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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

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Theoretical and Methodological Problems of

Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychologies:
Commentary by Eduardo B. Issaharoff (Buenos Aires)
Eduardo B. Issaharoff

Arenales 874, 5, 1061 Buenos Aires, Argentina, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Eduardo B. Issaharoff (2001) Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Psychoanalysis and Cognitive
Psychologies: Commentary by Eduardo B. Issaharoff (Buenos Aires), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for
Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 3:1, 19-23, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2001.10773329
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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

very remote ones, and this has to be discovered
through the analysis of free association.
I wish I could agree with Semenza on the engagement between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology,
blessed in a marriage to come. It is not a question of
"leaving neurology aside" but of trying to define the
specific space of psychical mechanisms. The relation
between neurology and psychical activity is not direct.
The only suggestion I have for expanding the debate
between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology is the
creation of discussion groups wherein psychoanalysts
report a series of sessions and ask scientists for their
interpretation. Imagination is needed to fill the gaps.
Semenza complains about wild speculations, but he
does not seem to realize that his wild reductionism,
even if he protests otherwise, is a gross misrepresentation of psychoanalysis. Imagination is also desirable
in the scientific literature about psychical activity. One
must admit that a Shakespearean quotation can be
more enlightening for a psychoanalyst than a ton of
scientific literature! Evidence for the value of the
imagination may be seen in the fact that scientific
findings are frequently outdated two years after they
are issued, whereas people continue writing on Hamlet
400 years after its creation. I am less interested in
keeping up scientific standards than grasping the complexities of psychical truth. Freudian psychoanalysis
has a double origin. One origin is rooted in science;
the other in art, mostly literature. Both aspects are
necessary to form the clinical approach. The exclu-

sively scientific attempt was wrong, and led Freud to

reject his own "Project for a Scientific Psychology"
and to write instead The Interpretation of Dreams. It
is impossible to go backwards.

References
Dupuy, J. P. (1994), Aux origines des sciences cognitives.
Paris: Editions La decouverte.
Edelman, G. M. (1992), Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the
Matter of Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Freud, S. (1891), On Aphasia. New York: International
Universities Press, 1953.
- - - (1895), Project for a scientific psychology. Standard Edition, 1:281-396. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.
- - - (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard
Edition, 4&5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
- - - (1940), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Standard
Edition, 23:139-207. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.
Green, A., & Stern, D. (2000), Clinical and Observational
Psychoanalytic Research: Roots of Controversy. London: Karnac Books.
Morin, E. (1990), Introduction a la pensee complexe. Paris:
ESF Editeur.
- - - (2000), Les sept savoirs necessaires a l'education
du Futur. Paris: Seuil.
Andre Green
9 avenue de l'Observatoire
Paris 75006
France
e-mail: andregreen@compuserve.com

Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychologies:

Commentary by Eduardo B. Issaharoff (Buenos Aires)

In order to foster a partnership between psychoanalysis and cognitivism, so that they may work together,
it is essential to ask ourselves what trend in cognitivism and what trend in psychoanalysis we should
choose to participate in this partnership. Both sciences
have various schools of thought, each of which advocates positions using terms that have very different
meanings for each group, and in turn, each group has
divergent ideas about the nature of the mind.
In the case of cognitivism, we shall consider two
positions related to computation in mental processes.
Eduardo Issaharoff, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Analyst of
the Argentine Psychoanalytic Society.

There are currently two main schools of psychoanalysis: One school conceives of the mind as a system of
meanings that must be understood by means of hermeneutic procedures; the other considers meaning as having biological structures supported by specific
functions. Only the laws of language and discourse
apply in the first case; in the second, the laws of the
biological sciences complete the explanation of the
functions of the mind.
Cognitivism was born from and grew through the
contribution of many techniques and theories. Neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, experimental psychology,
and computer science are the basic sciences, while
psychophysics, computer programs of operations on

