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11, 2016 1
VALMONTE V CA
2.
3.
4.
DRUG
COURT
OF
ISSUES:
1
HELD: As to the first issue, it was held that jurisdiction over the person
must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or
by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall
be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative
defenses shall not be constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such
defense. With regard to the second issue, it was held that where the
court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature
of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is
neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let
alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character.
Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as herein
before exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must
then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for
damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular
proceedings at an opportune
Davao City and with branch offices at Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with
the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of
very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general
housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They
hence
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure
petitioner
of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a
few
"restricted,
unfinished
low
cost
houses,
there
were
no
this
upon
limited
service
and
of
exclusive"
petition.
summons
following
on
the
its BranchManager
rule
on
statutory
construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules
were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the stated
address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. under
that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at their new office Villa Gonzalo,
Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face
of the original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of
and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly
served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is
the defendants in default when their Answer had already been filed albeit
after the 15-day period, but before they were declared as such. Applying
that ruling to the present case, we find that respondents were, therefore,
imprudently declared in default.
Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The account was
transferred to HSBC [Trustee]. Catalan then requested
Trustee to pay her. They still refused and even asked her to
submit back to them the original checks for verification.
ISSUES
Whether or not HSBC Bank and Trustee are liable to pay
damages to Catalan on the ground of Abuse of right under Article 19
of the Civil Code
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner: HSBC claims that they are a foreign corporation
not doing business in the Philippines thus the courts do not
have jurisdiction over them. Moreover, there is no cause of
action because it was not alleged in the there was abuse of
right.
LIMITED,
petitioner,
respondent
submitted
the affidavit of
publication
and
Answer,
alleging
that
the affidavit of
service
submitted
by
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as
Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation [G.R. No. 170943; September 23,
2008]
it was not executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion
Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Sunday, March 11, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was
and held that the rules did not require such execution with the clerk of court.
sustained the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount
served with summons by publication and that there is jurisdiction over his
Issues:
person.
(1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to
improper service of summons.
(2) The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule
because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable
but this has been changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule
(2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule
personam.
(3) Whether or not the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons
should have been prepared by the clerk of court and not respondents
messenger.
Held:
(1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligentinquiry, service may, by leave
of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order.
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite
diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was
The
rules,
however,
do
not
require
that
the affidavit of
No.
175799
CASTRO,
J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the RTC of
Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia)
Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts
between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and for damages. Upon respondents motion, the trial court
authorized respondents counsel to personally bring the summons and
Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the
latter
office
to
effect
service
of
summons
on
petitioner.
The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint on the following
grounds: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the
trial court, there was a proper service of summons through the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on account of the fact that the defendant has neither
applied for a license to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Written Power of Attorney
designating some person on whom summons and other legal processes
maybe served. The trial court also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated
a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion to Dismiss were
brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated during the
trial.
ISSUES:
I.
Whether
petitioner
is
real
party
in
interest
II. Whether or not it was proper for the petitioner to resort to a petition for
certiorari
with
the
CA
III. Whether or not the lower courts correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss
HELD:
(1) Respondent points out that as of the date of the filing of the Petition,
there is no such corporation that goes by the name NM Rothschild and Sons
(Australia) Limited. Petitioner claims that NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia)
Limited still exists as a corporation under the laws of Australia under the new
name Investec Australia Limited. We find the submissions of petitioner on
the change of its corporate name satisfactory and resolve not to dismiss the
present Petition for Review on the ground of not being prosecuted under the
name
of
the
real
party
in
interest.
(2) We have held time and again that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss
is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. The general rule, therefore, is that the denial of a
Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for Certiorari
(3) As correctly ruled by both the RTC and the CA, the alleged absence of a
cause of action, the alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the
argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged
contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section
1, Rule 16[17] of the Rules of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary
issues closely related to the validity and/or existence of respondents alleged
cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during the trial.
As regards the allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same
is usually available as a ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot
be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the very merits of
the main case. In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that
the Hedging Contracts are void for being contrary to Article 2018[25] of the
Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts, despite the
express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of the parties was
allegedly merely to compel each other to pay the difference between the
value of the gold at the forward price stated in the contract and its market
price at the supposed time of delivery. The determination of whether or not
the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry
into whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws.
