states
to at least consider developing nuclear weapons of their own. However, precisely
The evidence presented in this article suggests three important conclusions. First,

because of the strength of the US nonproliferation regimewhich was expanded in the 1970s to include stringent
export controls and automatic sanctions against proliferating statesthis response is likely to be more limited than
in the China case, when US nonproliferation policy was in its infancy and was less established. In particular,

regional states that critically depend on the US economically or militarily

are likely to be deterred from actively pursuing nuclear weapons by the
threat of a rupture in relations with the United States. This suggests the risk of an active nuclear
weapons program in countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Iraq is low. However, in countries where the relationship
with the United States is likely to be ambivalent, for example a post-Arab Spring Egypt and a post-civil war Syria the
risk is significantly higher. Unfortunately, the evidence in this article suggests these could be especially hard cases

proliferating states were always either friendsTaiwan, Japan, Australia
or enemiesIraq, Libya, Syria, and Egypt (the latter vis-a-vis Israel).
Meanwhile, ` the one case of failure was India, an unaligned state with
ambivalent relations with the United States. Successful nonproliferation may be especially difficult with
for nonproliferation to succeed. In the cases where US and Israeli nonproliferation efforts were successful,

this type of state since neither brute military force nor the provision of security guarantees are likely to be realistic
options, while sanctions are unlikely to be effective (since the state will not have an important relationship with the

Were the United States to reduce its

international engagement and cut back its economic and military
commitmentsthus increasing the number of states falling into the neither ally nor enemy category
there would be important consequences for nonproliferation . While a less
forward US presence would likely reduce motivations for pursuing nuclear
weapons amongst adversaries of the United States, it would also reduce
US leverage vis-a-vis its former allies. Depending ` on ones assessment of the dangers of
nuclear proliferation, this deserves to be an important consideration in
retrenchment debates.
United States to cut off).196 This leads to a final point.

Japanese nuclear development leads to massive toxic waste

nuclear testing and nuclear weapons create pervasive, lowlevel radiation and toxic waste throughout East Asia
WCC 14
(Statement towards a Nuclear-free World, July 7, 2014,

The 10th Assembly of the World Council of Churches met in a region where nuclear explosions, accidents and threats have taken a heavy toll.

Northeast Asia is the only place on earth where nuclear weapons have been
used in warfare. During the Cold War more than 1,000 nuclear bombs were tested in adjoining areas of the Pacific and Asia. Today all states in the
region either possess nuclear weapons or depend on the US nuclear arsenal. The 100-plus nuclear power plants in East Asia and the many more planned
are signs of economic prowess but also reminders of the Fukushima tragedy. South Korea has the highest geographic concentration of nuclear power

Living in proximity to nuclear power plants and in the target

zones of opposing nuclear forces, people of conscience and courage in
Northeast Asia are raising serious questions about the military and
economic path of their societies. Before and after the Busan Assembly, ecumenical and inter-religious conferences in
plants in the world.

Japan, Korea, USA and Europe have called variously for replacing nuclear power in the region as a step toward sustainable development, and eliminating
nuclear weapons as a step toward peace.[i]

real peace .

Nuclear weapons cannot indeed be reconciled with

They inflict unspeakable suffering with blast, heat and radiation. They wreak destruction which cannot be bound by space or time.

Their power is indiscriminate and their effects cannot be matched by any other device. As long as nuclear weapons exist, they pose a threat to humanity.
Cities are the main targets of nuclear weapons. Attacking cities with 100 small, Hiroshima-size bombs would kill some 20 million people outright and cause

