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STRATEGY
Strategy Update | 11 January 2015
2016: a year of challenges. Continued slow down in Chinas economy may bring further
yuan devaluation. Low oil price, crash in junk bond market and a surprise pace in Fed
Funds Rate rise may spark a capital flight out of emerging markets. Yet we expect JCI to
end 2016 strongly on a pick up of consumer and private investments spending.
UNDERWEIGHT
5,000
7.8%
HMSP
91,000
36.0
12.1%
MIKA
2,210
42.4
29.7%
SILO
9,450
77.3
49.1%
BSDE
1,765
10.6
23.0%
WSKT
1,685
23.4
8.3%
3,000
JCI
2,500
Dec-16
18.5
Dec-16
5,000
Aug-16
4,250
Aug-16
54,500
Dec-13
4,000
Apr-16
GGRM
Oct-13
4,000
3,500
Jan-16
Oct-15 4,500
4,500
Dec-15
-10.0%
Jul-15
5,000
Dec-15
4,700 May-16
4,500
Aug-15
6.0
Apr-15
6,725
Dec-14
LPCK
4,000
Aug-14
33.5%
Apr-14
7.7
Dec-13
4,935
Aug-13
BBNI
4,500
Apr-13
16.1%
Dec-12
16.2
Apr-12
3,060
Dec-11
TLKM
Feb-15
5,100
Oct-14
4,800
Sep-11
2016F
EPS Gr.
May-11
PE
Jan-11
Last Price
(Rp)
Aug-12
TOP PICKS
Dec-14
Aug-14 5,200
Apr-14 5,200
4,800
Table of Contents
Market Outlook and Mansek Top Picks ........................................................ 3
We expect the first eight months of 2016 to be a highly volatile period. Positive
domestic news would probably be overwhelmed by major negative global
themes, but we expect the JCI to close the year strongly once clear signs of a
recovery in consumer and private investments spending emerge. .......................................... 3
Page 2 of 88
Dec-14
Aug-14 5,200
Apr-14 5,200
4,800
5,500
Mar-13
4,545
5,000
Feb-15
5,100
Oct-14
4,800
4,500
4,000
Oct-13
4,000
3,500
3,000
Dec-13
4,000
JCI
Jul-15
5,000
Dec-15
4,700 May-16
4,500
Jan-16
Oct-15 4,500
4,500
Dec-16
5,000
Aug-16
4,250
Dec-16
Aug-16
Apr-16
Dec-15
Aug-15
Apr-15
Dec-14
Aug-14
Apr-14
Dec-13
Aug-13
Apr-13
Dec-12
Aug-12
Apr-12
Dec-11
Sep-11
Jan-11
May-11
2,500
A series of positive catalysts emerging in early 2016 should help maintain the JCI
gyrating around the 4,500 level:
Cut in subsidised fuel price (done already on 5th Jan 2016), and
Cut in the benchmark BI rate (we expect two rounds of 25 bps each in Q1
2016), and
The cuts in subsidised fuel prices (by 4.7% to Rp 7,050 per litre for gasoline and by
15.6% to Rp 5,650 per litre for diesel fuel sold in Jawa, Madura and Bali slightly lower
percentage cuts for fuel sold outside these areas) should reduce inflation by 0.2 to 0.3
ppt in our economists estimation. The Bottom Line believes the Government enjoys a
significant scope to cut these prices further assuming crude oil price of USD 35 per
barrell and an average exchange rate of Rp 14,000 per USD, the economic price of
premium (the name by which subsidised gasoline is known in Indonesia) is Rp 5,900 per
litre, some 16.3% lower than the new price applied on 5th Jan 2016.
The soothing effect that cuts in fuel prices will have on inflation also reinforces our
economists expectation that the central bank would cut its benchmark BI rate twice by
25 bps each before the Q1 2016 ends. The combined effect of these fuel price and
interest rates cuts on the economy should be strongly positive, in our view, and so our
economists project real GDPgrowth accelerating to 5% in 2016 (vs 4.7% in 2015).
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 3 of 88
The passage of a new Tax Amnesty Law is critical to the JCI, in our opinion. The property
sector, for example, had suffered terribly in 2015 our property analysts estimate that
almost all property firms in Mansek Universe would post lower marketing sales than the
original company guidance issued at the beginning of 2015. (The sole exception is
Lippo Cikarang, thanks to strong sales in its Orange County project in Cikarang.) See
Figure 3. We ascribe this development to the fact that property transactions attracted
heightened scrutiny from the tax authorities in 2015. Without passage of the new Tax
Amnesty Laws, therefore, the property sector is likely to remain moribund in 2016.
FIGURE 3. FULL YEAR 2015 MARKETINGSALES (MGMT TARGET AND MANSEK ESTIMATES)
12,000
Rp bn
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
APLN
CTRA
SMRA
LPCK
BSDE
PWON
MDLN
JRPT
Mansek estimate
In addition, efforts to raise tax revenue in 2016 would be boosted, as income that had
for decades been evading taxation in the past would now be subject to taxation. The
fact that the tax payers full assets and income would be legalized would also remove
peoples fear of the tax effect of purchasing big-ticket assets such as properties, motor
vehicles and others. This in turn would help spark growth in household consumption.
The combined effect of these positive catalysts should maintain the JCI oscillating
around the 4,500 level in the early part of 2016 in our estimate. However, if not all of
these positive catalysts get delivered (Bank Indonesia now sound more cautious about
cutting the BI rate in the face of the Chinese Yuan depreciation, and internal strife
within GOLKAR, the political party with the second largest number of Parliamentary
seats, may delay the passage of the Tax Amnesty Laws), then the sharp correction in the
Jakarta Composite Index may well start earlier and go deeper than our current
projection here.
Two key factors in our opinion will deliver a sustainable recovery in equity valuation :
recovery in consumer spending, and recovery in private sector investment spending.
We believe the sharp drop in crude oil price will result in WTI and Brent trading within
the USD 25 to 35 per bbl band for most of 2016 (see the next section for a fuller
discussion). This should allow the Indonesian government to cut the subsidised fuel
price further, as we noted earlier. We expect the impact to be seen with household
consumption spending accelerating from the normal 5% YoY growth starting in 3Q16.
The Indonesian government has also adopted market-friendly policies in recent months
which should prompt the private sector to grow their investment spending. While the
bulk of the effect would probably materialise towards the end of 2016, we believe some
signs of this recovery in private investment spending should emerge starting in 3Q16.
Hence we expect signs of economic improvement in August would mark the turnaround in the Jakarta Composite Index, allowing a strong close for the year.
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 4 of 88
Company's Name
Stock
Price
11-Jan-16
Starting
Stock
Price (Rp)
Changes
Mkt. Cap
(USDmn)
PER
2016F
(x)
2016 EPS
Growth
Fcast
Target
Price
(Rp)
3,060
4,935
3,105
4,990
-1.4%
-1.1%
21,598.8
6,649.2
16.2
7.7
16.1%
33.5%
3,225
5,900
6,725
54,500
7,250
55,000
-7.2%
-0.9%
338.2
7,576.2
6.0
18.5
-10.0%
7.8%
13,500
56,000
TLKM
BBNI
Telekomunikasi Indonesia
Bank Negara Indonesia
LPCK
GGRM
Lippo Cikarang
Gudang Garam
SMRA
PWON
1,565
464
1,650
496
-5.2%
-6.5%
1,631.0
1,614.5
19.9
9.9
-3.9%
32.2%
1,600
620
SOCI
LSIP
490
1,235
475
1,320
3.2%
-6.4%
249.9
608.8
4.6
5.5
10.5%
10.8%
810
2,700
MPPA
HMSP
1,675
1,825
91,000
-8.2%
650.8
30,590.0
24.6
36.0
14.0%
12.1%
2,175
111,000
MIKA
SILO
2,210
9,450
2,323.3
789.3
42.4
77.3
29.7%
49.1%
3,400
11,000
BSDE
WSKT
1,765
1,685
2,342.8
1,652.9
10.6
23.4
23.0%
8.3%
2,400
1,900
962.4
4,465.5
1,000.0
4,593.0
1,100
1,050
1,000
1,000
950
878.7
900
850
804.2
800
990
980
972.2
970
750
JCI
700
JCI
Mansek Portfolio
Mansek Portfolio
962.4
960
650
600
11-Jan
8-Jan
7-Jan
6-Jan
5-Jan
4-Jan
1-Jan
Dec-15
Nov-15
Oct-15
Sep-15
Aug-15
Jul-15
Jun-15
May-15
Apr-15
Mar-15
Feb-15
Jan-15
950
Page 5 of 88
2013A
2014A
2015F
2016F
2017F
EBITDA
Net Profit
14,807
10,818
14,235
10,181
14,337
10,484
15,043
11,751
17,265
13,210
2,325.2
8.8
2,188.2
(5.9)
2,253.3
3.0
2,525.6
12.1
2,839.1
12.4
39.1
28.7
41.6
29.9
40.4
29.5
36.0
28.1
32.1
24.5
29.9
2.3
31.4
2.5
12.2
2.4
11.7
2.4
11.2
2.7
ROAE (%)
78.8
73.6
43.5
33.1
35.7
HM Sampoerna (HMSP IJ)s sizable exposure in growing mild cigs segment, coupled
with their ability to sustain/improve their high-base market share are key competitive
advantages, in our view. Its dominant market share and excellent management team
justify premium valuation. Buy with TP of Rp111k/sh. BUY.
Mild is the future. Mild cigs are estimated to deliver faster volume growth than other
cigs segments on the back of rising middle class, hence affordability, prestige, and
health becoming the key issues here. Historical data has shown a substantial volume
improvement in mild segment during the past 10 years, representing about 42% of
total national cigs sales volume in 2014 (from 16% in 2005). HMSPs A Mild brand has
first-mover advantage in this segment, which commands the single largest market
share of 14% from total Indo cigs market.
The ability to sustain/improve market share. We like the companys ability to gain
c.10% market share in the past 10 years despite burgeoning new comers offering
cheaper products in the market. Their A Mild market share has continued to grow to
15% in Sep15, from 14.1% in Sep13.
Excise tax in favor of SKT? Under Jokowi's era, we believe excise tax will likely be in
favor of hand-rolled (SKT) products given their focus on employment and economic
growth. Based on the latest excise tax details for 2016, the highest increase of c.16% is
for Tier 1 machine-made (SKM) and white cigs (SPM), while only 10-11% hike for Tier 1
hand-rolled (SKT). The excise tax will be applicable to HMSP at c.15% which we are
positive can be fully passed on to the consumers.
Its a Buy. We have buy call on HMSP with TP of Rp111k/sh based on 39x 2017 EPS as
we see that the company will continue to be the market leader for cigarettes in the
country. Note that Unilever as a dominant player in home personal care segment
(coupled with stable margin and superior return) has been trading at c.110% average
premium to consumer sector since 2008.
Page 6 of 88
80%
80%
Op margin
35.0%
70%
29.8%
60%
30.0%
50%
25.0%
30%
20.7%
35%
40%
21%
20%
17%
20.0%
10%
0%
SPM
Marlboro
15.9%
15.0%
13%
6%
24.0%
Source: Company
12.7%
9.7%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
HMSP
GGRM
WIIM
Source: Company
2013A
2014A
2015F
2016F
2017F
EBITDA
543
615
739
874
1,035
Net Profit
Fully-Diluted EPS (Rp)
399
27.4
517
35.5
584
40.1
758
52.1
886
60.9
38.0
80.7
29.7
62.2
13.0
55.0
29.7
42.4
17.0
36.3
EV/EBITDA (x)
P/B Ratio (x)
57.4
19.0
50.8
18.5
40.6
9.9
34.1
8.7
28.7
7.6
0.0
26.7
0.0
30.1
0.9
23.4
0.9
21.8
1.2
22.3
Page 7 of 88
A cash rich company. MIKA has no debt currently and its FCFF grew by 35% CAGR to
Rp478bn in FY2014, which will be sufficient to support its hospital expansion plans
onward. Assuming US$10-15mn of investment cost to build a new hospital, MIKA has
the capability to build one-to-two hospitals annually given its Rp2.4tr net cash position
and Rp832bn operating cash inflow as per 2016F.
A buy call. We have TP of Rp3,400/sh based on 45x EV/EBITDA 2017F. Risks include
declining patient volume due to BPJS and delay in the execution of new hospitals.
FIGURE 11. EBITDA AND NET MARGIN PERFORMANCE
(%)
40.0
80%
32.0
60%
24.0
40%
16.0
20%
8.0
Net Margin
9M15
6M15
3M15
12M14
12M13
2017F
2016F
2015F
2014
2013
2012
2011
EBITDA Margin
12M12
12M11
0%
2013A
2014A
2015F
2016F
2017F
EBITDA
303
487
558
773
1,096
Net Profit
Fully-Diluted EPS (Rp)
50
43.1
63
54.1
95
82.0
141
122.3
245
211.8
(1.2)
219.1
25.5
174.6
51.6
115.2
49.1
77.3
73.2
44.6
35.9
6.8
22.8
6.6
20.2
6.3
14.8
5.8
10.5
5.2
0.0
5.4
0.0
3.8
0.1
5.6
0.1
7.8
0.1
12.3
Page 8 of 88
(%)
(%)
35.0
4.0
30.0
80%
60%
3.0
25.0
40%
2017F
2016F
2015F
2014
2013
2012
2011
EBITDA margin
3Q15
2Q15
1Q15
4Q14
3Q14
0%
2Q14
1.0
5.0
1Q14
10.0
20%
4Q13
2.0
15.0
4Q12
20.0
Source: Company
Page 9 of 88
2013A
2014A
2015F
2016F
2017F
EBITDA
Net Profit
2,910
2,691
2,632
3,821
3,333
2,499
3,676
3,073
3,981
3,532
146.5
109.3
208.0
42.0
136.0
(34.6)
167.2
23.0
192.2
15.0
12.0
12.2
8.5
14.0
13.0
9.9
10.6
8.2
9.2
6.9
3.2
0.8
2.1
0.9
1.7
2.9
1.5
1.9
1.4
2.4
29.7
29.8
14.7
15.5
15.7
AEON success could provide a boost to its commercial and residential estate. We
think that there is a potential for BSD City to become a commercial hub. With the
success of AEON mall, BSD City could boost its commercial land sales. With landbank
limitation in Alam Sutera and Summarecon Serpong, these companies could not serve
landed residential market under Rp2bn. BSDE still can launch landed residential
property priced under Rp2bn per unit.
Plenty of projects ready to launch. BSDE has plenty of new projects that could be
launched once the market improves. These include Aerium condominium at Permata
Buana, Tanjung Barat project near Lenteng Agung, project in Benowo, potential mixedused development projects in Surabaya. These projects could contribute up to Rp4-5tn
of marketing sales per annum.
Attractive valuation. BSDE is trading at FY16F P/E of 11x and 61% discount to NAV.
The company is trading at a discount compared to average big cap property companies
P/E of 14x. We maintain Buy on BSDE with PT of Rp2,200.
FIGURE 17. STEADY MARKETING SALES
Grand Wisata
Bekasi; 7%
Taman Permata
Buana; 1%
Others; 5%
BSD City
Serpong; 59%
Nava Park; 6%
Aerium Taman
Permata Buana;
0%
Rasuna
Epicentrum;
10%
Kalimantan
projects; 6%
Source: Company
Page 10 of 88
2013A
2014A
2015F
2016F
2017F
EBITDA
Net Profit
666
368
832
502
1,538
751
1,790
977
1,937
1,034
38.2
44.9
52.1
36.3
66.5
27.7
72.0
8.3
76.2
5.8
44.1
25.1
32.4
21.3
25.3
12.8
23.4
13.1
22.1
11.1
6.7
0.1
5.9
0.7
2.1
0.5
2.3
0.0
2.1
0.0
16.6
19.3
12.9
10.4
9.9
The new big boy in town. Waskita is now the largest construction company by market
capitalization and equity at Rp22.7tn and Rp8.7tn respectively thanks to their successful
rights issue back in June 2015. They enjoy a first-movers-advantage of already receiving
the Government Equity Injection (PMN) because the PMN of WIKA and PTPP is currently
clouded by political uncertainties in the parliament. This extra capital can now be
utilized to take on large infrastructure projects and establish a lead in orderbook among
their peers.
Strong contract achievement. As of 11M15, WSKT leads the industry with Rp27.9tn
new contracts (+78% YoY) or 93% of their full year target. Notable projects include the
500kV electricity transmission project in Sumatra (Rp6.7tn), Solo-Kertosono toll road
(Rp5.5tn), and Bakaheuni-Terbanggi toll road (Rp2.4tn). The company guides a new
contract target of Rp40tn (+33% YoY) for 2016 of which Rp20tn is from toll road
projects, Rp10tn from government (including Rp7tn from LRT project in Palembang),
and Rp10tn from SOEs and private combined. We deem this as a realistic target given
that many of the toll road projects are self-owned while the LRT was a direct
appointment by the President.
Expect consensus to gradually upgrade earnings. We believe the abundant projects
won by Waskita in 2H15 have not been fully priced in by the market. As such, we
foresee analysts to revise their earnings and target price upwards in the near future.
WSKT is our top pick within the Construction sector with a TP of Rp1,900 by valuing
the construction segment at 23x P/E16F and the toll road segment using DCF with a
WACC of 10.8%. Key risk is cash flow management. Many of WSKTs projects are
turnkey-based which means that cash will only be transferred once the project is fully
completed.
FIGURE 20. NEW CONTRACTS COMPARISON VERSUS PEERS
Rp bn
30,000
13.4%
14.0%
25,000
12.0%
20,000
10.0%
15,000
12.1%
12.1%
9.9%
8.0%
6.0%
10,000
4.0%
5,000
4.8%
4.3%
4.5%
2.5%
2.0%
0.0%
ADHI
PTPP
2013
WIKA
2014
11M15
Source: Company
WSKT
ADHI
PTPP
Gross Margin
WIKA
WSKT
Net Margin
Page 11 of 88
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Source: CEIC
Since peaking at 14.9% in Q2 2007, Chinas economic growth has been steadily slowing
down to 6.9% in Q3 2015. See Figure 22. More importantly in our view, both the
Chinese government and the market consensus expect it to slow down further in 2016.
The IMF, for example, expects Chinas economic growth to decelerate to 6.3% this year.
FIGURE 23. CHINA PMI
60
% YoY
35.0
55
30.0
50
25.0
20.0
45
15.0
40
10.0
Gov't
5.0
Source: Bloomberg
Dec-15
Jan-15
Mar-14
May-13
Jul-12
Sep-11
Nov-10
Jan-10
Mar-09
May-08
Jul-07
Sep-06
Nov-05
Jan-05
35
0.0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Caixin
Source: Bloomberg
Page 12 of 88
60%
54%
50%
Nickel
Coal
Copper
49%
48%
46%
Tin
Zinc
Steel
46%
45%
Lead
Cotton
40%
31%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Soybean Oil
Rice
Soybean Meal
Gold
Corn
Wheat
Uranium
Oil
Sorghum
Palm Oil
70%
30%
30%
28%
23%
22%
17%
13%
12%
11%
10%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Source:
- World Bureau of Metal Statistics (first six month of 2015 fore refined metals, slab zinc)
- World Gold Council (2014 for gold)
- BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (2014 for oil, natural gas)
- Metalytics via Morgan Stanley (2015 estimate for finished steel)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (2013-14 season for others)
Why does Chinas economy matter to the global equity investors outside China ? China
is the worlds second largest economy, and has been a strong contributor to world
economic growth for a number of years. The countrys manufacturing sector has been a
huge buyer of raw materials and energy from countries such as Australia, Brazil, Chile,
Russia, Indonesia and Malaysia. China consumes, for example, 60% of global concrete
usage, 54% of world aluminium consumption, 50% of nickel, 49% of coal and so on. See
Figure 25. Hence we believe the slow down in Chinas economic growth is the reason
for the collapse in commodity prices, and so the continued subdued outlook for Chinas
economy in 2016 spells further pain for commodity producers.