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20
internal representation, information processing, and
artificial intelligence are techniques that have provided
deep new insights into these basic sciences. In recent
times, evolutionary psychology has striven to acquire
the status of a basic science.
Different branches have emerged from the abovementioned sciences and techniques. They are: cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, computational
neuroscience, contemporary neuropsychology and its
three major groups: (1) clinical neuropsychology, (2)
cognitive neuropsychology, and (3) cognitive neuroscience/neuropsychology. Each branch focuses on different and specific problems using different tools and
methodologies.
The new synthesis theory in cognitive psychology, represented by authors such as Pinker (1997) and
Plotkin (1998), has generated a perspective in which
the key idea is that the mind is a system of organs of
computation designed by natural selection to solve the
problems faced by our evolutionary ancestors. I selected this theory because it is at the center of current
discussions about the limits of computation, as we
now know it, in a theory of the human mind.
For the new synthesis theory, computation is a
formal operation based on syntactically structured
representations. Concepts such as representations and
computation are at the very foundation of cognitivism,
according to Semenza, but he is careful, from an epistemological point of view, when he qualifies the use
of computation as metaphorical, and modularity as
strategic.
In a recent book, The Mind Doesn't Work That
Way (2000), a reply to Pinker's book How the Mind
Works (1997), Fodor revised the computational theory
of the mind in cognitive psychology. This commentary
will take a position on cognitivism that is related to
Fodor's; my discussion of psychoanalysis will be related to that of Rubinstein (1967, 1969, 1975, 1976),
and to the idea that some aspects of psychoanalytic
theory can be tested in the clinical situation, while
other aspects can only be tested by means of neuroscience.
Semenza is a researcher, and the use of metaphors and strategies is normal while doing research.
Methodological and epistemological criticism of a researcher's work is pertinent only when the wor k has
reached a conclusion. During the research process,
there are no rules as to how to create hypotheses. That
specific part of the process, for which we still lack
computational architectures or systems, pertains
strictly to the creative mind of the researcher. It is
a nonlinear process that establishes relations among

Eduardo B. Issaharoff
elements or structures of different levels and aspects
of phenomena, and creates hypothetical entities to explain them. Analogies, metaphors, strategies, and
models are common tools in this activity. Since computer theory of the mind and modularity theory provide
no plausible hypotheses concerning this process, they
are in a certain way, incomplete.
Fodor (2000) asserted the existence of a fundamental dichotomy between mental processes that are
local, and others that are not. Local processes share
characteristic properties. They appear to accommodate
well to the application of Turing's theory that hypothesizes thinking as computational in nature; they appear
to be largely modular, and much of their architecture
and their proprietary domain of application appear to
be innately specified.
The cognitive role of a thought in inferential processes is, therefore, determined by essential syntactic
properties of the corresponding mental representation.
The effect of the logical form of a thought on its role
in demonstrative inferences is what makes it computational in Turing's sense. But there are some other determinants, such as beliefs and desires, of the role a
thought plays in mental processes; in particular, the
properties of thought that are sensitive to the belief
system it is embedded in. Inferences in which features
of an embedding theory affect the inferential-cumcausal roles of their constituent beliefs are what phi10sophers sometimes call "global" or "holistic" inferences.
Global inferences are presumptive examples in
which the determinants of the computational role of
a mental representation can shift from context to context; hence the computational role of a mental representation is not determined only by its individuating
properties and by its syntax.
From the new synthesis perspective, modules are
the second element in the model of the structure of
mind. With regard to modules: If the information is
encapsulated, it is difficult to conceive how new
hypotheses, or inferences related to context, or creation of theoretical terms, can occur. The use Semenza
makes of the concept "encapsulated information"
could be an example of the type of risk implicit in
metaphorical uses since, by definition, modules are
informationally encapsulated, and the informational
resources to which a computational mechanism has
access inside the module are not sensitive to global
properties or belief systems. In my opinion, the example by Semenza refers rather to the difficulty of changing procedural mechanisms and their motor circuits.
Dissociability of functions is subject to the same

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

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problem. Only modules with encapsulated information and not sensitive to context conditions admit an
exhaustive definition based on their functions. And
there are many functions in most of the brain mechanisms that require information from many different
metrical and analogical levels and qualities; hence,
they cannot be modules in the strict sense of the term.
I would like to propose the theory submitted by
A. Pellionisz and R. Llinas (1983) as a possible example, in brain structures, of computational architecture,
modules with encapsulated information, and dissociability of functions. In the abstract, the authors say:
Here we present an elaboration and a quantitative
example for a hypothetical neuronal process implementing what we refer to as the metaorganization
principle. This process allows the internalization of
external (body) geometries into the central nervous
system (CNS) and a reciprocal and equally important
action of the CNS geometry on the external (body)
geometry.... The metaorganization of metric networ ks, together with the sensorimotor covariant embedding network, provides an explanation of the
emergence of a whole sensorimotor apparatus leading
to the feasibility of constructing truly brain-like robotic systems [po 245].

