Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173632

September 29, 2014

AMBROSIO ROTAIRO (substituted by his spouse MARIA RONSA YRO ROTAIRO, and his
children FELINA ROTAIRO, ERLINDA ROTAIRO CRUZ, EUDOSIA ROTAIRO CRIZALDO, NIEVES
ROTAIRO TUBIG, REMEDIOS ROTAIRO MACAHILIG, FELISA ROTAIRO LEGASPI, JOSEFINA
ROTAIRO TORREVILLAS, and CRISENCIO R. ROTAIRO, MARCIANA TIBAY, EUGENIO
PUNZALAN, and VICENTE DEL ROSARIO,Petitioners,
vs.
ROVIRA ALCANTARA and VICTOR ALCANTARA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated July 21, 2005 and Resolution2 dated July 7, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58455, which set aside the Decision 3 dated December 27, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 672.
Civil Case No. 672 was filed by the respondent Rovira Alcantara (Rovira) for the recovery of
possession of a parcel of land in Barangay San Andres, Cainta, Rizal, measuring 2,777 square meters
and originally titled under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 481018. Said property was formerly
owned by Roviras father, Victor C. Alcantara (Alcantara), and Alfredo C. Ignacio (Ignacio), who
mortgaged the property to Pilipinas Bank and Trust Company (Pilipinas Bank) in 1968. Two years
after, the property was parcelled out by Alcantara and Ignacio, through their firm Wilfredo S. Ignacio &
Company (Ignacio & Co.), and separately sold to different buyers. One of the buyers was Ambrosio
Rotairo (Rotairo) who bought a 200-square meter portion on installment basis. Rotairo constructed his
house on the property identified as Lot C-1, and after completing payments, a Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed on September 25, 1979 in his favor by Ignacio & Co.4
In the meantime, Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan obligations causing Pilipinas Bank to
foreclose the mortgage on the entire property. Without redemption being made by Alcantara and
Ignacio, title was consolidated in the name of Pilipinas Bank, being the highest bidder during the
auction sale. Pilipinas Bank then sold the property in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 6, 1975 to
Rovira, who happens to be Alcantaras daughter.5
In 1988, Rovira filed her Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 672 for recovery of possession and
damages.After trial, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 672. The Decision dated December 27, 1996
provides for the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and defendants counterclaim;
and plaintiff, being the successor-in-interest of the subdivision owner, Wilfredo S. Ignacio, is ordered to
issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to defendant Ambrosio Rotairo pursuant to the
provisions of PD [No.] 957.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC ruled that the transaction between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo was covered by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 957.7 Rovira, as "successor-in-interest of Wilfredo S.Ignacio [and Victor Alcantara]
was well aware of the condition of the property which she bought from the Pilipinas Bank, because
she lives near the land, and at the time she purchased it she was aware of the existing houses or
structures on the land."8 She was, therefore, not entitled to the relief prayed for in her complaint.
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC decision and ordered the turnover of possession of the property

to Rovira. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision dated July 21, 2005 provides:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The Heirs of Ambrosio Rotairo and their
assigns, are ORDERED to turn over possession of Lot C-1 to Rovira Alcantara. Third party
defendants, William [sic] Ignacio and Victor Alcantara, are ORDERED to return the purchase price
of P10,000.00 to the Heirs of Ambrosio Rotairo, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum until finality
of this decision, and at the rate of 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution 10 dated
July 7, 2006.
In granting possession in favor of Rovira, the CA held that P.D. No. 957 is not applicable since the
mortgagewas constituted prior to the sale to Rotairo. According to the CA, Section 18 11 of P.D. No.
957 protects innocent lot buyers, and where there is a prior registered mortgage, the buyer purchases
it with knowledge of the mortgage. In the caseof Rotairo, P.D. No. 957 does not confer "more" rights to
an unregistered buyer like him, as against a registered prior mortgagee like Pilipinas Bank and its
buyer, Rovira.12 Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not, notwithstanding that the subject land is subdivision lot, Ambrosio Rotairo
(father of the Petitioners), [a] buyer and builder in good faith should suffer, while the seller in
bad faith Victor Alcantara should be benefited by his malicious acts.
2. Whether or not, Ambrosio Rotairo (father of the Petitioners), a buyer and builder in good faith
should suffer while the seller in bad faith Victor Alcantara should be benefited by his malicious
acts.13
Petitioners insist on the applicabilityof P.D. No. 957 in this case, and that the transaction between
Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. should fall within the protection of the law. On the other hand, Rovira
principally relies on the prior registration of the mortgage and the sale in her favor vis--visthe
petitioners unregistered transactions.
The first issue then that must be resolved is whether P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case. But the
more crucial issue before the Court is who, as between the petitioners and Rovira, has better right to
the property in dispute?
Retroactive application of P.D. No. 957
The retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 to transactions entered into prior to its enactment in 1976 is
already settled.1wphi1 In Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon,14 which involved a land purchase agreement
entered into in 1972, the Court stated that the unmistakeable intent of the legislature is to have P.D.
No. 957 operate retrospectively. Moreover, the specific terms of P.D. No. 957 provide for its retroactive
effect even to contracts and transactions entered into prior to its enactment. In particular, Section 21 of
P.D. No. 957 provides:
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of
prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the
subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in
the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond isfiled in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 ofthis Decree. (Emphasis
ours)
In this case, the contract to sell between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. was entered into in 1970, and the
agreement was fully consummated with Rotairos completion of payments and the execution of the

