Introduction: Cognitive iinguistic approaches

to humor

GEERT BRONE,^ KURT FEYAERTS,^ and TONY VEALE^

Ever since the publication of Victor Raskin's seminal work on the Semantic Mechanisms of Humor (1985), linguistic humor research has had a decidedly cognitive orientation. The cognitive psychological roots of the Semantic Script Theory of Humor (SSTH) presented in the aforementioned
book, have been adopted in a large number of studies that have appeared
since. In this respect, Attardo, in a recent discussion on the cognitive tum
in literary studies, points out "that linguists who study humor may well
be pleased to find out that they were doing cognitive stylistics all along"
(2002: 231). Indeed, the two most influential linguistic humor theories of
the last two decades, the SSTH and the General Theory of Verbal Humor
(GTVH, Attardo and Raskin 1991; Attardo 1994, 1997, 2001a), along
with a number of other theoretical studies (Giora 1991; Kotthoff 1998;
Yus 2003) share some significant features with the broad Hnguistic framework that is the methodological angle of the present thematic issue, viz.
Cognitive Linguistics (CL).
What is Cognitive Linguistics? Although introducing a highly diversified research endeavor like CL is a book project in itself (see e.g. Taylor
2002; Croft and Cruse 2004; Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2006), we necessarily limit ourselves to the pinpoint motto of the Cognitive Linguistics Series
(Mouton de Gruyter):
Cognitive Linguistics subsumes a variety of concerns and broadly compatible theoretical approaches that have a common basic outlook; that language is an integral facet of cognition which reflects the interaction of social, cultural, psychological, communicative and functional considerations, and which can only be
understood in the context of a realistic view of acquisition, cognitive development
and mental processing ... It seeks insofar as possible to explicate language structure in terms of the other facets of cognition on which it draws, as well as the
commimicative function it serves.
Humor 19-3 (2006), 203-228
DOI 10.1515/HUMOR.2006.012

0933-1719/06/0019-0203
Walter de Gruyter

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G. Brone et al.

The brief mission statement above can be interpreted as a reaction on two

levels against the formalist, Chomskyan tradition. First, rather than hypothesizing that language is a separate cognitive module in the mind,
with its own principles, CL approaches language as part and parcel of
cognition, guided by general cognitive principles that are not restricted
to linguistic organization. In consequence, one of the major objectives of
cognitive linguists is the study of the reflection of general conceptual
mechanisms in language and linguistic structure. Second, the phrase "a
realistic view of acquisition, cognitive development and mental processing" can be interpreted as a reaction against the generative-linguistic hypothesis that grammar is essentially innate ("Universal Grammar"), and
exposure to language in use only plays a secondary role in language development. CL argues, in contrast, that an individual's knowledge of a
language is "based in knowledge of actual usage and of generalizations
made over usage events" (Taylor 2002: 27). In other words, grammar is
considered to be usage-based, grounded in experience (and hence not as
schematic as the generative grammar). This claim has important methodological consequences relevant to the present issue. If language acquisition is a bottom-up process of generalization over usage events, then linguistic analysis should equally be bottom-up and data-driven, starting
from actual language in use and making generalizations/schemas on the
basis of patterns in the usage (rather than working the other way around,
formulating transformations of abstract principles so as to fit the surface
appearance of language). The further methodological implications of this
general CL claim of a usage-based grammar are elaborated in the next
section ("humor theoretical interest in cognitive linguistics").
Given this somewhat simplifying description of CL, it should be noted
that the SSTH and GTVH both share with cognitive linguistics the fundamental interest in the interrelationship between language and cognition in
language use. In general, most recent linguistic humor research makes the
same basic assumption with respect to humor that cognitive linguistics
does with respect to linguistic structure in general, viz. that (humorous)
language is not to be treated as an isolated, autonomous cognitive phenomenon. On the face of it, this observation may appear trivial, since
there seems to be general agreement that understanding verbal (as well
as non-verbal) humor implies the activation of higher-order cognitive
processes. Nevertheless, the observation that the same cognitive-semantic
strategies underlie cases of punning, referential humor, and visual himior
(Attardo 1996: 2) is highly relevant, since it implies a gradual loss of the

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artificially drawn boundaries between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics

that have been proposed in formalist theories of language. This questioning of traditional boundaries in linguistic structure is one of the comerstones of cognitive linguistics, since it aims at uncovering the role of domain general conceptualization principles at all levels of linguistic
structure.
This overlap in the basic philosophy of both traditions opens up research perspectives for both cognitive linguists and humor researchers.
Thus, the aim of the present issue, dedicated to studies that analyze various semantic aspects of verbal humor from the perspective of cognitive
linguistics, is essentially twofold. First, by embedding the linguistic study
of humor within a larger terminological-conceptual framework that
claims a cognitive-functional perspective, like cognitive linguistics, htimor
researchers are urged to treat htmiorous language in relation (and in contrast) to general patterns of hnguistic and cognitive structure rather than
in isolation. In other words, adopting the tools developed in cognitive linguistics can shed new light on the specific semantic construal of humorous
texts and the "marked" character that these texts are generally considered
to have (Giora 1991, 2003; Kotthoff 1998). Second, from the perspective
of cognitive linguistics, a linguistic framework that claims a focus on the
cross-cognitive and conceptual aspects of language use should be able to
naturally cover cases of linguistic expressivity that are motivated through
the marked, non-prototypical use of the everyday cognitive mechanisms
described in that paradigm. After all, humor is interpreted on the fly in
everyday discourse, just hke the other cases of "figurative language" cognitive linguistics has given center stage to, like metaphor, metonymy and
conceptual integration. And just like these other cases, the study of humor can yield interesting insights into some of the specifics of cognitive
processing, insights that extend beyond the perspective of linguistic humor theories alone. In the following paragraphs, both the htimor theoretical interest in cognitive linguistics and the cognitive linguistic importance
of studying humor is discussed in more detail, in order to give an overall
picture of this mutual interest.