I have introduced this example because the functions implied are completely described by means of
mathematics and constitute a complete local system
for that set of functions. This example represents
primitive characteristics, or primordial ones, of the
central nervous system. But it is difficult, or maybe
impossible, to imagine the evolution from these kinds
of modules to the functions of thought and language.
Here, I would like to quote Fodor:
[T]he moral will eventually be conceded, namely, that
the Computational Theory is probably true at most of
only the mind's modular parts. And that a cognitive
science that provides some insight into the part of the
mind that isn't modular may well have to be different
from the kind of syntactical account that Turing's insight inspired. It is, to return to Chomsky's way of
talking, a mystery, not just a problem, how mental
processes could be simultaneously feasible, and abductive, and mechanical. Indeed, I think that, as things
now stand, this and consciousness look to be the ultimate mysteries about the mind [po 99].

Another point that Semenza mentions is the importance of pathological findings, which bring a lot of

diverse information to light, so that sometimes it is

difficult to know which data are stable and which are
not, due to the complexity of the functions of the brain
and the variable specificity of local phenomena. Laboratory experiments restrict this risk, but at the same
time, they impoverish data. We must deal with complexity. In Koch's (1999) words: "it is dangerous in
neurobiology to study anyone mechanism at only a
single, isolated level of complexity. Phenomena at
multiple levels, such as ionic channel, synapse, dendrite, neuron, small network, and so on, interact in
highly nonlinear and nonintuitive ways ... anyone
computation is carried out using a plurality of mechanisms at different spatial and temporal scales" (p.
474). Regarding Semenza's philosophical reflections
about Freud, I would like to remar k that from my point
of view, Freud opted for a dualistic methodological
position and a monistic ontological one. About the
inclusion of Freud in the mainstream of Western scientific tradition, nothing can be more demonstrative
of this than his belief in the principle that natural laws
govern human mental life. Nothing in the building of
psychoanalysis makes sense without this principle.

Interdisciplinary Issues
The first problem with interdisciplinary issues is the
concept of a discipline itself. Sometimes a discipline
is defined in relation to an object, that is, as the theoretical and experimental activity that relates to a particular object. We find the typical historical example
in light, which is the object of the discipline of optics.
Once a new theory changes conceptions of the object,
as the notion of electromagnetism changed the concept
of light, must we consider this to be the emergence of
a new discipline just because the view of the object
has changed? From an epistemological point of view,
it is more convenient to consider specific problems
and the corresponding theory or theories as the actual
unit of knowledge. I prefer to use the terms intertheoretical and interscientific in lieu of interdisciplinary.
On the other hand, disciplines are not homogeneous
fields. They are comprised of different theories and
belief systems at differing stages of evolution. By evolution I mean the formalized state of the theory, the
experimental development of its hypotheses, and the
more or less explicit belief systems included in each
theory.
This lack of homogeneity has favored arbitrary
elections of hypotheses or beliefs, resulting in an inadequate knowledge content. This is the kind of sin that

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22
could be attributed to the authors of some psychoanalytic papers who have chosen theories and clinical data
according to their convenience; moreover, the lack of
logical and methodological strictness of the discipline
also admits this possibility, as well as any combination
of hypotheses and data.
An additional problem arises from the insight that
behavioral data alone are not sufficient to characterize
mental processes. John Anderson (1978) proved that
any set of behavioral data could always be explained
by more than a single theory, and suggested that neurophysiological constraints would help to ameliorate
this problem.
Because our goal is to understand how the brain
produces behavior, we need descriptions of behavior
that can be related in a relatively direct way to underlying neural mechanisms. Many sorts of behaviors reflect complex interactions among many mechanisms.
Unfortunately, there is no way to know in advance
which regularities in behavior will mesh neatly with
distinct properties of the brain, and which regularities
will reflect complex interactions among numerous
properties.

Cognitive Psychology and Psychoanalysis

Semenza says: "One cannot be but in favor of psychoanalysts engaging in poetry. However, when addressing a theory of mental function, a dialogue with
other branches of science becomes desirable. I hope
every psychoanalyst engaged in the enterprise will remain close to the lucidity of thought and sheer readability of Freud. " I concur with Semenza in the desire
to make psychoanalysis a scientific theory of the mind.
But I do not agree with the proposal of a dialogue
between sciences. What follows represents, from a
methodological viewpoint, a more ambitious aim,
namely, to test psychoanalytic hypotheses by means
of cognitive neuroscience. To do this, it is necessary
to consider psychoanalytic hypotheses and theories according to the usual methodological standards of science. This means that what the hypotheses and
theories say about the mind is susceptible of being
controlled in some way. From what the hypotheses
affirm, we can, using logic as the instrument, derive
consequences that can be observed through pertinent
experiences. This is the basic method of science, in
which only logic is not specific; what the hypotheses
affirm, the consequences and the pertinent experiences
are specific for the conditions of the material each
theory manages. So, a first step should involve defin-

