North Korea, a nuclear-armed rogue state, has a formidable missile capability.

According
to many nuclear experts, North Korean ballistic missiles are capable of reaching Tokyo
and Seoul and have the ability to deliver biological and chemical weapons.
In the Middle East, Israel has a well-developed ballistic missile programme since the late
1970s, serving to aggravate certain existing threats to regional peace and security. The
Jericho III is a very advanced Israeli Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with the
ability to launch nuclear warheads into almost any location on the Earths surface. The
2006 Israel-Hezbollah war made it evident that some non-state actors have also acquired
missile capability but this development largely went unnoticed.
During the ongoing civil war in Syria, the Syrian military has launched ballistic missile
strikes on rebel-controlled areas. This shows the increasing role of ballistic missiles in
civil conflicts but no concrete steps by the international community have been taken to
prevent the proliferation of missiles and related technologies in the region.
In South Asia, another highly volatile region, India and Pakistan maintain relatively large
stockpiles of ballistic missiles. More alarmingly, Indias military establishment has also
been working on its ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme, triggering fresh
tensions in the region.
In India, over the past decade, support for ballistic missile defence (BMD) has broadened
because the public is unaware of new security threats to regional peace due to Indias
aggressive approach. Even many well-known Indian journalists have no idea that the
success rate of a deployed BMD system is very low.
The Indian BMD does not even provide reliable defence against Pakistani stealth cruise
missiles like the Hatf-VII and would surely be unable to provide Indias two cities New
Delhi and Mumbai a shield against Chinese Dongfeng-41 missile with multiple subwarheads with separate trajectories.
The unfortunate fact is that India, Iran, North Korea and some other countries have
successfully advanced their missile programmes with foreign assistance. Many countries
have even remained involved in selling sensitive missile technology to other members.
Yet, because of their voluntary nature, the missile technology control regimes cannot
mandate any forceful action against member countries violating its guidelines.
Curbing the spread of missile technology is particularly difficult because of lack of
recognition of the threat it poses. The MTCR urgently needs to address all these concerns
related to WMD delivery systems if it wants to avoid the fate of becoming totally
incapable of mitigating the dangers associated with the global nuclear trade.
Email: rizwanasghar5@unm.edu