Deed of Sale in his favor in 1979. Clearly, P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case.
It was error for the CA to rule thatthe retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 is "warranted only where
the subdivision is mortgaged after buyers have purchased individual lots." 15 According to the CA, the
purpose of Section 18 requiring notice of the mortgage to the buyers is to give the buyer the option to
pay the instalments directly to the mortgagee; hence, if the subdivision is mortgaged before the lots
are sold, then there are no buyers to notify.16 What the CA overlooked is that Section 21 requires the
owner or developer of the subdivision project to complete compliance with its obligations within two
years from 1976.The two-year compliance provides the developer the opportunity to comply with its
obligation to notify the buyers of the existence of the mortgage, and consequently, for the latter to
exercise their option to pay the instalments directly to the mortgagee.
Nevertheless, such concomitant obligation of the developer under Section 21 did not arise in this case.
It must be noted that at the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 957 in 1976 and asearly as 1974,
Pilipinas Bank had already foreclosed the mortgage and bought the properties in the foreclosure sale.
There was, thus, no mortgage to speak of such that Rotairo should be notified thereof so that he could
properly exercise his option to pay the instalments directly to Pilipinas Bank.
Rovira is not a buyer in good faith
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, the Court finds that Rovira cannot claim a better right to the
property because she is not a buyer in good faith. Initially, it must be stated that the determination of
whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which generally cannotbe determined by the
Court in a petition for review filed under Rule 45.17 The rule, nonetheless, admits of exceptions,
someof which are when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension offacts or when the
CA overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 18 A
review of this case shows that the CA failed to appreciate the relevance of certain undisputed facts,
thus giving rise to its erroneous conclusion that Rovira has a better right to the property in dispute.
Rovira contended that the registered mortgage between Pilipinas Bank and Alcantara and Ignacio is
superior to the unregistered contract to sell between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo, which was sustained
by the CA. The CA applied Section 50 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act and ruled that since
the sale to Rotairo was unregistered and subsequent to the registered mortgage, the latter was
obligated to respect the foreclosure and eventual sale of the property in dispute, among others.19
Indeed, the rule is that as "[b]etween two transactions concerning the same parcel of land, the
registered transaction prevails over the earlier unregistered right." 20 This is in accord with Section 50
of the Land Registration Act,21 which provides:
Sec. 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the
same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of deeds, mortgages[,] leases, or
other voluntary instruments like those now in use and sufficient in law for the purpose intended. But no
deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under
this Act the registration shall be made inthe office of register of deeds for the province or provinces or
city where the land lies. (Emphasis ours)
Section 51 of the Land Registration Act further states that "[e]very conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, decree, instrument, or entry affecting registered land x x x, if registered x x x be
notice to all persons from the time of such registeringx x x." "The principal purpose of registration is
merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has
been entered into."22 Thus, it has been held that "registration in a publicregistry creates constructive
notice to the whole world."23 Moreover, "[a] person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate

to determine the condition of the property."24

The rule, however, is not without recognized exceptions. "The conveyance shall not be valid against
any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons
having actual notice or knowledge thereof." 25 Moreover, "when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when
the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce
a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation, 26 he cannot
find solace in the protection afforded by a prior registration. Neither can such person be considered an
innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.27
In this case, two factors work against Rovira as a buyer in good faith. One, she cannot be considered
a third person for purposes of applying the rule. Rovira does not deny that she is the daughter and an
heir of Victor C. Alcantara, one of the parties to the contract to sell (and the contract of sale) executed
in favor of Rotairo. "The vendors heirs are his privies."28 Based on such privity, Rovira is charged with
constructive knowledge of prior dispositions or encumbrances affecting the subject property made by
her father.29 The fact that the contract to sell was unregistered became immaterial and she is,
therefore, bound by the provisions of the contract to sell and eventually, the contract of sale, executed
by her father in favor of Rotairo.
Further, more than the chargeof constructive knowledge, the surrounding circumstances of this case
show Roviras actual knowledgeof the disposition of the subject property and Rotairos possession
thereof. It is undisputed that after the contract to sell was executed in April 1970, Rotairo immediately
secured a mayors permit in September 28, 1970 for the construction of his residential house on the
property.30 Rotairo, and subsequently, his heirs, has been residing on the property since then. Rovira,
who lives only fifty (50) meters away from the subject property, in fact, knew that there were
"structures built on the property." 31 Rovira, however, claims that "she did not bother to inquire as to
the legitimacy of the rights of the occupants, because she was assured by the bank of its title to the
property."32 But Rovira cannot rely solely on the title and assurances of Pilipinas Bank; it was
incumbent upon her to look beyond the title and make necessary inquiries because the bank was not
in possession of the property. "Where the vendor is not in possession of the property, the prospective
vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in possession." 33 A purchaser cannot simply
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard, 34 and thereafter claim that he
acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.35 Hence, Rovira
cannot claim a right better than that of Rotairo' s as she is not a buyer in good faith.
"[I]t is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does
not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich
oneself at the expense of others. "36
Under different circumstances, the prior registration of the mortgage between Pilipinas Bank and
Alcantara and Ignacio, and Rovira's subsequent purchase of the subject property would have been
valid and binding, and could have defeated Rotairo's unregistered claim over it. But given Rovira's
privity with her father Victor C. Alcantara and the fact that she had actual knowledge of the disposition
of the property and Rotairo's possession thereof, her acquisition of the property cannot be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 21, 2005 and Resolution dated July
7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58455 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
December 27, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, dismissing Civil Case
No. 672 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las
Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation
to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment
as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth
and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos
estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent
Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of
the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together
as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON
WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIAQUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word

"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. 14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence
or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death
Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While
the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his
death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985,
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That Eliseo went to the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves
rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages,
to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced
by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of
her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity

thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, 26 has a cause
of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the
probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the
absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be
filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an

heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled
to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate
of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is
entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No 176556
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

- versus -

RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C.

QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
their mother RITA QUIAO,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
July 4, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.:

The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where children
are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the
community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without
regard to the message they send to their children.Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our
obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and
partition of properties.

The Case

This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order[2]dated January 8, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a
Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation
in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.

Antecedent Facts

On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).[3] Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent
Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely,
Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the
plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all

the remaining properties, namely:

1.
coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2.
coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3.
corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4.
coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5.
a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
6.
a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7.
a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8.
Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[P]45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.[5]

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under Section
17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.[6]

On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution[7] which the trial court granted in
its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of
execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED.[8]

Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution[9] which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B.
QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic],
together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and
your lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said
[petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to

strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[10]

On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the amount
of P46,870.00, representing the following payments:

(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;

(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,[12] asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits
Earned.

To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order[13] dated August 31,
2006, which held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.[14] The
Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net
profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.[15] The dispositive
portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the
remaining properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate
properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] on
September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order[18]dated November 8, 2006,
holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still

consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net
profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET
PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common
children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code.[20]

On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[21] praying for the
correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,[22] the
trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration
whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31,
2006.

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:

Issues
I
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF
LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND
AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS
ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE

OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT

OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]

Our Ruling

While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are wellaware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10,
2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed.[24] Thus, we are constrained to
resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss
the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become
final and executory at the time the Motion for
Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that it would be practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.[26]

In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new

trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[27] In other
words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the
trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.

In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed
a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had
lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February
10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ
had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed
his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner
had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005.For 270 days, the
petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at
the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and
executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses
and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can
arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final.[28]

The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the
petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of
the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a void judgment is no judgment at
all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation.[29] But what
precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?

A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both.[30] In other words, a court, which does
not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties,
will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.[31]

The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial court
has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an

RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide,
among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband
and wife or those living together.[32] The Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the petition [for
legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.[34] In
the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six
months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the
respondent's petition below.Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the
herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the
Complaint on January 9, 2001.[35] Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned
judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.

From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly not
void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same
cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct what may be considered an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[36]In fact, we have ruled that for [as] long as the public
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount
to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.
[37] Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the
petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the
petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which
has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised
below and nothing more.

For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005
judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:

(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who is not
his wife;[38]

(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;[39]

(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;[40]

(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership;[41]

(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;[42]

(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession;[43]

(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse;[44]

(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and pursuant to
Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved;[45]

(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were living
together;[46]

(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;[47]

(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated and the
fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these properties;[48]

(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121 of the
Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income
generated by these properties;[49]

(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate properties

which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;[50]

(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);[51]

(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be divided
equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime;[52]

(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children;[53] and

(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees
and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.[54]

After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will discuss the
following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.

Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present

case since the parties' property relation is governed
by the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other
provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.

Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family Code
applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.

First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can deduce
that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and

since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and
the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.[55] Article 119 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime.In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the
petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the
husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry.[56] The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains.[57]

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law
in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129
of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.
[58]

Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2)
and 129 of the Family Code?

We respond in the negative.

Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: As earlier adverted to,
the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in
common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application to
the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal

partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired
vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of
the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common
by the husband and wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the
conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the
promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may
deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive
application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.

However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals,[61] we define and explained vested right in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which
is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and
natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just
and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the present or future
enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)

In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S.
Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested.Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable.[64] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the
same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that
the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.[65] In
fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October
10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the
trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's vested right is one founded,
not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like
Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal
partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of
the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the
children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the
wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this
forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under
Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the
guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to
present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code
since the trial court found him the guilty party.

More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder orremanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the

dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the

marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)

Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October 10, 2005
that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[70] The petitioner did not file a
motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from
questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by
this Court.[71]

From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case since
the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains
are all the fruits of the separate properties of the
spouses and the products of their labor and industry.

The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned by the conjugal partnership for
purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that
since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.

What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal
partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community?

Now, we clarify.

First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations
between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of net profits. As earlier discussed,
Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the

computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code.
Moreover, as to the definition of net profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code,
since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under
Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.[72] Thus, without any
iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under
Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article
129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the
processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime
under Article 129 of the Family Code.

Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and the
conjugal partnership regime.

On Absolute Community Regime:

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.[73]

Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the
debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and
if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to
each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided

between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture,
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.[74]

Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that we first find the market value of
the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the
properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net
assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market
value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.[75]

Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen if we
apply Article 102:

(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate properties,
thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its market
value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the market value at
dissolution.

(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the properties
which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and
obligations will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.

(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the absolute
community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the
petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be
subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the net profits.

(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to
each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. However, in the
Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his
children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left
to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.

On Conjugal Partnership Regime:

Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining net profit. As
earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the
absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2)
of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.

Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the
Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
[76] From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.[77]

Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the
same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the
conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.

(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if
any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the
partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court
has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children.

In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the
spouses:

(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal
properties and their separate properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple
has no separate properties when they married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the following
conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;

8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is
returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;[81]and if the community is
enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made.[82]

(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership;
while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate
properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the
spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.[83]

(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife shall be
returned to each of them.[84] In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court
that the spouses have no separate properties,[85] there is nothing to return to any of them. The
listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains
in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective
heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net
profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2)
of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any
property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial
court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan
City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial
Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169766

March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO,Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws,
no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married
couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano)
as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate
children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged, inter alia,
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under
the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is

void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda
was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis,
because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not
have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by
invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for
the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never
deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided
under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not
register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an
extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, 8 and again, another 15
days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995
where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the
Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity.13Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA 14 which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be
no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer.
Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence.
When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 were postponed
mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in view of
the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the
case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September
30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July
9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case
for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the
ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the
reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen.
Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the
Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 29 The court
said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the
late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the
second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after
the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as
his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she
highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that Estrellita can no
longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita
cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and
original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is
void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial.
Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos
wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors she
raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the existence of
collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 34 and Article 48 of the Family
Code35 will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been
adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before
the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded
Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to
the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen.
Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding
the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an
answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She
claims that Judge Macias v. Macias 36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead
of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to

suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been
resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the
trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court
will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment
as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No.
126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of
the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before
further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was
already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under
Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to
by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the
husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court
Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that
Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari
does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says
that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously
shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing to
challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper
interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such
right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter was
rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme
Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed
her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared
void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending
petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the
higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of
Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer

and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following
reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the
complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint.
Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court
to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued
its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11
of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid
Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x 41 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in
the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the
trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it
denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure,
the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court
after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for
the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However,
in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not
suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action
which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment
complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." 43 In
fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered
judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to
herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither
should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor
should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the
propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 0211-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages.
It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is

collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the
court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pretrial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo
T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995, 46 wherein he attested that there could be no
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of
any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of
report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court
of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation
by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and
non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized
except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already
ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise

specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless
the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively,
and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in
respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with nonMuslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register
their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one
contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil
and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status
since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of
marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for
nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground
is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) 56 thereof, only the husband
or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore
only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion
of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following
manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not
be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and
the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an
action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which
no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of
the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest
in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that
would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find
the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ISIDRO ABLAZA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 158298

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
BRION,

-versus -

BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
August 11, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be
determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed
by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to
bring the action.
Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.[1] The case was docketed
as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a
real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the
marriage being void ab initio.[2]

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000, [3] the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to
DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had
long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by
Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the
petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

In its decision dated January 30, 2003,[4] however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC,
thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by
the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage.
In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceasedspouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party
in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for
annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law
file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not
even impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, this appeal.

Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to
seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the
mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a
valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted.[6] As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be
changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.[7] To illustrate, a marriage between a
stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under
the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the
law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.[8]

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solelyby the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.[9] Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends
only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.[10]

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,[11] the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15,
2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26,
1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no
application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,[12] the children were allowed to file after the
death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court
distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might

be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose,
its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties
at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of
the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death
of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.[13]

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,[14] the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.[15] Thus, only
the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action.[16] Interest within the meaning of

the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack
of cause of action.[17]

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir. Assuming
that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil
Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds estate.

[18] Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We
reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos
surviving wife,[19] stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is
relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity;[20] hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage
license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise
of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court
[that] the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.[21]

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses
Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of
the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26,
2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in
that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila
and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was
another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect.
The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering that Section 11,[22] Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder
of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an
indispensable party may be made on motion of any party or on (the trial courts) own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are
returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with
instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila
Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late
Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the
time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late
Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed
accordingly.

No costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

MICHAEL C. GUY, G.R. No. 163707

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138,
Makati City and minors, KAREN
DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES
WEI, represented by their mother, Promulgated:
REMEDIOS OANES,
Respondents. September 15, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000[2] and July 17, 2003[3] of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioners
motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004Resolution[4] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented
by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration [5] before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549
and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei,
who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00
consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and
children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed
for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate. They
likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as
Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents petition was a Certification
Against Forum Shopping[6] signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez.

In his Comment/Opposition,[7] petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima
Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss[8] on the ground that the certification

against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They
contended that Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as
mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,[9] petitioner and his co-heirs
alleged that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished
by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation
of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioners
objections on the certification against forum shopping.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January
22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Orders datedJuly 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent
Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of
the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who
are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei,
a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.[10]

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum
shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the
Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do

not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove
their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.

Private respondents contend that their counsels certification can be considered substantial compliance
with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to
warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents petition should be dismissed for failure
to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of
Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private
respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.

The petition lacks merit.

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be
executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause
for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest
of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,[11] we ruled that while a petition may have
been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the
party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.[12] So it is in the
present controversy where the merits[13] of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the
rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the
rules.

As regards Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not
explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.[14]

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received

P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full
settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim.[15] Considering that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.

Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents,
such waiver will not bar the latters claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate
an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to
their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or
in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property[16]which must pass the
courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from
asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of

a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.[17]

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It
would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that
they do not have such right. Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents

must fail.

Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on
the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present
evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of
illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment
of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document. (Emphasis supplied)

We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo[18] that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.[19]

On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the
Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a

state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which
to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or
special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to
be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to
determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a
trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.

While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the
trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents filiation. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir.[20] That the two
causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.[21] As held in Briz v. Briz:[22]
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same
time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying
the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In
other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful
conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that

generally applicable in other cases. x x x

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court,
is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs
(Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same
person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased
natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13
Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been
thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment.
The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of
heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss; and its
Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let
the records be REMANDED to theRegional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149417. June 4, 2004]

GLORIA
SANTOS
DUEAS, petitioner, vs. SANTOS
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondent.

SUBDIVISION

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated December 29, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51601, setting aside the Decision[2] of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) in HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 which earlier affirmed the Decision[3] of the
HLURB-NCR Regional Field Office in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821. Said Regional Field
Office dismissed the petition of herein respondent Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association
(SSHA) seeking to require herein petitioner, Gloria Santos Dueas, to provide for an open space in the
subdivision for recreational and community activities. In its assailed decision, the CA remanded the
case to the HLURB for determination of a definitive land area for open space.[4] Petitioner assails also
the Court of Appeals Resolution[5] dated July 31, 2001, denying her motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who, during his
lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at General T. De
Leon, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the
whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision (for brevity, Santos Subdivision). The then Land
Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA)
issued the required Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the time of Cecilios death in
1988, there were already several residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision.
Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her
to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other community activities, in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957,[6] as amended by P.D. No. 1216.[7] Petitioner,

