COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES

BOOK III
by
Thomas Aquinas
CONTENTS

Distinction 1: Why Incarnation? Why the

Son?
Distinction 2: Why human nature? How
assumed?
Distinction 3: Sanctification of Mary;
conception of Christ
Distinction 4: Role of Holy Spirit; Mary
mother; grace of Christ
Distinction 5: Union of divine and human
Question 1: The union (tr. Jason L.A.
West)
Article 1: What is union?
Article 2: Did the union take place in
the nature?
Article 3: Is Christ one person, with the
union in the person?
Question 2: The assumer
Question 3: The assumed
Distinction 6: The composition of
Christ (tr. Jason L.A. West)
Question 1
Question 2
Article 1: Is Christ two in a neuter
sense?
Article 2: Is there only one existence in
Christ?
Question 3
Distinction 7: "Is", "made",
"predestined"
Distinction 8: Human and divine birth
of Jesus
Distinction 9: Worship and honor
Distinction 10: Christ as man,
adoption, predestination
Distinction 11: Christ created?

Distinction 16: Why he suffered and died; the

Transfiguration
Distinction 17: Christ's human and divine wills
Distinction 18: Christ's merit
Distinction 19: What Christ's suffering freed us
from; Mediator
Distinction 20: Satisfaction; other ways of
redemption?
Distinction 21: The death and resurrection of
Christ
Distinction 22: Death, descent to underworld,
ascension
Distinction 23: Virtues in general, faith
Distinction 24: Objects and merit of faith
Distinction 25: Articles of Creed; explicit,
implicit faith
Distinction 26: Hope
Distinction 27: Charity
Distinction 28: Whom we must love
Distinction 29: Order and grades of love
Distinction 30: Love of enemies
Distinction 31: Loss of charity; the book of life;
charity in next life
Distinction 32: God's love
Distinction 33: Moral virtues in general;
cardinal and adjunct virtues
Distinction 34: Gifts of Holy Spirit
Distinction 35: Active and contemplative life
Distinction 36: The connection of virtues
Distinction 37: The ten commandments
Distinction 38: Kinds of lying
Distinction 39: Perjury
Distinction 40: Old and New Law compared

Distinction 12: Christ's beginning,

power of sinning, gender
Distinction 13: The grace of Christ
Distinction 14: Christ's knowledge
Distinction 15: Which defects,
suffering, passions had he?

Sentences Commentary: In III Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 2

Utrum unio sit facta in natura. Ad secundum "Whether the Union was Brought about in the
sic proceditur.
Nature?"
Videtur quod unio sit facta in natura. Quod 1. It seems that the union was brought about in the
enim constat ex duabus naturis, videtur
nature. For what consists of two natures seems to
habere unam naturam mediam inter illa,
have one nature in the middle between them, as a
sicut mixtum quod constat ex quatuor
mixed thing which consists of the four elements.
elementis. Sed Christus constat ex duabus But Christ consists of two natures according to
naturis, secundum Augustinum, qui dicit,
Augustine (Enchir. 35) who says, that from each
quod ex utraque substantia, scilicet divina et substance, namely divine and human, there is one
humana, est unus Dei et hominis Filius.
Son of God and of man. Therefore, he seems to
Ergo videtur habere unam naturam ex
have one nature composed from both.
utrisque compactam.
Praeterea, natura, secundum quod hic
2. Further, nature, in the sense we are speaking of
loquimur, est unumquodque informans
here, is the specific difference informing each and
specifica differentia, ut dicit Boetius in lib. de every thing, as Boethius says in the book
duabus naturis. Sed Philosophus dicit, quod Concerning the Two Natures. But the Philosopher
semper una differentia addita mutat
says (Metaphysics 8, 10) that one added difference
speciem, sicut in numeris quaelibet unitas always changes the species, as in numbers any
addita facit novam speciem numeri. Ergo
added unity makes a new species of number.
humana natura addita divinae facit novam Therefore, human nature added to the divine
naturam secundum speciem.
nature makes a new nature according to species.
Si dicatur, quod non potest una natura
constitui ex duabus, quia oportet utramque
naturam servari in Incarnatione; contra.
Anima et corpus constituunt humanam
naturam. Utrumque tamen, scilicet corpus et
anima, intransmutatum permanet in sua
natura. Ergo ex duabus naturis potest tertia
constitui, utraque remanente salva.

3. If it is said that one nature cannot be constituted

from two because it is necessary that each nature
be preserved in the Incarnation, then one may
reply as follows. A soul and body constitute a
human nature. Yet, each, namely soul and body,
remains unchanged in its own nature. Therefore a
third nature can be constituted from two natures,
while each of the two is preserved.

Praeterea, proprietas sequitur naturam eius

cuius est proprietas. Sed proprietates
divinae naturae dicuntur de illo homine:
dicitur enim, quod ille homo creavit stellas;
et e converso dicitur, quod Filius Dei est
passus. Ergo videtur quod aliquid divinae
naturae est in humana natura, et aliquid
humanae sit in divina; et sic videtur esse
facta quaedam coniunctio naturarum in

4. A property follows the nature of that whose

property it is. But, the properties of the divine
nature are attributed to that man. For, it is said that
that man created the stars and conversely, it is said
that the Son of God suffered. Therefore, it seems
that something of the divine nature is in the human
nature, and that something of the human is in the
divine; and so there seems to be a certain joining
of natures in one nature.

unam naturam.
Praeterea, quando aliqua duo coniunguntur
quorum unum multum superat alterum, hoc
quod superatur transit in naturam
superantis, sicut si gutta vini in mille
amphoras proiiciatur aquae. Sed natura
divina in infinitum superat humanam. Ergo
humana natura coniuncta divinae, tota
convertitur in divinam.

5. Further, when any two things are joined, one of

which goes beyond the other, the one which is
exceeded changes into the nature of the one which
exceeds, just as if a drop of wine were thrown into
a thousand vessels of water. But the divine nature
infinitely exceeds the human nature. Therefore,
[when] the human nature is joined to the divine, the
whole is changed into the divine.

Praeterea, hoc videtur per hoc quod caro

Christi dicitur deificata a sanctis, sicut
Damascenus narrat.

6. Besides, this [natural union] seems to be the

case because the flesh of Christ is called deified
by the saints as Damascene reports (5,11).

Sed contra, filiatio requirit similitudinem in

natura. Sed Christus dicitur Filius Dei Patris
et Virginis matris. Ergo est similis in natura
utrique. Sed Virgo et Deus Pater non
communicant in aliqua natura. Ergo oportet
Christum ponere duarum naturarum.

To the contrary, filiation requires a similarity in

nature. But Christ is called the Son of God the
Father and of the Virgin mother. Therefore, he is
similar in nature to both. But the Virgin and God the
Father do not share in any nature. Therefore, it is
necessary to posit a Christ of two natures.

Praeterea, per proprietates naturales in

cognitionem naturae devenimus. Sed in
Christo invenimus proprietates duarum
naturarum, ut humanae et divinae. Ergo
oportet Christum duarum naturarum ponere.

Further, we arrive at an understanding of a nature

through natural properties. But in Christ we find the
properties of two natures, that of human nature and
that of divine nature. Therefore, it is necessary to
posit a Christ of two natures.

