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Auditor-client relationship: the case of audit tenure and auditor switching in

Malaysia
Author: Abu Thahir Abdul Nasser; Emelin Abdul Wahid; Sharifah Nazatul Faiza Syed Mustapha
Nazri; Hudaib, Mohammad
ProQuest document link
Abstract (Abstract): The main purpose of this paper is to examine one aspect of auditor-client
relationship, namely audit tenure and switching behaviour, and factors affecting it. Lengthy audit
tenure with the same client has been cited as one of the threats to auditor independence. Given
the importance of this issue, this research attempts to shed some light on the effect of audit
tenure and switching behaviour on auditor independence in Malaysia. This study evaluates the
effects of various independent variables on switching behaviour and audit tenure using logistic
regression analysis. An examination of 297 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
over a period of 11 years reveals audit firm switching to be significantly associated with
distressed large clients and that the length and direction of switch depend upon the type of audit
firm. A number of important variables such as corporate governance characteristics, audit and
non-audit fees and types of audit opinion that could enhance our understanding of audit tenure
and auditor switching in Malaysia, were not incorporated into our regression models. Hence,
future studies may consider such variables. This study is the first conducted using Malaysian data
where audit tenure and switching are used as dependent variables. The results have important
implications on the auditing profession and regulators in Malaysia.

