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Working Paper No. 43 - March 2010

MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
WHAT IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AUTONOMY?

Jan Wouters
Nicholas Hachez
Pierre Schmitt

MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: WHAT IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL

ORGANISATIONS AUTONOMY?
Jan Wouters
Nicolas Hachez
Pierre Schmitt

ABSTRACT
This contribution explores the relationship between the autonomy and the
accountability of international organisations. It argues that the degree of autonomy of
an international organisation is a function of the model of managerial accountability
applied by this organisation. An appropriate model of managerial accountability,
though it may seem to constrain an international organisations autonomy, may in
fact be a way of enhancing it. If accountability and autonomy are not conceived of as
mutually reinforcing then the effectiveness, the legitimacy and, ultimately, the overall
authority of the organisation might be severely compromised. Properly functioning
managerial accountability systems allow an international organisation to enjoy its
autonomy to the fullest extent while limiting the ability of its staff to overstep their
margins of discretion. These findings are supported by a study of the managerial
accountability practices in major international organisations, notably the UN and the
EU, and the recent reforms that these organisations carried in response to scandals
such as the resignation of the Santer Commission or the Oil-for-Food scandal.

KEY WORDS
Autonomy, (Managerial) Accountability, International Organisations, United Nations,
European Union.

AUTHORS
Jan Wouters
Nicholas Hachez
Pierre Schmitt

ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE

jan.wouters@ggs.kuleuven.be
nicholas.hachez@law.kuleuven.be
pierre.schmitt@ law.kuleuven.be

2010 by Jan Wouters, Nicolas Hachez and Pierre Schmitt. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper
may be reproduced without permission of the authors.
Working papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and
critical discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review.

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

1. THE AUTONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR

ACCOUNTABILITY

2. A PARTICULAR BREED: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS

2.1. EXTERNAL INDEPENDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE

2.2. INDEPENDENT INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
SERVICE
3. PRINCIPLES OF MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

9
10
13

3.1. WHO IS ACCOUNTABLE?

14

3.2. TO WHOM?

14

3.3. ON WHAT BASIS?

15

3.4. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A MULTIFACETED CONCEPT

16

3.5. HOW DOES MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION IN THE PRACTICE

OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS?

17

3.5.1. Intricate Accountability Channels

17

3.5.2. The Cresson Case

21

3.5.3. The Oil-for-Food Case

23

4. DESIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL

ORGANISATIONS: THE RIGHT ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL FOR THE RIGHT LEVEL
OF AUTONOMY

26

CONCLUSION

28

INTRODUCTION

International organisations are becoming ever more important actors on the

international, political and legal scene. As globalisation forces States to handle an
ever greater variety of issues in common, the number and competences of
international organisations are constantly on the rise. Correspondingly, the staff of
such organisations, i.e. international civil servants, is also increasing, and they tend
to be given more numerous and important tasks nowadays compared to the past. In
light of this, the question of managerial accountability within international
organisations has recently come to the fore.
Managerial accountability can be described as
accountability relating to managerial functions within public or private sector
entities or organizations. More specifically, managerial accountability in the
context of the UN system is focused upon accountability of those provided
with delegated authority (i.e. Secretariat officials, including executive heads
such as the Secretary-General), and holding them accountable for the actions
(or the lack of actions) taken in accordance with given mandates or
responsibilities with respect to programmes and financial, human and/or other
resources, as well as for the performance and the manner in which the
related resources were managed.1
The recent attention given to managerial accountability in international organisations
has been driven by two main parallel developments. First, attention to accountability
issues at the State level has risen with the emergence and proliferation of New
Public Management.2 This has led to the empowerment at different levels of
management in international organisations. International civil servants have become
increasingly entrusted with responsibilities which they are expected to discharge
individually. Second, the expansion of the tasks of international organisations and
their staff affects an ever larger number of stakeholders. For example, some

S. Kuyama and M. Fowler, Introduction, in S. Kuyama and M. Fowler (eds.), Envisioning Reform.
Enhancing UN Accountability in the Twenty-first Century, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009,
p. 5 (emphasis in original footnote omitted).
2
The New Public Management is generally presented as a paradigmatic break from the traditional
model of public administration starting in the mid-1970s. C. Hood identified its key doctrinal components
in the early 1900s as: 1. Hands-on professional management; 2. Explicit standards and measures of
performance; 3. Greater emphasis on output controls; 4. Disaggregation of units in the public sector; 5.
Greater competition in the public sector; 6. Private sector styles of management practice; and 7.
Greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. C. Hood, A Public Management for All Seasons?,
Public Administration, 1991, vol. 69, 3-19.
3

international organisations wield substantial amounts of public finances (e.g. the

World Bank and regional investment banks) and/or have the power to make
decisions directly binding on citizens and businesses (e.g. the European Union, EU).
In this context, the overall legitimacy of international organisations (which has a
bearing on the effective conduct of their operations3) requires that the latter, and,
hence, their organs and staff, be accountable for their decisions and actions to
Member States, but also increasingly to the general public. Perhaps as a token of
this search for legitimacy, organisations have paid particular attention to the issue of
managerial accountability and have engaged in reform as a reaction to public
scandals.4 Among the cases of mismanagement which have haunted international
organisations and have led to interesting developments in the area of managerial
accountability, one may highlight the EU case of the resignation of the Santer
Commission and the United Nations (UN) Oil-for-Food scandal. We will revert to
these and other cases below.
As a result of the above, international organisations have gradually been developing
a diverse array of accountability mechanisms to control the exercise of their
competences by international civil servants and to prevent any abuse or arbitrary
exercise of power. This may have mixed effects on the way the organisation
operates. On the one hand, not enough control on executive power may allow for
abuse. On the other hand, too much control may result in policy inertia (over
bureaucratisation) since it may inhibit the capacity of organisations to design and
implement policies.
In the first section, we seek to link the managerial accountability question with the
overall theme of this book, i.e. the autonomy of international organisations as
institutional actors in the international legal and political order. We do so by offering a
theoretical conception of the relationship between the managerial accountability
practices of an organisation and the latters autonomy.

On the impact of the perceived legitimacy of an organisation or of a decision-making process on the

effectiveness of the said organisation, see e.g. J. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, Regulation & Governance, 2008, Vol. 2, p. 148.
4
In order to address these problems and take appropriate corrective actions in the face of problems
that have arisen, a variety of accountability systems, including codes of conduct, were put in place by
international organisations. As noted by Chris de Cooker, only a few organisations have codes of
conduct that were introduced without any apparent pressure from either inside or outside these
organisations. Most of the codes of the organisations are, however a reaction to particular events. C.
de Cooker, Ethics and Accountability in the International Civil Service, in C. de Cooker (ed.),
Accountability, Investigation and Due Process in International Organizations, Leiden/Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, p. 5.
4

In the second section we examine the notion of international civil service and its
characteristics in terms of accountability. Though the job descriptions of international
civil servants vary from one international organisation to another, a common feature
of all international civil service systems is the independence of their staff vis--vis
Member States. This external independence is reinforced by a system of immunities
generally extended to international civil servants. Consequently, managerial
accountability in international civil service relies chiefly on internal mechanisms
established by the international organisations themselves. We will study the UN as
an illustration of an international civil service system.
The third section delves more deeply into the concrete workings of managerial
accountability in international organisations. We will review some of the main
mechanisms that were adopted by various international organisations in relation to
various types of functions, by identifying who is held accountable to whom, on what
basis and following what type of mechanism. As will be seen, many international
organisations have since their creation sought to establish some form of internal
justice system in order to deal with problems of misconduct encountered in their
administration.5
In the final section we discuss from a more normative standpoint the way managerial
accountability mechanisms in international organisations should be designed in
relation to the appropriate level of autonomy that such organisations should enjoy.
As will be seen, the debate on the proper design of managerial accountability
mechanisms in international organisations, in particular the need to avoid an excess
or deficit of accountability, has important consequences for the autonomy of these
international organisations.

