G.R. No.

L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged
Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice
of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston
Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence,
and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by
the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco,
et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had
been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal
and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private
law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above
ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the
legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a
"Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this
Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and
further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law
practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the
Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20,
1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no
reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action
was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and
be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended
party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or
that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in
the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos,
Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from
Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by
the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the
other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal
case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect
her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together
with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney
Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of

Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an

agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D.
Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without
merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge,
heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the
theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32
of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that
"no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office
of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the
bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney
Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney
Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative
of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of
the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to

the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in

consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
People vs. Villanueva (G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965)
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Sunday, March 18, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The complainant in the case was represented by City Attorney
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City after securing permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The condition for his appearance as such was that every time he
would appear at trial of the case he would be considered on leave of
absence and that he would not receive anypayment for his services. Such
appearance was questioned by herein respondents counsel.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Fule should be allowed to appear on behalf of
the complainant
Held: The court ruled in the affirmative. The court held that in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case, the isolated appearance of City Attorney
Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequenthabitual exercise. Practice of law to

fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or

habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding paymentfor such services. The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services. Furthermore Atty. Fule was given the permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born

citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,

at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing
in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal

matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending

litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105
Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a

mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and

insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar

Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).

(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice
of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.
(Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it
has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I
make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on
Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of
the members of the Commission on Audit. Among

others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is

that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar"
I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long
as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment
as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it
up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in
the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the
Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work

of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications
under our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to
this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone
are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the

members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are
the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception
of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer
as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than

in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage
in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one
such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is
one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to
the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a

revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are
finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved
corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and
the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress
the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of

advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a crossdisciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other
professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation
will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who

handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he
is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by
corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do
their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the
realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot
in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current
advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect
the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews
the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with

each other often with those who are competitors in other

arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decisionmaking roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside
existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and management
of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is
world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness
of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the
organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the

corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has
been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social,
and psychological. New programming techniques now make
the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of
a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on
on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the

legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special
skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities
at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which
are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate

lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on

corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able
to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance
of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next
is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues

paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in
the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans
and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987)
of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of
the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (19861987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the partylist system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod
used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a

team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
(such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating
the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction
is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser
of the United States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at
the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so
than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law
of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in

renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with

an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one
or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not
only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also
state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery."
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15,
Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily

more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been

engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143
SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has
no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its

certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent

appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to
say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional
intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states
that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which
really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the

definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost
all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising
others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising
law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is
the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by

the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in
the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit
that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front
of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood
flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit
only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on
the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment
on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position
of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional
qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were
the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not
possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least
ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof
to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution.
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice"
refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as

distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes

an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually
performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice
of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be
said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer
who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a
governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice
of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ...
(emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in
a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of
whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
(People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and

files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his

intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket
Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all
advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et
al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the
term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence,
where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship,

such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot

be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in
determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional
qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to
the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears
from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the
tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could
be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like
the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice,
such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past
endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law,
there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in theactive and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional

services are available to the public for a compensation, as a

source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare
respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC
Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I
must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ
with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the
qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not
the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the
discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to
the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by
this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we
cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this
Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found
acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that

what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether
or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From
the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in
litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law
only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed
when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating
such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source
of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations
of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as
the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes
on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the

commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be

too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually
every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn
his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are
incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived
from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years
as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is
that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of
his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-atlaw whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian
and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional
Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in
these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other
positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice
of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or
another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian
Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote
behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the
matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing
the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is
precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office.
Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can
look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness.
Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in
terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned
by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional
duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is
a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not
dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where
membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to
have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower
courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving
in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no

active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice,

except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass
the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice
envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in
an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by
respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited
because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at
the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice
law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the
Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University
of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division
Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various

companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive
Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December
1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree
of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years.
Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of
giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort
to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge
in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue
ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even
an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary welldefined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his
life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,