Full text: The Influence of "Culture" on Accounting and Auditing in Malaysia. Dr Ros Haniffa
1 Introduction
Auditor independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession. In general, auditor
independence can be of two forms: "independence in fact" and "independence in appearance".
The former requires auditors to form and express an opinion in the audit report as a disinterested
and expert observer, uninfluenced by personal bias, while the latter expects auditors to avoid
situations that might cause others to conclude that they are not maintaining an unbiased
objective attitude of mind ([20] Porter et al. , 2003).
[12] Flint (1988) argued that independence will be lost if the auditor is involved in a personal
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relationship with the client, as this may influence their mental attitude and opinion. One of such
threats is lengthy tenure. He contends that lengthy tenure in office may cause the auditors to
develop "over-cosy relationships" as well as strong loyalty or emotional relationships with their
clients, which could reach a stage where auditor independence is threatened. Lengthy tenure also
results in "over familiarity" and consequently, the quality and competence of auditors' work may
decline when they start to make unjustified assumptions instead of objective evaluation of current
evidence.
The GPES 1.201 (para 2.5) of the [16] ICAEW (2001) recognised that this problem may be
perceived as a threat to auditor independence and recommends that auditors avoid situations
that may lead them to become over-influenced or to be too trusting of the client's directors and
key personnel which could consequently lead to audit staff being too sympathetic to the client
interest. Since, the relationship between the auditor and his client can be close in one way or
another regardless of the number of years in office, there is little the profession can do with
regard to this matter ([11] Dunn, 1996). In other words, the profession does not object to auditors
serving their clients for a long period of time, but the objection seems to be over the worry that
long period of service may lead to "cosy relationships" that may threaten auditor independence.
Hence, to maintain public confidence in the audit function and to protect auditors' objectivity, the
profession through a series of clauses proscribes auditors from having personal relationships with
their clients that may give rise to a potential conflict of interests. One of the proposals is to have
mandatory auditor rotation ([2], [3] AICPA, 1978a, b) as it may increase auditors' ability in
protecting the public via the increase in alertness to any possible improprieties, increase in quality
service and prevent closer relationship with client ([18] Mautz, 1974; [27] Winters, 1976; [14]
Hoyle, 1978; [5] Brody and Moscove, 1998). However, some are against the idea because they
believe that the costs outweigh the benefits. Frequent rotation and switching would result in
increased audit fees as the benefits to be gained from subsequent lower cost after the initial
years of any audit would not be fully realised. Another disadvantage is that the knowledge gained
over time in improving quality of audit work would be wasted with the appointment of a new
auditor ([1] AICPA, 1992). Nevertheless, in 1994, the professional bodies in the UK introduced a
seven year rotation policy for the audit engagement partners auditing public listed companies
([20] Porter et al. , 2003). A similar rotation policy was also introduced for audit engagement
partners involved in auditing SEC registered companies ([28] Wood and Sommer, 1985; [5] Brody
and Moscove, 1998).
In Malaysia, the issue of audit tenure and interval rotation of audit firms or audit partners were
not explicitly addressed in any of the relevant Malaysian official documents such as the
Companies Act 1965, the Security Commission regulations, approved auditing standards, etc.
Lack of official pronouncements on this issue could be due to the rejection of such rotation idea by
the business community. [17] Jaffar and Alias (2002) found only 35 per cent of the audit firms'
partners and only 32.4 per cent of the chief finance officers surveyed favoured audit firm rotation
every three years of engagement. However, in light of the Enron case, the Chairman of the
Malaysian Accounting Standard Board announced the intention of the board to make it mandatory
to rotate the audit firm once every five years ([24] The Edge , 2002). While some countries are
either considering or have already imposed the five-year restriction to rotate the audit firms, the
length of audit tenure and the possible effect of switching on auditor independence in Malaysia is
still unclear. Hence, the results would highlight if audit tenure and switching should be of
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concerned before any rotation length is imposed. This is our main contribution to the literature.
Our analysis involves an examination of 297 Malaysian listed companies between 1990 and 2000
using logistic regression. Results indicate the probability of switching the audit firm is greatest for
distressed large client and that the direction of switch and length of tenure are dependent on type
of audit firm. This implies that auditors in such environment fear losing their tenure and being
switched, hence their independence and objectivity may be impaired. As such, we assert that
rotation policy should be partially imposed on distressed clients as a first step forward in
protecting auditor independence in the country. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section
discusses the literature review and the development of the hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 present
the research method and results, respectively. Section 5 presents the summary and conclusions.
2 Literature review and development of hypotheses
It has been suggested in the literature that larger audit firms (Big 4) are usually perceived as
more capable of maintaining an adequate degree of independence than their smaller
counterparts because they usually provide a range of services to a large number of clients, hence
reducing their dependence on certain clients ([10] Dopuch, 1984; [26] Wilson and Grimlund,
1990). In addition, larger audit firms are generally perceived as the provider of high audit quality
and enjoy a high reputation in the business environment and as such, would strive to maintain
their independence to keep up their image ([9] DeAngelo, 1981; [10] Dopuch, 1984; [26] Wilson
and Grimlund, 1990). Furthermore, larger audit firms are also perceived to be more independent
than their smaller counterparts in withstanding management's pressure in the event of disputes
as they normally have more clients and can afford to give up some of their more "difficult" clients
([8] Chow and Rice, 1982).
In Malaysia, high dependence on a few clients has been found to affect perception of
independence ([23] Teoh and Lim, 1996). This is not surprising as the market for audit services for
public companies in Malaysia is dominated by the international Big 4 (previously the Big 6) audit
firms. In fact, [7] Che-Ahmad and Derashid (1996) report that the Big 6 (and their affiliates)
audited 75.9 per cent of the Bursa Malaysia (Main Board) listed companies in 1991. Based on the
above arguments, we expect the length of tenure by Big 4 audit firms to be significantly longer as
their clients would be less likely to switch them compared to their smaller counterparts. Hence,
the H1 is stated as follows:H1. The probability of switching big audit firms (Big 4) is significantly
lower than the probability of switching smaller audit firms, ceteris paribus. Besides the possible
effect of the type of audit firms on the length of tenure, the choice of audit firm can be related to
the size of the auditee and the type of services needed. It has been argued that larger auditees,
due to the complexity of their operations and the increase in the separation between
management and ownership, demand highly independent audit firm to reduce agency costs ([25]
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and auditors' self-interest threat ([15] Hudaib and Cooke, 2005).
Furthermore, as the size of the companies increases, it is likely that the number of agency
conflicts also increases and this might increase the demand for quality-differentiated auditors
([19] Palmrose, 1984), i.e. Big 4 audit firms.
Based on the above arguments, we expect the length of tenure of auditors of large clients to be
longer than that of auditors of smaller clients in Malaysia. In other words, we expect the
propensity to switch auditors to be lower for large clients than their smaller counterparts. This
leads us to the following hypothesis: H2. The probability of large clients switching audit firms is
significantly lower than the probability of small clients switching audit firms, ceteris paribus. When
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businesses continue to grow, the demand for the highly independent and qualified audit firm to
reduce agency costs and to provide non-audit services needed for the expansion of the firm
increases. Therefore, growing businesses are expected to be more likely to retain their audit firms
than their lower growth counterparts. [22] Sinason et al. (2001) examined 16,976 COMPUSTAT
companies in the US over a period of 20 years and found that audit tenure is significantly affected
by client's growth rate.
Since, the literature indicates that audit tenure is affected by the client's growth rate, we
hypothesised the length of tenure of auditors of high growth clients in Malaysia to be longer than
low growth clients. In other words, high growth clients are less likely to switch their auditors. As
such, our next hypothesis is: H3. The probability of high growth clients switching audit firms is
significantly lower than the probability of low growth clients switching audit firms, ceteris paribus.
The financial position of auditees may have important implications on decisions in retaining the
audit firm. Auditees who are insolvent (have high gearing ratios) and are experiencing an
unhealthy financial position are more likely to engage auditors having high independence to boost
the confidence of shareholders and creditors as well as to reduce the risk of litigation ([13] Francis
and Wilson, 1988). In addition, financially stressed clients are more likely to replace their audit
firms compared to their healthier counterparts ([21] Schwartz and Menon, 1985; [15] Hudaib and
Cooke, 2005).
As such, we expect auditors of distressed clients to have shorter tenure compared to their
counterparts auditing healthier clients and will in turn be less likely to be switched. The next
hypothesis is stated as follows:H4. The probability of distressed clients switching audit firms is
significantly higher than the probability of healthier clients switching audit firms, ceteris paribus.
[22] Sinason et al. (2001) found the length of audit tenure to be positively affected by the type of
audit firm. In other words, smaller audit firms experience shorter tenure compared to their larger
counterparts who often enjoy lengthy tenure. Differences in the length of tenure between the two
types of audit firms could impair independence because in the long run, small audit firms will find
it difficult to keep their existing clients and at the same time maintain a high degree of
independence and objectivity due to increased competition and size mismatch. Ideally, the size of
audit firm should match the size of auditee. A size mismatch between large auditees audited by
small audit firms could cause termination of the audit engagement ([15] Hudaib and Cooke,
2005), i.e. a switch of auditor.
Since, there are four possibilities of switching auditors, viz. switch from non-Big 4 to non-Big 4,
from non-Big 4 to Big 4, from Big 4 to non-Big 4 and from Big 4 to Big 4, we expect the lengths of
tenure for the four types of switches to be significantly different. Specifically, we hypothesise that:
H5. The length of audit tenure for non-Big 4 replaced by Big 4 ( ) is significantly shorter than the
2