1. Humor theoretical interest in cognitive linguistics

Given the cognitive orientation that most linguistic humor research has,
there should be a high compatibility between CL and humor research.

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which promotes the exchange of insights in two directions. The true challenge for both traditions is to explore some of the "waste land" that can
be covered through this cooperative effort (for an argument in favor of a
take-what-you-need strategy, see Ritchie 2004). In this section, we focus
somewhat more on the two cornerstones of the cognitive linguistics paradigm introduced above, and the interesting implications these assumptions have for humor theories.
The first pillar of cognitive linguistics, the one that most clearly separates CL from truth-conditional and generative approaches to language,
is the hypothesis that meaning is essentially conceptualization (Langacker
1987). This view runs counter to the classic formalist belief that there is a
one-to-one mapping between extemal world and linguistic-conceptual
structure. Rather, dynamic semantic theories like CL argue that "situations can be "construed" in different ways [... ] and different ways of encoding a situation constitute different conceptualizations" (Lee 2001: 2).
In other words, situations can be framed in diflferent ways and these different framings result in a different semantic structure. Bearing in mind
this cognitive linguistic view on language as a recipe for constructing
meaning, a recipe which relies on a lot of independent cognitive activity
(Saeed 1996: 319), the notion of conceptualization processes is of central
importance. Or as Croft and Cruse (2004: 42) put it, "in cognitive linguistics conceptualization is the fundamental semantic phenomenon; whether
altemative construals give rise to differences in truth conditions or not is a
derivative semantic fact." So one ofthe tasks cognitive linguists set out to
do is to uncover the conceptualization processes that are used in everyday
language use. Over the last two decades, a whole range of construal operations or conceptualization mechanisms have been uncovered (Langacker
1987; Talmy 2000; Taylor 2002; Croft and Cruse 2004). These operations
are considered to be cognitive in nature in that they are active on all levels
of linguistic and conceptual organization, and are instances of more general cognitive processes as described in cognitive psychology (Croft and
Cruse 2004: 45). Croft and Cruse present an overview of the vast literature on construal and propose an altemative, more encompassing (in
comparison to Talmy and Langacker) typology of construal operations,
including the general categories of attention and salience, comparison,
perspective and viewpoint, and Gestalt (see also Veale et al., this issue).
If these construal operations are indeed basic-level semantic-conceptual
mechanisms, then they may not only account for the semantic construal
of conventional language use, but also for more marked cases, like

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207

humor. And indeed, linguistic humor researchers have focussed on the

functionality of some of these operations in the semantics of jokes and
other humorous texts. For example, one of the fundamental construal
mechanisms that underlie various semantic phenomena, is comparison,
which has been developed in phenomenology and cognitive psychology.
And the most powerful reflection of this basic cognitive faculty is the human need for categorization or framing, i.e. viewing a linguistic expression against the background of a frame of reference or prior experience.
The hypothesis that frames (or scripts) as structured categories grounded
in experience (Fillmore 1982) play an essential role in producing and
comprehending linguistic utterances has not only been extremely influential in the development of the semantic theory of cognitive hnguistics, but
is also the foundation ofthe SSTH and GTVH. The SSTH (Raskin 1985)
basically argues that jokes revolve around the opposition, overlap and
switch between two (or more) scripts or frames. Jokes, on this view, are
partly or fully compatible with two diflerent, (con)textually opposed
scripts, only one of which is saliently activated in the flrst part of the
text. The punch line of the joke turns out to be incompatible with the flrst
script interpretation (incongruity), but there is a lexical cue in the text
(script-switch trigger) that enables the switch or shift from the first interpretation to the second, backgrounded script (resolution). Coulson (2000)
and Coulson et al. (this issue) elaborate on this idea with a discussion of
frame-shifting within a larger cognitive linguistic framework of language
comprehension, labeled the space structuring model. It is argued that this
model better accounts for the influence of context in meaning construction and the flexible mechanisms that are involved in that process than
the SSTH and GTVH. The psychological reahty of frame-shifting is subsequently tested in a number of psycho- and neurolinguistic experiments.
The minimalist description above of the basic semantic idea of the
SSTH and Coulson's approach touches upon a second principle of construal that has gained increasing interest in both cognitive linguistics and
humor research, viz. salience. Jokes, it is argued, typically have a first,
contextually salient interpretation that is discarded at the punch line in
favor of a more marked reading (Giora 1991: 470). But as Giora has extensively argued, salience, defined as the coded meanings that are foregrounded in our mind, plays a central role not only in humor, but in a
large range of semantic phenomena, hke metaphor (Giora 1997, 2003),
metonymy (Gibbs 1999; Langacker 1993), irony (Giora 2001; Giora
and Fein 1999a, 1999b), idioms (Giora 2003), and styhstic innovation in

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general (Giora 2002, 2003). According to Giora's graded salience hypothesis, salient information is always accessed before any other, less salient
information, and this very general organizational principle is exploited
in many types of "expressive" language use, like novel metaphor, punning, irony, and humor.
Apart from the function of salience and framing, other general conceptualization mechanisms have been treated, directly or indirectly, at various places in the humor literature, likefigure-groundconstellations (Hofstadter and Gabora 1989: 422; Attardo and Raskin 1991: 303; Attardo
2001a: 19; borrowed from Talmy 1978), metaphor (Pollio 1996, based
on Lakoif's conceptual metaphor theory), and conceptual mappings in
general (Attardo et al. 2002). But since it is not our intention to give a
full review of all of these points of contact in the domain of semantic
principles, we will not further explore these issues here (for a more detailed overview, see Brone and Feyaerts 2003). The basic intention of this
rough sketch is to illustrate some of the commonalities in the semantic
construal of different types of language use and open up new perspectives
for research exploring exactly this question of how everyday cognitive
mechanisms are exploited in various ways for humorous, stylistic, or
other purposes.
Despite this obvious movement towards cognitively motivated semantic humor analysis, the tension between marked and unmarked semantic
construal, which can be plotted using the meaning construction mechanisms of CL, and which accounts for the effect of unexpectedness or incongruity (Kotthoff 1998: 50), has not been explored to its fullest in
most of the linguistic humor research. The contributions to the present
issue are intended to open this debate. As mentioned above, the implications of these studies are not relevant to humor research alone, in that
they illustrate one of the central claims of CL, viz. that the human conceptual system is prototypically structured and highly flexible (see also
the section on "cognitive linguistic interest in humor"). The contributions
by Veale et al. and Kotthoff especially draw attention to the heuristic importance of prototypicality for describing humor in terms of ubiquitous
cognitive categories of construal and communication.
One central aspect of construal that has been widely discussed in CL,
but which has been poorly dealt with in humor research, is the role of imagery in linguistic meaning. Particularly the phenomena involving conceptual mappings, like metaphor, metonymy and analogy, have been the
subject of an ever-growing body of research. Conceptual metaphor.

