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A Profile of the Steel


A Profile of the Steel

Global Reinvention for a
Second Edition
Peter Warrian

A Profile of the Steel Industry: Global Reinvention for a NewEconomy,

Second Edition
Copyright Business Expert Press, LLC, 2016.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any
meanselectronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or any other
except for brief quotations, not to exceed 400 words, without the prior
permission of the publisher.
First published in 2012 by
Business Expert Press, LLC
222 East 46th Street, New York, NY 10017
ISBN-13: 978-1-63157-383-5 (paperback)
ISBN-13: 978-1-63157-384-2 (e-book)
Business Expert Press Industry Profiles Collection
Collection ISSN: 2331-0065 (print)
Collection ISSN: 2331-0073 (electronic)
Cover and interior design by Exeter Premedia Services Private Ltd.,
Chennai, India
First edition: 2012
Second edition: 2016
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America..

The steel mill and the auto plant were the icons of the 20th-century
industrial economy. By the early 21st century, many people viewed steel
as Big, Ugly, and Gone to China. Not so. In manufacturing, The World
IsNot Flat! The steel industry has continuously been forced to remake
itself. This book describes those developments and dynamics.

steel, manufacturing, technology, trade, unions

Abbreviations xvii
Chapter 1Introduction1
Chapter 2 Steel Basics11
Chapter 3 How Steel Companies Operate19
Chapter 4 How the Steel Industry Operates53
Chapter 5 Industry Organization and Competition71
Chapter 6Steel Labor Relations83
Chapter 7Steel Trade Flows and Trade Disputes109
Chapter 8 Outside Market Forces135
Chapter 9Steel and Technological Change157
Chapter 10Regulation175
Chapter 11Challenges and Opportunities185
Chapter 12Conclusion197

After the China Steel Supercycle
The story of the steel industry is characterized by constant change and
transformation. It continues to be so. The later part of the 2012 edition
of this book described a number of risk factors emerging in the industry
with prospects of an uncertain future. Three years on, those factors have
produced a full-blown restructuring crisis in global steel. The original
edition can help readers understand the historical background, technical
and economic factors driving these challenging developments. Theorigin
of the current problems, in the authors view, is well documented.
However, the speed and dimensions of change always surprise us.
At the broadest level, the imbalance between global steel demand and
supply has been inverted. Fifteen years ago, all major players were aware
of the imbalance in global steel: excess capacity in the West and the need
to rapidly expand steel production capacity in Asian economies. No one
foresaw, however, how quickly and completely China would come to
overshadow the entire global industry. Now, however, this imbalance has
reversed itself with equal surprise and speed. The most expansive steel
markets are in the USA and the overhang of capacity is greatest in China.
The downturn in China more than anything has undermined the raw
materials supply and price balances.
Regrettably, steel trade wars have re-emerged with the likelihood that,
in the end, there will be no real winners. This is not a repeat of the disputes between the USA, Europe and Japan in the 1980s. All countries
are now bound by World Trade Organization rules. But the technical
filing requirements, criteria for injury such as allegations of currency
manipulation and timing of procedures and decisions are being aggressively changed in the USA, whose industry has frankly gone protectionist
in the name of survival. Taking only one issue, currencies, the picture
is actually much more complicated than media statements allege. Has


China sought competitive advantage through an undervalued currency?

Probably, as the Japanese did before them. But Russia, with very efficient producers such as Severstal, has received a cost reduction of about
50% because of political sanctions and declining oil prices impacting the
rouble, but this would not qualify as dumping for trade dispute purposes. Or, the Brazilians strongly allege that quantitative easing by the US
Federal Reserve is a shadow form of currency manipulation. In the end,
currency movements are but a small part of the problems of global steel.
The threat of Chinese steel overcapacity compromising the global
industry is an absolutely legitimate concern. The original edition describes
the dramatic impact of the rise of China, not on how steel is produced,
but on input prices for coal and iron ore. Now we see the startling reversal
of the same factors. Falling steel demand in China, in the face of previous excess capacity expansion, is having catastrophic financial impacts
on Chinese steel producers. There is evidence that they have turned to
exports to relieve pressure on the domestic industry. Ironically, while the
US industry rhetoric constantly impugns China, the actual trade cases
are targeted mainly against other countries for the simple fact that China
does not ship much steel directly to the USA. However, because China is
the marginal price setter, depressed prices can be as devastating or more so
than just physical shipments of goods. In fact, the most vociferous attacks
from the USA now point the blame game at Australia, accusing the excessive expansion of Australian iron ore production and subsequent collapse
of iron ore prices as providing the means for inefficient Chinese steel mills
staying in the game. What does one do with that? What it actually teaches
us is that steel, like other major industries, functions on the basis of global
supply chains. It is no longer a standalone producer industry. There will
be no winner from renewed steel trade wars.
As described in the book, over the past 40 years, the electric arc
furnace (EAF) segment of the steel industry emerged as the leading innovators and the US market was the prime site for implementing those
breakthroughs. Nucor was the technical leader in the 1980s with thin slab
casting. It has now become the largest US domestic producer and continues to lead with direct reduced iron-based production to shield against
iron ore and scrap price increases and its new Castrip(R) process, which
it describes as steel production with no metallurgy, that is, no rolling or


