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74 Phil 579 Legal Ethics Malpractice

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage
licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage
arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is
confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for
Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same
and asked for the courts mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The advertisement he caused to be published
is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again
emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayots plea for
leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the
Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Legal Ethics : Definition
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent
judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de
parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires
full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So
Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of
discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He
ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the
ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the
performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish
the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials or employees of the
superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since
he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor
was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs.
Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by
counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law
unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de officio for such action as it
may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325,
August 31, 1930)

Cui vs. Cui

113 SCRA 39 Political Law The Legislative Department Appearance in Court by a Congressman

This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress may appear
before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.

Case 1

In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino
Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as
counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the

Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding judge
however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate
jurisdiction.

Case 2

In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a
corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the
appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez
is also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa
may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.

HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFIs acting in their original jurisdiction.
CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts
depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of
general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in
the case at bar are courts without appellate jurisdiction.

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice
or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals,
being administrative agencies, are included.
Salcedo vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-42992. August 8, 1935]

16
OCT
Ponente: DIAZ, J.

FACTS:

Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged contemptuous paragraph in his
motion for reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within out power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because
we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the
press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the
victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.

The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of
ten days for that purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in
said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because,
according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

YES. Atty. Francisco ordered to pay a fine of P200.00 in ten days and reprimanded.

RATIO:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to
uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor
and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this
is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guarranty, said institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.

ALAWI VS ALAUYA
Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sale representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. of
Davao City. Ashari Alauya is the incumber executive of clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. It appears that through Alawi's agency, a
contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, or
more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.
Ruling:
1. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged

members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
2. WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use
of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Pangan

93 SCRA 87 Legal Ethics Lack of Candor by a Lawyer Proper name to be used by a


lawyer
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos
was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the
records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found
that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has
the right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro
Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname.
However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a
name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official
oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the
temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and
frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio
D. Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The
Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar
infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.

Philippine Lawyers

Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for


disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on the ground of
immorality, for allegedly carrying an immoral relationship
with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli) husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Iris attached a photocopy of a marriage
certificate that said that she and Carlos got married in
1985 but according to the certificate of marriage obtained

from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were


married in 1987.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted
herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to
be barred from the practice of law.
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The
bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice
of the legal profession simply by passing the bar, he must
also have a continued possession of good moral
character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral
conduct , which has been defined as the conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the good and respectable members of the
community. Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and
thus must handle their personal affairs with great caution.
Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However the fact remains that her relationship with
Carlos, clothed as it was with what she believed as a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. For such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, it must be grossly immoral, it must be
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous


relationships but must also behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards. Her act of distancing
herself on her discovery that Carlos was married proves
that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession.
On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is
contrary to human experience and highly improbable that
she did not know the year of her marriage or she failed to
check that the information onthe document she attached
to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and
acts of malpractice.
Case Digest in PALE: Deles v. Aragona, Jr.
AM No. 598; Mar. 28, 1969; J. Castro

Facts:
Aurora Soriano Deles, complainant , filed a verified letter-complaint against Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. , respondent,
for having made, under oath, false and unfounded allegations against Deles in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian
Relations, Iloilo, cases 1254 and 1255, which allegedly caused hergreat mentaltorture and moral suffering.

The CAR Case -- an intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of 10 hectares of the estate by Deles
to one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique Soriano (brother of Deles) as lessee of said land. In
effect, the order likewise sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the
said land being tenanted by themupon authority of the lessee, Enrique.
IN DISREGARD OF THE ORDER, Deles attempted to take possession of the landholdings by placing thereon her
own tenants. The Aglinaos countered by filing against Deles two petitions with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Iloilo.
After a hearing, the men of Deles entered the land in question and planted rice thereon, this unauthorized entry
prompted Atty. Aragona to file an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order" praying that Deles, her agent, or
any person acting for and in her behalf from interfering with the work of the Aglinaos in their respective landholdings.
Mrs. Soriano (wife of Enrique) went to see Atty. Aragano - she told him that she was personally present when one
Albert, a tenant of Deles, accompanied by armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the palay thereon
over the protests f the Aglinaos; and that she was told that they were acting upon orders of the Deles. POSSESSED

OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, Atty. Aragona promptly prepared and filed with the CAR an "Urgent Motion to
Declare [Deles] in Contempt of Court."

Issue/s:
Whether Atty. Aragona should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the said motion.

Held:
No.
#1 -- In People vs. Aquino, this Court laid down the decisional authority that [S]tatement made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of
malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view
of this, the person who makes them such as a judge, lawyer, or witness does not thereby incur the risk of being
found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. (emphasis supplied)

Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for contempt are
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 besides being
relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby
precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.

#2 -- Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Xxx. The ultimate
test is that of bona fides.

Indeed, the actuations of Atty. Aragano were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the interests of his clients -Mrs. Soriano informed Atty. Aragano of the incident coupled with Deles'
BLANZA VS ARCANGELFacts:1. On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension
claims in connection with the death of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers. a. They handed Arcangel pertinent
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. b. After which, they noticed that respondent lost interest
and no progress was made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent to return the said documents but the latter
refused. c. Upon questioning by Fiscal Rana to whom the case was referred by the Solicitor General respondent
admitted having received the documents butexplained that it was for photostating purposes only. d. His failure to
immediately return them was due to complainants refusal to hand him money to pay for the photostating costs which
prevented himfrom withdrawing the documents. e. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and

turned over the documents to the fiscal.2. Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the
respondents exoneration. a. However, Sol Gen feels that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand
considering:1) his failure to attend to complainants pension claims for 6 years; 2) his failure to immediately return the
documents despite repeated demands upon him, and 3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly all of her
documents.Issue: WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasanceHeld: No. 1. Respondents explanation
for the delay in filing the claims in returning the documents has not been controverted by complainants. 2. On the
contrary, they admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him
any money. Hence, complainants are partly to blame. 3. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually
returned by respondent during the fiscals investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. 4. As for the
alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to complainant Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of
Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet.
A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. vs. ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO (A.C. No. 8390 [FormerlyCBD 06-1641], July 2,
2010)Atty. Valerio obtained a loan from complainant and secured the payment of the loan obligationby issuing a
postdated check. However, upon its maturity date, the check was dishonored dueto insufficient funds. As of the filing
of the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay herobligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her
obligation. After repeated demandsby the trial court Atty. Valerio failed to give any response. After an administrative
case had beenfiled by complainant against Atty. Valerio with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),the
latters mother explained that her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus,could not properly respond
to the complaint against her. IBP-CBD recommended Atty. Valerio besuspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years, having found her guilty of grossmisconduct. IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification of the period ofsuspension to 1 year. Issue: whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the Code ofProfessional ResponsibilityHeld: WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated
December 11, 2008 of the IBP,which found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation
of theCode of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is herebySUSPENDED for two (2)
years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of thisDecision. She is warned that a repetition of the same
or a similar act will be dealt with moreseverely.Ruling: SC sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBPCBD. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to theirclients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves ina manner that reflects the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. The Court, finds
unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her daughter, Atty. Valerio, issuffering from a health condition, i.e.
schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properlyanswering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take
the medical certificate on itsface, considering Mrs. Valerios failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present
thephysician who issued it.Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of
seriousconcern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attendthe
disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the court asshe likewise failed to both
answer the complaint against her and appear during her arraignment,despite orders and notices from the court.
Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers
oath which imposes uponevery member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has
failedto live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code ofProfessional
Responsibility.SC deems it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio wasordered
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, because, aside from issuingworthless checks and failing to pay

her debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of theIBPs and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings.#
11RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
PER CURIAM; February 4, 2004
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Bar Scandal.
FACTS
- On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman
of the 2003Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on thesubject. He
then reported to Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and to the other members of theCourt, recommending that the
examination on the subject be nullified and that aninvestigation be conducted forthwith.- On September 2003, the
Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug and resolved tonullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to
hold another exam on the said subjectagainst which petitions were filed. The petitions voiced out the support to
nullifying the examon the said subject and not to take another exam due to the emotional, physical and
financialburdens it will cause the barristers. Alternative proposals were submitted to the Court. TheCourt moved to
nullify and to spread out the weight of the Mercantile Law among theremaining seven bar subjects.- The Court
resolved also to create a Committee composed of three retired members of theCourt that would conduct a thorough
investigation of the incident subject of the September23, 2003 resolution. The Investigating Committee found that the
leaked test questions inMercantile Law were the questions which the examinee, Atty. Balgos had prepared
andsubmitted to Justice Jose Vitug. His questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in theexamination in
Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some caseswith slight changes which were not
substantial and in other cases exactly as Atty. Balgos, 71years old, proposed.- The circumstances that the leaked test
questions consisted entirely of test questionsprepared by Atty. Balgos proves conclusively that the leakage originated
from his office, notfrom the Office of Justice Vitug. Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions wereprepared
by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questionswas Atty. Balgos computer. The
culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgoscomputer without the latters knowledge and consent, and
who faxed them to other persons,was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Atty. Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily
confessed the deedto the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, withthe
help of his secretary Villasis to his frat brods in Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, namely,
Garvida, Arlan, and Erwin Tan. In turn, Garvida faxed the test questions to Iigo and Bugain.Iigo passed a copy or
copies to other Betan Guiapal who gave a copy to the MLQU-BetaSigmas Most Illustrious Brother, RonaldCollado
who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 barcandidates.- Atty De Guzmans act of
downloading Balgos test questions in mercantile law from thelatters computer, without his knowledge and
permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It wastheft of intellectual property.- Besides theft, De Guzman also
committed an unlawful infraction of Balgos right to privacy of communication and to security of his papers and effects
against unauthorized search andseizurerights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. He
transgressedthe very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that alawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for lawand legal processes.- De Guzman also
violated rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility for members of theBar,
which provide:Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.Canon 7A
lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal professionand support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.- He is guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. Also, the Investigatingcommittee
does not believe that he acted alone. Palma, secretary of Atty. Balgos and Atienzaknew of the password. Certain
brods should also be investigated. The committee does notbelieve De Guzman did this out of love for the fraternity.
There must have been an ulteriormaterial consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy
that, he verywell knows, covers the bar examinations.- Atty. Balgos is also negligent.He could have just used the
typewriter considering his lack of adeptness with the computer.
ISSUE
WON Danilo De Guzman should be disbarred
HELD

YES. He should be disbarred plus he ought to make a public apology and pay damages to theSupreme Court- Atty.
Balgos should be reprimanded by the Court and make a written apology as a result of his negligence. He is not
entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.- Further examination of the others should be held to
show accountability and also to find outhow De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR
database without thecourts permission.