Respondeo dicendum, quod ad huius

Solution: I answer that for a clear understanding of
quaestionis evidentiam oportet scire, quid this question it is necessary to know what the
nomen naturae significet. Natura autem a
name "nature" signifies. But, "nature" takes its
nascendo nomen accepit; quae proprie
name from being born (nascendo) and this is
dicitur generatio viventium ex similibus
properly called the generation of living things
similia in specie producentium; unde
producing things similar in species from similar
secundum primam sui institutionem natura things. Hence, according to the first institution [of
significat generationem ipsam viventium,
the word] nature signifies the generation itself of
scilicet nativitatem. Item translatum est
living things, namely, nativity. Further, the name
nomen naturae ad significandum principium "nature" was transferred to signifying the active
activum illius generationis: quia virtutes
principle of that generation: because the agent
agentes ex actibus nominari consueverunt. powers are accustomed to be named from [their]
Inde ulterius procedit nomen naturae ad
acts. From this the name "nature" came to be used
significandum principium activum cuiuslibet to signify the active principle of any natural motion:
motus naturalis: et ulterius ad significandum and further to signifying even the material principle
etiam principium materiale cuiuslibet
of any generation: and from that to also signifying
generationis: et inde etiam ad significandum the formal principle, which is the terminus of
principium formale, quod est terminus
generation. But because generation is not
generationis. Sed quia non solum generatio terminated merely at form, but at a composite
terminatur ad formam, sed ad substantiam substance, [the word nature] was thus transferred
compositam; ideo translatum est ad
to signifying any substance, according to what the
significandum quamlibet substantiam,
Philosopher says in 5 Metaphys. (text 5), and also
secundum quod dicit Philosophus in 5
for signifying any being (ens) as well, as Boethius
metaph., et ad significandum etiam
says.

quodlibet ens, sicut dicit Boetius.

Substantia autem, praeter significationes
quibus forma vel materia dicitur substantia,
dicitur duobus modis, secundum
Philosophum 5 metaph. Uno modo
subiectum ipsum quod dicitur hoc aliquid, et
de altero non praedicatur, ut hic homo,
secundum quod substantia significatur
nomine hypostasis; et secundum hanc
significationem substantia dicitur natura
secundum quod natura est quod agere vel
pati potest, ut dicit Boetius in praedicto libro.
Alio modo dicitur substantia quod quid erat
esse, idest quidditas et essentia, quam
significat definitio cuiuslibet rei, prout
significatur nomine usiae; et sic etiam
substantia dicitur natura, secundum quod
Boetius dicit, quod natura est unumquodque
informans specifica differentia: quia ultima
differentia est quae definitionem complet.

However, "substance", besides the significations

by which form or matter are called substance, is
used in two ways according to the Philosopher. In
one way, substance is used of the subject itself
which is called a "this something" and is not
predicated of another, e.g. this man, insofar as a
substance is signified by the name hypostasis; and
according to this signification a substance is called
a nature insofar as nature is what can act and be
acted upon, as Boethius says in the
aforementioned book. In another way substance is
used of "that which it was to be", that is the quiddity
and essence which the definition of anything
signifies. This is the sense of substance signified
by the name "ousia"; and so a substance is also
called a nature, in accordance with what Boethius
says, that "nature is the specific difference
informing each and every thing"; since the ultimate
difference is what completes the definition.

Relictis ergo omnibus aliis significationibus Leaving aside all other significations of nature, we
naturae, secundum hanc tantum
ask, according to this signification alone, whether
significationem quaeritur, utrum in Christo there is one nature in Christ or many. But, if there
sit una natura vel plures. Si autem sit una
were only one [nature], then [there would be] either
tantum, vel altera earum tantum, vel
one of these [natures] alone or a nature composed
composita ex utrisque. Si altera earum
from both. If one of these alone, this would come
tantum, hoc erit dupliciter. Uno modo nulla about in two ways. In one way, with no joining of
adiunctione interveniente unius ad alteram; one nature to another intervening; and thus if there
et sic si sit divina tantum, nihil novum accidit were only the divine nature, nothing new would
in hoc quod Verbum caro factum est, et
happen in this, that the Word was made flesh, and
incarnatio nihil est. Si vero sit humana
the incarnation is nothing. But, if it were only the
tantum, non differt Christus ab aliis
human nature, Christ would not differ from other
hominibus, et perit incarnatio. Alio modo
men, and the incarnation perishes. In the second
altera naturarum transeunte in alteram; quod way, one of the natures passes over into the other;
non potest esse: quia quae non
which cannot be: since those things which do not
communicant in materia, non possunt in
share in matter are not able to pass over into one
invicem transire; divina autem natura
another. But, the divine nature is entirely
penitus est immaterialis, nedum ut
immaterial, still less does it share a human nature
communicet humanae in materia. Praeterea in matter. Further, if the divine nature passed over
si divina natura transiret in humanam,
into the human nature, the simplicity and
tolleretur simplicitas et immutabilitas divinae immutability of the divine nature would be
naturae; si vero humana verteretur in
destroyed; but, if the human were changed into the
divinam, tolleretur veritas passionis, et
divine, the truth of the passion and of everything
omnium quae corporaliter operatus est
which Christ did corporeally would be destroyed.
Christus.
Si autem esset una natura composita ex
duabus, hoc posset esse dupliciter. Uno

However, if one nature were composed from two,

this could be in two ways. In one way, some third

modo quia tertia natura componeretur ex

duabus naturis non manentibus, sicut ex
quatuor elementis componitur mixtum; et
secundum hoc poneretur divina natura
passibilis et materialis, quia mixtio non est
nisi eorum quae communicant in materia, et
nata sunt agere et pati ad invicem; et
tolleretur fides confitens Christum esse
verum Deum et verum hominem. Alio modo
quod componeretur ex duabus naturis
manentibus: et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo
secundum commensurationem vel
continuationis vel contiguationis; et
secundum hoc poneretur divina natura
corporea: quia continuatio et contactus
corporum est. Alio modo secundum
informationem, sicut ex anima et corpore fit
unum; et hoc etiam non potest esse: quia
per modum istum non fit unum ex duobus
actibus nec ex duabus potentiis, sed ex actu
et potentia, secundum Philosophum: divina
autem natura et humana, utraque est ens
actu. Praeterea divina natura non habet
aliquid potentialitatis, nec potest esse actus
veniens in compositionem alicuius, cum sit
esse primum infinitum per se subsistens.
Patet igitur quod quocumque modo ponatur
una natura in Christo, sequitur error: et ideo
Eutyches, qui hoc posuit, ut haereticus
condemnatus est.

nature would be composed from two natures which

do not remain, as a mixed thing is composed from
the four elements; and according to this a passible
and material divine nature would be posited,
because there is no mixture except of those things
which share in matter, and which they are fitted to
act upon one another and to be acted upon; and
the faith confessing Christ to be true God and true
man would be destroyed. In another way,
something is composed from two natures which
remain; and this in two ways. In one way according
to commensuration, either of succession or of
contiguity; and according to this a corporeal divine
nature would be posited: because succession and
contact belong to bodily things. In another way,
according to formation, as one thing comes out of a
body and a soul, and this also cannot be, because
through that way one thing does not come to be
from two acts or two potencies, but from act and
potency, according to the Philosopher, (De Anima,
2,2): but, the divine nature and the human nature
are each a being in act. Moreover, the divine
nature does not have any potentiality, nor can it be
an act joining into the composition of another,
since it is the first infinite being subsisting through
itself. Therefore, it is obvious that in whatever way
one nature is posited in Christ an error follows.
Thus, Eutyches, who posited this, was condemned
as a heretic.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid

Resp. 1: Something consists of two natures, yet it
constat ex duabus naturis, non tamen ex
is not from two natures as a mixed thing is from
duabus sicut mixtum ex elementis: quia et in elements: because in such things it is necessary
talibus oportet quod sit media natura
that there be a middle nature constituted from two
constituta ex duabus non manentibus.
which do not remain. But, Christ consists of two
Christus autem constat ex duabus naturis ita natures in such a way that he subsists in two
quod in duabus naturis salvatis subsistit: est remaining natures. For he is of human and divine
enim naturae divinae et humanae: et ideo
nature. Therefore, the argument does not follow.
ratio non sequitur.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit
Avicenna, differentia nominat totam naturam
speciei; alias non praedicaretur de specie;
sed non nominat ex toto, sed ex parte,
scilicet formali principio: dicitur enim
rationale habens rationem. Genus autem e
converso nominat totum ex principio
materiali. Unde differentia non additur
differentiae per hoc quod natura additur

Resp. 2: As Avicenna says the difference names

the whole nature of the species; otherwise, it would
not be predicated of the species; but it does not
name from the whole, but from the part, namely,
from the formal principle. For example, something
is called rational as having reason. But conversely,
the genus names the whole from the material
principle. Hence the difference is not added to a
difference through this, that the nature is added to a

naturae, sed per hoc quod ulterius

principium formale additur, sicut
intellectivum supra sensitivum. Talis autem
additio non est in Christo: non enim una
natura additur alteri sicut formalis respectu
illius, ut dictum est.

nature, but through this, that a further formal

principle is added, as the intellective principle is
added above the sensitive principle. But, there is
not such an addition in Christ; for one nature is not
added to another as if it were the formal principle of
that thing, as was said.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima et corpus

secundum quod sunt partes hominis,
proprie loquendo, non sunt duae naturae,
prout in proposito de natura loquimur; sed
utrumque est pars naturae, alterum sicut
forma, alterum autem sicut materia; unde
non est instantia.