further processing required. In combination, these constitute a dramatic

shift downwards as the reference point for production costs. At the other
end of the EAF industry, micro-mills in the Southwest USA are gaining
market share and challenging the regional market position of traditional
EAF producers.
Finally, the book describes the long and intimate relationship between
the steel and automotive industry. In the new phase, the environmental regulatory pressure on car companies for dramatic improvements in
lightweighting to meet emission standards has produced a new stage
of materials competition between steel, aluminum and other advanced
materials. The steel industry has responded with whole new classes of
advanced high-strength steels. It is well positioned to compete with
aluminum. However, the very nature of the new steels is a challenge to
steels own customers. The very heart of the new steelstheir complex
microstructuresthat produce the lightweighting properties, require
major changes in manufacturing technologies to actually produce the
parts for the new cars. Steel producers now have an array of new grades
that only a limited number of their automotive customers can yet manage.
The transformational story of the steel industry never ends. As the
industry currently struggles to adjust to the end of Chinas steel super
cycle, it faces a sustained low-growth period. In such a time, as the
industry slows down, the premium for innovation increases.
What should students of Management learn from this?
1. How does innovation take place in a down market? The mid-term
outlook is bleak for Global Steel. Prices have fallen to unsustainable levels, with little price relief coming for at least 2 years. The
15-year Chinese steel supercycle has abruptly halted halfway through
its p
resumed lifecycle and no equivalent upside is seen for at least
another 10 years. In a major slow-growth period, the premium for
innovation significantly increases. New technologies and processes
become even more important.
2. We may be seeing the end of the steel company as we have known
it. The former vertically integrated steel company that owned and
controlled the whole value chain from natural resources to finished
products ended in the 1990s. In fact, the current crisis is mostly


driven by the whiplash from the supply chain of the upstream

resource companies. Similar to other manufacturing corporations,
steel executives now face the challenge of managing global supply
chains, not unidimensional integrated entities.
3. Having left industrial commodity production behind, the high-end,
value-added steels now supply a new kind of advanced and microstructural manufacturing. Led by the critical auto industry customer
base and its supply chain, steel production and realization of value
added are predominantly realized away from the immediate site of
production-the steel mill.

Globalization and Technical Change
We live in a time of change. In particular, we live in a world in which
computing power is steadily transforming the way people work. Today,
there are many who have never seen anyone operate an elevator as a way
to earn a living because that task was long since delegated to a button,
a sensor, and a computer chip. If we were to track occupations as we do
animal species, secretaries would surely be joining elevator operators and
many others on the ever-lengthening list of work species endangered or
displaced by the impact of technology.
Improvement in the cheapness and ease of sending and receiving
information has also changed how corporations work. This has made tight
coordination with far-flung global enterprises much more feasible. Container ships, huge freighters, and air freight have also made moving not
only information but also goods between national geographies cheaper
and easier. These changes, by opening up national markets to international trade, have worsened the fate of industries and the divisive public
policy issue, rather than something that is in the main naturally arranged
by geographical separation. Successful remote market access, with all its
possibilities for disruptive change, now occurs on a much larger scale than
ever before.
These changes are usually described as globalization. But globalization
is a very abstract word; it is not clear that it means the same thing to different people. Nor can it, because, in fact, globalization is very different
in its effect on different industries. Simple models of what is going on
cannot be expected to be realistic.
What then can be done to make these important changes and their
consequences more intelligible? I suggest that one thing to do is to obtain
a realistic view of at least one industry. I do not mean that one sample
industry can tell you what globalization means to other industries. Rather


when you have seen what can happen in one industry, and have seen that
much that actually happened is neither intuitive nor obvious, you will
be in a better position to ask and comprehend more about what is going
on in other industries. This will help in understanding even if the actual
events occurring in the other industry are quite different.
In some manufacturing industries, access to necessary natural inputs
may be easy, and an insignificant advantage or disadvantage to firms in
different locations, but in others it can be a life or death issue. Steel,
surprisingly enough, has experienced both these situations.
This book describes the steel industry; it gives its history; it describes
the many ways that steel is made today, how it was made in the past,
and how it may be made in the future. It describes the effect of change.
We watch as the Bessemer process transforms steel from something rare,
special, and precious, like the Damascus steel prized for sharp-edged
swords, into something common: an everyday material with a thousand
uses. And that first seminal event turns out to be only a beginning.
We watch as steel plants turn from being assemblages of burly men
sweating against a background of flames and hot glowing steel to vast
buildings containing only a few people. And these few are perched high
above the hot plant floors, looking down at what is happening below, and
looking toward computer screens. From their lofty perches they operate
the controls that move the hot steel shapes below from place to place and
are in control of every detail of the processing.
We watch as almost all the corporations that would be even slightly
familiar to Americans, corporations like Bethlehem Steel, Jones and
Laughlin, Lackawanna Steel, Inland Steel, and Republic Steel, disappear through mergers and end up being parts of something called
ArcelorMittal. ArcelorMittal is not an American household word, but
today it is the worlds largest single steel producer, a widespread global
corporation controlled by two members of Indias wealthy Mittal family.
Meanwhile, the company that was once a household word, U.S.
Steel, and that was also once the largest company in the world, still
survives after a merger with Carnegie Steel. But it has been reduced in
scope and scale with a production capability less than a quarter of that
of ArcelorMittal.


