The Facade of Objectivity: An Inquiry into the Epistemology of Value-Free Sociology

Author(s): Abdur Rahman Momin

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 44 (Oct. 28, 1972), pp. 2195-2202
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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SPECIALARTICLES

The

Facade

of

Objectivity

An Inquiry into the Epistemology of Value-Free Sociology

Abdur Rahman Momin
With its overwhelming emphasis on objective and value-free social research, academic sociology has in
recent years come under heavy attack not -only from administrators but also from socially committed intellectuals and students.
In particular, the value-free stance of sociology and its paradoxical espousal of 'policy-relevant' social
research has engendered deep resentment and anguish. Its critics strongly feel that sociology, in its obsession
with scientism, has become an ally of the repressive regime of technocracy.
Scientific sociology is not onily'becoming inimical to radiCal social change but wittingly or unwittingly
also lends support to the forces of injustice.
[Grateful acknowledgement is made to the following for their constructive suggestions and comments:
A R Desai, J V Ferreira, B Narain and Manorama Savur, all of the Department of Sociology, University
of Bombay; S N Valanjoo of Sophia College; and Jyoti Kulkarni of St Xavier's College, Bombay.]
True observation must necessarily be 50)
extemal to the observer; the famous
Sociology is generally defined as the
internal observation is no more than a.
vain parody of it, which presents the scientific study of human behaviour in
ridiculously contradictory situation of its social context. In the past five deour intelligence contemplating itself cades sociology as a scientific enterprise
during the habitual performanceof its has made rapid strides and is now in
own activity.

a position to claim a place in the galaxy

"NO science", wrote Max Weber in Iiis of sciences. This was made possible
of
characteristic style, "is absolutely free by an unprecedented proliferation
research designs
and methodological
from presuppositions anrdno science can
One of the dominant
prove its fundamental value to the man paraphernalia.
themes of modern, sociological researclh
who rejects these presuppositions."
and theory is the
canon of scientific
(Gerth and Mills, 1946: 153) And what is
objectivity or value-neutral scholarship.
more important, these presuppositions
it means that the aim of
which are essentially of a philosophical In essence
sociology as a scientific discipline is to
nature, permeate every phase of the
scientific enterprise. Not only theore- undertake a purely detached and distical formulations and empirical gene- interested investigation of social phenoralisations but also methodological pro- mnena and the description of empirical
cedures and research designs bear the regularities obtained therefore in valueimpress of such philosophic assump- free terms. All reference to value-judgtions. In the social sciences this fact ments concerning any aspect of research
is all the more conspicuous because the findings is supposed to be beyond the
subject matter of the socio-cultural dis- pale of professional and scientific inteIn the
history of sociological
ciplines is not inaniimate physical en- grity.
thought it was Max Weber who made
tities but valuing and meaning-seeking
human beings. Since the social scien- objectivity and value-neutral scholarces deal with man as a social animal ship an article of professional faith.
it is only natural that they make cer- Since then it has become an integral
tain presuppositions about human na- part of the sociological tradition and it
ture and the reality of culture and so- is only recently that it has come under
ciety. These presuppositions underlie concerted attack from younger sociolothe various research procedures and gists who insist on a radical and comtechniques designed to obtain, classify mitted perspective on the part of sociologists.
and interpret
-AUCGUSTE

COMTE

empirical data. As Alvini

This is not to say that all sociologists
Gouldner has put it, "every research
method makes some assumptions about have accepted the canon of value-free
how information may be secured from scholarship with an easy con-science;
people and what may be done with time and again daring intellects have
people, or to them, in order to secure raised their voice of protest against the
it; this, in turn, rests on certain do- value-free doctrine. The ideals of emmain assumptions concerning who and pathic identification and personal coi-iwhat people are." (Gouldner, 1971; Tnitment have stirred the imaginations of

a number of thinkers and the sociological tradition has a rich legacy of the
existential-phenomenological perspective.
(Tiryakian, 1965) The burden of my
argument here is that the norm of scieItific objectivity and value-free scholarship has been a dominant motif of empirical social research arid that it has a
definite set of epistemological implications about the nature of man and society.
SOCIOLOGY AS HER TO POSITIVE
EPISTEMOLOGY