length of audit tenure for non-Big 4 replaced by another non-Big 4 ( ). Hence, .

1

where, , switched from non-Big 4 to non-Big 4; , switched from non-Big 4 to Big 4; ,

1

switched from Big 4 to non-Big 4; , switched from Big 4 to Big 4.

4

3 Research method
3.1 Data sources
There were 810 listed companies on both the main and second board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange (KLSE) or Bursa Malaysia as at 10 June 2002. The sample of this study consists of 297
randomly selected companies listed on both boards. Based on the sample error formula ([6] Burns
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and Bush, 2003), a sample size of 297 is deemed appropriate. The relevant data had been
collected from KLSE Research Institute Database for a period of 11 years from 1990 to 2000.
Besides the relevant financial statements, the relevant audit reports of the sample firms available
at KLSE were also used in this research.
The dependent variables are auditor switching (SWITCH ) and the four directions of switch ( )
t

xt

which are noted from the audit reports during the study period. The independent variables consist
of book value of equity (BVE) and market value of equity (MVE), client size (CLI.SIZE), changes in
total assets (Ln TA), changes in sales (Ln S ), type of audit firm (AUDIT), changes in income
from continuing operations in the two years preceding the audit change (Ln R ), financial
t -2

distress of the client company (Ln Z ),[1] interactive effects of length of tenure held by Big 4 and
non-Big 4 before being switched (TENU*AUDIT ) and the interactive effects of length of tenure
xt

before the first switch (TENU*B1.SWI).

