Maisonneuve & Larose

Ibn Khaldn and His Cycle of Fatalism: A Critique

Author(s): B. A. Mojuetan
Source: Studia Islamica, No. 53 (1981), pp. 93-108
Published by: Maisonneuve & Larose
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IBN KHALDUNAND HIS CYCLE

OF FATALISM: A CRITIQUE

Ibn KIhaldiin's cyclical theory of state-evolution represents

the firstand, to my knowledge, the only attempt at a scientific
explanation of the phenomenon of political instability in the
medieval Maghrib. In his attempt to rationalise history,
namely, to identify a recognisable pattern in the maze and
complexity of historical phenomena, Ibn Khaldfin may be said
to have anticipated the speculative philosophers of history, like
Hegel and Marx, who saw in history a certain metaphysics,
an inner logic or 'underlying plot'. (1) For Ibn Khaldfin as
for Hegel and Marx, the denouement of the historical drama
obeys an inexorable behavioural pattern or law, even though
for the three, this final outcome may be very dissimilar. (2)
Such a law of historical change, the law of the Three Stages,

AugusteComtealso formulatedin the realmof humanintellectual development, in his bid to reduce the apparent muddle of
'social phenomena' to some intelligible order or 'one body of
homogenous doctrine',(3) just as scientists have done for

(1) W. H. Walsh, An Introductionto Philosophyof History,London 1970, p. 26.

(2) Cf. also another speculative philosopher of history, Kant: The history of
the human species as a whole may be regarded as the realisation of a secret plan
of Nature for bringinginto existence a political constitution...such a constitution
being the sole condition under which Nature can fully develop all the capacities
she has implanted in humanity. Cited in W. H. Walsh, op. cit., p. 124.
(3) Harriet Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte (2 vols),
London 1875, vol. 1, pp. 12-13, excerpt in L. W. Lancaster, Masters of Political
Thought,vol. 3, London 1963, pp. 74-75.

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94

B. A. MOJUETAN

natural phenomena. In this sense of rationalising reality, the

positivism of Auguste Comte may also be said to be reminiscent
of Ibn Khaldfin's historical schema.
Laws or generalisations, though useful as explanatory tools
in history, exhibit, nonetheless, a patent deficiency-they
sacrificethe particular forthe universal, attempting ambitiously
to explain everything, but ending up paradoxically explaining
nothing! Historical explanation must ultimatelybe based
on the examination of the particular.
It is argued that the key to the problem of political instability

in the medieval Maghribcannot be soughtin a 'coveringlaw'

such as that formulated by Ibn Khaldfin, which prescribes for

Maghribian political systems an inevitable cycle of doom
arising from the incompatibility between rural 'asabiyya and
urban civilisation. The 'AlawI dynasty established in Morocco

in the second half of the 17th centurydid not succumb to

Ibn Khaldfin's cycle of fatalism, which suggests the shortcomings of Ibn Khaldfin's thesis, and the need therefore for
its revision.
It is suggested that at the root of the problem of political
instability in the medieval Maghrib was the question of legitimHow does a conquering minority group-for the Berber
acy.

dynasticstates of the medievalMaghribwere,in fact,conquer-

ing ethnic machines, products of movements originating from

particular social segments of society-enjoy legitimacy in a
heterogenous, multi-ethnic society? The religious ideologies
of the Almoravids and the Almohads may have endowed them
with legitimacy within the ruling organisation, the state; but
the critical condition fordynastic stability, however, is its legitimacy in society, or what may be referred to as its political
socialisation; for dynastic stability is ultimately a function of
its social acceptability; a function of its support or approval by
society.
Related to the question of legitimacy is the character of the
medieval Maghribian state. Professor Ernest Gellner has
proposed a paradigm-the paradigm of the three concentric
circles-to symbolise the relationship between state and society

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IBN KHALDON AND HIS CYCLE OF FATALISM

95

in the medieval Maghrib,the state being representedas the

nerve centre around which society revolved.
It is relativelyeasy to schematizethe structureof the traditional
NorthAfricanIslamic state. A dynastyis based upon towns,which
are garrisonsand centersof trade and Muslimlearning. The dynasty
is supportedby privileged,tax-exempttribes (which,in the case of
medieval Moroccandynasties,for instance,tend to be the tribes of
origin of the dynastyitself). Outside the inner circle of protected
townsand privilegedtribes,thereis a middlecircleof tribessubjected
to the dynastyand administeredby local noables,who are dependent
on local support,rather than transferableadministratorsappointed
fromthe center. Finally,thereis the outercircleof dissidentor semidissidenttribes who successfullydefy central authority. We have,
then, those who extracttaxes, those who have taxes extracted,and
those who do not allow taxes to be extractedfromthem,a paradigm
of the human condition (1).