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defined as the conceptualization of one domain (target) in terms of another domain (source), can be considered as a construal operation, since
the choice of a particular domain for conceptualizing a target inherently
construes the target in a specific fashion (cf. Croft and Cruse 2004: 194).
Although it has been repeatedly pointed out that there is a theoretically
interesting (vague) conceptual boundary between humor and metaphor/
analogy (Koestler 1964; Hofstadter and Gabora 1989), humor theorists
have, until recently, only focused on the potentially humorous ambiguity
of a literal vs.figurativereading of a metaphorical expression (Alexander
1997; Attardo 1994). Pollio (1996) explores the boundaries in humor and
metaphor, using insights from the interaction theory of metaphor (Black
1962) and the Lakovian approach (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff
1987). It is argued that humorous bisociation (to use Koestler's 1964
term) differs from metaphorical conceptualization in the profiling of domain boundaries. Whereas metaphors essentially fuse the source and target to form a single entity (Gestalt), suppressing the obvious domain
boundaries, humorous stimuli (un)intentionally emphasize the dissimilarities between domains. Veale et al. (this issue) follow a similar argument,
in that they illustrate that in many cases of interactional humor, utterances with an underlying metaphorical (and/or metonymical) structure
are used as a cue for a trumping strategy. This strategy consists of a
speaker B subverting a speaker A's utterance, e.g. by distorting the
source/target structure of the initial metaphorical utterance.
Metonymy, in a cognitive hnguistic approach, is generally viewed as a
cognitive mechanism enabling the selection of a salient reference point in
a frame to refer to a different concept in the same frame or to the frame
as a whole (Langacker 1993; Panther and Radden 1999). This conceptual
approach to metonymy covers phenomena that were previously treated in
pragmatics as inferences or conversational implicatures (Gibbs 1999; Panther and Thomburg 2003). Given the general agreement that humor interpretation involves complex inferential activity, metonymy can be argued to play a substantial role in this process. Barcelona (2003) argues
that the inferential work in joke interpretation is facilitated by preexisting metonymic connections in a cognitive frame. Metonymic connections, on his account, are the driving force behind the script switching
process (Raskin 1985) that yields the resolution. Brone and Feyaerts
(2003) illustrate, using various types of verbal as well as non-verbal
humor, that the interpretation process is often complicated through
the use of marked metonymic reference-point structures. This process of

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de-automatization results in a balanced processing difficulty, which is argued to contribute to the humorous effect (see also Giora 1991, 2003).
Another construal operation that has only very recently received scrutiny in humor research is viewpoint. If meaning, as advocated in the CL
framework, is essentially construed from a specific perspective, then
adopting a different viewpoint automatically entails a different conceptualization. Of particular interest for humor researchers is the treatment of
viewpoint in mental spaces theory (Fauconnier 1994 [1985], 1997). The
theory of mental spaces was introduced to linguistics and cognitive science
to coherently deal with a wide range of problematic semantic phenomena,
such as indirect reference, pragmatic functions (Nunberg 1979), referential opacity, (counterfactual) conditionals, compositionality, etc. Mental
spaces, on Fauconnier's account, are small conceptual structures "that
proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning
of our discourse and knowledge structures" (Fauconnier 1997: 11). On
this account, viewpoint is dealt with in terms of different mental spaces:
the viewpoint space is the structure from which others are accessed.
Humor research has only very recently touched upon the relevance of
mental spaces. Ritchie (this issue) argues that the accepted dichotomy between referential and linguistic jokes is not satisfying, since both create
an event which is open to alternative interpretations, albeit by different
means. By the same token, the generally accepted view that a reader/
hearer of a joke is forced into a reinterpretation from an incorrect to a
correct interpretation of a lexical element or grammatical construction,
thus performing a frame-shifting operation, does not account for all (or
even the majority) of verbal jokes. Ritchie explores a number of jokes
that revolve around a misinterpretation by a story character, and proposes
an account of viewpoint shifts/reinterpretations in terms of mental spaces
(see also Brone forthcoming for a systematic account). Attardo (2001b)
uses a mental space account of ironical mode adoption. Mode factive
utterances (i.e. utterances allowing mode adoption), such as irony, metaphorical utterances, fiction, etc., trigger the construction of a new mental
space (next to the base/reality space) so as to allow the hearer to avoid
having to reject the utterance as ill-formed. In accordance with dLaconmtr's presuppositionfloatprinciple (1994 [1985]: 61), it is argued that
the construction of e.g. an ironical mental space avoids a clash between
the presuppositions of an utterance and those of the speaker and hearer.
What this brief overview of some of the general purpose construal operations and their relevance for humor research aims to show is that CL