The pioneering organisation in this respect was the International Labour Organization, which
established its ILO Administrative Tribunal already in 1946. See B. Kingsbury and R. Stewart,
Legitimacy and Accountability in Global Regulatory Governance: The Emerging Global Administrative
Law and the Design and Operation of Administrative Tribunals of International Organizations, in S.
Flogaitis (ed.), International Administrative Tribunals in a Changing World, London: Esperia
Publications, 2009, available at
http://www.iilj.org/aboutus/documents/LegitimacyAccountabilityandGAL.UNATvolumefinalAug82008.pdf
p. 14.
5

1. THE AUTONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR

ACCOUNTABILITY

Before delving concretely into the mechanisms of managerial accountability in

international organisations, we examine, from a theoretical and normative point of
view, the relationship between accountability and the autonomy of international
organisations. Nowadays, international organisations are no longer regarded as
simple proxies for State policies, but have rather become global administrators.6 In
that sense, they are progressively acquiring a certain degree of autonomy, which can
be analysed from different angles.
First, from an institutional point of view, international organisations are no longer
exclusively considered as simple fora for collective problem-solving by Member
States, but are increasingly defined as full-grown normative units, having their own
normative competences, and for a majority of international organisations a legal
personality distinct from those of their Member States.7 This shift can be described
as an evolution from inter-governmentality to supra-governmentality.8 The fact that
international organisations have a staff of their own, independent from their Member
States (see infra, subsection 2.1.), illustrates this evolution. Second, from a legal
point of view, international organisations are increasingly entrusted with proper lawmaking powers, no longer entirely dependent on the consent of all Member States,
and may take acts which are now being studied as full-fledged sources of
international law9, subject to principles of treaty law, but also constitutional and
administrative law.10 The fact that certain organs of international organisations may
adopt acts by a qualified, or even simple majority, and that such acts are said to form
part of separate legal orders equipped with their own (quasi-) judicial institutions, is

See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, Law &
Contemporary Problems, 2004-2005, Vol. 68, 21.
7
Even though not all founding treaties specifically state that the international organisation in question
has international legal personality, such legal personality may be derived from a constructive
interpretation of the competences granted to it by its founding treaty. The necessary effectiveness of the
international organisation and its assumed autonomy in the exercise of its functions directly have a
bearing on its being considered as having international legal personality. See International Court of
Justice, 11 April 1949, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, at 178-179.
8
For a historical picture of such evolution in the European Union, see K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel,
nd
Constitutional Law of the European Union (R. Bray, ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2 ed., 2005, pp.
41-75.
9
J. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law Makers, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
10
Founding treaties of international organisations are indeed increasingly described in terms of a
constitution, especially the UN Charter. See for example the genuine textbook of UN Constitutional
Law: T. Franck, S. Chesterman and D. Malone, Law and Practice of the United Nations, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007. In the EU context, see inter alia T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of
European Community Law: An Introduction to the Constitutional and Administrative Law of the
European Community, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2003.
6

an important token of this evolution.11 Third, from a political point of view, it is

increasingly accepted that international organisations may formulate positions which
are not dependent on any imprimatur from Member States. In this regard, the
existence, in international organisations, of high-level political organs or of officials
entrusted with policy-making competences12 evidence this growing political
autonomy.
This multifaceted autonomy implies that international organisations have become an
additional layer of public administration.13 Such status, it is now agreed, must come
with accountability, which is an almost universally accepted standard for public
administration.14 Before delving more deeply into the different facets of the notion,
and the way it relates to autonomy, let us note that accountability may roughly be
said to protect, promote or guarantee two end-goals: the democratic control of the
organisation by the public and the need to ensure the proper functioning of the
organisation as a provider of services to the public.15
One can therefore see that, at the heart of the accountability of international
organisations, their organs and their staff, is their relationship to the public, which is
composed, from a corporate perspective, of the Member States of the organisation
(shareholder model16), and, from a more democratic perspective, of the larger body
of individuals whose lives are being affected by the organisation (stakeholder

11

This is however regarded as problematic by some, who regard this integration of entire fields of
international law into separate legal orders as contributing to the fragmentation of international law. On
this issue, see the report of the International Law Commission: UN General Assembly, International Law
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 13
April 2006, UN Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.682.
12
The profile of the UN Secretary-General corresponds to this description. Although Article 97 of the UN
Charter only defines the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, he is
in fact much more than that. See S. Chesterman (ed.), Secretary or General? The UN SecretaryGeneral in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. The newly created position of
President of the European Council (Art. 15, paras. 5-6 TEU), is also thought to potentially bear a high
political weight, but experience will tell if this proves to be the case, or if, in the facts, the President is
only a chairman. On the other hand, the European Commission clearly has a strong political
dimension, as it is entrusted with the task to promote the general interest of the Union and take
appropriate initiatives to that end, most notably by formulating legislative proposals (Art. 17 1. TEU).
13
For a study of such impact in the Belgian legal order, see J. Wouters, N. Hachez and P. De Man,
Internationaal Recht voor de Praktizijn Hoe Omgaan met Handelingen van Internationale Instellingen
en Internationale Rechtspraak, in K. Lenaerts and J. Wouters (eds.), Internationaal and Europees
Recht, Themiscahier No. 49, Brugge: Die Keure, 2008, p. 57.
14
A. Wolf, Symposium on Accountability in Public Administration: Reconciling Democracy, Efficiency
and Ethics Introduction, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 2000, Vol. 66, 16.
15
P. Aucoin and R. Heintzman, The Dialectics of Accountability for Performance in Public Management
Reform, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 2000, Vol. 66, 45-55. Mark Bovens identifies
three such goals: popular control, equilibrium of power, and effective governance. M. Bovens,
Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, European Law Journal, 2007, Vol.
13, 465-466.
16
Such reduced vision of the circle of account holders also fits the delegation or principal-agent model.
7

model).17 Starting from there, the model and level of accountability applicable
throughout the organisational chart of an international organisation is directly
impacting its ability to act. Tight accountability schemes will reduce the
organisations or the individual agents level of discretion, while loose accountability
schemes will enhance it. Accountability, in short, determines an organisations
degree of enjoyment of its autonomy, the latter being necessary in order to reach the
purpose for which the organisation was created. In the next sections we will explore
how the accountability of international organisations is being operationalised at the
managerial level, before analysing the way the numerous modalities of such
accountability relate to the organisations autonomy.

2. A PARTICULAR BREED: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS

Naturally, this contribution does not intend to provide an exhaustive overview of the
legal regimes applicable to international civil servants.18 However, the substantive
scope of this study the international civil service is in need of further clarification
with a view to examining the issues of managerial accountability and autonomy. As
stated above, a general trend emerges out of all regimes of international civil service,
namely the need to ensure the independence of international civil servants towards
the organisations Member States, in particular their Member State of origin. The
system of immunities and inviolabilities applicable to international civil servants
enhances this external independence. As a consequence, the accountability of
international civil servants relies on internal mechanisms established by the
international organisation. The UN system provides an interesting illustration of these
principles. In this section, the independence of international civil service will be
analysed from two perspectives: the external independence towards individual
States, and the independent internal organisation of international civil service.

17

On this distinction between the shareholder and stakeholder model of accountability, treated along
the internal/external accountability divide, see R. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic
Accountability, in D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of
Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, 130; T. Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy
Power and Representation beyond Liberal States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 94-95.
18
These regimes are governed by the constitutive treaties of international organisations, additional
conventional sources, administrative practice, case-law of international administrative tribunals, general
principles, employment contracts between the servant and the organisations etc.
8

2.1. EXTERNAL INDEPENDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE

The concept of international civil service finds its origins in the League of Nations.19
Sir Eric Drummond, the first Secretary-General of the League of Nations, built a truly
international secretariat on the basis of the vague language of the Leagues
Covenant.20 In his view, members of the Secretariat were no longer servants of their
country but strictly of the League of Nations. The international civil service had to be
internationally composed and bear international responsibilities. This ideal of an
international secretariat independent from Member States influence had also
inspired Article 100 of the UN Charter.21
The conditions of service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of the entire UN
staff are contained in the Staff Regulations of the United Nations. According to these
regulations, staff members are international civil servants and have to make a written
declaration witnessed by the Secretary-General or his or her authorised
representative.22 They are accountable to the Secretary-General and are required to
uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.23 A number of
additional documents govern the exercise of their duties. In 2001, the International
Civil Service Commission24 adopted a renewed version of the Standards of Conduct
for the International Civil Service,25 which was welcomed by the General Assembly in
Resolution 56/244.26 Although these standards do not have force of law, they help
the staff understand their role as international civil servants, as stated by former
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2002 in a Bulletin under the title Status, Basic
19