FIGURE 26. INDONESIAN EXPORT 2014 (US$ BN)
Japan
13%
China
10%
Singapore
10%
United States
9%
Others
45%
17,348
2.1
2.8
China
10,357
6.9
6.3
Japan
4,602
1.0
1.0
India
2,051
7.4
7.5
South Korea
1,410
2.7
3.2
308
2.2
2.9
Singapore
India
7%
South Korea
6%
Source: CEIC
Source: IMF
Page 13 of 88
In addition, President Xi Jin Ping calls for rebalancing China growth towards services,
consumption and high-tech innovation over exports and manufacturing. Indeed while
industrial production growth continues to slump, retail sales are actually picking up.
See Figure 24 above. The days of China relying on its role as the world centre for mass
manufacturing are over in our opinion. Any hope for recovery in commodity prices in
the foreseeable future due to resurging Chinese demand is likely to be disappointed.
The continued slow down of Chinas economy is also bad news to Indonesias exports
prospects. Japan and China are Indonesias main exports partners see Figure 26. The
IMF is forecasting stagnating or slowing down growth in Japan and China for 2016
thus putting immediate pressure on Indonesias economy.
Therefore a continued slow down in Chinas economy will dampen Indonesias exports
through both lower commodity prices, and lower volume exported to China itself.
6,000
Shanghai
Shenzhen
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Dec-09
Dec-10
Dec-11
Dec-12
Dec-13
Dec-14
Dec-15
Source: Bloomberg
We ascribe this huge stock market rally to a number of reasons, none of which however
has anything to do with an improving economy :
1. Surge in margin lending
Margin trading in equities only became legal in China in October 2011. It did not
immediately become popular because the requirements were pretty demanding at first
the customer must have had a registered account for 18 months, and deposit stocks
and cash to the value of at least CNY 500,000. The minimum length of account history
was shortened to 6 months in 2013 by CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission).
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 14 of 88
CNY bln
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
Dec-15
Sep-15
Jun-15
Mar-15
Dec-14
Sep-14
Jun-14
Mar-14
Dec-13
Sep-13
Jun-13
Mar-13
Dec-12
Sep-12
Source: Bloomberg
Online peer to peer (P2P) lending accounts changed this landscape. Investors can
borrow up to 5 times his collateral (vs 3x at stock-brokers traditional margin lending),
and some P2P online lenders required its investors to deposit CNY 2,000 only. In the
face of this competition, conventional stock brokers soon relaxed their own conditions,
and margin lending boomed.
Before long, China banks participated by treating margin loans made by stock brokers
to their customers as collateral for loans to the stock brokers themselves. The brokers
also turned to the stock markets to raise new equity Galaxy Securities, GF Securities
and Haitong Securities raised over USD10bn in China and Huatai Securities raised
USD4.5bn in Hong Kong in 2015, feeding more ammunition to this frenzy. Chinese
stock brokers are clear beneficiaries of this boom in margin lending, a business that
generated far greater profits than underwriting or financial advisory services. The
balance of outstanding margin loan shot up from CNY 392 billion in May 2014 to its
peak of CNY 2.27 trillion (USD365bn) in June 2015 almost a six-fold increase in one
year. See Figure 29 above.
2. Cuts in interest rates
The Peoples Bank of China has been aggressive in cutting interest rates beginning Nov
2014 after leaving them unchanged since Jun 2012. One-year deposit rate was cut
seven times from Nov 2014 to Oct 2015, halving it from the 3.0% level reached in Jun
2012 to 1.5% in Oct 2015. The one-year lending rate was also cut from the 6% level to
4.35% over the same period. See Figure 30. One of the effects of these interest rate cuts
is to make alternative investments to bank deposits more attractive to the Chinese
savers, helping to feed the frenzied entry into stock markets.
FIGURE 30. CHINA INTEREST RATES RECENT HISTORY
One Year
One Year
Deposite Rate
Lending Rate
June 2012
3.00%
6.00%
November 2014
2.75%
5.60%
February 2015
2.50%
5.35%
May 2015
2.25%
5.10%
June 2015
2.00%
4.85%
August 2015
1.75%
4.60%
October 2015
1.50%
4.35%
Source: Peoples Bank of China
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 15 of 88
158%
121%
8%
282%
Total
38%
Households
125%
Non-financial
corporate
65%
Financial
institutions
Government
20%
72%
83%
24%
7%
23%
42%
55%
2000
2007
2014
Source: BlackRock Investment Institute and McKinsey Global Institute, February 2015
Note; 2014 data are as of the second quarter
Page 16 of 88
China therefore needs to engineer a soft landing whereby falling profitability and
decelerating economic growth do not spark waves of debt defaults. Happily for the rest
of the world, Chinas financial system remains isolated. Hence even if a full-blown debt
crisis should develop in China, few global banks would be affected.
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
-9
Taiwan (TAIEX)
India (Nifty)
Japan (Nikkei)
Korea (Kospi)
Hongkong (HSI)
Philippin (PSEi)
Thailand (SET)
Malaysia (KLCI)
Singapore (STI)
Indonesia (JCI)
China (Shenzhen)
China (Shanghai)
FIGURE 32. DECLINES IN REGIONAL BOURSES WHEN CHINA INDICES DROPPED (JAN 2016)
4-Jan-16
7-Jan-16
Source: Bloomberg
All the same The Bottom Line views the 130-160% bull rally in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock markets from mid 2014 to mid 2015 in the face of an over-leveraged
corporate sector, declining profitability and slowing-down economy as total hubris. We
expect the China indices to return to their original starting point in June 2014 (2,048 for
the Shanghai Composite Index and 1,097 for the Shenzhen Composite Index) before
fair values are restored, implying another -34.5% and -44% decline in the Shanghai
and Shenzhen indices respectively.
Unfortunately the Chinese stock markets have a sizeable impact on other equity
bourses across the world. The first trading week of Jan 2016 saw two occasion when
trading was halted by the new circuit breaker system (Monday 4th Jan and Thursday 7th
Jan 2016). In each occasion stock markets in other countries also suffered, regardless of
their domestic consideration see Figure 32 for some examples. So were the Chinese
bourses to suffer 30%+ decline, it goes without saying that the Jakarta Composite Index
will come under severe pressure too.
Is that inevitable though ? Isnt Chinas authorities taking extreme measures to stop the
crash and stabilise the markets ? Indeed, here is a list of actions taken :
Freezing proposed IPOs (4th Jul 2015) to keep investors being focused on
buying stocks already listed in the markets;
Trading suspension (8th Jul 2015) The government allowed half of Chinas
stocks on the stock exchanges to halt trading activities. At least 1,430 out of
2,800 companies traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets pulled
their shares out of the market.
Page 17 of 88
Restriction on short selling (3rd Aug 2015) Under the old rules, investors are
able to go short in the morning and cover their shorts before the market close
the same day and lock in their profits. With the new regulation, investors
cannot cover their short position in the same day, but have to wait until the
next day at the earliest.
Naturally if you halt trading, ban large shareholders from selling, and flood the market
with state-funded buy orders, a semblance of calm would descend into the markets.
This however is fake calmness, in our opinion. A frozen market will not be able to find its
natural bottom. The mispricing of equity values remains, and the double trading halts
in the first week of Jan 2016 show that when correction finally materialises, such market
intervention can cause investors to panic instead.
The anatomy of the China stock market crash reminds The Bottom Line of the dot com
bubble at the start of this century. If we super-impose the tech-heavy NASDAQ index
during the period 15th Apr 1999 to 29th Dec 2000 to the current Shanghai Composite
Index (1st Jul 2014 to now), the readers can see uncannily similar pattern. See Figure 33.
FIGURE 33. PATTERN OF A CRASH : SHANGHAI COMPOSITE INDEX VS NASDAQ INDEX
6,000
IRRATIONAL RALLY
CRASH REBOUND
FINAL
CRASH
5,000
Dec. 29, 2000
2,470.5
4,000
3,000
Jan. 7, 2016
3,125.0
2,000
Shanghai
1,000
Nasdaq
0
Source: Bloomberg
No, The Bottom Line is not proposing that history repeats itself exactly but the pattern
certainly does. The crisis consists of four elements : (a) the original massive rally that
lack fundamental justification, jolted by (b) severe crash, interrupted by (c) seemingly
convincing recovery (either stock brokers convince the world that all the bad news are
already in the price, and current valuation looks cheap compared to 3 months ago, or
the authorities step in and send you to jail for posting a sell order), but this fleeting joy
is then rudely broken up by (d) the final leg of the crash that bring valuation back all the
way to its starting point.
Page 18 of 88
8.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
Dec-12
Jun-13
Dec-13
Jun-14
Dec-14
Jun-15
Dec-15
Dec-07
Jun-08
Dec-08
Jun-09
Dec-09
Jun-10
Dec-10
Jun-11
Dec-11
Jun-12
Dec-04
Jun-05
Dec-05
Jun-06
Dec-06
Jun-07
5.0
Source: Bloomberg
The Chinese Yuan was pegged to the USD at CNY 8.30 per USD from 1997 to 2005, but
on 21st Jul 2005 the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) released that peg and applied a
dirty float instead. Every morning the PBOC announced a daily midpoint exchange
rate, and forex brokers are allowed to trade the currency (the reference is the USDCNY
exchange rate) within a band surrounding this mid point. In the beginning, the trading
band was 0.3% (Jul 2005), and it was subsequently relaxed to 0.5% (May 2007), 1% (Apr
2012), and 2% (Mar 2014). On 24th Jul 2015, the PBOC announced that it would widen
the trading range further to 3%, but no timeline has been set.
FIGURE 35. CHINA EXPORTS VALUE (LHS) AND GROWTH (RHS)
US$ bn
250
60%
200
50%
150
40%
30%
100
20%
50
10%
0%
China Export
Nov-15
Sep-15
Jul-15
May-15
Mar-15
Jan-15
Nov-14
Sep-14
Jul-14
-20%
May-14
-100
Mar-14
-10%
Jan-14
-50
%YoY
Source: Bloomberg
Page 19 of 88
What spurred Chinas monetary authority to devalue the Yuan was its worsening export
performance. Throughout the first half of 2015, Chinas exports had been declining (the
exception was Feb 2015 due to base effect of a one-off weak showing in Feb 2014). In
Jul 2015 Chinas exports fell again, by -8.3% YoY when consensus expectation at the
time was for a -1.5% YoY decline only. See Figure 35.
So on 11th Aug 2015 the PBOC set a midpoint exchange rate that represented a 1.87%
devaluation, the biggest one-day change since 1993 at the time. This was followed the
next day by another 1.62% devaluation against the USD. Taken together this decision
represented the largest yuan depreciation for 20 years then. The PBOC also changed its
method to set the midpoint exchange rate which in essence let the free markets to
have more influence over the Yuan.
The impact on other emerging market currencies were well spread. Whereas developed
economies currencies such as the Japanese Yen and Euro appreciated against the US
dollars over this two day period (10th to 12th Aug 2015), emerging market currencies
such as the Indonesian rupiah, Malaysian ringgit, Brazilian real, South African rand and
Thai bath depreciated significantly, as did the currencies of the Asian Tigers such as
Korean won and Singapore dollars. See Figure 36.
FIGURE 36. IMPACT OF YUAN DEVALUATION ON REGIONAL CURRENCIES (1012 AUG 2015)
0.0%
-0.5%
-0.6%
-1.0%
-1.2%
-1.2%
USDSGD
-1.5%
USDBRL
-0.8%
-2.7%
-2.3%
-2.3%
USDMYR
-2.8%
USDIDR
-3.0%
USDCNY
-2.5%
USDKRW
-2.0%
USDTHB
USDZAR
-3.5%
Source: Bloomberg
Page 20 of 88
FIGURE 37. TOP 20 EXPORTS DESTINATION FOR CHINA AND OTHER REGIONAL ECONOMIES (2014)
No
Destination Country
Exporting Countries
China
Brazil
South Korea
Thailand
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
27.1
70.6
19.7
24.2
24.0
16.6
11.3
45.1
12.6
2.8
25.3
16.7
21.8
23.1
United States
397.1
Hong Kong
363.1
3.3
27.3
Japan
149.4
6.7
32.2
South Korea
100.3
3.8
4.5
16.7
8.6
10.6
Germany
72.7
6.6
4.5
5.4
5.5
2.8
Netherlands
64.9
13.0
4.6
7.3
7.2
4.0
Vietnam
63.7
7.9
12.9
7.9
United Kingdom
57.1
3.8
22.3
India
54.2
4.8
12.8
10
Russian Federation
53.7
3.8
10.1
11
Singapore
48.9
23.9
12
Malaysia
46.4
7.6
13
Australia
39.1
10.3
14
Indonesia
39.1
11.4
15
39.0
16
Brazil
34.9
17
Thailand
34.3
7.6
18
Mexico
32.3
3.7
10.8
19
Canada
30.0
40.6
11
20
China
Total Match with China's
Export Destination
9.7
2.4
11.1
33.3
9.7
12.2
10.4
16.8
49.0
12.7
9.7
10.1
15.5
9.3
5.0
9.7
38.4
9.5
3.6
6.1
3.6
12.3
15
145.3
25.1
51.5
28.2
17.6
14
15
14
15
13
2.5
8.9
5.8
Page 21 of 88
USD/barrel
160
WTI Crude Oil
140
120
100
80
Brent
33.55
60
40
WTI
33.16
20
2015
2013
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1990
Source: Bloomberg
The crash happens because Saudi Arabia, the worlds top crude oil exporter, launched a
price war starting in mid 2014 by keeping its production level abnormally high to drive
certain key competitors (particularly the US shale oil drillers) out of business, in our
opinion. The same applies to the refining sector Saudi Arabia has been flooding the
market with refined fuel and decimating oil refining margins world-wide.
Will this continue ?
FIGURE 39. COST OF PRODUCING OIL (USD PER BBL)
Brazil
Canada
USA
Venezuela
Russia
Iran
UAE
Capital Expenditure
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Operational Expenditure
Kuwait
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
Page 22 of 88
It will, if we follow the rationale of Saudis decision. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are the
worlds cheapest producer of crude oil, with production cost of USD 8.50 and USD 9.90
per bbl respectively in 2015, according to the oil and gas data intelligence and
consulting firm Rystad Energy. By contrast in the US oil production cost on average USD
36.20 per bbl, and in Canada they cost USD 41.00 per bbl. See Figure 39. Hence by
driving crude oil price below USD 35 per bbl and keeping it there for considerable
period, there is every reason to expect many US shale oil producers would fold.
But low oil price hurts all oil producers, Saudi Arabia included. Can it continue to bear
the pain ?
The answer is No to the oil bulls. Oil producers have an incentive to produce as much
as possible, rather than cut production, in order to make up for the lower prices. Indeed
US shale oil producers, as well as other non OPEC producers such as Russia, Brazil and
Norway have all increased production as the price war intensifies. This was achieved
through an impressive array of efficiency drives: thousands of workers laid off, focusing
rigs on the biggest gushers only (in the process idling more than 60% of rigs in the US)
and fracking faster by applying cutting-edge technology. Meanwhile the IMF predicted
earlier last year that the Saudi government budget deficit would reach USD140bn (or
21.6% of GDP) in 2015. So the oil bulls argue that the Saudis would blink first and start
cutting their oil production, and thus ending the price war and sending oil price back
up, later in 2016.
FIGURE 40. SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT BUDGET BALANCE
600
40%
Budget balance (SAR bn)
30%
400
% of GDP (RHS)
20%
200
10%
0%
-10%
(200)
-20%
(400)
-30%
(600)
2015
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
-40%
Source: Bloomberg
We do not share this view we think the WTI and Brent would be trading within the
USD 25 to 35 per bbl band for most of 2016.
Our reason is that we believe Saudi Arabia is well positioned to withstand the fiscal
pain, and has taken step to fortify its resilience. The Saudi government announced in
late Dec 2015 that it estimated its budget deficit to reach 367 billion riyals (USD98bn),
or 16% of GDP in 2015 far lower than IMFs USD140bn and 21.6% of GDP forecast (also
lower than 20% of GDP concensus forecast in Bloomberg). See Figure 40. Its 2016 state
budget plans to slash government spending by 840 billion riyals, mostly by cutting
energy subsidies. Its 2016 government budget deficit is projected to narrow to 326.2
billion riyals, or 10.8% of GDP according to estimates by Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank.
Page 23 of 88
So the Saudis appear well aware of the costs of the price war, and have taken painful
steps to deal with them. Most importantly, the subsidy cuts had not sparked any social
unrest, signalling a good chance that the budget targets would be met in 2016.
In fact, IMFs World Economic and Financial Survey (published on 15th Oct 2015)
studies this issue of how much fiscal space oil-exporting countries have, comparing
the size of governments financial assets (also referred to as fiscal buffers) with the
government budget deficits. It concludes that Saudi Arabias fiscal buffer can last five
years whereas Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates can last more then 20 years.
Please note the IMF study arrives at this conclusion using assumption about 2015 deficit
which has now proved too pessimistic so the real resilience of Saudis finances may
well be significantly more than just five years. Therefore The Bottom Line sees little
reason why the Saudis should blink and end the price war in 2016.
Finally, the crude oil inventory in the US remains at elevated level see Figure 41. All
these evidence indicate to us that oil price would remain depressed in 2016.
FIGURE 41. US CRUDE OIL INVENTORY
mn barrels
500
460
450
440
140
450
130
430
400
120
420
110
410
350
400
100
390
Source: Bloomberg
90
Dec-15
Oct-15
Nov-15
Sep-15
Sep-15
Jul-15
Aug-15
Jul-15
Jun-15
May-15
Apr-15
May-15
Mar-15
Mar-15
Jan-15
80
Dec-14
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
370
2002
200
2001
380
2000
250
Feb-15
300
Source: Bloomberg
As a result, the high yield bond markets are plummeting now to levels not seen since
2009. See Figure 42. Investors are reminded that a lot of high yield (junk) bonds had
been issued in recent years, taking advantage of the low interest rate environment, and
that sustained low levels of oil price may result in a wave of debt defaults by energy
companies. Many oil companies had hedged their crude oil selling price until summer
2016 at prices much higher than the current level, according to Babson Capital
Management, an investor in high yield bonds. Once that hedge protection expires, the
risk of waves of debt default would become prominent in our view. Indeed Standard &
Poors Rating Service warned last Dec 2015 that a stunning 50% of energy junk bonds
are distressed (meaning, they are at risk of default).
Focused Credit, a bond fund managed by Third Avenue, announced in Dec 2015 that it
was blocking its investors from redeeming their investments. The fund would be
wound down, its assets had lost two-third of its value in seven months to USD788mn
when the announcement came. Another bond fund, Lucidus Capital Partners, has
liquidated its entire portfolio and announced in mid Dec 2015 that it would return its
USD900mn asset under management to its investors. The Bottom Line believes this is
just the beginning.