market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of
court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of
any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such
as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect
of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or
definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law"
has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at
law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the
giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any
person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred
to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should
not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were
rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared
contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be
more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that
he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if
he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee
to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker
in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a
practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that
is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate
broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection
with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of realestate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is
no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
years and has charged for his services in that connection. ...
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person
designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an

agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to

appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings.
Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;"
but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at
law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without
being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a
court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an
attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to
manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity;
(3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business;
(4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are
to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply,
as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art.
etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan,
S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency
or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva
(14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self

out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such

services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice
of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and
files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have
profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the FactFinding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities
which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be
likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines
which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the
Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active

and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental

and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This
was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence,
integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, VicePresident, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution
charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit
only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the

second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore

vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on
the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment
on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position
of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional
qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were
the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not
possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least
ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof
to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution.
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice"
refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually
performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice
of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be
said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer
who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a
governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice
of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ...
(emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in
a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of
whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or

habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
(People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and
files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket
Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all
advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et
al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which

calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the
term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence,
where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship,
such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in
determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional
qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to
the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears
from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the
tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could
be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like
the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice,
such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past

endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law,

there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in theactive and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare
respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC
Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I
must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ
with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the
qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not
the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the
discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to
the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by
this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we

cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the

Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this
Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found
acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether
or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From
the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in
litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law
only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed
when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating
such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source
of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations
of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as

the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes
on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually
every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn
his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are
incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived
from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years
as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is
that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of
his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-atlaw whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian
and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional
Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in
these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other
positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice
of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or
another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian
Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote
behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the
matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing
the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is
precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office.
Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can
look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness.
Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in
terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned
by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional
duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is
a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not
dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where
membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to
have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC

chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower
courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving
in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no
active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice,
except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass
the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice
envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in
an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by
respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited
because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at
the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice
law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the
Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University
of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry

Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division
Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various
companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive
Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December
1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree
of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years.
Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of
giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort
to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge
in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue
ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even
an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-

defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his
life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of
court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of
any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such
as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect
of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or
definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law"
has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at
law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the
giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any
person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred
to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should
not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were
rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared
contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be
more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that
he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if
he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee
to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker
in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a
practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that
is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate
broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection
with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of realestate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is
no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
years and has charged for his services in that connection. ...
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person
designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to
appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings.
Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;"
but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at
law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without
being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a
court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an
attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to
manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity;
(3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business;
(4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are
to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply,
as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art.
etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan,
S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency
or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva
(14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.

864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice
of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and
files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have
profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the FactFinding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities
which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be
likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines

which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the

Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental
and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This
was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence,
integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, VicePresident, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution
charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite
Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required
qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and
prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There
shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at

the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a

college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10
years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods appointment.
HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where
the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the
1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term
practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the
Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they
use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also
cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that
lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers,
prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization,
lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for
example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with
the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment
bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became
a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have
been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager,
lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the
Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The
power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so
vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for
the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CA.
The Practice of Law
Tuesday, September 18, 2012
in Ethics, Law
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The case of Cayetano vs. Monsod (201 SCRA 210) has defined
the practice of law as "any activity in and out of court which
requires the application of law, legal principle, practice or
procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience."
People vs. Villanueva (14 SCRA 111) says "it implies
the customary or habitual holding of oneself to the public as a
lawyer and demanding compensation for his fees."

Practicing law doesn't only mean lawyering in the traditional

sense. Writing about law as well as teaching it also comes under
the definition of "practice of law."

Essential Criteria

The following indicators must be present to prove that a lawyer is

practicing law:

1.) Habituality

Customarily holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer. This

doesn't mean that lawyers who work in a corporation's legal
department aren't practicing law; they are. The corporation, as
a juridical person, engages the services these lawyers.

2.) Compensation

The
lawyer
must
be
in
active
practice
and
his professional services are available to the public with the
corresponding fees. This includes the lawyer's salary if he works
in a government office or the legal department of a private entity.

3.) Application

The lawyer must apply his knowledge, training and skills in the
practice of his profession.