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211

indeed provides some articulate tools that have not been fully explored
in linguistic humor theories. Uncovering patterns in the semantics of humorous texts, using these mechanisms, can provide useful insights into
the essentially marked character of these texts. The tension between
normal and marked use (or between prototypical and peripheral use) of
semantic-pragmatic devices seems to play an essential role in the humor
game. One of the general conclusions that can be drawn from the papers
in the present issue is that a prototypical model is needed for the use of
conceptualization operations, differing core cases in conventionalized language use from more marked uses. Analogously, from a more pragmatic
point of view, the contribution by Kotthoff advocates a highly flexible description of communication principles in terms of prototypical categories.
The second cornerstone of the cognitive linguistic philosophy of language is that linguistic structure is usage-based. Usage-based models of
language essentially state that a speaker's linguistic system is grounded
in usage events, and hence is experientially driven (Langacker 1987,
1988; Barlow and Kemmer 2000). Langacker (1988: 131) notes concisely
that "[i]n describing cognitive grammar as a 'usage-based' model of language structure, I have in mind the 'maximalist', 'non-reductive', and
'bottom-up' character of the general approach (as compared to the minimalist, reductive and top-down spirit of the generative tradition)." If the
linguistic system is indeed inherently tied to usage ("bottom-up"), then
the primary source of information is the actual use of language in context.
In contrast to most formal approaches to language, CL argues that linguistic and non-linguistic context both play an essential role in the production and processing of language. There is no strict boundary between
linguistic and contextual information, in that features of contextual (and
pragmatic) information can, through conventionalization, become part of
the linguistic system as such. The linguistic utterance as such merely functions as a cue the processor uses as a starting point in the meaning construction process (supra).
Uncovering the tight interaction between contextual and linguistic understanding is the main research goal of the steadily growing field of cognitive discourse analysis (Langacker 2001; Van Hoek et al. 1999). One of
the advantages of such a perspective is that it can provide "a valuable
corrective to the often-assumed dichotomy between cognitively-oriented
studies, which often ignore the interactional aspects of discourse, vs. interaction models, which often de-emphasize cognitive processes" (Barlow
and Kemmer 2000: xvii). This multidimensional approach can be of

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obvious interest to hiiinor researchers studying the interpersonal and inferential nature of humor. On the level of interpersonal dynamics, it needs
to he ohserved that many cases of humor directly or indirectly draw on
collaborative (Kotthoff, this issue) and adversarial (Veale et al., this
issue) strategies in interaction. Speakers in running (humorous) discourse
often huild on previously introduced strands or themes (Davies 1984),
and thus either proceed on a humorous topic in collaboration with other
participants, or counter another participant's utterance hy means of adversarial humor strategies (cf. Davies 1984 on the thematic principles of
contradiction and elaboration). The semantics of multi-agent forms of
humor has been poorly analyzed in humor research, especially in comparison to the hulk of literature on (canned) jokes, which often does not refer
to the context these jokes are delivered in. Cognitive linguistics explicitly
states that language is grounded in discourse and social interaction (Langacker 2001: 143), which means that the context of speech and shared
knowledge all play a central role in semantics, and they cannot he separated from the "core meaning" of an utterance. Langacker's notion of a
current discourse space, defined as a mental space "comprising those elements and relations construed as being shared hy the speaker and hearer
as a hasis for communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse"
(2001: 144), illustrates this unified treatment of semantics. On this view,
meaning arises in discourse through a range of cues, rather than by simply processing stored semantic information (see also the papers by Kotthoff and Coulson et al., this issue).
Apart from the general theoretical importance, positing a usage-based
model of language and conceptualization has major methodological implications as well. Usage-based theories hypothesizing a tight relationship
between linguistic structures and real usage necessarily need to base their
claims on the observation of actual data, rather than on constructed examples. This has led to a renewed attention to the empirical support of
theoretical claims, both on the level of production and processing. Production data can be drawn from corpora collecting usage material. This
way, corpus analysis can chart linguistic variation at all possible levels,
including sociolectic, dialectic, idiolectic, but also expressive variation.
As a central instance of linguistic variation, expressivity and creativity
should not be neglected in a usage-based model (see also the next section).
Kotthoff (1998, this issue) and Priego-Valverde (2003) illustrate that a
semantic-pragmatic account of meaning construction in humor can draw
interesting insights from corpus-based conversation analysis.

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Data on the processing of linguistic input can be drawn from simulation experiments like reading times, priming tests, ERP-analyses, etc.
Vaid et al. (2003) provide an overview of the various accounts that have
been proposed of the different stages of meaning activation in joke comprehension. In order to test empirically the conflicting hypotheses in the
literature, the authors used a lexical decision semantic priming experiment to measure the time course of meaning activation. Coulson et al.
(this issue) report on a number of studies that test the psychological reality of frame-shifting (supra) in joke comprehension. Self-paced reading
times for one-line jokes (see also Coulson and Kutas 1998) show that
jokes that require frame-shifting take longer to process than straight endings. These data suggest that frame-shifting requires an extra processing
cost. A complementary ERP-experiment (event-related brain potentials)
was conducted to get a more fine-grained view of the cognitive process
involved in frame-shifting (see also Coulson and Kutas 2001). It is argued
that a sustained negativity 500-900 ms is the ERP effect that indexes the
frame-shifting needed for joke comprehension. In a third experiment,
Coulson et al. measure eye movements to examine whether the reinterpretation process of frame-shifting involves an increased amount of regressions (leftward eye movements) in comparison to non-joke endings. The
eye tracking data show that total viewing duration is longer for jokes
than for non-joke controls, and that participants make more regressive
eye movements when frame-shifting is required for the interpretation. In
general, these empirical studies show a renewed awareness of the need for
experimental backup of theoretical hypotheses, a need that has been expressed, among others, by Attardo (2001a: 208). Nevertheless, this field
is still in its infancy (partly because it is notoriously difficult to design
methodologically sound tests), and needs a fair amount of basic data.
In sum, in this first section we have connected some of the basic concepts of the Cognitive Linguistics framework to the specific linguistics
of humor in an attempt to uncover common ground and new perspectives
for both cognitive linguists and humor researchers. As a stepping stone,
we used two of the key ideas in CL. First, the broad, dynamic view on
meaning as comprehensive conceptualization leads to a focus on the reflection of higher-level construal mechanisms or conceptualization operations in language. Although some of these mechanisms have been studied
at length in their relevance in the meaning construction process in humor
(e.g. framing, salience), others have gone largely unnoticed (e.g. metaphor, metonymy). It is argued in a number of papers in this issue that