Page 24 of 88
FIGURE 43. MSCI EMERGING MARKETS INDEX VS S&P 500 INDEX RELATIVE
180
160
140
162.5
120
110
99.3
100
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
90
69.0
S&P 500
MSCI EM
80
83.0
70
S&P 500
MSCI EM
Dec-15
Nov-15
Oct-15
Sep-15
Aug-15
Jul-15
Jun-15
May-15
Apr-15
Mar-15
Feb-15
Jan-15
Dec-14
Dec-15
Jun-15
Dec-14
Jun-14
Dec-13
Jun-13
Dec-12
Jun-12
Dec-11
Jun-11
Dec-10
60
Source: Bloomberg
The danger with this crash in the high yield bond market is that it might spark a general
flight to quality. Should investors start to cast their wary eyes and ask what other asset
classes might follow the path of the high yield bonds, we fear that emerging markets
might be that next target.
Indeed, similar to the high yield bond market (whose performance has not been too
healthy even before this still-developing crash), emerging market as an asset class has
badly under-performed US equities. Figure 43 show that the MSCI Emerging Markets
Index under perform the S&P 500 index both in the one-year time frame (down 17% vs
S&P 500s 0.7% decline) as well as in the five-year time frame (down 31% vs S&P 500s
62.5% appreciation in value).
Page 25 of 88
FIGURE 44. FED FUNDS RATE FORECAST BY FOMC MEMBERS (AS AT DEC 2015)
The futures market begs to disagree. It has only priced in two rate hikes (25 bps each)
with Jun and Dec 2016 (or Feb 2017) being considered most likely months for these
raises. See Figure 45.
FIGURE 45. FED FUNDS RATE IMPLIED FORECAST BY THE FUTURES MARKET (8 JANUARY 2016)
Probability
of hike
Probability
of cut
0% 0.25%
0.25% 0.5%
0.5% 0.75%
0.75% 1.0%
1% 1.25%
1.25% 1.5%
1.5% 1.75%
27-Jan-16
0.0%
8.0%
8.0%
92.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
16-Mar-16
40.5%
4.5%
4.5%
55.0%
40.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
27-Apr-16
46.0%
4.0%
4.0%
50.0%
41.9%
4.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
15-Jun-16
62.0%
2.7%
2.7%
35.3%
44.5%
16.2%
1.3%
0.0%
0.0%
27-Jul-16
66.2%
2.4%
2.4%
31.4%
43.4%
19.6%
3.1%
0.2%
0.0%
21-Sep-16
75.0%
1.7%
1.7%
23.3%
40.0%
26.2%
7.7%
1.0%
0.0%
2-Nov-16
78.8%
1.4%
1.4%
19.7%
37.3%
28.5%
10.8%
2.1%
0.2%
14-Dec-16
84.7%
1.0%
1.0%
14.3%
32.1%
31.1%
16.0%
4.6%
0.8%
1-Feb-17
87.5%
0.8%
0.8%
11.7%
28.5%
31.2%
19.0%
6.9%
1.5%
Source: Bloomberg
So while both the capital markets and the Federal Reserves use the word gradual, they
seem to mean different things. Of course, as the Fed has repeatedly said, its decision on
further rate rises will depend on how the economic data evolves. We do not rate this
risk too highly, but it is not impossible either that the American economy would grow
more strongly in 2016 than current market expectation.
Page 26 of 88
PE (x)
50
45.4
40
25.7
16.4
16.5
17.6
17.8
Thailand (SET)
Malaysia (KLCI)
India (Sensex)
13.8
19.3
China (Shanghai)
12.8
Korea (Kospi)
20
Singapore (STI)
30
10
China (Shenzhen)
Indonesia (JCI)
Source: Bloomberg
This reflects the fact that Indonesias corporate earnings performance has been poor in
2013, 2014 and again in 2015.
Please refer to Appendix 1 on p.58-59. What we did here is that we took note of 2012
EPS consensus forecasts as at Dec 2011 (for companies in Mansek Universe and a few
others that we include in this analysis for their trading liquidity). We then compare
these with the actual EPS performance in 2012, noting the over- or under-performance
of each company. At the bottom of the Table, we aggregate these figures to give the
readers a sense of how the Indonesian market had performed as a whole against the
concensus forecast in that year. We do the same analysis for 2013 and 2014. For 2015, as
the Full Year results have not been announced yet, we compare the projected EPS
growth instead. So we take the concensus 2015 forecast as at Dec 2014, and we work
out what % EPS growth in 2015 are implied by comparing it to the actual EPS result in
2014. We then compare these implied EPS growth expectation with the actual year-onyear EPS growth delivered at the 9M 2015 stage.
The results are not pretty. 2012 was the last year when the actual performance beat the
consensus forecasts. 2013, 2014 and 9M15 had been disappointing and disappointing
in a big way.
To look at this from a different angle, we note how many companies in this analysis
managed to beat market expectation. In 2012, 94.3% of companies in this survey did
better than consensus expectation. In 2013, the number slumped to just 37.3%. In 2014
it deteriorated further to 28.4%. And by the time we came to the 9M15 period, only
22.1% of the companies in our survey managed to beat the Streets expectation.
Hence the JCIs high trailing PER shown in Figure 46 above shows that current valuation
already prices in quite an aggressive expectation that 2016 will witness substantially
stronger earnings performance than in the past three years.
Given the preponderance of global issues that might put equity values world-wide at
risk today, Indonesian equity is not cheaply valued in our opinion. This underlies our
reason for keeping our Underweight rating for the market and maintaining a largely
defensive posture in Mansek Top Picks.
Page 27 of 88
1,610
Economic price
before tax
(Rp/liter)
11,098
Economic
price after tax
(Rp/liter)
12,491
9,027
1,610
10,637
11,984
8,566
1,610
10,176
11,476
14,000
8,105
1,610
9,715
10,969
81.6
14,000
7,182
1,610
8,792
9,954
70
76.3
14,000
6,721
1,610
8,331
9,447
65
71.1
14,000
6,260
1,610
7,870
8,940
60
65.9
14,000
5,799
1,610
7,409
8,432
55
60.6
14,000
5,337
1,610
6,947
7,925
50
55.4
14,000
4,876
1,610
6,486
7,418
10
45
50.1
14,000
4,415
1,610
6,025
6,910
11
40
44.9
14,000
3,954
1,610
5,564
6,403
12
35
39.7
14,000
3,493
1,610
5,103
5,896
13
30
34.4
14,000
3,031
1,610
4,641
5,388
Brent price
(USD/bbl)
MOPS
(USD/bbl)
Rupiah/US$
MOPS
(Rp/liter)
100
107.8
14,000
9,488
95
102.5
14,000
90
97.3
14,000
85
92.0
75
No
Presently our economic team is forecasting a 5.0% real GDP growth in 2016, driven
among others by a 5.0% growth in household consumption. As the readers can see
from Figure 48, growth in Indonesias household consumption has been decelerating
since 2012. In our economists estimation, if the subsidised fuel price is cut to Rp 5,900
per litre, the impact would be to boost consumer spending to 5.2% growth rate this
year. We expect signs of this recovery to be seen by 3Q16, helping the JCI to start
appreciating around Aug 2016 when 3Q16 economic data would be released.
FIGURE 48. INDONESIA REAL GDP GROWTH BY EXPENDITURE
%, yoy
2011
2012
2013
2014
1Q15
2Q15
3Q15
2015F
2016F
Real GDP
6.17
6.03
5.58
5.02
4.72
4.67
4.73
4.7
5.0
Household
5.05
5.49
5.38
5.14
5.01
4.97
4.96
5.0
5.0
Govt spending
5.52
4.53
6.93
1.98
2.65
2.13
6.56
5.0
5.5
Investment
8.86
9.13
5.28
4.12
4.37
3.69
4.62
4.0
5.8
Exports
14.8
1.61
4.17
1.02
-1.04
-0.09
-0.69
0.0
1.3
Import
15
1.86
2.19
-2.38
-6.98
-6.11
-1.0
2.2
Page 28 of 88
ADHI
15.2
11.1
% YoY
Growth
76%
PTPP
27.0
21.0
31%
78%
WIKA*
31.6
25.3
26%
80%
WSKT
22.7
27.9
78%
123%
4.0
3.5
35%
88%
Company
WTON*
% of Target
73%
*= 12M15 Realization
Source: Company
After such big misses last year, one would think that brokers would be more
circumspect in forming their expectation for 2016. This is not the case, however. The
Bottom Line believes that such high expectation might contribute to selling pressures
on the JCI in early 2016 if earnings performance in 1Q16 fail to reflect the positive
benefits of this supposed robust growth in public sector capital spending.
However the private sector forms the bulk (almost 70%) of the nation's infrastructure
investments in the governments original plans. Unfortunately, for much of 2015 policy
actions by the government had not been conducive for private investments in our
opinion. These include :
cajoling the CEOs of Bank Mandiri (BMRI), Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BBRI), Bank
Nasional Indonesia (BBNI) and Bank Tabungan Negara (BBTN) to lower their
credit interest rates (Feb 2015), and
floating the ideas of imposing maximum retail prices on essential goods, and
instructing all state-owned enterprises which consume steel to buy them from
Krakatau Steel (May 2015), and
ordering toll road operators to cut their tariffs by 25-35% during the period 10
days prior to and 5 days after 2015 Lebaran (Jun 2015), and
banning the sales of beverages with alcohol content of less than 5% in mini
mart or retail shops (Jan 2015), and
calling on rice millers and traders to put public good above profits (Sep 2015).
The direct impact is negative. Gross fixed capital formation (GCFC), composed of both
public and private sector investment spending, grew by 3.7% to 4.6% YoY only
throughout the first nine months of 2015. See Figure 48. In early 2015, when our
economists were still forecasting real GDP growth of 5.3%, this was based on GCFC
growth of 6.2%. No mystery that the final economic growth in 2015 is likely to be nearer
4.7%. Likewise Foreign Direct Investments actually declined in 9M15. See Figure 50.
Page 29 of 88
USD mn
9M2012
9M2013
9M2014
9M2015
9M2013
9M2014
9M2015
18,252
21,203
21,745
21,337
16.2
2.6
-1.9
4,481
5,093
5,500
4,592
13.7
8.0
-16.5
Primary Sector
Food Crops & Plantation
1,272
990
1,623
1,421
-22.1
63.9
-12.4
Mining
3,157
4,061
3,793
3,089
28.6
-6.6
-18.6
Others
52
43
85
82
-18.1
98.8
-3.2
Secondary Sector
8,594
12,429
10,150
8,522
44.6
-18.3
-16.0
1,149
1,487
2,547
1,156
29.4
71.3
-54.6
2,477
2,562
1,978
1,477
3.4
-22.8
-25.3
1,284
2,633
1,543
2,099
105.0
-41.4
36.1
Automotive
1,308
2,791
1,602
1,482
113.4
-42.6
-7.5
Others
2,376
2,956
2,480
2,308
24.4
-16.1
-6.9
Tertiary Sector
5,177
3,681
6,095
8,224
-28.9
65.6
34.9
1,072
757
684
1,636
-29.4
-9.6
139.0
49.1
Construction
Transport & Communication
Real Estate
Others
196
521
618
921
165.9
18.5
1,873
887
2,804
2,816
-52.6
216.0
0.4
328
492
806
1,481
49.8
63.8
83.8
1,708
1,024
1,184
1,369
-40.1
15.6
15.7
Source: CEIC
Happily government actions in the recent past have reflected a major shift towards free
market mechanism. For example :
Jasa Marga was due to raise its tariffs in a number of toll roads in Oct 2015, as
stipulated by its contracts. Initially Director General of Bina Marga (Ministry of
Public Works and Public Housing) Hediyanto W. Husaini announced that this
would be delayed to Jan 2016, due to weak economic condition. In the end
the tariffs were raised on 1st Nov 2015.
This shift towards market mechanism rather than government diktat would, in our view,
remind investors world-wide about the attractiveness of Indonesia as destination for
investments. Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. See Figure 51.
Page 30 of 88
mn person
1,600
1,368
1,400
1,276
1,200
1,000
800
200
252 203
186 174 158 146
127 120 99
91
88
Ethiopia
319
400
Vietnam
600
87
Egypt
Philippines
Mexico
Japan
Russia
Bangladesh
Nigeria
Pakistan
Brazil
Indonesia
US
India
China
Source: IMF
Indonesia has a much lower dependency ratio (a measure of productive part of the
population, taking the ratio of those NOT in the labour force to those currently working)
compared to developed economies such as the US or Japan. See Figure 52.
FIGURE 52. DEPENDENCY RATIO (%)
China
India
Indonesia
Japan
US
Malaysia
Philippine
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
1950
61
68
75
67
53
85
89
75
83
56
1955
71
72
73
63
60
88
96
77
81
66
1960
77
77
76
55
64
96
100
83
85
80
1965
80
81
81
46
63
98
102
86
89
95
1970
78
79
83
44
59
93
96
73
90
96
1975
77
76
81
46
52
85
91
59
85
91
1980
67
74
78
46
47
74
87
47
76
84
1985
55
73
72
44
46
72
83
42
63
79
1990
50
71
65
40
48
69
79
37
53
75
1995
51
69
60
44
53
65
75
40
49
71
2000
48
65
54
47
51
59
72
40
45
60
2005
42
60
51
51
50
58
68
39
44
50
2010
39
56
49
56
50
54
64
36
42
42
2015
40
52
46
63
52
51
60
36
41
41
2020
44
49
44
67
55
50
57
41
42
42
2025
46
47
43
69
58
51
56
51
45
42
2030
49
45
44
71
61
52
55
61
49
43
2035
54
44
47
76
62
53
54
71
54
45
2040
59
44
50
86
62
53
52
76
58
49
2045
61
45
53
92
62
53
52
79
62
54
2050
63
47
56
96
63
54
51
81
65
61
Source: UN Population
In many countries, large productive segment of the population does not necessarily
imply good economic potential, if in fact they live in penury. Not so in Indonesia its
size of the middle income has grown from 38% in 2003 to 62% of the population in
2013, according to the World Bank. See Figure 53.
Page 31 of 88
120%
0%
0%
0%
57%
62%
43%
37%
100%
38%
80%
60%
40%
62%
20%
0%
2003
2010
Middle
Low
2013
High
In short, many facets of Indonesias demographic and population levels and growth are
highly attractive to potential investors in our opinion. This has the real potential of
being turned into a massive engine of economic growth. The ratio of GCFC to real GDP
has been hovering between 30 to 33% level only since 2008. Yet during the heyday of
Soehartos years, it passed the 35% level for a number of years and touched just under
40% in late 1996. See Figure 54.
FIGURE 54. REAL GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION TO REAL GDP RATIO
45.0%
Real GFCF to real GDP
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
Sep-15
Mar-14
Sep-12
Mar-11
Sep-09
Mar-08
Sep-06
Mar-05
Sep-03
Mar-02
Sep-00
Mar-99
Sep-97
Mar-96
Sep-94
Mar-93
0.0%
Our economists had estimated that if Indonesia succeeds to raise its GCFC to real GDP
ratio to 38% in 2017, somewhat below the maximum ratio delivered in history, that
would imply that real investment spending would grow by 24% YoY. That would be a
massive improvement compared to the 4 to 5% growth level witnessed in recent years.
Even if Indonesia delivers a fraction of that potential, the impact on the economy would
remain immense. In our opinion, with a pro-market policy attitude by the government,
there is little reason why Indonesias investment potential should not be realised soon.
Page 32 of 88
500
450
JCI
395.0
400
350
300
250
FD int Rate
213.3
S&P 500
163.7
200
150
100
S&P 500
JCI
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Mar-14
Aug-13
Jan-13
Jun-12
Nov-11
Apr-11
Sep-10
Feb-10
Jul-09
Dec-08
May-08
Oct-07
Mar-07
Aug-06
Jan-06
50
0
If we compare this equity performance to investing in rupiah Fixed Deposit, the relative
superiority of equities is pronounced. Putting Rp 100 in 3-month rupiah fixed deposit at
the end of Dec 2005, and rolling it over (with accrued interest being fully re-invested)
every 3 months, would grow into Rp 213.3 more than doubling over 10 years or
equivalent to an annualised return of 7.9% CAGR. Looking strictly at the CAGR, investing
in shares outperformed holding cash in fixed deposit by an average of 6.7% a year. Of
course, this pronounced outperfornance comes at the cost of significantly higher risks,
but there is no disputing that equity investing delivers significantly higher returns than
holding cash over the medium term.
Interestingly in our opinion, the Indonesian equities also outperformed US equities.
Investing USD 100 at the end of Dec 2005 in S&P 500, the main index for US equities,
would grow into USD 163.7 by 2015 a 64% appreciation over 10 years equivalent to
5.3% CAGR. Not a bad return but clearly outshined by the 14.6% CAGR delivered by
Indonesian equities over the same medium-term period. See Figure 55 above.
The same conclusion would be reached if we consider an even longer horizon the 23
years period from the end of Dec 1992 to Dec 2015. Putting USD 100 into American
equities (represented by the S&P 500 index) at the end of 1992 would grow into $490 in
Dec 2015, a five-fold appreciation equivalent to an annualised return of 7.3% CAGR.
Page 33 of 88
By contrast, putting Rp 100 into the Jakarta Composite Index at the end of 1992 would
transform into Rp 1,856.6 this is over 18-fold appreciation in value over 23 years, or
equivalent to an annualised return of 13.5% CAGR. Please see Figure 56.
FIGURE 56. 23-YEAR RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OFJCI VS S&P 500 (IN LOCAL CURRENCIES)
2,500
2,200
JCI
1,856.6
1,900
1,600
1,300
1,000
700
S&P500
490.0
400
-200
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
100
S&P 500
JCI
All the above equity returns statistics account for stock price movements only we do
not include dividends income, much less dividends income re-invested. Hence the total
returns performance in equity investing would be much stronger than depicted above.
600
S&P500
490.0
500
400
300
JCI
265.7
200
100
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
S&P 500
JCI in USD
Page 34 of 88
7-Apr-15
28-Sep-15
-25.4%
81
% of
Declining
Liquid
Stock
95%
20-May-13
27-Aug-13
-23.9%
94
91%
3-Sep-14
1-Aug-11
4-Oct-11
-22.0%
80
96%
3-Apr-12
8.2
30-Apr-10
25-May-10
-15.4%
57
96%
14-Jul-10
2.5
27.2
Crashes Period
JCI chg
No of
Liquid
Stock
Date of
Break Even
Period to
Break Even
(months)
15.7
9-Jan-08
28-Oct-08
-60.7%
71
93%
5-Apr-10
24-Jul-07
16-Aug-07
-20.5%
55
100%
2-Oct-07
2.3
11-May-06
14-Jun-06
-20.5%
33
100%
10-Oct-06
5.1
3-Aug-05
29-Aug-05
-16.6%
34
94%
4-Jan-06
5.1
27-Apr-04
17-May-04
-18.3%
20
100%
21-Sep-04
4.9
79.2
8-Jul-97
21-Sep-98
-65.0%
42
93%
9-Jan-04
24-Apr-96
15-Aug-96
-16.0%
22
100%
5-Dec-96
7.5
5-Jan-94
18-Apr-95
-32%
N/A
N/A
15-Apr-96
27.7
19-Jun-92
21-Dec-92
-18%
N/A
N/A
26-May-93
11.4
However the key observation are that each stock market crash inflicted a deep wound
(the average decline is -27.3%, and on two occasion the JCI fell by more than -60%), and
that the recovery period is usually quite long (the average is 16.4 months, and on four
occasion the JCI needed more than one year to return to its pre-crash level). Clearly a
Buy and Hold investment strategy (i.e. once you pick a quality stock, hold on to it
through thick and thin) would not only inflict a painful damage to the investors wealth
during a stock market crash but would also require a very long time, on average, just to
return to point zero again. See Figure 58 above.