The notion of the centrality of the state in the social environment is perhaps more reminiscent of modern states with their
high degree of administrative intervention in society, thanks
to advances in technology; for medieval state systems, however,
which lacked the resources of the modern state forcentralisation,
a paradigm which locates the state on the periphery of society
may be more representative of the medieval reality. A remarkable feature of the medieval Maghribian state was its marginality
or alienation-what may be referredto as its 'frontierexistence'.
The state's marginal relationship with society obviously inhibited
the political socialisation process essential to its stabilisation.
In NorthAfrica(as in mostofmedievalIslam) thestatewas peripheral
to the loyaltysystem. Therewas attachmentat the level of primary
relationsto the extendedfamily,the guild,the religiousbrotherhood,
the tribe(in rural areas) and the quarter(in the urban). At the top
therewas the over-riding
feelingof identitywith the Islamic totality,
the dar al-Islam.

The 'state' was an outside body to be tolerated

wherenecessary,avoided if possible. The sense of the need forthe

(1) Ernest Gellner, 'Tribalism and social change in North Africa', in

W. H. Lewis (ed.), French-speakingAfiica: The Search for Identity,New York
1965, p. 107 ff;p. 111. See also Idem, 'A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam',
in Annales de Sociologie Marocaines (1968) pp. 5-14, reproduced in R. Robbertson
(ed), Sociology of Religion, U.K. 1972, p. 127ff;p. 133. The paradigm of the
medieval Maghribian state, enunciated by Gellner, is reproduced by Elbaki
Hermassi in his Leadership and National Developmentin North Africa, California
1972, p. 8.

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96

B.A. MOJUETAN

state did not transcendthe pessimisticconcept that any government

even tyrannicalwas preferable
to anarchy-a veryunderstandable
result
in a societywhose fewurban and settledareas lived constantlyunder
the threatof hinterlandnomadicand mountainfolk(1).
The picture of the marginality of the state may be highlighted by a paradigm which conceptualises state and society
as constituting a single organism, the bulk of which was
constituted by society, with the state representing the small
tip of the iceberg. Significantly,this marginality has imposed
on the state, typified by its administrative institution or the
makhzan, a peripatetic 'nomadic' existence. Nomadism may
be regarded as the response of the state to its situation of
marginality; it represented the strategy for maximising the
political effect of the state, given its limited resources for
centralisation and the constraints on its spatial dimension
imposed by the segmentary social environment. The state's
nomadism, however, imposed obvious limitations on its degree

ofinteractionwithsociety;and thisinteraction,in characteristic

nomadic fashion, took a largely predatory form, concerned,

as it was, largely with functions of an extractive, exploitative
nature. The state's nomadism also precluded [or reduced to
the barest minimum] a state-society dialectic, that mutual
dialogue essential to the emergence of some consensus on institutional procedure.
Such a dialogue and the resulting consensus may ultimately
have led to the legitimation of the leadership, since, as the
product of conquest, the leadership could not lay claim to authority either

on traditionalgrounds-resting(it) on an establishedbeliefin the

traditionsand the legitimacyof thoseexercising
sanctityofimmemorial
authorityunderthem(traditionalauthority).
(or)
on rationalgrounds-resting(it) on a beliefin the legalityof enacted
rules and the rightof those elevatedto authorityunder such rules to
issue commands(legal authority).

(1) Leon Carl Brown, 'Changing Cultures and New Loyalties in North Africa',
in W. H. Lewis, op. cit., p. 98.