however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA.
On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution to Romulo Q. Fabul,
Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the HLURB in Quezon City.[8]
In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the Regional Director of the Expanded NCR Field Office, HLURB,
opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not
applicable to Santos Subdivision.[9]
SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration,[10] docketed as HLURB Case No. REM070297-9821, which averred among others that: (1) P.D. No. 957 should apply retroactively to Santos
Subdivision, notwithstanding that the subdivision plans were approved in 1966 and (2) Gloria Santos
Dueas should be bound by the verbal promise made by her late father during his lifetime that an open
space would be provided for in Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots of which were at that time
already for sale.
Petitioner denied any knowledge of the allegations of SSHA. She stressed that she was not a
party to the alleged transactions, and had neither participation nor involvement in the development of
Santos Subdivision and the sale of the subdivisions lots. As affirmative defenses, she raised the
following: (a) It was her late father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned and developed the subdivision, and
she was neither its owner nor developer; (b) that this suit was filed by an unauthorized entity against a
non-existent person, as SSHA and Santos Subdivision are not juridical entities, authorized by law to
institute or defend against actions; (c) that P.D. No. 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to make it
applicable to Santos Subdivision as the law does not expressly provide for its retroactive applicability;
and (d) that the present petition is barred by laches.
On January 14, 1998, HLURB-NCR disposed of HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 in this
wise:
In view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
It is So Ordered.[11]
In dismissing the case, the HLURB-NCR office ruled that while SSHA failed to present evidence
showing that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law with capacity to sue, nonetheless,
the suit could still prosper if viewed as a suit filed by all its members who signed and verified the
petition. However, the petition failed to show any cause of action against herein petitioner as (1) there
is no evidence showing Santos-Dueas as the owner/developer or successor-in-interest of Cecilio
Santos, who was the owner/developer and sole proprietor of Santos Subdivision; (2) the LRCapproved subdivision plan was bereft of any proviso indicating or identifying an open space, as
required by P.D. No. 957, as amended, hence there was no legal basis to compel either Cecilio or his
daughter Santos-Dueas, as his purported successor, to provide said space; and (3) the alleged verbal
promise of the late Cecilio Santos was inadmissible as evidence under the dead mans statute.[12]
SSHA then appealed the NCR offices ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The latter
body, however, affirmed the action taken by the HLURB-NCR office, concluding thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision
of the Office below is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The HLURB Board decreed that there was no basis to compel the petitioner to provide an open
space within Santos Subdivision, inasmuch as the subdivision plans approved on July 8, 1966, did not

provide for said space and there was no law requiring the same at that time. It further ruled that P.D.
No. 957 could not be given retroactive effect in the absence of an express provision in the law. Finally,
it found the action time-barred since it was filed nine (9) years after the death of Cecilio. The Board
noted that SSHA sought to enforce an alleged oral promise of Cecilio, which should have been done
within the six-year prescriptive period provided for under Article 1145[14] of the Civil Code.
Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51601, was
decided by the appellate court in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED--and the decision, dated January 20, 1999, of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this case is ordered REMANDED to the HLURB for the
determination of the definitive land area that shall be used for open space in accordance with law and
the rules and standards prescribed by the HLURB. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In finding for SSHA, the appellate court relied upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon,[16] which held
that while P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactive application, nonetheless, it can be
plainly inferred from its intent that it was to be given retroactive effect so as to extend its coverage
even to those contracts executed prior to its effectivity in 1976. The Court of Appeals also held that the
action was neither barred by prescription nor laches as the obligation of a subdivision developer to
provide an open space is not predicated upon an oral contract, but mandated by law, hence, an action
may be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues under Article 1144[17] of
the Civil Code. Moreover, the equitable principle of laches will not apply when the claim was filed
within the reglementary period.
Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on July 31, 2001.
Hence, this petition grounded on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW BY TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF RESPONDENTS PETITION (WHICH ASSAILS THE DECISION OF
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE HLURB) WHEN JURISDICTION
THEREON IS WITH THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AS CLEARLY MANDATED
BY SEC. 2, RULE XVIII OF THE 1996 RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSING
AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD.
II. IT WAS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HAVE ASSUMED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION BELOW WHEN RESPONDENTS CLEARLY
FAILED TO EXHAUST THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM
UNDER THE LAW.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, A NONREGISTERED ORGANIZATION, LACKED THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION HAS NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER; NEITHER WAS SANTOS SUBDIVISION,
A NON-ENTITY, POSSESSED WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED NOR IS PETITIONER
GLORIA SANTOS-DUEAS A PROPER PARTY TO THE CASE, THE LATTER NOT

BEING THE OWNER OR DEVELOPER OF SANTOS SUBDIVISION.

