Nagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.

GR. No. 111097

July 20, 1994
Statcon: Nocitur a sociis
I.

Facts
In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de
Oro by operating a casino. It leased land from Pryce Properties
Corp. Inc.
In turn, the Sangguniang Paglunsod responded swiftly by enacting
Ordinance No. 3353,prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and
to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using
and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the
operation of CASINO in December 1992. In January 4, 1993, it
issued a sterner ordinance that stated, the operation of gambling
CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.
Pryce assailed the ordinance in the CA, which granted the petition,
declaring the ordinances invalid.
Cagayan de Oro City filed a petition with the SC.

II.
Issues
W/N the ordinances are valid? No!
III.
Held
PAGCOR was created by PD 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, which is the countrys 3 rd
largest revenue-earner.
Cagayan de Oro is empowered by the LGC to enact ordinances for
the general welfare of the city as stated in the LGCs general welfare
clause, and Sec 458 of the said code.
o Sec 258 (a) (1) (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent,
suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,

prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill

repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance. The legislative power
conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all
kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the
respondents erroneously argue.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized
the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack
and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
Furthermore, they believe that the charter of PAGCOR had been
repealed by the repealing clause in the LGC. It also maintained that
also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of
the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance to section 5 of the
Code.
o Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any
question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower local government unit.
Court: We must begin by observing Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, stating that local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance."
Using the rule noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with
which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of
chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal
gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be

IV.

prevented or suppressed.
The prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section
458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its
accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but
to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view
includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction,
PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or
centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government
units
Petition is DENIED.
Statcon
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one
statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation,
courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering
that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of
a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a
conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is
not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both
by harmonizing them if possible.

Romulo, Mabanta v. Home Development Mutual Fund

G.R. No. 131082
June 19, 2000
Statcon: And/Or
I.

Facts

II.

The case tackles the issue of the validity of the amendments of the
IRR of RA 7742, which require the existence of a plan providing for
both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from
the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752,
as amended.
Petitioner Romulo Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los
Angeles, a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31
December 1995 from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent
Home Development Mutual Fund because of a superior retirement
plan.
The HDMF Board issued a resolution, amending the IRR, which
provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension
of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/
retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the
Pag~IBIG Fund.
Petitioner filed with the respondent an application for waiver because
of its superior retirement plan. Petitioner submitted that the
amendments were invalid. The trustees denied petitioners claim.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review, but was dismissed
on the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under
the Home Development Mutual Fund is mandatory in character as
clearly worded in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A.
No. 7742.
o Under P.D. No. 1752 and R.A. No. 7742 the Board of
Trustees of the HDMF is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations, as well as amendments thereto, concerning the
extension, waiver or suspension of coverage under the
Pag~IBIG Fund.
Issues
Whether the amendments were valid? No!

III.
Held
The issue of the validity of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and

Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, specifically Section I, Rule

VII on Waiver and Suspension, has been squarely resolved in the
relatively recent case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the
Board of Trustees:
o The term and/or means that the effect shall be given to both
the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or"; or that one
word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the
other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the
legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is
used to avoid a construction which by the use of the
disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several
of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and" will
exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing
alone.
o It was ruled null and void insofar as they require that an
employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan and
a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund
in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund
coverage.
o Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer with
a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to
that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the
law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a
superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to
qualify for exemption, it would have used the words "and"
instead of "and/or."
Petition is granted. CA decision reversed.

IV.
Statcon
It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in
using the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are
to be used interchangeably. By removing the disjunctive word "or" in
the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its
authority.

Espiritu v. Cipriano
G.R. no. L-32743
February 15, 1974
Statcon: Retroactivity
I.

Facts
Primotivo and Ricardo Espiritu in 1969 filed in the Municipal Court of
Pasig for unlawful detainer against Ricardo Cipriano. The court ruled
against Cipriano.
Cipriano appealed in the CFI, where he sought to amend his answer
filed in the MTC for lack of time to disclose material facts to his
counsel and failure to contact said counsel. The important facts are
as follows
o plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question
o house of the defendant was built on the property with the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral
contract of lease
o Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year
arrangement
o The defendant has remained in possession of the property
up to the present
o Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a monthto-month basis and rental was increased to P30.00 a month
by the plaintiffs
o Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the

present monthly rate

A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent
by registered mail to, and received by, defendant.
Respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the
prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, which the Judge
sustained.
o Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which
another's dwelling is located shall, during the period of one
year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental
agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee prior to the
approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three
hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.
o Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
o Approved June 17, 1970.
Hence, this petition.
o

II.
Issues
Whether or not RA 6126 or the Rental Law is retroactive? No!
III.
Held
The increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January,
1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after
a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been
effected.
Respondent argues that there was no perfected contract covering
the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly
payments of P30.00 effective January 1969, as he did not give his
consent thereto.
o The alleged new contract of lease and subsequent increase
in the amount of rental were not effected as of January 1969
with respect to the defendant. He did not accept the new
rate of rental.
There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to show that his consent to
the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was

essential to its validity.

Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and
may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is untenable. Article 4 of
the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, our
duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found.
The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary
situation", it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so
worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor of a
dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from
March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between
the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act."
The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport to give a
retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory
construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" (what is
expressed makes what is implied silent.)
Petition is granted. Orders of CFI is set aside.

IV.
Statcon
It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive
effect unless it is otherwise provided therein.

People v. Manatan
G.R. no. 14129
July 31, 1962
Statcon: casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
I.

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54,
Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice
of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the
said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding
that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.

Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of

any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or
exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is
a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449
of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary,
or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid
any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or
take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He
claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the
intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its
operation.

II.
Issue
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the
Revised Election Code?

III.
Held
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly
included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the
kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance
and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because
the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term,
"judge." which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by
virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all
officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that
capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who

are judges of facts.From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first

omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the
phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of
the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its
operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked
by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been
clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or
omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded
from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the
peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does
not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at
bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statutes to enlarge the officers within its
purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations,
judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in
the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously
applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give

reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
peace".
Manila Jockey Club v. Games and Amusement Board
Statcon: Statement of Individual Legislator
Facts:
The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in
Section 4 of RA 309 the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines
amended by RA 983 are as follows: (1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for 12
Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand
Derby Race of PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29
Sundays.
However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the
PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays, but without specifying the days
on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races,
GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private
individuals and entities by six.
Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12
Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable relief OR should
be assigned to any day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal
Holiday.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved
Sundays.
(2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be inserted in
club races as debated in the House of Representatives in the voting of
HB 5732/RA1502.
Held:
(1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or
even to the 24 Saturdays (except holidays) because their holding on
races for these days are merely permissive, subject to the licensing and
determination by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502 was enacted
increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races but without specifying

the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make
room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available
racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on which the private
individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject
to licensing and determination by GAB.
(2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally
enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of
these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the
sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely
devoid of any such indication.
In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in
the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to
obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors,
but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in
such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of
the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language
he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses
that meaning.
The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase,
clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention
of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which
could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have
included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were
specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not
impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races
all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion
seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were
intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club
races.
Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view
that in the interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely differing
constructions, legislative debates and explanatory statements by
members of the legislature may be resorted to, to throw light on the

meaning of the words used in the statutes. Upon the other hand, the
appellees, likewise, quote in their briefs other authorities to the effect
that statements made by the individual members of the legislature as to
the meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently enacted into law,
made during the general debate on the bill on the floor of each
legislative house, following its presentation by a standing committee, are
generally held to be in admissable as an aid in construing the statute.
Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual
members and are not safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is
impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon
an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by
resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not
speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke,
might differ from each other.
Nemarco v. Tecson
Statcon: Computation of time
Facts:
On 10/14/55, the CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil case, Price
Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on
10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case. On 12/21/65,
NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and
choses in action of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment creditor
therein, filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants for the
revival of the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to dismiss
said complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others.
The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c
was certified to the SC, upon the ground that the only question raised
therein is one of law, namely,
Issues:
W/n the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the

statute of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be
brought w/in 10 yrs from the time the judgment sought to be revived has
become final. This in turn, took place on 12/21/55 or 30 days from notice
of the judgment-- w/c was received by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal
having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on
w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired. Pltff alleges that it was 12/21/65,
but appellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law speaks of years
xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in
1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 days each, or an
aggregate of 3650 days, from 12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65.
Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not
a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If the extra
day in a leap year is not a day of the year, bec. it is the 366th day, then
to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it
falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one yr.
Held:
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory
contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of
each "year"-- as the term is used in our laws-- to 365 days.
[The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21,
1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in
terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19,
1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the
computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.]