4.) Attorney-Client Relationship

There is a professional relationship between the lawyer and his

client. That includes his employment status.
G.R. No. L-43053

December 9, 1955

In re Guardianship of the incapacitated Vicente Arevalo FERNANDO

ARCE, claimant-appellant,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, guardian-appellee.
Fernando Arce in his own behalf.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be decided in this case to do with the determination of the
reasonable compensation which Attorney Fernando Arce receive for
services rendered in connection with the guardianship of the incapacitated
Vicente Arevalo. The guardian of the person of the incapacitated offered to
pay the sum of P200 and on the matter coming on for hearing before the
Court of First Instance of Manila it was raised to P400. Appearing from this
order, the attorney asks that he be allowed the sum of P5,000.
Something is made of the manner in which the services of Attorney Arce
contracted, but this is beside the point, for it is evident that the relation of
attorney and client existed. The record further shows that in pursuance of
such employment, Attorney Arce prepared a petition praying for the
appointment of a guardian of the person of the incapacitated and a
successful conclusion after a hearing in court, conducted certain
negotiations with the banks, made the necessary investigation, and
attended to other incidental matters. The inventory of the properties
belonging to the incapacitated Vicente Arevalo showed him to be worth
approximately half a million pesos. Predicated on these facts, our opinion is
that the trial court was overly strict in arriving an amount which would
adequately compensate Attorney Arce for his legal work.
The law is a profession, not a business. Lawyers are officers of the court.
That is true. At the same time professional men are entitled to have and
recover from their clients a reasonable compensation for their services

rendered with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the

controversy, to the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the lawyer. Pursuant to the power entrusted to the courts to
base conclusions on their professional knowledge relative to the fees which
should be rewarded lawyers, courts have constantly to protect clients from
unconscionable or unreasonable claims. On the other hand, the standing of
the members of the bar is not enhanced by quibbling relative to just fees,
equivalent to the bargaining had between a prospective purchaser and a
merchant in the markets before a sale is made.lawphi1.net
Taking into consideration the established facts and the factors which
determine a reasonable compensation for a lawyers, we believe that
Attorney Arce is entitled to P1,000 for his services.
Sustaining the appeal to the above extent, the order in question will be
modified and Attorney Fernando Arce allowed the sum of P1,000 to be paid
by the Philippine National Bank as the guardian of the property of the
incapacitated out of the property of the latter. So ordered, with the costs of
this instance assessed against the appellee.
A.C. No. 528

October 11, 1967

ANGEL ALBANO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano
against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. In a
letter dated June 20, 1962 addressed to this Court, complainant alleged
that during the Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he
retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which
came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been
reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of

the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another

lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in
the case to collect her attorney's fees. It was then alleged that during the
hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a
document showing that they as well as their co-plaintiffs in the case
promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-/3% of whatever could be
recovered whether in land or damages. A copy of such document was
attached to the letter. The more serious charge was that the signature
therein appearing, purportedly that of the complainant, and the writing after
the name of his mother were not made by them. It was further stated that
the Honorable Delfin B. Flores, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, submitted the document in question to the National Bureau of
Investigation (hereinafter referred to as NBI) together with samples of his
genuine signature. A copy of the finding of the NBI was attached, the
conclusion being that the questioned signature "is NOT in the hand of the
person whose sample signatures were received."
Complainant stated that being a poor man, he could hardly pay for the
services of a lawyer to assist him in the disbarment proceedings. He added
the information that respondent Coloma "is a very influential woman in the
province of Ilocos Norte" as she was then a member of the provincial
board. The prayer was for the "kind and generous help regarding this
matter in order that Atty. Perpetua Coloma may be made to stand before
the bar of justice and disbarred from the practice of her profession as a
lawyer."
In a resolution dated July 20, 1962, this Court required respondent
Perpetua Coloma to answer the complaint. The answer came in September
4, 1962. There was a specific denial of the allegation that the complainant
was "a victim of injustice," respondent alleging that the same was "untrue,
unfounded and imaginary." While admitting that her services were
contracted by complainant and his mother and their co-plaintiffs, in Civil
Case No. 4147, she stated that there was a contingent fee of one-third (/3)
of whatever land and damages could be obtained for the plaintiffs. She
denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of such