How did these enormous changes come about? There are many reasons, but the most important are certainly not what a purely economic
overview would predict. For example, in steel, where labor is a small part
of cost, cheap labor was not the issue. Much of the difficulties of American
companies in the 1980s and 1990s were not the simple working out of
something economically inevitable.
Technical decisions played a major role. And those decisions were
shaped in part not only by financial pressures but also by personal histories and national differences. Innovative Japanese firms, supported by
the Japanese governments Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), pioneered in better steel manufacturing processes, but most U.S.
firms, sticking with the familiar, fell behind. Organizational issues too
played a role.
Then there was and is the rise of China. While many U.S. integrated
steel firms were acting on the appealing idea of concentrating on their core
competencies and were busy selling off their peripheral coal mines and
iron ore sources, China was busy acquiring them. Then with the development of both the appetite for steel and the ability to make steelChina
today makes more than half the worlds steelraw material prices went
through the roof handicapping those who did not have raw m
aterials in
In addition, there is the rise of the minimills that made steel from
scrap, and the vital role played throughout by union-management relations. This book describes in some detail what was at stake in the great
steel strike of 1959 and the later landmark steel agreements, and what
their consequences actually were.
This book contains all this and much more. Its account of steel
industry shows clearly how much more there is to a real industry than is
apparent from a distance; and how that much more can be decisive.
We are fortunate that the steel industry is described to us here by Peter
Warrian. Peter Warrian, a Canadian, has been in the steel industry for
35years. He is a steel insider with deep knowledge, but he is not a simple
partisan of management, or of labor, or of government. He has been the
chief economic advisor to the Ontario government, has held important
posts in the steelworkers union, and has consulted with major steel


corporations. He is now a research fellow at the University of Toronto

and head of the Lupina Foundation.
Peter Warrians account of the steel industry does not make the events
he describes seem mysterious, or due to greed, or to stupidity. Rather he
describes humans working as best they know how, but embedded in an
environment that is changing, complex, and unpredictable.
That is the kind of account we need if we are going to understand and
be realistic about the role of industries in a globalized world.
Ralph Gomory

American Railway Engineers Association
American Society for Testing Materials
Basic Oxygen Furnace
Brazil, Russia, India, and China
Bull Whip Effect
Continuous Casters
Coordinated Committee Steel Companies
COLA Cost-of-Living
Cooperative Partnership Agreements
Co-Operative Wage Study
Directly Reduce Iron
Electric Arc Furnaces
Experimental Negotiating Agreement
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Global Production Network
Information and Communications Technology
International Standards Organization
International Trade Commission
Knowledge Intensive Business Services
Labor Management Participation Teams
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Oxygen Blown Converter
Original Equipment Manufacturers
Open Hearth Furnace
Pension Benefits Guarantee Corporation
Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund
Society of Automotive Engineers
Sustained Contingent Collaborative
Statistical Process Control
Transformation-induced plasticity steel



Twinning-induced plasticity steel

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
Voluntary Restraint Agreements
World Trade Organization


The steel mill and the auto plant were the icons of the 20th-century
industrial economy. By the 21st century, many people viewed steel as Big,
Ugly and Gone to China. An informed observer would have the picture
that in the 1980s the traditional big steel mills were overtaken by the modern smaller minimills. Then, after 2000 the whole business shifted to
China. Not so. In manufacturing, The World Is Not Flat! Public discourse
about globalization is dominated by simple models such as the existence of
Chinese low wages means all manufacturing will inevitably relocate there.
The real world of industry is much more complicated and even hopeful.
The steel industry has continuously been forced to remake itself, which it
has done. This book describes those developments and dynamics.
Economic discourse in our time is dominated if not preoccupied with
the issue of innovation. This is seen rightly to be the key to 21st-century
competitiveness. The somewhat counterintuitive facts are that, notwithstanding the stunning accomplishments of modern biomedical technologies, over 80 percent of innovation in the economy takes place in
manufacturing.1 Steel is the material backbone of manufacturing. So, in
turn, the underpinning of manufacturing innovation lies in materials science and engineering, whose base is in steel.
The rise of China was the steel story of the past decade. It now has
over half of the worlds capacity, and taking the Recession into account,
China may have close to half the operating capacity currently producing. But the rise of China has not fundamentally changed how steel is
produced. What it has done is dramatically change the input prices for
producing steel, primarily for iron ore, coal, and scrap. This has had a
destabilizing effect on how the industry operates comparable to the
disruptive Steel Trade Wars of the 1980s and 1990s.
There has also been a more subtle but critical technical change. With
the rise of China, integrated steelmaking has risen again to the forefront of


innovation in steel. Instead of further eating into integrated market share,

minimills are now faced with equally challenging cost pressures from the
dramatic rise in scrap prices as well as escalating energy prices. Energy prices
alone now equal or exceed labor costs in steel production. And, at the bottom end of the commodity food chain, new micromills are starting to do to
minimills what minimills did to integrated mills 40years ago.
The huge growth cycle in global steel set off by the rise of China has
now come to an end. Steel demand in 2015 is less than in 2014 with a
25 percent decline in prices and capacity utilization levels of steel mills
below levels for sustainable profitability. There may be a modest increase
in 2016 but the cascading growth of steel demand and production in the
last decade will not be matched in the coming decade. All national industries will have to adjust to the new normal. China itself faces a probable
10 year downward adjustment in steel capacity. India may be the exception. A low growth cycle means different industrial dynamics, though the
pressure for innovation may increase.

Who Needs Steel?