two or three times that number of casualties over time. Soot from the incinerated cities would be lofted into the upper atmosphere, disrupting the global
climate. For a decade, colder temperatures and shorter growing seasons would put two billion people at risk of starvation.[ii] In the face of such data, 124
governments declared in 2013 that It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any
circumstances.[iii] Nuclear strategy, however, demands an unequivocal commitment to use the weapons and nuclear history is rife with accidents,
miscalculations and near-disasters.[iv] What is more, even one nuclear detonation would overwhelm the emergency services of any country in the world.
[v] The only way to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again is to eliminate the weapons themselves. The related technology of nuclear energy
is a peculiarly hazardous form of development. The Fukushima Daiichi disaster in 2011 has demonstrated once more the threats it poses to people,
community life and natural ecosystems. Tens of thousands of the people displaced by the disaster will never be allowed to go home. Their farms, villages
and cities stand empty, contaminated. The disasters full impact on public health and the environment will never be known. A complete clean-up is
impossible. Victims of Fukushima are now referred to as hibakusha, a term that connotes suffering, social stigma and an unnatural fate. The term was
first used to describe people struck by the atomic bombings in Japan. 2015 is the 70th anniversary of those bombings. The hibakusha of 1945 still bear
witness in the hope that no one else will ever suffer their fate. They are now joined by the hibakusha of 2011 who decry nuclear power. It is right that

Military and
civilian uses of nuclear technology both produce large quantities of
Christians and churches listen to them and make their witness our own. Health, humanitarian and environmental concerns

poisonous materials that do not exist in nature and are among the worlds
worst forms of environmental contamination . Some of the by-products
pose a threat to living things for millions of years.[vi] No known options for
long-term storage or disposal of nuclear waste are capable of isolating
nuclear waste from the environment for the timeframe of its inherent hazards.[vii] By fuelling our
economies with nuclear power and protecting ourselves with nuclear
weapons, we are poisoning the earth and generating risks for ourselves,
our descendants and other living things . Nuclear radiation is a poison
that cannot be seen, smelled or tasted. Its health effects are severe and multi-generational. Isotopes released
by nuclear power plants may contaminate the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the food we eat. They are radioactively and chemically toxic to the
human body. The effects of ionizing radiation are observable early in a nuclear disaster in the psychological and social traumas that tear at families and

increased risks of a variety of cancers also emerge and

permanent genetic damage becomes apparent. The use of the term
communities. With time,

safe for the nuclear industry has proven to be unsupportable .

Serious accidents

that were judged to be highly unlikely have occurred repeatedly.[viii] The grave consequences of such accidents have been routinely ignored or dismissed

Setting acceptable levels for exposure to the

ionizing radiation and chemical toxins released during nuclear accidents and
nuclear tests has proved to be misleading and dangerous . After Chernobyl, Fukushima and
by the governments and corporations involved.

other accidents, the acceptable level of contamination was simply raised in order to minimize the perceived seriousness of the event and to deflect

Local inhabitants were routinely told by

the foreigners using their land that they had nothing to fear from radioactive
fallout. Sometimes they were not even told to leave high-risk areas. In many reported cases, military doctors sent to study the effects of radiation
were authorized to examine the test victims but not to provide medical care. The adverse impact of nuclear
substances on communities around nuclear test sites continues to this
public criticism. Similar policies prevail around nuclear test sites.

Prolif creates massive colonial surveillance and security

infrastructure they ensure energy infrastructure becomes
militarized, producing new techniques of social control
Klare 7
(Michael, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College,
January 16 2007, Petro-Power and the Nuclear Renaissance Two Faces of an
Emerging Energo-fascism (Part 2), http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/157744/)

The last face of Energo-fascism to be discussed here is the inevitable rise

in state surveillance and repression attendant on an expected increase

in nuclear power.