The central thesis developed in this

paper is that the doctrine of scientific
objectivity and value-neutrality as followed in present-day empirical social
research is, in large measure, an offshoot of positivists epistemology which
has a set of presuppositions concerning
the nature of man and the socio-cultural
reality. What follows is in the main an
exposition and elaboration of the same.
The positivist thesis maintains in
principle that all phenomena are subject to universal laws. Like natural
phenomena, social and cultural phenomena are also permeated with invariant
patterns or laws which can be discovered and explained by the methods of the
natural sciences. The positivists maintain that there is no funidamentalcleavage between the natural and the social
sciences.
Physicalism is the unifying
principle in positivist epistemology
which holds that every thing in principle can be explained in the language
of physics. The aim of the socio-cultural disciplines is to discover universal
laws of social phenomenaby objective or
'external' investigation.
The positive viewpoint was set
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forth in a systematic manner by the sophy of the natural science is foundFrench social philosopher Henri de ed on an epistemological dichotomisaSaint-Simon who was aliso the first to tion between the subject and the object.
propose a science of society. At the This dichotomisation - the Cartesian
outset of the century Saint-Simon pro- split between the knower and the
claimed the founding of the Religion of known - is facilitated by the fact that
Newton. "...Universal gravity", Saint- the observation and analysis of natural
Simon asserted, "is the sole cause of all phenomena is in large measure objecphysical and moral phenomena." All of tive, in that the phenomena under
human life and activity, of society and study re'mainunaffected by the cognitive
politics, were reducible to the ultimate contaminations of the observer.' It is
source of cosmic gravitation. Saint- therefore possible, in the study of
Simon's vision of society was founded enJ natural phenomena, to ascertain the
exact relationships between the variathe image of the new mechanics-technically rationalised in every cletail, pre- bles which lead to the next stage of
dictable in every activity, and hence prediction and finally control. It goes
brought under total scientific manage- without saying that the natural and
ment. The religion of science was a exact sciences are founded on the
faith in the existence of an objective assumption that natural phenomena are
Reason, impersonal and mechanical, governed by necessary laws and that it
harmonious and determinate, existing is possible to ascertain, predict and conentirely apart from individual men and trol the mode of empirical regularities
indifferent to their purposes (Matson, with a view to formulating general laws
and propositions.
1964: 31-33).
Audisciple
Saint-Simon's one-tinme
OBJEcTIvE AS A METHODOLOGICAL
guste Comte who later quarrelled with
PoSTULATE
invented
opponent,
his
him and became
The methodology of the natural
the name sociology for the emerging
with all its underlying philosciences
book
his
In
Coturs
science of society.
de philosophie positive he spoke of ri- sophical assumptions was introduced
gid, inexorable laws of social life which into the social and behavioural sciences
determine the necessary conditions of by the positivistically-oriented social
society in every epoch. He also de- scientists. The Cartesian dualism of
scribed the evolution of every society subject and object being separated for
from the theological, to the nmetaphysi- detached scientific analysis was applied
cal, and finally, the positivist or scienti- to the study of socio-cultural phenomefic stage. For the discovery of univer- na. Out of this epistemological dichosal laws which were believed to govern tomisation emerged the methodological
the socio-cultural realm, Comte proposed postulate of scientific objectivity and
a social physics modelled after the phy- disinterested inquiry. Behind the acsical science. Thus he wrote: "We ceptance of the value-free doctrine was
possess now a celestial physics, a ter- the implicit belief that objectivity finds
restrial physics, either mechanical or its fullest expression in the exact scienchemical, a vegetable physics and an ces which the social sciences would do
animal physics; we still want one more well to approximate.
The idea of objectivity and valueand last one, social physics, to complete
the system of our knowledge of nature. neutrality as an article of professional
I understand by social physics the sci- belief has been advocated right from the
ence which has for its object the study, father figures of sociology such as
of social phenomena considered in the Durkheim and Weber to the rank and
same spirit as astionomical, physical, file of their contemporary followers.
chemical or physiological phenomena, Emile Durkheim was one of the first
that is, subject to natural invariable major theorists in sociology to stress ani
objective and dispassionate study of
laws, the discovery of which is the spcial object of investigation." (Timasheff, what he called 'social facts'. We can
clearly trace a continuity with the
1967:21)
The scientific method characteristic positivist tradition in his writings, partiof physical and biological sciences aims cularly in his "Rules of the Sociological
natural
at discovering universal laws underlying Method" wherein he envisions a
the
after
modelled
society
of
science
or
in
physical
recurrent uniformities
biology.
biological phenomena. Abstraction and exact sciences like physics and
generalisation and therefrom, prediction Durkheim regarded society not only logiascribed
and control are the basic elements of the cally prior to the individualbut
facts
Social
its
own.
of
a
reality
it
to
scientific method by which the exact
sciences attempt to explain natural which are the stuff of sociefi, are
entities which can be known only
phenomena.
by
The framework of positivist epistemo- through external observation and not
empathy.
or
inltrospection
logy in its essential points was borrowMax Weber was another social
ed from the natural sciences. The philo-

theorist of major importance who

worked out a methodological distinction
between problems of scientific investigation and those of evaluation. He
forcefully demanded for sociology a
value-free perspective. In his essay
entitled 'Science as a Vocation' he forcefully argued for renouncing personal
value-judgments in social scientific
investigations. "The researcher and
teacher", Weber argued, "must keep
apart the ascertainment of empirical
facts and his practical evaluation in
terms of likes and dislikes, because factfinding and evaluation happen to be two
different things." (Bendix and Roth,
1971: 49).2
The dominant figure in contemporary
American sociology is undoubtedly
Talcott Parsons. Parson's system theory
inherited a good deal from positivist
epistemology and is clearly an attempt
to follow upon the heels of the natural
sciences. It is interesting to reflect that
George Lundberg, who was himself e
staunch positivist, once described Parsons as a neo-positivist 'who proposed to
force sociology into thle framework of
physics.' The high priest of positivism
had asserted that Newton's three law,
of motion could be applied to social
phenomena. In Parsons' system theory
we find a practical and consistent application of these laws to social life.
The generalised conditions of equilibium
or laws offered by Parsons and Bales, in
their "Working Papers in the Theory of
Action", are: (1) The Principle of
Inertia; (2) The Principle of Action and
Reaction; (3) The Principle of Effort;
and (4) The Pri4'iple of System Integration. In Parsons' conception of society
as a boundary maintaining system, the
model of classical mechanics is basic to
the argument, as Don Martindale points
out (Martindale, 1961: 498-99). The
above conditions, offered as laws of
'homeostatic equilibrium' were acknowledged by Parsons himself to be analogous to the Newtonian laws of mechanics.
Objectivity and value-neutrality is an
integral part of Parsons' structuralfunctionalism. An objective and disinterested investigation of social phenomena is a prerequisite for uncovering
empirical regularities underlying social
processes which are, in tum, reduced to
invariable laws of social life. Thus it
will be clear that behind the facade of
objectivity lies essentially the same positivist epistemology propounded by
Comte. In fact the entire corpus of the
empiricist tradition in American sociology, represented in the main by
structural-functionalism,has clear positivistic colourings. Even the vocabulary
and methodological procedures bear the
halo of the Comtean vision (Horton,
1968: 434-51).