Here is another key observation diversification within Indonesia would not help. At
the start of each of these 13 stock market crashes, we listed the stocks that had had
average daily trading values in excess of USD1mn over the past 6 months prior to that
day these we define as liquid stocks. We then asked how many of these liquid stocks
managed to stay above water (i.e. avoid decline in their stock price) during the
subsequent crash. Figure 58 above gives this shocking answer : in all of Indonesias
stock market crashes, at least 91% of liquid stocks would lose value. In four occasion,
ALL liquid stocks lost value over the crash period.
Furthermore, success does not repeat itself in Indonesias stock market crashes. Figure
59 below shows those liquid stocks that had managed to stay above water during each
of the JCIs 13 crashes over the past 23 years. NOT one stock managed to repeat its
success. Each stock in this list appeared exactly once only. In addition, this list of
winners consists of both companies with fundamentals that, we argue, are generally
recognised as respectable (SMGR, LPBN, PTBA, BNII, GGRM, UNVR, AALI, TBIG, MPPA,
MIKA, AKRA) as well as those that are not. Fundamentals alone, therefore, do not offer
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 35 of 88
guidance. If your probability of success is less than 9%, and fundamental analysis
appears to make no difference, then we argue that stock picking skills would have been
practically powerless to help investors to avoid damage during crashes.
FIGURE 59. LIQUID STOCKS THAT ROSE IN VALUE DURING CRASHES
Crash Period
Neutral-Or-Positively-performing Stocks
7-Apr-15
28-Sep-15 MIKA (16%), AKRA (5%), BCIP (4%), SRIL (67%)
TRAM (3%), NOBU (28%), SUGI (2%), AALI (5%), MYRX (8%), TBIG
20-May-13
27-Aug-13
(2%), CMNP (72%), MPPA (6%)
1-Aug-11
4-Oct-11 TRAM (17%), STAR (46%)
30-Apr-10
25-May-10 GGRM (15%), UNVR (5%)
9-Jan-08
28-Oct-08 BNII (33%), BAEK (46%), COWL (2%), IIKP (147%), MIRA (55%)
24-Jul-07
16-Aug-07 11-May-06
14-Jun-06 3-Aug-05
29-Aug-05 LPBN (1%), PTBA (5%)
27-Apr-04
17-May-04 8-Jul-97
21-Sep-98 SMGR (32%)
24-Apr-96
15-Aug-96 Source: Bloomberg (figures in bracket show their stock price movement during the crash period)
MARKET RISKS
Then it is obvious that diversification within one market can only eliminate non market
risks (i.e. risks that are specific to individual companies), but it will do nothing to reduce
market risks.
Stock Pick
4.2%
Asset
Allocation
93.6%
Timing
1.7%
Others
0.5%
Page 36 of 88
For equity funds, this answer may appear a non solution as they cannot hold other asset
classes such as government bonds or corporate bonds (the major common alternatives
to holding equities). Here is one good news : holding bonds in Indonesia would not
help anyway. Figure 61 below shows that in every equity crash period where
government bonds were actively traded (we use the Indonesian Government
benchmark 10-year bonds as a proxy), the bond yields actually went up (meaning, the
bond lost value as bond yield and price are inversely related). Hence holding bonds
would not help investors avoiding the negative impact of equity crashes.
FIGURE 61. JCI, 10YR GOVT BOND YIELD & USDIDR IN CRASHES
Start Date
End Date
19-Jun-92
JCI INDEX
Start Value
End Value
Chg
21-Dec-92
331.1
270.5
5-Jan-94
18-Apr-95
612.9
24-Apr-96
15-Aug-96
8-Jul-97
21-Sep-98
Start Value
End Value
USDIDR
Chg
Start Value
End Value
Chg
-18.3%
2,030
2,064
1.7%
415.0
-32.3%
2,105
2,226
5.7%
630.2
532.4
-15.5%
2,326
2,341
0.6%
740.8
256.8
-65.3%
2,433
11,100
356.2%
27-Apr-04
17-May-04
818.2
668.5
-18.3%
11.2
11.8
59
8,625
9,010
4.5%
3-Aug-05
29-Aug-05
1,192.2
994.8
-16.6%
11.7
13.7
201
9,755
10,775
10.5%
11-May-06
14-Jun-06
1,553.1
1,234.2
-20.5%
11.6
13.1
145
8,703
9,475
8.9%
24-Jul-07
16-Aug-07
2,401.1
1,908.6
-20.5%
9.0
9.6
65
9,088
9,550
5.1%
9-Jan-08
28-Oct-08
2,830.3
1,111.4
-60.7%
9.9
21.0
1,106
9,440
11,050
17.1%
30-Apr-10
25-May-10
2,971.3
2,514.1
-15.4%
8.6
9.3
69
9,013
9,405
4.3%
1-Aug-11
4-Oct-11
4,193.4
3,269.5
-22.0%
7.0
7.6
69
8,464
8,920
5.4%
20-May-13
27-Aug-13
5,215.0
3,967.8
-23.9%
5.6
8.7
314
9,758
11,358
16.4%
7-Apr-15
28-Sep-15
5,523.3
4,120.5
-25.4%
9.7
234
12,997
14,741
13.4%
7.3
However Figure 61 above also demonstrates one asset class that always appreciates in
value whenever the Indonesian stock market crashes the USD (against the rupiah). It
shows why holding Indonesian equities throughout crash periods is doubly hurtful to
foreign investors not only do they suffer the loss in equity value, but they also suffer
from holding assets in a depreciating currency. So the answer to foreign investors is
clear in our opinion do not hold Indonesian equities during crash periods. While
Indonesia-specific equity funds cannot hold the USD, they can hold rupiah cash as an
alternative asset class.
The next question, of course, is how to recognise an incoming stock market crash ?
This cannot be done consistently, according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. This
theory (dating back to Eugene Famas seminal paper Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, Journal of Finance, 1970) asserts that stock
markets are efficient in reflecting information about individual stocks and about the
stock market as a whole. Therefore market prices are unbiased estimates of the true
value of investments meaning, market prices may not be equal to the true values at all
times, but the errors themselves are unbiased there is an equal chance that stocks are
under- or over-valued. This theory therefore asserts that no groups of investors should
be able to identify under- or over-valued stocks consistently using any investment
strategy. Trying to identify an incoming stock market crash is therefore futile, it says.
In our opinion, this theory is just plain wrong. In the coming sections, The Bottom Line
presents three different methods (seasonality, trend analysis and The Bottom Line itself)
to avoid the negative impact of stock market crashes. Contrary to the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, all three methods deliver track records of excess returns.
Page 37 of 88
4,500.0
JCI
4,000.0
Best 8 Months
3,961.5
Best 8 Months
3,500.0
3,000.0
2,500.0
2,000.0
1,500.0
JCI
1,837.5
1,000.0
500.0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
0.0
In addition to long term outperformance, The Bottom Line believes it is also important
to examine periodic performance. Figure 63 below shows the difference between the
annual returns of JCI and those of the Best 8 Months strategy.
FIGURE 63. OVER/UNDER PERFORMANCE BEST 8 MONTHS VS JCI
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
-60%
Page 38 of 88
The Best 8 Months strategy delivered stronger returns than the JCI in 12 years out of
the 23 years in this review (1992 2015 period) not an overwhelming (52%) winning
percentages but realistic.
FIGURE 64. JCI MONTHLY CHANGE (STDEV, MAX & MIN)
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
-10.0%
-20.0%
-30.0%
-40.0%
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov Dec
Page 39 of 88
Apr
1.1%
-6.1%
-2.8%
6.5%
-1.5%
-15.0%
25.8%
-9.7%
-6.0%
10.9%
13.3%
6.5%
-4.7%
10.7%
9.2%
-5.8%
20.1%
7.0%
3.8%
1.4%
1.9%
1.5%
-7.8%
2.6%
1.6%
9.7%
60.9%
May
8.8%
8.5%
14.1%
-1.0%
6.7%
-8.6%
18.2%
-13.7%
13.3%
-0.6%
9.7%
-6.5%
5.7%
-9.2%
4.3%
6.1%
11.3%
-5.9%
0.5%
-8.3%
0.7%
1.1%
2.6%
2.5%
2.1%
8.4%
65.2%
Jun
4.9%
-8.9%
3.5%
-3.8%
4.1%
6.1%
13.1%
13.4%
7.8%
-4.9%
2.2%
0.0%
3.1%
-1.5%
2.6%
-3.9%
5.7%
4.2%
1.3%
3.2%
-4.9%
-0.3%
-5.9%
1.8%
2.4%
5.7%
60.9%
Jul
-0.5%
-1.4%
4.0%
-9.8%
-0.5%
8.0%
-9.7%
-4.4%
1.5%
-8.2%
0.5%
3.4%
5.3%
3.2%
9.8%
-1.9%
14.6%
5.3%
6.2%
4.7%
-4.3%
4.3%
-2.2%
1.2%
1.5%
6.1%
56.5%
Aug
17.0%
13.1%
-2.2%
2.2%
-31.5%
-28.9%
-5.2%
-5.2%
-1.9%
-4.3%
4.3%
-0.3%
-11.2%
5.9%
-6.6%
-6.0%
0.8%
0.4%
-7.0%
-2.0%
-9.0%
0.9%
-6.1%
-3.6%
-2.1%
10.7%
34.8%
Sep
0.6%
-2.4%
-1.5%
4.8%
10.7%
-19.4%
-3.4%
-9.7%
-9.9%
-5.5%
12.8%
8.7%
2.8%
7.2%
7.5%
-15.4%
5.4%
13.6%
-7.6%
5.0%
2.9%
0.0%
-6.3%
0.0%
1.1%
8.8%
56.5%
Oct
11.0%
5.1%
-1.0%
-1.0%
-8.5%
8.9%
8.4%
-3.8%
-2.2%
-12.0%
4.7%
4.9%
-1.2%
3.1%
12.0%
-31.4%
-4.0%
3.8%
6.8%
2.1%
4.5%
-0.9%
5.5%
0.6%
2.6%
9.2%
56.5%
Nov
11.3%
-7.8%
-1.4%
7.9%
-19.7%
28.4%
-1.7%
5.9%
-0.9%
5.8%
-1.4%
13.6%
2.9%
8.6%
1.7%
-1.2%
2.0%
-2.9%
-2.0%
-1.7%
-5.6%
1.2%
0.2%
1.9%
0.5%
9.0%
47.8%
Dec
13.5%
-2.7%
6.7%
4.0%
0.0%
3.0%
16.0%
-3.0%
3.1%
8.8%
12.1%
2.3%
6.0%
5.0%
2.1%
9.2%
4.9%
4.9%
2.9%
0.9%
0.4%
1.5%
3.3%
4.6%
3.2%
4.8%
91.3%
Page 40 of 88
16,000
JCI
14,000
12,368.3
JCI > MA 50
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
1,818.4
2,000
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
As in our previous analysis of JCI returns seasonality, The Bottom Line also examines the
annual returns of JCI and those of this MA 50 strategy. Figure 67 below shows that the
MA 50 strategy delivers stronger returns than the JCI in 13 of the past 23 years (19922015). Again the percentage of winning (56.5%) is not overwhelming, but it is realistic
and sufficient to deliver a consistent outsized performance against a buy and hold
strategy.
FIGURE 67. OVER/UNDER PERFORMANCE MA50 VS JCI
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
-30%
Before readers of The Bottom Line jump straight away into employing this strategy,
please be mindful that it has several weaknesses too (chief of which is that it does not
work well in sideways market). Looking at Figure 67 again, note that this MA 50
strategy would have under performed the JCI in five of the past seven years (2009, 2010,
2011, 2012 and 2014). Few fund managers would probably be able to retain their
customers after such showing eventhough, at the other side of the coin, this MA 50
strategy would have beaten the JCI hands down over the last three years (2013-15).
Page 41 of 88
700
600
2,500
591.5
JC I
JC I
JC I > MA 50
JC I > MA 50
2,000
2,125.8
500
1,500
400
300
1,000
1,153.9
160.9
200
500
100
0
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
Dec-14
Aug-14 5,200
Apr-14 5,200
4,800
5,500
Mar-13
4,545
5,000
Feb-15
5,100
Oct-14
4,800
4,500
4,000
Oct-13
4,000
3,500
3,000
Dec-13
4,000
JCI
Jul-15
5,000
Dec-15
4,700 May-16
4,500
Jan-16
Oct-15 4,500
4,500
Dec-16
5,000
Aug-16
4,250
Dec-16
Aug-16
Apr-16
Dec-15
Aug-15
Apr-15
Dec-14
Aug-14
Apr-14
Dec-13
Aug-13
Apr-13
Dec-12
Aug-12
Apr-12
Dec-11
Sep-11
May-11
Jan-11
2,500
Page 42 of 88
FIGURE 71. CORRELATION BEETWEN JCI VS MANSEK UNIVERSE (RESPECTIVE IPO DATES TO JAN 6, 2016)
Ticker
Company Name
Average
Minimum
Maximum
BMRI
TLKM
15,716.9
15,630,682.1
0.71
0.13
0.95
23,600.6
15,262,650.4
0.69
0.17
0.94
BBRI
20,482.1
20,395,765.2
0.68
0.09
0.94
ASII
Astra International
17,717.6
14,292,253.1
0.63
-0.13
0.90
BBCA
23,445.4
13,782,885.6
0.62
0.07
0.90
WSKT
1,652.4
3,485,971.9
0.58
0.20
0.81
WTON
568.2
1,312,143.0
0.55
0.06
0.83
INDF
3,668.8
3,387,033.6
0.55
0.07
0.89
PTBA
748.6
2,122,414.9
0.54
-0.06
0.91
BBTN
1,036.8
1,493,792.6
0.54
-0.03
0.91
JSMR
2,816.8
2,255,936.8
0.54
0.19
0.85
GGRM
Gudang Garam
7,589.1
3,443,586.1
0.53
-0.09
0.87
ADRO
Adaro Energy
1,152.1
2,014,462.0
0.53
-0.01
0.89
BSDE
2,551.3
1,983,105.6
0.52
-0.17
0.86
ANTM
519.4
2,537,139.6
0.52
-0.09
0.91
ADHI
568.2
4,702,675.2
0.52
-0.11
0.89
WIKA
1,264.8
2,405,683.2
0.52
-0.06
0.86
ISAT
Indosat
2,104.1
184,810.3
0.51
-0.13
0.90
PGAS
4,706.5
7,124,908.3
0.51
-0.01
0.89
AALI
1,897.4
1,938,840.4
0.51
0.03
0.91
BBNI
6,784.5
10,921,494.0
0.51
-0.19
0.94
ASRI
481.3
2,371,416.1
0.51
-0.09
0.81
UNTR
United Tractors
4,494.4
4,089,747.1
0.50
-0.32
0.91
BJBR
537.9
585,617.1
0.50
0.15
0.93
ITMG
474.2
787,893.7
0.49
-0.09
0.91
DMAS
Puradelta Lestari
SMGR
BBKP
INTP
TINS
Timah Persero
PTPP
722.2
162,428.0
0.48
0.11
0.63
4,892.7
4,287,106.4
0.48
-0.19
0.86
448.4
180,712.4
0.48
0.00
0.86
5,807.9
3,034,550.4
0.47
-0.25
0.90
257.0
292,367.0
0.47
-0.09
0.90
1,351.8
1,840,140.8
0.46
-0.12
0.83
ICBP
5,828.4
1,810,401.1
0.46
0.06
0.82
NRCA
118.7
162,587.2
0.45
0.03
0.79
SGRO
Sampoerna Agro PT
232.1
165,946.2
0.45
-0.06
0.88
KLBF
Kalbe Farma
4,643.3
4,737,565.8
0.45
-0.19
0.84
BEST
208.5
580,565.8
0.44
-0.14
0.76
APLN
482.9
307,937.7
0.44
0.00
0.84
LSIP
621.8
1,852,767.5
0.44
-0.06
0.90
MNCN
1,810.1
1,002,632.9
0.42
-0.21
0.86
CTRS
Ciputra Surya
319.9
68,529.4
0.42
-0.31
0.88
CTRA
Ciputra Development
1,584.9
1,040,601.5
0.42
-0.12
0.87
BDMN
2,244.1
592,921.2
0.42
-0.40
0.88
PNBN
1,344.9
92,859.9
0.42
-0.33
0.90
SMCB
Holcim Indonesia
549.3
81,402.7
0.41
-0.27
0.92
ERAA
Erajaya Swasembada
0.71
HMSP
HM Sampoerna
RALS
WIIM
HRUM
Harum Energy
KIJA
INCO
Vale Indonesia
BJTM
121.2
339,054.7
0.41
-0.10
31,658.4
3,922,042.0
0.41
-0.19
0.87
327.2
141,584.0
0.41
-0.21
0.79
62.8
13,515.1
0.39
-0.01
0.82
135.4
47,471.2
0.38
-0.09
0.86
0.91
360.2
623,834.5
0.38
-0.31
1,102.4
1,557,276.4
0.38
-0.33
0.89
471.8
110,546.0
0.38
-0.01
0.72
SIDO
567.3
184,864.8
0.37
0.17
0.57
MYOR
Mayora Indah
1,804.0
58,960.1
0.35
-0.21
0.83
BMTR
Global Mediacom
1,048.5
694,769.6
0.35
-0.23
0.85
Page 43 of 88
Ticker
Company Name
MLPL
Multipolar
Average
Minimum
Maximum
176.9
169,572.2
0.35
-0.38
0.91
MPPA
681.9
1,019,594.1
0.35
-0.26
0.82
MAPI
Mitra Adiperkasa
477.2
411,847.0
0.34
-0.06
0.79
BWPT
315.7
1,076,358.5
0.34
-0.18
0.74
MPMX
152.7
42,259.3
0.34
-0.04
0.67
CPIN
3,414.0
1,260,376.7
0.34
-0.28
0.89
TSPC
565.7
62,631.0
0.33
-0.27
0.86
UNVR
Unilever Indonesia
20,571.5
4,460,087.3
0.32
-0.37
0.85
TELE
364.2
193,638.6
0.31
-0.13
0.61
SSIA
0.83
SMRA
Summarecon Agung
GIAA
LPKR
Lippo Karawaci
BKSL
Sentul City
249.1
845,860.0
0.31
-0.35
1,652.5
2,837,909.5
0.31
-0.37
0.84
587.0
451,956.7
0.31
-0.12
0.67
1,695.8
5,403,325.2
0.31
-0.40
0.85
146.8
289,049.4
0.31
-0.42
0.81
2,264.4
739,328.7
0.30
-0.23
0.84
360.7
1,099,951.0
0.30
-0.52
0.86
81.5
344,121.2
0.30
-0.06
0.82
0.58
EXCL
XL Axiata
DILD
Intiland Development
CSAP
LINK
Link Net
854.9
433,200.7
0.29
-0.03
SSMS
1,238.6
8,161,708.3
0.28
-0.06
0.53
JPFA
468.5
140,335.3
0.28
-0.29
0.86
TBIG
1,978.3
1,439,233.8
0.28
-0.27
0.67
CFIN
78.1
10,095.5
0.28
-0.30
0.83
PWON
Pakuwon Jati
1,689.6
2,097,251.2
0.28
-0.37
0.86
AKRA
AKR Corporindo
2,041.2
3,962,140.4
0.28
-0.36
0.86
MDLN
Modernland Realty
433.4
349,388.9
0.27
-0.40
0.84
ACST
Acset Indonusa
106.3
71,184.2
0.27
-0.15
0.64
HEXA
Hexindo Adiperkasa
74.4
5,410.4
0.26
-0.33
0.85
MIKA
2,321.9
4,268,226.5
0.26
-0.03
0.43
TAXI
17.3
573,942.0
0.26
-0.14
0.66
352.2
421,241.6
0.26
-0.29
0.82
30.4
46,475.6
0.26
-0.35
0.83
LPCK
Lippo Cikarang
DOID
MAIN
Malindo Feedmill
221.0
69,584.1
0.26
-0.19
0.86
AISA
275.9
326,993.6
0.25
-0.28
0.81
BTPN
SRIL
ACES
SCMA
SOCI
1,018.2
5,126.0
0.25
-0.23
0.79
530.4
4,708,686.9
0.24
-0.08
0.54
932.8
475,155.8
0.24
-0.26
0.67
3,470.8
1,482,820.6
0.21
-0.46
0.77
Soechi Lines
250.7
347,393.3
0.19
-0.10
0.41
ULTJ
792.8
7,380.6
0.18
-0.47
0.84
JRPT
733.0
21,304.6
0.18
-0.48
0.75
ARNA
Arwana Citramulia
263.4
180,674.3
0.18
-0.37
0.67
VIVA
284.7
207,642.4
0.15
-0.24
0.61
MYRX
Hanson International
714.5
5,874,106.7
0.12
-0.24
0.72
SILO
782.9
3,361,012.9
0.12
-0.36
0.52
CASS
180.4
1,695.1
0.11
-0.32
0.57
IMAS
428.3
4,260.2
0.09
-0.41
0.77
LPPF
3,594.6
4,430,507.3
0.06
-0.41
0.75
TOWR
3,564.9
52,070.5
0.05
-0.26
0.50
Page 44 of 88
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Banking
BBCA
Neutral
BBNI
PER (x)
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
Mkt Cap
(Rpbn)
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
773,633
12.7
10.8
2.1
1.8
1.9%
1.9%
EPS Growth
2015
2016
ROE
2015
NPL
2016
2015
2016
2.2%
2.1%
12,750
12,400
314,351
17.7
15.7
3.5
3.0
1.2%
1.5%
7.9%
12.6%
21.3%
20.6%
0.6%
0.6%
Buy
4,935
5,900
92,031
10.3
7.7
1.5
1.3
2.9%
1.9% -16.8%
33.5%
14.9%
17.5%
2.9%
2.8%
BBRI
Buy
11,375
11,500
280,612
11.7
10.5
2.5
2.1
2.1%
2.1%
-0.9%
11.6%
22.7%
21.5%
2.5%
2.4%
BBTN
Buy
1,310
1,500
13,844
7.3
5.6
1.0
0.9
1.6%
2.7%
69.5%
29.6%
14.5%
16.4%
3.2%
2.9%
BDMN
Neutral
2,900
3,150
27,795
10.7
7.9
0.8
0.7
2.8%
2.8%
-0.6%
36.2%
7.7%
9.9%
3.1%
2.9%
BJBR
Buy
770
1,100
7,466
5.9
4.9
1.0
0.9
9.7%
10.1%
12.7%
20.9%
17.2%
19.1%
3.3%
2.8%
BJTM
Neutral
446
400
6,587
6.5
5.7
1.0
0.9
9.0%
9.2%
8.1%
13.6%
16.3%
17.2%
3.6%
3.3%
BTPN
Neutral
2,350
3,000
13,725
7.8
7.1
1.0
0.9
0.0%
0.0%
-5.3%
10.8%
13.8%
13.3%
0.8%
0.8%
PNBN
Neutral
715
1,000
17,223
9.8
8.7
0.8
0.7
0.0%
0.0% -25.5%
13.0%
8.0%
8.3%
2.1%
2.1%
3Q15 results summary Banks were still in the process of building up the provisioning
resulting to the average net earnings growth of -1% in 9M15. Average loan growth of
the banks we follow was 10.7% y-y with average LDR declined to 86.9% in September
2015 from 87.2% in September 2014. Average problem loans increased to 2.51% from
2.11% over the same period while restructured loans also rose to 3.21% from 1.97%
over the past one year.