We all need steel. It is the backbone material for manufacturing. We still
live in a world where we primarily consume stuff. It is estimated that
80 percent of consumer goods contain steel. In addition, if you are concerned about the environment then there should be more steel in your
life. It is the most recycled material in the economy; 70 percent of steel
is recycled compared to about 12 percent of aluminum. Steels physical
properties can withstand almost endless recycling.
Steel companies and national industries have also had to reconstruct
themselves due to changing political, economic, and technology factors.
For instance, the European Union was founded on the European Coal
and Steel Community. Steel had been the cornerstone of modern warfare
and Europe sought to put its troubled past behind it by seeking to unify
this industry on a continental basis as a means to peace and prosperity.
There have been three major destabilizing forces in the past 50 years that
have challenged steel companies and steel management around the world.
The first major postwar steel destabilization factor was trade. For the
first half of the 20th century, steel was a stay at home industry. However,

Introduction 3

every emerging country wanted its own flag, airline, and steel mill. The
rebuilt Japanese steel industry was the first that had a capacity that well
exceeded domestic demand and required large volumes of exports in
order to be profitable. This was the fundamental, though not the only,
backdrop to the Steel Trade Wars of the 1970s and 1980s.
The second disruptive change was in technical steelmaking itself
and the rise of the so-called minimills. These were small, more efficient
mills making steel totally from scrap. The U.S. steel industry became
ground zero for commercialization of this new steelmaking technology.
They started at the commodity end of the market, producing rod for the
construction industry. At first this was a minor irritant for big existing
steel companies. But, by the later 1980s technology development by the
minimills allowed them to move into the higher value added and higher
margin flat-rolled steel product markets such as automotive. Just prior
to the 2008 Financial Crisis, minimills were producing half the steel in
the United States.
The third impact involves the rise of China. Virtually no one in the
traditional steel industry saw it coming. China, with a stunning level of
growth in the past decade, now has the ability to determine the marginal
price of flat-rolled products around the world and has emerged as a significant player in export markets. However, the real disruptive impact of
China has been on raw material prices: iron ore and coal.

Why People Should Read This Book

People should read this book because steel continues to be a huge factor
in the economy.
The American steel industry directly employed more than 139,000
workers and contributed $17.5 billion in value added to gross domestic product in 2011. In addition, it contributed to household incomes
by generating $121.4 billion in wages and salaries across the economy,
the purchase of $20 billion in materials from other industries, $8 billion
in services, $5 billion in energy products, $4.5 billion in machinery,
$4.4billion in wholesale and retail trade.
The total economic impact of steel in the economy is even larger. Its
net contribution to the overall economy was $246 billion. Every job in


steel creates seven jobs in the U.S. economy. In total, the steel industry
supports 1,022,009 jobs across the economy as of 2011.2
What kinds of other industries and jobs does the steel industry
support? Economists use demand multipliers to estimate how much a
change in one industry has on another industry, for example, how much
an increase in the level of activity in the steel i ndustry will have on demand
in the machinery industry. Readers would not be surprised to learn that
steel has important impacts on industries such as machinery and mining.
They would be surprised to learn that steel has an even greater impact
on jobs in professional, scientific and technical services, education and
health care.
Total economic activity supported by steel, including things such
as the impact of taxes paid by the steel industry, produces an 11.298
employment multiplier. For all these reasons, people who care about the
economy and its future should try to understand the Steel Story.
There are two individual profiles for the kind of readers who would
benefit from reading this book. First is a student in a managerial economics class to whom it might be assigned as a supplemental reading.
The s econd is a person who is an investor who knows little about it and
reads the book to get a better grasp on the steel industry. However, there
is a much broader audience of people concerned about the implications
of globalization of the economy. For them, learning about this specific
industry may suggest lessons for a perspective on the future of many
For instance, profit is critical to steel companies. Without it they
would not be viable. At the same time, the challenges and decisions confronting decisionmakers in the industry are not driven by short-termism
and simplistic shareholder value ideologies. Companies are facing
ongoing struggles to continue to exist, keeping up with technological and
market changes, making better steel, improving quality and productivity.
Even in the heyday of Big Steel, profit was a central but not exclusive issue
for steel executives, albeit that they were riding a wave of postwar expansion, oligopolistic pricing and an absence of significant competition. All
of this changed in the 1970s. New competitors, loss of price leadership,
new regulatory challenges from the environmental and employee benefits
side all hit the large integrated producers at once. The 1990s saw a s elling

Introduction 5

off of assets and deverticalization in the name of realizing short-term

shareholder value. The rise of China and the impact on raw materials
destabilized the reconstituted mills. The new steel ownership around the
world understands that it will realize shareholder value only if it gets the
business operations, technology, marketing and human resources right.
This is a particular challenge for large, capital intensive, environmentally
exposed companies like steel. However the lessons extend to all other
industries in the new global economy.

The Perspective of This Book

It is the perspective of this book that the global steel industry in the past
decade is undergoing its second great reorganization in the past 75 years.
The first was the post-World War II steel restructuring under the
direction of the Allied Powers as described in Gary Herrigel, Manufacturing Possibilities (2010). He challenges the traditional view of the steel
industry in the postwar period. The pre-World War II steel industries of
Germany, the United States, and Japan were all characterized by a dominant integrated producer surrounded by smaller, specialized firms. Following the war, they were decentralized into an industry dominated by
a small set of mass production, oligopolistic, large steel companies. But
in the 1970s and 1980s, in all leading countries, traditional integrated
operations have been rationalized and minimills deployed a radically disruptive steelmaking technology to gain a major market share. By the first
decade of the 21st century, the postwar steel industry stood on its head.
A limited number of highly specialized integrated firms were surrounded
by standardized minimill producers.
The subject of this book is the next stage of these developments.
The global restructuring of steel in the past decade has produced a new
configuration of core specialized firms and secondary commodity firms.
How are these core primary steel producers now being managed and
coordinated after the global steel consolidation? And, how do steel companies learn? National steel industries have become merged into global
supply chains. Ones position in a contingent collaborative supply chain
is correlated with learning capabilities. New global steel companies are
clearly embedded within this framework.