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October 28, 1972

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

OBJECTIVE

RESEARCH AND TH
SOcAL
ImAGE OF MAN

As has been noted in the beginning,

every science has a set of philosophic
presuppositions concerning the nature
and reality of the phenomena under
investigation which structures and
'conditions the fabric of its theory and
method. Scientific-empiricist sociology
which has positivist epistemology as its
donmainassumption, functions under a
definite set of presuppositions concerning the socio-cultural reality and the
nature of man. These presuppositions
hardly find explicit and consistent expression in the professional writings of
modem sociologists; nevertheless, they
undergird all empirical research and
theory-building. Gouldner succinctly
describes this set of assumptions
To the degree that social sciences
are modelled on the physical
sciences, they entail the domain
assumption that people are "things"
which may be treated and controlled in much the same mnannerthat
other sciences conitrol their nonhuman materials; people are "subjects" who may be subjected to the
control of the experimenter for
purposes they need not understand
or even consent to (Gouldner,
1971: 50).
It seems pertinent at this juncture to
pinpoint the fact that the general
culture in which the various sciences
flourish acts as a potent source of the
assumptions on which the sciences
build the structure of theory and research. If the presuppositions of a
science happen to be in accord with
the cultural ethos of a society at a
giveni point of time, that science has
favourable chances for flourishing and
consolidating itself. My contention in
this connection is that the image of
man and society wvhichis projected in
present-day social science research is
but a reflection of the Zeitgeist. The
spirit of the times in modern society,
particularly in the technologically advanced countries of the WVest,is permeated with the values of science and
technology. The pervasive penetration
of the values of science in all spheres
of life has intoxicated our consciousness
with the hubris of science. The cultural
ethos of modem Western society is
clearly immersed in scientism, in an
addition to the values of science andl
technology. And what kind of an
image of man does the scientific worldview offer? It treats man as "an
accident of evolution, a complex of
reflexes, a puppet twitched into love
or war by the showman who pulls the
strings, or

...

a by-product of chemical

andi physiological processes pursuing his

course across a fundamentallyalien and choice play no decisive part."

and brutal environmentand doomed (Bendix, 1961: 34)
ultimatelyto finishhis pointlessjourney
THE DIExMMA OF A VALUE-FREE
with as little significance as in the
SOCIOLOGY
personof the amoebahis ancestorsonce
began it." (Klapp,1969 : 60)3 Probably
"Today", writes Alvin Gouldner with
the philosophicalsensitivitiesof C E M
Joad led him to paint an overdrawn his characteristic candour, "all the
picture of the scientific world-view; powers of sociology, from Parsons to
nevertheless,it is a realistic portrayal Lundberg, have entered into a tacit
of its essentialfeatures. The scientific alliance toa'bind us to the dogma that
world-viewturns a valuing and mean- 'Thou shalt not commit a value-judging-seeking human organism into a ment !"' (Gouldner, 1963: 35) Objectithing, an object, and thus depriveshim vity and disinterested scientific inquiry
of his Existenz,the free, personal,and is the avowed aim of scientific sociology.
subjectiveessence of his personality. The sociologist is supposed to set aside
Needless to say, the social and his value preferences and ethical judgbehaviouralsciences which are a pro- ments while carrying out sociological
duct of the Zeitgeist cannot but drink investigation in order that the scientific
from its cup. The image of man that validity of his analyses and conclusions
science portraysand finds supportand may not suffer from his personal whims
approvalin the spiritof the times finds and biases. Unfortunately, however,
repeated expressionin social scientific the sociologist is caught in a paradoxiresearch.Behind the facade of ongoing cal trap the monmenthe sets to work.
objective social research there stands The question of selecting his problem
the basic assumption,which is a hang- makes him confront a dilemma: the
over of the old positivist vision, that tragedy of the value-free sociologist is
it is possible to discoveruniversallaws that while selecting his area of research
of socio-cultural phenomena which he has to make a value-judgment,
conditionand determinehumanbehavi- either consciously or uniconsciously.
our in all its variety and diversity. The professionalisation of sociology
The nomotheticambitiondoes not rest as a scientific discipline has widened
here: it proceeds to effect prediction the network of social research to an
and control of human beings on the enormous extent. This phenomenon is
basis of such laws. ElbridgeSibley, in more conspicuous in the United States
a recent accessmentof the aims and where big research projects are largely
claimsof scientificsociologyhas observ- sponsored and funded by the federal
government or corporate agencies. The
ed that:
value-free sociologist might comfort
Throughoutthe historyof American himself by believing that the much
sociology.., it is possibleto discern
a basic faith in the possibilityof dreaded task of mnaking value-judgdiscovering universal patterns of ments is finally left to the sponsoring
social structureand function and and financing agency and that he has
hence a basic faith in the ultimnate only to provide expertise. Here again
possibility of achieving scientific
prediction,with the corollary,but the dilemma creeps in: in-leaving the
even more remotely,possibilityof task of making value-judgments to the
exercisingcontrol (Sibley, 1971).4 agency, he secretly acquiesces in what
And the image of man standing,as C Wright Mills termed the 'bureauit were, behind the bars of inexorable cratic ethos', since he provides his exsocial laws, is essentiallythat of a help- pertise with the full knowledge that his
less, determinedcreature,a prisonerof findings would be utilised by the
a social world which is of his own financing agency for some purpose or
maldng but over which, paradoxically, the other. In fact what he does, as
he has no control. The conceptionof Robert Friedrichs puts it, is to trade
a man who makes himself and excer- one value for another - the personal
cises rational control over his destiny that he assigns to the solution of certain
as a free agent is somethingalien to problems for the delightfully impersonal
present-daysocial researchand theory. value of financial support. (Friedrichs,
The indictmentmight sound harsh;but 1970: 85).
so is the situation. Surveyingthe proAlthough most of the findings of
gressof a decadeof sociologicalresearch social science research are utilised in
in 1961, Reinhard Bendix made the serving communications and advertising
followingremarkwhich is all the more agencies, sometimes, wittingly or unvalid today after a decade: "Modern wittingly, they lend support to the
social science teaches us to regardman furtherance of utterly inhuman and
as a creatureof his drives, habits, and exploitative ends of official bureaucracy.
social roles in whose behaviour reason