Resp. 3: The soul and the body, insofar as they are

parts of a man, are not, properly speaking, two
natures, as we are speaking of nature in the matter
under discussion; but each is part of a nature, the
one as a form, the other as matter; hence there is
no objection.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod proprietates

Resp. 4: Properties of the human nature are never
humanae naturae nunquam dicuntur de
said about the divine nature, nor conversely,
divina, nec e converso, nisi secundum
except according to a certain participation. But, [the
quamdam participationem; sed dicuntur
properties of] both [natures] are said of the thing
utraeque de habente naturam, vel humanam which has a human or a divine [nature], which is
vel divinam, quae significatur hoc nomine
signified both by the name "God" and by the name
deus, et hoc nomine homo: idem enim est "man", for it is the same thing which has both
qui utrasque naturas habet.
natures.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio ista
procedit in illis quae communicant in
materia, et agunt et patiuntur ad invicem: et
ideo non est ad propositum.

Resp. 5: That argument holds good in those things

which share in matter, those which both act upon
one another and are acted upon, and thus it is not
to the point.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod caro dicitur

deificata, non quia sit facta ipsa Divinitas,
sed quia facta est Dei caro, et etiam quia
abundantius dona Divinitatis participat ex
hoc quod est unita Divinitati, et quia est
quasi instrumentum per quod divina virtus
salutem nostram operatur: tangendo enim
leprosum carne sanavit per Divinitatis
virtutem, et moriendo carne mortem vicit per
virtutem Divinitatis. Virtus autem agentis
aliquo modo est in instrumento, quo
mediante aliquid agit.

Resp. 6: The flesh is called deified not because it

was made the Godhead, but because it was made
the flesh of God, and also because it shares more
abundantly the gifts of the Godhead from the fact
that it was united to the Godhead, and because it is
like an instrument through which the divine power
accomplishes our salvation: for by touching the
leper in the flesh he healed by the power of the
Godhead, and by dying in the flesh he conquered
death through the power of the Godhead. Now, the
power of an agent is in some way in the instrument,
by which means the agent does something.

Sentences Commentary: In III Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 3

Utrum unio sit facta in persona, et si
Christus est una persona. Ad tertium sic
proceditur.

"Whether the union was brought about in the

person, and if Christ is one person?"

Videtur quod in Christo non sit una tantum

persona, et sic non sit unio facta in
persona. Nulla enim natura invenitur sine
illis quae per se consequuntur ad naturam

1. It would seem that there is not only one person in

Christ and, thus, the union was not brought about in
the person. For no nature is found without those
things which result from that nature per se. But,

illam. Sed personalitas per se consequitur personality results from the human nature per se,
naturam humanam, et similiter divinam.
and likewise as regards the divine nature.
Ergo utraque natura tenet suam
Therefore, each nature has its own personality.
personalitatem.
Praeterea, natura humana est dignior in
Christo quam in Petro. Sed personalitas ad
dignitatem
pertinet: unde in substantiis ignobilibus non
invenitur persona. Ergo sicut humanitas
Petri habet suam personalitatem, ita et
humanitas Christi.

2. Further, the human nature is of a greater dignity

in Christ than in Peter. But, personality pertains to
dignity. Hence, a person is not found in inferior
substances. Therefore, just as the humanity of
Peter has its own personality, so too does the
humanity of Christ.

Praeterea, in persona non videtur aliquid

esse nisi natura, et distinguentia
suppositum naturae ab aliis suppositis. Sed
naturae in Christo sunt diversae, et
distinctiva diversa, quia per relationes
aeternas distinguitur a Patre et Spiritu
Sancto; per divisionem autem materiae et
accidentium distinguitur ab aliis hominibus.
Ergo est ibi duplex personalitas.

3. Further, nothing seems to be in a person except

a nature and the things distinguishing the
suppositum of the nature from other supposita. But,
the natures in Christ are different, and [each nature]
is distinctively diverse, because he is distinguished
from the Father and the Holy Spirit through eternal
relations. Now, he is distinguished from other men
by the division of matter and of accidents.
Therefore, there is a two-fold personality there.

Praeterea, maior est convenientia in

persona quam in genere vel specie: quia
illa est in aliquo quod secundum rem unum
est, hoc autem est secundum rationem
unum. Sed propter maximam distantiam
naturae divinae et humanae non potest
esse earum convenientia in genere vel in
specie. Ergo multo minus possunt
convenire in una persona.

4. Further, there is a greater agreement in a person

than in a genus or species, because agreement in a
person is in something which is one thing in reality,
but agreement in a genus or species is one thing
according to reason. But, on account of the great
distance [between] the human and divine natures
there cannot be an agreement of them in a genus or
species. Much less, then, can they agree in one
person.

Praeterea, Philosophus dicit in 5 metaph.,

quod ad diversitatem in genere sequitur
diversitas in specie, et ad hanc diversitas
secundum numerum. Sed in Christo
invenitur diversitas secundum speciem:
quia sunt diversae naturae secundum illam
acceptionem qua natura dicitur
unumquodque informans specifica
differentia. Ergo etiam secundum numerum
differentia invenitur. Sed ubi est eadem
persona, est idem secundum numerum.
Ergo in Christo non est una persona.

5. Further, the Philosopher says in 5 Metaphys. (l.

16), that diversity in a species follows on diversity in
the genus and on this follows diversity according to
number. But diversity according to species is found
in Christ: because there are different natures [in
him], according to that sense by which a nature is
called the specific difference informing each and
every thing. Therefore, a difference is also found
according to number. But, where the person is the
same, the thing is the same according to number.
Therefore, there is not only one person in Christ.

Praeterea, non est minor affinitas naturae

ad personam quam formae ad materiam.
Sed secundum diversitatem formarum est
diversitas materiae: quia proprius actus fit
in propria materia. Ergo secundum
diversitatem naturarum est etiam diversitas

6. Further, there is no less an affinity between

nature and person than between form and matter.
But there is a difference of matter according to the
difference of forms, because one's own act
happens in one's own matter. Therefore, according
to the diversity of natures there is also a diversity of

in persona; et sic idem quod prius.

Sed contra, ea quae secundum personam
differunt et naturam, quod dicitur de uno,
non dicitur de altero. Sed ea quae sunt Dei,
in Scripturis attribuuntur homini: Psalmus
86, 5: homo natus est in ea, et ipse fundavit
eam Altissimus; et quae sunt hominis,
attribuuntur Deo; 1 Corinth., 2, 8: nunquam
Dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Ergo Deus
et homo conveniunt in persona.

persons; and thus the same conclusion as in the

first objection follows.
To the contrary, in those things which differ
according to person and nature, what is said of one,
is not said of the other. But things which are God's
are attributed to man in the Scriptures: Ps. 86:5,
Man was born in her, and the Most High
established her; and those things which are man's
are attributed to God; 1 Cor., 2:8: "They never
would have crucified the Lord of glory". Therefore,
God and man belong to [the same] person.