3.2 Data analysis
Logistic regression was adopted to assess the relationships since the dependent variables are
dichotomous. The model parameters are estimated using the maximum-likelihood method
whereby the coefficients that make the observed results most "likely" are selected on the basis of
an iterative algorithm. Furthermore, the maximum-likelihood method has also the advantage of
asymptotic normality ([15] Hudaib and Cooke, 2005). Model 1 has the dependent variable as
switching/non-switching (SWITCH ) and Model 2, direction of switching/otherwise ( ). Model 1
t

xt

provides answers to the research hypotheses associated with audit tenure and switching while
Model 2 investigates the impact of independent variables on the directions of auditor switching.
3.3 Model specification
3.3.1 Model 1
We use the following logistic regression model to test for the relationships between auditor
switching (SWITCH ) and type of audit firm (AUDIT), client size (CLI.SIZE), client growth (Ln S ),
t

client financial risk (Ln Z ), the interactive effects of length of tenure of remaining in the office
before being switched (TENU*AUDIT ), the change in operating income (Ln R ), change in
xt

t -2

market value of equity (Ln MVE) as well as change in total assets (Ln TA): Equation 1 [Figure
omitted. See Article Image.] SWITCH is a binary variable indicating whether or not the audit firm
t

was switched or not switched. The other independent variables are as summarised in Table I
[Figure omitted. See Article Image.].
3.3.2 Model 2
To further explain the impact of independent variables on the switched directions of audit firms (

xt

), the following logistic regression model was adopted to test the association between auditor
switching from one type of audit firm to another and the nine independent variables, viz. type of
audit firm (AUDIT), client size (CLI.SIZE), client growth (Ln S ), financial risk (Ln Z ), change in
operating income (Ln R ), change in market value of equity (Ln MVE), the change in total
t -2

assets (Ln TA), the interactive effects of length of tenure before the first switching
(TENU*B1.SWI) and the interactive effects of length of tenure of a large audit firm (Big 4)
remaining in the office before being switched (TENU*AUDIT

B4

): Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See

Article Image.] The model is run four times to cover all switch directions taken by clients to
appoint their new audit firms after terminating the services of their incumbent audit firms.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics for the
experimental, control and dependent variables. The mean size of clients is RM 1.5 billion. The
negative signs in the mean values indicate poor financial performance during the period of
analysis. Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] (Panel B) reports the descriptive statistics of
the dichotomous variables. It can be seen from the table that the sample consisted of 43 per cent
(129) large companies, 60 per cent (175) Big 4 and 29 per cent (87) cases of audit termination
(switching). It also shows that switching from small to large audit firm (i.e. from non-Big 4 to Big 4)
is the most common type of auditor change (36 cases), followed by switching from small audit
firm to small audit firm (23 cases) and switching from large audit firm to large audit firm (19
cases). Not surprising, the least common type of auditor switch is from large audit firm to small
audit firm (9 cases).
Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] presents the correlation matrix for the dependent and
continuous independent variables. It indicates no multicollinearity problem, as the correlations are
relatively low except the correlation between two independent variables: type of audit firm
(AUDIT) and (TENU*AUDIT - the tenure length of Big 4 and non-Big 4). Therefore, AUDIT and
xt

TENU*AUDIT are dropped when we run our regression models.

nB4

4.2 Results of the logistic regressions

4.2.1 Model 1
Model 1 tests which independent variables (viz. client size, client growth, client financial risk, the
length tenure in the office before being switched, the changes in operating income, market value
of equity as well as the changes in total assets) explain the behaviour of ending audit firm tenure
in office (i.e. audit switching). The results are shown in Table IV [Figure omitted. See Article
Image.]. Client size, client financial risk, the changes in total assets and the interactive effects of
the length of tenure in office before switching large audit firm (TENU*AUDIT