Globalization and the Steel Industry

We will be discussing steel as a globalized industry.
Three phenomena are at the heart of globalization. The first is the
internationalization of ownership structures. This is most evident over the
past several years, among steel-producing companies where there has been
a change of ownership in virtually every steel-producing operation. This
change in ownership in most cases involved a shift from domestic control
to international control.
A direct consequence of the transformation of ownership structures
is significantly increased international flows of not only capital and
technology, but also managerial norms and talent. While attention most
often focuses on capital and technology, the adoption of international
managerial norms and the international flows of talent may have the most
far-reaching impact on operations management. These include productivity benchmarking, new approaches to work organization and distinct
strategies related to training and human resources development.
The second phenomenon that defines globalization is the accelerated
integration of international markets on a regional basis such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) steel market. The signature
development that marks this integration is a sharp increase in both exports
and imports of steel products. This process accelerated in the past decade
and is the basis for many peoples perception that the industry has disappeared. In reality, one kind of industry disappeared. But it was replaced
by another.
The merger wave in the industry resulted in major changes to facilities:
some were closed, others expanded, many became more specialized. This is
reflected in the increased export orientation of the industry. The rationalization of capacity drove a step-function increase in productivity that reduced
overall employment and is also reshaping the skill needs of the steelworker
of the future, as discussed in Chapter 11. Although globalization led to
an increase in the steel industrys export orientation, it would be a serious
error to discount the continuing importance of the domestic market. Even
with exports taking an increased share of output, the domestic market still
accounts for at least half of industry shipments. As discussed in Chapter 7,
the industry is still vulnerable to unfair trade practices, such as dumping.

Introduction 7

The third phenomenon at the heart of globalization is a marked

increase in the scope and reach of international supply chains. The logic
driving the globalization of supply chains is the competitive advantage
that derives from achieving an approximate symmetry between labor
intensiveness and skill availability on the one hand and labor cost on the
other. The migration of low-skill, labor-intensive production processes
to lower cost jurisdictions is not a new story. What is new is the increase
in the scope and reach of international supply chains to include production processes that were much less vulnerable to o ffshoring prior to this
In summary, for steel production, the impact of globalization is most
evident in the internationalization of ownership, the rationalization of
production and the adoption of international performance benchmarking. These developments have fundamentally altered productivity conditions over the past decade and will reshape human resources requirements
in the industry in the future. Labor costs have never been a static figure
in the industry, they vary over time. Currently, owing to the relatively
low share of labor in total production costs (approximately 15 percent),
the industry is much less vulnerable to pressure to relocate production to
low-cost jurisdictions. However, the internationalization of production
has increased the intensity of competition for investment and technology
within global companies. This puts new levels of pressure on workplace

How This Book Is Organized

The book tells the story of a huge, complicated industry. It begins with
an introduction to the making of steel, a brief history of the metal and its
usage and then a quick summary of the history of the industry in the past
century. As we proceed through the topical chapters, there is inevitably
movement back and forth between historical periods and developments
of companies and technologies. Unfortunately, it is not possible to do
all of the history in one place. Often, a chapter will begin with a description of a current situation or fact that will strike the reader as unfamiliar or
counterintuitive. The chapter will then go back in time to give the h
behind the facts to make the current situation more u
nderstandable for


the reader. Utmost effort is made to make the context clear whenever
there are such references.
Chapter 2 seeks to give the general reader an introduction to Steel Basics,
the metal, its production and steel companies in a historical context.
Chapter 3 describes how steel companies operate, the objectives of executives, what global consolidation has meant in terms of benchmarking and
coordination. Because steel is an intermediate product, it also describes
steel supply chains, upstream to raw materials, and downstream to steelconsuming industries.
Chapter 4 talks about how steel industries operate and how they have
been reorganized over time. It also describes how steel firms are positioned within regional markets and in the global economy.
Chapter 5 describes how steel product pricing has evolved and the new
sources of competition, pressures from imports, and by the minimills. It
also discusses the impact of surging raw material prices, principally coal
and iron ore, on the costs and margins of steel companies.
Chapter 6 discusses the challenging history of steel industry labor relations, which have shown steel unions and management on their best
and their worst days. It also identifies human resource issues including
legacy health and pension costs, and the need to find new forms of
employee engagement and leveraging of production knowledge on the
shop floor.
Chapter 7 summarizes the troubling story of steel trade disputes,
particularly the vexatious issues of foreign dumping and antidumping
trade policies as applied to steel. It also discusses the rise of China as a
new challenge for global steel and, as illustrated by the Chinese case, the
continued role of the state in the steel industry.
Chapter 8 examines steel and external market forces. Is there a steel growth
story? How does the industrial cluster associated with steel facilities work?
It concludes with a discussion of new global steel and manufacturing
supply chains.