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IBN KHALDUN AND HIS CYCLE OF FATALISM

97

It is, however, possible for the leadership of a conquering

group to lay claim to authority
on charismaticgrounds-resting(it) on devotion to the exceptional
sanctity,heroismor exemplarycharacterof an individualperson,and
of the normativepatternsor orderrevealedby him (charismaticauthority)(1).
Individual Berber leaders, like the Mahdi, Ibn Tumart, may,
therefore, have commanded charisma within the conquering
society or ruling nucleus, the state; but here again the critical
condition for dynastic stability is the command of charisma
within the wider or dominated society in order to legitimise
dynastic rule in society.
Lacking therefore the institutional support or legitimacy
emanating from a state-society dialectic, the medieval Magh-

ribian state was a weak, predatory,'patrimonial'(2) organisation, whichexplains its heavy relianceon coercionas a necessary
instrument of government as well as the means of survival.
'The strength of political organisations and procedures varies
with their scope of support and their level of institutionalisation'.
Huntington's definition of institutionalisation would

assimilateit to legitimation. 'Institutionalisation

is theprocess

by which organisations and procedures acquire value and

stability'. (3)
'The separation of state and society...', namely, the state's
marginality in its social environment, severely restricted its
'scope of (social) support and level of institutionalisation' or
legitimation; this '...clearly tilted the balance of power on the

(1) Max Weber, Economy and Society (eds.) G. Roth and C. Wittich, New
York, 1968, p. 215.
(2) Patrimonialism and, in its extreme form,sultanism tend to arise whenever
traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which
are purely personal instrumentsof the master... The primary external support
of patrimonial power is provided by slaves... coloni and conscripted subjects,
but also by mercenarybodyguards and armies... By controllingthese instruments
the ruler can broaden the range of his arbitrarypowers... Max Weber, op. cit.,
pp. 231-2.
(3) Samuel P. Huntington, 'Political Developments and Political Decay',
World Politics, Vol. 17 No. 3 1965, cited by Clement Henry Moore, Politics in
North Africa, Boston 1970, p. 92.
7

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98

B. A. MOJUETAN

side of political weakness', (1) producing a pattern of fragile

and unstable configurationsof power in the medieval Maghrib.
It is not without significance, therefore, that the stability of
the dynastic state in the medieval Maghrib (2) was to await
a certain 'bridging' of the state-society dichotomy through the
internalisation of a political tradition, namely, the sharifian,
monarchical tradition. This gave the leadership of the 'Alawi
state the legitimacy which ensured its political continuity and
its defiance of Ibn Khaldin's fatalistic cycle.

II
The concept of 'asabiyya in Ibn Khaldin's political philosophy
is already well-known. State-formation in societies characterised by ethnic plurality requires a certain degree of group
cohesion or solidarity. This attribute is more developed in
rural areas where the communal esprit de corps has as yet not
been eroded by the individualism of city life. It is to this group
cohesion that state-formationin complex, ethnic environments
owes its initial dynamic.
Not so well-known, however, is Ibn Khaldtin's reflectionon
the dysfunctional aspect of 'asabiyya in the state organism.
'Asabiyya, the engine of state, is also a major constraint on the

centralisationof poweressentialto state-formation;

(3) and this

is why
a dynastyrarelyestablishesitselffirmlyin lands with many different
tribesand groups. The reason for this is the difference
in opinions
and desires. Behind each opinionand desire,thereis a groupfeeling,
thereis much oppo'asabiyya,defendingit. At any time,therefore,
sitionto a dynastyor rebellionagainst it even if a dynastypossesses

(1) Leon Carl Brown,op. cil., p. 98.

(2) The notionofmedievalMaghribhas beenextendedto meanpre-19th
century
Islamic Maghrib.
(3) I am indebtedto Elbaki Hermassiwho has drawnattentionto thisdouble
role of'asabiyya in his provocativeworkalreadycited. Accordingto Hermassi
'it would be theoretically
sounder,however,to renderthis concept ('asabiyya)
as thepropensity
forcohesionand segmentation',
op. cit.,p. 15.