Liquidity easing and rate cut the 89% industry LDR has led to the central banks
move to ease the monetary policy through the reduction of rupiah primary reserve
requirement to 7.5% from 8.0% starting 1 December 2015. We believe given the
expected manageable inflation there is room for the central bank to cut the BI rate by
50bps to 7.0% in 2016, which will eventually lead to declining lending rates.
Banks expected to see higher loan growth in 2016 2015 is expected to see 11-12%
loan growth, the second lowest after since the Asian Crisis in 1998. The industry
recorded 10.6% loan growth back in 2009 following the Global Financial Crisis
compared to the 20% CAGR during 1999-2014. Up to September, total loan growth is
11.1% y-y, which is adjustable to 7.9% y-y if it is adjusted to rupiah depreciation as 17%
of the loans are in foreign currencies. The banks monthly data to October shows
average loan growth of 10.7% y-y, similar level to the one recorded in September. Of
the usage, investment loans are likely to see the highest growth rate with consumption
loans the lowest given the weak purchasing power and the efforts from the tax office to
collect more tax. Despite -2% y-y growth on realized FDI the domestic investment still
shows 17% y-y growth rate which may trigger the 13% y-y growth in investment loans.
Going into 2016 banks are still cautious on the economic growth, however, we expect
slightly higher loan growth of 12-14% with improvement to be seen in the
consumption loans. The tax amnesty 2015-16 is anticipated to help support the
consumption goods sales such as housing and automotives.
However, problem loans are still rising - the industry NPL was at 2.71% in September
2015, up from 2.16% in December 2014 but it improved from 2.76% in August 2015. The
continued low economic growth and uncertain global outlook are expected to impact
the asset quality. We anticipate the industry NPL to increase towards the 3% level by
end 2015 and to peak in mid-2016 before seeing some improvement towards the end
of 2016 through loan restructuring, write offs and real asset quality improvement. The
rising problem loans have resulted in declining coverage ratio to 124% in September
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 45 of 88
2015 from 137% in December 2014. This level is expected to remain stable in 2015 and
2016 with BBCA to see the steepest reduction in coverage ratio on their rising NPL of
more than 1% in 2016. The special mention loans (SML), or category 2 loans, have also
risen to average 5.81% in September from 4.15% in December 2014. The trend in SML
should be similar to the rising NPL. Banks are also active in restructuring the loans, even
prior to them becoming problem loans. As such, we have seen the restructured loans
rising to 3.2% of total loans in September 2015 from 2.1% in December 2014. Banks are
still actively doing loan restructuring, which will translate into higher portion of it.
Without this exercise the NPL level will even be higher than our expectation.
High net interest margin to build up provisioning despite the weak loan growth
and rising NPL, banks have seen improvement in net interest margin due to lower cost
of funds. The low demand on loans led to improvement in the banks liquidity and
hence they were able to lower the deposit rates, which help those with high portion of
time deposits and the large banks which used to attract large depositors given their
extra rates on the large deposits. All banks except BBNI and BJBR saw NIM improvement
between in 2015 so far. We expect NIM among our bank universe to average 6.5% in
2015, with an expected minor improvement in 2016. However, a lot of the strong NIM in
these years will be utilized to build up the provisioning.
Asset revaluation the government has issued the ruling on asset revaluation, in
which there is a 3% final income tax on the revalued assets if a company conducts the
revaluation by end December 2015, 4% by end June 2016 and 6% by end December
2016. Some banks, in particular the state banks, plans to use the opportunity to do asset
revaluation, which will increase their equity by around 10% and their CAR by 1.5-3%.
This will enable banks to have higher legal lending limit, which is needed to support the
large projects.
Maintain Neutral We maintain our Neutral stance on the sector, which is trading at
2.1x and 1.9x P/BV for 2015 and 2016. We keep BBRI as our top pick in the sector with
TP of Rp11,500 on the rising activities in the micro loans and declining cost of funds. We
also suggest BBTN with TP of Rp1,500 for its strong presence in housing activities with
the government support and improving asset quality. For smaller banks, we
recommend BJBR with TP of Rp1,100 for continued operating improvement following
the appointment of the new management team at end of 2014.
FIGURE 73. INDUSTRY LOAN, DEPOSIT GROWTH AND LDR
(%)
100
LDR (RHS)
Working Capital
Consumption
Investment Growth (RHS)
Jan-15
(30.0)
Jan-14
(20.0)
40
Jan-13
(10.0)
500
Jan-12
50
Jan-11
1,000
Jan-10
1,500
Jan-09
10.0
60
Jan-08
20.0
2,000
Jan-07
30.0
2,500
Jan-06
3,000
Jan-05
40.0
80
Jan-04
50.0
3,500
Jan-03
4,000
70
(% y-y)
60.0
90
Dec-02
Aug-03
Apr-04
Dec-04
Aug-05
Apr-06
Dec-06
Aug-07
Apr-08
Dec-08
Aug-09
Apr-10
Dec-10
Aug-11
Apr-12
Dec-12
Aug-13
Apr-14
Dec-14
Aug-15
(Rp tr)
4,500
Jan-02
(% y-y)
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Investments
Working Capital Growth (RHS)
Consumption Growth (RHS)
Page 46 of 88
NPL (LHS)
BI rate (RHS)
Dec-14
NPL (RHS)
Special mention (RHS)
Dec-14
Dec-13
2.0
Dec-12
Dec-11
20
Dec-10
4.0
Dec-09
Dec-08
40
Dec-07
6.0
Dec-03
Dec-13
60
Dec-12
8.0
Dec-11
Dec-10
80
Dec-09
10.0
Dec-08
10
Dec-07
100
Dec-06
12.0
Dec-06
(%)
12
Dec-05
(%)
Dec-04
(Rp tr)
120
Commercial Banks
Regional Developments
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Property
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
PER (x)
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
134,701
12,096
14,459
-11.2%
19.5%
11.1
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
2015
2016
2015
9.3
8.5
7.5
Div.Yield
2016
2015
2016
1.9
1.6
0.5%
1.5%
APLN
Buy
319
420
6,540
1,031
1,236
32.5%
19.8%
6.3
5.3
7.2
7.3
0.9
0.8
2.4%
3.2%
ASRI
Buy
327
730
5,841
1,240
1,811
13.0%
46.0%
4.7
3.2
4.9
4.3
0.8
0.7
6.1%
9.0%
BSDE
Buy
1,765
2,400
32,426
2,499
3,073
-34.6%
23.0%
13.0
10.6
9.9
8.2
1.7
1.5
2.9%
1.9%
CTRA
Neutral
1,355
1,350
20,550
1,436
1,557
24.4%
8.4%
14.3
13.2
10.7
9.6
2.4
2.1
1.1%
1.4%
CTRS
Buy
2,155
3,600
4,264
643
490
9.9%
-23.8%
6.6
8.7
4.2
5.0
1.4
1.2
3.1%
3.5%
JRPT
Buy
700
1,350
9,625
877
1,117
21.5%
27.3%
11.0
8.6
9.4
7.1
2.5
2.0
1.1%
1.1%
LPCK
Buy
6,725
13,500
4,681
864
778
2.4%
-10.0%
5.4
6.0
4.3
5.0
1.3
1.1
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
MDLN
Buy
467
680
5,853
610
996
-14.3%
63.3%
9.6
5.9
6.6
5.3
1.0
0.8
0.0%
PWON
Buy
464
620
22,346
1,714
2,266
-31.9%
32.2%
13.0
9.9
8.9
7.1
3.1
2.4
2.6%
1.8%
SMRA
Neutral
1,565
1,600
22,575
1,183
1,137
-15.4%
-3.9%
19.1
19.9
12.8
12.0
3.4
2.9
-8.2%
-1.2%
Next year guidance are muted. Nearing the end of the year, the property companies
seem to be less optimistic about the coming year. Most companies are considering to
hold off new project launching, in particular apartments in Jakarta areas. The property
companies are also divided about the impact of tax amnesty. For next year, we think
that companies would at most guided flat marketing sales growth.
The year of positive sentiments. We think FY16F would be driven by 3 positive
catalysts: 1) decline of interest rate, 2) tax amnesty, 3) further loosening on LTV by the
Central Bank. However, marketing sales could remain weak in FY16F, as the full impacts
for tax amnesty possibly only occur in towards the end of the year. We expect property
developers which cater to middle-upper income to benefit the most from the tax
amnesty.
Top pick: PWON and BSDE. We think PWON is the one that benefit the most from tax
amnesty, as the company mainly caters to middle-up income. Additionally, the stock
has been a laggard in FY15, due to uncertainty over property taxes. With more certainty
on luxury taxes, we believe that PWON has a room for upside. Stock is currently trading
at 9.9x FY16F P/E and 55% discount to NAV. We also like BSDE, as the company
continues to serve demand for housing below Rp2bn per unit.
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 47 of 88
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Industrial Estate
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
15,752
1,700
1,919
-4.0%
12.8%
9.3
8.2
6.7
6.6
1.1
1.0
2.6%
3.0%
3.7%
DMAS
Buy
205
270
9,881
1,016
1,222
5.4%
20.2%
9.7
8.1
7.4
5.9
1.2
1.1
3.1%
BEST
Neutral
277
410
2,672
211
222
-46.1%
5.4%
12.7
12.0
8.4
11.7
0.9
0.8
0.7%
0.4%
SSIA
Buy
680
1,100
3,200
473
474
13.9%
0.3%
6.8
6.7
5.2
5.6
1.1
0.9
2.6%
3.0%
Land supply continues to be the issue for industrial estate players. Developers
prefer to remain conservative in terms of marketing sales target for 2016 as there are
still uncertainties regarding the countrys economy. However, they do note some
industrial land inquiry pick up after the announcement of the stimulus packages which
seems to be pro industrial estate. We view that industrial estate players will look more
at its land supply to determine their target. Thus, SSIA, BEST, and KIJA would likely aim
for more conservative target of 20-30ha. LPCK is a special case as it has the Delta Silicon
8 JV project, however, we view that the company will likely rely more on its residential
sales for 2016. MDLN and DMAS are the two estates with ample of land. MDLN has
already secured about 100ha sale to CPIN, so it may aim for a target of 140-150ha.
Meanwhile, DMAS claimed that it is more comfortable with marketing sales of about 5060ha for 2016. Due to the smaller land sales, we expect ASP growth to be the driver of
the marketing sales growth.
Looking at flat earnings for next year. In terms of earnings, we expect soft, nearly
flattish growth for next year due to the weak marketing sales in 2015. SSIA aims for flat
earnings growth for 2016 due to weak marketing sales and slower order book growth
under NRCA. We expect BEST to show benign growth on the top line while its bottom
line will still be subject to forex. DMAS is aiming for flat growth due to high base effect.
Top pick is DMAS. Improvement on the economy will be the key catalyst for industrial
estate for next year. Land acquisition will also be key as some of the developers are now
running out of land. Our top pick for the sector is DMAS with a Buy call and PT of Rp270.
DMAS has the most landbank, steady demand, and healthy balance sheet. SSIA is also
attractive in our view due to its cheap valuation of 78% discount to NAV and 6.0x FY16F
PE. However, we view the company to be lacking catalysts for now unless it manages to
secure larger landbank in Subang and new toll road contracts.
Page 48 of 88
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Construction
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
75,588
2,639
3,333
26.8%
14.2%
24.6
22.7
12.3
10.2
3.1
2.7
0.7%
0.5%
ADHI
Buy
2,325
2,880
8,279
400
498
6.0%
-26.7%
12.2
16.6
7.8
6.4
1.8
1.6
1.2%
1.4%
PTPP
Buy
3,900
4,560
18,886
714
845
34.3%
18.4%
26.4
22.3
10.5
8.2
6.1
3.7
0.6%
0.0%
WIKA
Neutral
2,835
3,000
17,309
596
746
-3.1%
25.2%
29.0
23.2
15.3
11.2
3.9
3.4
0.7%
1.0%
WSKT
Buy
1,685
1,900
22,878
751
977
27.7%
8.3%
25.3
23.4
12.8
13.1
2.1
2.3
0.5%
0.0%
WTON
Neutral
945
970
8,236
177
266
-49.4%
49.9%
46.5
31.0
21.8
16.7
3.7
3.4
1.2%
0.6%
Page 49 of 88
Dec
93.0
90
Budget
80
73.1
94.4
Realization
70
56.1
60
66.8
44.3
50
40
30.2
24.3
30
16.9
20
10
Nov
Oct
Sep
Aug
Jul
Jun
May
Apr
Mar
Feb
%
100
Jan
FIGURE 80. MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND PUBLIC HOUSING BUDGET SPENDING
0.9
4.0
1.2
0
0.2
2.2
1.0
6.6
51.3
41.3
30.3
10.9
22.4
15.5
9.5
4.6
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Building Materials
SMCB
Sell
INTP
SMGR
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
2015
2016
2015
143,643
9,823
10,626
-14.6%
N/M
2016
8.2%
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
2015
2016
2015
Div.Yield
2016
2015
2016
14.6
13.5
9.3
8.4
2.4
2.2
5.5%
3.8%
N/M -258.1
18.2
10.8
7.1
0.9
0.8
2.7%
-0.1%
975
900
7,471
-29
410
Neutral
19,750
21,600
72,704
4,972
5,130
-5.7%
3.2%
14.6
14.2
9.9
9.1
2.9
2.8
6.8%
5.5%
Neutral
10,700
12,100
63,467
4,880
5,086
-12.3%
4.2%
13.0
12.5
8.5
8.1
2.4
2.1
4.4%
2.3%
Page 50 of 88
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Media
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
68,674
3,037
3,753
-5.5%
23.6%
22.6
18.3
14.3
12.6
5.1
4.4
2.8%
2.4%
SCMA
Neutral
3,040
3,000
44,450
1,534
1,769
5.5%
15.3%
29.0
25.1
20.3
17.8
11.3
9.5
2.3%
2.4%
MNCN
Buy
1,645
2,200
24,224
1,503
1,984
-14.7%
32.0%
16.1
12.2
9.8
8.6
2.5
2.2
3.8%
2.5%
Better TV ADEX growth in 2016? We expect 2015 to close with a national TV ADEX
growth of 8% yoy. For 2016, we expect TV ADEX to continue showing moderate growth
of roughly 9% yoy. Following our economists flat private consumption growth of 5.1%
yoy, we believe that TV ADEX follows closely on the growth of the national private
consumption. Based on our conversation with media companies, the local advertisers
are currently the ones supporting national ADEX as the multinational companies have
cut down their spending in 1H15. According to our channel check with local FMCG
companies, the industry is still spending money in advertisement and promotion but
more towards store discounts and online advertisements. Moreover, TV ads are
relatively more expensive compared to online ads. Thus, we still expect flat TV ADEX
growth going forward. Potential upside on ADEX will be fuel price cut if it happens next
year.
Possible room to grow rate card for selected networks. YTD rate card growth seems
to be flat with the exception of Indosiar and ANTV who showed 9.2% and 28.0% yoy
revenue growth respectively as of 9M15. We believe the growth is due to the strong
improvement in audience share and the low base effect. As ANTV catch up with its Tier
1 peers in terms of rate card, we believe that there is a possibility of rate card hike for
RCTI, ANTV, Indosiar, and MNC TV in 2016 given their solid audience share
performances. However, the slow ad demand may limit possible rate card hike if the
market remains weak next year. We expect rate card to grow in-line with the national TV
ADEX going forward.