B4

), were found to be

significantly associated with audit switching while client growth, changes in operating income and
market value of equity were found not to be significant. The results indicate that the main factors
for switching audit firm are the increase in total assets and the financial risk of the company. The
highest log odds of CLI.SIZE [Exp(B)=1.76] indicates that client size is the most important factor
followed by financial risk in explaining switching and as such H2 and H4 are accepted. However,
the growth of company's business, the increase in operating income and increase in market value
do not affect the length of tenure of the audit firm, thus allowing us to reject H3 . The fact that the
length of tenure of large audit firms (Big 4) is negatively associated with switching suggests that
larger audit firms experience fewer instances of being replaced compared to their smaller
counterparts who face shorter tenure as they tend to be replaced more often and as such, H1 is
accepted.
4.2.2 Model 2
Table V [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] shows the results of testing Model 2, i.e. the impact of
various independent variables on the four switching directions ( ). As indicated by the results,
xt

the only factor that significantly impacts switching behaviour is the interactive effects of length of
tenure before the first switch (TENU*B1.SWI), followed by changes in total assets of the client (Ln
TA).
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Table VI [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] (Panel A) provides details on the pattern of switching
behaviour. As can be seen, switching for similar sized audit firms, i.e. switching from a small audit
firm to another or from a large audit firm to another, often occurs after lengthy tenure. However,
switching to dissimilar sized audit firms, i.e. switching from a small to a large audit firm or from a
large to a small audit firm, occurs in a relatively shorter period. This suggests that the propensity
to switch to a large audit firm is greater for clients experiencing an increase in total assets.
We further extended our analysis by using ordinary least squares regression where TENU*B1.SWI
is the independent variable to test the H5 . The results are reported in Table VI [Figure omitted.
See Article Image.] (Panel B). The results show that the length of tenure is longer for similar sized
switching of audit firms and shorter for dissimilar sized switching of audit firms. Hence, based on
the results, H5 is accepted.
5 Summary and conclusions
This paper examines audit tenure and switching behaviour in the Malaysian audit environment for
the period from 1990 to 2000. It provides evidence on the relationships between switching and
five related variables, viz. the interactive effects of length tenure of Big 4 before being replaced
(TENU*AUDIT

B4

), client size (CLI.SIZE), client growth (Ln S ), client financial risk (Ln Z ) and four

switching directions ( ). The results show that retention of audit firms depends on the size of
xt

clients based on total assets, level of financial risk and type of audit firm but not by changes in
operating income and market value. The likelihood of non-distressed large client audited by large
audit firm to switch is significantly less compared with distressed small client audited by small
audit firm. Results also show that switching directions are mainly influenced by the interaction
between directions of switch and type of audit firm with the length of tenure. Length of tenure
before switching from a small to a large audit firm is significantly shorter compared to the length
of tenure before switching from a small to another small audit firm. Large audit firms were found
to secure longer tenure. Hence, such differences in the lengths of tenure suggest independence
impairment.
Since, financially distressed clients are more likely to switch audit firms, the smaller auditors
would be more reluctant to qualify their reports or show disagreement with their clients for fear of
being dismissed and losing a client. The implication of this finding is that such audit-client
relationship may impair auditor independence and weaken audit quality. This in turn has
important implications for policy makers in Malaysia since auditor independence may be impaired
due to the unhealthy competition among the audit firms.
This study is subject to several limitations. First, corporate governance characteristics that would
shed more light on this topic were not included in our analysis. Second, we have not considered
the effects of audit and non-audit fees on audit tenure and the decision to retain auditor. Third, we
did not consider types of audit opinion and how receiving qualified opinion might affect the
decision to switch or retain the audit firm. Hence, future studies should consider such variables in
the models to enhance our understanding of the Malaysian audit environment.
The authors acknowledge the research funding from IRDC of University Teknologi Mara, Malaysia
in conducting this research.
Footnote
1. [4] Beaver (1968) used the ratio of cash flow from operations over long-term debt to diagnose
financial risk of the company.
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References
1. AICPA (1992), Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly
held Companies, American Institute of Certified Public Accountant: SEC Practice Section, New
York, NY.
2. AICPA (1978a), The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and
Recommendations, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, NY.
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NY.
4. Beaver, W.H. (1968), "Alternative accounting measures as predictors of failure", The Accounting
Review, January, pp. 113-22.
5. Brody, R.G. and Moscove, S.A. (1998), "Mandatory auditor rotation", The National Public
Accountant, pp. 32-5.
6. Burns, A.C. and Bush, R.F. (2003), Marketing Research, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.
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listed companies", Journal Analysis, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 33-45.
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Accounting Review, Vol. LVII, pp. 326-35.
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Accounting and Economics, August, pp. 113-27.
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setting: an empirical investigation: discussion", in Abdel-Khalik, A. and Solomon, I. (Eds) paper
presented at Auditing Research Symposium, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, pp. 253-63.
11. Dunn, J. (1996), Auditing: Theory &Practice, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.
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Ltd, London.
13. Francis, J. and Wilson, E.R. (1988), "Auditor changes: a joint test of theories relating to agency
costs and auditor differentiation", The Accounting Review, Vol. 63, pp. 663-82.
14. Hoyle, J. (1978), "Mandatory auditor rotation: the argument and alternative", Journal of
Accountancy, pp. 69-78.
15. Hudaib, M. and Cooke, T.E. (2005), "The impact of managing director changes and financial
distress on audit qualification and auditor switching", Journal of Business Finance &Accounting,
Vol. 32 Nos 9/10, pp. 1703-39.
16. ICAEW (2001), Members Handbook 2001, Institute of Charted Accountants in England and
Wales, London.
17. Jaffar, N. and Alias, N. (2002), "Audit firm rotation in Malaysia: prospects and problems",
Finance India, Vol. XVI No. 3, pp. 933-48.
18. Mautz, R.K. (1974), "Rotation of auditors", Financial Executive, July, pp. 48-56.
19. Palmrose, Z. (1984), "The demand for quality-differentiated audit services in an agency-cost
setting: an empirical investigation", in Abdel-Khalik, A. and Solomon, I. (Eds) paper presented at
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Auditing Research Symposium 1984, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL.