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IBN

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groupfeelingbecause each groupfeelingunderthe controlof the ruling

dynastythinksthat it has in itself(enough)strengthand power(1).
An 'asabiyya aspiring to dominion, mulk, must therefore be
supplemented by an additional force so as to be able to overcome the centrifugal posture of its rivals. According to
Ibn Khaldfin,
Religiouspropagandagives a dynastyat its beginninganotherpower
in addition to that of group feelingit possessed as the resultof the
numberof its supporters.
The 'religious propaganda' generates unity of purpose
amongst its adherents-'... their outlook is one and their object
There is also the strength born of the
one of common accord'.
commitment and the fanaticism of the devotees-'They are
ready to die (for their objective)'. (2)
The Almoravid and the Almohad states illustrate Ibn
Khaldiin's thesis of how a combination of 'asabiyya and 'religious propaganda', or what may be called 'ideology', can generate
the momentum for state-formation. The state so formed,
which may be characterised as the ethnic state because of its
genesis in an ethnic movement, embodied, however, the seed of
its own destruction. Its foundation, the ethnic 'asabiyya, is
susceptible to erosion in the city, the seat of dynastic power.
The urban-based dynasty invariably therefore succumbs to
dissident forces emanating from the rural world, animated by
an 'asabiyya as yet uncontaminated by the ease and the luxury
of city life, and its individualising influence. There is therefore a certain antithesis between urbanism and the ethnic state,
which is responsible for the crisis of instability in the medieval
Maghrib.
When royalpoweris obtained,it is accompaniedby a lifeofease and
Under the influenceof royal authority
increasedopportunities...
(8)
and a life of ease the second generationchanges fromdesertattitude
to sedentaryculture,fromprivationto luxuryand plenty,froma state
in which everybody shared in the glory to one in which one man claims
(1)
Franz
(2)
(3)

Ibn Khaldfin, The Musaddimah An Introductionto History Vol. I, transl.

Rosenthal, London 1967, pp. 232-3.
Ibid., p. 320.
Ibid., p. 347.

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100

B.A.

MOJUETAN

all the glory for himself... Thus the vigour of the group feeling,
'asabiyya,is brokento some extent... Luxuryreachesits peak among
them (the thirdgeneration)because they are so much given to a life
of prosperityand ease... Group feelingdisappears completely(1).
The resultis that the militarydefenceof the dynastyis weakenedand
the powerof the dynastydeclines. Neighbouring
dynasticsor groups
and tribes under the controlof the dynastyitselfbecome bold and
attack it and God permitsit to sufferthe destructionthat He has

destined for (all) His creatures (2).

This cycle of fatalismis repeated every threegenerations'...the durationof the lifeof a dynastydoes not as a rule exceed
three generations'.(3)
III
The Sa'dians may be said to have inaugurateda revolution
in the traditionof the medieval Maghribianstate; their state
was inspired by a national movement and thus marked a
radical departure from the ethnic political tradition of the
medieval Maghrib. The new phenomenon of the national
state (4) was the productof indigenousreactionto the crisisof
Portuguese imperialism.
By the 15th century,MaghribianIslam was on the defensive
against Christian expansion from the Iberian peninsular.
Spain and Portugaloccupiedcoastal areas on the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic respectively. Portuguese imperialism,(5)
however,constituteda much greater burden on the Muslim
communityin Morocco. The Portugueseattemptedto invade
the middlemanpositionof the trans-Saharanmerchantsin the
Sous region; they also instituteda monopolisticcommercial
regimeon the Atlantic seaboard, which not only stifledtrade

(1) Ibid., p. 344.

(2) Ibid., p. 341.
(3) Ibid., p. 344. Ibn Khaldin's generation is forty years.
(4) The national state has been used advisedly rather than the nation-state,
which is a twentieth century phenomenon in the Maghrib.
(5) Sources Inddites de l'Histoire du Maroc ire Serie Porfugal, Vol. I, Paris
1934, Introduction, 'Les Debuts de l'Occupation Portugaise au Maroc', p. viiff.

