Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
DECISION
Copyright 1994-2015
MALCOLM, J :
p
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a Judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of
parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the
plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable
tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the
year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a
possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel
No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto
Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and
his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not
acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on
the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the
objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the
provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize
that for land to come under the protective aegis of the Maura Law, it must have been
shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and that it was not land
which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the land was, even as long ago
as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not agricultural in nature is the fact that there
are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible,
following the doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court with reference
to Mexican and Spanish grants within the United States, where some recital is claimed
to be false, to say that the possessory information, apparently having taken cognizance
of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney
[1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs. United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It
is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in interest to
the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
Subsection 6 of Section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as
Copyright 1994-2015
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed.
The first relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of what, for present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public
land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Relative to actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only
about one fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the
Government, following:
Copyright 1994-2015
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the
supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural
public land." The law affirms that the phrase is defined by the Act of Congress of July
1st, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in
Sections 13 to 18 thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is
variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral land,"
and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes nearest to a
precise definition, when it makes the determination of whether the land is more
valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on
numerous occasions, what was said In the case of Jones vs. Insular Government
([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear
and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from
objection. In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject (Mapa vs.
Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 1753, it was found that there does exist in the
Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said that
the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal
or mineral in nature and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here,
again, Philippine law is not very helpful. For instance Section 1820 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character."
This definition of "Public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of this
chapter." A little further on, Section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not
including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said
lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by
the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With reference to the last section, there
is no certification of the Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a
natural growth of trees and underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that the
word "forest" has a significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not
Copyright 1994-2015
embrace land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of
consider able extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N.Y. Supp., 262;
People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful.
B.H. Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:
"Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be
found either to exclude some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the
other hand, to include some with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be
necessary, for example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land
which at present has neither trees brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in the
course of time it is hoped will be 'reboise;' but any definition wide enough to
take in all such lands, would also take in much that was not wanted. On the
other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and
indeed would be almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery orchard, or
vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with."
purposes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
considered as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is merely
that of possession, then the public or private character of the parcel is open to
discussion and this character should be established not simply on the alleged
right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil characteristics of the
land, and by comparison between this area, or different previously occupied
areas, and those areas which still preserve their primitive character."
10
Copyright 1994-2015
11