Praeterea, quod attribuitur Filio et non Patri, Further, what is attributed to the Son and not to the
convenit ei secundum id in quo a Patre
Father belongs to him according to that in which he
distinguitur. Sed unio passive accepta
is distinguished from the Father. But passively
convenit Filio, et non Patri. Ergo convenit ei receiving the union belongs to the Son and not to
secundum id in quo a Patre distinguitur.
the Father. Therefore, it belongs to him according to
Sed hoc est in persona. Ergo unio facta est the thing which distinguishes him from the Father.
in persona.
But, this [distinguishing feature] is in the person,
therefore, the union was brought about in the
person.
Praeterea, ad hoc quod fiat redemptio
humani generis, oportet quod sit agens
satisfactionem unus Deus qui potest, et
homo qui debet, ut patet ex dictis in 1 dist.,
quaest. 1, art. 2. Sed nullo modo duae
personae possunt esse unum agens. Ergo
si sunt duae personae, nondum facta est
satisfactio; et ita adhuc sumus in servitute
peccati, quod est contra sacram Scripturam
Novi Testamenti.

Further, for the redemption of mankind, it is

necessary that there be one agent who is God,
capable [of making] satisfaction, and who is a man,
owing satisfaction, as is obvious from the things
said in 1 d., q. 1, a. 2. But two persons cannot be
one agent in any way. Therefore, if there are two
persons, satisfaction would not yet be
accomplished; and thus we are still in slavery to
sin, which is contrary to the sacred Scripture of the
New Testament.

Respondeo dicendum, quod Nestorius, qui

ponit duas in Christo personas, ex hoc
deceptus fuit, ut dicit Boetius, quia credidit
idem esse personam et naturam; unde
credidit, cum sint duae naturae in Christo,
quod sint duae personae: et ex eodem
fonte processit error Eutychetis, qui cum
audivit unam personam in Christo,
aestimavit unam naturam: et ex eodem
fonte contra trinitatem processit error Arii et
Sabellii. Sciendum est ergo, quod in
quibusdam differunt natura et persona
secundum rem, in quibusdam vero
secundum rationem tantum.

I answer that, Nestorius, who posited two persons

in Christ, was deceived from this, as Boethius says,
because he believed that person and nature are the
same thing; hence, he believed that since there are
two natures in Christ, there are two persons. And
the error of Eutyches, who, since he heard that
there was one person in Christ, judged that there
was one nature, proceeded from the same source.
And the error of Arius and Sabellius, against the
Trinity, also proceeded from the same source.
Therefore, it is necessary to know how person and
nature differ in reality, and in which ways they differ
only according to our idea (ratio) of them.

Natura enim, secundum quod hic loquimur, For nature, as we speak here, is the quiddity of a
est quidditas rei quam signat sua definitio; thing which its definition signifies; but, a person is
persona autem est hoc aliquid quod
that something which subsists in that nature. Now

subsistit in natura illa. In simplicibus autem

quae carent materia, ut dicit Avicenna,
ipsum simplex est sua quidditas; quidditas
vero compositi non est ipsum compositum:
humanitas enim non est homo. Cuius ratio
est, quia in significatione humanitatis, sive
quidditatis, sive naturae, continentur tantum
essentialia principia hominis, secundum
quod homo est; non autem ea quae
pertinent ad determinationem materiae, per
quam natura individuatur, quae tantum
continentur in significatione Socratis, quia
per ea Socrates est hic, et divisus ab aliis:
et ideo, quia humanitas non includit in sua
significatione totum quod est in re
subsistente in natura, cum sit quasi pars,
non praedicatur: et quia non subsistit nisi
quod est compositum, et pars habetur a suo
toto, ideo anima non subsistit, sed
Socrates, et ipse est habens humanitatem.
Homo autem significat utrumque, et
essentialia, et individuantia, sed
diversimode: quia significat essentialia
determinate, individuantia vero
indeterminate haec vel illa: et ideo homo,
cum sit totum, potest praedicari de Socrate,
et dicitur habens humanitatem; sed quia
esse indistinctum est incompletum, quasi
ens in potentia, ideo homo non subsistit,
sed hic homo, cui convenit ratio personae.
Est ergo ratio personae quod sit subsistens
distinctum et omnia comprehendens quae
in re sunt; natura autem essentialia tantum
comprehendit. In simplicibus autem non
differt re natura et persona: quia natura non
recipitur in aliqua materia per quam
individuetur, sed est per se subsistens:
tamen inquantum considerantur essentialia
rei, sic dicimus ibi naturam; inquantum
autem invenitur ibi aliquid subsistens, sic
dicimus ibi personam. Patet igitur quod ex
quo de ratione personae est quod
comprehendit omnia quae in re sunt, si
aliquid est extra illud quod comprehendit
persona, hoc non est unitum rei, nisi forte
secundum similitudinem in genere vel in
specie vel accidente: et ideo, ut Boetius
dicit, si non est una persona in Christo,

in simple things, which lack matter, as Avicenna

says, the simple thing is its own quiddity. But the
quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite:
for humanity is not a man. The reason for this is that
only the essential principles of a man, according to
which he is a man, are contained in the signification
of humanity, whether of the quiddity, or of the
nature, but not those things which pertain to the
determination of matter, through which a nature is
individuated, [for] these are only contained in the
signification of Socrates because through them
Socrates is a "this", and is distinguished from other
things. And thus, because humanity does not
include in its own signification the whole that is in a
thing subsisting in a nature, for it is as it were a part,
[hence,] it is not predicated, and since nothing
subsists unless it is a composite, and a part
belongs to its whole, so, the soul does not subsist,
but Socrates subsists, and he has humanity [i.e. he
is the whole to which the parts belong].
Now, "man" signifies both the individual and the
essential principles, but in diverse ways, because it
signifies the essential principles determinately, but
the individual ones indeterminately [as] these or
those [i.e. the principles]. And thus, man, since it is
a whole, can be predicated of Socrates, and he is
said to have humanity; but, because an
undetermined being is incomplete, as if [it were] a
being in potency, thus man does not subsist, but
this man, to whom the character of a person
belongs. Therefore, it is the character of a person to
be a distinct subsisting thing, embracing all things
which are in reality. But, nature only includes the
essential principles. But in simple things nature and
person do not differ in reality; because nature [in
these things] is not received in some matter which
individuates it, but it [i.e. the nature] is subsisting
through itself. Yet, insofar as the essential
principles of a thing are considered, we use the
term nature there; but, insofar as something
subsisting is found there, we use the term person.
Therefore, it is evident from the fact that the
character of a person includes all things that exist in
reality, if something is outside of that which person
includes, this is not a united thing, unless perhaps
according to a similarity in the genus or in species
or in an accident. And thus, Boethius says, if there
is not one person in Christ no union of the divinity

nulla unio facta est divinitatis et

humanitatis, nisi secundum similitudinem
gratiae; quod etiam Nestorius posuit: et hoc
non est novum, nec Christo proprium;
neque per eum redemptio fieri potuisset,
nec ipse esset verus Deus, sed per
participationem, sicut alii sancti. Unde
simpliciter est concedendum, in Christo
esse unam personam.

and the humanity took place, except according to

some similitude of grace; which even Nestorius
posited. And this is not new nor unique to Christ;
neither could the redemption take place this way,
nor would he be true God, but only through
participation, just as the other saints. Hence it must
be conceded simply that there is one person in
Christ.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod humana Resp. 1: The human nature in Christ is not without
natura in Christo non est sine personalitate, personality, but it is in the one person of the Word
sed est in persona una Verbi cum natura
with the divine nature.
divina.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc
natura Christi maxime nobilis est quod est
in persona
divina.

Resp. 2: Christ's human nature is most noble from

the fact that it is in the divine person.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod de ratione

Resp. 3: The character of a person includes all the
personae est quod comprehendat omnia
essentials and the individuating properties of the
essentialia, et proprietates individuantes
conjoined things at the same time. Hence, it does
simul coniunctorum; unde non sequitur
not follow that if there were two natures and diverse
quod si sint duae naturae et diversae
properties, there would be two persons. For if the
proprietates, sint diversae personae. Si
natures were posited separately with their own
enim essent naturae cum suis
properties, each would be a totality, which requires
proprietatibus seorsum positae, utrinque
the character of a person, but there is only one
esset totalitas, quam requirit ratio personae, totality when they are joined; and thus there is one
non est autem nisi una totalitas, quando
person.
coniunguntur; et ideo est una persona.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ea quae
differunt genere vel specie, differunt
numero essentiae vel naturae; non autem
oportet quod differant numero suppositi vel
subiecti: quia ea quae secundum se
considerata diversorum sunt generum vel
specierum, in unum suppositum vel
subiectum congregari possunt; sicut caro et
os ad constituendum corpus, et albedo et
longitudo in eodem subiecto sunt; et
similiter quamvis divina natura et humana
differant plus quam specie vel genere, in
unam tamen personam uniri possunt.

Resp. 4: Those things which differ in genus or

species differ in the number of the essences or
natures. But it is not necessary that they differ in the
number of the supposita or subjects: because those
things which are considered to be of different
genera or species according to themselves can be
gathered together into one suppositum or subject;
just as flesh and bone are for constituting a body,
and whiteness and length are in the same subject,
and likewise, although the divine and human
natures differ more than a genus or species do, yet
they can be united into one person.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit

Boetius, species est totum esse
individuorum, et etiam genus aliquo modo,
ut dicit Avicenna, secundum quod
indistincte significat totum: et quia natura
humana non comprehendit totum esse

Resp. 5: As Boethius says, (book 3 On Porphyr.

chapter concerning species), the species is the
entire being of individual things, and so too is the
genus in some way, as Avicenna says, insofar as it
indistinctly signifies a whole. And because the
human nature does not embrace the whole being of

Christi, ideo non habet in Christo naturam

speciei; et ideo non sequitur quod in
Christo sint diversae species. Vel
dicendum, quod illud Philosophi est
intelligendum quando naturae diversorum
generum non coniunguntur: accidens enim
et subiectum, quia coniunguntur (quamvis
sint diversa genere), non faciunt numerum.

Christ, thus, it does not posses the nature of a

species in Christ; and thus it does not follow that
there are diverse species in Christ. One can saythat
this [teaching] of the Philosopher must be
understood [to refer to] the case when natures of
different genera are not joined. For an accident and
a subject (although they are in a different genus) do
not make a difference of number because they are
joined.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod forma adunatur

materiae informando eam; et ideo oportet
quod ad diversas formas diversae sint
materiae dispositae; sed ad rationem
personae requiritur tantum adunatio, quae
potest esse etiam quantumcumque
diversorum; et ideo non oportet quod
diversae naturae habeant diversas
personas.

Resp. 6: Form unites to matter by informing it; and

thus it is necessary that different material things be
disposed to different forms. But, the charachter of a
person needs only the sort of unity which can come
about between very different things. Thus, it is not
necessary that different natures have different
persons.

In 3 Sent. D.6, q. 2, a. 1: "Whether Christ is Two in the

Neuter?"
Utrum Christus sit duo neutraliter.

Whether Christ is two in the neuter.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur, quod

Christus sit duo neutraliter. Isidorus enim
dicit in lib. de Trinit.: Mediator Dei et
hominum, homo Iesus Christus, quamvis
aliud sit de Patre, aliud de Virgine, non
tamen alius. Sed ubicumque est aliud et
aliud, ibi sunt duo. Ergo Christus est duo.

Obj. 1:It seems that Christ is two in the neuter. For

Isidore says in the book on the Trinity(1): The
Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ,
although he is other than the Father, and other than
the Virgin, yet he is not other (alius). But, wherever
there is one thing and another, there are two things.
Therefore, Christ is two.

Praeterea, Christus est unum unitate

increata, et est unum unitate creata. Unitas
autem creata non est unitas increata. Ergo
Christus est duo.

Obj. 2:Further, Christ is one thing by an uncreated

unity and he is one thing by a created unity. But a
created unity is not an uncreated unity. Therefore
Christ is two.

Praeterea, sicut in trinitate sunt tres

Obj. 3:Further, just as there are three persons in
personae in una essentia; ita in Christo sunt one essence in the Trinity; so too there are two
duae naturae in una persona. sed propter natures in one person in Christ. But on account of
unitatem naturae dicuntur Pater et Filius
the unity of nature, the Father and the Son are
unum, quamvis non unus. Ergo et propter called one thing (unum), although [they are] not
unitatem personae Christus debet dici
[called] one (unus). Therefore on account of the
unus, et non unum, sed duo propter
personal unity Christ ought to be called one, and
dualitatem naturarum.
also not one thing, but two things because of the
duality of natures.
Praeterea, Christus secundum quod est
Deus, est aliquid quod est Pater; et
secundum quod est homo, est aliquid quod
est mater. Sed hoc quod est Pater, non est

Obj. 4:Further, Christ insofar as he is God, is

something which is the Father; and insofar as he is
a man, he is something which is the mother. But the
Father is not the mother. Therefore, Christ is

hoc quod est mater. Ergo Christus est

aliquid et aliquid; et ita est duo.

something and something; and thus he is two.

Praeterea, Christus est aliquid passibile et

aliquid impassibile. Sed passibile non est
impassibile. Ergo Christus est aliquid et
aliquid. Ergo non est unum.

Obj. 5:Further, Christ is something passible and

something impassible. But a passible thing is not
an impassible thing. Therefore Christ is something
and something. Therefore, Christ is not one thing.

Praeterea, secundum Damascenum,

Christus totus est ubique, non tamen totum.
Sed est ubique secundum quod est Deus.
Ergo Christus non est totum Deus. Sed ex
hoc quod est Deus, est aliquid. Ergo est
aliquid et aliquid; et sic idem quod prius.

Obj. 6:Further, according to Damascene (De Fide

3,7), the whole (totus) Christ is everywhere, but not
the whole thing (totum). But, he is everywhere
inasmuch as he is God. Therefore, Christ is not the
whole God. But from the fact that he is God, he is
something. Therefore he is something and
something; and thus the previous objection follows.

Praeterea, Christus non est tantum homo. Obj. 7:Further, Christ is not only a man. But "man"
Sed homo praedicat aliquid unum de ipso. predicates some one thing of him. Therefore, Christ
Ergo Christus non est tantum unum aliquid: is not only something one, therefore he is two.
ergo est duo.
Sed contra, quidquid est, ideo est, quia
To the Contrary, whatever is, is thus, because it is
unum numero est. Si ergo Christus non est one in number. Therefore, if Christ is not one thing,
unum, nihilest; quod falsum est.
he is nothing, which is false.
Praeterea, maior est convenientia naturae
humanae in Christo ad naturam divinam,
quam accidentis ad subiectum. Sed
accidens cum subiecto non facit numerum.
Ergo nec ratione naturae humanae et
divinae dicetur Christus esse duo.

Further, the human nature in Christ is more

harmonious with the divine nature than an accident
is with a subject. But an accident with a subject
does not produce something numbered. Therefore,
neither may we call Christ two by reason of the
human and divine nature.

Praeterea, ea quae non sunt unum, non

possunt de se invicem praedicari. Sed
Deus praedicatur de homine Christo, et e
converso. Ergo Christus est unum.

Further, those things which are not one thing

cannot be predicated of each other. But we
predicate God of the man Christ, and conversely.
Therefore Christ is one thing.