RCTI and Indosiar performed well in audience shares. All-time audience share
competition remains tight. RCTI and SCTV continue tailing on each other. However,
RCTI seems to lead YTD with an audience share of 16.3% vs SCTV with 15.9%. ANTV
seems to start losing its steams due to RCTIs wide range of primetime dramas and
Indosiars variety shows. We think RCTI and Indosiar performed very well this year and
may see revenue growth in 2016 on the back of growing rate card.
Margin improvement ahead? As of 9M15, SCMA and MNCN recorded EBITDA margins
of 49% and 40% respectively. We believe that there is room for margin improvement for
each company. SCMA is planning to end its contract for the Barclays Premiere League
which we believe will decrease its program cost going forward. Meanwhile, MNCNs
new studios will also cut down some program cost.
Maintain Neutral on the sector. We like SCMA as it has stable earnings with Indosiar
strong performance in audience share and earnings growth. The company also has
clean balance sheet and ample of cash. We expect less negative surprises from SCMA.
We have a Neutral call on SCMA with PT of Rp3,000. We remain Neutral on SCMA as the
sector is lacking strong catalyst. Despite its large exposure to forex risk, MNCNs share
price is now trading at a very cheap valuation of 12.6x FY16F PE. Thus, we put a Buy call
on the counter at Rp2,200 PT.
Page 51 of 88
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Retail
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
2015
2016
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
85,895
3,569
4,182
1.8%
17.2%
24.1
20.5
13.3
11.5
4.6
4.1
1.8%
2.0%
1.5%
ACES
Neutral
735
720
12,605
531
617
-3.3%
16.3%
23.8
20.4
14.8
12.8
4.6
4.0
1.1%
ERAA
Neutral
550
600
1,595
197
175
-7.0%
-11.1%
8.1
9.1
8.2
7.4
0.5
0.5
3.7%
3.3%
LPPF
Neutral
16,150
17,600
47,110
1,808
2,036
27.4%
12.6%
26.1
23.1
17.8
15.8
43.6
22.4
1.9%
2.2%
MAPI
Sell
3,860
2,700
6,408
34
179
-53.9%
431.2%
189.8
35.7
8.7
6.8
2.5
2.3
0.2%
0.1%
MPPA
Neutral
1,675
2,175
9,008
321
366
-42.0%
14.0%
28.0
24.6
12.0
10.6
3.0
2.8
1.8%
1.1%
RALS
Neutral
595
680
4,222
320
323
-9.9%
0.9%
13.2
13.1
7.6
6.9
1.2
1.2
4.1%
4.2%
TELE
Buy
705
1,040
4,948
359
486
5.0%
35.3%
13.8
10.2
9.1
8.1
1.8
1.6
2.5%
3.4%
Short term pressure. We think retailers will have a challenging time until 1Q16 in
relation to tough macroeconomic condition. Further, exchange rate fluctuation will still
be a tough obstacle for MAPI, while ACES may be able to still survive with its existing
and cheaper inventory. Generally, in light of Christmas and Year End sales, retailers will
have their margins cut out again to accommodate for promotions and discounts for this
period.
Pickup in Consumer Confidence Index (CCI). CCI have picked up in the last 2 months
from a very low base in Sep15 of 97.5 back to a better psychological level (>100) of
103.7 in Nov15. This shows that Indonesian consumer is more optimists on the
economy outlook of the country; hence we can expect better spending going forward.
Looking for positive signs - 2Q16 is the mark. The first catalyst for FY16 should start
in 2Q16 with Lebaran effect boosting the sales. Next year, Lebaran will take place in
early July which means the shopping period should already take place in June. Thus,
mass retailers such as RALS and LPPF will have bigger portions of their FY16 revenue
and profit in 1H16. For other retailers, we believe despite not experiencing as big of an
impact as mass retailers, they will also have significant portions of sales during the
quarter.
Will tax amnesty come to the rescue? If tax amnesty works out as planned, then we
will see improvement in government spending in 2H16. Eventually, increase in
purchasing power and customer spending should not be just a headline anymore. At
the moment, we keep our view conservative on tax amnesty application to overall
economy.
TELE as our top pick. Our primary concern remains in the short term pressure
considering rising cost relating to weak currency and lower purchasing power
concerning to bleak macro outlook. Among retailers we believe TELE will have the best
performance considering its resilient business model and superior growth as a result of
Telkom's business initiatives.
Page 52 of 88
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Consumer
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
2015
2016
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
960,679
29,560
32,415
3.5%
9.7%
32.5
29.6
20.3
19.2
7.5
7.0
2.2%
2.2%
1.9%
ICBP
Neutral
13,950
14,000
81,342
3,086
3,298
18.5%
6.9%
26.4
24.7
17.4
16.1
5.1
4.6
1.6%
INDF
Neutral
5,525
6,000
48,515
3,272
4,160
-15.8%
27.1%
14.8
11.7
8.4
7.8
1.8
1.6
4.0%
3.4%
MYOR
Sell
28,000
24,500
21,464
1,104
784
173.5%
-29.0%
19.4
27.4
12.1
13.2
4.3
3.8
0.4%
1.1%
ULTJ
Buy
3,710
5,100
10,722
402
511
43.8%
27.0%
26.7
21.0
14.3
11.4
4.1
3.5
0.4%
0.5%
UNVR
Neutral
35,325
41,000
269,530
5,808
6,051
1.2%
4.2%
46.4
44.5
33.2
32.4
57.7
54.9
2.1%
2.2%
GGRM
Buy
54,500
56,000
104,863
5,256
5,665
-2.1%
7.8%
20.0
18.5
11.8
11.1
2.9
2.6
1.8%
1.8%
HMSP
Buy
91,000 111,000
423,396
10,484
11,751
3.0%
12.1%
40.4
36.0
29.5
28.1
12.2
11.7
2.4%
2.4%
WIIM
Buy
848
148
195
44.0%
31.5%
5.7
4.3
3.8
2.6
0.9
0.8
5.2%
6.9%
404
840
Decelerating top-line growth. We are seeing slower top-line growth across the board
in consumer space for 3Q15 on the back of seasonality factor coupled with soft
demand. On average consumer companies under our coverage posted 3.8% sales
growth in 3Q15, which were mainly driven by ASP adjustment as volume growth was
still considered weak.
Down-trading in tough times. Interestingly, we are also seeing down-trading trend in
some categories given tough macro environment. People are switching from powder
milk to sweetened condensed milk (SCM), cup noodle to pack noodle, and branded to
unbranded generic products. It seems that people are also delaying their consumption
until promotional period (for discretionary items), reducing consumption, and
switching to cheaper alternative.
Lower soft commodity prices provide margin cushion. Gross margin seems relatively
stable partly helped by the declining soft commodity prices trend. Soft commodity like
wheat, CPO and coffee prices dropped by 16%, 23% and 29% YTD respectively in 9M15.
Rupiah depreciation will likely to negatively impact companys profitability in 1Q16
given the fact that they are reluctant to further adjust prices in 4Q15.
2016 Outlook. We are in view that 2016 will be a challenging year for consumer
companies to sustain their profitability given the impact of weakening Rupiah. We
expect an average of 90bps contraction in Ebit margin as companies are focusing to
sustain their market share. In 2016, we expect consumer companies to be more
aggressive in advertising/promotional spending in attempt to sustain/grab market
share.
GGRM as our top pick. Lackluster earnings growth coupled with not-so-cheap
valuation warrant our Neutral call on Consumer sector. GGRM is our only key pick given
its minor exposure in US$, reasonable excise tax increase and undemanding valuation.
Page 53 of 88
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Hospital
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
43,082
679
899
17.2%
32.4%
63.5
47.9
31.8
25.0
8.6
7.7
0.7%
0.7%
MIKA
Buy
2,210
3,400
32,157
584
758
13.0%
29.7%
55.0
42.4
40.6
34.1
9.9
8.7
0.9%
0.9%
SILO
Buy
9,450
11,000
10,925
95
141
51.6%
49.1%
115.2
77.3
20.2
14.8
6.3
5.8
0.1%
0.1%
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Pharmacheutical
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
2016
PER (x)
2015
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
80,500
3,028
3,281
-1.0%
8.3%
26.6
24.5
17.7
16.0
4.6
4.1
1.6%
1.6%
KLBF
Neutral
1,385
1,500
64,922
2,004
2,156
-3.0%
7.6%
32.4
30.1
20.9
19.1
6.1
5.4
1.3%
1.2%
SIDO
Neutral
515
550
7,725
440
490
5.9%
11.4%
17.6
15.8
11.6
9.9
2.9
2.6
2.7%
2.8%
TSPC
Neutral
1,745
2,100
7,853
585
635
1.0%
8.6%
13.4
12.4
9.1
8.2
1.8
1.6
3.7%
3.0%
Page 54 of 88
Macro play. On top of the BPJS pressure, pharmaceutical companies still need to face
the current macroeconomic condition with lower consumer purchasing power.
Customer downgraded their purchase of branded / licensed products into unbranded
generics for cheaper price; they also cut down spending on vitamins and supplements
in exchange for daily necessity.
Making medicine affordable for all. Government is planning to make the industry
more efficient by removing subsidy and protectionism. Hence, the current limit of
foreign investment of 85% to pharmaceutical can be increased to 100%. The purpose is
simply to make competition better and improve pricing strategy of the player,
benefiting customers with more affordable drugs.
A short term pain. In the short run, it is inevitable that margin would continue to be
suppressed on the back of higher than ever unbranded generics sales proportion
compared to licensed or branded generics drugs. As of example, KLBFs unbranded
generics drugs sales represent 14.6% of total sales in 9M15, recording the highest sales
proportion of unbranded generics in the last 3 years. Gross margin also declined in
3Q15 recording a 50bps decreased to 47.9%. We expect margin pressure to continue
due to change in product mix; this is in line with BPJS implementation which is
estimated to last until 2019.
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Coal
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
2015
2016
2015
2016
33,985
6,178
6,926
-8.3%
12.1%
PER (x)
2015
5.4
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
2016
Div.Yield
2015
2016
2015
2015
4.8
3.3
2.8
0.5
0.5
9.7% 10.8%
2016
ADRO*
Neutral
486
700
15,545
205
226
14.2%
10.3%
5.6
5.0
3.8
3.3
0.4
0.4
7.1%
HRUM*
Neutral
695
915
1,877
-4
-2
N/M
59.2%
-35.0
-84.6
2.4
2.0
0.5
0.5
0.0%
7.9%
0.0%
ITMG*
Neutral
5,675
8,300
6,412
113
125
-43.4%
10.4%
4.2
3.7
1.3
1.0
0.6
0.5
19.1%
21.4%
PTBA
Buy
4,405
10,000
10,151
1,938
2,141
-3.9%
10.5%
4.9
4.5
3.6
3.1
1.1
1.0
9.5%
10.5%
Production risk to emerge next year. With coal price remain weak at below
US$55/ton, we see risk on production outlook in FY16F particularly for coal mine that
produces low quality coal or coal mine with high cost structure. ADRO and ITMG have
cut production outlook this year by up to 4% citing weak demand and we believe that
further production cut is expected if coal price remain low. We do not expect a sharp
recovery due to still weak demand outlook and industry overcapacity problem.
Multiple negative catalysts ahead. We reiterate our view that the coal sector remains
vulnerable to multiple negative catalysts from weak coal price. In addition to risk of
production and earnings downgrade by consensus, low coal price also leads further
reserves downgrade and asset impairment. UNTR has indicated the plan to announce
further asset impairment in 4Q15 due to weak coal price outlook. On top of UNTR, we
also see risk on asset impairment from ADRO due to their aggressive coal mine
acquisition in the past three years. Risk on coal reserves downgrade is higher on coal
producers with low reserves base such as HRUM and ITMG.
Lack of positive catalyst. While valuation has come down to close to the 2009 financial
crisis, we believe that the sector will trade at cheap valuation due to the lack of positive
catalyst. For the proxy to the sector, we prefer PTBA due to better production growth
outlook and greater exposure to growing domestic demand. We reiterate our Neutral
call for coal sector.
Page 55 of 88
US$/ton
US$/ton
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
60
50
40
30
20
10
1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15
1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15
ITMG
ADRO
ITMG
PTBA
Source: Company
ADRO
PTBA
Source: Company
US$/ton
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
Dec-15
Jul-15
Feb-15
Oct-14
May-14
Dec-13
Jul-13
Mar-13
Oct-12
May-12
Dec-11
Aug-11
Mar-11
Oct-10
Jan-10
May-10
Source: Bloomberg
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Telco
Mkt Cap
(Rp Bn)
EPS Growth
PER (x)
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
356,766
15,872
20,808
34.1%
31.9%
22.6
EV/EBITDA (x)
2016
P/BV (x)
2015
2016
2015
17.1
6.0
5.4
Div.Yield
2016
2015
2016
3.6
3.3
3.0%
3.6%
EXCL
Buy
3,385
4,000
28,882
-516
1,153
42.1%
N/M
-56.0
25.0
6.9
5.7
2.2
2.0
0.0%
0.8%
ISAT
U/R
5,325
U/R
28,936
441
1,147
N/M
237.1%
85.4
25.3
3.7
3.9
2.1
2.0
0.9%
1.5%
TLKM
Buy
3,060
3,225
298,949
15,947
18,508
8.9%
16.1%
18.7
16.2
6.4
5.6
4.1
3.7
3.5%
4.0%
Monetizing data growth. After a long downtrend, data price finally picked up in 3Q15,
which should indicate that the era of cheap price is coming to an end. While we do not
expect an aggressive pick up in data price in the near term, we expect it to stabilize over
in the fourth quarter before a more meaningful pick up next year. Data traffic grew by
more than a double in 9M15 (ex EXCL) and we expect 30%p.a growth for the next three
years driven by higher smartphone penetration.
Please see important disclosure at the back of this report
Page 56 of 88
Healthy growth on voice and SMS. Despite strong data adoption, the growth in
traditional services such as voice and SMS remain healthy due to successful clusterbased pricing, which allowed them to set different prices based on various factors
including local demand characteristic, network coverage, as well as level of
competition. TLKM still registered double digit growth on its voice and SMS while
EXCLs revenue in voice and SMS declined due to the change in strategy to focus on
higher quality customer which has led to the sharp drop in the subscriber base (30%yoy). Nevertheless, we expect a 3%CAGR decline in SMS over the next three years
due to higher smartphone adoption.
Prefer TLKM as the proxy to the sector. We like TLKM for its strong leadership in the
cellular business, strong cash flow, and healthy balance for network expansions and
dividend. Having the best 3G network, TLKM is the best positioned to ride growing
demand for data. It also has a healthy balance sheet to provide flexibility on capex to
develop network infrastructure and attractive dividend yield of 4% (70% payout ratio)
vs peers of 1-2%.