As oil and natural gas become scarcer, government and industry leaders will undoubtedly push for a greater
reliance on nuclear power to provide additional energy. This is a program likely to gain greater momentum from rising concerns over global warming
-- largely a result of carbon-dioxide emissions created during the combustion of oil, gas, and coal. President Bush has repeatedly spoken of his desire
to foster greater reliance on nuclear power and the administration-backed Energy Policy Act of 2005 already provides a variety of incentives for
electrical utilities to build new reactors in the United States. Other countries including France, China, Japan, Russia, and India also plan to up their
reliance on nuclear power, greatly adding to the global spread of nuclear reactors. Many problems stand in the way of this so-called renaissance, not
least the mammoth costs involved and the fact that no safe system has yet been devised for the long-term storage of nuclear wastes. Furthermore,
despite many improvements in the safety of nuclear power plants, worries persist about the risk of nuclear accidents such as those that occurred at
Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986. But this is not the place to weigh these issues. Let me instead focus on two especially worrisome
aspects of the future growth of the nuclear power industry: the possible federalization of nuclear reactor placement in the U.S. and the repressive
implications globally of the greater availability of nuclear materials open to diversion to terrorists, criminals, and "rogue" states. Currently, America's
municipalities, counties, and states still exercise considerable control over the issuance of permits for the construction of new nuclear power plants,
giving citizens in these jurisdictions considerable opportunity to resist the placement of a reactor "in their backyard." For decades, this has been one
of the leading obstacles to the construction of new reactors in the U.S., along with the costly and time-consuming legal process involved in winning
over state legislatures, county boards, and environmental agencies. If this practice prevails, we are never likely to see a true "renaissance" of nuclear
power here, even if a few new reactors are built in poor rural areas where citizen resistance is minimal. The only way to increase reliance on nuclear
power, therefore, is to federalize the permit process by shunting local agencies aside and giving federal bureaucrats the unfettered power to issue
permits for the construction of new reactors. Unlikely, you say? Well consider this: The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a significant precedent
for the federalization of such authority by depriving state and local officials of their power to approve the placement of natural gas "regasification"
plants. These are mammoth facilities used to reconvert liquified natural gas, transported by ship from foreign suppliers, into a gas that can then be
delivered by pipeline to customers in the United States. Several localities on the East and West coasts had fought the construction of such plants in
their harbors for fear that they might explode (not an entirely far-fetched concern) or become targets for terrorists, but they have now lost their legal
power to do so. So much for local democracy. Here's my worry: That some future administration will push through an amendment to the Energy Policy
Act giving the federal government the same sort of placement authority for nuclear reactors that it now has for regasification plants. The feds then
announce plans to build dozens or even hundreds of new reactors in or near places like Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Denver, and so on, claiming an urgent need for additional energy. People protest en masse. Local officials, sympathetic to the protestors, refuse to
arrest them in droves. But now we're speaking of defiance of federal, not state or municipal, ordinances. Ergo, the National Guard or the regular Army

there's another danger

in the spread of nuclear power: that it will require a systematic
is called up to quell the protests and protect the reactor sites -- Energo-fascism in action. Finally,

increase in state surveillance of everyone even remotely connected

with commercial nuclear energy. After all, every uranium enrichment
facility, nuclear reactor, and waste storage site -- and any of the linkages between them -- is a
potential source of fissionable materials for terrorists, black-market traffickers, or rogue
states like Iran and North Korea. This means, of course, that all of the personnel employed in these facilities, and all their contractors and subcontractors (and all their families and contacts) will have to be constantly vetted for possible illicit ties and kept under strict, full-time surveillance

The more reactors there are , the more facilities and contractors who will have to be subjected to this sort of oversight
-- and

the more the security staff itself will have to be subjected to ever

higher levels of surveillance by state security agencies . It's a formula

for Big Brother on a very large scale .


Okinawa Link
Marines from Okinawa go to Guammilitary officials will keep
them forward deployed
Harkins 10/1 (Gina, writer for MarineTimes, Marines identify units that will move from Japan to Guam
10/1/15. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/10/01/marines-identify-units-move-japanguam/73046768/)

the Marine Corps' oldest infantry regiments will be among the units moving from
Japan to Guam over the next few years. Members of 4th Marine Regiment, known as "The
One of

