Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of
Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle
owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative
Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order
are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal
protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.
Issue
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative
Order issued is unconstitutional
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are
deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as
such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of
instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction
mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due
to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

Giovanni Christian D. Ladines

October 2, 2013

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203, G.R. No. 180702, April 12, 2011
FACTS:

The Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan by

complaint, impleading as defendants respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
(Cojuangco) and 59 individual defendants.
Cojuangco allegedly purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock
through the 14 holding companies owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason,
the block of 33,133,266 shares of SMC stock shall be referred to as the CIIF
block of shares.

Contention of the Republic of the Philippines:

That Cojuangco is the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited powers to
deal with the coconut levy funds, who took undue advantage of his
association, influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, misused coconut levy funds to buy out
majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and ACCRA law offices plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through
the use of coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK. CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy-funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and
its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:

Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-F was dismissed for failure of
plaintiff to prove by preponderance of evidence its causes of action against
defendants with respect to the twenty percent (20%) outstanding shares of
stock of San Miguel Corporation registered in defendants names

Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the Supreme Court invoking that
coconut levy funds are public funds. The SMC shares, which were acquired by
respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco companies with the use of
coconut levy funds in violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.s fiduciary
obligation are, necessarily, public in character and should be reconveyed to the
government.

ISSUE:

Whether Respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the coconut levy funds to acquire SMC
shares in violation of the his fiduciary obligation as a public officer.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a
prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
Republics burden to establish by preponderance of evidence that respondents
SMC shares had been illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds was not discharged.
The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code (like
the trustee using trust funds to purchase, or a person acquiring property through
mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the Corporation Code (like a director or trustee
willfully and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation, among others) require factual foundations to be first laid out in appropriate
judicial proceedings. Hence, concluding that Cojuangco breached fiduciary duties as an
officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB without competent evidence
thereon would be unwarranted and unreasonable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that Cojuangco had committed
breach of any fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the
UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint contained no clear factual allegation on which
to predicate the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code, and Section 31
of the Corporation Code. Although the trust relationship supposedly arose from
Cojuangcos being an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the
link between this alleged fact and the borrowings or advances was not established. Nor
was there evidence on the loans or borrowings, their amounts, the approving authority,
etc. As trial court, the Sandiganbayan could not presume his breach of fiduciary duties
without evidence showing so, for fraud or breach of trust is never presumed, but must
be alleged and proved.
The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent might even
preclude any consequent trust implication but is more inclined to be a contract of loan.
To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws do not provide for such
requires evidence that confidence is reposed by one party in another who exercises
dominion and influence. Absent any special facts and circumstances proving a higher

degree of responsibility, any dealings between a lender and borrower are not fiduciary in
nature.
DISPOSITION:
The Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari and, AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on November 28, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-F.
The Court declares that the block of shares in San Miguel Corporation in the
names of respondents Cojuangco, et al. subject of Civil Case No. 0033-F is the
exclusive property of Cojuangco, et al. as registered owners.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni
83 Phil 171
Facts:
Shinegori Kuroda, a former lieutenant-general of the Japanese Imperial Army and
commanding general of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged
before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. Being the commanding
general of the enemy forces during the war period, he was tried for failing to
discharge his duties well and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes
committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese
forces, in clear violation of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court
because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He
further contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare for the war crimes committed cannot stand ground as the
Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he
alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two
US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional.
2. Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War
Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals is
constitutional as it is aligned with Sec. 3, Article 2 of the Constitution which states

that, The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation. The generally accepted principles of international law includes those formed
during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations. These include the principle that all
persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a
war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws
and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the
Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that
commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It
abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere
incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been
equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is
charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special
military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed
by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.

PHILIP MORRIS, INC. VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION (Equal

Standing of International Law and Municipal Law)
Penned by: GARCIA, J.:
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
Philip Morris, Inc., Benson & Hedges (Canada) Inc., and Fabriques de Tabac
Reunies, S.A. (now Philip Morris Products S.A.) seek the reversal and
setting aside of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66619: PETITION DENIED
1. Decision dated January 21, 20031 affirming an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, in its Civil Case No. 47374
Dismissed the complaint for trademark infringement and
damages thereat commenced by the petitioners against respondent
Fortune Tobacco Corporation; and
2. Resolution dated May 30, 20032 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Philip Morris, Inc., a corporation (State of Virginia, U.S.A),
is the registered owner of the trademark MARK VII for

cigarettes. (per Certificate of Registration No. 18723 issued on April

26, 1973 by the Philippine Patents Office (PPO)
Similarly, petitioner Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., a subsidiary
of Philip Morris, Inc., is the registered owner of the trademark MARK
TEN for cigarettes (PPO Certificate of Registration No. 11147)
Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A. (Swiss company), another
subsidiary of Philip Morris, Inc., is the assignee of the trademark
LARK, (Trademark Certificate of Registration No. 19053) (originally
registered in 1964 by Ligget and Myers Tobacco Company)
Respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation, a company organized
in the Philippines, manufactures and sells cigarettes using the
trademark MARK.

Petitioners, on the claim that an infringement of their respective

trademarks had been committed, filed, on August 18, 1982, a
Complaint for Infringement of Trademark and Damages against
respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No.
47374 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166.
The decision under review summarized what happened next, as
follows:
o Prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, [petitioners]
alleged that they are foreign corporations not doing business in the
Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction.
o Countries in which they are domiciled grant to corporate or
juristic persons of the Philippines the privilege to bring action for
infringement, without need of a license to do business in those
countries.
o [Petitioners] likewise manifested [being registered owners of the
trademark MARK VII and MARK TEN
o registered the trademarks in their respective countries of origin
by virtue of the long and extensive usage of the same,
these trademarks have already gained international fame
and acceptance
[respondent], without any previous consent from any of the
[petitioners], manufactured and sold cigarettes bearing the
identical and/or confusingly similar trademark MARK
have caused and is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or
would deceive purchasers and the public in general into
buying these products under the impression and mistaken
belief that they are buying [petitioners] products.
o
Invoked provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial and Intellectual Property (Paris Convention)
o Philippines is a signatory, [petitioners] pointed out that upon the
request of an interested party, a country of the Union may
prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction,

imitation, or translation of a mark already belonging to a person

entitled to the benefits of the said Convention. In accordance
with Section 21-A in relation to Section 23 of Republic Act
166, as amended, they are entitled to relief in the form of
damages [and] the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
which should be made permanent.
o
[Respondent] filed its Answer denying [petitioners] material
allegations and averred [among other things] that MARK is a
common word, which cannot particularly identify a product to
be the product of the [petitioners]
o After the termination of the trial on the merits trial court rendered its
Decision dated November 3, 1999 dismissing the complaint and
counterclaim after making a finding that the [respondent] did not
commit trademark infringement against the [petitioners].
o
The issue of whether or not there was infringement of the
[petitioners] trademarks by the [respondent] was likewise
answered in the negative. It expounded that in order for a name,
symbol or device to constitute a trademark, it must, either by itself or
by association, point distinctly to the origin or ownership of the article
to which it is applied and be of such nature as to permit an exclusive
appropriation by one person.

Maintaining to have the standing to sue in the local forum and that
respondent has committed trademark infringement, petitioners went
on appeal to the CA. (Appellate recourse docket CA-G.R. CV No.
66619)
o CA decision on January 21, 2003 (while ruling for petitioners on
the matter of their legal capacity to sue in this country for
trademark infringement) affirmed the trial courts decision
on the underlying issue of respondents liability for
infringement.
Motion for reconsideration denied by the CA (Resolution of May
30, 2003)

ISSUES
Petitioners seek petition for review (Court of Appeals):
o (1) whether or not petitioners, as Philippine registrants of
trademarks, are entitled to enforce trademark rights in
this country;
o (2) whether or not respondent has committed trademark
infringement against petitioners by its use of the mark MARK
for its cigarettes, hence liable for damages.

Respondent: issue the propriety of the petition as it allegedly raises

questions of fact.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petition raises both questions of fact and law
o question of law exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts
o question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsity of alleged facts
Court is not the proper venue to consider factual issues as
it is not a trier of facts
Unless the factual findings of the appellate court are
mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled
by the court of origin, we will not disturb them
Petitioners: contentions should be treated as purely legal since they
are assailing erroneous conclusions deduced from a set of undisputed
facts
A trademark is any distinctive word, name, symbol, emblem, sign,
or device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant on his goods to identify and distinguish
them from those manufactured, sold, or dealt in by others.
o A trademark deserves protection.

PETITIONER:
Petitioners assert that, as corporate nationals of membercountries of the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine
courts for infringement of trademarks, or for unfair competition ,
without need of obtaining registration or a license to do
business in the Philippines, and without necessity of actually
doing business in the Philippines.
o Right and mechanism are accorded by
Section 21-A of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166 or the
Trademark Law, as amended
Article 2 of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, aka Paris Convention.
Not doing business in the Philippines does not mean that cigarettes
bearing their trademarks are not available and sold locally. Citing
Converse Rubber Corporation v. Universal Rubber Products,
Inc., such availability and sale may be effected through the acts of
importers and distributors.
Entitlement to protection even in the absence of actual use of
trademarks in the country

o Philippines adherence to the Trade Related Aspects of

Intellectual Property Rights or the TRIPS Agreement
o enactment of R.A. No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property
Code (IP Code)
o fame of a trademark may be acquired through promotion or
advertising with no explicit requirement of actual use in local
trade or commerce

Before discussing petitioners claimed entitlement to enforce

trademark rights in the Philippines, it must be emphasized that
their standing to sue in Philippine courts had been recognized,
and rightly so, by the CA
o such right to sue does not necessarily mean protection
of their registered marks in the absence of actual use in
the Philippines.