Robert Lynd's characteristic indictment

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ECONOMIC AND POLMTICALWEEKLY

October 28, 1972

of 'policy relevant' social research exposes the scandal of objective and
value-free scholarship.
These volumes (on the American
.soldier) depict science being used
with great skill to sort out and to
control men for purposes not ot
their own willing. It is a significant measure of the impotenoe of
liberal democracy that it must
increasingly use its social science
not directly on democracy's own
problems, but tangentially and
indirectly; it must pick up the
crumbs from private business research ...

from Army research- on

how to tum frightened -draftees

into tough soldiers who will fight
a war whose purposes they do not
understand. With socially extraneous purposes controlling the use of
social science each advance in its
use tends to make it an instrument
of mass control, and thereby a
threat to democracy. (Mills, 1959:
A
115)5
It becomes clear that such professedly objective, value-free social research provides a convenient and quasinatural pretext for defending and
justifying the status quo, however inhuman and degenerated it may happen
to be. Or may be, as Couldner argues,
that sociological objectivity and valueneutrality' is the product of a cynical,
alienated man and society. Sociology
emerged in a period which witnessed
the disintegration of a traditional belief
system. It took shape in a social structure which was in the throes of a
pervasive anomie. The rise of sociological objectivity was an adaptive response to this goalless, cynical social
situation. The strains of alienation echo
in the cotemporary

scene.

"...

theii

(sociologists') conception of themselves

as 'value-free' scientists, while not
accurate, does reflect an underlying
structure of sentiment that entails a
certain remoteness from the rhythm of
contemporary society, a feeling that
they are marching to a somewhat
different music. To some degree, it
expresses a remoteness common to all
withdrawn soldiers." (Gouldner, 1971
336) The "objectivity of the social
Sciences is not the expression of a dispassionate and detached view of the
social world; it is rather, an ambivalent
effort to accommodate to alienation and
to express a muted resentment of it."
(Gonddner, 1971 : 53).
It is not that the value-free sociologist does not have his personal opinion
about the social and human implications
of his work. As George Lundberg
once admitted, social scientists, like
other people, often have strong feelings
about religion, art, politics, and economics. Thrt is, they have likes in these

are largely responsible for shaping the

present social structure are the special
targets of youth resentment and attack.
The diffusion of this disaffiliation has
assumed such large proportions that it
clearly heralds the emergence of a counter culture. In fact as Theodore Roszak
points out, this counter culture is so
radically disaffiliated from the mainstream assumptions of American society
that it scarcely looks to many as a culture at all, but -takes on the alarming
appearance of a barbaric intrusion (Ros.
zak, 1968: 42).6 But the fact is that,
in spite of its characteristic disregard of
conventional norms of behaviour, the
value-orientation of this counter culture
is imbued with a deep sense of humanism. The following declaration of the
New Left is perhaps the best exposition
of their viewpoint:
We regard men as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled
capacities for reason, freedom and
We- oppose the depersolove....
nalisation that reduces human beings to the status of things.
Loneliness, estrangement, isolation describe the vast distance between man and man today. These
dominant tendencies cannot be
overcome by better personnel management, nor by improved gadgets, but only when a love of man
overcomes the idolatrous worship of
things by man. (Roszak, 1968: 5859)
Anti-technologism and anti-academicism,- according to Kenneth Keniston, are among the dominant themes of
youth dissent in contemporary America.
Anti-technologism is directed against
the impersonality stratification and
hierarchy of modem institutions. Antiacademicism, in essence, lays stress on
the relevance, applicability, and personal meaningfulness of knowledge.
SCnrvrrC SOCIOLOGYCONFRONTS
What is demanded is that intelligence
TiE COTNTmRCULTUnE
be engaged with the world just as acThe sixties in America witnessed a tion should be informed by knowledge.
widespread upsurge directed against the (Keniston, 1970: 21-49) This trend is
-American social system. This upsurge, clearly against the professional canons
initiated and guided by the dissenting of objectivity and value-neutrality in
youth, took varied forns of expression, the academic disciplines. Social scien.
ranging all the way from violent stu- ces, and sociology in particular, to the
dent rebellions at Harvard, Berkelev, degree to which they have come to rely
and Columbia universities and the poli- exclusively on scientific techniques and
tical activism of the New Left to beat- procedures, have engendered resenthippie bohemianism. What is most ment and antagonism among the humacharacteristic about this dissenting wave nistically inclined intellectuals and stuwith the Zeitgetst. dents. The stress in academic sociology
is its disenchantment
Behind the manifestations of generation- on quantification, large-scale social real conflict, student demonstrations, pas- search, and especially on objective,
sive withdrawal of hippies and yippies, value-free scholarship has resulted in a
and the generally non-conformist and backlash opposition from students and
defiant mood of the young, is a deep- younger sociologists. The young radiseated malaise which is endemic in the cals mince no words in regarding acadestructure of the technocratic society of mic sociology and social theory as "an
America. Science and technology which undifferentiated obfuscation of life, an

matters as they have in wine, women,

and song. Then why on earth this talk
of objectivity, one might ask. To mneit
seems that behind the facade of objectivity and value-neutrality lurks the
same nomothetic pretension: the desire
to compare biceps --with their bigger
brothers or natural scientists, to borrow
Robert Merton's picturesque phrase.
Since long the positivist vision of a
natural science of society has haunted
the imaginative minds of sociologists
and most of the theoretical and
methodological sophistication of their
discipline is an expression of this
lingering hope. It is interesting, however, to note that there are Signs of
awakening from this idealistic slumber
among a number of modem sociologists;
they have begun to take stock of the
aims and claims of their discipline in
tenns of performance and achievement.
Consequently, there has been a decline
in the obsession with a purely natural
scienre of society. A large number of
sociologists feel no hesitation in confessing that the ideal of value-neutrality
literally remains an ideal, an altar, so
to speak, kept on a high pedestal and
worshipped ritually from a distance,
with hardly any pragmatic considerations on the part of the worshippers. In
this connection, the survey of sociological opinion undertaken by' Gouldner in
1964 is quite revealing. It indicates that
altogether 45 per cent of the approximatelj 3,500 who replied felt that the
discipline's value-free ideal "helps sociology to remain independent of outside pressures and influences," nearly
three-quarters acknowledged that "most
sociologists merely pay lip service to the
ideal." (Friedrichs, 1970: 124)

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ECONOMIC AND POLIIlCAL WEEKLY

ideology discoloured by a pervasive
bias in the service of the status quQ."
(Gouldner, 1971:9) It is not merely a
coincidence that quite a niunber of rebellious students have been students of
sociology who have turned down conventional academic sociology as an ally
of the Establishment.
VALUE-NEu-TALiTy:
REALITY?

MYTH OR

The contention of value-free sociologists that it is possible to purge our

perception of all cognitive contaminations, which forms the basis of their
value-neutral stance, does not stand
closer scrutiny. The fact of the matter
is that, as existential-phenomenologists
have held since long, the perception of
reality is an evaluation of reality; and
the stuff of evaluation is provided by
previous cognitive experience. Evaluation being essentially subjective, this
means that all knowledge has an ineradicable component of the personal. The
obvious corollary of this is that the ideal
of objective knowledge remains at best
an ideal and not a proven fact of experience. Recently, Michael Polanyi, the
British scientist-philosopher-sociologist,
has offered a thorough and extensive
documentation in this behalf in his
monumental "Personal Knowledge". The
burden of Polanyi's contention is that
"into every act of knowing there enters
a passionate contribution of the person
knowing what is being knowvn,and this
co-efficient is not mere imperfection but
a vital component of knowledge."
(Polanyi, 1958: 1) Polanyi convincingly
demonstrates that even in the realm of
the exact and natural sciences this personal element of knowledge makes its
way; that the so-called subjective values
of personal commitment and passionate
participation are as integral to science
as rigorous analysis and mathematical
abstraction.
This perspective finds support from
the recent developments in the newlyemerging field of metalinguistics. Researches in this field have brought to
light the fact that the very linguistic
tools and grammatical systems selected
predispose us to observe and analyse
selected areas of experience, that the
very symbols and models that structure
our systemnaticthinking will necessarily
bias that which we perceive (Friedrichs,
1970: 143).
When the natural and exact sciences
are not supposed to be immune from
this linguistic preconditioning, how can
the sciences of man be an exception,
especially in view of the fact that in the
latter the observer and the observed are

subject to the same cultural conditioning? In point of fact, this selective perception and value preference finds expression in three distinct phases of
social research: in the selection of problems; in the preference for certain hypotheses and not others; and in the choice
of 'certain conceptual schemes for the
itnterpretationof data. Whatever claims
of objectivity and value-neutrality the
disinterested researcher might make in
these phases of his work he does exercise his valuing faculties either at a
conscious or unconscious level. The professional demands of objectivity may
compel him to shun all subjective delusions, but the paradox of the situation
is that, as Morris Cohen once described
it, those who banish questions of value
at the front door admit them unavowedly and therefore uncritically at the back
door.
At this point a crucial question arises:
when detached and disinterested observation is merely a delusion and valuefudgments are unavoidable, how can
we guarantee the scientific worth of our
findings? The best way to solve this
puzzle, in my opinion, is to make an
explicit acknowledgment of our presuppositions and value preferences
underlying our research designs. This
will not only facilitate consistency between the objective of the research work
and the actual empirical findings but
will also help in the detection of possible flaws in the handling of factual
data. In the normal course of sociological investigation, the researcher selects
his specific area of research and proceeds with the formulation of hypotheses and the construction of a conceptual framework in keeping with certain assumptions which he sets himself
to prove before he goes about the busfness of actual empirical investigation.
Sometimes it so happens that his handling of empirical data, on the basis of
w7hich he formulates his hypotheses
and theoretical framework, suffers from
a conscious or unconscious manoeuvring; this happens as a result of his
eagerness to confirm his preconceived
conceptual framework. Now when the
error is detected and is attributed to the
conceptual bias of the investigator, once
again he harps on the professional canon
of objectivity, giving a step-by-step description of his research design. However, the heart of the problem escapes
his attention: the deliberate or otherwise mishandling of factual data is not
accepted as a possible reason of the
flaw in the outcome of research. Contrary to popular misconception, facts
hardly speak for themselves: they arc
made to speak in a certain fashion ac-

October 28, 1972

cording to one's convenienoe, or as
Gunnar Mydral has put it, "Facts do
not organise themselves into concepts
and theories just by being looked at;
indeed, except within the framework of
concepts and theories, there are no
scientific facts but only chaos." (Myrdal,
1970:9)
On the other hand, if he explicitly
sets forth the underlying set of assumptions and then proceeds with his work,
it is always possible to point out such
flaws and convince the researcher himself of such a possibility. Otherwise
there is always the danger of mixing
up empirical data with value-judgments based on them. The best way,
therefore, is to draw a sharp line of
demarcation between value-judgments
and actual empirical data; and this is
possible only when we make an explicit and clear-cut acknowledgment of
the former. Anthropologist Kathleen
Gough considers this the safest way of
safeguarding the professional integrity
of the social sciences: "I suggest that
an anthropologist(or for that matter any
social scientist) who is explicit about his
own values is likely to frame his problems more sharply and to see more
clearly the line between values and data
than one who has not examined
his values." (Gough, 1968:
149)
Irving Horowitz makes the matter
more explicit: "the history of social science is internally and organically
bound at its upper and lower levels by
ethical perspectives ... It is my further
contention that the suppression of this
commitment of social science to ethical
perspectives leads not to better scientific work, but on the contrary, to a series
of disastrous consequences: (a) indifference to problem solving; (b) unconscious ideological distortion in t:heory
construction; (c) a neglect of the scientific evaluation of value theory; (d) an
identification of objectivity in social research with indifference to ethical
judgments." (Horowitz, 1967-31) Karl
Mannhein suggested essentially the
same thing almost three decades ago:
"A clear and explicit avowal of the
implicit metaphysical presuppositions
which underlie and make possible empirical knowledge will do more for the
clarificationand advancement of research
than a verbal denial of the existence of
these presuppositions accompanied by
their surreptitious admission through the
back door." (Mannheim, 1936:80)
FOR WHAT?
SOCIOLOGY