Introduction 9

Chapter 9 discusses steel technology developments and its evolution from

company R&D facilities to traded knowledge to global consortia. It also
situates steel in the future of materials competition.
Chapter 10 discusses regulation of the steel industry from antitrust policy
to environmental policy. It also describes the importance of industrial
standards such as SAE and ISO.
Chapter 11 discusses steel in the postindustrial, knowledge-based economy.
Specifically, it looks at how steel companies learn and how knowledge
networks arise between steel companies and their customers.
Chapter 12 concludes with some general observations about how further
restructuring of the steel industry may unfold, its linkages to the future
of manufacturing, materials competition in the new economy and the
potential impact of public policy on the industry.

ALAM. See Association of Licensed
Automobile Manufacturers
Allocation of production,
optimization, 66
Ameristeel, 3739
Antidumping Act, 112
Antitrust and steel pricing, 175177
ArcelorMittal, 2425, 199
Asian Financial Crisis, 58
Association of Licensed Automobile
Manufacturers (ALAM), 178
Auto steel, 150151
history, 136138
modern auto-steel interface,
Available time, 4243
Bankruptcy, 105107
Baosteel, 26
centralized, 9597
Cooperative Partnership
Agreements (CPA), 98101
Labor Management Participation
Teams (LMPTs), 99
Twelve Points of Light, 9798
Basic oxygen furnace (BOF), 12, 15,
Bessemer process, 12
Big Steel
Asian Financial Crisis, 58
cartelization, 5556
HGW, 56
monopolistic to oligopolistic steel
firms, 57
primary actors, 54
strategic shift in, 58
Vestag, 56
VRAs, 57
Yahata Steel, 55

Boeing, 5052
Boeing Systems Integrator model, 52
BOF. See Basic oxygen furnace
Bull Whip Effect (BWE), 135,
BWE. See Bull Whip Effect
CADCAM and BIM software
systems, 169
Calendar time, 4243
Carbon steel, 12
Cast Strip processing technology, 186
Caterpillar University, 192
CCM. See Continuous casting
CCs. See Continuous casters
CCSC. See Coordinated Committee
Steel Companies
Centralized bargaining, 9597
Challenges and opportunities, 185
Eurofer, 188190
knowledge management strategies,
Metallos, 190193
steel and the customer base,
Chandlers theory, 30
steel trade flows and trade disputes,
Clean Water Act, 75
Cleveland Cliffs, 198
Coal chain, 47
CO2 emissions, 179181
Cold reduction mill, 139141
Compact strip process (CSP), 76
Competition policy, 133134
Competitive Advantage, 146
Construction fabricators, 8082
Construction steel, 152153

214 Index

Continuous casters (CCs), 15

Continuous casting machine (CCM),
Continuous improvement strategies.
See Kaizen
Cooperative Partnership Agreements
(CPA), 98101
Co-Operative Wage Study (CWS)
system, 83
factor weighting, 8788
history, 8687
job classification, 9192
job description, 90
job hierarchy, 8889
objectives, 87
Responsibility for Operations,
Coordinated Committee Steel
Companies (CCSC), 97
CPA. See Cooperative Partnership
CSP. See Compact strip process
Customer base and steel, 193195
CWS. See Co-Operative Wage Study
(CWS) system
Damascus steel, 12
Digital manufacturing, 169170
Directly Reduced Iron, 186
Dofasco steel organization chart, 29
787 Dreamliner, 50, 52
Dual-phase steel, 13
Antidumping Act, 112
definition, 110
domestic market, effects of,
Secretary of the Treasury, 111112
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement, 112
Dynamic efficiencies, 67
EAFs. See Electric arc furnaces
Economies of scale, 65
Effective time, 4243
Electric arc furnaces (EAFs), 12,
1517, 62, 7374, 181
Electro-tinning operations, 168

Employee Retirement Income

Security Act (ERISA), 75, 105
ENA. See Experimental Negotiating
Environment and steel, 179181
EPA, 179181
ERISA. See Employee Retirement
Income Security Act
Eurofer, 188190
benchmarking metrics, 39
productivity mill metrics, 4142
ranking tables, 40
European Steel Technology Platform,
Evolutionary economics, 158159
Experimental Negotiating Agreement
(ENA), 97
Expertise communities, 192193
Fixed-cost hypothesis, 6465
Functionally departmentalized
organization, 30
GATT. See General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), 109
General Motors Institute (GMI), 190
Gerdau, 25
GHG. See Green house gas
Gilchrist-Thomas process, 12
Global consolidation
level of concentration, 23
list of companies, 2022
Globalization, 67
steel companies management and,
Global production network (GPN),
Global steel, 15
Global steel companies
ArcelorMittal, 2425
Baosteel, 26
Gerdau, 25
Nucor, 24
Posco, 25
Tata Steel, 2627
Tenaris, 26

Index 215

ThyssenKrupp AG, 2526

U.S. Steel, 2324 (see also U.S.
Global supply chains and steel
coal, 44
Hard Carbon Coal (HCC), 45
restructuring and locational
decisions, 4849
significant implications, 50
supply problems, 4546
value chain, 4647
GMI. See General Motors Institute
GPN. See Global production network
Great steel industry consolidation
allocation of production
optimization, 66
capital attraction, 67
dynamic efficiencies, 67
economies of scale, 65
fixed-cost hypothesis, 6465
flexibility in labor contracts, 6667
OECD Steel Committee, 64
synergies, 6566
Green house gas (GHG), 180, 183

IPCC. See Intergovernmental Panel

on Climate Change
Iron and Steel Foundries, 8082
ISG. See International Steel Group
ISO. See International Standards
ITC. See International Trade