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including these general cognitive mechanisms may contribute to the development of a genuinely cognitive account of verbal (as well as nonverbal) humor. A second trigger in the discussion is the cognitive hnguistic view on linguistic structure as usage-based. The implications of this
basic claim for the scope of semantic analysis and for the methodologies
that are used, are not trivial. From the perspective of production, a cognitive semantic analysis needs to take into account the rich conceptual
landscape in which meaning emerges, including semantic, pragmatic, contextual, cultural, and even (inter)personal information. This multidimensional perspective may contribute to a better understanding of the way
in which different cues jointly trigger a humorous effect. On the level of
processing, a cognitive linguistic account generates direct hypotheses that
can be tested in a simulation setting. This may provide a new impetus
for the much-needed interaction between descriptive-theoretical work and
empirical testing in linguistic humor research.
This general account of the potential contribution of a cognitive linguistic perspective on humor does not, as such, motivate why cognitive
linguists interested in linguistic structure in general may find the study
of humor compelling and worthwhile. In the next section, we pursue the
question why cognitive hnguists should (occasionally) deviate from the
accepted path of conventional language use to study more creative cases.
To a large extent, this interest arises from looking at the arguments proposed in this section from a different angle.

2.

Cognitive linguistic interest in humor

There are several levels on which a cognitive linguistic theory of meaning,

defined in a broad sense, might benefit from the inclusion of humor and
creative language as an object of research. Not claiming any exhaustiveness in this regard, we will restrict our observation to those matters which
appear most relevant to the aim and set-up of this issue.
Vis-a-vis its characterization as a usage-based, dynamic theory of
meaning as conceptualization, treating language on a par with other cognitive abilities. Cognitive Linguistics is urged to take creativity into account as a fundamental cognitive ability. In their study of scalar humor,
Bergen and Binsted (2003) emphasize the theoretical as well as methodological importance of broadening one's empirical scope to cover cases
of creativity as well: "Only by expanding our range of data to include

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215

this most human of cognitive behaviors do we do justice to our theories of

language. Artificially restricting language data to that which is considered
core or central can only serve to keep our models of language blind to the
realities of human language knowledge, and thus hobbled with respect to
the scientific method." Generally, the analysis of creative language use
used as a cover term including all kinds of verbal humor and witallows
a more accurate picture to be drawn of the way in which our experience is
structured by cognitive construal mechanisms such as metaphor, metonymy, figure/ground-arrangement, frames, etc. In the following, the impact of this observation will be discussed in more detail both with respect
to descriptive semantic theory as well as regarding psycholinguistic experiments on the processing of language.
From the perspective of semantic theory, we draw attention to four dimensions of semantic structure, in which the functionality of analyzing
non-conventionalized, creative language use for CL theory becomes apparent. A first aspect pertains to the basic CL claim concerning the nonrestrictive, encyclopedic nature of the meaning of an utterance. In many
humorous contexts like jokes, collaborative or adversarial interaction,
wordplay etc. (see Kotthoff; Veale et al., this issue), the successful processing of the intended meaning heavily depends on the activation of
experiential (cultural, social, embodied ...) knowledge shared by both
speaker and hearer in the current discourse space (Langacker 2001). The
witty effect in an exchange like (1), for instance, hinges only partially on
the exploitation ofthe linguistic structure ofthe verb to aim for. Crucial is
the activation of encyclopedic knowledge concerning Von Braun's early
career as a scientist at the service of Nazi-Germany (see Veale et al., this
issue).
(1) Von Braun (S):
Book critic (H):

I aim for the stars! (title of coffee-table book)

I aim for the stars, but I keep hitting London.
(title of book review)

A second aspect of meaning construal which is inherent to any semantic

structure, but frequently exploited in creative language use, concems the
varying degrees of salience displayed by different meanings of a single
word with respect to its usage in a given context or frame. Salience of a
word or utterance is defined in Giora (1997: 185) as "a function of its
conventionality, frequency, or givenness status in a certain (linguistic
and non-linguistic) context" (see also Giora 2003: 15ff). In the same
vein, Attardo (2001a) relates salience phenomena to the activation of

216 G. Brone et al.

scripts against the background of which meanings are being profiled. In
humorous utterances like (1), it is apparent that at any moment in unfolding discourse, interlocutors may decide to realize the cognitively salient
meaning by altering the conceptual background.
A third aspect, in which the analysis of humorous material might add
to a more comprehensive view on conceptualization concerns the inclusion of discourse as a relevant dimension for an adequate determination
of semantic structure. With regard to a discursive-cognitive analysis of
jokes, Giora (1991: 469) formulates the marked informativeness requirement, according to which "jokes and point-stories are markedly informative. Their final informative messages are marked in that they are too
distant, in terms of the number of similar features, from the messages preceding them". As such, they provide a cognitive link to the preceding
text, but at the same time they violate the expected, conventional pattern
of gradual increase in informativeness (see also Coulson 2000: 33ff; Coulson and Kutas 2001). In her pragmatically oriented contribution, Kotthoff (this issue) emphasizes the impact of discursive elements on the generation of a humorous meaning in collaborative conversation. In CL, this
observation parallels a broadening of the analytical scope, integrating discourse elements into the paradigm of Cognitive Grammar as apparent in
the Current Discourse Space model, as proposed by Langacker (2001).
Finally, the analysis of creative language use (humor) highlights prototypicality as a major structural characteristic of semantic-conceptual organization. Although since the very beginning, CL has embraced prototypicality as a basic feature of categorization, which integrates fiexibility
with structural stability (see, among others, Geeraerts 1989, 1997), most
studies in the field have related this notion to the structure of lexicalsemantic categories. Linguistic studies of creative language demonstrate
that humorous effects tend to be generated through the exploitation of
prototypical categories throughout the current discourse space. Interestingly, these categories are not restricted to the level of lexical semantics
(Veale et al., this issue), as they are also identified on the pragmatic plane
(Kotthoff, this issue). In their survey of different kinds of verbal as well as
non-verbal humor, Brone and Feyaerts (2003) demonstrate that even on a
meta-linguistic level, construal mechanisms appear as prototypically organized categories. Their analysis of one-panel cartoons and different
types of verbal expressions illustrates that a balanced processing difficulty
is achieved through the strategic manipulation and distortion of the prototypical metonymic reference-point structure, according to which "a