A few years, ago the New York

Times ran an editorial under the above
caption, chiding the sociologists for
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ECONOMIC AND POLMTICALWEEKLY

October 28, 1972

offering so little that had any relevance
to the problems of our times. Does one
pursue sociology, the Times asked, "to
get particular individuals academic
positions, profitable grants of doubtful
use, or is it to make pioneering contributions to the understanding of the
nature and operation of a complex
society undergoing rapid change?" And
here is an even more impassioned outburst of a sociologist himself:
Time is short; we cannot wait
years for research to give us
America's
impregnable theses.
academia fiddles while the fires are
burning. Where are the studies of
the new corporate power, of the
Defenoe Department, of the military-industrial complex, of the new
bureaucracies, of Vietnam? American academics are prisoners of
liberal democratic ideology. Even
as the chains rust, they do not
move. A new current of reason
and passion is arising in America
outside of its conventional institutions. The current of reason must
flow faster to create an image of
reality and hope for the future....
(quoted in Bendix, 1970)
The young radicals who are the
champions of the culture denounce all
of academic sociology and social theory
as "an undifferentiated obfuscation of
life, an ideology discoloured by a pervasive bias in the service of the status
quo." And what is more agonising for
the sociologist is that even the upholders of the status quo look at his contributions with suspicious eyes. Once a
Congressman put a very baffling question to one of America's -most distinguished sociologists, Robert Merton:
"Why don't you sociologists get to work
and contribute something useful?" to
which Merton could only mumble,
"That damned popular image again!"
In recent years academic sociology,
with its overwhelming emphasis on objective and value-free social research,
has come under heavy attack not only
from administratorsbut also from socially committed intellectuals and students.
In particular, the value-free stance of
sociology and its paradoxical espousal
of 'policy-relevant' social research has
engendered deep resentment and anguish. Its critics strongly feel that
sociology, in its obsession with scientism, has become an ally of the repressive regime of technocracy. Scientific
sociology is not only becoming inimical
to radical social change but wittingly
or unwittingly also lends support to the
forces of injustice. As Elbridge Sibley
has described it, "sociologists are simultaneously charged with irresponsibility
in standing aloof from struggles for
social justice and wvith serving assidu-

ously as handmaidens of the forces of

social injustice. Indeed, the strictures
of the vehement critics suggest a composite image of a sociologist as Pontius
Pilate, Machiavelli, and a playboy."
(Sibley, 1971)
In recent years sociology has grown
in its outward stature to an enormous
extent. There has been a tremendous
proliferation of research techniques and
methodologies to fathom and explore the
immensities of the social world. Countless monographs, books and research
reports have been published, along with
scores of professional journals to serve
the communication needs of an evergrowing community of sociologists the
world over. Looking from this vantage
point, one might well ask a legitimate
question: Has this remarkable growth
in outward stature been accompanied
by a proportionategrowth in the inward
stature of the discipline? How much
has sociology, conceived as the science
of man living in a norm-bound community of human beings, contributed to
man's understanding of himself in relation to his fellow human beings? How
much has it contributed to bringing
people nearer one another which fact
is the moving spirit behind most social
relationships? An honest and critical
soul-searching on the part of sociologists
would indicate that compared to the advancements in methodologicalparaphernalia, sociology's contribution to human
understanding in a cross-cultural and
national context is quite disappointing. Reinhard Bendix's indictiment is
perhaps a little too harsh, but it is a
plain truth: "social scientists are less
concerned with improving the understanding of the mass of men, and they
are more intent on insuring the objectivity of their own practices." (Bendix,
1961: 34)'
It is gratifying to note that there is
emerging a breed of humanistically committed sociologists who repudiate the
nomothetic pretensions of an objective,
value-free sociology and who want their
discipline to adopt a critical and committed stance towards social institutions
and problems. Foremo.st among them
are Alvin Gouldner, Peter Berger,
Lewis Coser, Edward Tiryakian, Ernest
Becker, Lewis Feuer, Dennis Wrong,
Arthur Vidich and Maurice Stein. In
a large majority of contemporary sociologists there is a growing realisation
that sociology should adopt a posture of
involvement and engagement. Thus, in
Gouldner's survey, some 70 per cent
of the respondents agreed that "one
part of the sociologist's role is to be a
critic of contemporary society". A
majority went on to deny that sociolo-

gists "contribute to the welfare of society mainly by providing an understanding of social processes"; contributing "ideas" for "changing society" was
felt to be more important.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of homo sapiens, MIanthe Wise,
is that he utilises the fund of his
knowledge and experience which he
gradually accumulates over the years
and generations, for his betterment and
welfare. In the light of his experiences
and accumulated wisdom he tries new
forms and modes of living and being
which would help him in the unfoldment of his fathomless potentialities.
Being a self-reflecting animal, he keeps
on evaluating critically his own creations
over time which, in turn, widens and
deepens his cultural consciousness.
Freedom and creativity which underlie
the evaluative process, has always been
a vital component of man's existence,
leaving its indelible mark on the complex of human behaviour patterns we
call culture. What is a science, if not
a systematic body of knowledge and
wisdom accumulated over a period of
time and shared in common by a variety
of cultures? The very fact of man
being an ever-growing organism in his
multi-dimensional personality demands
that the ideal of a science of man, as
of all knowledge, should be permeated
with a critical, evaluative spirit. As
Ernest Becker has beautifully put it,
"The scienoe of man is an active,
innovative, interventionist science. It
is founded on the belief that men must
continually modify cherished lifeways to
accord with future goals and continuing
historical changes." (Becker, 1969:
170)8 Needless to say, an objective,
value-free science of man and society
can never take such a critical posture
simply because it does not believe in
social criticism.
A critical, evaluating science of man
and society, by implication, has to be a
humanistic discipline, that is to say, it
wvouldbe committed to a belief inl the
wvorthand dignity of the hbumani
person.
It is curious to reflect that psychology
which followed more closely Apon the
heels of the natural sciences has been
the first to come out of the nomothetic
cocoon in wvhich it encapsulated itself
in the beginning of its scientific career.
The emergence of a new outlook, that
of humanistic psychology which enlists
the sympathy and active co-operation of
such distinguished psychologists and
psychotherapists as Abraham Maslow,
Carl Rogers and Rollo May, among
others, is indicative of this new phase
in its development.
What lesson can we in India drawfrom