civil case as the record would show that she filed "more than twenty (20)
papers and pleadings, went to trial for several days and with the assistance
of her sister, Atty. Oliva D. Coloma, obtained a favorable judgment in the
Court of First Instance for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs and filed with
the Honorable Court of Appeals a thirty-five (35) page brief, finished after
careful, conscientious and exhaustive study and preparation." She attached
a copy of the favorable decision rendered by Judge Simeon Ramos of
November 10, 1948;1 the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
October 13, 1950, confirming the above favorable decision, which was
penned by the then Justice Gutierrez David; 2 and the dismissal of a petition
for certiorari to review such decision in the resolution of this Court of
January 10, 1951.3 Then came a reference to a decision by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10563-R, the complainant as one of the plaintiffs
having appealed from an order of the lower court, sustaining her lien upon
the judgment as well as "her share of one-third (/3) of the lands
adjudicated" which according to the lower court however would require that
the proper action be filed. In the opinion of the Court of Appeals penned by
Justice Sanchez, now a member of this Court, an evaluation of her service
was made thus:
"Appellee served as plaintiffs' counsel for a period of about seven years.
The record shows that she was diligent in her work. That she had rendered
valuable services cannot be doubted. In fact, the final decision favorable to
plaintiffs is almost wholly the result of her efforts. Literally, she gambled on
the success or failure of the litigation. She was a member of the Bar since
1940. Gauged by the familiar rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of
the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered,
and the professional standing of the attorney, . . ., we feel, as did the trial
court, that appellee is entitled to one-third of all the lands and damages
recoverable by plaintiffs under the judgment of the Court below."
She likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to
comply with her obligations as counsel as she served "faithfully, efficiently,
continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity." Her dismissal

then, according to her, "was made without cause and without the consent of
herein respondent and only on June 18, 1951, when the undersigned had
already won the case for them in the Court of First Instance and in the
Court of Appeals." In view of the failure of the new lawyers retained to be at
times available in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and as
pleadings by opposing counsel were still sent to her and out of loyalty to
her former clients she continued "to render professional legal services to
complainant and his mother." Then came the allegation "that after the case
was won in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, complainant and his
co-plaintiffs stopped seeing the undersigned and even disowned their
contract with her in the trial of [her] petition to record attorney's lien which
was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals." Copies
of the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, were submitted
together with the answer.4 She characterized as "false and unjust" the
averment of complainant "that the latter and his mother did not sign Annex
'A' because they really signed the instrument in the presence of attesting
witnesses who testified to and confirmed the signing of the same, which
fact (of signing) was found and confirmed by the trial court after and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, . . . ."
Then came the denial of the allegation of complainant that due to the
seriousness of the charge, Judge Delfin B. Flores submitted the alleged
falsified document to the NBI for examination, the truth being that it was
complainant who did so. She likewise "specifically denies the authenticity
and veracity of the alleged findings of the National Bureau of Investigation
on Annex 'A' because the signatures therein are genuine and have been
found to be so by the trial and appellate courts after hearing the testimony
of the instrumental witnesses and comparing the signatures in Annex 'A'
with signatures admitted to be genuine by the complainant as well as upon
the affirmation of complainant's sister and a co-plaintiff in Civil Case No.
4147." She then referred to a rule which she considered well-settled in this
jurisdiction that a question of whether or not a given document is genuine
falls within the general knowledge and competence of a judge who may
inquire into its authenticity, the testimony of instrumental witnesses
sufficing, without the court being bound even by real experts. Nor could she