According to the Covenant to the Treaty of Versailles, [t]he permanent Secretariat shall be
established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such
secretaries and staff as may be required.
20
D. Hammarskjld, The international civil servant in law and in fact a lecture delivered to
Congregation on 30 May 1961, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
21
Pursuant to this provision, [i]n the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff
shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the
Organisation. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international
officials responsible only to the Organisation. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect
the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and
not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. A similar system is established
for the Members of the EUs European Commission by Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU).
22
UN Secretary-General, Staff Rules Staff Regulations of the United Nations and provisional Staff
Rules Secretary-General Bulletin, ST/SGB/2009/7, 21 October 2009. Staff Regulation 1.1.
23
Ibid., Staff Regulation 1.3.
24
The International Civil Service Commission is an expert body established by the UN General
Assembly. It regulates and coordinates the conditions of service of UN staff in addition to promoting and
maintaining high standards in the international civil service. United Nations General Assembly, United
Nations salary system, Resolution 3042 (XXVII), 19 December 1972.
25
International Civil Service Commission, Standards of conduct for the international civil service,
January 2002, available at http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardse.pdf. This new version of
the Standards replaces the 1954 report of the International Civil Service Advisory Board, also entitled
Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service, and which governed international civil servants
conducts until then. Internet pages last visited on 11 January 2010.
26
UN General Assembly, United Nations common system: report of the International Civil Service
Commission, A/Res/56/244, 5 February 2002.
9

Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff, summing up the rights and duties of
international civil servants.27
The appointment of international civil servants has important consequences in terms
of their independence towards Member States. At the UN, staff members are
appointed by the Secretary-General according to regulations established by the
General Assembly.28 The Secretary-General may act autonomously for what
concerns his staff29 and he is the Chief Administrative Officer of the organisation.30
Another important characteristic of the international civil service are the immunities
typically granted to staff members of international organisations.31 At the UN, Article
105(2) of the UN Charter and Section 18(a) of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the UN, confer immunity from legal process to UN officials in respect of
official duties.32 This system ensures the independence of the international
organisations and their officials from national court systems and their protection from
State strategies driven by national interest. However, such a system is sometimes
instrumentalised in order to avoid facing justice in cases of abuse.33
2.2. INDEPENDENT INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE
The UN organisational chart is quite complex and is composed of several categories
of personnel, each corresponding to numerous levels of responsibility and discretion.
The highest positions are the ranks of Secretary-General, Under Secretary-General
(Department head) and Assistant Secretary-General (Head of Office).34 The UN
Secretariat is composed of more than 25 departments and offices. Each hierarchical

27

UN Secretary-General, Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Secretary-General
Bulletin, ST/SGB/2002/13, 1 November 2002.
28
Article 101 of the United Nations Charter states that [t]he paramount consideration in the
employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of
securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
29
C. Schreuer and C. Ebner, Article 100, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 1254.
30
Article 97 of the UN Charter. However, it goes without saying that Member States lobby for the
appointment of their nationals to important positions and try to influence the Secretary-General. He is
particularly vulnerable to the most powerful States because he needs their political support and/or
because of their financial importance. Id., pp. 1232-1233.
31
See M. Bossuyt and J. Wouters, Grondlijnen van internationaal recht, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005, p.
429.
32
UN General Assembly, Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Resolution 22 A (I), 13
February 1946.
33
F. Loriot, Accountability at the United Nations In Need of a Genuine Enforcement Body, in C. de
Cooker (ed.), op. cit., p. 67.
34
These positions are political and are only accessible by appointment and not by promotions.
10

level includes an Office, a Division, a Service, a Section and a Unit.35 As of 30 June

2009, some 40.000 staff members were working for the Secretariat. 126 members
were working at the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General level,
589 members belonged to the Directory category (D-category36), 10,839 to the
Professional category (P-category37) and 28,424 staff members were at the General
Service (G-category38) and related categories. 39
Although all departments and offices report directly to the Secretary-General, many
of them operate in isolated silos and receive very little guidance from the SecretaryGeneral. Besides, there are ten heads of programmes and funds that report to the
Secretary-General and require strategic guidance. 40
In the current system, the Secretary-General delegates his authority to his senior
managers in order to implement the various mandates which he receives from the
organisation. He then reports the achieved results to Member States, who will
evaluate these results.41 As a consequence,
the chain of responsibility, authority and accountability flows institutionally
from the intergovernmental organs to the Secretary-General and personally
to managers and staff members. Accountability then flows back up through

35

The office is composed of a minimum of 20 high level professionals under the supervision of a D-2
staff member, or in a few cases an Assistant Secretary General or Under Secretary General; the
division is composed of a minimum of fifteen high level professionals under the supervision of a D-2
staff member; the service is composed of a minimum of eight high level professionals under the
supervision of a D-1 staff member; the section is composed of a minimum of four professionals under
the supervision of a P-4 or a P-5 staff member; the unit is composed of a minimum of four positions
under the supervision of a chief. The organisational structure within the Secretariat is described in
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, A Guide to a Career with the United
Nations, available at
http://esa.un.org/techcoop/associateexperts/APPLICANTS/Guide_to_employment/unpan000153.pdf.
36
At the top of the career line within the Secretariat, there are two D-positions, namely D-1 which
designates the General Administrators who are Service Heads and D-2 which concerns the Directors,
who are Division Heads. Ibid.
37
Following the D-positions, there are five professional levels, from P-1 to P-5. Anyone in possession of
an advanced university degree will progress from one category to the next, following seniority and
merits. P-1 designates recent graduates or United Nations General Service employees, that have
passed internal qualification examinations; P-2 is accessible via examination or through external
recruitment with two to three years of experience; P-3 level may be accessed through examination or
through external recruitment with four to eight years of experience; P-4 requires eight to 12 years of
experience; P-5 is accessible with 13 to 17 years of experience. Ibid.
38
The General Service is composed of various groups occupied with clerical, secretarial and
administrative work. There are seven levels, from G-1 to G-7. It is possible to move up to the
professional category by internal examinations. Ibid.
39
UN General Assembly, Composition of the Secretariat Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/352,
15 September 2009, p. 15.
40
UN General Assembly, Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide
Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/692, 7 March 2006, p. 16.
41
UN General Assembly, Accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control
framework, and result-based management framework Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/701, 19
February 2008, p. 4.
11

each of these layers through performance appraisals and reporting. [] The

Secretary-Generals discretion as chief administrative officer is governed by
Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter and by the staff, financial and programme
planning regulations and rules adopted by the General Assembly. His
managerial discretion is exercised under the mandates given to him
collectively by Member States and with the resources they make available to
carry them out.42
The UN Secretariat distinguishes the institutional accountability of the SecretaryGeneral as an organ of the organisation from the personal accountability of individual
staff members for accomplishing the goals stated in their work plans and for acting
ethically and in accordance with all rules and regulations. Based on Article 98 of the
UN Charter, the Secretary-Generals institutional accountability is defined as
the responsibility of the Secretary-General to explain and justify to the
General Assembly and other relevant intergovernmental bodies, in a
systematic framework and by an orderly process using transparent
mechanisms, the performance of the Organization in using resources to
achieve results mandated by the Member States in the Assembly and/or
other intergovernmental bodies established under the Charter of the United
Nations.43
The personal accountability of individuals is defined as
the duty of an individual staff member to exercise defined responsibilities
appropriately, with a clear understanding of the consequences, and to explain
and justify to the official who conferred the authority the results achieved and
the manner in which the authority has been exercised.44
This definition leaves room for interpretation, which permits to take into consideration
inter alia the level or the responsibility of the international civil servant and the
discretion enjoyed by the staff member in the fulfilment of his/her work plan.
At the 2005 World Summit, Member States agreed to strengthen the UN through a
series of management and Secretariat reforms. On 7 March 2006, former Secretary42
43
44

Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., p.7.
Ibid., p. 7.
12

General Kofi Annan issued the report Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger
Organization worldwide, in which he presented several proposals streamlining the
managerial structure of the Secretariat.45 Some of these proposals were adopted,
such as the creation of a Management Performance Board to assess the
performance of senior managers and brief the Secretary-General on managerial
matters requiring his attention, including corrective actions. In his report of 19
February 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon proposed a new accountability
architecture and a review of accountability measures based on three pillars, namely
integrity, performance and compliance.46 Some of these measures will be analysed
in the next section.