FIGURE 92. TLKM DATA TRAFFIC AND DATA YIELD
Pbyte
Rp/MB
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
2012
2013
2014
TLKM
2015F
2016F
2017F
2012
EXCL
Source: Company
2013
2014
TLKM
2015F
2016F
2017F
EXCL
Source: Company
Page 57 of 88
EPS gr
EPS
2015F
9M15A
2014F
2014A
Diff
2013F
2013A
Diff
2012F
2012A
Diff
AALI IJ
9.1%
-92.3%
1,523.2
1,589.9
4.4%
1,615.6
1,143.9
-29.2%
1,663.0
1,530.6
-8.0%
ACES IJ
18.3%
4.8%
30.9
32.4
5.1%
27.8
29.7
7.0%
18.0
25.0
38.6%
ADHI IJ
9.3%
36.0%
195.1
152.6
-21.8%
145.7
191.2
31.2%
101.4
99.7
-1.7%
ADRO IJ
25.0%
-18.2%
0.009
0.006
-37.8%
0.013
0.007
-43.8%
0.022
0.012
-45.0%
AISA IJ
39.2%
-6.1%
109.0
110.6
1.5%
76.0
106.1
39.6%
n/a
72.2
n/a
ANTM IJ
N/M
N/M
70.7
-68.0
-196.2%
98.9
36.1
-63.5%
150.6
263.8
75.1%
APLN IJ
16.5%
-24.4%
53.7
41.7
-22.3%
40.5
41.5
2.6%
32.4
39.6
22.2%
ASII IJ
11.9%
-17.3%
520.5
474.0
-8.9%
532.9
479.6
-10.0%
484.5
479.7
-1.0%
ASRI IJ
24.7%
-92.2%
83.4
55.9
-33.0%
69.5
44.6
-35.8%
44.7
61.2
36.9%
BBCA IJ
15.1%
9.5%
643.8
669.0
3.9%
554.2
578.6
4.4%
465.3
480.0
3.2%
BBNI IJ
4.9%
-21.1%
490.2
578.0
17.9%
408.5
485.5
18.9%
349.2
377.8
8.2%
BBRI IJ
10.8%
1.4%
891.1
982.7
10.3%
765.9
865.2
13.0%
630.1
778.9
23.6%
BBTN IJ
33.5%
61.1%
162.0
106.0
-34.6%
162.8
148.3
-8.9%
134.9
148.0
9.7%
-1.3%
BDMN IJ
39.7%
-10.0%
445.9
271.7
-39.1%
481.5
421.7
-12.4%
424.2
418.6
BEST IJ
46.9%
-76.9%
78.4
40.6
-48.3%
92.8
77.8
-16.2%
n/a
56.4
n/a
BJBR IJ
4.6%
20.7%
156.3
115.1
-26.4%
147.5
141.6
-4.0%
129.0
123.0
-4.7%
BJTM IJ
22.3%
-6.2%
65.7
63.0
-4.2%
64.0
55.3
-13.7%
n/a
56.0
n/a
BKSL IJ
252.9%
-643.3%
8.5
1.7
-80.0%
12.8
20.1
56.4%
5.0
7.0
40.8%
BSDE IJ
-35.3%
-48.2%
118.9
211.3
77.6%
76.4
153.8
101.2%
57.3
73.5
28.3%
BTPN IJ
32.0%
-3.3%
434.2
317.0
-27.0%
394.0
364.9
-7.4%
282.3
341.0
20.8%
BWPT IJ
151.6%
-108.9%
67.8
26.6
-60.8%
96.5
36.8
-61.8%
80.4
53.9
-32.9%
CPIN IJ
93.0%
-26.9%
224.9
107.0
-52.4%
211.1
154.3
-26.9%
161.4
164.0
1.6%
CTRA IJ
5.5%
6.0%
80.9
86.1
6.4%
46.4
63.7
37.3%
24.7
38.6
56.3%
CTRS IJ
71.4%
20.6%
21.8%
294.7
260.6
-11.6%
207.7
199.2
-4.1%
80.1
137.2
DMAS IJ
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.0
n/a
n/a
0.0
n/a
DYAN IJ
N/M
-416.7%
n/a
-3.0
n/a
n/a
12.5
n/a
n/a
22.0
n/a
ERAA IJ
51.6%
-8.1%
135.8
73.0
-46.3%
220.4
120.2
-45.4%
n/a
149.0
n/a
EXCL IJ
N/M
N/M
227.8
-105.0
-146.1%
416.3
121.0
-70.9%
427.5
324.3
-24.1%
14.4%
1.6%
2,530.6
2,790.0
10.2%
2,946.4
2,249.8
-23.6%
3,044.2
2,086.0
-31.5%
HEXA IJ
0.0%
-50.0%
0.033
0.020
-39.4%
0.077
0.030
-61.0%
0.070
0.080
14.3%
HMSP IJ
n/a
-0.8%
n/a
2,306.2
n/a
n/a
2,450.4
n/a
n/a
2,252.6
n/a
HRUM IJ
3900.0%
-94.8%
0.026
0.000
-99.2%
0.058
0.016
-73.3%
0.096
0.049
-49.3%
ICBP IJ
18.8%
16.4%
463.2
447.0
-3.5%
443.9
381.6
-14.0%
379.9
373.8
-1.6%
IMAS IJ
N/M
N/M
363.5
-46.4
-112.8%
410.4
192.6
-53.1%
473.4
289.9
-38.8%
-82.5%
GGRM IJ
INCO IJ
64.7%
-61.5%
0.011
0.017
54.5%
0.021
0.004
-81.0%
0.040
0.007
INDF IJ
23.5%
-45.1%
462.0
442.5
-4.2%
439.1
285.2
-35.1%
408.0
371.4
-9.0%
INTP IJ
6.9%
-13.7%
1,497.5
1,431.8
-4.4%
1,422.4
1,361.0
-4.3%
1,129.7
1,293.2
14.5%
ISAT IJ
N/M
N/M
150.2
-365.7
-343.5%
273.5
-512.0
-287.2%
299.6
69.0
-77.0%
ITMG IJ
-16.7%
-53.3%
0.226
0.180
-20.4%
0.346
0.204
-41.0%
0.531
0.380
-28.4%
JPFA IJ
153.3%
-145.2%
130.7
31.0
-76.3%
109.2
55.9
-48.7%
522.0
94.4
-81.9%
JRPT IJ
18.5%
28.3%
57.3
54.9
-4.2%
n/a
41.5
n/a
n/a
32.4
n/a
JSMR IJ
29.9%
-18.0%
277.9
206.4
-25.7%
285.5
151.1
-47.1%
242.4
235.9
-2.7%
KLBF IJ
24.1%
0.0%
50.3
44.0
-12.6%
41.4
41.0
-1.1%
37.7
37.0
-2.0%
LPCK IJ
-7.1%
7.4%
1,366.0
1,212.8
-11.2%
592.9
848.6
43.1%
554.0
584.8
5.6%
LPPF IJ
40.0%
30.2%
540.3
486.0
-10.1%
n/a
394.3
n/a
n/a
264.3
n/a
LSIP IJ
18.3%
-32.6%
130.3
134.0
2.8%
222.6
112.8
-49.3%
228.7
164.0
-28.3%
MAIN IJ
N/M
-433.3%
281.3
-48.0
-117.1%
242.6
142.3
-41.3%
140.0
178.6
27.6%
MAPI IJ
375.7%
-77.1%
283.6
45.0
-84.1%
344.5
197.5
-42.7%
246.4
260.7
5.8%
MDLN IJ
18.2%
-43.6%
76.9
56.8
-26.2%
28.3
195.6
592.5%
n/a
20.8
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
37.4
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
MIKA IJ
Page 58 of 88
Ticker
MNCN IJ
EPS gr
EPS
2015F
9M15A
2014F
2014A
Diff
2013F
2013A
Diff
2012F
2012A
Diff
26.4%
-53.8%
161.0
125.8
-21.9%
137.9
120.7
-12.4%
94.3
119.2
26.3%
MPPA IJ
-1.7%
-30.3%
86.0
103.0
19.8%
n/a
82.7
n/a
n/a
41.0
n/a
MYOR IJ
115.5%
248.4%
1,068.0
451.0
-57.8%
924.4
1,164.8
26.0%
715.5
815.8
14.0%
PGAS IJ
13.3%
3.5%
0.036
0.030
-16.7%
0.036
0.040
11.1%
0.031
0.037
18.4%
PNBN IJ
22.2%
-43.6%
106.3
97.8
-8.0%
109.2
93.8
-14.1%
72.8
87.5
20.1%
PTBA IJ
-3.8%
-4.3%
897.2
927.0
3.3%
1,292.4
822.4
-36.4%
1,789.8
1,262.0
-29.5%
-7.6%
PTPP IJ
31.1%
n/a
99.2
110.0
10.8%
75.5
87.0
15.2%
69.3
64.0
-18.3%
-11.2%
30.8
52.2
69.7%
17.4
23.5
35.0%
n/a
15.5
n/a
RALS IJ
17.4%
-9.6%
69.0
50.0
-27.5%
72.6
55.0
-24.2%
66.5
59.7
-10.2%
RANC IJ
50.0%
-160.8%
45.0
10.0
-77.8%
32.9
22.4
-31.8%
n/a
25.5
n/a
SCMA IJ
22.8%
3.8%
116.4
99.4
-14.6%
114.8
87.5
-23.7%
104.2
120.4
15.5%
SGRO IJ
25.2%
-37.4%
147.2
180.0
22.3%
258.7
63.0
-75.7%
313.8
174.0
-44.6%
SIDO IJ
16.0%
3.6%
n/a
27.7
n/a
n/a
27.1
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
SILO IJ
56.7%
29.6%
71.4
54.1
-24.2%
n/a
47.6
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
SMCB IJ
63.9%
-162.8%
143.6
87.0
-39.4%
188.7
124.2
-34.2%
144.6
176.2
21.8%
SMGR IJ
10.7%
-21.8%
1,012.8
938.0
-7.4%
955.9
905.4
-5.3%
767.3
817.0
6.5%
SMRA IJ
-8.2%
-7.5%
83.3
96.9
16.3%
50.7
76.4
50.8%
29.1
57.4
97.1%
SOCI IJ
2.9%
33.3%
n/a
0.0
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
SRIL IJ
-16.7%
72.9%
0.002
0.002
20.0%
n/a
0.002
n/a
n/a
0.002
n/a
SSIA IJ
6.1%
107.8%
164.9
88.9
-46.1%
174.4
147.4
-15.5%
46.0
150.3
226.8%
TAXI IJ
46.2%
-89.8%
78.9
55.0
-30.3%
n/a
61.7
n/a
n/a
53.5
n/a
TBIG IJ
43.6%
-29.6%
303.0
274.9
-9.3%
256.0
260.2
1.6%
164.2
180.8
10.1%
TELE IJ
28.0%
0.0%
69.0
50.0
-27.5%
63.0
54.6
-13.3%
n/a
38.3
n/a
TLKM IJ
13.4%
0.2%
161.3
149.8
-7.1%
145.4
147.4
1.4%
127.9
133.8
4.6%
TOWR IJ
76.6%
-45.1%
108.5
82.0
-24.4%
75.1
16.5
-78.0%
51.0
33.9
-33.4%
TSPC IJ
10.8%
-5.5%
199.8
129.0
-35.4%
163.6
141.0
-13.8%
130.4
139.5
7.0%
ULTJ IJ
84.7%
94.8%
n/a
98.0
n/a
n/a
112.6
n/a
n/a
122.0
n/a
7.9%
16.6%
1,462.2
1,440.0
-1.5%
1,563.4
1,296.0
-17.1%
1,791.0
1,549.0
-13.5%
PWON IJ
UNTR IJ
UNVR IJ
7.2%
3.2%
781.7
752.0
-3.8%
708.1
701.0
-1.0%
593.1
634.0
6.9%
WIIM IJ
12.2%
14.1%
68.5
53.4
-22.0%
n/a
62.9
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
WIKA IJ
35.3%
-2.6%
117.6
100.2
-14.8%
94.9
92.9
-2.1%
64.6
78.0
20.7%
WSKT IJ
3.2%
186.2%
41.4
50.6
22.1%
n/a
37.2
n/a
n/a
37.2
n/a
12.0%
-61.4%
n/a
40.2
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
WTON IJ
Avg Out /
(Under) Perf.
Prob of Out
Performance
22.1%
-27.1%
-10.0%
5.3%
28.4%
37.3%
94.3%
Page 59 of 88
Dec-09
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
BBTN
12
0.50
10
0.25
0.00
-0.25
Dec-13
Dec-14
Dec-15
Dec-14
Jun-15
Dec-15
Dec-12
0.75
14
Jul-14
16
Jan-12
BBTN
Jan-14
1.00
Jan-11
Jul-13
Jan-10
Jan-13
Jan-09
10
Jul-12
12
Jan-08
BBRI
Feb-12
Jan-16
Jun-14
Nov-12
Apr-11
Sep-09
Feb-08
Jul-06
Dec-04
May-03
Oct-01
10
Jan-07
0.50
Aug-11
12
Mar-00
0.75
14
Jan-06
16
Feb-11
BBNI
Dec-15
Sep-14
Jun-13
Feb-12
Nov-10
Aug-09
Apr-08
Jan-07
Sep-05
Jun-04
Mar-03
Nov-01
Sep-98
10
Aug-00
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
15
Feb-97
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
20
Feb-05
-1.00
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
: PE ratio
: Mean PE ratio
Aug-10
-0.75
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
BBCA
Feb-04
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
-0.50
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-10
Jan-16
Jul-15
Jan-15
Jul-14
Dec-13
Jun-13
PE (x)
18
Jul-12
PE (x)
14
Dec-12
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
PE (x)
18
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Jun-12
Dec-11
Jun-11
Dec-10
Jun-10
Jan-09
1.00
BBCA
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
0
-0.75
-1.00
1.00
BBNI
0.25
-0.25
0.00
1.00
BBRI
0.75
0.50
8
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 60 of 88
8
7
5
4
3
2
1
0
BTPN
1.00
16
10
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Aug-04
Aug-02
Oct-00
Nov-98
Jan-97
Apr-10
BJTM
Sep-14
-1.00
Mar-15
-0.25
May-08
0.00
Mar-14
Nov-14
0.75
Jun-06
May-13
BJBR
Oct-13
Dec-15
Dec-15
Dec-15
Dec-15
Jan-14
Jul-15
Sep-15
May-15
Mar-12
Jun-15
Sep-14
Feb-15
Jan-14
12
Jun-13
0.75
Aug-14
0.50
BTPN
Oct-12
14
May-14
-0.75
Mar-12
Nov-12
Feb-14
1.00
Jul-11
-0.50
Jun-12
Oct-13
Dec-10
0.25
Jan-12
10
Jul-13
12
Apr-10
0.50
Aug-11
14
Apr-13
16
Sep-09
BJBR
Feb-95
2
0
Mar-11
6
4
Jan-13
10
8
Jan-09
12
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
16
14
Sep-10
Jan-16
Jul-15
Feb-15
Aug-14
Mar-14
Sep-13
Apr-13
BDMN
Sep-12
Jan-16
Sep-15
Jun-15
Feb-15
Nov-14
Jul-14
Apr-14
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
May-08
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
18
Jul-12
PE (x)
10
9
Oct-12
May-12
Nov-11
Jun-11
Dec-10
Jul-10
PE (x)
18
Dec-13
Sep-13
May-13
Feb-13
Oct-12
Jul-12
PE (x)
20
18
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
1.00
BDMN
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 61 of 88
0
-0.75
CFIN
0
-1.00
1.00
0.50
0.25
-0.50
-0.75
CFIN
0.75
-0.25
0.00
-1.00
Jun-14
Mar-15
Dec-15
Dec-13
Dec-14
Dec-15
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Feb-12
May-11
Aug-10
Aug-13
-0.25
Nov-12
Apr-10
0.00
Nov-12
Nov-11
0.50
May-08
0.75
Nov-10
0.25
BMRI
Jun-06
10
Nov-09
1.00
Aug-04
12
Oct-09
1.00
Nov-08
14
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
Aug-04
Aug-02
Oct-00
Nov-98
Jan-97
1.00
Aug-02
BMRI
Oct-07
Oct-00
Jan-09
0.00
Oct-06
Nov-98
0.25
Apr-08
Oct-05
10
Jan-97
BBKP
Feb-95
Jun-07
Oct-04
10
Feb-95
15
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
20
Sep-06
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
PNBN
Sep-03
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
9
Jul-12
PE (x)
16
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
BBKP
0.75
0.50
-0.25
2
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 62 of 88
60
50
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
30
-0.25
20
-0.50
10
-0.75
-1.00
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Aug-13
Oct-14
Dec-15
Apr-10
70
Jun-12
40
ARNA
May-08
Apr-11
Jun-06
10
Feb-10
15
Aug-04
20
Nov-08
1.00
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
Aug-04
Aug-02
1.00
Aug-02
SMGR
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
Aug-04
Aug-02
Oct-00
Nov-98
Jan-97
1.00
Sep-07
-0.75
Oct-00
Oct-00
-0.50
20
Jul-06
-0.25
40
Nov-98
60
Nov-98
0.00
Apr-05
80
Jan-97
100
Jan-97
120
Feb-04
SMCB
Feb-95
Feb-95
Feb-95
10
Nov-02
15
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
20
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
INTP
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Sep-01
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
80
Jul-12
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
160
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
SMCB
140
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
SMGR
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 63 of 88
30
25
35
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
15
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Jan-15
Jul-15
Jan-16
Aug-14
Apr-15
Dec-15
Aug-14
20
WIKA
Dec-13
Feb-14
10
Apr-13
15
Aug-13
20
Aug-12
25
Feb-13
1.00
Jan-12
PTPP
Jan-16
Jan-15
Jan-14
Feb-13
Feb-12
Mar-11
Mar-10
Apr-09
1.00
Aug-12
Jan-16
May-15
Sep-14
Jan-14
May-13
Sep-12
Jan-12
May-11
Sep-10
Feb-10
1.00
May-11
Apr-08
10
Mar-12
15
Sep-10
20
Apr-07
ADHI
Sep-11
-0.75
Jan-10
Jun-09
-0.50
May-06
10
Apr-11
15
May-09
0.25
Sep-08
30
May-05
0.50
Oct-10
35
Sep-08
25
Jan-08
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
40
Jun-04
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
JSMR
Apr-10
Dec-15
Jul-15
Jan-15
Jul-14
Jan-14
Jul-13
Jan-13
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
40
Jul-12
PE (x)
30
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Jul-12
Jan-12
Aug-11
Feb-11
Aug-10
Feb-10
PE (x)
45
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
20
0.00
-0.25
-1.00
ADHI
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
PTPP
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
5
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 64 of 88
20
15
10
NRCA
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Dec-15
Oct-15
Aug-15
May-15
Jan-16
Oct-15
Aug-15
Jun-15
Mar-15
5
0
Mar-15
15
10
Jan-15
25
20
Jan-15
30
Nov-14
40
35
Nov-14
1.00
Jan-16
Nov-15
Oct-15
Aug-15
Jun-15
May-15
Mar-15
Feb-15
1.00
Sep-14
ACST
Dec-15
Oct-15
Jul-15
Apr-15
Jan-15
Oct-14
Aug-14
May-14
Feb-14
Nov-13
Aug-13
1.00
Sep-14
Dec-14
10
Jun-14
20
Jun-14
30
Nov-14
40
Apr-14
50
Apr-14
60
Sep-14
WTON
Jan-14
Jan-14
0.00
May-13
15
Aug-14
0.25
Nov-13
20
Nov-13
10
Mar-13
Dec-15
Sep-15
Jun-15
Mar-15
Dec-14
Sep-14
Jun-14
25
Jun-14
Jan-16
Nov-15
Sep-15
Aug-15
Jun-15
Apr-15
Feb-15
WSKT
Sep-13
Jan-16
Oct-15
Jul-15
May-15
Feb-15
Dec-14
Sep-14
Mar-14
Dec-13
Sep-13
Jun-13
Mar-13
Dec-12
Sep-13
Jan-16
Oct-15
Aug-15
May-15
Mar-15
Dec-14
PE (x)
25
Oct-14
PE (x)
50
45
Jan-15
Nov-14
Sep-14
Jul-14
Jun-14
Apr-14
PE (x)
70
Jul-14
Apr-14
Feb-14
Nov-13
Sep-13
Jun-13
PE (x)
30
Jul-14
May-14
Feb-14
Nov-13
Sep-13
Jun-13
0.75
0.50
-0.25
5
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
WTON
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
ACST
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 65 of 88
0
-0.75
APLN
1.00
16
14
0.50
12
10
0.25
-0.50
-0.75
Dec-15
10
APLN
0.75
-0.25
0.00
-1.00
Oct-15
-0.25
Jul-15
15
Jul-15
20
Feb-15
0.25
Apr-15
25
Oct-14
0.50
30
Jan-15
35
May-14
40
Oct-14
1.00
Nov-13
TAXI
Jul-14
Dec-15
Aug-15
Mar-15
Oct-14
Jun-14
Jan-14
Aug-13
-60
Jul-13
-20
Apr-13
1.00
Apr-14
0.00
Dec-15
Nov-15
Oct-15
Oct-15
Sep-15
Aug-15
Jul-15
Jun-15
May-15
May-15
1.00
Feb-13
Nov-12
0.25
Jan-14
20
Sep-12
40
Jun-12
GIAA
Oct-13
-0.75
Apr-12
Apr-15
-0.50
Feb-12
Jul-13
Nov-11
0.25
Mar-15
Sep-11
0.50
Apr-13
Jun-11
Feb-15
Jan-16
Dec-15
Oct-15
Sep-15
Aug-15
Jul-15
Apr-11
Jan-16
Aug-15
Mar-15
Oct-14
May-14
Dec-13
Jun-15
SOCI
Jan-13
Dec-15
Sep-15
Jun-15
Mar-15
Dec-14
Sep-14
Jul-13
May-15
Apr-15
Mar-15
Feb-15
Jan-15
Dec-14
Jan-11
Dec-15
Jul-15
Feb-15
Sep-14
Apr-14
Nov-13
Jun-14
PE (x)
45
Jun-13
PE (x)
18
Feb-13
Sep-12
May-12
Dec-11
Jul-11
Feb-11
PE (x)
60
Feb-14
Nov-13
Aug-13
May-13
Feb-13
Nov-12
PE (x)
9
Dec-12
Jul-12
Feb-12
Sep-11
Apr-11
Nov-10
0.75
4
0.00
-0.25
-1.00
GIAA
0.75
0.50
-0.25
-40
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
TAXI
0.75
0.00
-1.00
Page 66 of 88
16
14
0.50
12
10
0.25
-0.50
-0.75
CTRS
0.75
-0.25
0.00
-1.00
May-12
Mar-14
Dec-15
Mar-13
Aug-14
Dec-15
Aug-10
Oct-11
Oct-08
10
Jun-10
15
Dec-06
20
Jan-09
25
Mar-05
30
Aug-07
1.00
-1.00
Jan-12
Jun-11
Oct-10
Feb-10
Sep-14
Apr-15
Dec-15
Oct-14
May-15
Dec-15
Jan-14
0.25
Feb-14
0.50
May-13
0.75
Jul-13
35
Sep-12
BSDE
Nov-12
Apr-12
Sep-11
1.00
May-03
CTRA
Jul-09
1.00
Mar-06
-0.75
Feb-11
Jul-01
-0.50
Oct-04
-0.25
10
Jun-10
15
Oct-99
0.00
Jun-03
20
Nov-09
25
Dec-97
30
Jan-02
BSDE
Nov-08
Apr-09
Mar-96
10
Aug-00
15
Mar-08
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
20
Aug-08
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
ASRI
Jun-94
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Apr-99
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
18
Jul-12
PE (x)
35
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
40
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
CTRA
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 67 of 88
30
25
20
15
10
0
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Mar-12
Feb-14
Jan-16
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
May-10
PWON
Apr-10
Jun-08
20
May-08
0.00
Jul-06
30
Jun-06
0.25
Aug-04
1.00
Aug-04
40
Dec-15
Jun-14
Dec-12
Jun-11
Nov-09
May-08
Nov-06
May-05
Oct-03
1.00
Sep-02
50
Dec-15
Mar-14
May-12
Aug-10
Nov-08
Feb-07
Apr-05
Jul-03
Sep-01
Dec-99
Mar-98
1.00
Aug-02
MDLN
Oct-00
Oct-00
Apr-02
0.00
Dec-98
Nov-98
0.25
Oct-00
Jan-97
10
Jan-97
LPCK
Jun-96
Apr-99
Mar-95
10
Feb-95
15
Sep-94
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
20
Oct-97
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
JRPT
Apr-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
35
Jul-12
PE (x)
60
Jan-12
Jun-11
Nov-10
Apr-10
Sep-09
Feb-09
PE (x)
12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