agree that the complainant was a poor man and could hardly afford the
services of a lawyer because thru her efforts, he and his co-plaintiffs were
richer "by about P100,000.00 (P85,000.00 in realty and P15,000.00 in cash
as damages) by winning Civil Case No. 4147 for them" notwithstanding,
which ingratitude had been her reward. Respondent also denied the
insinuation that she was using her influence as a board member. She
stated that from 1944 to 1951, when she rendered her services for
complainant, she was in private life, not having been elected to the
provincial board until 1959.
She concluded by saying that "during her practice of law for more than
twenty (20) years [she] has strictly adhered to the ethics of the profession
and has always been guided by the principles of justice, fairness and
respect for individual rights and that as a public official, [she] has never
used her influence to corrupt public servants or ordinary citizens, and all
the people of Ilocos Norte well know that complainant has no sense of
justice, no integrity to preserve, no honor to treasure and no future to build.
On the other hand, the people of said province have faithfully supported
[her] in her aspirations, first as councilor and then as board member with
overwhelming majorities. Said support speaks of vindication and means full
faith and credit to [her] integrity, ability and honesty." She further submitted
as affirmative defenses the cause of action being barred by (1) prior
judgment and (2) by the statute of limitations. She prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint against her.
The matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated September 7, 1962.
On September 12, 1967, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General was submitted. He asked "that this case be dismissed." We grant
such a plea.
In his report, the Solicitor General noted that in the investigation conducted
on his behalf by the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte, "only the complainant
appeared."5 No evidence was introduced by him other than the NBI report
on the alleged falsified signatures. He manifested that all his evidence

could be found in the records of Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte.6 Respondent on her part, according to the Solicitor
General, "merely filed a manifestation to the effect that the contract for
attorney's fees in question had already been declared genuine and
authentic by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, the Court of
Appeals, and this Honorable Court, in their respective decisions, copies of
which were attached to her answer; that said Contract was signed by
petitioner and the instrumental witnesses thereto in her presence; and that
she was submitting the case on the annexes to her answer and the
transcript of the trial of the proceedings on the recording of her attorney's
lien in Civil Case No. 4147. . . ."7
The facts as found by the Solicitor General in so far as the services of
respondent as counsel for the complainant and his mother were concerned
reveal the utmost diligence and conscientiousness on her part. What she
said in her answer was sustained in all respects.
The express finding was then made by the Solicitor General that the
question of the genuineness and due execution to pay respondent her
attorney's fees "had already been litigated by the parties in the course of
the proceedings for the recording and enforcement of the attorney's lien of
respondent in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte; that the plaintiffs in said case (one of whom is the complainant in this
case) denied the genuineness and due execution of said agreement Exh.
'A'; that they had full opportunity to present evidence in support of their said
contention; that after hearing, the trial court found said document to be
genuine (pp. 43-48, rec.); and that on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said
court likewise found said document genuine . . ." 8
On this point an extended excerpt from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the opinion being penned as noted by Justice Sanchez, was
quoted. Thus:
1. Exhibit A, the written contract of professional services, shows that
appellee, as plaintiffs' attorney, is entitled to one-third of all the lands

and damages which may be awarded plaintiffs; otherwise, if the case

is lost, then appellee is not entitled to compensation.
That Exhibit A was duly executed is a proven fact. A witness to that
document, namely, Sergio Manuel, testified that the cross after the
name of Delfina Aquino was placed by her and that the signature of
Angel Albano, one of the plaintiffs, is the genuine signature of the
said Angel Albano. It is true that on the witness stand Delfina Aquino
denied that she placed a cross after the typewritten words "Delfina
Aquino" in Exhibit A, and that Angel Albano likewise denied his
signature therein. Suffice it to say that this negative testimony will not
prevail over the positive testimony of appellee and her witness
aforesaid. People vs. Bueno, 41 Phil. 447, 452; People vs. Ferrer, 44
O.G., No. 1, pp. 112, 115.
Further, appellee's evidence on this point is not limited merely to
Exhibit A. The record shows that previous thereto, there was a verbal
agreement regarding said attorney's fee's. On this point, appellee
finds corroboration in the testimony of Rosario Lagasca, a blood
relation of plaintiff and Silvina Guillermo.
Plaintiffs' evidence that in 1955 appellee undertook to take up the
case of plaintiffs for a stipulated contingent fee of P2,000.00 does not
merit serious consideration. It does not seem probable that appellee
would take the case on a win-or-lose basis, i.e., for the sum of
P2,000.00 in case the litigation is won and nothing in case of loss,
because at that time P2,000.00 was worth only a few gantas of rice.
No lawyer in his right mind would accept such a miserable fee.
The following testimony of Felicidad Albano, one of the plaintiffs,
given in an obviously unguarded moment, stripped plaintiffs naked of
the pretense that there was no such contract for one-third share as
fees:

"Q Did you not authorize your brother, Angel Albano, or

your mother, to give one-third (1/3) of all the properties and
damages?
"A

We authorized them." Tr., p. 8, Galapon.