This is, precisely, the very issue to be determined. The trial court, therefore,
correctly
denied
the
Motion
to
Dismiss
on
this
ground.
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person
on account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on
petitioner through the DFA, with respondents counsel personally bringing the
summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney,
Australia. Moreover, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court,
petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said
SANTOS VS LIWAG
FACTS:
Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 57282,
seeking the annulment of certain documents as having been executed by
means of misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and
other fraudulent means, as well as for damages and costs.
The plaintiff opposed the motion saying that the allegations in his
complaint are sufficient and contain ultimate facts con- constituting his
causes of action and that the subject of the defendant's motion is
evidentiary in nature.
The trial court granted the motion and directed the plaintiff "to submit a
bill of particulars with respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant's
motion",
dismissed the
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for bill of particulars
filed by Respondent Liwag.
HELD:
NO
BILL OF PARTICULARS DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURT. - The
allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars
rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in
matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard
will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or
a clearly erroneous order.In the instant case, the complaint is without doubt
imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization to enable
the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues
and aid the court In an orderly and expeditious disposition tion in the case.
NEED FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS DUE TO VAGUE COMPLAINT;
FAILURE OF TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER TO FILE A BILL OF
PARTICULARS RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF COMLAINT. - The present
action is one for the annulment of documents which have been allegedly
executed
by
reason
of
deceit,
machination,
false
pretenses,
misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means. Deceit,
machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats, however, are
largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without a statement
of the facts to which such terms have reference are not sufficient. The
allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud,
deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be
inferred as a conclusions In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that
all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use
of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and
Sale To A Citizen
The Facts:
Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot 398 from the
Dinglasans in 1936. When Lee died in 1944 without will, he was succeeded
by his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who extrajudicially settled the
estate among themselves and partitioned Lot 398. When the brothers died,
Lot 398 was transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth
and Pacita Yu-Lee. In the 1956 case of Dinglasan vs. Lee Bun Ting1, the
Court held that the sellers (Dinglasan) cannot invalidate the sale of land (Lot
398) to the buyers who are Chinese citizen on the ground of in pare delicto;
in the latter case of Lee Bun Ting vs Judge Aligaen 2, the Court again
dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata, being a mere relitigation of
the Dinglasan case.On January 26, 1995, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a Complaint for Reversion of Lot 398, praying that the sale of Lot 398 to
Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void, and for Lot 398 to be reverted
to the public domain for State disposal in accordance with law. In their
answer, Elizabeth and Pacita invoked the affirmative defense of prescription;
Lee a buyer in good faith and for value, and that they were qualified to own
by succession Lot 398, being Filipino citizens. The RTC ruled in favour of the
OSG and declared the sale of Lot 398 to Lee Liong as null and void. His
being a purchaser I good fait and for value did not cure the nullity of the
sale, and prescription does not run against the State. The Court of Appeals
however reversed the RTC. It ruled that the transfer of the land to Elizabeth
and Pacita who are both Filipino citizens may no longer be impugned even
though the initial sale was void, considering that the objective of the
constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep
our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved. The OSG elevated its case to
the Supreme Court. It argues that since the acquisition of Lot 398 was null
and void, it did not form part of estate of Lee Liong, and thus cannot be
transmitted by succession to his heirs and eventually to Elizabeth and Pacita.
Petitioner argues that since the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong was void,
Lot No. 398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liongs estate. Hence,
Lot No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liongs surviving
heirs and eventually to private respondents.
Lot No. 398 has already been transfered to Filipino citizens. In the
private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of
398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion
violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and
lands under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact
proceedings, thus:
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because
of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for
In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40
years from the promulgation of the case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun
Ting,6 where the Court held that the sale of Lot No. 398 was null and void
for violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If
petitioner had commenced reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still
in the hands of the original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title
thereto, then reversion of the land to the State would undoubtedly be
allowed. However, this is not the case here. When petitioner instituted the
action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot No. 398 had already been
transferred by succession to private respondents who are Filipino citizens.
Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw
in the original transaction is considered cured. 7 As held in Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority:8
Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires
Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the purpose of the
constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In
short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to
hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the
buyer himself becomes a qualified party.9(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private
respondents who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can
no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper
since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
SO ORDERED.
were
in
fact
made,
the
case
must
be
dismissed.
No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of
brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend
sisters-in-law
EDWIN
N.