Oldest and the Proudest," along with 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade's command element will eventually be
relocated to the Pacific island, said Chuck Little, a spokesman with Marine Corps Forces Pacific. Both units are
currently based in Okinawa. Aviation and logistics support enablers will also move to Guam, Little said. Those
moves will leave about 1,600 Marines permanently based on the U.S. territory in the western Pacific. Another 3,300
Marines will rotate through Guam as part of the Corps' unit deployment program, which currently sends U.S.-based
units to Japan for six months at a time. About 1,300 Marine dependents will also be based on Guam, Little said. In
late August, Navy officials signed off on the long-awaited Record of Decision authorizing the relocation of Marines
and their families to Guam. The move is largely meant to reduce the Corps' presence in Okinawa, which will
eventually be reduced to about 10,000 Marines. That shift will be gradual, with the bulk of Marines and their family
members slated to arrive in Guam in 2020. Those numbers will gradually increase each year through 2026, when
the Corps plans to reach its target of 5,000 Marines and 1,300 dependents on the island, according to the Navy's
plan. Lt. Gen. John Toolan, MARFORPAC's commander, said operating from Guam provides the Marine Corps with a
robust area where multinational training exercises can be held. Additionally, he said, it will allow Marines in the
region to respond to crises quickly when time is critical, "whether in combat or natural disasters." " The

distances of the region necessitate that our Marines be forward-based
and forward-deployed , ready to respond throughout Asia-Pacific," Toolan said.
Naval Facilities Engineering Command has released a proposal for the first
construction project that will house the majority of Marines and their families on
Guam, Toolan said. Marine families will live in housing at Andersen Air Force Base and bachelors' quarters will be
built at a Navy facility on the north side of the island, according to the Navy's plan.

Troops from Okinawa shift to Guamspecific to responses to

RT 11/23 (Russia Times, Guam, Marianas brace for massive US military redeployment 11/23/15.

Thousands of American military personnel are expected to arrive in the

Mariana Islands over the next several years, as part of the US strategic pivot to East Asia.
Many will come from Okinawa, Japan, where many local residents want US
bases closed. Military facilities in Guam, the archipelagos largest island and a US possession
since 1898, have been reinforced and updated in anticipation of almost 5,000 Marines, as well as
new aircraft, submarines and patrol boats. The infrastructure upgrades will elevate the tiny Pacific island into a
maritime strategic hub, a key element laid out by the Pentagon in the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy,
according to the US military newspaper Stars and Stripes. We have two 11,000-foot concrete runways, both rebuilt
within the last 10 years, Steven Wolborsky, director of plans, program and readiness at the Andersen Air Force
Base told Stars and Stripes, adding that roughly 19 million pounds of explosives are now stored across the facilitys
4,400 acres. We have enough parking for more than 155 aircraft, with a robust in-ground refueling infrastructure,
Wolborsky added. We have the largest capacity of jet fuel in the Air Force at 66 million gallons coupled with an

The construction has been driven primarily by

the plan to move thousands of Marines to Guam from Okinawa , Captain Alfred
Anderson, the base commander, said. The redeployment is expected by 2023 or so. More than a third of
the estimated $8.7 billion cost of building the new facilities for the Marines is being funded by
Japan, according to McClatchy reporter Adam Ashton. The Japanese residents of Okinawa have complained for
equal amount down south with the Navy.

years about the impact of US military presence, ranging from drugs, alcoholism, and sexual abuse to environmental

Troops from Okinawa would get shifted to Guam military has

just signed off on plans to move 5,000 marines there.
FoxNews 9/7 [Navy OKs plan to send 5,000 Marines to Guam, September 7,
2015, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/09/07/navy-oks-plan-to-send-5000-marinesto-guam/]
The Navy has signed off on plans to move 5,000 Marines to Guam , in an
effort to rebalance forces in the Western Pacific and bolster air defenses and
aviation capacity, the Marine Corps Times reported. The move will include 1,300
Marine Corps family members. The Marines are moving to Guam from
Okinawa, Japan, where the U.S. military presence has been viewed by the
Japanese as burdensome, the Marine Corps Times reported.

They would shift the marines to Guam it is part of the pivot

to Asia.
Kan 14 [Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Guam: U.S. Defense
Deployments, Congressional Research Service, November 26, 2014]
In 2006, the United States and Japan had agreed on a Realignment
Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3
billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and
to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by
2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed a U.S.-Japan agreement on the relocation of the III Marine
Expeditionary Force personnel from Okinawa to Guam that reaffirmed the Roadmap of May 1, 2006. However, the Marines
relocation will not occur by 2014 and will be more geographically distributed. Opposition on Okinawa to the U.S.-Japan plan for a
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma brought implications for the Marines move
from Okinawa to Guam. Despite the dispute over the FRF, Japan has budgeted for its contributions to the Marines move.