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ECONOMIC AND POLMTICALWEEKLY

these shifts in values and perspectives
in the social sciences of a technologically advanced country? For one it
must be clear that the historical, sociocultural and philosophical context of the
development of the social sciences in
India (however meagre it might seem
from Western standards) is entirely
,different from that of advanced nations.
The shallowness of the ideals of objectivitv and value-neutrality as exposed
by the radical sociologists of the West
should in the least sharpen our sensitivities and perceptions to the needs of
our social situation. The ideals of
involvement and participation should be
all the more fruitful and rewarding,
both theoretically and from a pragmatic
standpoint, on the part of humanistically committed social scientists of an
underdeveloped country like India. The
gnawing poverty of the teeming millions,
the awfully unhygienic conditions of
sprawling slums, mass illiteracy and
superstitions, and in short, all the dreadful features of a tradition-oriented
society undergoing rapid modemisation, call for opening up of the liberating vistas of social science. Thus
wNe can draw a clear-cut lesson from
our survey of objectivity and valueneutrality in its epistemological and
historical context: first, we need a social
commitment in the htumanistic and
phenomenological sense, an unwavering
belief in the worth and dignity of
individual human beings and their
capability to develop their potentialities
in a rational manner; we should utilise
the fund of our experiences and insights into the dynamics of human behaviour in assisting the suffering
humanity to rise to higher levels of
existence. The only purpose of science,
Galileo had said, is to ease the hardships of huiimanexistence and I believe
it is a noble and most sublime ideal
for the science of man.
NoTEs
1 Even in the realm of the natural
sciences the situation is not as hopeful as the positivists would have us
believe. The competitive atmosphere prevalent in the world of
scientific inventions and discoveries
highlights the personal factor involved in scientific enterprise. This is
enthusiastically described in Jim
Watson's account of how Francis
Crick, Maurice Wilkins and he
solved the problem of the structure
of the genetic material DNA.
"Watson's account makes clear that
he at least, worked in constant fear
that the great chemist and Nobel
prize-winner, Linus Pauling, who
had already solved the problem of
the structure of protein, would get
there first ... No one after reading

Watson, whether his accounts of

his colleagues are reasonably
accurate or wildly biased, could
believe that the genetic code was
cracked by detached, unemotional
men working solely for truth's sake
and caring little for the world"
(Rose and Rose, 1969: 242-43).
Recent developments in quantum
physics have opened up a broad
vista of epistemological implications
with regard to the nature of scientific observation. Werner Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacyhas
a crucial significance in this connection. "The fact that we cannot
observe the course of nature without
disturbing it" in principle implies,
as Matson puts it, that the act of
observation is at the same time unavoidablv an act of participation,
that man is at once an actor and
a spectator in the drama of existence. The post-modern image of
the scientist stands *as that of an
actor, as a "participant-observer"
(Matson, 1964: 142-46). For an
outstanding and masterly exposition
of this view, see (Polanyi, 1958).
2 Weber formulated an 'understanding' sociology with verstehen. or
empathic communication or understanding as its method. He insisted
on objectivity in order to draw a
distinction between statements of
facts and statements of value. Within the bounds of this distinction
he was not against the expression
of value-judgments on the part of
the sociologist. As Gouldner argues,
"Weber also held that the sociologist's expression of value-judgments may be voiced if caution waas
excercised to distinguish them from
Weber
statements of facts. If
insisted on the need to maintain
scientific objectivity he also warned
that this was altogether different
from moral indifference" (Gouldner
1963: 35-52). Weber's insistence
on value-neutrality was motivated
by his intense desire to preserve
the integrity and autonomy of the
social sciences. As Guenther Roth
has observed, "Weber was a champion of the liberal university which
endeavours to be open to all political and philosophical orientations,
with the proviso, of course, that
professors he competent and productive scholars, not just propagandists of their cause" (Roth,
1971: 34-54). Lewis Coser, in a
sociological
recent history of
thought, has describedthe historical
and intellectual context of Weber's
position in an excellent way:
"Weber was appalled by the- fact
that the social sciences were
dominated by men Who felt obliged,
out of a sense of patriotism, to
defend the cause of the Reich and
the Kaiser in their teachings and
writings. They oriented their research toward enhancing the greater
glory of the Fatherland. It is
against this prostitution of the
scientific calling that Max Weber
directed his main effort. I-Iisappeal
intended
wIas
for value-neutrality
as a thoroughly libJerating end-