20. Porter, B., Simon, J. and Hatherly, D. (2003), Principles of External Auditing, Wiley, Chichester.
21. Schwartz, K.B. and Menon, K. (1985), "Auditor switches by failing firms", The Accounting
Review, Vol. LX, pp. 248-61.
22. Sinason, D.H., Jones, J.P. and Shelton, S.W. (2001), "An investigation of auditor and client
tenure", Mid-American Journal of Business, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 31-40.
23. Teoh, H. and Lim, C. (1996), "An empirical study of the effects of audit committees, disclosure
of nonaudit fees, and other issues on audit independence: Malaysian evidence", Journal of
International Accounting, Auditing &Taxation, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 231-48.
24. The Edge (2002), "Column 4th", The Edge, 5 November, pp. 2-3.
25. Watts, R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L. (1986), Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
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reputation", Auditing: A Journal of Practice &Theory, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 43-59.
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Appendix
Corresponding author
Mohammad Hudaib can be contacted at: m.hudaib@Bradford.ac.uk
AuthorAffiliation
Abu Thahir Abdul Nasser, Faculty of Accountancy, University Technology Mara, Johor, Malaysia
Emelin Abdul Wahid, Faculty of Accountancy, University Technology Mara, Johor, Malaysia
Sharifah Nazatul Faiza Syed Mustapha Nazri, Faculty of Accountancy, University Technology Mara,
Selangor, Malaysia
Mohammad Hudaib, Department of Accounting and Finance, Bradford University School of
Management, Bradford, UK
Illustration
Equation 1
Equation 2
Table I: Variables in the logistic regression models
Table II: Descriptive statistics
Table III: Correlation matrix
Table IV: Multivariate logistic analysis: propensity to switch (Model 1)
Table V: Multivariate logistic analysis: propensity to switch (Model 2)
Table VI: Crosstabs between length of tenure with the four directions and regression results
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Subject: Studies; Auditors; Client relationships;

Location: Malaysia
Classification: 9130: Experimental/theoretical; 4130: Auditing; 2400: Public relations; 9179:
Asia & the Pacific
Publication title: Managerial Auditing Journal
Volume: 21
Issue: 7
Pages: 724-737
Publication year: 2006
Publication date: 2006
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing, Limited
Place of publication: Bradford
Country of publication: United Kingdom
Publication subject: Business And Economics--Management
ISSN: 02686902
Source type: Scholarly Journals
Language of publication: English
Document type: Feature
Document feature: Equations Tables References
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686900610680512
ProQuest document ID: 274697959
Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/274697959?accountid=50257
Copyright: Copyright Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2006
Last updated: 2014-05-18
Database: ABI/INFORM Complete

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