Eduardo B. Issaharoff
ing the characteristics of our psychoanalytic hypotheses, elaborating some classification of them, and
proposing the adequate material to observe consequences.
I follow Rubinstein in the division of the psychoanalytic hypotheses into two broad classes: clinical
and metapsychological. The hypotheses of both
classes are general in the sense that they refer to aspects of mental functioning, not to specific syndromes,
as is the case in a similar classification by Rapaport
(1959). While the class of metapsychological hypotheses includes high-level hypotheses and theoretical
terms, the class of clinical hypotheses includes both
high-level and low-level hypotheses, with a mix of
theoretical and observational terms. One difference
between clinical and metapsychological hypotheses is
that the former are more directly relevant to clinical
inference (i.e., clinical interpretation) than the latter.
Clinical hypotheses can be subdivided into particular
clinical hypotheses and general clinical hypotheses.
Particular clinical hypotheses refer to what a person
wishes, feels, and does, and to what happens to him in
the psychoanalytic situation. If we speak about wishes,
feelings, and thoughts in general, abstracted from a
particular person, or outside the psychoanalytic situation, then we speak about wishes, feelings, and
thoughts as phenomena that are the product of specific
structures and functions. We might say that, for the
time being, we lack a wide repertoire of theories about
these structures and functions in the brain and about
the way in which they interact to produce observable
behavior at the level of the psychoanalytic situation.
But what we now have is enough to propose new
hypotheses and rich experiments related to mechanisms that are involved in clinical phenomena. Fonagy's (1999) paper, quoted by Semenza, is an example
of this.
Our beliefs and theories of different kinds and
levels, which we use to assign meaning to the behavior
of our patients, are essential components of the process that produces interpretations in the analyst's
mind. Ergo, interpretation is a particular clinical hypothesis that we arrive at by means of general clinical
hypotheses and metapsychological hypotheses. Testing or contrasting each type of hypothesis poses different kinds of problems. While particular clinical
hypotheses can be tested only inside the clinical situation, general clinical hypotheses and metapsychological hypotheses cannot be tested only in the context
of clinical observation because they predict attributes,
characteristics, and particularities of universal psychic
mechanisms. The universality of psychic mechanisms

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

implies that they are structures determined by and

transmitted through genetic codes, and that they are
not the product of a particular environment or society.
If this is true, then general clinical hypotheses and
metapsychological ones make predictions about human beings as physiological organisms, and more specifically about the structures and functions of the brain
of those organisms. Particular clinical hypotheses refer
to the realization of universal mechanisms in a particular person and his circumstances.
Only general clinical hypotheses form part of the
clinical psychoanalytic theory; particular hypotheses
represent the application of this theory to actual cases.
Only in the psychoanalytic process can we test particular hypotheses. When I work with a person, it is with
that person in the clinical situation that I must test my
hypotheses. When I work with the brain, it is in the
brain (i.e., in the context of neuroscience), that I must
test my hypotheses. One of the conclusions derived
from this argument is that in a global theory of the
human mind I need the brain to theorize about the
mind, and the mind to theorize about the brain.
The aforementioned statement that we need descriptions of behavior that can be related in a relatively direct way to underlying neural mechanisms is
the challenge we are faced with. Since this will require
an input of knowledge and expertise from both psychoanalysis and neuroscience, it should be the work
of a team of psychoanalysts and cognitive neuroscientists to explore and test the possible elements that may
satisfy the required descriptions.
Here I can only mention the issues that I consider
have greater possibilities of complying with these requirements. The field of dynamic processes in memory
systems, and cognitive theories with their rich classification of memories, are concepts that could be very
useful for psychoanalysis at the clinical and theoretical
levels. On the other hand, the patient's increased capacity, acquired through psychoanalysis, to transform
part of the nondeclarative aspects of memory into declarative sentences, which represents the development
of his communicative competence, is an interesting
contribution of psychoanalysis to cognitive theories.
We know that behavior is the product of a complex process that includes internal states, sensory inputs, motor outputs, motivation, strategies, planning,
and the peculiarities of each person. Psychoanalysis
is a source of observation of behavior in its complexity, in the context of a peculiar asymmetrical relation
with the analyst. The conception of behavior in actual
cognitive neuroscience, incorporating the dimensions
of affect and intentionality, draws us closer to an un-

23
derstanding of the brain structures involved in human
behavior as we experience it in the psychoanalytic situation.

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Eduardo B. Issaharoff
Arenales 874, 5
1061 Buenos Aires
Argentina
e-mail: ebis@pccp.com.ar