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS FINDINGS
WITH THAT OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD AND BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
THE HLURB WHEN THEIR DECISION IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM.
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEVIATED FROM THE EXISTING LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT P.D. 957 HAS RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION -- WHEN THE LAW ITSELF DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ITS
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE THEREON CLEARLY
PRONOUNCED THAT IT HAS NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. TO PROVIDE
RETROACTIVITY TO P.D. 957 WOULD CAUSE IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHTS.
VII. WHILE AS A GENERAL RULE, THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE WHEN
THE FORMERS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES, THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN OR ABSURD,
THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUDGMENT IS BASED ON
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY CONCERNED, AND IT WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND
THE SAME IS CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS OF BOTH PARTIES.[18]
To our mind, the foregoing may be reduced into the following issues: (1) the applicability of the
doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) the legal capacity of respondent to sue the
petitioner herein; and (3) the retroactivity of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 was premature
as SSHA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner submits that since Section 1,
[19] Rule 43 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure does not mention the HLURB, the respondent should
have appealed the decision of the HLURB Board in HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 to the
Office of the President prior to seeking judicial relief. In other words, it is the decision of the Office of
the President,[20] and not that of the HLURB Board, which the Court of Appeals may review.
We find petitioners contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is, under the factual circumstances of this case, inapplicable. While this Court has held that
before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, it is a pre condition that he avail himself of
all administrative processes afforded him,[21] nonetheless, said rule is not without exceptions.[22] The
doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of each case.[23]
In the instant case, the questions posed are purely legal, namely: (1) whether the respondent had
any right to demand an open space and the petitioner had any legal obligation to provide said open
space within Santos Subdivision under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, and (2) whether
the action had already prescribed under Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
found that SSHA had sought relief from the Office of the President, but the latter forwarded the case to
the HLURB. In view of the foregoing, we find that in this particular case, there was no need for SSHA
to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
On the second issue, the petitioner claims that respondent SSHA failed to present any evidence
showing that it is a legally organized juridical entity, authorized by law to sue or be sued in its own
name. Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3[24] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it has no legal

capacity to file this suit before the HLURB and the Court of Appeals.
SSHA counters that it has the capacity to sue as an association, since it is a member of the
Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., which is registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. In the alternative, the individual members of SSHA who signed both the
resolution and the complaint in this case may, as natural persons, pursue the action.
There is merit in petitioners contention. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Article
44[25] of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an
association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from
that of its members.[26] The records of the present case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an
association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR Office to
give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, given the SSHAs lack of
capacity to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by
all the parties who signed and verified the complaint. The members cannot represent their association
in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association any
legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation of Valenzuela
Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the personality and capacity to sue. Mere
allegations of membership in a federation are insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself
has a separate juridical personality and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM070297-9821 nor in this case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent
SSHA. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
made a party, must be averred.[27] Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by
law with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever, to
institute any action.
Anent the third issue, the petitioner ascribes error to the appellate court for holding that P.D. No.
957 has retroactive application. She points out that there is no retroactivity provision in the said
decree. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to Article 4[28] of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The same holds true for P.D. No. 1216, which amended Section 31 of P.D. No. 957
and imposed the open space requirement in subdivisions. Petitioner stresses that P.D. No. 1216 only
took effect on October 14, 1977 or more than ten (10) years after the approval of the subdivision plans
of Cecilio Santos.
Although it may seem that this particular issue, given our ruling on the first issue regarding the
lack of capacity of SSHA to bring any action in its name, is now moot and academic, we are
constrained to still address it.
This petition was brought to us not by respondent SSHA but by Gloria Santos Dueas who assails
the appellate courts finding that our ruling in Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon[29] allows P.D. No. 957, as
amended, to apply retroactively.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant case. The issue
in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to
its enactment where there was non-payment of amortizations, and failure to develop the
subdivision. We held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive
application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the
manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers justify its

retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its enactment. Hence, we ruled that the nonpayment of amortizations was justified under Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the
subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project.
Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any allegation
of non-payment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a subsequent case[30] that P.D. No. 957, as
amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its
retroactive application. Thus:
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in
the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be
applied to a situation that occurred years before their promulgation.
At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an amendment
introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus on the retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216
and not P.D. No. 957 per se.
We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause or provision
expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance,
rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated.[31] Hence, there is no
legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the HLURB
dated January 20, 1999 sustaining that of its Regional Office is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]

ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor
ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up
to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for
(1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919
and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as
(2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City
(Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on
the merits.[5]

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three (23)
years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was
named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on
December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be
declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his
share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of
the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred
x xx.[6]

Orders of the Trial Court

In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition.
Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the
action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been
filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the
childs filiation.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in
1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to
be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of
the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]

Issues

In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate
daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers
death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from
the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in
complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable
jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure
to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition

Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article
285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the
latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not

agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by
Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the
lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a
minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the
claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition,

which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the
Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency x x x.[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is
procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from
procedural laws.[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.[14](Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive
law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining
majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff
therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand,
in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil
Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because
the right had already vested.