Respondeo dicendum, quod neutrum

genus est informe et indistinctum;
masculinum vero est formatum et
determinatum; unde masculinum non
praedicatur absolute nisi de re perfecta
subsistente; neutrum vero genus de re
perfecta subsistente, et de non perfecta;
unde non potest dici, quod albedo vel
humanitas Petri est aliquis, sed quod est
aliquid; de Petro autem possumus dicere,
quod est aliquis, et quod est aliquid.
Similiter in Christo de persona potest dici
est aliquis, et est aliquid: de natura autem
quod est aliquid, et non quod est aliquis.
Secundum igitur secundam opinionem, de
qua agitur, illud aliquid quod est natura
assumpta, non praedicatur de Christo: quia

I answer that the neuter genus is unformed and

indistinct; but the masculine is formed and
determinate; hence the masculine is not predicated
absolutely except of a complete (perfecta)
subsisting thing; but the neuter genus is predicated
absolutely of either a complete or incomplete
subsisting thing. Hence we cannot say that the
whiteness or humanity of Peter is someone, but we
can say that it is something. Now we can say that
Peter is someone, and that he is something.
Likewise, we can say of the person in Christ "it is
someone" and "it is something", but of the nature
we can say that it is something and not that it is
someone. Therefore, according to the second
opinion, of which we are treating, the "something"
which is the assumed nature is not predicated of
Christ: because it does not have the character of a

non habet rationem hominis, sed

man, but of humanity. Therefore, "something"
humanitatis. Aliquid ergo, secundum quod insofar as it is predicated of Christ does not signify
praedicatur de Christo, non significat
merely the nature, but the suppositum of the nature:
tantum naturam, sed suppositum naturae: et and since the plural is the singular doubled, thus
quia plurale est geminatum singulare, ideo Christ could not be called some things (aliqua),
Christus non posset dici aliqua, nisi essent unless there were two supposits of the natures in
in eo duo supposita naturarum; quod negat him; which the second, and also the third, opinion
secunda opinio, et similiter tertia; et ideo
denies; and thus each opinion says that Christ is
utraque opinio dicit, quod Christus est
one; but the second says that he is one per se;
unum; sed secunda dicit, quod est unum
while the third says that he is one accidentally, like
per se; tertia vero, quod est unum per
a white man. But the first opinion says that the thing
accidens, sicut albus homo. Sed prima
assumed does not only have the character of
opinio dicit, quod assumptum non tantum humanity, but also of a man; and yet we cannot call
habet rationem humanitatis, sed etiam
[this] "someone", since it is joined to another thing
hominis; et tamen non potest dici aliquis,
of higher dignity, but it is called "something", and
quia est alteri digniori adiunctum, sed
that "something" is predicated of the person
dicitur aliquid, et illud aliquid praedicatur de assuming; and thus it follows that Christ is
persona assumente; et ideo sequitur quod someone, namely the one assuming, and
Christus sit aliquis, scilicet assumens, et
something, namely the thing assumed; and that he
aliquod, scilicet assumptum; et quod sit duo is two in the neuter, but not in the masculine.
neutraliter, sed non masculine.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliud
partitivum est; unde requiritur aliquod a quo
dividatur. Cum autem dicitur, Christus est
aliud et aliud, cum aliud non praedicet
naturam tantum, sed suppositum naturae
(quia humana natura de Christo non
praedicatur), requiritur quod sit ibi aliquid
distinctum vel divisum a supposito
humanae naturae, quod de Christo
praedicetur. Hoc autem non potest esse
secundum secundam opinionem: quia
suppositum divinae naturae non est aliud a
supposito humanae naturae; nec divina
natura, quae de Christo praedicatur, est
aliud a supposito eius, nec per consequens
a supposito humanae naturae. Unde
secundum hanc opinionem Christus non
dicitur proprie aliud et aliud; sed
exponendum est, alterius et alterius
naturae. Prima vero opinio, quae distinguit
supposita naturarum, potest dicere quod
Christus est aliud et aliud.

Reply 1: "Other" is a partitive term; hence it requires

something from which it is divided. Now when we
say, "Christ is one thing and another thing", since
"other" does not predicate the nature alone, but the
supposit of the nature (since human nature is not
predicated of Christ), it is necessary that there be
here something distinct or divided from the supposit
of the human nature, which is predicated of Christ.
But this cannot be according to the second opinion:
because the supposit of the divine nature is not
anything other than the supposit of the human
nature; nor is the divine nature, which is predicated
of Christ, other than its supposit, neither
consequently is it other than the supposit of the
human nature. Hence according to this opinion
Christ is not properly called one thing and another;
but we must explain that he is of one nature and of
another nature. But the first opinion which
distinguishes the supposits of the natures, can say
that Christ is one thing and another thing.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod termini

numerales, ut in 1 dictum est, se habent
communiter ad personam et naturam; unde
loquendo de unitate personali, est tantum

Reply 2: Numerical terms, as was said in 1, are

related commonly to the person and the nature;
hence speaking of personal unity, there is only one
in Christ, inasmuch as we say one Christ; but

una in Christo, secundum quam dicitur

unus Christus; loquendo autem de unitate
naturali, est duplex unitas. Non tamen
sequitur quod Christus sit unum et unum:
quia unum quod de Christo praedicatur,
non refertur tantum ad naturam, sed ad
suppositum naturae, quod non geminatur.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod natura divina
praedicatur in recto de personis propter
identitatem rei; sed duae naturae quae sunt
in Christo, non praedicantur de eo in recto:
quamvis enim divina natura praedicetur de
eo in recto, non tamen humana, sicut nec
de aliquo alio homine. Si autem tres
personae differrent secundum rem a natura,
quamvis esset una numero in eis, non
tamen posset propter hoc dici, quod tres
personae essent unum simpliciter; sed forte
quod essent unus Deus; sicut multi
homines dicuntur unus populus.

speaking of the natural unity there is a twofold

unity. Yet it does not follow that Christ is one thing
and one thing; since the one thing which is
predicated of Christ, does not refer only to the
nature, but to the supposit of the nature, which is
not doubled.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum dicitur,

Christus est aliquid quod est mater, ly
aliquid non praedicat tantum naturam, sed
suppositum naturae, ut patet ex praedictis;
relativum autem refert suum antecedens,
non gratia suppositi, sed gratia naturae:
mater enim non convenit cum Filio in
supposito, sed in natura: relativum autem
non refert idem secundum suppositum, sed
quandoque idem secundum naturam
speciei. Cum vero dicitur: est aliquid quod
est Pater, ly aliquid praedicat naturam
divinam: unde ex hoc sequitur quod
humana natura non sit divina natura, non
autem quod Christus sit duo.

Reply 4: When we say "Christ is something which

is the mother", the "something" does not predicate
the nature alone, but the supposit of the nature; as
is evident from the aforesaid; but a relative term
refers to the antecedent supposit, not because of
the supposit, but the because of the nature; for the
mother does not agree with the Son in a supposit,
but in a nature. But the relative term does not refer
to the same thing according to the supposit,
whenever it refers to the same thing, it is according
to the nature of the species; but when we say there
is something which is the Father the "something"
predicates the divine nature: hence from this it
follows that the human nature is not the divine, but
not that Christ is two.