3. PRINCIPLES OF MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is traditionally defined as the process of being called to account to

some authority for ones actions.47 As stated by the International Law Association
(ILA)s

Committee

on

the

Accountability

of

International

Organisations,

accountability is linked to the authority and power of an [organisation]. Power entails

accountability, that is the duty to account for its exercise.48 Certain scholars however
advocate a less retrospective and self-centred conception of accountability in
international organisations, arguing that genuine accountability implies engaging with
relevant stakeholders (internal as well as external) at all stages of the organisations
activities, from decision-making to evaluation.49 In that sense, accountability would
encompass accounting for ones actions, as well as taking into account the
preferences of stakeholders.
Applied to the context of management within international organisations, the analysis
of accountability requires shedding light on the various elements forming
accountability relationships in the context of the international civil service: who is
held accountable by whom and on what basis (subsections 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3.)?
Accountability is a multifaceted concept and may follow various channels (subsection

45

UN General Assembly, Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide
Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit.
46
UN General Assembly, Accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control
framework, and result-based management framework Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit.
47
R. Mulgan, Accountability: an Ever-Expanding Concept, Public Administration, 2000, vol. 78, 555.
48
International Law Association Committee on the Accountability of International Organisations,
Conference Berlin Final Report, April 2004, pp. 5-6.
49
S. Burall and C. Neligan, The Accountability of International Organizations, GPPI Research Paper
Series No. 2, 2005, available at http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/IO_Acct_Burall_05012005.pdf, p. 7.
13

3.4.).50 In relation to the international civil service, the most important channels are
legal accountability, disciplinary accountability, mediatory accountability and political
accountability. The various principles of managerial accountability identified and
analysed in this subsection have progressively been transposed within the
institutional framework of international organisations, as we will illustrate with
practical examples from the managerial accountability practice of international
organisations (subsection 3.5.).
3.1. WHO IS ACCOUNTABLE?
Managerial accountability in international organisations generally applies to
international civil servants. At the UN, for instance, the principle is that managerial
accountability is applicable to all levels of staff, from the executive heads such as the
Secretary-General down to lower levels of managers/staff members.51
3.2. TO WHOM?
In most international organisations, Member States are the only constituencies which
may trigger accountability mechanisms, and, as the case may be, obtain redress in
case of mismanagement. However, in some organisations, the accountability system
is directed towards a larger circle of stakeholders, with a right of complaint,
participation and redress for the victim of the dysfunctional act of the administration.
A stakeholder may be defined as any group or individuals who can affect or is
affected by [] an organization.52 In this case, two categories of stakeholders may
be distinguished, namely those internal staff members, Member States,
shareholders and those external to the organisation. For instance, the World Bank
established in 1993 an Inspection Panel which is responsible for investigating claims
launched by locally affected people regarding projects allegedly violating the Banks
policies, procedures and loan agreements.53 This accountability to external

50

International Law Association Committee on the Accountability of International Organisations,

Conference Berlin Final Report, op. cit., p. 5. Accountability of IO-s is a multifaceted phenomenon.
The form under which accountability will eventually arise will be determined by the particular
circumstances surrounding the acts or omissions of an IO, its member States or third parties. ()
These forms may be legal, political, administrative or financial. A combination of the four forms provides
the best chances of achieving the necessary degree of accountability.
51
M. Fowler and S. Kuyama, op. cit., p. 5. See also ILOAT, OPCW v Bustani, Judgement No. 2232, 16
July 2003, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/fulltext/2232.htm. The Tribunal
considered that the OPCW Director-General has the status of an international civil servant and is
consequently to be regarded as a staff member.
52
R. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholders Approach, Boston: Pitman, 1984.
53
World Bank, Resolution of the Executive Directors establishing the Inspection Panel for the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (No. 93-10) and the International
Development Association (IDA) (No. IDA 93-6), Sec M93-988 (IBRD) and Sec M93-313 (IDA) of 22
September 1993, available at www.worldbank.org.
14

stakeholders is certainly to be approved in cases where international organisations

policies directly affect individuals.54
3.3. ON WHAT BASIS?
The rules regulating the behaviour of international civil servants have several
sources: international law, rules of the international organisation itself, domestic laws
(criminal law, labour law, etc.), and ethical principles.55 When they join an
international organisation, staff members have to accept the staff regulations. These
generally contain a loyalty clause according to which they have to act with the
interest of the organisation always in mind.56 Moreover, international organisations
have issued documents containing ethical standards, such as mission statements,
codes of conduct or charters of values. Examples are the EU Code of Conduct for
Commissioners57, the World Bank Code of Conduct for Board Officials58 or the
above-mentioned UN Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service. The
scope and status of these codes of conduct vary from organisation to organisation.
In some of them, the code is to be used as guidance and has no legal value per se,
such as the UN Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service59 and the
IMF Code of Conduct for Staff.60 It must however be pointed out that failure to
respect the code could constitute misconduct giving rise to disciplinary or other
consequences. In other organisations, the code is integrated into the employment
contract, or is part of the general labour regulations. In those cases61 the code is
legally binding on the civil servants and can be judicially enforced as such.
54

Accountability of global governance institutions among which international organisations towards

the larger circle of those impacted by their decisions and activities is identified as essential in the
democratization of global governance. See J. Cohen and C. Sabel, Global Democracy?, N.Y.U.
Journal of International Law and Politics 37, 2005, 766.
55
In this regard, in an article systematically investigating the practice of international administrative
tribunals in the framework of the Global Administrative Law project, Benedict Kingsbury and Richard
Stewart state that international organisations administrative tribunals reach their decisions by reference
to such sources as: staff employment contracts; staff rules and regulations; internal orders, circulars,
handbooks and practices of the organizations; the constituent instruments of the relevant organization
and of the specific tribunal; and a somewhat open-ended range of other sources including, in particular,
general principles of law. See B. Kingsbury and R. Stewart, op. cit, p. 2.
56
C. de Cooker, op. cit., p. 8.
57
European Commission, Code of conduct for Commissioners, SEC(2004) 1487/2, 23 November 2004,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/code_of_conduct/code_conduct_en.pdf.
58
World Bank, Code of conduct for Board Officials, 1 November 2007, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf.
59
International Civil Service Commission, Standards of conduct for the international civil service,
January 2002, available at http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardse.pdf. This new version of
the Standards replaces the 1954 report of the International Civil Service Advisory Board, also entitled
Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service, and which governed international civil servants
conducts until then.
60
IMF, Code of Conduct for Staff, 31 July 1998, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/code.htm.
61
For instance, the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour is binding on the European Commission
Staff. This Code, adopted on 13 September 2000, states that it is binding on all staff covered by the
Staff Regulations and the other legal provisions on relations between the Commission and its staff that
15

3.4. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A MULTIFACETED CONCEPT

Managerial accountability may be put in practice in a variety of ways, along a variety
of channels and through a variety of means.62
Legal accountability is the most evident accountability channel and extends beyond
the framework of the international organisation. The implementation of this channel
of accountability implies that the actions of the agent being called to account fall
within the scope of an applicable law, and that the said agent may face
consequences as a result of the application of such law. The most typical instrument
of legal accountability in this framework is criminal law.
Disciplinary accountability consists of the internal administrative procedures of the
international organisation through which the actions of civil servants can be judged
and sanctioned. For instance, Article 86 of the EU Staff Regulations provides that
[a]ny failure by an official or former official to comply with his obligations under these
Staff Regulations, whether intentionally or through negligence on his part, shall make
him liable to disciplinary action. Furthermore, the staff regulations define disciplinary
proceedings and penalties.63
Mediatory accountability constitutes an alternative accountability channel which is
not characterised by a judgment/sanction scheme, but rather by a dialogue between
are applicable to officials and other servants of the European Communities. However, persons
employed under private law contracts, experts on secondment from national civil services and trainees
etc. working for the Commission should also be guided by it in their daily work. European Commission,
Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, OJ L 267, 20 October 2000. This Code is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/code/index3_en.htm.
62
On top of the various channels identified in this subsection and without pretending to be exhaustive,
accountability relationships can be distinguished according to their type, that is, the sort of
accountability relationship linking the individual or body owing account with the individual or body
claiming account (see, in this regard, among many others, R. Mulgan, Holding Power to Account:
Accountability in Modern Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003; in an international
perspective, R. Grant and R. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,
American Political Science Review, 2005, Vol. 99, p. 8; in the EU context see C. Harlow, Accountability
in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.); according to their dimensions, that is,
the material grounds on which accountability can be claimed (see J. Koppel, Pathologies of
Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of the Multiple Accountabilities Disorder, Public
Administration Review, 2005, Vol. 65, 94, identifying five such dimensions: transparency,
responsiveness, liability, responsibility, and controllability); according to their intensity: accountability
can be strong or diffuse (see the proceedings of the NYU Institute for International Law and Justice
Workshop on Accountability in Global Governance, held on 17 November 2006 at New York University
School of Law in the framework of the Global Administrative Law Project, available at
http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/AccountabilityinGlobalGovernance-WorkshopReport_000.pdf);
according the values accountability relationships intend to protect or promote (see K. Kernaghan, The
Post-Bureaucratic Organization and Public Service Values, International Review of Administrative
Sciences, 2000, Vol. 66, 91); or according to their source, which can be internal or external, or
institutionalised or informal (see R. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, op.
cit.; M. Bovens, op. cit., 455-56; and R. Keohane, Accountability in World Politics, Scandinavian
Political Studies, 2006, Vol. 29, 79 ff.).
63
European Commission, Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities, 1 May 2004,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf.
16

the civil servant, the international organisation and, often, the public. This channel
aims at analysing the reasons of a possible dysfunction and to reach an agreeable
and constructive solution for each party involved. Mediatory accountability processes
are typically embodied by an ad hoc person/institution called an Ombudsman (e.g.
the EU Ombudsman).
Political accountability relates to the political consequences attached to conduct of
holders of public office, or to conduct of civil servants working under them within their
sphere of competence, by the institution or person who can hold such holders of
public office to account. Although political responsibility is present in all democratic
legal systems, it exists in different forms and at different levels depending on the
constitutional structure of the legal system concerned.64 The political accountability
channel is activated as a result of pressure exerted by the agents political
environment as a consequence of his/her actions. Political accountability may derive
from parliamentary distrust, from media coverage of an incident (sometimes turning
into a public scandal) and/or from peer pressure. The outcomes of political
accountability processes are also undefined a priori, and can take various forms
such as public apologies, resignation or reduced authority.
3.5. HOW DOES MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION IN THE PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS?
3.5.1. Intricate Accountability Channels
The various channels of accountability listed above are likely to overlap in a number
of cases. One can for example imagine the case of a senior international civil servant
who commits, in the exercise of his or her functions, a criminal offence under
domestic law (legal accountability), for which he or she is disciplinarily sanctioned
(disciplinary accountability). The media pressure forces him or her to resign (political
accountability).65 The articulation of the various channels of accountability is
currently, as we will see, less than ideal and may give rise to a number of issues
negatively impacting the work of international organisations.
Unlike domestic administrations, international organisations and their administrations
usually lack the control of a democratically elected organ, such as a parliament. As a
consequence, in most international organisations, the political accountability is
64

Committee of Independent Experts, Second Report on Reform of the Commission. Analysis of

current practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud, Volume I, 10
September 1999, para. 7.14.15.
65
See the case of former EU Commissioner Edith Cresson, infra, this subsection and subsection 3.5.2.
17

usually weakly institutionalised.66 International organisations therefore tend to turn to

other accountability channels, namely internal disciplinary or legal accountability
systems.67 Within the UN for instance, individual staff members have to report to the
official having authority on them about the results achieved and the manner in which
their function was exercised.68 This implies that accountability issues are first dealt
with through the hierarchical path.
However, a disciplinary accountability system based on the hierarchy of international
civil servants may pose particular problems in the case of heads of organisations.
For them, regular internal accountability systems may have a reduced impact.
Effective levels of accountability may apply to lower staff levels typically along
hierarchical lines and progressively dilute when moving up to higher ranking staff
members. For instance, at the UN, senior levels have long been considered to be
immune to a large extent from any accountability.69 The case of the former UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, accused in
2004 of sexual harassment against one of the members of the staff of the High
Commissariat,

revealed

the

awkward

and

opaque functioning

of

internal

accountability channels against high-level officials. The UNs Office of Internal

Oversight (OIOS) had rendered an unequivocal report concluding to the culpability of
Mr. Lubbers, but the Secretary-General initially dismissed the case without much
reason-giving. It was only after the OIOS report was leaked to the international press
that Mr. Lubbers was forced to step down. At the UN, the recently established
Management Performance Board70 should prove instrumental in avoiding such
situations and to ensure that senior officials will be held accountable in the future.
The hierarchical accountability system sometimes presents another deficiency,
namely a lack of procedural guarantees in favour of the suspected staff member.
Although the possibility of a sanction is not necessarily a definitional feature of
accountability, accountability systems tend in practice to designate a guilty agent
and to sanction him or her, possibly very severely. This calls for strong procedural
66

Political pressures may however stem from sources external to the organisation, such as the media
or the general public, and may have consequences on the agent, for example forcing him to resign or to
apologize.
67
See generally J. Ferejohn, Accountability in a Global Context, IILJ Working Paper No. 2007/5, 2007,
available at http://iilj.org/publications/2007-5Ferejohn.asp, arguing that the political accountability
mechanisms available through electoral means in traditional domestic democracies are not available in
the international realm. Therefore, international organisations would need to resort primarily to legal
accountability mechanisms, even though political accountability mechanisms would be more
appropriate from a democratic point of view.
68
UN General Assembly, Accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control
framework, and result-based management framework Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit., p. 7.
69
F. Loriot, op. cit., p. 68.
70
See supra, subsection 2.2.
18

safeguards in favour of the suspected agent.71 The elements of these guarantees

would include a right to receive timely and thorough information on the case; the
right to be heard and to defend oneself; the proportionality of the sanction;
application of the ne bis in idem principle; a possibility of review of the decision, etc.
The European Court of Justice has dedicated long paragraphs to this issue in its
judgment in the Cresson Case, referring to due process rules as general principles of
European Union law.72 This issue also has to do with whistle blowing schemes, in
which civil servants have the possibility, and sometimes the obligation, to report
cases of misconduct of which they may become aware.73 This topic is highly
sensitive, especially in Europe, and calls for both the protection of the identity of the
whistle blower and for the protection of the suspected agent against false
accusations.
For what concerns more particularly the legal accountability channel, problems of
conflicts of law and of jurisdiction are also frequent as international civil servants
have a particular international status and usually operate in various locations. As a
result, they are likely to be subject to various international and domestic regulations
and/or judicial fora. The absence of clear rules in this respect can lead to a blurring
of behavioural standards, but can also have a negative impact on the predictability
and fairness of the accountability process itself. For example, the former EU
Commissioner Edith Cresson74 was criminally investigated for corruption by a
Brussels Investigative Judge, but the Council Chamber of the Tribunal of First
Instance of Brussels held that there was no criminal conduct on the part of Mrs
Cresson. Later, the European Commission brought an action against her before the
European Court of Justice, claiming that she had acted in breach of her obligations
under Article 213 (2) EC75 and Article 126 (2) EA.76 Mrs Cresson raised numerous
71

The right of every person to a fair trial is laid down in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and in Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999
UNTS 171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed 4
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221.
72
ECJ, Case C-432/04, Commission of the European Communities v. dith Cresson, ECR [2006] I6387, paras. 103-114.
73
Such obligation is laid down in Article 22 of the EU Staff Regulations. Article 22 (a) states that [a]ny
official who, in the course of or in connection with the performance of his duties, becomes aware of
facts which give rise to a presumption of the existence of possible illegal activity, including fraud or
corruption, detrimental to the interests of the Communities, or of conduct relating to the discharge of
professional duties which may constitute a serious failure to comply with the obligations of officials of
the Communities shall without delay inform either his immediate superior or his Director-General or, if
he considers it useful, the Secretary-General, or the persons in equivalent positions, or the European
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) direct. Information mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be given in
writing. []. European Commission, Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities, op.
cit.
74
See infra, section 3.5.2. for more details on this case.
75
Article 213 (2) EC stated: The Members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the
Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties. In the performance of these
19

arguments in her defence and contended that the decision of the Belgian Council
Chamber not to refer the case for trial rendered the Commissions action devoid of
purpose and content. The European Court of Justice considered that it was not
bound by the legal characterisation of the facts made in the context of the criminal
proceedings and had full discretion in its investigations.77
The fairness owed to the staff of international organisations when required to
account for their actions is also at stake when the accountability channel is political.
This is especially the case when the media release and comment upon information
on alleged misconduct by officials and staff of international organisations, but also
when the political organ of an organisation decides to withdraw its confidence to an
official of the said organisation. A decision taken by a political body and based on
political reasons may however remain an administrative act reviewable by a judicial
organ. An interesting case is that of Mr Bustani, a former director-general of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, whose mandate was
terminated by a motion of non-confidence voted by the Conference of the State
Parties. The ILO Administrative Tribunal ruled that, even though the decision to
dismiss Mr Bustani had been taken by a political organ and was based on political
considerations, the general principles of due process and the independence owed to
international staff in the exercise of their functions allowed for the judicial review of
that decision.78
In light of the poor operation of managerial accountability mechanisms, as evidenced
above, international organisations have progressively developed specific bodies in
charge of overseeing staff activities and investigating cases of mismanagement. As
stated by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in relation to the UN,

duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body. They
shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Each Member State undertakes to respect
this principle and not to seek to influence the Members of the Commission in the performance of their
tasks. The Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage in any other
occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn
undertaking that, both during and after their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising
therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance,
after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits. In the event of any breach of
these obligations, the Court of Justice may, on application by the Council or the Commission, rule that
the Member concerned be, according to the circumstances, either compulsorily retired in accordance
with Article 216 or deprived of his right to a pension or other benefits in its stead. It has been replaced
by Article 245 TFEU.
76
This provision is identical to Article 213(2) EC.
77
ECJ, Case C-432/04, op. cit., paras. 103-114. Domestic tribunals have also in a number of instances
reviewed judgments of international administrative tribunals in reference to due process principles. See
B. Kingsbury and R. Stewart, op. cit., p. 15.
78
ILOAT, OPCW v Bustani, op. cit. See J. Klabbers, The Bustani case before the ILOAT:
constitutionalism in disguise?, ICLQ, 2004, Vol. 53, 455.
20

[t]he oversight bodies play a crucial role throughout the entire process, both
mid-course and ex post facto, as they conduct oversight activities to
determine whether the Secretariat is achieving the intended results and
acting ethically and in compliance with the regulations and rules governing its
work.79
The case of Mrs Cresson at the European Commission and the Oil-for-Food crisis at
the UN provide interesting illustrations of this evolution in the area of managerial
accountability. Indeed, both public scandals have revealed situations of abuse and
arbitrariness due to the insufficient control on executive power. The international
organisations concerned became aware of this important deficit and established
more institutionalised systems of investigation and control. Moreover, they
developed accountability mechanisms in order to enhance the transparency of their
operations.
3.5.2. The Cresson Case
Mrs Cresson was from 1995 to 1999 a member of the European Commission
presided by Mr Santer and was in charge of science, research and development,
human resources, education, training and youth. She was suspected of using her
position at the European Commission in order to extend benefits to close
acquaintances for fictitious services. Investigations were carried out by various
bodies and following diverse procedures. The investigations were initiated by a
Committee of Independent Experts, established on 27 January 1999 in order to seek
to establish to what extent the Commission, as a body, or Commissioners
individually, should bear specific responsibility for causes of fraud, mismanagement
or nepotism raised in Parliamentary discussions.80 The Committee issued a report
revealing instances of fraud, irregularities or mismanagement. The report notoriously
concluded with the devastating finding that [i]t is becoming difficult to find anyone [in
the Commission] who has even the slightest sense of responsibility.81 Since the
European Parliament asked the Commission to reform its departments, the
Commission created an independent European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to combat
any fraud affecting the sound financial management of the budget.82 OLAF
79

UN General Assembly, Accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control
framework, and result-based management framework Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit., p. 4.
80
Committee of Independent Experts, First report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and
Nepotism in the European Commission, 15 March 1999, para. 1.1.4. referring to a note adopted at the
European Parliaments Conference of Presidents at its meeting of 27 January 1999.
81
Ibid., para. 9.4.25.
82
The Office shall exercise the Commissions powers to carry out external administrative investigations
for the purpose of strengthening the fight against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity
adversely affecting the Communitys financial interests, as well as any other act or activity by operators
21

undertook investigations on the case of Mrs Cresson and submitted a report on 23

November 1999. This report led to disciplinary proceedings against officials of the
Commission and members of its staff. The Personnel and Administration DirectorateGeneral started an additional investigation on this case and prepared its reports.
These were adopted by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the Commission
(IDOC) after its creation on 19 February 2002. Additional investigations were carried
out by a Brussels Investigative Judge and Mrs Cresson was brought before the
European Court of Justice by the European Commission, as mentioned above. The
Court of Justice found Mrs Cresson guilty of breach of her obligations under Articles
213 (2) EC and 126 (2) EA. Nevertheless, it did not pronounce any particular
sanction.83
The entire Santer Commission resigned on 16 March 1999 but remained in office
until 8 September 1999. This crisis raised important independence and autonomy
concerns. For A. Macmullen,
the Santer Commission suffered from the cumulative effects of the
ambiguities in the structure and role of the Commission in the European
Union system. While the Commission has a self-image which stresses its
independent political leadership functions in the developing European Union,
it has always had to struggle against the intergovernmental view that it is
essentially an elaborate permanent secretariat or civil service to implement
the collective decisions of the national governments.84
Commissioners must be independent of national governments. However, this does
not imply that the Commission is unaccountable to other EU institutions and
especially the European Parliament. According to Article 234 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), there is a collegiate political
accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament for its activities.
Moreover, individual Commissioners are legally accountable for their own actions
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the basis of Article 247 TFEU. Lower
level EU staff members are subject to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions.

in breach of Community provisions. European Commission, Decision establishing the European AntiFraud Office (OLAF), OJ L136, 1999.
83
ECJ, Case C-432/04, paras 50-51, where the Court held that having regard to the circumstances of
the case, the finding of breach constitutes, of itself, an appropriate penalty and that [i]t is therefore
appropriate not to impose on Mrs Cresson a penalty in the form of a deprivation of her right to a pension
or other benefits in its stead.
84
A. Macmullen, Political Responsibility for the Administration of Europe: The Commissions
Resignation March 1999, Parliamentary Affairs 52(4), 1999, 715.
22

As stated above, disciplinary proceedings have been reformed in search of greater

objectivity and institutionalisation. Both OLAF and IDOC, as independent and
impartial bodies responsible for administrative inquiry, play a crucial role in this
system.85 According to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, the Appointing
Authority has to inform the officials concerned of the investigation.86 On the basis of
the investigation report, after having notified them of the evidence contained in the
files and having heard them, the Appointing Authority will decide on the case. It may
decide to itself issue a written warning or a reprimand. It may alternatively initiate
disciplinary proceedings before a Disciplinary Board described in Annex IX of the
Staff Regulations in which case the list of penalties at the disposal of the
Appointing Authority is extended.87
The official concerned may submit a complaint to the Appointing Authority against an
act adversely affecting him, either where the said authority has taken a decision or
where it has failed to adopt a measure prescribed by the Staff Regulations.
Moreover, an appeal to the European Court of Justice is available subject to certain
conditions laid down in Annex IX of the Staff Regulations. Within the EU judicial
system, a Civil Service Tribunal has been established to deal with these matters.88
This constitutes a very elaborate example of an internal justice system established
by an international organisation to handle staff-related issues.
3.5.3. The Oil-for-Food Case
The second illustration concerns the scandal involving the Oil-for-Food programme
at the UN, which spurred calls for UN management reform. This programme was
intended to supply food and medicines to the Iraqi population despite the economic
blockade which followed the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. Though its aim was
praiseworthy, serious allegations of corruption revealed grave weaknesses in the
programme which were exploited by some both within the UN and outside of it.
85

OLAF deals with cases of fraud or other financial irregularities, while the IDOC conducts impartial
administrative inquiries and prepares disciplinary proceedings in all other matters.
86
European Commission, Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities, op. cit.
87
See Section 3 of Annex IX of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities. Ibid.
According to Article 9, para. 1 of Section 3, [t]he Appointing Authority may impose one of the following
penalties: a written warning; a reprimand; deferment of advancement to a higher step for a period of
between one and 23 months; relegation in step; temporary downgrading for a period of between 15
days and one year; downgrading in the same function group; classification in a lower function group,
with or without downgrading; removal from post and, where appropriate, reduction pro tempore of a
pension or withholding, for a fixed period, of an amount from an invalidity allowance; the effects of this
measure shall not extend to the officials dependants. In case of such reduction however, the former
officials income may not be less than the minimum subsistence figure laid down in Article 6 of Annex
VIII, with the addition of any family allowances payable.
88
Council of the European Union, Decision establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal,
2004/752/EC, Euratom, OJ L 333/7, 9 November 2004.
23

Numerous audits were conducted by the UNs Office of Internal Oversight. OIOS had
been established in 1994 under General Assembly Resolution 48/218B as an
operationally independent office assisting the Secretary-General to enhance the
oversight functions within the UN through monitoring, internal audit, inspection,
evaluation and investigation.89 The Offices analysis of the Oil-for-Food programme
was however criticised by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), which
considered that OIOS lacked the resources and independence needed to provide
full and effective oversight of this large, costly, and complex UN effort.90
In April 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan decided to establish an Independent
Inquiry Committee. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1538, endorsing the
inquiry and calling for full cooperation in the investigation by all UN officials and
personnel, the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, and all other UN Member States,
including their national regulatory authorities. Interim reports were released on 3
February 200591 and on 29 March 2005.92 In its final report of 7 September 2005, the
Committee concluded that [t]he administrative structure and the personnel practices
of the Organisation certainly within the Secretariat were simply not fit to meet the
truly extraordinary challenges presented by the Oil-for-Food Programme, or even
programmes of much lesser scope.93 Though the Secretary-General is described by
the UN Charter as the chief administrative officer of the Organisation, the Committee
noted that
the Secretary-General any Secretary-General has not been chosen for
his managerial or administrative skills, nor has he been provided with a
structure and instruments conducive to strong executive oversight and
control. That is most clearly evident in the area of personnel management,

89
UN General Assembly, Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the
United Nations, A/RES/48/218 B, 12 August 1994.
90
USGAO, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government
Information, and International Security. United Nations. Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and
Procurement Could Affect the Effective Implementation of Planned Renovation, GAO 06-877T, 20 June
2006, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06877t.pdf.
91
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Interim Report, 3
February 2005, available at www.iic-offp.org/documents/InterimReportFeb2005.pdf.
92
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Second Interim
Report, 29 March 2005, available at www.iic-offp.org/documents/InterimReportMar2005.pdf. This report
focused on the role of the Secretary-General and his relationship with a company employing his son.
The report also exposed that the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services had used oilfor-food money to employ a senior staff member, who in fact did not work on these issues. A charge
letter was issued against him on 30 March 2005.
93
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, The Management
of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. Volume I The report of the Committee, 7 September
2005, available at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/Sept05/Mgmt_V1.pdf, p. 3.

24

where professional competence must compete with, and often take second
place to, the narrow political interests of Member States.94
At the World Summit in 2005, UN Member States agreed to reform many of the UNs
management practices by strengthening internal oversight and accountability, and
helping to ensure ethical conduct and reviewing budgetary, financial, and human
resource policies.95 In December 2005, the UN established a dedicated Ethics Office
approved by Member States.96 According to Section 1.1 of the Secretary-Generals
bulletin promulgating the establishment of the Ethics Office, its objective is
to assist the Secretary-General in ensuring that all staff members observe
and perform their functions consistent with the highest standards of integrity
required by the Charter of the United Nations through fostering a culture of
ethics, transparency and accountability.
Similarly to the EU, the UN has established a special jurisdiction dealing with
employment relations. By its Resolution 62/228 of 6 February 2008, Administration
of justice at the United Nations, the UN General Assembly has created a first
instance UN Dispute Tribunal and an appellate instance UN Appeals Tribunal.97
They replace the UN Administrative Tribunal, abolished as of 31 December 2009,98
and have jurisdiction to hear and pass judgment upon applications alleging nonobservance of contracts of employment of staff members of the UN Secretariat or of
their terms of appointment. Moreover, rule 10.3 of the UN Staff Regulations, with the
title Due process in disciplinary proceedings, states that [a] staff member against
whom disciplinary or non-disciplinary measures, pursuant to staff rule 10.2, have
been imposed following the completion of a disciplinary process may submit an
application challenging the imposition of such measures directly to the United
Nations Dispute Tribunal, in accordance with chapter XI of the Staff Rules. The
statutes for the Dispute Tribunal and the Appeals Tribunal were adopted by the
General Assembly in Resolution 63/253.99 As stated by Secretary-General Ban Ki94

Ibid.
UN General Assembly, Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcome
of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields. Followup to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005.
96
UN Secretary-General, Ethics Office establishment and terms of reference Secretary-General
Bulletin, ST/SGB/2005/22, 30 December 2005.
97
UN General Assembly, Administration of justice at the United Nations, A/Res/62/228, 6 February
2008.
98
UN Secretary-General, Transitional measures related to the introduction of the new system of
administration of justice Secretary-General Bulletin, SGB/2009/11, 24 June 2009.
99
UN General Assembly, Administration of justice at the United Nations, A/Res/63/253, 23 February
2009.
95

25

Moon, this system of internal justice serves as a last-resort guarantor of

accountability among individuals.100
It follows from these illustrations that both the EU, the UN and their Member States
have come to recognize the need to reform managerial accountability in these
organisations. This evolution may certainly be approved. However, achieving an
appropriate design for managerial accountability remains a tough challenge. As
bureaucracy is a ubiquitous feature of modernity,101 dysfunctions in administration
have enormous consequences. Of central importance is the level of autonomy that
an international organisation should enjoy in order to discharge the function for which
it was created. In the next section, the interrelationship between the accountability of
the international civil service and the autonomy of international organisations is
further examined.

4. DESIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS:

THE RIGHT

ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL FOR THE RIGHT LEVEL OF AUTONOMY

In this section, we seek to identify the ways in which the managerial accountability
model does influence an international organisations degree of enjoyment of its
autonomy. The facets and modalities of accountability are many and complex, as we
have seen from the above depiction of managerial accountability practices in
international organisations.102 Our study of managerial accountability in international
organisations has focused on the means or channels through which accountability
can be exercised. This distinction is crucial from an institutional perspective, in
particular when reform is envisaged: many institutional choices as to managerial
accountability are available to the would-be reformers. It now becomes clear that a
delicate balance has to be achieved between the mode and level of accountability to
which an agent or organisation should be subject (aimed at securing democratic
control and quality of service), and the appropriate degree of autonomy which an
100

UN General Assembly, Accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control
framework, and result-based management framework Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit., p. 7.
101
C. Lord, Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1998, p. 81.
102
As was explained above, overall, conceptions of accountability may be placed along a continuum
stretching from a reactive to a proactive pole: either an organisation seeks to connect to its public by
reacting to dissatisfaction stemming from past errors or mishaps; or it proactively pursues its publics
preferences and continually adapts its practices accordingly. In other words, accountability would mean
accounting for ones actions, as well as taking into account the preferences of ones stakeholders
(see supra, section 3). However, between these two poles, the notion of accountability may be further
refined, and examined under a variety of lenses. Many distinctions can be identified, which in turn shed
light on the countless facets of accountability which all have a bearing on an organisations enjoyment
of its autonomy, and are thus relevant to the proper design of accountability mechanisms. For an
overview of these distinctions, see supra note 62.
26

agent or organisation should enjoy (aimed at effectively pursuing a particular

pragmatic goal).103 Improper design of managerial accountability mechanisms may
result in accountability excesses,104 which can paralyse the organisation, and run
counter to its usefully taking advantage of its autonomy by disturbing the balance
between the sense of initiative of its staff, and their deference to the processes and
fora to which they are held accountable.105 As a result, there is every chance that the
organisation will not function effectively.106 On the other hand, improper balance in
the accountability regime may also result in accountability deficits, threatening the
level at which the organisation is democratically controlled and the extent to which
professional service is guaranteed to the citizen. This might allow agents and
organisations to overstep the extent of their autonomy and their activities to go out of
hand, not constrained as they should be by the tight link they have with the public
whose affairs they administer. This would be a serious blow to the legitimacy of the
organisation.107
Finding the right arrangement, as was shown by our study of managerial
accountability practices in international organisations, has been a game of trial and
error. Achieving the right level of autonomy and designing the right model of
accountability entails finding the right managerial accountability regime at every floor
of the international organisation.108 Organisations have particularly struggled to finetune accountability channels with the variable level of responsibility of staff members,
leading to situations in which high-level civil servants were largely unaffected by
mainstream hierarchical modes of accountability. Scandals therefore ensued, and
the accountability of such agents ended up stemming, quite arbitrarily, from noninstitutional sources, such as the media or the general public. Such a state of affairs
largely based on erratic and diffuse forms of accountability is universally

103

International Law Association, Report of the sixty-eighth Conference held at Taipei, Taiwan,
Republic of China, 24-30 May 1998, London: ILA, 1998, p. 602. The ILA states that the accountability
regime will have to keep the balance between preserving the necessary autonomy in decision-making
of International Organisations and guaranteeing that the International Organisations will not be able to
avoid accountability.
104
Resulting, for example, in micro-management, overburdening with report and oversight,
cumbersome processes, excessive sanctions, etc.
105
See A. Wolf, op. cit., 18: like actors in repertoire theatre, public administrators must be able to play a
variety of roles: as obedient subordinate, innovative expert, responsive servant, and principled agent.
106
On the delicate tradeoffs between accountability and effectiveness, and the potential mutually
supportive character of their relationship, see P. Aucoin and R. Heintzman, op. cit., p. 54.
107
M. Bovens, op. cit., 464. On such intertwinement of the accountability and the legitimacy of
international organisations, and the place of administrative tribunals in this relationship in the absence
of electoral legitimation mechanisms, see B. Kingsbury and R. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 17-20.
108
Embryonic patterns as to this seem to have been identified: The less discretion an agent has, the
more formal the accountability channel appears to be when very high level of discretion than
accountability channels become much more political IGOs have their own very specific organisational
cultures. An accountability mechanism which works in one place may not work well in another. S. Burall
and C. Neligan, op. cit., p. 7.
27

regarded as unsatisfactory and as failing to guarantee the protection of the values or

purposes (e.g. ethics, democratic control, proper service, see supra) which citizens
may expect from a properly functioning administration. Extensive reform was
therefore undertaken in relation to managerial accountability.
Despite such good intentions, in the current context of the globalisation of
administrative

functions,

designing

appropriate

accountability

mechanisms

applicable, in a differentiated manner, to all of an international organisations

activities is an increasingly difficult task. Administrative layers do indeed tend to
become ever more diversified, involving networks of actors linked through
innumerable relationships, and discharging increasingly numerous administrative
duties. Adding to this difficulty is the increasing recourse that is had in international
administration to private companies through the outsourcing of a large number of
tasks.109
Given the strong relationship between accountability and autonomy, when designing
accountability mechanisms in international organisations, reformers would be welladvised to reflect in terms of the degree of autonomy that they want the organisation
to enjoy and to have a sensible knowledge of the different facets that accountability
may have. If accountability and autonomy are not conceived of as mutually
reinforcing then the effectiveness, the legitimacy and, ultimately, the overall authority
of the organisation might be severely compromised, thereby running the risk of
defeating the purpose for which it was created.110

CONCLUSION

The general trend evidenced by our review of recent managerial accountability

practices in international organisations is that the latter are increasingly aware of the
necessity to plan, institutionalise and manage this aspect of their operations. In the
109

The Oil-for-Food Programme was for example highly dependent on private companies for its
implementation. It was unfortunately manipulated to a large extent by such companies. See the Report
on the Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme rendered on 27 October 2005 by an Independent
Inquiry Committee, available at http://www.iic-offp.org/story27oct05.htm. In the context of US foreign
policy and the problem of the accountability of private contractors, see L. Dickinson, Public Law Values
in a Privatized World, Yale Journal of International Law, 2006, Vol. 31, 383.
110
The effectiveness and the legitimacy of a public regulatory actor are indeed the cornerstones of its
authority. See, on the connection between legitimacy and authority, M. Weber, Economy and Society
An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (G. Roth and C. Wittich eds.), Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978, pp. 212 ff. On the difficult question of authority in the international system, see R. Hall and
T. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System, in R. Hall and T.
Biersteker (eds.), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002, p. 3.
28

past, managerial accountability channels tended to be limited to staff regulations and

simple hierarchical/disciplinary review and sanction schemes, the effectiveness of
which was fading with the degree of responsibility of the civil servant under review.
International organisations now seem to turn to much more elaborate processes,
operationalising a much richer conception of managerial accountability. On the one
hand, staff control schemes are becoming increasingly embodied by independent
investigation and judiciary organs, avoiding hierarchical biases and conflicts of
interest, applying indifferently to low- and high-level civil servants, and guaranteeing
due process.111 On the other hand, the daily course of activities in international civil
service is also increasingly supervised in a proactive manner, with the intent to preempt dysfunctions, and to generate positive learning and improvement curves within
the organisation.
Generally, recent public scandals, in particular the Cresson case in the EU, have
allowed for a better understanding and articulation of the way different channels of
accountability might combine and work in support of one another. The disciplinary
channel, on the one side, is being rationalised and reinforced as the more natural
instrument of managerial accountability, as it aims at generally supervising the way
day-to-day international civil service is being discharged in reference to predefined
rules and procedures. The legal channel might also in some instances complement
the disciplinary channel in case of particularly grave offences falling within the scope
of an applicable law, for example in the case of a criminal offence. Next to these
rules-based

channels,

institutional

and

non-institutional

forms

of

political

accountability persist and thrive in relation to top-level civil servants occupying

policy-making positions. Examples include, on the one hand, increased public
awareness of international organisations activities, sometimes resulting in scandals
having varied results, from resignations (see the Cresson and Lubbers cases above,
as well as the highly publicised resignation of Paul Wolfowitz as head of the World
Bank following a case of alleged nepotism112) to simple apologies (see the recent
sex scandal involving IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn113). On the
111

In this connection, see the study by Benedict Kingsbury and Richard Stewart, investigating the
extent to which the growingly pervasive practice of international administrative tribunals can be
analysed against the three basic normative conceptions of Global Administrative Law, namely internal
administrative accountability; protection of private rights or the rights of states; and promotion of
democracy. B. Kingsbury and R. Stewart, op. cit.
112
In this case, the Executive Directors of the World Bank did not conclude that the ethics of Mr.
Wolfowitz had failed. Mr. Wolfowitz however chose to resign. See World Bank News Release,
Statements of Executive Directors and President Wolfowitz, Washington, 17 May 2007, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21339650~menuPK:34463~page
PK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html.
113
In the case of Mr. Strauss-Kahn having intimate intercourse with a married staff member, the IMF
executive board also did not find any evidence of harassment, favoritism, or other form of abuse of
29

other hand, more institutionalised political accountability mechanisms are generally

being operationalised by confidence relationships between top administrators of
international organisations and representative assemblies.114
One may think that such reinforced and rationalised forms of managerial
accountability curtail the autonomy of international organisations, and therefore risk
limiting their ability to reach the purpose for which they were created. This may be
true, as we said: if such reforms result in accountability excesses responding to prior
accountability deficits. On the contrary, if the system of managerial accountability is
properly designed (in particular with reference to the various facets which we
identified above) we suggest that the outcome might be opposite. This requires
understanding the relationship of mutual supportiveness between accountability,
autonomy and authority.
Our final submission is that an appropriate managerial accountability system will
allow an international organisation to better define the limits and modalities of its
autonomy and, ultimately, to make better use of it. Indeed, properly operating
managerial accountability will allow an international organisation to enjoy its
autonomy to the fullest extent while limiting the ability of its staff to overstep their
respective margins of discretion. This, in turn, should reinforce the organisations
effectiveness and legitimacy and, therefore, its authority and its ability to act in its
domain of competence. In conclusion, we suggest that the autonomy of an
international organisation requires an appropriate model of managerial accountability
in order to best serve the purpose for which the international organisation was
created.

authority. It however deplored a serious error of judgment on the part of Mr. Strauss-Kahn (see IMF
Press Release No. 08/257, Statement by IMF Executive Board on Review of Managing Directors
Conduct, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08257.htm). In this case, however,
Mr. Strauss-Kahn did not resign, but publicly apologized (See IMF Press Release No. 08/258,
Statement by IMF Managing Director Strauss-Kahn on Executive Board Review of his Conduct,
available at, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08258.htm.) Let us note that both in Mr.
Wolfowitzs and in Mr. Strauss-Kahns cases, the relevant bodies relied on independent investigations.
114
See Article 17. 8. of the Treaty on the European Union, providing that [t]he Commission, as a body,
shall be responsible to the European Parliament. In accordance with Article 234 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, the European Parliament may vote on a motion of censure of the
Commission. If such a motion is carried, the members of the Commission shall resign as a body and the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall resign from the duties that
he carries out in the Commission. See also the general regime of accountability of the UN SecretaryGeneral to the UN General Assembly (art. 97 UN Charter and UN General Assembly, Accountability
framework, enterprise risk management and internal control framework, and result-based management
framework Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit., p. 4) or Article XII, Section 4 (a) of the Articles of
Association of the International Monetary Fund, stating that [t]he Managing Director shall cease to hold
office when the Executive Board so decides.
30

The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies is an interdisciplinary research centre of the
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