Anderson, Benedict.

Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o

f Nationalism. Revised Edition ed. London and New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 5-7.
"In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the n
ation: it is an imagined political community - - and imagined as both inherently
limited and sovereign.
"It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds
of each lives the image of their communion. Renan referred to this imagining in
his suavely back-handed way when he wrote that 'Or l essence d'une nation est que
tons les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient o
ubli bien des choses. With a certain ferocity Gellner makes a comparable point whe
n he rules that 'Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousne
ss: it invents nations where they do not exist.' The drawback to this formulatio
n, however, is that Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades u
nder false pretences that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsi
ty', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'. In this way he implies that 'tru
e' communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations. In fact,
all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and pe
rhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by thei
r falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. Javanese vil
lagers have always known that they are connected to people they have never seen,
but these ties were once imagined particularistically-as indefinitely stretchab
le nets of kinship and clientship. Until quite recently, the Javanese language h
ad no word meaning the abstraction 'society.' We may today think of the French a
ristocracy of the ancien rgime as a class; but surely it was imagined this way on
ly very late. To the question 'Who is the Comte de X? the normal answer would have
been, not 'a member of the aristocracy,' but 'the lord of X, 'the uncle of the
Baronne de Y,'or 'a client of the Duc de Z.'
"The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyon
d which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. T
he most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the
human race will join their nation in the way that it was possible, in certain e
pochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet.
"It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enl
ightenment and Revolution were destorying the legitamcy of the divinely-ordained
, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history wh
en even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably con
fronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism betwee
n each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of bein
g free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is t
he sovereign state.
"Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequ
ality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived
as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes i
t possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so
much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.
"These deaths bring us abruptly face to face with the central problem posed by n
ationalism: what makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history (scarcely more
than two centuries) generate such colossal sacrifices? I believe that the beginn
ings of an answer lie in the cultural roots of nationalism."

Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage Publications, 1995.

"... there is something misleading about this accepted use of the word nationalis
m . It always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery. Separatists are often
to be found in the outer regions of states; the extremists lurk on the margins o
f political life in established democracies, usually shunned by the sensible pol
iticians of the centre. The guerrilla figures, seeking to establish their new ho
melands, operate in conditions where existing structures of state have collapsed
, typically at a distance from the established centres of the West. From the per
spective of Paris, peripherally placed on the edge of Europe. All these factors
combine to make nationalism not merely an exotic force, but a peripheral one. In
consequence, those in established nations
at the centre of things
are led to se
e nationalism as the property of others, not of us .
"This is where the accepted view becomes misleading: it overlooks the nationalis
m of the West s nation-states. In a world of nation-states, nationalism cannot be
confined to the peripheries. That might be conceded, but still it might be objec
ted that nationalism only strikes the established nation-states on special occas
ions. Crises, such as the Falklands or Gulf Wars, infect a sore spot, causing bo
dily fevers: the symptoms are an inflamed rhetoric and an outbreak of ensigns. B
ut the irruption soon dies down; the temperature passes; the flags are rolled up
; and, then, it is business as usual." (p. 5)
"... the term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits wh
ich enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued th
at these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have suppo
sed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or flagged , in the lives of its citizenry. Na
tionalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the en
demic condition." (p.6)
"The central thesis of the present book is that, in the established nations, the
re is a continual flagging , or reminding, of nationhood. The established nations a
re those states that have confidence in their own continuity, and that, particul
arly, are part of what is conventionally described as the West . The political lead
ers of such nations
whether France, the USA, the United Kingdom or New Zealand a
re not typically termed nationalists . However, as will be suggested, nationhood pr
ovides a continual background for their political discourses, for cultural produ
cts, and even for the structuring of newspapers. In so many little ways, the cit
izenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However
, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously regist
ered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which
is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnotice
d on the public building.
"National identity embraces all these forgotten reminders. Consequently, an iden
tity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include t
hose of thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess w
ays of talking about nationhood. As a number of critical social psychologists ha
ve been emphasizing, the social psychological study of identity should involve t
he detailed study of discourse . Having a national identity also involves being si
tuated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally: typically, it mean
s being situated within a homeland, which itself is situated within the world of
nations. And, only if people believe that they have national identities, will s
uch homelands, and the world of national homelands, be reproduced.
"In many ways, this book itself aims to be a reminder. Because the concept of na
tionalism has been restricted to exotic and passionate exemplars, the routine an
d familiar forms of nationalism have been overlooked. In this case, our daily nati
onalism slips from attention. There is a growing body of opinion that nation-sta
tes are declining. Nationalism, or so it is said, is no longer a major force: gl

obalization is the order of the day. But a reminder is necessary. Nationhood is

still being reproduced: it can still call for ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, i
ts symbols and assumptions are flagged." (pp.8-9)