CIR v. Primetown Propety Group

Statcon: Computation of time

FACTS
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted

return. On March 11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property
Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit of income tax paid in 1997.
However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition for
review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed
beyond the two-year reglementary period provided by section 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Tax Appeals further
argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court
ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a
regular year or a leap year.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents petition was filed within the two-year
reglementary period.
RULING
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year
reglementary period because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that
provides that a year is composed of 365 years is repealed by Executive
Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under
Executive Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.

Viray v. CA
GR L-25290
March 18, 1966
Statcon: Computation of Time

I.

Facts

October 25, 1965 - Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the

adverse decision was denied
The 15 - day period allotted by the Rules of Court to appeal this
decision will expire on November 9, 1965
Petitioner's counsel was granted an extension of only 15 days
from the expiration of the reglementary period
Since the Petitioner filed it on Nov. 26, 1965, when the period for
doing so expired on Nov. 24 - Court dismissed the petition for
having been filed out of time
Petitioner moves for reconsideration based on the following
grounds
o first 15-day period (prescribed by the Rules) - should
have ended on Nov. 10, 1965 and not on Nov. 9
because Nov. 9 was a holiday (Election day)
o the 15-day extension (granted by the Court) - counted
from Nov. 10 and should terminate on Nov. 26 because
Nov. 25 was a holiday (Thanksgiving)
o Therefore, she had until the next day, Nov. 26 to file the
petition

II. Ruling
The extension of 15 days granted to the petitioner in effect have
her a 30-day period from October 25, 1965, therefore her last
day was Nov. 24, 1965 (since October had 31 days)
The rule that excludes the last day of a period, should the same
be a holiday, refers to the performance of the act prescribed or
required. But it does not apply where at the end of the period no
such act is to be done.
American jurisprudence: When the last day of the period falls on
a Sunday, the Courts allow the next day for the purpose. But it is
subject to an exception when there is nothing to be done on the

last day, in which case Sunday is not to be excluded in the

computation of time.
There was :
o no adequate excuse offered for the delay in tendering
the allegedly correct facts and theory
o the unauthorized abandonment of her certificate of
public convenience was in violation of law and cannot
be used by her to avoid her statutory obligation
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED
Go Tiaco brothers (Go Tiaco y Hermanos)
v. Union Insurance Society of Canton
Facts
Petitioners were transporting rice aboard their ship the Hondagua from
the port of Saigon to Cebu in the early days of May 1915. Upon delivery
it was discovered that one thousand four hundred and seventy (1,473)
sacks of rice had been damaged due to seawater seeping in from one of
the drain pipes. The trial court found in favour of Union Insurance in that
the damage to the rice was not due the perils of the sea but due to a
defect in one of the drain pipes for which the Go Tiaco brothers were
liable.
Issues
The issues upon which this case turns is
1. Whether the meaning of the phrase "Perils . . . of the seas, men
of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, . . .
barratry of the master and mariners, and of all other perils,
losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt,
detriment, or damage of the said goods and merchandise or any
part thereof." Which was contained in the insurance policy
agreement covered the seawater damage to the drainpipe?

2. Whether there is an implied warranty on the part of the insured

as to the seaworthiness of his ship?
Held
1. The first issue is the one relevant to our statcon class. It displays
the doctrine of Ejusdem Generis quite clearly. Ejusdem Generis
is an established doctrine of statutory construction which
provides that a particular section of the statute shall not be
divorced from the rest of the act/section/sentence. This rule
applies in this case to resolve the problem of giving meaning to
groups of words where one or more of the words is ambiguous
or inherently unclear. In this case, the words perils of the sea,
should not be taken apart from the examples given after it such
as men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves,
jettisons, . . . barratry of the master and mariner. The seawater
entry to the afterhold of the ship due to damage to the drain pipe
was caused by the negligence of the owners as to the
maintenance of their vessel and was not covered by the policy
2. Yes there is an implied warranty on the part of the insured to
ensure the seaworthiness of his ship in order to be covered by
an insurance policy. (not relevant to statcon but just sayin)
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA
FACTS:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment
rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner,
against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and
controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted
from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well
cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and
despite petitioners several demands. The petitioner then informed the
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant
to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for
arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in
favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the
petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court
of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the
respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to
the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by
the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to
pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned
judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of
action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the
appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not
have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign
court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari,

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between
the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the
contract.
RULING:
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure
in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final
and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court
simply because our rules provide otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of
the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch
30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED,