HIRABAYASHI VS UNITED STATES

Facts
In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to prevent incidents
of subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese descent living in the United States. He
issued two executive orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of War the
power to designate certain parts of the country "military areas" and exclude certain persons from
them. The second established the War Relocation Authority which had the power to remove,
maintain, and supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon Kiyoshi
Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was convicted of violating a curfew and
relocation order.
Issue
Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate
against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment?
Held
The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of
military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that
individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese
actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and
focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone
argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations
with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry."
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the
Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from
taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts
from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to
the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the
termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for
under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their
services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be
no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process.
He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to
the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities
this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in
part: The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims
that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed
by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be
created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue
of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete

in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68
lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is
present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government
may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
CARDONA VS BINANGONAN
FACTS: The Municipality of Cardona alleged that section 1 of Act No. 1748; entitled "An Act
authorizing the adjustment of provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of
capitals of provinces and subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public
convenience and interest," is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates
legislative powers to the Governor-General, whereas the Act of Congress referred to lodges those
powers in the Philippine Legislature.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 1748 is "unconstitutional" on the ground that it confers on the
Governor-General legislative authority?
HELD: No, it is not unconstitutional. The delegation of the power referred to on the Governor- General does not
involve an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the particular subjectmatter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain details with
respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to
more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might
require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as
such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act applicable so far as it touches this case which is in
violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

BOCEA VS TEVES
http://www.scribd.com/doc/184817793/CASE-DIGEST-BoC-vs-Teves#scribd
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