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983
, pp. 6-7
"In fact, nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity
. Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances. Moreov
er, nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they
were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and
constitutes a tragedy. But before they could become intended for each other, eac
h of them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and contingent. The
state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have c
ertainly emerged without the blessings of their own state. It is more debatable
whether the normative idea of the nation, in its modern sense, did not presuppos
e the prior existence of the state.
"What then is this contingent, but in our age seemingly universal and normative,
idea of the nation? Discussion of two very makeshift, temporary definitions wil
l help to pinpoint this elusive concept.
1. "Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, w
here culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways
of behaving and communicating.
2. "Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as b
elonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the
artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category
of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language
, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly r
ecognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their share
d membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kin
d which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever
they might be, which separate that category from non- members.
"Each of these provisional definitions, the cultural and the voluntaristic, has
some merit. Each of them singles out an element which is of real importance in t
he understanding of nationalism. But neither is adequate. Definitions of culture
, presupposed by the first definition, in the anthropological rather than the no
rmative sense, are notoriously difficult and unsatisfactory. It is probably best
to approach this problem by using this term without attempting too much in the
way of formal definition, and looking at what culture does."

Hobsbawm, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge Unive
rsity Press, 1990.
Neither objective nor subjective definitions are thus satisfactory, and both are
misleading. In any case, agnosticism is the best initial posture of a student i
n this field, and so this book assumes no a priori definition of what constitute
s a nation. As an initial working assumption any sufficiently large body of peop
le whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as
such. However, whether such a body of people does so regard itself cannot be est
ablished simply by consulting writers or political spokesmen of organizations cl
aiming the status of 'nation' for it. The appearance of a group of spokesmen for
some 'national idea' is not insignificant, but the word 'nation' is today used

so widely and imprecisely that the use of the vocabulary of nationalism today ma
y mean very little indeed.
Nevertheless, in approaching 'the national question' 'it is more profitable to b
egin with the concept of "the nation" (i.e. with "nationalism") than with the re
ality it represents'. For 'The nation as conceived by nationalism, can be recogniz
ed prospectively; the real "nation" can only be recognized a posteriori.'
This is the approach of the present book. It pays particular attention to the ch
anges and transformations of the concept, particularly towards the end of the ni
neteenth century. Concepts, of course, are not part of free-floating philosophic
al discourse, but socially, historically and locally rooted, and must be explain
ed in terms of these realities.
For the rest, the position of the writer may be summarized as follows.
1. I use the term 'nationalism' in the sense defined by Gellner, namely to mean
'primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should b
e congruent.' I would add that this principle also implies that the political du
ty of Ruritanians to the polity which encompasses and represents the Ruritanian
nation, overrides all other public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as wa
rs) all other obligations of whatever kind. This implication distinguishes moder
n nationalism from other and less demanding forms of national or group identific
ation which we shall also encounter.
2. Like most serious students, I do not regard the 'nation' as a primary nor as
an unchanging social entity. It belongs exclusively to a particular, and histori
cally recent, period. It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a cert
ain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state', and it is pointless to
discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it. Moreover, w
ith Gellner I would stress the element of artifact, invention and social enginee
ring which enters into the making of nations. 'Nations as a natural, God-given w
ay of classifying men, as an inherent ... political destiny, are a myth; nationa
lism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, so
metimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a real
ity.' In short, for the purposes of analysis nationalism comes before nations. N
ations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round.
3. The 'national question', as the old Marxists called it, is situated at the po
int of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation. Nations e
xist not only as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspi
ration to establish one - broadly speaking, the citizen state of the French Revo
lution - but also in the context of a particular stage of technological and econ
omic development. Most students today will agree that standard national language
s, spoken or written, cannot emerge as such before printing, mass literacy and h
ence, mass schooling. It has even been argued that popular spoken Italian as an
idiom capable of expressing the full range of what a twentieth-century language
needs outside the domestic and face-to-face sphere of communication, is only bei
ng constructed today as a function of the needs of national television programmi
ng. Nations and their associated phenomena must therefore be analyzed in terms o
f political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and requir
ements.
4. For this reason they are, in my view, dual phenomena, constructed essentially
from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, tha
t is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordina
ry people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist. If I h
ave a major criticism of Gellner's work it is that his preferred perspective of
modernization from above, makes it difficult to pay adequate attention to the vi
ew from below.

That view from below, i.e. the nation as seen not by governments and the spokesm
en and activists of nationalist (or non-nationalist) movements, but by the ordin
ary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda, is exceedingly d
ifficult to discover. Fortunately social historians have learned how to investig
ate the history of ideas, opinions and feelings at the sub-literary level, so th
at we are today less likely to confuse, as historians once habitually did, edito
rials in select newspapers with public opinion. We do not know much for certain.
However, three things are clear.
First, official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what it is
in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters. Second, and more spe
cifically, we cannot assume that for most people national identification - when
it exists - excludes or is always or ever superior to, the remainder of the set
of identifications which constitute the social being. In fact, it is always comb
ined with identifications of another kind, even when it is felt to be superior t
o them. Thirdly, national identification and what it is believed to imply, can c
hange and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgme
nt this is the area of national studies in which, thinking and research are most
urgently needed today.
5. The development of nations and nationalism within old-established states such
as Britain and France, has not been studied very intensively, though it is now
attracting attention. The existence of this gap is illustrated by the neglect, i
n Britain, of any problems connected with English nationalism - a term which in
itself sounds odd to many ears - compared to the attention paid to Scots, Welsh,
not to mention Irish nationalism. On the other hand there have in recent years
been major advances in the study of national movements aspiring to be states, ma
inly following Hroch's pathbreaking comparative studies of small European nation
al movements. Two points in this excellent writer's analysis are embodied in my
own. First, 'national consciousness' develops unevenly among the social grouping
s and regions of a country; this regional diversity and its reasons have in the
past been notably neglected. Most students would, incidentally, agree that, what
ever the nature of the social groups first captured by 'national consciousness',
the popular masses - workers, servants, peasants - are the last to be affected
by it. Second, and in consequence, I follow his useful division of the history o
f national movements into three phases. In nineteenth-century Europe, for which
it was developed, phase A was purely cultural, literary and folkloric, and had n
o particular political or even national implications, any more than the research
es (by non-Romanies) of the Gypsy Lore Society have for the subjects of these en
quiries. In phase B we find a body of pioneers and militants of 'the national id
ea' and the beginnings of political campaigning for this idea. The bulk of Hroch
's work is concerned with this phase and the analysis of the origins, compositio
n and distribution of this minorit agissante. My own concern in this book is more
with phase C when - and not before - nationalist programmes acquire mass suppor
t, or at least some of the mass support that nationalists always claim they repr
esent. The transition from phase B to phase C is evidently a crucial moment in t
he chronology of national movements. Sometimes, as in Ireland, it occurs before
the creation of a national state; probably very much more often it occurs afterw
ards, as a consequence of that creation. Sometimes, as in the so- called Third W
orld, it does not happen even then.
Finally, I cannot but add that no serious historian of nations and nationalism c
an be a committed political nationalist, except in the sense in which believers
in the literal truth of the Scriptures, while unable to make contributions to ev
olutionary theory, are not precluded from making contributions to archaeology an
d Semitic philology. Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently no
t so. As Renan said: 'Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.' Hist
orians are professionally obliged not to get it wrong, or at least to make an ef
fort not to. To be Irish and proudly attached to Ireland - even to be proudly Ca

tholic-Irish or Ulster Protestant Irish - is not in itself incompatible with the

serious study of Irish history. To be a Fenian or an Orangeman, I would judge,
is not so compatible, any more than being a Zionist is compatible with writing a
genuinely serious history of the Jews; unless the historian leaves his or her c
onvictions behind when entering the library or the study. Some nationalist histo
rians have been unable to do so. Fortunately, in setting out to write the presen
t book I have not needed to leave my non-historical convictions behind.