TheepochthroughHusserlandMerleauPonty.

Thebasesofphilosophicalandscientificcrisisshouldbemade,inHusserl'sopinion,byacult'sfact,
conductedbypositivism,naturalism,historicismandpsychologist'sfocus.
Ifphilosophyisabletobecomeintoastrictscience,itisnecessarytodebatesomepsychologist's
terms,especiallythoseconcerninglaw'sandlogic'sknowledgeanditscontent.Althoughmind's
proceedingrulesaresubjective,logictreatstofindanobjectiveanduniversaltruthanditscontent
cannotbereducedintoapsychologicalphenomena.Husserl'salternativetriestogiveanuniversal
validitytophilosophy,introducinganspecificmethod:phenomenology,akindofradicaland
criticalattitudetofacefactualrealitythatexperiencegiveus.Itissaidthatphenomenologyisan
attitudebutalsoitisamethodtoknowrealityinanobjectiveperspective,contrarytothemere
explanationoffacts(positivism),butbreakinginitsproperconstituentcenter:essencesofthings.
Weneedtoimmerseourselvesintothings,buttheyonlyconsistakindofbeingorappearing,they
are a haunt of everything we assign that being. These phenomena don't refer to something
foreign,extramental.Theisnotnoumenabehindphenomenaanditisnotanaspectofbeingeither
animageorarepresentationseparatingtoitsowndevelopment.
However,thisdevelopmenttakesplaceinconsciousnessitisakindofrealizing,andthisprocess
cannotbeconceivedasanentityoradeterminedsubstance,evenasanareawhererepresentations
appearaccordingtoexternalthings.Stickingtopresentedthings,divestingstrangeelementsand
addedfromphenomenaandconsciousness.Phenomenologyislikeapurge,adepuration.
Husserl understood consciousness as an approach or an addressing (to something that it is
appearing)differenttoitself,aconsciousnessthatnevershowsitself.
Consciousnessisintentionalbecauseitalwaystendstowardsomething,settinguptheobjectasan
objectandexcludingitsextramentalexistence.Theobjectisnotrealbutideal,thatmeansthat
itissubjective.
Husserldistinguishtheactswherebyconsciousnesstenderstoitsobjectandithasdifferentwaysof
beingrepresented(thinking,beingafraid,wishing...)alsotothecontentoftheseacts(thatthought,
frighteningordesiredthing)orthereferenceterm.Thefirstoneitiscalled nesis,thatitisa
subjectiveactofconsciousness.Thesecondissocalled nema anditisanobjectiveaspectof
consciousness.Duringourdailymentaloperationsnemavalidatesandexplainsnesis.
Phenomenology'smaintaskconsistoncomplyingfullytothegiven,tearingitawayfromallits
superfluousregaliaoraddedthatwasnotits,essentially.Thisimpliesbracketingtheexteriority
existential question, the exteriority that happens in consciousness. This constituted mainly the

epochthatperformsinthephenomenologicalreductionorexternal,itinvolvesrefrainingfrom
makingajudgementregardingtoexistencequestion,contemplatingitasafigureinconsciousness.
Theeideticreductionlooksforthing'sessence,whoseexistenceisfoundbyremovingtheproblem
of the extramental existence, that it is achieved trough intuition ,the direct and immediate
manifestationofthelimitsofsomethingthatcouldvarywithoutstoppingbeingwhatitis(essence).
Allaccidentalandcontingentfactsaredeletedtogettheinvariablecenterthatallowstheidentityof
something,despitethechanges,thatformsitsuniversal'sfeatures,whicharenecessary.Theessence
isalsocalledeidosanditisnotcapturebyabstractionbuttroughanintuitionthatrefersourselves
totheabsolutelyandnecessarilyreal.
Duringthetranscendentalreduction,theconsciousness,understoodassubstance(I)succumbs.
ThatIbecomesapureconsciousness,atranscendentalsubjectthatconsistonbeingrealizedof
thepresenceofsomething,theessencesbeyondempirical,psychologicalorcontingencyvirtues.
Consciousnessnevershowsitself,isneveruncovered,asitisnotanobject,itcannotbethoughtlike
anobject.
F.C.CoplestonedefinesclearlytheepochApointinsistedonbyHusserlisthesuspensionof
judgment(thesocalledepoch)inregardtotheontologicalorexistentialstatusorreferenceofthe
objects of consciousness. By means of this suspension existence, is said to be bracketed.
Suppose, for example that I wished to develop a phenomenological analysis of the aesthethic
experienceofbeauty.Isuspendalljudgmentaboutthesubjectivityorobjectivityofbeautyinan
ontologicalsenseanddirectmyattentionsimplytotheessentialstructureofaestheticexperienceas
appearingtoconsciousness.1

MerleauPontyalwaysfelthimselfasadiscipleofHusserlevenmorethanthosewhomethim,in
facthemaintainsHusserl'sthesis.Inoppositiontothemostextendedview,JoelSmithclaimsthat
thereisakindofinvestigatingandcooperatingworkbetweenthephilosophers.Hefocuseshis
effortondemonstratinghowMerleauPontyconservesthemainnucleusofHusserl'sthinking:the
phenomenologicalreduction.HeshowshowMerleauPontymovesaroundapositiveheuristicwhen
he is criticizing the transcendental idealism from the Husserlian context, the one that appears
constantlyonthereduction'sconceptualizationandwhenheusestheempiricscience'sresultswitha
clearly proximity to phenomenology. However he adheres to negative heuristic as such critics
whichdon'tmakeitincompatiblewiththeepoch,evenmore,herecognizesandacceptsthatthe
1 Coplestone, F.C. 1963.- Later currents of thought: retrospect and prospect, History of Philosophy: Fichte to
Nietzsche, page 433

bracketingisthebehaviorthatdifferentiatesphenomenologist,healsoconcludesinarevealing
wayMerleauPontyisactuallyclosertotheorthodoxHusserlianpositionthanhascommonlybeen
acknowledged2
Inconclusion,wecansaythatphenomenologicalhistoryisthehistoryofHusserl'sheresies,wecan
trytounderstandphenomenologyasakindofreflectiveanalysis.

PaulaLorenaVegaMartnez.

2 Smith, J. 2005.- Merleau Ponty and The Phenomenological Reduction, on Inquiry, vol 48, n6 (2005).