October 28, 1972

eavour to free the social sciences
from the stultifying embrace of the
powers that be and to assert the
right, indeed the duty, of the
investigator to pursue the solution
to his problem regardless of
wvhetherhis results serve or hinder
the affairs of the.national state. In
Weber's view, value-neutrality is
the pursuit of disciplined and
methodical inquiry would emancipate the social sciences from
the heavy hand of the political
decision-makers. It would end the
heteronomy of the social sciences
and clear the way for their autonomous growth" (Coser, 1971: xix).
3 This world-view, mechanistic and
and materialistic as it is, is not
intrinsic to science per se, but is
a product of historical and cultural
forces operating in Western society.
As Abraham Maslow has pointed
out, "Our orthodox conception of
science as mechanistic and ahuman
seems to me one local part-manifestation of expression of the larger,
more inclusive world-view of
mechanisation and dehumanisation"
(Maslow, 1966: Ch 1). For an
excellent exposition of the impact
of this scientific wvorld-viewof the
social sciences, see Matson, 1964,
Chs 1, 2, 3.
4 Functionalist social anthropology,
like scientific sociologv, has had a
good dose of the positivist elixir.
As E E Evans-Pritchardhas observed: "Social anthropologists, dominated consciously or unconsciously,
from the beginnings of their subject,
by positivist philosophy, have
aimed, and for the most part
still

aim

...

at

proving

that

man is an automaton, and' at

describing the sociological laws in
terms of whlich actions, ideas and
beliefs can be explained and in the
light of which they are controlled.
The approach implies that human
societies are natuiral svstems which
can he reduced to variables"(EvansPritchard, 1962: 60).
5 "The short point is that the science
of human relations. constitutes an
effectivc tool for the manipulation
of men. A very large portion of
scientific knowledge about human
relations is the resnilt of research
geared to manipulative puirposes.
The Western Electric Company
paid Mayo and his collaboratorsto
increase the prodluctivitvof workers.
Stouffer and his colleagues and
Grinker anid Spiegel had direct
responsibilities -for adlding to the
fighting qualities of men in the
armed services. Leighton's wvork
was dcone as an a(ljunct for the
wartime Japanese evacuation and
the larger purpose Nvasto provide
guidance to the. military for the
administration of -onquered people" (Morton Grodzins quoted in
Matson, 1964: 289).
6 It is interestiang to reflect that
Pitirim Sorokin, in his famous
Ideational-Sensate characterisation
of socio-cu-lturalsystems, predicted,
as far hlack as the thirties, the rise
of a counter culture within the
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df Western civlsation. This counter culture, he held,

would he launched bv a disenchanted fragment of the population who
would turn indifferent and antagonistic to the dominant values of its
sensate cutlture (see Mormin,1971:
27-32).
sensate systen

scientists ... no
social
"Modern
longer believe that men can rid
their mincls of ... impedliments to
lucid thbotiuht: only scienltist.s can

Thev assert that there is onlv one

e scapte frnom the consequences of

irrationalitv: that is hs' the application of scientific method. And this
method can INe used effectively only
by the expert fev . .. Instead of

Free Press.

Gerth, H H and Mills, C W 1946:

"From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology". New York, Oxford University
Press.
Colgh, Kathleen 1968: "World Revolution and the Science of Man" in
Rosrzak 1968a.
Couldner, A XV 1963: "'Anti-Miniotatir:I
The Myth of a Value-Free Sociologv",
in Stein and Vidich, 1963.
Couldner, A IV 1971: "The Coming
Crisis of Western Sociology", New
Delhi, Ileinemann.

H-orow7itz, I L 1967: "Professing SocioPtublishing

Aldine
Chicago,
logy",

Company.
o-lorton,John 1968: "Order and Conflict
Theories of Social Problems" in
attempting to makc people more
Lindenfeld, 1968.
rational, contemporary social scientists often content themselves with Kaplan, A 1970: Individuality and the
New Society, Seattle, University of
asking of them that they place
Washington Press.
their trust in social science and
accept its fincdings"(Bendix, 1961: Keniston, K 1970: "Dissenting Youth
and the New Society" in Kaplan,
34). The positivistically-inclined
1970.
sociologist's fascination with the
Klapp, 0 E 1969: "Collective Search
natur al scienitists has been well
for Idenitity", Neew York, Holt,
satirised by C WVrightMills: "[the
Rinehart.
abstracted empiricist's] most cherished professional self-imagc is that Lindenfeld, F 1968: "RaclicalPerspectives on Social Problems", New York,
of the natuiral scientist. In their
Macmillan.
arguments about various philosophical issues of social science, one of Lipset, S M and Smelser, N J 1961:
their invariable points is that tbey"Sociology: The Progress of a
Decade", New jersev, Prentice-Hall.
are 'natural scientists', or at least
Mannheim, Karl 1936: "Ideology and
that they represent the viewI&int
Utopia", New York, Harcourt, Brace. q
of natural science. In the discourse
Martindale, i) 1961: "The Nature and I
of the more sophisticated, or in the
Types of Sociological Theoryv, p
presence of some smiling and exalt-

ed physicist, the self-image is more

likely to be shortened by merely
'scientist'
(Mills, 1959: 56).
Ernest Becker is among those few
original \sirite(rs in the social sciences
today \x ho have an acute r'ealisation of the inadequacv of modern
theoi-ies in providing the
social
of a uinified, huimanistic
ediifice
man founded on a
science, of
realistic theorv of human natuire.
Currently he is engaged in such a
challeanging endeavoulr and his lauidable efforts holdl promise for the
social sciences of a troubled xvorld
that is ours. The present writer is

working onl a critical evaluation of

Becker's contribuitionsfor his Ph D.

Londotn, Routledge and Kegani Paul.

"The Psychology of
Maslow, A 1966:

Science", New York, Hiarper and

Row.
Matson, F W 1964: "The Broken
Image", New York, George Braziller.
Mills, C W 1959: "The Sociological
Imagination", New York, Oxford
University Press.
Momin, A R 1971: "Man against Culture: an Essay on Sorokin's 13th Prophecy" in Journal of the Bombay
University Postgraduate Studetts
Union.
Myrdal, Gunnar 1970: "Objectivity in'
Social Research", London, Gerald
1 uckworth.

Plolanyi,M 1958: "PersonialKnowledge",

London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Rose, H and Rose, S 1969: "Science
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senting Academy",

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Tradition" American Sociological
Review, Volume 30, Niumber 5.

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Oxford

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Press
* University

at

Bombay
calcutta

Delhi

Madras