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IBN

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101

but also ensured the Portuguese substantial control of Morocco's

maritime trade. A number of coastal communities were
reduced to vassalage status; they were subjected to a fiscal
burden and their life severely regimented in the interest of
Hinterland communities, too, did
Portuguese security. (1)
not escape the disabilities of Portuguese imperialism; they were
victims of periodic raids by Portuguese armed bands.
Such
raids, which entailed looting and plunder of property, and the
enslavement of Muslims, were very lucrative ventures, which
explains their frequency. The following extract from a
16th century Portuguese chronicle (2) illustrates the dimensions
of such raids. The Portuguese raiding party set out at night
and concealed themselves near the market-town of Azro (near
Agadir), which was to be raided, poised for action in the
morning.
'They came out running and seized the open gates; they
foughttheir way into them, killed many inhabitants with spear,
and captured the market-town together with all that was
there. They led away many Muslims, men and women,
young boys and girls, cattle and merchandise of all sorts, cloth,
burnous, bedens, khenifs, haiks, ghonbaz, veils of women and
other garments..., arms, saddled and harnessed horses, mare,
beasts of burden, male and female mules and all kinds of animals,
wheat, barley, dates, almonds and many fruits of all kinds
which they found loaded on camels...'
The Portuguese domination thus wieghed heavily on the
Muslim community, particularly in southern Morocco where
'Wattisid authority had diminished... and was only nominal'
and 'the Muslims had no leader who could rally them together
and organise the forces of Islam' (3) against the infidel (kuffar).
The Sa'dians thus filled a political vacuum in southern Morocco,
(1) R. Ricard, 'Le Maroc Septentrional au xve sitcle d'aprbs les chroniques
Portugaises', Hespiris Vol. XXIII 1936, pp. 130-31; also idem, 1tudes sur l'Histoire
des Portugais au Maroc, Coimbre 1955, pp. 68-71.
(2) P. de Cenival, Chroniquede Santa Cruz du Cap de Gud (Agadir) Paris 1934,
p. 37, cited in Jean Brignon et al, Histoire du Marod, Paris 1967, pp. 178-9.
(3) Al-WufrinI, Nozhet el-Hddi : Histoire de la Dynastie Saadienne au Maroc
1611-1670, transl. O. Houdas, Paris 1889, p. 10 Ar. text; 20 Fr., transl.

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102

B. A. MOJUETAN

championingan opposition movement that ought to have

devolved on the leadership. The oppositionmovementstemmed fromthe socio-economicgrievancesarisingfromPortuguese
imperialism,but its language of expression was necessarily
religious; Islam was the emblem of the Muslims collective
solidarityvis-a-visthe Christianinvader;it was also the ideology
of recruitmentand mobilisation for the jihad against the
Portuguese. The ideological complexion of the movement,
coupled with its militarysuccessesagainst the Portuguese,was
to transformthe movementfroman isolated local revolt in
the Sous to a national uprising,which subsequentlyousted
the Wat~tsids frompower. It is in this sense that the Sa'dian
state may be characterisedas a national state, national from
the pointof view of its inspirationin a national,ratherthan the
ethnic,movementof its predecessors. The national image of
the state was furtherenhancedby the non-ethnicidentification
of the Sa'dians; earlierstate traditionshad been characterised
by the identificationof the leadershipwith particularethnic
groups. (1)

The birth of the Sa'dian state through a mass, national

movementdid not, however,alter the basic characterof the
medieval Maghribianstate; the Sa'dian state, like its earlier
counterparts,remained a socially circumscribedor dynastic
institution,separated fromsociety by a wide chasm, because
of its narrowexclusivism. The state was more of a personal
estate, 'an extension of the private domain of the men in
power'(2) than a public institution. The private(3) character
(1) Cf. J. M. Abun-Nasr (A History of the Maghrib, Cambridge 1971, p. 202),
who explains the non-ethniccharacterof the Sa'dian state not in termsof a national
movement but in terms of urbanisation. '...no leader was able from this time
(the 16th century)to establish dynastic rule in Morocco on the basis of the exclusive
domination of one tribal element as the Almoravids and the Almohads had done...;
the reason is to be found in the growth of cities since the 11th century and the
emergence of a large urban class of merchants and artisans'.
(2) Elbaki Hermassi, op. cit., p. 23.
(3) In his 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa:A Theoretical Statement',
ComparativeStudies in Societyand History,Vol. 17 No. 1 1975, p. 90ff,Peter Ekeh
makes the distinctionbetween the 'public and the private realms' (p. 92) in state
systems,a distinctionthat has a particularlymodern relevance. In the medieval
Maghrib this distinctionwas almost non-existentor not clearly defined; the state

