NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS

United States vs Ang Tang Ho

Facts: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor
General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of
such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53
which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should
be sold at 63 centavos per ganta.
On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of 80 centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The
sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of
the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation
of power to the Governor General.
Issue: Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Held: By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is
left to the discretion of the Governor-General. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in
any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment
and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is
or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule
or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

PANAMA v RYAN
Facts: Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized the
President of the United States to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced to withdrawn from storage in
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer,
or other duly authorized agency of a State.
Any violation of an order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection
shall be punishable by a fine, not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment not to exceed six
months, or both.
The President issued the foregoing prohibition by Executive Order, and then authorized the
Secretary of Interior to exercise all of the powers vested in the President under
Section:9(c). The Secretary of Interior then issued regulations to carry out the Presidents
orders, which required all petroleum producers to file monthly statements, under oath,
with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior. Further, the President
approved a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, and designated the
Secretary of Interior with all of the powers vested in him under the Act and the Code.
Section:9(c) was challenged on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power by Congress.
Issue: Was the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?
Held: Yes. The attempted delegation was plainly void because the power sought to be
delegated was legislative power, but nowhere in the statute did Congress declare or
indicate any policy or standard to guide or limit the President when acting under the
delegation.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement
of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was
then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it
violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in
order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president
under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing
law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president underAmendment number
6.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be said that
it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the
purpose sought has a gap.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his
defense and punished immediately.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company

Facts: The General Electric Company owned and was operating a broadcasting station at
Schenectady, N. Y., when the Radio Act of 1927 went into effect. Thereafter it sought and
obtained from the commission successive licenses under that act for the further operation
of the station
January 14, 1928, the company made application for a renewal of that license. The
application was not acted upon until October 12, 1928, and then the commission ordered
that a license be not issued with terms like those of the existing license, but that one be
issued with other terms much less advantageous to the company and the communities
which it was serving; the chief change being a pronounced reduction in the admissible
hours of service
The act of 1927, c. 169, 44 Stat. pt. 2, p. 1162 (47 USCA 81-119), was enacted as a
regulation of interstate and foreign radio communication; and it is in such activities that
the company's broadcasting station is used.
The act authorized the commission to determine the question of public convenience,
interest, or necessity; declares that decisions of the commission in all matters over which it
has jurisdiction 'shall be final, subject to the right of appeal' therein given; provides
( section 16) that any applicant for a station license or the renewal of such a license, whose
application is refused by the commission, may appeal from such decision to the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia
We think it plain from this re sume of the pertinent parts of the act that the powers
confided to the commission respecting the granting and renewal of station licenses are
purely administrative, and that the provision for appeals to the Court of Appeals does no
more than make that court a superior and revising agency in the same field. The court's
province under that provision is essentially the same as its province under the legislation
which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisions of the
Commissioner of Patents.
ISSUE: Our jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is challenged.
HELD: A proceeding in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under the Radio Act
of 1927, to review an order of the Radio Commission refusing an application for the
renewal of an existing license for full time operation of a broadcasting station, is not a case
or controversy within the meaning of the judiciary article of the Constitution, but is an
administrative proceeding, and the decision therein is not reviewable by this Court.
The court's province under that provision is essentially the same as its province under the
legislation which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisions
of the Commissioner of Patents

'The decision of the Court of Appeals under section 9 of the act of 1905 2 is not a judicial
judgment. It is a mere administrative decision. It is merely an instruction to the
Commissioner of Patents by a court which is made part of the machinery of the Patent
Office for administrative purposes.'
In the cases just cited, as also in others, it is recognized that the courts of the District of
Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are legislative
courts, and therefore that Congress may invest them with jurisdiction of appeals and
proceedings such as have been just described.
It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with
judicial power only, and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies
falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are
merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative.
MERALCO v PASAY TRANSPORTATION
Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift
to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and
operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an
easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act
provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the
grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of
way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court requesting the members of
the SC sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Meralco.
Copies were sent to affected transportation companies including Pasay Tanspo
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is
attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A
submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not
oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar
rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, can act in that capacity.
Held: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with
the administering of judicial functions.
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or
authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in
the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require
or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other
duty.
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section
11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority
of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the
members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
Facts: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President Ferdinand
Marcos issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of
the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios
may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of
Congress.

If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred
from being created by the President.
He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power
to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President
by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government
that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.
Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities
referred to.