They will shift the marine to Guam its a core part of the Asia
Feffer 14 [John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for
Policy Studies and the author of several books, The Asia-Pacific Pivot: More Smoke
Than Firepower, January 31, 2014, Foreign Policy in Focus, http://fpif.org/asia-pacificpivot-smoke-firepower/]
highly touted rebalancing has essentially been a shell game, involving
not a substantial build-up, but a shifting around of American forces in Asia.
The Pacific pivot has been billed as a way to halt this drift and reinforce the U.S. position as a player in Asia. So far, however,

This shell game has involved, among other elements, the contingent of 18,000
Marines at that base in Futenma. For more than 15 years, Washington and Tokyo have failed to come to an
agreement on closing the decrepit base and building a replacement facility. The vast majority of Okinawans still reject any new base
construction, which would damage the areas fragile ecosystem. In addition, the island already houses more than 70 percent of all
U.S. bases in Japan, and its residents are tired of the collateral damage that U.S. service personnel inflict on host communities.

those Marines are to be transferred to an expanded

facility on the U.S. island of Guam, a huge construction project
underwritten by the Japanese government. Another 2,700 are slated to go to Hawaii. Up to 2,500
Sooner or later, about 5,000 of

will rotate through an expanded Royal Australian Air Force base in Darwin.

2NC ImpactWorse than OkinawaNot Politicized

Guam shift is real and worseno backlash or politicization
Tanji 12
(Miyume Tanji is visiting research fellow at the College of Asia & Pacific at the
Australian National University, 'Chamorro Warriors and Godmothers Meet Uncle
Sam' in Gender, Power, and Military Occupations: Asia Pacific and the Middle East
since 1945 (Routledge Research in Gender and History), edited: Christine de Matos
and Rowena Ward, 2012)
Okinawa and Guam, both small islands inhabited by indigenous minorities, have
many historical parallels as they have lived under continued postwar US
military occupation (Tanji 2010). Okinawa has recently been highlighted as an
anti-base island; however, as the Chamorros did in Guam, the Okinawans
likewise experienced wartime abuses by the Japanese military including
forced prostitution, and have lived with US militarism ever since. As Diaz
points out, forced prostitution (locally remembered as comfort girls) and rape of local
women by the Japanese is well known in Guam; however, both corporeal and
emotional experiences and trauma of the victims have been excluded from
public discussion. Until 2007, no survivor of forced prostitution by the Japanese had stepped forward to
participate in the war claims presently being made elsewhere in Asia (Diaz 2001, 159). In the Guam-Okinawan joint
work shop, a Chamorro play was performed, enacting the Chamorro women during World War II who were forced to
provide sexual and other services to the Japanese soldiers as com1ort women (Cena 2009). Through the
performance of this play, the recognition of connections between sexual violence and militarism was shared among
the women participants, not specific to Okinawa or Guam, but in nearly all military and war situations. This crosscultural communication had the effect of breaking the silence on prostitution and rape, known to accompany

Unlike in Okinawa, accounts of rape, assault

and prostitution of local women by soldiers in Guam are not politicized in
a way that overwrites the dominant narrative of patriotic support of the
US military and its war activities. In a society where the boundaries
between the occupier (military) and the occupied (people) are inextricably
blurred, prostitution and sexual assaults are treated as mundane social
issues, or in the context of the international human trafficking system:
they are not at the forefront of Chamorro concerns related to the US
military buildup. In the recent public sphere in Guam, the official discourse of liberation and uncritical
militarism, whether American or Japanese.

loyalty to Uncle Sam is increasingly matched by criticism and defiance. Figure 6.2 shows a poster displayed at a
public hearing held at a high school in Dededo, Guam, by the US Navy, as a part of a required consultation process
for the US Navy to legally build up or relocate military facilities. At a frst glance, this poster appears to fit the
official discourse of liberation in its description of the brutal wartime Japanese soldiers. Yet the message projects a

The rape of Chamorro women by

Japanese soldiers is discussed more openly since the controversy over the
impending military buildup has emerged in the last few years . Such a direct
critical turn in public expression of Chamorro history.

message would have been unthinkable a decade earlier in a discursive climate where bodily experiences of rape

Japan is now dumping

its burden of alliance, of hosting US military presence, which imposes the
environmental and cultural costs on Guam (Instead of Okinawa). Furthermore,
and sexual crimes were still excluded from the public debate (Diaz 2001, 159).