David
Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a
period of five years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written
report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of
suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.
On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an
agent. (For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix
David filed a motion for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs
Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.
In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of
the Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the
attorney for the Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without
Designating That I am Practicing as attorney-at-law.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm
name under the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to
signing of a non-qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an
agency, and because he will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative
body in violation of the constitutional restriction. He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution
prohibits directly.
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.

FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is
duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply,
maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers
and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that
for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent application,
etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any
party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or
technical men, which is not the case.
Legal Ethics Practice of Law

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was
affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the
ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman
of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.

Monsods track record as a lawyer:

Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.


Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in various
foreign corporations.
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice of law?

HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench
and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation

and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely
described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of
this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this
work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

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Justice Padilla dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in determining what constitutes practice
of law:

1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public as a
lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends
a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term practice
of law (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. Peoples Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is
within the term practice of law. (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship.
Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).

Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities which are related to the practice
of law like drafting legal documents and giving legal advice, but he only did so as isolated incidents.

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Justice Gutierrez dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his fathers law office. The Chairman of the COMELEC
should have engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the
practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to
pass the bar examinations?

There is nothing in Monsods track record which will show that he Monsod has given the law enough attention or a
certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having
engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead
of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the one adviced and those services as an executive but
not as a lawyer.
A.c.no.6792, jan. 25, 2006Roberto soriano vs. Atty. Manuel dizon
Facts:this is a case of disbarment filed against the accused due to his conviction of frustrated homicide.the case
stemmed from a traffic altercation by the respondent withthe complainant. In the course of their trouble,respondent
was able to hit the neck of the complainant by his revolver making the complainant physically paralyzed.the manner
which the respondent attacked the complainant and a credible corroboration of witnessesas to the crime lead the
conviction of the respondent of the said crime but later the rtcsuspended the sentence by granting the respondent a
probation.respondent banking hisdefense on a concocted story and alibi which later disregarded by the court due
toexistence of credible documentary and testimonial evidence.Issue: whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves
moral turpitude? Whether hisconviction warrants disbarment?Ruling: the court resolved the matter by declaring the
actuation of the respondent in thecrime of frustrated homicide involved moral turpitude.the court also consider the
rtcsfindings of treachery as a further indications of skewed morals of respondent.it is alsoglaringly clear that

respondent seriously transgressed canon 1 of the code of professionalresponsibility thru his possession of an
unlicensed fire arm and his unjust refusal tosatisfy civil liabilities.the court remind him both the attorneys oath and
code of professional responsibility.the appalling vindictiveness and,treachery, and brazendishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to continue as member of the bar.thus the court,disbarred the respondent and odered
the name of the latter be strickenfrom the roll of attorneys

FACTS: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned
by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10) hectares.
These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner
tosecure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International
Hotel Corporation. During the pendency of these suits that these parcels of
land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing
Corporation and on the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to
Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation. Three months later,
mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower court
found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers
and transactions.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of
party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service
Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion
to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant
to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated
properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to
appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted
the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the
attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.
Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on
quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments
between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully
paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of
P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but
merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on
December 15, 1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to
arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a
compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its
charging lien for payment of its attorney's fee.
2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of
such lien.

3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the


actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum
meruit basis.
HELD:
1. NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he
has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and
shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to
the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over
suchjudgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien
andsecure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to
such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the
payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment
for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in
the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce
his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in
the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due
his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below
were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill
satisfaction of their claims."
2. NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly
recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this
jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will
determine attorneys fees.
3. The Court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be considered
in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on
the
basis
of
quantum
meruit.
These
are:
(1)
the
importance
of
the
subject
matter
in
controvers
(2) the extent of the services rendered, and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer order of the trial court is
hereby
REVERSED and SET.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the
order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without

prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private


respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.A.M. No. 1048, July 14, 1995Facts:
Complainant reported to the NBI that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent lawyer.An entrapment was set
up by the NBI. Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills for marking. The paper bills were sent to the
Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment.
Complainant went to the respondents office and thereafter handed to respondent the marked money which he placed
in his pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry
Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to
the marked money. The NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019 and recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of
disbarment proceedings against him. In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that
complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. In a
resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.,
the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On March 15, 1993,
Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended that respondent be
disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26,
1994.Issue: Whether or not the recommendation approved by the IBP Board of Governors is correct?Ruling:Yes.
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground.
Theextortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath , imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice.
The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action