SUFFICINECY OF STANDARDS
People v. Rosenthal & Osmena
Facts: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O.
Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market,
buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products.
Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to
individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the
Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.
Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation
attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.
On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds
one of which is:
1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer
Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional in any of the three grounds
Held: The law is CONSTITUTIONAL on all grounds alleged by the appellants.
The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision
regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit
The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person
,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the
provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions
of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when
the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit
is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In
view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of
stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like
fraudulent exploitations, we hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard
to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance
or cancellation of certificates or permits.

The maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare has
beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically all
modern governments.
CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
Facts: Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation (NAFCO) with annual salary of P15,000.00. The NAFCO Board of Directors
granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.
On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the
Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned
and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947,
promulgated Executive Order No. 93
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise
council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and
concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds:
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and voidbecause it is as an illegal
delegation of legislature power to executive, and was promulgated beyond the period of
one year limited in said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and
void. And R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.
HELD: The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation.
Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make
reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and
policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of
the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The
President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power.

People v. Jolliffe (1959)

Facts: William Ernest Jolliffe is a canadian, born in China, permanently residing in HK. Son
of former Chancellor of West China Union University and had been Trade Commissioner for
Canada in Shanghai and HK. He made several trips to manila for business or to meet his
wife and children.
One day he came to Manila to collect on a debt from Woo. He was paid in cold which he hid
under his shirt. On his way to his hotel room, he was acoosted by a secret service agent,
Amanda Arimbay. The 4pcs of gold bullion and $100 travellers check was found on him.
He does not deny he had no license to export the gold. He was arrested for violationg RA
265: An act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines
SEC 34: whenever anyone willfully violates this act or any order legally issued by Monetary
board, he shall be punished by imprisonment.
CB Circular 21: any person desiring to export gold bullions must obtain license from
Central Bank
Jolliffe was arrested. He questioned validiy of Circular 21 for being an undue delegation of
legistlative power.
ISSUE: Whether or not CB 21 vaild?
HELD: Yes. The rule is that the delegated power, if the law authorizing the delegation
furnishes a reasonable standard which sufficiently marks the field within which the
administrator is to act so that it may be known wheteher he has kept within it in
compliance with the legislative will.
In this case, Sec 74 of RA 265 conferred upon Monetary board and President the power:
subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to protect the
international reserve of central bank
take such apporpirate remedial measures to protect the international stability of the
peso
These powers must be exeriesed in relation to the objectives of the law creating the central
bank which is to maintain monetary stability & promoto a rising level of production,
employment, and income.
These standards are sufficiently definite to vest in the deleagated authority the characteher
of administraive details in the enforcment of the law.

Balbuna v Secretary of Education

Facts: Members of the Jehovas Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent the
enforcement of Dept. Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and
regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools.
The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of worship
and of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:

it is an undue delegation of legislative power

Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power

Held: The requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an
adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the
National Anthem. Specifically, to observe daily flag ceromony which shall include the
playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem and rules and regulations for the
proper conduct of the flag ceremony.
In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit,
simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem
specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public
interest"
The Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the
validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy
that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency
To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power
would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States

Facts: In 1935 the FDR administration sought to regulate the poultry industry through the
National Industrial Recovery Act procured by the executive branch.
Section:3 of the Act authorized the President to approve codes of unfair competition for
trades and industries, and a violation of any code provision in any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce was made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine.
The relevant portion of the law regulated the price of chickens as well as the eventual sale
of unhealthy chickens Under this regulation, Plaintiff was convicted of 18 counts of selling
unhealthy chickens.
Petitioners contended that the Code had been adopted pursuant to an unconstitutional
delegation by Congress of legislative power.
Issue: Did Congress, in authorizing the codes of unfair competition establish the
standards of legal obligation, thereby performing its essential legislative function?
Held: No. The code-making authority conferred was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
Under Title 1, Section:1 of the Act there was a broad Declaration of Policy, and the
Presidents approval of a code was simply conditioned on his finding that it would tend to
effectuate the policy of this title. The Act imposed no limitations on the scope of the new
laws, and there was a very wide field of legislative possibilities.
Section:3 of the Act was without precedent in that it supplied no standards for any trade,
industry or activity. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorized the President to
make the codes to prescribe them. Congress made an unconstitutional delegation because
it vested in the President a clearly legislative function without imposing necessary
standards and restrictions.