Introduction

217

well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that is salient and easily coded, and thereby evokeessentially automaticallya
target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name" (Langacker 1993:
30). Such manipulations may rely on, for instance, the profiling of nonessential side elements in a visual setting or an event structure as reference
points, or also the non-profiling of highly salient elements ("profile gap",
Brone and Feyaerts 2003: 3Iff). The analysis of these phenomena in
terms of non-prototypical cases of metonymic construal, rather than
humor-specific logical mechanisms, strongly invites an integrated, nonmodular CL account of humor. At the same time, however, it calls upon
CL to further refine its heuristic tools in order to live up to its name as the
framework most suitable for the analysis of dynamic meaning construction. More specifically, as instances of creative language use show, construal mechanisms seem to require a more elastic definition in terms of
prototypical characteristics in order to bring even full creativity (Bergen
and Binsted 2003) within reach of basic cognitive construal mechanisms.
By adopting a construal approach to incongruity resolution, the linguistic
interest in humor interpretation might stretch beyond the purely humor
theoretical perspective. Instead of focusing on the uniqueness of the humor phenomenon (e.g. in logical mechanisms), a CL account may reveal
the way in which day-to-day cognitive capacities are explored and pushed
to the limit for humorous purposes.
Besides its relevance for descriptive semantic theory, the analysis of creative language use (humor) also promises new insights to psycholinguistic
studies on the processing of language. In the context of this issue, we
briefiy refer to two observations whose relevance extends beyond the semantic structure of humorous utterances alone. A first benefit of tackling
humorous material through the application of experimental methods concems the psychological reality of frames, more specifically, the process of
frame shifting. In their observation of regressive eye movements, Coulson
et al. (this issue) confirm earlier reading time findings by Coulson and
Kutas (1998, 2001) as they note that "people were more likely to make
regressive eye movements when they read the joke than the straight endings, as if they wanted to re-examine earlier parts of the sentence for clues
to which altemative frames should be retrieved" (Coulson et al., this
issue). A second, related observation pertains to the multifold interaction
between the processing of both word and surrounding context (message).
Analyzing the complexity of frame-shifting jokes, Coulson et al. (this
issue) arrive at an upgraded notion of context compared to traditional

218 G. Brone etal.

psycholinguistics. Whereas the traditional psycholinguistic approach to
meaning construction focuses on the way in which context determines
the processing of lexical items (rather than how these items may have
any impact on the representation of the broader discourse event (context,
frame, message ...), Coulson et al. (this issue) use frame-shifting jokes to
demonstrate "the need for a model of message-level processing prompted
by language".

3.

Outline of the issue

In the opening paper of the issue Seana Coulson, Thomas Urbach and
Marta Kutas present the space structuring model, a cognitive linguistics
inspired model of linguistic comprehension that focuses on the interaction
between sentence processing and text processing. Using insights from that
model, the authors report on a number of experiments that test the psychological reality oi frame-shifting, the semantic and pragmatic reanalysis
that is necessary for the interpretation of the punchline of a joke. In the
case of frame-shifting, the lexical processing of the punchline triggers the
construction of cognitive models in working memory. Previous self-paced
reading and ERP (event-related brain potentials) experiments both suggest that frame-shifting involves an additional processing cost in comparison to non-joke controls. The eye-tracking study presented in this issue
confirms the results of previous studies under the more natural reading
conditions this methodology provides. In addition to the other studies,
the eye movement data show that the extra cognitive cost is not simply a
question of word recognition, since the length of the readers' initial gaze
duration of a word did not differ significantly for jokes and controls.
Rather, the cost is related to higher-level processing, as indexed by the
longer total viewing duration of words in jokes. The fact that jokes elicit
more regressive eye movements upon encountering the punch word than
straight controls provides additional evidence for the psychological reality
of a reanalysis process like frame-shifting.
Graeme Ritchie starts from the widely accepted idea in humor theories
that many jokes consist of a set-up phase, which has a salient interpretation and a punch line that suddenly forces the reader or hearer to reinterpret the set-up differently. However, the level at which the reinterpretation process occurs, is not as unambiguous as most theories observe,
since the initial misinterpretation can be situated on the level of either

Introduction 219
the reader/hearer or a character in the joke. In order to capture this stratification, Ritchie presents an account in terms of viewpoints or belief sets,
formalized by means of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994 [1985]). It is argued that the reinterpretation process does not necessarily have to be directly in the mental space of the audience, but rather, it suffices that it
happens in a viewpoint that is accessible to the audience (nested viewpoint). An in-depth analysis shows that the change of interpretation can
occur in the hearer's viewpoint, in the narrative viewpoint or in the viewpoint of a story character, hence widening the canonical view that the
reinterpretation process involves a hearer making a revision from a previously false to a correct interpretation. What is more, the higher-level, formal treatment of forced reinterpretation provides a generalization that
can not be captured by some other taxonomies (like e.g. the widely accepted verbal-referential distinction). In using a mental space account to
capture this generalization, Ritchie seems to corroborate one of the basic
claims of cognitive hnguistics, viz. that it is possible to account for a wide
range of phenomena, verbal as well as non-verbal, using a restricted set of
basic conceptual mechanisms.
Although Helga Kotthoff's analysis of conversational humor formally
figures as a pragmatic approach, this contribution also provides valuable
input to the recent discussion in Cognitive Linguistics to pursue the concept of 'usage-based hnguistics' to the full (see, among others, Geeraerts
2003). Specifically, three key notions of CL-theory may be identified, motivating the relevance of this paper for the theoretical orientation of the
present issue. First, and most importantly, Kotthoff highlights flexibihty
as a crucial characteristic of semantic/pragmatic categories such as communication principles. By doing so, she adopts an ecological view on (linguistic) categorization, which basically boils down to the adaptation
of prototype theory to linguistic analysis. This theory still represents one
of the methodological cornerstones of CL, providing a structural explanation for the differentiation between, among others, preferred (salient) and
non-preferred (less-sahent) meaning structures. Although she does not
explicitly argue in terms of 'prototypicahty,' a major point of Kotthoff's
paper concerns the flexible extension of communicative principles, thus
rejecting an "explosion of maxims" in favor of "maxim exploitation"
allowing humorous utterances to be described as "[d]eviations from normal conventional ways of speaking." Second, Kotthoff clearly adopts an
encylopedic view on semantics according to which meaning resides in the
interplay of linguistic, social and cultural factors. Although this may not