TRIBIANA,
vs.
LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent
petitioner,
FACTS:
Edwin Tribiana & Lourdes Tribiana are husband and wife. Lourdes
filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court claiming
that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter Khriza Mae 1 year
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, should have dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the
condition precedent under art. 151 of Family code.
HELD:
The petition is lack of merit, for the habeas corpus on the ground of
failure to comply with the article 151 of Family Code, can not be allowed
such to dismiss such with the compliance of art.151 because they are both
different in nature. The petition for habeas corpus is a valid ground or
contention of the respondent because she was deprived of personal liberty.
The art. 151 cannot be applied with this present case, if ever it were
supposed to be applied, Lourdes validly answer it with its compliance when
she attached the court to file action from their Barangay.
TOPIC:
UNDER
CAUSE
OF
ACTION,
IN
CONTRAST
WITH
THE
MINCI that they intend to cancel its order. The order was cancelled on
CCCs (herein respondent) complaint for damages against Danfoss. So, the
case was elevated to the Supreme Court on appeal of the said ruling of the
Hence the complaint for damages filed by CCC with the RTC of
CCC: Due to the impending delay in the delivery of its order, it suffered
more than P8 million and was compelled to look for another supplier.
MINCI to be used in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant in Bulacan. In the
terms of conditions of the original purchase order, the two unit Frequency
Converter shall be delivered by Danfoss within 8 to 10 weeks from the
opening of the letter of credit. The letter of credit opened by CCC in favour
Danfoss: The case should be dismissed on the ground that it did not state a
cause of action.
On September 17, 1997, MINCI informed CCC that its order are 1)
already ready for shipment and MINCI requested to amend the letter of
The letter of credit was opened on September 9, 1997, so, since the
agreed delivery period is 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of
(Singapore is the Asian Regional Office of Danfoss, the Head Office of the
company is Denmark). CCC complied and the port of origin in the letter of 2)
Although Danfoss was having a problem with its supplier prior to CCCs
cancellation of its order, CCC only surmised that Danfoss could not deliver
Neither Danfoss nor CCC agreed to change the date of delivery. Only the
delivery of the order will cause loss to their company, so CCC requested for
port of origin was changed in the letter of credit. Danfoss has until
November 19, 1997 to deliver the order, CCC cancelled the order on
November 13, 1997.
CCC never made an extrajudicial demand for the delivery of its order on its
due date as it cancelled the order before the due date.
5)
Damages sought for by CCC could not have accrued yet since the order
was cancelled before the delivery was actually delayed.
this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of
question which necessitates actual trial on the merits where the parties have
to adduce evidence in support of their respective stance.
While the defendants contend that the stipulated period of delivery
had not lapsed yet when the plaintiff cancelled its order of the two
equipments in question as the cancellation took place seven (7) days before
the expiry date of the defendants obligation to deliver, the plaintiffs position
is that the acts of the defendants had made compliance with their obligation
to deliver within the period stipulated, impossible, hence, there was no need
for a demand as the law provides that when demand would be useless, as
when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform. The
plaintiffs contention if properly and strongly supported by evidence during
the hearing of the merits of the case may well negates (sic) the defendants
The RTC erred in ruling that the issue of whether or not the
defendants incurred delay in the delivery of the equipment within the period
stipulated was a debatable question. How could Danfoss be liable for
damages when Danfoss had not yet breached his obligation to deliver the
order of CCC, aside from the fact that the obligation was already negated
when CCC cancelled the order before the prestation became due and
demandable? Thus, there was no breach and there was no damage caused
by Danfoss.
contrary stand.
CA: Affirmed
the
decision
of
the
RTC
and
denied
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration of Danfoss.
ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action in the complaint filed by CCC
against Danfoss and WON the principle of anticipatory breach can be applied
CCCs fear that Danfoss might not be able to deliver its order on
time was not the cause of action referred to by the Rules and jurisprudence.
in the case.
HELD: No, there was no cause of action in the complaint for damages filed
by CCC.
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For
complaint.
REMEDIAL LAW : motu proprio dismissal
March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez (Juana), his common-law wife
The appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code,
Art.151.No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is
Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16
of
1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
on any of the following grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the
respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at
the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of
from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals
with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of
the
1997
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure,
which
provides: Section
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only
four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res
judicata; and (d) prescription of action.