Yankee soldiers are associated with the horrible wartime experience suffered by Chamorros: the US military is now
viewed as an accomplice to the Japanese. This change is a critical turn in the post-Asia Pacific War legend of Uncle
Sam as the representative of good versus the Japanese cvii. Contacts and exchanges with international feminists

had a broader appeal to the critically minded local residents in Guam. In particular, exchanges with the common
Okinawan experiences of comfort women have highlighted the relationships between sexual violence and

postwar US military occupation is the most

contemporary phase of Guams triple colonization in the modern period .
The transition from wartime Japanese to the postwar American military
occupation has been decorated by the patriotic myth of the Chamorro
peoples liberation by Uncle Sam. It also creates a social terrain upon
which the development of Chamorro masculinities and femininities are
played out. This chapter discussed important personas of Chamorro femininities and masculinities that have
militarism in general. CONCLUSION The

arisen in the social terrain of occupation. In particular, images of the Warrior and the Godmother represent the
spiritual legacies of the Chamorro peoples endurance in surviving colonial hardships, especially the brutal Japanese
military occupation. Here, an understanding of power beyond the language of top- down coercion is needed. Under
military occupation, the occupied sometimes willingly enact the interests, ideologies and identities of the

Link-- AT: Framing of Aff Solves

The aff is the exact wrong response to anti-base activists in
Asia---planned, top-down withdrawals are done via agreements
between the Japanese and U.S. governments, out of the public
eye, and are designed to ensure the overall level of
militarization in the region remains unchanged
Andrew Yeo 7, Ph.D. candidate in government at Cornell University, Winter 2007,
Why Isn't the Closure of a U.S. Military Base Cause for Celebration?,
To some degree , anti-base activists, particularly those residing near U.S. facilities, do welcome
troop withdrawals and base closures since this reduces potential social
costs. Protest against negative externalities such as crime, prostitution, safety hazards, or pollution associated with U.S.
military presence are a staple of movement demands across Asia. Indeed, if we understand anti-base movements as simply a not-

local communities should claim victory upon the

removal of U.S. military presence. Yet for many anti-base activists, each victory is only
partial and bittersweet. Base closure often means relocating troops and bases to some
other nearby location, either within the same country, or elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific . For instance, after
in-my-backyard (NIMBY) movement,

the closure of Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri in 2005, USFK and South Korean officials prepared to modernize the air-to-surface
firing range on Jikdo Island, in another part of the country. South Korean anti-base activists also criticized the relocation of USFK
headquarters from Yongsan, Seoul, lamenting that the move 50 miles south to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek only exported the
problems. Most urgent for Korean activists is the ongoing displacement of farmers living on the designated land expansion site of
Camp Humphreys In Okinawa, the closure of Futenma and relocation of 7,000 Marines to Guam was attached to the condition that
a replacement facility would be provided for United States Forces, Japan (USFJ) within Okinawa. Currently, Tokyo and Washington
have agreed to build the facility at Camp Schwab in northeastern Okinawa. Aggravating activists is the lack of transparency and

local input is ignored when Seoul, Tokyo, or Manila enter base

policy negotiations with Washington. Activists engaged in current protests
in Asia including the relocation of Yongsan and the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea, the relocation of
Futenma in Okinawa, and the return of U.S. troops in Mindanao under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and Mutual
Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in the Philippines have all criticized their governments lack
of transparency with the process of force realignment. Although Pentagon
officials have declared that a purpose of force realignment is to ease the
burden on local communities, activists remain skeptical, retorting that
such decisions are designed to meet U.S. strategic interests, not
community concerns . Two principles fundamental to anti-base activists in the Asia-Pacific, peace and nationalism,
the perception that