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IBN KHALDUN AND HIS CYCLE OF FATALISM

103

of the state and its 'frontier

existence'inhibitedits institutionalstate
to a heavy reliance on forceas
the
isation, condemning
the instrumentof survival; and with al-Mansir, such was the
prominenceof the institutionof coercionin the administration
that we may talk of the militarisationof the state. (1)

The reign of al-Mansir marked the supreme point of Sa'dian

power in Morocco; he inaugurated a professional army (2) which
provided the underpinning of his political philosophy of repressive authoritarianism, expressed in his determination to hold the
people in 'chains and menacles' as a guarantee for 'peace and
security'(*) in Morocco. With the army, al-Mansir 'eliminated most of the rebels and saboteurs' (4) in Morocco and

increasedthe dimensionsof the state vis-a-vissocietythrough

the process of political centralisation. The increasing complexity of government entailed a measure of bureaucratisation of
the state, and thus was inaugurated the proto-type of the
modern makhzan. (")

Al-Mansir's elaborate political structuredid not, however,

survive his death; lacking the institutional foundation or support

in society,the state was sustained by forceas well as by the

personal drive and the political acumen of al-Mansgiir. 'Leadership was (thus) a personal role rather than an established

itselfbelonged to the 'private realm' just like the various social units comprisingthe
segmentary society. The Maghribian politico-religiouscommunity may thus be
conceptualised in terms of an aggregationof 'private realms'. This socio-political
atomisation not only restrictedthe social base of the state--the state thus had a
weak social anchorage, which was a factor of fragility-but also inhibited the
evolution of an extensive and corporate civil society or political community,
namely, a 'public realm'. This 'lag in political evolution' was a contributory
factor to the situation of 'colonisabilit6' in the Maghrib. The word is Malek
Bennabi's: Vocationde l'Islam, Paris 1954, p. 83, cited by Leon Carl Brown, op. cit.,
p. 98; note 5 (pp. 245-246).
(1) The same may be said also of Mawlay Ismi'il's state. See p. 105.
(2) The organisation of al-Mansir's army is discussed by al-Wufrini, op. cit.,
pp. 115-118 Ar. text; 195-201 Fr. transl.
(3) Ibid., p. 158 Ar. text; 259 Fr. transl.
(4) Al-FishtBli, Mandhil
ft Akhbdr al-Mulhk al-Shurafd' (ed.)
al-safd'
'Abdallih GanOn, Tetuan 1964, p. 18.

of the maCkhian
in the Encyclo(5) Michaux-Bellaire discussesthe development
paedia of Islam 1st Edition.

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104

B. A. MOJUETAN

office'.(1) The death of al-Mansiir was subsequently followed

by the collapse of the Sa'dian dynasty. The Sa'dian dynasty
may, however, collapse, but the attachment to the principle
of sharifian rule remained. The point may be illustrated by
the struggle for succession to the decadent Sa'dian dynasty.
No sooner had al-Manstir died than his sons, Mawlay Zidan,
Abai F~ris and Muhammad al-Shaikh, engaged in a bloody
power-struggle, which embroiled Morocco in a ruinous civil
war. (2) With the leadership of the Sa'dian princes discredited,
separatist movements sprang up in differentparts of Morocco,
headed by local leaders, the most prominent of whom were the
Prominent as the
were, however,
murabijin.
mura~bi.fan
particularly those of the zawiya of Dill' they were unable to
In the long run,
provide an alternative to sharifian rule. (3)

it was anothersharifianhouse, namely the 'AlawI family,that

emerged out of the troubled politics of the time as successors
to the Sa'dian dynasty, confounding the political trend which
indicated a non-sharifian succession. (4) The establishment
of the 'Alawi dynasty may be regarded as indicating that in a
competitive political situation, the sharifian qualification is an