Reply 3: The divine nature is predicated of the

person in the nominative on account of the identity
of the thing; but the two natures which are in Christ
are not predicated of him in the nominative: for
although the divine nature is predicated of him in
the nominative, yet the human nature is not, just as
it is not predicated of any other man. But if the three
persons really differed from the nature, although it
[s.c. nature] would be in number in them,
nevertheless on account of this we could not say,
that the three persons were one simply; but
perhaps that they were one God; just as many men
are called one people.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum dicitur,

Reply 5: When we say Christ is something
Christus est aliquid passibile, ly aliquid non passible, "something" does not predicate the
praedicat naturam, sed suppositum
nature, but the supposit of the human nature; since
humanae naturae; quia proprietates naturae the properties of the nature are predicated
denominative praedicantur de supposito,
denominatively of the supposit, although the nature
quamvis natura de eo non praedicetur, et
is not predicated of it, and likewise the properties of
etiam proprietates partium. Petrus enim
the parts. For although Peter is not hair, yet he is
quamvis non sit capillus, est tamen crispus. curly. But when we say, "Christ is something
Cum vero dicitur, Christus est aliquid
impassible", the "something" predicates the
impassibile, ly aliquid praedicat suppositum supposit of the divine nature, which is none other
divinae naturae, quod non est aliud quam than the supposit of the human nature; or even the
suppositum humanae naturae; vel etiam
divine nature, which is not other than its supposit.
divinam naturam, quae non est aliud a suo Hence it does not follow that there is one thing and

supposito. Unde non sequitur quod sit ibi

another thing here: for the middle [proposition] is
aliud et aliud: media enim falsa est quae
false which says that something passible is not
dicit quod aliquid passibile non est aliquid something impassible: for the same supposit which
impassibile: idem enim suppositum quod
is passible according to one nature, and impassible
est passibile secundum unam naturam, est according to the other.
impassibile secundum aliam.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod totus refertur ad Reply 6: "Whole" [totus] refers to the person, but "a
personam, totum autem ad naturam. Totum whole thing" [totum] refers to the nature. Now
autem, secundum quod hic sumitur, est cui wholes, as it is taken here, are that from which
nihil deest: et quia nihil deest de
nothing is lacking: and since nothing is lacking from
personalitate Filii, quam significat nomen
the personality of the Son, which the name Christ
Christi, secundum quod est ubique, quia est signifies, insofar as he is everywhere, since he is
persona aeterna; ideo dicitur totus ubique. an eternal person; thus we say the whole [totus] is
Deest autem aliquid de natura ei,
everywhere. But something of the nature is lacking
secundum quod non est ubique; sed tamen to him, insofar as he is not everywhere; but yet that
illud aliquid non praedicatur de Christo.
[sense of] "something" is not predicated of Christ.
Unde non sequitur quod Christus sit aliquid Hence it does not follow that Christ is something
et aliquid; sed quod in eo sit aliquid et
and something; but that there is something and
aliquid.
something in him.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod termini in
Reply 7: Terms posited in the predicate are taken
praedicato positi tenentur formaliter: unde formally (Cf. S.T. I, q. 13, a. 12): hence we do not
non conceditur ista, quod Christus sit
concede that Christ is only a man; since every other
tantum homo; quia excluderetur omnis alia nature would be excluded from him. But
natura. Ly aliquid autem, et ly unum non
"something" and "one" do not determine any form
determinant aliquam formam vel naturam; or nature; but the supposit is determined, insofar as
sed determinatum suppositum, secundum they are predicated of Christ: for they do not
quod de Christo praedicantur: non enim
determine [anything] except that concerning which
determinant nisi illud circa quod ponuntur. they are posited. Hence if we should say: "Christ is
Unde si diceretur: Christus est tantum
only one thing", or "only something", we do not
unum, vel tantum aliquid, non excludit aliam exclude another nature, but another supposit: and
naturam, sed aliud suppositum: et ideo
thus this is true: "Christ is only some one thing";
haec est vera: Christus est tantum aliquid and there is a fallacy of the consequent in that
unum; et est in processu illo fallacia
reasoning, since the "something one" is wider in
consequentis, quia aliquid unum est
extension than "man". Therefore it proceeds
superius ad hominem. Procedit ergo
negatively from a term of less extension to one of
negative ab inferiori ad superius, cum
wider extension, with an exclusive expression.
dictione exclusiva.

In 3 Sent. D.6, q. 2, a.2: "Whether there is not only one

being (esse) in Christ?"
Utrum in Christo non sit tantum unum esse. Whether there is not only one being in Christ.
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod
in Christo non sit tantum unum esse. Omnis
enim forma substantialis dat esse. Sed
anima est forma substantialis. Ergo dat

Obj. 1: It seems that there is not only one being in

Christ. For every substantial form gives being. But
the soul is a substantial form. Therefore it gives
being. But it does not give the being of the divine

esse. Sed non dat esse divinae personae, person, since this is eternal. Therefore it gives
quia hoc est aeternum. Ergo dat aliud esse: another being: therefore there is not only one being
ergo in Christo non tantum est unum esse. in Christ.
Praeterea, unum est esse Filii Dei et Patris.
Si ergo unum est esse huius hominis et Filii
Dei, unum erit esse huius hominis et Dei
Patris. Sed nulla est maior unio quam ea
quae est aliquorum secundum esse unum.
Ergo humanitas est unita Deo Patri.

Obj. 2: Further, there is one being of the Son of

God and of the Father. Therefore, if the being of
this man and of the Son of God is one thing, then
the being of this man and of the Father will be one.
But there is no greater union than that which is of
things according to one being. Therefore, humanity
was united to God the Father.

Praeterea, in divinis non est esse nisi

essentiale. Si ergo unio humanae naturae
ad divinam facta est in esse Filii Dei, facta
est in essentia: quod est impossibile.

Obj. 3: Further, in divine persons there is no being

except essential being. Therefore if the union of the
human nature to the divine took place in the being
of the Son of God, it took place in the essence,
which is impossible.

Praeterea, definitio est oratio indicans quid Obj. 4: Further, a phrase indicating what it is to be.
est esse. Sed homo secundum eamdem
But "man" is predicated of Christ and of Peter
definitionem praedicatur de Christo et de
according to the same definition. Therefore, the
Petro. Ergo est idem esse humanitas illius human being of this man is the same as that of
hominis cum esse Petri secundum speciem. Peter according to the species. But the being of the
Sed esse Filii Dei non est idem specie cum Son of God is not the same species as the being of
esse Petri. Ergo in Christo non est tantum Peter. Therefore there is not only one being in
unum esse.
Christ.
Praeterea, de quocumque responderi potest Obj. 5: Further, Of whatever can produce an
ad quaestionem factam per an est, habet
[affirmative] answer to the question "Is it?" has its
proprium esse. Sed haec quaestio fit non
own being. But this question is asked not only of
tantum de persona, sed etiam de natura.
the person, but also of the nature. Therefore being
Ergo esse non tantum est personae, sed
is not only of the person, but of the nature. But there
etiam naturae. In Christo autem sunt duae are two natures in Christ. Therefore there is a twonaturae. Ergo in Christo sunt duo esse.
fold being in Christ.
Sed contra, omne quod habet per se esse,
est subsistens. Si ergo in Christo est duplex
esse, sunt ibi duo subsistentia: ergo duae
hypostases: quod supra improbatum est.

To the Contrary, everything which has being per

se, is a subsisting thing. If therefore there is a twofold being in Christ, there are two subsisting things
there; therefore there are two hypostases: which
was disproved above.

Praeterea, quaecumque differunt secundum

esse, unum eorum non praedicatur de
altero. Sed Deus est homo, et e converso.
Ergo est esse unum Dei et hominis.

Further, [regarding] wherever things differ

according to being, one of them is not predicated of
the other. But God is man and conversely.
Therefore, there is one being of God and man.

Praeterea, unius non est nisi unum esse.

Sed Christus est unum, ut dictum est. Ergo
habet unum esse tantum.

Further, of one thing there is only one being. But

Christ is one thing, as was said. Therefore he has
only one being.

Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum

Philosophum 5 Metaph., esse duobus
modis dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod
significat veritatem propositionis, secundum
quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator

I answer that, according to the Philosopher 5

Metaphys. Text 6, being is said in two ways. In one
way it signifies the truth of a proposition, insofar as
it is a copula; and thus as Averroes says in the
same place, a being [ens] is an accidental

ibidem dicit, ens est praedicatum

predicate; and this is not being [esse] in reality, but
accidentale; et hoc esse non est in re, sed in the mind, which joins the predicate with the
in mente, quae coniungit praedicatum cum subject, as the Philosopher says in 6 Metaphys.
subiecto, ut dicit Philosophus in 6 Metaph. Text 6. Hence the present question does not
Unde de hoc non est hic quaestio. Alio
concern this. In another way we use the term being
modo dicitur esse, quod pertinet ad naturam as it pertains to the nature of a thing, insofar as it
rei, secundum quod dividitur secundum
falls under the ten categories; and this indeed is
decem genera; et hoc quidem esse est in re, being in reality, and is the act of a being resulting
et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, from the principles of the thing, just as to light is the
sicut lucere est actus lucentis.
act of lighting.
Aliquando tamen sumitur esse pro essentia,
secundum quam res est: quia per actus
consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut
potentiae vel habitus. Loquendo igitur de
esse secundum quod est actus entis, sic
dico, quod secundum secundam opinionem
oportet ponere tantum unum esse;
secundum alias autem duas oportet ponere
duo esse. Ens enim subsistens, est quod
habet esse tamquam eius quod est,
quamvis sit naturae vel formae tamquam
eius quo est: unde nec natura rei nec partes
eius proprie dicuntur esse, si esse praedicto
modo accipiatur; similiter autem nec
accidentia, sed suppositum completum,
quod est secundum omnia illa. Unde etiam
Philosophus dicit in 2 Metaph., quod
accidens magis proprie est entis quam ens.
Prima ergo opinio, quae ponit duo
subsistentia, ponit duo esse substantialia;
similiter tertia opinio, quia ponit quod partes
humanae naturae adveniunt divinae
personae accidentaliter, ponit duo esse,
unum substantiale, et aliud accidentale;
secunda vero opinio, quia ponit unum
subsistens, et ponit humanitatem non
accidentaliter advenire divinae personae,
oportet quod ponat unum esse. Impossibile
est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo
esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur
super ens: unde si sint plura esse,
secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens
simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur
unum. Sed non est inconveniens quod esse
unius subsistentis sit per respectum ad
plura, sicut esse petri est unum, habens
tamen respectum ad diversa principia
constituentia ipsum: et similiter suo modo

Yet, sometimes being is used for the essence,

according as it is a thing, since their principles [s.c.
of things] are customarily signified through acts,
such as potency or habit. Therefore, speaking of
being insofar as it is the act of a being, thus I say,
that according to the second opinion it is necessary
to posit only one being; but according to the others
it is necessary to posit a two-fold being. For a
subsisting being [ens], is what has being [esse] as
if this is its "that which is" [quod est], although it
[s.c. the divine esse] is of a nature or form, as if this
is its "that by which it is" [quo est]. Hence, neither
the nature of a thing nor its parts are properly said
to be [esse], if "to be" [esse] is taken in the
aforesaid manner; likewise neither are accidents,
but the complete supposit, [i.e.] that which is in
virtue of all of these things. Hence, also the
Philosopher says in 2 Metaphys., 3, that an
accident is more properly of a being, than a being.
Therefore, the first opinion, which posits two
subsistences posits a two-fold substantial being.
Likewise the third opinion, since it posits that the
parts of the human nature come to the divine
person accidentally, posits a two-fold being, one
substantial, and the other accidental. But the
second opinion, since it posits one subsisting
thing, and that humanity does not come to the
divine person accidentally, must posit one being.
For it is impossible that something one should
have a two-fold substantial being, since one [unum]
is founded upon a being [ens]: hence if there are
several beings [esse], according to which
something is called a being simply, it is impossible
that it be called one thing. But it is suitable that the
being of one subsisting thing be related to many,
just as Peter's being is one thing, yet it is related to
the diverse principles constituting him: and
likewise in its own way, Christ's one being has two

unum esse Christi habet duos respectus,

unum ad naturam humanam, alterum ad
divinam.

relations, one to the human nature, the other to the

divine.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod forma facit Reply 1: Form produces being; not so that that
esse; non ita quod illud esse sit materiae
being is of matter or of form, but of a subsisting
aut formae, sed subsistentis. Quando ergo thing. Therefore when a thing composed from
compositum ex materia et forma est per se matter and form is subsisting per se, absolute
subsistens, acquiritur ex forma illi composito being per se is acquired by that composite from the
esse absolutum per se; quando autem non form. But when it is not subsisting per se, being is
est per se subsistens, non acquiritur per
not acquired by that composite through the form;
formam esse illi composito; sed subsistenti but by virtue of the subsisting thing to which it is
cui hoc adiungitur, acquiritur respectus
adjoined, it acquires a relation according to being
secundum esse ad hoc quod ei additur:
to this thing which is added to it: just as if we posit
sicut si ponamus hominem nasci sine
that a man is born without a hand, and a hand by
manu, et manum per se separatim fieri, et
itself is separately formed, and later it is
postea ei miraculose coniungi, constat quod miraculously joined to him, it is obvious that the
forma manus causabit esse manus per se form of a hand will cause the being of a hand which
subsistentis: sed postquam coniungitur
is a subsistent thing per se: but after it is joined to a
homini, non acquiritur ex forma manus
man, no being is acquired from the hand's form by
aliquod esse manui, quia manus non habet the hand, since a hand does not have its own
esse proprium; sed acquiritur homini
being, but a relationship to the and according to his
respectus ad manum secundum suum esse. being [esse] is acquired by the man. So too I say
Ita etiam dico, quod anima in Christo non
that the soul in Christ does not acquire its own
acquirit proprium esse humanae naturae;
being of a human nature: but from the son of God it
sed Filio Dei acquirit respectum secundum acquires a relation according to its being to the
suum esse ad naturam humanam, qui
human nature, yet this relation is not something
tamen respectus non est aliquid secundum really in the divine person, but only something
rem in divina persona, sed aliquid
according to reason as was said above of the
secundum rationem, ut dictum est de
union d. 2, q. 2, a. 2 sub-quest. 3 ad 3.
unione, supra, dist. 2, qu. 2, art. 2,
quaestiunc. 3, ad 3.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliud est de
Deo et de omnibus aliis rebus: quia in Deo
ipsa essentia subsistens est, unde sibi
secundum se debetur esse; immo ipsa est
suum esse subsistens: unde essentia a
persona non differt secundum rem: et ideo
esse essentiae est etiam personae; et
tamen persona et essentia ratione differunt.
Quamvis ergo unum sit esse, potest tamen
esse considerari vel prout est essentiae; et
sic non unitur humanitas in esse divino,
unde non unitur Patri: vel potest considerari
prout est personae; et sic unitur in esse
divino.

Reply 2: [The being] of God is different from [the

being] of all other things: since in God his essence
is subsisting, hence for him being must be
according to himself; nay rather he is his own
subsisting being: hence essence does not really
differ from person: and thus the essential being is
also personal being; and yet person and essence
differ by reason. Therefore although there is one
being, still being can be considered either as just
as it is essential, and thus humanity is not united to
the divine being, hence it is not united to the
Father: or it can be considered just as it is
personal.; and in this way it is united to the divine
being.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium.

And through this the solution to the third objection

is obvious.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod Philosophus Reply 4: The Philosopher here takes being for
accipit ibi esse pro essentia, vel quidditate, essence, or quiddity, which the definition signifies.
quam signat definitio.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illa obiectio
procedit de esse secundum quod signat
veritatem propositionis: sic enim potest dici
non tantum de his quae sunt in re, sed de
his quae sunt in intellectu: de quibus potest
locutio formari.

Reply 5: That objection proceeds from being

insofar as it signifies the truth of a proposition: for
this can be said not only of those things which are
in reality, but of those things which are in the
intellect, about which we can form a statement.