Hand sheet mills, 139

Hard Carbon Coal (HCC), 45
HCC. See Hard Carbon Coal
Herman Goring Works (HGW), 56
HGW. See Herman Goring Works
Hot strip mill, 139140

Labor Management Participation

Teams (LMPTs), 99
Labor-management relations,
Labor process, 8486
Lake Ontario Steel Co. (LASCO),
LASCO. See Lake Ontario Steel Co.
Legacy costs, 104107
LMPTs. See Labor Management
Participation Teams
LOC. See Loose Material
Local union role, steel, 102104
Loose Material (LOC), 183
Low alloy steel, 1213
LTV Corporation, 105107

ICT. See Information and

communications technology
Industry-wide wage bargaining,
Information and communications
technology (ICT), 189
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), 179
International Standards Organization
(ISO), 159
International Steel Group (ISG),
International Trade Commission
(ITC), 110

Japanese steel revolution, 5860

Chiba experiment, 77
continuous casting machine
(CCM), 7778
Kimitsu, 7879
research laboratories and
innovations, 7980
Kaizen, 187188
KIBS. See Knowledge Intensive
Business Services
Kimitsu, 7879
Knowledge Intensive Business
Services (KIBS), 68
Knowledge management strategies,
Knowledge Transfer problem, 187

Metallos, 4244, 190193

Metals Service Centres, 80, 82
Microstructural manufacturing, 151
Minimill breakthrough, 7576

216 Index

Ministry of International Trade and

Industry (MITI), 59
MITI. See Ministry of International
Trade and Industry
Modern auto-steel interface, 141143
NAFTA. See North American Free
Trade Agreement
great recession and steel, 115116
trade disputes, 117
trade liberalization, 120
Negotiated restructuring, 101102
Networked manufacturing, 20
New deal steel, 14
North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), 6
Nucor, 24, 76
Nucor revolution, 6062
Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), 75
OECD report, 202203
OECD Steel Committee, 64, 198
OEMs. See Original equipment
OH. See Open hearth furnaces
Open hearth method, 161162
Open hearth (OH) furnaces, 14
Organization and competition
Japanese steel revolution
Chiba experiment, 77
continuous casting machine
(CCM), 7778
Kimitsu, 7879
research laboratories and
innovations, 7980
minimill breakthrough, 7576
new competitors, 7375
Pittsburgh Price system, 71
product market segments, 7172
steel distribution and fabrication,
Original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs), 144145, 150, 194
OSHA. See Occupational Safety and
Health Act
Outside market forces
automotive changes steel, 139141

auto steel, 150151

history, 136138
modern auto-steel interface,
construction steel, 152153
future prospects, 153154
manufacturing, 151
new collaborative supply chains,
new global steel manufacturing,
postindustrial steel, 145147
steel changes automotive, 138139
steel clusters and local markets,
steel supply chains and business
cycles amplification, 154155
value chain, 149150
Pattern bargaining, 97
PBGC. See Pension Benefits
Guarantee Corporation
PBGF. See Pension Benefits Guarantee
Pension and legacy costs, 104107
Pension Benefits Guarantee
Corporation (PBGC), 104
Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund
(PBGF), 104
Pittsburgh Price system, 54, 71,
Platform strategies, 142143
Posco, 25
Possible time, 4243
Postindustrial steel, 145147
Postwar steel, 1415
Premier Steel, 73
Principles of Scientific Management, 83
Production Planning Department,
Product Strategy Board (PSB), 170
Professional engineering associations,
PSB. See Product Strategy Board
Public policy
agenda, 203204
European Steel Technology
Platform, 201

Index 217

OECD report, 202203

urban industrial vs. modern
lifestyle, 201
Recycling and steel, 181184
Reference mill labor productivity
Ameristeel, 3739
benchmarking metrics, 39
productivity mill metrics, 4142
ranking tables, 40
Metallos, 4244
Pittsburgh Pricing system, 175177
SAE standards, 177179
steel, environment, and the EPA,
steel and recycling, 181184
Responsibility for Operations,
Rest of the world (ROW), 115116
Restructuring, steel industry, 199200
Reverticalization. See Global
supply chains and steel
ROW. See Rest of the world
SAE. See Society of Automotive
SCC. See Sustained Contingent
Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE), 12, 175, 177179
SPC. See Statistical Process Control
Stamping, 140
Statistical Process Control (SPC), 85
customer base and, 193195
earliest sites, 1113
environment and the EPA,
global consolidation, 15
history, 11
images and realities, 14
manufacturing, 1517
new deal steel, 14
postwar steel, 1415

pricing (see Pittsburgh Price system)

recycling and, 181184
SAE standards, 177179
technological change and, 157
company technology
development, 160161
continuous casting to continuous
process, 162163
digital manufacturing, 169170
evolutionary economics,
future prospects, 163165
materials competition, 172173
new product development
practices, 170172
new steel appliances, 168
open hearth and basic oxygen
furnace, 161162
product and process innovation,
steel cans, 167168
WTO and ISO, 159
Steel benchmarking and time metrics,
Steel clusters and local markets,
Steel companies operation
Ameristeel, 3739
benchmarking metrics, 39
productivity mill metrics,
ranking tables, 40
future prospects, 5052
global consolidation
level of concentration, 23
list of companies, 2022
global steel companies
ArcelorMittal, 2425
Baosteel, 26
Gerdau, 25
Nucor, 24
Posco, 25
Tata Steel, 2627
Tenaris, 26
ThyssenKrupp AG, 2526
U.S. Steel, 2324 (see also U.S.