The court below, therefore, is correct in declaring that, after weighing

and considering the evidence of both parties, Exhibit A is genuine.
(pp. 61- 62, rec.)9
The Solicitor General thus concluded that the finding of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, and of the Court of Appeals that the questioned
document "is genuine, is now res judicata and bars complainant Angel
Albano (one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147) from raising said
question anew in these disbarment proceedings. As repeatedly held, the
fundamental principle of res judicata applied to all cases and proceedings,
in whatever form they may be (Brillantes vs. Castro, L-9223, June 30,
1956, 99 Phil. 497; 60 C.J.S. 31, 267), and a party can not escape the bar
of a judgment against him in a new suit on the same cause of action by
varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting
his cage (Wensel v. Surigao Consolidated Mining Inc., 57 O.G. 6958; Vda.
de Padilla vs. Paterno, G.R. No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961; 50 C. J., S. 98)." 10
It was noted further that there was no oral testimony as to the alleged
falsification, except the report of the NBI, lacking in persuasive force in that
it failed to state the reason or basis for its conclusion. The observation of
the Solicitor General here made is both pertinent and relevant: "The mere
conclusion in the aforesaid NBI report that the signature of complainant
Angel Albano on the document Exh. A was not written in the same hand
that wrote the genuine specimens of his signature, without any reason or
reasons supporting it, is, therefore, of little or no value in evidence and
consequently, it cannot support the present charge of falsification against
respondent, apart from the fact that, as already stated, it is inadmissible on
the ground of estoppel by judgment."11 On the reasonableness of the
contingent fee collected by respondent, the Solicitor General adopted the

same view found in the decision of the Court of Appeals, already referred to
being part of respondent's answer, that such indeed was the case.
The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone
guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the valuable services of
respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the
payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their
counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity
and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's
fees, . . . ."12
He was of the opinion then that even if for purposes of said case the
findings in judicial cases could not be considered binding "it is safe to
conclude, from a review of the evidence in said court proceedings taken
together with the evidence before us in this case, that respondent may be
exonerated herein."13 With such a conclusion of the Solicitor General, this
Court, to repeat, is in full agreement.
Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully
recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his
brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but
in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape
payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in
him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get
his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with
disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to
deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves
condemnation.
There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed:
"Reputation [in the legal profession] is a plant of tender growth, and its
bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This Court, certainly is not averse
to having such a risk minimized. Where, as in this case, the good name of

counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard of the

truth, an action prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is
called for.
Certainly, this is not to say that if a case were presented showing
nonfeasance or malfeasance on the part of a lawyer, appropriate
disciplinary action would not be taken. This is not such a case however.
Respondent, as has been so clearly shown, was in no wise culpable; there
is no occasion for the corrective power of this Court coming into play.
WHEREFORE, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member
of the Philippine Bar, is hereby dismissed.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Bengzon, J.P., are on leave.
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., took no part.
Albano v. Coloma (1967): Coloma was Albanos counsel
during theJ a p a n e s e occupation.Accordingt o Albano,Coloma
failed to expedite hearing and terminationof case. Coloma denied
that she did nothing toexpedite the hearing and termination of
such civilcase as the records would show otherwise. AfterAlbanos
won in the case, Coloma intervened tocollect attorneys fee which
is computed at 33.3%of what the Albanos can recover. The Court
held that Colomamay recover attorneys fees.H:Counsel, any
counsel, if worthy of his hire, isentitled to be fully recompensed
for his services.With his capital consisting solely of his brains
andhis skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only inmoney but in
the expenditure of time and energy,he is entitled to the
protection of any judicialtribunal against any attempt on
the part of aclient to escape payment of his fees. It is
indeedironic if after putting forth the best that is in himto secure
justice for the party he represents, hehimself would not get his
due. Such an eventualitythis Court is determined to avoid.