suggest why base closures and relocation have been met with only muted celebration. Interestingly, these principles also facilitate
networking across geography and cultures. While local issues of justice are always associated with anti-base movements, it would
be incorrect to identify these movements simply as NIMBY phenomena. More broadly, anti-base movements are motivated by peace
and sovereignty. The anti-base movement in the Philippines in the 1980s and early 1990s was fueled largely by the nations nuclearfree movement. Okinawans most visibly opposed to U.S. military presence have been people who experienced the Battle of
Okinawa. Thus, the urgency fueling anti-base mobilization in these countries does not subside with the relocation of bases and
troops. To many activists, bases are viewed as instruments of war and U.S. military aggression. Therefore, as they have begun to

moving bases out of our backyard merely shifts the

externalities associated with bases to my neighbors backyard. Goals of
peace and demilitarization are not satisfied under these conditions . The global
network in transnational solidarity,

anti-base movement may be framed as a peace movement, but what makes the movement in the Asia-Pacific somewhat distinct,
particularly to those in Europe, is the salience of nationalism. Colonial legacies in the Asia-Pacific are one reason why nationalism
and sovereignty rights play a pivotal role. For example, the legacy of foreign domination by Spain and the U.S. in the collective
memory of Filipinos provides anti-base movements with frames when organizing. Even prior to the formation of anti-base coalitions,
nationalist politicians such as Claro Recto, Jose Diokno, and Lorenzo Tanada spoke out against U.S. bases, claiming that they served
as symbolic reminders that the Philippines had not yet attained sovereignty from its former colonial master. South Korea

experienced colonization under the Japanese when Japan annexed Korea in 1910. The Japanese attempted to obliterate Korean
culture and identity by forcing Koreans to adopt Japanese names, banning literature printed in Korean, making Japanese the primary
language in schools, and drafting thousands of Koreans into the military during its conquest of Manchuria and Southeast Asia. It
comes as no surprise, then, that Japanese colonial rule strengthened Korean nationalism. Likewise, Japans annexation of the Ryuku
Kingdom as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879 and its brutality of forced conscription in World War II have left an imprint on the collective
memory of Okinawans. Hence, protests against U.S. bases in Okinawa are not only campaigns directed against Tokyo and
Washington, but for some, also an assertion of Okinawan identity. In sum, colonial legacies in the Asia-Pacific enable movement
leaders to frame anti-base issues through sovereignty or nationalist frames, by evoking readily-available symbols that link bases to
past violations of national sovereignty. Additionally, movement leaders can use local grievances related to U.S. bases to expand
their national goals within the broader context of sovereignty. Significant changes in U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific are well
underway. Army and Marine units from South Korea and Okinawa dispatched to Iraq will most likely return to the U.S. mainland
under Northern Command. Units in the 2nd Infantry Division are making the transition to Camp Humphreys. U.S. forces continue to

overall reduction of U.S.

troops in Asia is welcomed by anti-base activists, but the GPR and military
transformation continues to present new challenges. The expansion of major installations,
such as Camp Humphreys and Camp Schwab, and frequent visits by U.S. troops in the
Philippines suggests that U.S. forces plan to remain in these areas for the
long run. As one activist lamented about Camp Humphreys, The new base will be a state-of-the-art facility
which is built to last for the next 100 years . Thus, under the overarching banners of peace,
enter in and out of the Philippines as part of joint training and military exercises. The

sovereignty, and nationalism, we should not expect anti-base movements in the Asia-Pacific to dissipate anytime soon either.