218 Index

global supply chains and steel

coal, 44
Hard Carbon Coal (HCC), 45
restructuring and locational
decisions, 4849
significant implications, 50
supply problems, 4546
value chain, 4647
management, 3233
Metallos, 4244
networked manufacturing, 20
new global steel benchmarking, 34
price and financial pressures, 19
steel benchmarking and time
metrics, 42
steel executives objectives, 34
traditional performance
benchmarking, 3437
steel distribution and fabrication,
Steel Import Stabilization Act, 57
Steel industry
benefits, 35
challenges and opportunities (see
Challenges and opportunities)
destabilizing forces, 23
future prospects, 204
globalization and, 67
labor relations (see Steel labor
materials competition, 200
organization and competition,
8 (see Organization and
outside market forces (see Outside
market forces)
perspectives, 5
public policy
agenda, 203204
European Steel Technology
Platform, 201
OECD report, 202203
urban industrial vs. modern
lifestyle, 201
regulation, 9 (see Regulation)
restructuring, 199200
rise of China, 12

technological change, 9
trade flows and trade disputes, 8
(see Steel trade flows and trade
Steel industry operation
Big Steel
Asian Financial Crisis, 58
cartelization, 5556
HGW, 56
monopolistic to oligopolistic
steel firms, 57
primary actors, 54
strategic shift in, 58
Vestag, 56
VRAs, 57
Yahata Steel, 55
continual restructuring, 6264
great steel industry consolidation
allocation of production
optimization, 66
capital attraction, 67
dynamic efficiencies, 67
economies of scale, 65
fixed-cost hypothesis, 6465
flexibility in labor contracts,
OECD Steel Committee, 64
synergies, 6566
Japanese steel revolution, 5860
Nucor revolution, 6062
organization and reorganization,
21st century steel industry
perspectives, 6870
Steel labor relations
centralized, 9597
Cooperative Partnership
Agreements (CPA), 98101
Labor Management Participation
Teams (LMPTs), 99
Twelve Points of Light, 9798
labor-management relations, 8384
labor process, 8486
local union role in, 102104
negotiated restructuring, 101102
pension and legacy costs, 104107

Index 219

1959 steel strike, 9295

steel unions and labor agency,
wage structure (see Co-Operative
Wage Study (CWS) system)
Steel reverticalization. See Global
supply chains and steel
Steel strike, 9295
Steel supply chains and business cycles
amplification, 154155
Steel Technology Cluster, 146147
Steel trade flows and trade disputes,
China, impact of, 121123
Antidumping Act, 112
definition, 110
domestic market, effects of,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement, 112
economic geography, 113114
global steel, the state, and trade
flows, 132133
great recession and, 115116
key regional markets, 114
trade balances, 115
trade liberalization, 120
trade policy and competition
policy, 133134
US steel markets and import surge
Chinese capacity and demand,
Chinese exports, 125
comparative steel production
costs, 130131
domestic steel capacity
utilization, 127
imports by partner and category,
quarterly net income, 128
steel mill product, apparent
consumption, 124
steel mill product imports/
exports, 125

US trade deficit-manufacturing,
Steel unions and labor agency,
Structural stoppages, 42
Structured learning, 190193
Sustained Contingent Collaborative
(SCC), 194
Synergies, 6566
Tata Steel, 2627
Teardown process, 171
Technological change and steel, 157
company technology development,
continuous casting to continuous
process, 162163
digital manufacturing, 169170
evolutionary economics, 158159
future prospects, 163165
materials competition, 172173
new product development
practices, 170172
new steel appliances, 168
open hearth and basic oxygen
furnace, 161162
product and process innovation,
steel cans, 167168
WTO and ISO, 159
Tenaris, 26
ThyssenKrupp AG, 2526
Tool steel, 13
Total Productive Maintenance
(TPM), 189190
TPM. See Total Productive
TPP. See Trans Pacific Partnership
Trade balances, 115
Trade flows and trade disputes. See
Steel trade flows and trade
Trade liberalization, 120
Trade policy, 133134
Traditional performance
benchmarking, 3437
Transformation-induced plasticity
(TRIP), 13

220 Index

Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)

agreement, 112
TRIP. See Transformation-induced
Twelve Points of Light, 9798
Twinning-induced plasticity (TWIP),
TWIP. See Twinning-induced
ULSAB. See UltraLight Steel Auto
UltraLight Steel Auto Body (ULSAB),
172, 173
U.S. Antidumping Act, 110
U.S. Steel, 2324
Chandlers theory, 30
Dofasco steel organization chart, 29
integrated activity, 28
multidivisional structure, 2728
oligopolistic structure, 27
Production Planning Department,
strategic error, 3032
US steel markets and import surge
Chinese capacity and demand, 129
Chinese exports, 125

comparative steel production costs,

domestic steel capacity utilization,
imports by partner and category,
products, apparent consumption
of, 124
product imports/exports, 125
quarterly net income, 128
trade deficit-manufacturing, 131
Value chain, 4647, 149150
Vestag, 56
Voluntary restraint agreements
(VRAs), 57
VRAs. See Voluntary restraint
Wootz steel, 12
World Steel Association (WSA), 197
World Trade Organization (WTO),
117, 159
WSA. See World Steel Association
WTO. See World Trade Organization
Yahata Steel, 55

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