Not Limited to Natural Children

To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural children.
Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time
of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is not
a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal
impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,[19] the Court explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for

him to qualify as a natural child.[20]

A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the
aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were
disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a
married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two
illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962
and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the
two childrens parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the
Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed
father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said that the rules on voluntary
and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such
action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted
hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known
as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman
cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than
his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the
paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of
the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are
applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof
of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural
children may be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect
to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of
natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be
established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the
aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children,
as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.[22] (Citations omitted,
italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious ones.
[23] However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to
recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under
Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested
right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have

filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in
his Memorandum,[24] the State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in
1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his
alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA

Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead the
lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower
tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the
Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the
Petition
is
hereby DENIED and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

the

assailed

Decision

and

EDGARDO

M.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,

REYES, respondents.

vs. THE

COURT

OF

APPEALS,

and

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160,
declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P.
Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for
their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in
a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27,
1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City
declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.The church wedding
on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch
160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no
marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was
still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their
marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this
document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his
civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church
marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence
during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The
fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the
judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that
private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein
petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It
ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second
marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and
void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of
whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for this would be
the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent
court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the
least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code
on marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M.
Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab
initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of
P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4,
1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the
Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF
PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE
RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required
before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over
applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the
second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private
respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v.
Mendoza[3] and People v. Aragon[4] are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a
marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the
appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as
amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into
the provisions of law previously obtaining.[5]
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case.
Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .[6]
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in
1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case
differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis[7] and Mercado v. Tan,[8] both involving
a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the
Family Code,[9] under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.

Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code
contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be
conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v. Aragon,[11] this Court held that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual
milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the
death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second
marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the
ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first
marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the
second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two
subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both
cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,[12] and Consuegra v. Consuegra,[13] however, we recognized the right of
the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in
proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And
since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second
wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.[14]
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),[15] the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his
marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to
one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.[16]
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that there is a need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married
another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his
marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage.The Court, expressly relying
on Consuegra, concluded that:[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents

and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19] however, the Court found the second marriage void without need
of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings
in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.
[20] Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)[21] the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically
stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer
for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his
first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty.
Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),[22] the
Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).

[23]
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)[24] the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was
merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took
place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation ofWiegel and the effectivity of
the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza andAragon. The
first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that

despite private respondents deceit and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit
from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as
untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage
license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April
3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was
confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to
recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that
petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure
does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds
that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the
first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony
does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the
marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The
appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below
which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her
before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity,
of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although the appellate
court admitted that they found private respondent acted duplicitously and craftily in marrying petitioner,
it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.[26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present
case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which
caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her
parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage
of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND
SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of
minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S.

MILLER, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed originally to the Court of
Appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, granting the petition of
respondent spouses to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
In its decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court because the petition raised only questions of law.
By resolution adopted on September 23, 1996, we accepted the appeal. We shall treat the appeal
as one via certiorari from a decision of the Regional Trial Court under the Supreme Court Circular 290, dated March 9, 1990, on pure questions of law.
The facts are undisputed and may be related as follows:
On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988, at 9:00 in the morning. At
the hearing, with the attendance of an assistant city fiscal of Angeles City, in representation of the
Solicitor General, respondents adduced evidence showing that:
"Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S. Miller, 40 years of age, both American citizens, are
husband and wife, having been married on June 21, 1982.
They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of their union on account of a medical
problem of the wife."
Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air Force, as airman first class, assigned at Clark
Air Base since January 26, 1985.
"The family maintains their residence at Don Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since
1985."[1]
"The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida
Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the custody of
respondents since the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son
prompted the natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to have their child adopted by
respondents. They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption by
respondents."
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, through its Regional Office at San Fernando,
Pampanga, recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents were
morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to the
minor's best interest and welfare."[2]

On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding that petitioners possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for adoption, the instant petition is hereby Granted, and this Court decrees the minor MICHAEL
MAGNO MADAYAG freed from all obligation of obedience and support with respect to natural parents
and is hereby declared the child of the herein petitioners by adoption. The minor's surname shall be
changed from "MADAYAG" to "MILLER", which is the surname of the herein petitioners."[3]
In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court.
The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the
prohibition under the Family Code,[4] effective on August 3, 1988[5] when the petition for adoption was
filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code[6] which allowed
aliens to adopt.
The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right
which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.[7] 7
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right
of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the
time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. "A vested right
is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
deny."[8] "Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested."[9]
"As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the
law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases,
once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character
which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance."[10]
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code,
although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under
the law prevailing before the Family Code.[11]
"Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law."[12]
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Angeles City, in SP. Proc. No. 3562.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No.
34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after
giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument
with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of
the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with
her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija
town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon

the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her
in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before
a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article
40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At
the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he
never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary
before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first
marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage
license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as
a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement

benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.