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G. Brone et al.

be an exclusive characteristic of CL, it does represent an essential facet of

its characterising semantic structure in terms of conceptual structure.
Third, Kotthoff's approachalthough mainly articulated in terms of a
pragmatic modeladheres to Langacker's description (2001) of the
"viewing frame" (or: "immediate scope of predication") being built up
through different channels of conceptualization which, next to the objective content, also contain features such as gesture, intonation, sequencing,
etc. As Kotthoff puts it: "In order to describe the production of meaning
in concrete sequences, other sorts of knowledge must be referred to (e.g.
knowledge of sequencing, stylistic expectations, discursive genres and
contextualization procedures) which constitute a collateral system of
communication." To put it the other way around: in recent years, Langacker (CDS-model) and CL have themselves embraced a more discursive approach of meaning description, thus complementing the traditional
CL-focus on lexical-semantic and grammatical constructs.
It is clear that on the basis of each of these three notions alone, a linguistic analysis cannot be claimed to be part of the Cognitive Linguistic
paradigm, especially since the two latter may be characteristic for other
approaches as well. Yet, it is the combined application of these three
features that renders this contribution particularly relevant for a CLapproach of humor.
Tony Veale, Kurt Feyaerts and Geert Brone pursue a similar argument
for the case of adversarial humor in conversation, using the cognitive linguistic notion of construal operations. A specific adversarial humor strategy is singled out, which revolves around the subversion of the linguistic
forms of exchange. Based on a technical definition of this phenomenon
they label "trumping", the authors illustrate how agents in a conversational setting can "reflect" and "distort" the linguistic-conceptual construal set up in a prior tum in conversation. A typology of trumping
mechanisms is presented, based on the different levels of linguistic organization on which the reflection or parallelism in the trumping game can be
situated. More specifically, the use of insights from cognitive linguistics
reveals that adversarial agents exploit the various conceptual mechanisms
underlying an opponent's utterances in order to tum the tables in the humor game. In doing so, an agent can trump an adversary by demonstrating a "hyper-understanding" of the lexico-conceptual meaning of an opponent's utterance. A humorous effect arises partly because the sudden
manipulation of construal operations like metaphor, metonymy and
salience abruptly redirects the information flow of the discourse space set

Introduction 221
up in the previous utterance(s) (Langacker 2001). On the basis of the
analysis, the authors conclude that a cognitive semantic account in terms
of general principles of conceptual organization provides an adequate account of the tension between markedness and transparency in humor and
exhibits an ecological validity that is lacking in most linguistic humor research. The issue finishes with a thought-provoking epilogue article by
Salvatore Attardo, who, from the point of view of the GTVH, points out
a number of potential strengths and weaknesses of the cognitive linguistic
endeavor.

4.

Perspectives for future research

If cognitive linguistics is to live up to its reputation as a framework of dynamic meaning construction, it should be demonstrably capable of handling the most dynamic aspects of humorous meaning. The papers in
this special issue, we believe, go some way toward providing such a demonstration. However, many key questions remain either unanswered, or
worse, unasked, and cognitive linguistics must prove its value on these
questions also. For instance, how does humor relate to other cognitive
and social phenomena that appear to have a strong family resemblance?
Such phenomena include: gossip (jokes, like scandalous stories of the misbehavior of others, are amongst the most contagious memes that human
society has evolved; what makes these forms such compelling vehicles
for dynamic meaning, and what meaning-construction and meaninggrounding mechanisms do they share?); insults (not always humorous,
but the most valued are always creative; why does society prize indirect
and ambiguous assaults on character as clever over more direct and unambiguous attacks?); understatement (surely some mechanism of underspecification is shared with humor?); overstatement (like metaphors, humor often exploits literal mistruth); and so on. Since cognitive linguistics
refuses to box language and meaning into strict modular compartments
of mind, we should expect the cognitive ecology it fosters to have direct
application to all of these questions.
In line with this cognitive ecology, according to which humor figures
among other cognitive phenomena requiring a holistic, integrated approach, future research is expected to benefit from an even more intensified focus on commonalities with day-to-day communication in terms of
construal mechanisms, principles of communication, etc. On this view.

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G. Brone et al.

the awareness of prototypicality as an inherent property of conceptual

and linguistic categories is of crucial importance. To what extent and in
what ways a fiexible category structure may be stretched for humorous
purposes represents a complex research topic. Ultimately, pursuing this
approach must lead to the conclusion that humor is a marked {deautomatized) yet structurally not irregular kind of language use. In terms of
specific research questions further elaborating this general hypothesis,
several topics of interest may be discerned. Finishing off, we therefore
offer a survey of four such topics, located on a theoretical/descriptive as
well as an empirical/methodological plane. Each of these topics comprises an indicative, yet non-exhaustive list of concrete research questions.

4.1.