2NC Link Turns CaseOkinawaBase removal not

Base removal doesnt solve structural violence in Okinawa no
clean up, no compensation and new forms of sexual violence
Angst 1 (associate dean for academic affairs at Emory)
(Linda Isako, The Sacrifice Of A Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case, Discourses of
Power, and Women's Lives in Okinawa, Critical Asian Studies, 33:2, 243-266)

The demands made by Okinawan interest groups within the anti-base movement vary.
They include demands for the return of or compensation for base lands, often
contaminated by toxins; policies and programs to protect women; stronger
environmental regulations against noise and other pollution gener- ated by the U.S. military; and
greater regular access to ancestral tombs located on bases. Yet at the prefectural level elected officials
argue for removal of all bases, which does not address or may be at odds
with many of the above issues. Base removals do not guarantee
compensation for U.S.-used lands nor do they address how families will
get along whose livelihoods, until now, depended on leased lands. Womens
groups will still require policies and infrastructure to deal with the influx
of foreign male tourists, and women in the military service industries, who
may not be in the anti-base movement, are torn: on the one hand, concerns for personal
and family safety may lead to shared sentiments against the presence of bases; on the other hand, their livelihoods
have de- pended on the work generated by bases.

2NC Turns Case

Turns environment, community destruction, and sexual
violence impacts
Frain 9/4 [Sylvia C. Frain is a Ph.D. candidate with the National Centre for Peace
and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago on the South Island of Aotearoa New
Zealand and a Research Associate with the Micronesia Area Research Center (MARC)
at the University of Guam, Tiny Guam, Huge US Marine Base Expansions,
September 4, 2015, Counter Punch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/09/04/tinyguam-huge-us-marine-base-expansions/]
On Saturday morning August 29, 2015, the United States Navy signed the Record of Decision (ROD), the final document needed for
the implementation of one of the largest peacetime military build-ups in American history. This will cost between $8 and 9 billion,

a central aspect of
Americans foreign policy Pivot to the Pacific, the build-up will relocate thousands
of Marines and their dependents from Okinawa, Japan to Guam. This does not
auger well for the people of Guam. For decades, the Okinawans have protested
the violence, pollution, military accidents, and sexual assaults committed
by American Marines on the local population. Moving those Marines to tiny
Guam frightens many. Military-colonial destruction is not new to the
people of Guam. The indigenous Chamorro people were nearly
exterminated by invasion and colonization by Spain, then the US, then
Japan during WWII, and then back into US possession . Located in the Western Pacific Ocean
more than 8,000 miles from Washington D.C., Guam remains an unincorporated territory and possession of
the United States. While residents are American citizens, carry U.S. passports and pay federal taxes, they have no
representation in the Senate, have a non-voting delegate in Congress and
cannot vote in Presidential elections. Currently, one-third of the island of Guam
(210 square miles) is US Department of Defense (DOD) property and inaccessible to non-military
residents. Many people are still waiting for war reparations from World War II and compensation for their land taken by the
with only $174 million for civilian infrastructure, which Congress has not released yet. As

military. In addition, people from the Guam serve and die in the United States Armed Forces at higher rates than any other state in

The build-up will add further strain on already fragile infrastructure

and limited resources: * A thousand acres of limestone forest will be
destroyed for housing the Marines and their dependents and the military will control the largest water
source for the island. * Guam will become the biggest storage facility for fuel and ammunitions in the Pacific. * A Live Fire
Range Complex (LFRC) will be constructed at Northwest Field on Anderson Air Force Base
and will close Ritidian National Wildlife Refuge, a sanctuary to numerous
endangered species and a sacred site to the indigenous people. The public will no

longer have access to the National Wildlife Refuge, including the pristine beach, ancient caves, education center and a newly
rediscovered 4,000-year-old fishing village containing the oldest archaeological artefacts found on Guam. In the early 1990s, local
families demanded that Ritidian Point, or Litekyan, be returned to its traditional owners. However, the federal government instead
created the National Wildlife Refugee, owned by the United States Fish and Wildlife Services. While the Governor of Guam, the nonvoting Congresswoman, the Guam Chamber of Commerce and other military-business lobbyists welcome the military build-up, many
people on Guam consider the RODs release a sad day for the people, land, wildlife and culture of Guam. With an economy 60

massive expansion of the military on a vulnerable small

island will only degrade both the environment and the native Chamorro
percent derived from tourism, a