importantcredential,even though it must be conceded that

by itselfalone it may be unable to turn the scales.
What is the basis of the appeal of sharifian leadership?
The sharifian ruling institution embodied two diametrically
opposed principles which satisfied the political and religious
sensibilities of both the rural and the urban faithful. The
sharifian leadership satisfied the principle of the 'Divine Right

of Kings' because of its Propheticdescent and its association

(1) Elizabeth Colson, 'African Society at the time of the Scramble', in
L. H. Gann and P. Duignan, Colonialism ih Africa, 1870-1960, vol. 1, Cambridge
1969, p. 35.
(2) Al-Wufriini,op. cit., p. 190ff,Ar. text; 305ff,Fr. transl; Sources Inidites
Ire Sdrie Pays-Bas, Vol. 1, pp. 82-463, passim.
(3) Cf. Brahim Boutalib's review of Muhammad Hiji's La Zaouia de Dila.
Son rdlereligieux,scientifiqueet politique, Rabat 1964, in Hespiris Tamuda vol. IV
1968, p. 417.
(4) B. A. Mojuetan, 'Myth and Legend as Functional Instrumentsin Politics:
The Establishment of the 'Alawi Dynasty in Morocco', Journal of African History,
Vol. 16, 1975, p. 17ft.

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IBN KHALDUN AND HIS CYCLE OF FATALISM

105

with baraka-this was particularly appealing to the rural

faithful. The association of sharifian authority with divine
dispensation would correspond to Max Weber's third category
of authority, namely, charismatic authority. 'In the case of

charismaticauthority,it is the charismaticallyqualifiedleader

as such who is obeyed by virture of personal trust in his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities, so far as they fall

withinthe scope of the individual's beliefin his charisma'.(1)

The sharifian leadership also satisfied the Rousseauan principle

of popular sovereignty, expressed in the proclamation of the
urban elite, who were the community's spokesmen or representatives of the 'general will', during the traditional royal investiture (bay'a
The principle of popular sovereignty
al-KhaSsa). (2)

embodiedin the idea of the bay'a servedto buttressthe legitimacy of sharifianleadership which was founded essentiallyon
the charisma associated with its pedigree.
The historyof the 'Alawl dynastyprovidesa classic example
of how sharifianpoliticallegitimacyengendereddevotionto its
leadership. Founded by al-Rashid, the 'AlawI dynasty was
consolidatedby Mawlay IsmI'll. Mawlay Ismi'il, faced with
the same problem of sustaining a political system lacking
institutionalsupport,exhibitedthe same repressiveauthoritarianism as al-Mansir, relyingon an elaborate militarymachine
as a weapon of governmentas well as an instrumentof
authority. Mawlay Ism~'il's state, like at Mansfir's,did not
survive his death. The 'abrd army(3) and the guish Oudaya,
hitherto the main support of Mawlay Ismi'll's state, became

the chief instrumentsof its subversion; they functionedas

(1) Max Weber, op. cit., p. 216.
(2) The followingremark made in connection with the 'Alawis will also hold
good for the Sa'dians: The 'Alawis 'put together what, in most other parts of,
the Muslim world, were directly antithetical principles of political and religious
organisation: the principle that the ruler is ruler because he is supernaturally
qualified to be so; and the principle that the ruler is ruler because the competent
spokesmen of the communityhave collectively agreed that he is'. CliffordGeertz,
Islam Observed: Religious Developmentin Morocco and Indonesia, Yale University
Press 1968, p. 77, cited in E. Hermassi, op. cit., p. 45.
(3) N. R. Bennett, 'Christian and Negro Slavery in 18th century North Africa'
J.A.H. vol. I, 1960, p. 189ff.