The relationship between creativity and humor

Circumscribing the boundaries of humorous language is not a straightforward task. Although the mechanisms of humor on the one hand, and
those of metaphor, irony and linguistic creativity on the other are not
identical, neither are they are clearly demarcated categories of cognition.
To what extent does humor exploit different kinds of figurative and idiomatic language use? Is there a real difference between literal and figurative humorous language use, or is the difference as elusive, and in some
ways ideological, as it is in the study of metaphor? Just as all metaphors
are neither literally anomalous nor false, neither should a joke rely on the
perception of an incongruity to force a humorous interpretation. Certainly, metaphors can be stretched so far as to cross the line from persuasive analogy into humorous juxtaposition, but metaphors can be perceived
as humorous without negating their truth-theoretic content. Humor, like
other forms of playful creativity, rely to some extent on the "ludic" spirit
of participants. Further research is required to elucidate precisely which
mechanisms of mind are shared by creative language and humorous language, and which, if any, predates the other.

4.2.

Construal mechanisms in humor

Different types of humorous texts involve the creative manipulation of

cognitive mechanisms such as metaphor, metonymy, compression, figure/
ground alignment, generalization, specialization, etc. in order to achieve
an interpretational effect of deautomatization. To what extent does the

Introduction

223

interpretation of different types of humorous texts involve cognitive

mechanisms of construal? Do these mechanisms operate in the same, a
similar or a different way compared to non-humorous language use? To
what extent can conceptual mechanisms be characterized as essentially
flexible, prototypically organized categories?

4.3.

Interplay of quantitative and qualitative variables

Humorous utterances are extremely fragile linguistic and conceptual constructs, the meaning of which depends vitally on a nexus of quantitative
criteria (such as the time of delivery, and the activation of key expectations) and qualitative criteria (such as social context, cultural taboos,
shared world models, etc.). This fragility of humorous language makes it
an ideal linguistic form in which to theorize about the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of language and cognition.
How can we objectively determine the complexity of a given stimulus or
complexity of the intended cognitive resolution process? Should this be
based on degree of conventionahty, contextual expectation, complexity
of inferential work, the cognitive mechanisms that are exploited (e.g.
frame-shifting), or maybe a combination of all of these parameters?

4.4.

Empirical methods on the processing of humor

Many of the notions introduced in support of conceptual models of

humor are in serious need of experimental (i.e., psycholinguistic, neurohnguistic and corpus-linguistic) support if they are to hold theoretical
water. Cognitive linguistics, in prescribing a usage-based model of language, explicitly aims to develop a conceptual apparatus that is both a
beneficiary of insights from, and a source of testable hypothesizes for,
psycholinguistics (Tomasello 1998, 2002; Barlow and Kemmer 2000).
With respect to this inherent symbiosis between theory and empiricism,
the analysis of humor elicits a set of compelling issues that present a
methodological and theoretical challenge to cognitive science. To what
extent do the existing empirical methods meet the requirements of testing
the processing of complex data such as humorous expressions? What type
of methodological adjustments may be required with regard to their application to different types of humor? To what extent can formalization

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G. Brone et al.

models be useful in delineating hypotheses testable in an experimental

environment?
Many of the questions raised here are still largely unsolved, though
they have an important catalyzing role to play in deciding the future
direction of our discipline. Indeed, we expect that in the short-term a
cognitive-linguistic approach to humor will raise as many questions as it
helps to answer. With this inevitability in mind, we conclude this introduction with a question that is, for the most part, rhetorical, since we believe we already have a partial answer that is worth sharing. If the remit
of Cognitive Linguistics is considered in its broadest sense, as the Cognitive Science of language, then no account of humor will be complete without a computational dimension. This does not necessarily mean that researchers should implement computational realizations of their models,
merely that the models are unambiguous to the extent that such realizations are at least possible. The goal of course is to take subjectivity out
of the loop and to somehow capture that aspect of a humorous meaning
that humans themselves cannot always quantify without recourse to "it's
funny because it makes me laugh." This is an immense challenge and one
that we should at least aspire to. Our question then is: how should one
engage of a computationally-viable program of humor research in a cognitive linguistics framework? One should, we suggest, select a humorous
sub-phenomenon that is at once both small and easily circumscribed
(light-bulb jokes, puns, hyperbolic insults, etc.) and conceptually scalable.
Scalability is the key issue here: having constructed a detailed model of a
very specific humorous niche, one will of course want to build on this
model to capture further aspects of the humor phenomenon, but one can
only scale if an upgrade path exists between the initial niche and the
broader picture. Note that scalability depends not only on the phenomenon itself, but also on how the phenomenon is tackled and on the assumptions that are made in formalizing a model.
For instance, we would submit that while punning has the potential to
be a scalable phenomenon, the sub-phenomenon of wholly-homophonous
punning is not scalable yet that the sub-phenomenon of polysemouspunning is scalable. We base this claim on the realization that polysemous punning requires a conceptual as well as a phonetic understanding
of the domain of discourse, and this opens the door to more complex
forms of conceptual humor. Speaking for ourselves and our own contribution to this special issue, consider how the phenomenon of the "trumping insult" can be seen as a scalable sub-phenomenon. Starting with

Introduction

225

a very limited model of deautomatized idioms, one can construct a

computationally-viable model of trumping that subverts well-known
idioms using just lexico-semantic information. Thus, from this humble beginning, trumps like "he is the cream in my coffee; yes, sour cream" can
be understood and generated. From here it is a steep, but essentially
climbable upgrade path to trumps like "I am a great believer in the idiom
'drown your sorrows', but I can never persuade my wife to go swimming
with me." And from here it is an even steeper climb to humorous subversion in general, such as "the world would have a lot less litter if they
gave pointed sticks to blind people".
To this end, we believe that humor researchers should always have an
upgrade path, no matter how ambitious, and that we should always ask
the questions: "how formalizable is this phenomenon, how scalable is
this phenomenon, and where does its upgrade path lead?"
^University of Leuven
'^University College Dublin
Note
Correspondence address; geert.brone@arts.kuleuven.be

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