Thus clarified, what petitioners now harp about is their entitlement to

protection on the strength of registration of their trademarks in the
Philippines.
HELD/RATIO:
As we ruled in G.R. No. 91332,18 :
1. RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENT
Registration of a trademark gives the registrant (petitioners)
advantages denied non-registrants or ordinary users (respondent)
o validity of the registration
o ownership and the exclusive right to use the registered marks
they may not successfully sue on the basis alone of their
respective certificates of registration of trademarks.
o Petitioners: still foreign corporations
o condition to availment of the rights and privileges & their
trademarks in this country:
On top of Philippine registration, their country grants
substantially similar rights and privileges to Filipino
citizens pursuant to Section 21-A20 of R.A. No. 166.
In Leviton Industries v. Salvador
o Court: reciprocity requirement is a condition sine qua non to
filing a suit by a foreign corporation
Unless alleged in the complaint, would justify dismissal
o complainant is a national of a Paris Convention- adhering
country, its allegation that it is suing under said Section
21-A would suffice, because the reciprocal agreement

between the two countries is embodied and supplied by

the Paris Convention
being considered part of Philippine municipal laws,
can be taken judicial notice of in infringement suits.
2. REGISTRATION VERSUS ACUAL USE!!

members of the Paris Union does not automatically entitle

petitioners to the protection of their trademarks in this
country ABSENT ACTUAL USE OF THE MARKS IN LOCAL
COMMERCE AND TRADE.

Philippines adherence to the Paris Convention effectively

obligates the country to honor and enforce its provisions( as
regards the protection of industrial property of foreign nationals in this
country)
o However, any protection accorded has to be made subject
to the limitations of Philippine laws.
o Hence, despite Article 2 of the Paris Convention which
substantially provides that:
(1) nationals of member-countries shall have in this
country rights specially provided by the Convention as are
consistent with Philippine laws, and enjoy the privileges
that Philippine laws now grant or may hereafter grant to its
national
(2) while no domicile requirement in the country where
protection is claimed shall be required of persons entitled
to the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of any
industrial property rights
foreign nationals must still observe and comply
with the conditions imposed by Philippine law on its
nationals.

R.A. No. 166 (as amended, specifically Sections 228 and 2-A29),
mandates actual use of the marks and/or emblems in local
commerce and trade before they may be registered and
ownership thereof acquired
o the petitioners cannot, therefore, dispense with the
element of actual use.
o Their being nationals of member-countries of the Paris Union
does not alter the legal situation.

In Emerald Garment Mfg. Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court

reiterated its rulings in Sterling Products International, Inc. v.
Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, Kabushi Kaisha Isetan v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, and Philip Morris v. Court of Appeals and

Fortune Tobacco Corporation on the importance of ACTUAL
COMMERCIAL USE OF A TRADEMARK in the Philippines
notwithstanding the Paris Convention:
o The provisions of the 1965 Paris Convention relied upon by
private respondent and Sec. 21-A of the Trademark Law were
sufficiently expounded upon and qualified in the recent case of
Philip Morris, Inc., et. al. vs. Court of Appeals:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our
municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirements
of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an
international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is
being decided by a municipal tribunal.
Withal, the fact that international law has been made part
of the law of the land does NOT by any means imply
the primacy of international law over national law in
the municipal sphere.
Under the DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION as applied
in most countries, rules of International Law are
given a standing EQUAL, not superior, to national
legislative enactments.
A foreign corporation) may have the capacity to sue for
infringement but whether they have an exclusive right
over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial
writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in
the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the
same law.
It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity
need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in
the Philippines.

Such a foreign corporation may have the

personality to file a suit for infringement but it may
not necessarily be entitled to protection due to
absence of actual use of the emblem in the local
market.

Registration of trademark cannot be deemed conclusive as to the

actual use of such trademark in local commerce.
o registration does not confer upon the registrant an absolute
right to the registered mark.
o merely constitutes prima facie evidence that the registrant is the
owner of the registered mark.

o Evidence of non-usage of the mark rebuts the

presumption of trademark ownership
We stress that registration in the Philippines of trademarks does not
ipso facto convey an absolute right or exclusive ownership
thereof.
o Shangri-La International Hotel Management, Ltd. v.
Development Group of Companies, Inc.
Trademark is a creation of use
Actual use is a pre-requisite to exclusive ownership
Registration is only an administrative confirmation of the
existence of the right of ownership of the mark
does not perfect such right; actual use thereof is
the perfecting ingredient.

Petitioners reliance on Converse Rubber Corporation is quite

misplaced
o different factual milieu
o foreign owner of a Philippine trademark, albeit not licensed to
do, and not so engaged in, business in the Philippines, may
actually earn reputation or goodwill for its goods in the country.
o But unlike in the instant case, evidence of actual sales of
Converse rubber shoes, such as sales invoices, receipts
and the testimony of a legitimate trader, was presented in
Converse.
This Court also finds the IP Code and the TRIPS Agreement to be
inapplicable
o the infringement complaint filed in August 1982 and tried under
the aegis of R.A. No. 166, as amended.
o The IP Code (January 1, 1998) no provision on retroactivity;
TRIPS Agreement (December 16, 1994)
registration of a trademark unaccompanied by actual use
thereof in the country accords the registrant only the standing to
sue for infringement in Philippine courts. Entitlement to
protection of such trademark in the country is entirely a different
matter.