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106

B. A. MOJUETAN

kingmakers, enthroning and dethroning the sons of Mawlay

Ismi'il as dictated by their caprice and self-interest.(1) The
thirty-yearperiod between 1727 and 1757 was characterised by
factional struggle and political instability, during which seven
sons of Mawlay Ismi'll made ephemeral d6buts on the throne,
Mawlay 'Abdall~h alone making four. The long reign of
Sidi Muhammad ibn 'Abdallih (1757-1790) stabilised the
troubled politics of Morocco and initiated the process of reconstruction of the 'Alawi state. If stability had eluded the
political legacy of Mawlay Ismi'll, it did not, however,elude
the 'Alawi dynasty which has enjoyed a remarkable political
continuity since its establishment in the second half of the
17th century.
The medieval political history of Morocco from the 16th
century onwards may thus be expressed in terms of a paradox,
namely, the political instability of sultanism(2) within the
framework of sharifian political stability. How does one
explain this paradox?
Sharifian political stability was not
achieved by force. The examples of al-Mansilr and Mawlay
Isml'il have demonstrated the impermanence of military
solutions to the problem of political instability. Neither had

the state, inspiteof some 'de-alienation'process it had under-

gone under the centralising programmes of al-Mansiir and

Mawlay Ismi'll, abdicated its frontierexistence. The medieval
Maghrib was still characterised by 'the separation of state and
If the state still suffered alienation because of its
society'.
marginality and its exclusivism, not so, however, was the
sharifian ruling institution. The continuity of sharifian rule
in Morocco from the 16th century onwards had socialised the
sharifian monarchical institution and habituated the faithful
to no other form of political leadership. More importantly,
the sharifian monarchy inspired devotion and deference on the
part of the faithfuland thus enjoyed legitimacy. The succession of the Sa'dians by the 'Alawis has already been cited to
illustrate the internalisation of the principle of sharifian rule
(1) J. Brignonet al, op. cir.,p. 257ff.
(2) See note 2, p. 97.

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IBN

KHALDUN

AND

HIS

CYCLE

OF FATALISM

107

in Morocco. Perhaps a more convincingdemonstrationof the

phenomenonof sharifian,political socialisation is the crisis
which tollowed the death of Mawlay Ism'ill. Significantly,
the political factions involved in the power-strugglenever
aspired to leadership;lacking the legitimacyto rule, they did
no more than support the candidacy of the sons of Mawlay
Ism'ill. It is to this socialisation or legitimationof the
sharifianmonarchicalinstitutionthat the 'Alawl dynastyowes
its political continuity. Socialisation helped to bridge the
state-societydichotomy by 'naturalising' or internalisinga
political, institutional concept. In this way the sharifian
monarchicalinstitutionbecame the expressionof the political
cultureof the faithfuland the linchpinof the Moroccanstate
system.

IV
The 16th centurymarked a revolutionin the development
of the state traditionin the Maghrib. A state emergedin
Moroccothat was inspiredby a national ratherthan an ethnic
movement. In spite of its genesis in a mass movement,
however,the national state exhibitedthe same shortcomings
as the ethnicstate. Both sufferedalienationbecause of their
marginal, exclusivist character and thereforeneeded to be
propped up by forceto compensatefortheir limited'scope of
(social) support' and their low 'level of institutionalisation.'
If the sharifianstate lacked legitimacy,the sharifianruling
institution,however,enjoyed legitimacy,and this explains the
remarkablecontinuity,inspiteof political instability,of sharifianleadershipin Moroccosinceits inceptionin the 16thcentury.
The problemof politicalinstabilityin the medieval Maghrib
has a contemporary
relevancein the developingworldof today.
It would be belabouring a hackneyed political diagnosis to
remarkthat the high incidence of political instabilityin the
Third World may be attributedlargely to the absence of a
'political way of life' or institutionalconsensus,what is other-

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108

B. A. MOJUETAN

wise referred
to as 'the rulesofgame'. (1) The resultis that the
in
order
to survive,resort,like theirearliercounterparts
states,
in the medieval Maghrib,to elaborate militarybuild-ups to
provide the necessary instrumentof support. In this sense,
it may be postulatedthat a numberof the developing
therefore,
countriesof today have hardly evolved beyond the medieval
Maghribianstage in the developmentof the politicalprocess.(s)
B. A. MOJUETAN

(Ibadan, Nigeria)
(1) Cf, B. J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in
Nigeria, Ibadan University Press 1973, Chapt. I, for a review and critique of
representative theories of political instability in the Third World.
(2) An earlierversion of this paper was presentedin 1976 at a seminar organised
I am grateful to my
by the Department of History, University of Ibadan.
colleague, Dr. Peter Ekeh, for making available to me his paper cited in note 3,
p. 102.

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