LPCK
0.75
0.50
-0.25
2
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
MDLN
0.75
0.50
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 68 of 88
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Jun-12
Mar-14
Dec-15
Apr-10
0.50
Oct-10
0.75
May-08
KIJA
Jan-09
Jun-06
Apr-07
10
Aug-04
1.00
Jul-05
15
Dec-15
Jun-14
Dec-12
Jun-11
Dec-09
May-08
Nov-06
May-05
Oct-03
1.00
Aug-02
20
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
Aug-04
Aug-02
Oct-00
Nov-98
Jan-97
1.00
Oct-03
25
Oct-00
30
Feb-02
DILD
Apr-02
Nov-98
50
May-00
100
Oct-00
150
Jan-97
200
Aug-98
BKSL
Feb-95
Apr-99
10
Feb-95
15
Dec-96
20
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
25
Oct-97
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
SMRA
Mar-93
Dec-15
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-95
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
50
45
Jul-12
PE (x)
35
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
250
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
30
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
5
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
BKSL
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
DILD
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 69 of 88
8
7
5
4
3
2
1
0
Dec-15
Dec-15
10
5
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Aug-04
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
May-15
Sep-15
Dec-15
Apr-10
-0.25
Feb-15
0.00
Nov-15
15
May-08
0.50
Oct-14
0.75
Jun-06
0.25
BEST
Jul-14
20
Nov-15
25
Nov-15
1.00
Mar-14
BEST
Oct-15
-300
Aug-02
1.00
Dec-13
-100
-200
May-14
Oct-12
Mar-11
Jul-09
Dec-07
May-06
Sep-04
Feb-03
Jun-01
1.00
Oct-15
-0.25
Oct-00
0.00
100
0
Aug-13
200
Oct-15
0.25
Nov-98
400
300
May-13
600
500
Sep-15
MYRX
Nov-99
-0.75
Jan-97
Jan-13
-0.50
Sep-15
10
Apr-98
-0.25
Feb-95
0.00
15
Oct-12
20
Aug-15
25
Sep-96
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
30
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jul-15
Feb-15
Aug-14
Mar-14
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
LPKR
Jun-12
Dec-15
Sep-15
May-15
Jan-15
Oct-14
Sep-13
Apr-13
Oct-12
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Aug-15
Dec-15
Nov-15
Oct-15
Jun-14
Feb-14
PE (x)
30
Oct-13
May-12
Dec-11
Jun-11
Jan-11
Jul-10
PE (x)
40
Sep-15
PE (x)
10
9
Jul-13
Mar-13
Nov-12
Aug-12
Apr-12
PE (x)
700
Aug-15
Jul-15
Jun-15
May-15
35
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
MYRX
0.75
0.50
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
DMAS
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 70 of 88
25
20
15
10
INDF
1.00
25
20
15
10
0
-1.00
INDF
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Aug-04
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Feb-15
Jul-15
Dec-15
Jun-12
Mar-14
Dec-15
Apr-10
-0.75
Sep-14
-0.50
Aug-10
-0.25
May-08
0.00
Apr-14
0.25
Nov-08
0.50
Jun-06
0.75
Nov-13
ICBP
Feb-07
Jun-13
1.00
May-05
ICBP
Aug-02
1.00
Jan-13
Dec-15
Jun-14
Nov-12
May-11
Oct-09
Apr-08
Sep-06
Mar-05
Aug-03
Jan-02
1.00
Jul-03
Oct-00
10
Aug-12
15
Oct-01
20
Nov-98
25
Mar-12
30
Dec-99
GGRM
Jul-00
-0.75
Jan-97
Oct-11
-0.50
Mar-98
Dec-98
-0.25
Feb-95
0.00
May-11
Jul-96
10
Jun-97
Dec-15
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
12
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
SSIA
Dec-10
Dec-15
Jul-15
Feb-15
Sep-14
Apr-14
Oct-13
Jul-12
Jan-12
Jun-11
Nov-10
Apr-10
Sep-09
Feb-09
Sep-94
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
35
May-13
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
16
Jul-12
PE (x)
30
Dec-12
Jul-12
Jan-12
Aug-11
Mar-11
Oct-10
PE (x)
35
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
14
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
GGRM
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 71 of 88
40
0.75
0.50
30
25
0.25
20
15
-0.25
0.00
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Apr-10
35
HMSP
Apr-10
May-08
20
May-08
0.00
Jun-06
30
Jun-06
0.25
Aug-04
1.00
Aug-04
40
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
Aug-04
Aug-02
Oct-00
1.00
Aug-02
50
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
Aug-04
Aug-02
Oct-00
Nov-98
Jan-97
1.00
Aug-02
UNVR
Oct-00
Oct-00
20
Nov-98
0.00
Nov-98
30
Nov-98
0.25
Jan-97
40
Jan-97
50
Jan-97
ULTJ
Feb-95
Feb-95
20
Feb-95
30
Feb-95
40
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
50
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
MYOR
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
45
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
60
Jul-12
PE (x)
60
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
60
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
ULTJ
0.75
0.50
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
UNVR
0.75
0.50
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 72 of 88
30
25
20
15
10
SIDO
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Jan-14
Dec-15
Jan-16
-0.75
Nov-15
Mar-12
-0.50
Sep-15
10
Apr-10
15
Jul-15
0.25
May-08
25
May-15
0.50
30
Jun-06
35
Mar-15
40
Aug-04
1.00
Feb-15
KLBF
Dec-15
Jun-14
Dec-12
May-11
Nov-09
May-08
Oct-06
Apr-05
1.00
Aug-02
Dec-15
Oct-15
Jul-15
Apr-15
Jan-15
Oct-14
Aug-14
May-14
Feb-14
Nov-13
1.00
Dec-14
Sep-03
10
Oct-00
15
Oct-14
20
Mar-02
AISA
Nov-98
-0.75
Aug-14
Aug-13
-0.50
Sep-00
Jan-97
Jun-14
0.25
May-13
12
Mar-99
0.50
Feb-95
14
May-14
10
Mar-13
Dec-15
Sep-15
Jun-15
Mar-15
Dec-14
Sep-14
Jun-14
16
Aug-97
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
WIIM
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Mar-14
Dec-13
Sep-13
Jun-13
Mar-13
Dec-12
Mar-14
Jan-16
Nov-15
Sep-15
Jul-15
Apr-15
Feb-15
PE (x)
35
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-14
PE (x)
45
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
18
Oct-14
Aug-14
Jun-14
Apr-14
Feb-14
Dec-13
0.75
-0.25
0.00
-1.00
AISA
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
KLBF
0.75
20
0.00
-0.25
-1.00
Page 73 of 88
30
25
20
15
10
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Jan-16
Apr-15
Aug-14
Dec-15
Oct-15
Aug-15
Jun-15
0.75
Nov-13
MNCN
Apr-15
Mar-13
50
Feb-15
100
Jul-12
150
Dec-15
Dec-15
Nov-15
Nov-15
Oct-15
Oct-15
Sep-15
1.00
Dec-14
200
Dec-15
Mar-14
Jun-12
Aug-10
Nov-08
Feb-07
Apr-05
Jul-03
Sep-01
Dec-99
1.00
Nov-11
1.00
Oct-14
SILO
Mar-11
Aug-15
10
Aug-15
20
Aug-14
30
Jun-10
40
Jul-15
50
Jun-14
MIKA
Oct-09
-0.75
Mar-98
Jul-15
-0.50
Apr-14
10
Feb-09
-0.25
Jun-96
0.00
15
Jun-15
20
Jan-14
25
Aug-94
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
30
May-08
Jun-15
Dec-15
Nov-15
Oct-15
Sep-15
Jul-12
TSPC
Nov-13
Jan-16
Oct-15
Aug-15
Jun-15
Mar-15
Jan-15
Aug-15
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Sep-07
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Nov-14
PE (x)
250
Jul-12
PE (x)
35
Jul-15
Jun-15
May-15
Apr-15
Mar-15
PE (x)
70
Aug-14
Jun-14
Apr-14
Jan-14
Nov-13
Sep-13
PE (x)
40
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
35
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
MIKA
60
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
SILO
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 74 of 88
120
100
0
-0.75
ADRO
25
20
15
10
0
-1.00
1.00
ADRO
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Oct-05
Aug-12
Apr-14
Dec-15
Apr-15
Aug-15
Dec-15
Oct-14
May-15
Dec-15
Dec-10
-0.50
20
Jan-15
-0.25
40
Mar-14
60
Mar-09
0.25
Sep-14
0.50
Jul-13
0.75
Jul-07
140
May-14
0.00
VIVA
Dec-12
80
Jan-14
May-12
20
Feb-04
1.00
Sep-13
0.00
Dec-15
Nov-14
Oct-13
Aug-12
Jul-11
Jun-10
May-09
Apr-08
Mar-07
Jan-06
1.00
Oct-11
30
Jun-02
0.25
May-13
40
Mar-11
50
Oct-00
BMTR
Jan-13
-0.75
Jul-10
Dec-04
-0.50
Feb-99
10
Sep-12
15
Dec-09
0.25
Oct-03
30
Jun-97
0.50
May-12
35
May-09
25
Sep-02
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
40
Sep-95
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
SCMA
Feb-12
Jan-16
Sep-15
May-15
Dec-14
Aug-14
Apr-14
Dec-13
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Sep-08
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
30
Jul-12
PE (x)
160
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
60
Aug-13
Apr-13
Nov-12
Jul-12
Mar-12
Nov-11
PE (x)
45
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
20
-0.25
0.00
-1.00
BMTR
0.75
0.50
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 75 of 88
20
15
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Jun-13
Jan-13
Aug-12
Mar-12
Dec-15
Dec-15
-1.00
Dec-15
-0.75
Jan-16
-0.50
Jul-15
-0.25
Apr-15
0.00
Nov-14
0.25
Jan-15
0.50
Feb-15
0.75
Sep-14
PTBA
Nov-13
Sep-14
-0.25
Jan-14
0.00
Apr-14
0.25
May-13
0.50
Nov-13
0.75
Sep-12
Jan-12
Jun-11
ITMG
Jan-14
Oct-12
0.25
Jan-13
0.50
Sep-11
0.75
Jan-12
10
PGAS
Sep-10
Feb-11
Aug-09
1.00
Feb-10
10
Oct-10
1.00
Jul-08
15
Oct-11
1.00
Feb-09
20
Jun-07
PTBA
Feb-08
Feb-10
May-06
10
Feb-07
15
Jul-09
20
May-05
ITMG
Feb-06
-0.25
May-11
100
80
60
Nov-08
0.25
Apr-04
140
120
Mar-05
Dec-10
Dec-15
Jul-15
Feb-15
Sep-14
Apr-14
Oct-13
May-13
40
20
Mar-08
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
HRUM
Mar-03
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-12
Jul-12
Jan-12
Aug-11
Mar-11
Oct-10
Mar-04
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
25
Jul-12
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
200
180
160
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 76 of 88
60
50
40
30
20
10
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Jan-13
Jul-14
Dec-15
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Jul-11
0.75
Apr-10
INCO
Jan-10
10
May-08
20
Jul-08
1.00
Jun-06
ANTM
Jan-07
Jan-16
Oct-14
Aug-13
May-12
Mar-11
Jan-10
Nov-08
-160
Aug-04
-120
-140
Aug-07
1.00
Jul-05
-0.25
Jun-06
0.00
-80
-100
Jan-04
-60
Apr-05
0.25
Jul-02
-20
-40
Jan-04
20
0
Feb-01
DOID
Oct-02
Dec-15
Mar-14
Jun-12
Oct-10
Dec-08
Mar-07
Jun-05
Sep-03
Nov-01
Mar-00
Jun-98
Sep-96
Dec-94
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Aug-01
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
10
Aug-99
Feb-98
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
1.00
Aug-02
-1.00
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
15
Oct-00
-0.75
-40
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
20
Nov-98
-0.50
-30
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
25
Jan-97
-0.25
-20
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
AKRA
Feb-95
-10
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
PE (x)
70
Sep-13
0.00
Mar-10
Aug-09
PE (x)
40
Feb-13
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
35
Jul-12
Jan-09
PE (x)
40
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
30
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
DOID
0.75
0.50
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
ANTM
30
0.75
0.50
0.25
Page 77 of 88
0
-0.75
LPPF
30
25
20
15
10
0
-1.00
1.00
LPPF
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Jan-12
Sep-14
Apr-15
Dec-15
May-15
Sep-15
Dec-15
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Jan-14
-0.50
Jan-15
-0.25
10
Apr-10
15
May-13
0.25
Sep-14
0.50
May-08
0.75
Sep-12
35
May-14
0.00
ERAA
Jun-06
20
Jan-14
30
Aug-04
1.00
May-11
1.00
Sep-13
ERAA
May-14
Aug-12
Jan-11
May-09
Aug-07
Dec-05
Apr-04
Aug-02
Dec-00
Apr-99
1.00
Aug-02
-0.75
Sep-10
Jun-13
-0.50
Oct-00
-0.25
10
Jan-10
15
Feb-13
0.00
Nov-98
20
May-09
25
Oct-12
30
Jan-97
ACES
Aug-97
5
0
Sep-08
15
10
Jun-12
25
20
Feb-95
30
Jan-96
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
40
35
Jan-08
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
TINS
Feb-12
Dec-15
Aug-15
Apr-15
Dec-14
Aug-14
Apr-14
Dec-13
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Dec-14
Jun-14
Dec-13
Jun-13
PE (x)
35
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
50
45
Dec-12
PE (x)
40
Aug-13
Apr-13
Dec-12
Aug-12
Apr-12
Dec-11
PE (x)
40
May-12
Nov-11
May-11
Nov-10
May-10
Oct-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
ACES
35
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
Page 78 of 88
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
TELE
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Dec-15
Dec-15
May-14
Sep-15
10
Oct-12
15
May-15
20
Mar-11
25
Jan-15
30
Aug-09
1.00
Sep-14
RALS
Dec-07
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
-0.75
Jun-14
Aug-04
10
May-06
-0.50
Feb-14
20
Aug-02
1.00
Sep-04
30
Feb-15
Mar-14
Apr-13
May-12
Jun-11
Jul-10
Aug-09
Sep-08
Oct-07
1.00
Oct-13
0.25
Oct-00
50
Feb-03
60
Jun-13
0.50
Nov-98
70
Jul-01
80
Feb-13
MPPA
Nov-06
-0.75
Jan-97
Dec-99
-0.50
20
Nov-12
40
Dec-05
-0.25
Feb-95
0.00
60
May-98
80
Jul-12
100
Jan-05
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
120
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
MAPI
Oct-96
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Mar-12
Jan-16
Sep-15
May-15
Jan-15
Sep-14
May-14
PE (x)
20
18
Jan-14
PE (x)
35
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
90
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
160
Sep-13
May-13
Jan-13
Sep-12
May-12
Jan-12
140
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
MPPA
0.75
40
0.00
-0.25
-1.00
RALS
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 79 of 88
40
20
-20
-60
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-40
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Apr-14
Mar-15
Jan-16
Apr-10
0.50
Jun-13
0.75
May-08
EXCL
Aug-12
Jun-06
40
Nov-11
0.00
Aug-04
1.00
Jan-11
60
Jan-16
May-15
Sep-14
Jan-14
May-13
Sep-12
Feb-12
Jun-11
Oct-10
1.00
Aug-02
0.25
Sep-15
May-15
Jan-15
Sep-14
May-14
Jan-14
Sep-13
May-13
Feb-13
Oct-12
1.00
Mar-10
80
Oct-00
100
Apr-09
MLPL
Feb-10
5
0
Nov-98
15
10
Jun-08
25
20
Jun-09
30
Jan-97
40
35
Aug-07
CSAP
Jun-12
Oct-08
Feb-95
10
Oct-06
15
Feb-12
Dec-15
Aug-15
Apr-15
Dec-14
Aug-14
Apr-14
Dec-13
20
Mar-08
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
CASS
Mar-93
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Aug-13
Apr-13
Dec-12
Aug-12
Apr-12
Dec-11
Dec-05
Dec-15
May-15
Oct-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
60
Jul-12
PE (x)
120
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
50
45
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
CSAP
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
MLPL
0.75
0.50
-0.25
20
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 80 of 88
TBIG
30
25
0
-1.00
1.00
20
0.00
15
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
TBIG
35
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
Jan-06
May-04
Oct-15
Nov-15
Dec-15
Feb-15
Jul-15
Dec-15
Dec-15
Apr-14
Aug-12
Jan-11
-0.75
Aug-15
-0.50
Sep-14
-0.25
10
May-09
0.25
Jul-15
0.50
Apr-14
0.75
Aug-07
35
Jun-15
15
LINK
Nov-13
0.00
Apr-15
1.00
Jun-13
20
Aug-02
1.00
Mar-15
25
Dec-15
Mar-14
Jun-12
Oct-10
Jan-09
Mar-07
Jun-05
Sep-03
Dec-01
Mar-00
Jun-98
1.00
Jan-13
30
Jan-15
LINK
Aug-12
2
0
Jan-01
6
4
Dec-14
10
8
Mar-12
12
May-99
16
14
Nov-14
TLKM
Nov-11
-60
Sep-96
-20
Sep-97
Sep-14
20
Jun-11
Jan-95
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
40
Jan-96
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
ISAT
Aug-14
Jan-16
Nov-15
Oct-15
Aug-15
Jun-15
May-15
Mar-15
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Jan-11
Jan-16
Aug-15
Feb-15
Sep-14
Apr-14
Nov-13
PE (x)
40
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
60
Jun-13
PE (x)
40
Jan-15
Dec-14
Oct-14
Sep-14
Jul-14
May-14
PE (x)
20
18
Dec-12
Jul-12
Feb-12
Sep-11
Apr-11
Oct-10
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-40
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
TLKM
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 81 of 88
ASII
20
15
10
IMAS
100
50
-50
-100
1.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
1.00
IMAS
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Feb-13
Sep-12
Mar-12
Jan-15
Jul-15
Dec-15
Aug-15
Oct-15
Dec-15
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
May-12
Mar-14
Aug-14
0.00
May-15
0.25
Apr-10
0.50
Jul-10
0.75
Feb-14
ASII
Mar-15
-1.00
May-08
-0.25
Sep-08
0.00
Aug-13
Jan-15
0.75
Jun-06
SRIL
Nov-06
-0.75
Oct-14
Aug-04
-0.50
Jan-05
Aug-14
1.00
Aug-02
Oct-11
1.00
Mar-03
0.25
Jun-14
10
Oct-00
12
May-01
0.50
Apr-14
14
Nov-98
16
Jul-99
SRIL
Apr-11
-0.75
Jan-14
Jan-97
-0.50
20
Sep-97
40
Nov-10
-0.25
Nov-13
0.00
60
Feb-95
80
Nov-95
100
May-10
Dec-15
Jul-15
Jan-15
Jul-14
Jan-14
Jul-13
120
Sep-13
Jan-16
Oct-15
Aug-15
May-15
Feb-15
Dec-14
TOWR
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jan-13
Aug-12
Feb-12
Aug-11
Feb-11
Aug-10
Mar-10
Jan-94
Dec-15
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
PE (x)
150
Mar-13
PE (x)
25
Sep-14
Jul-14
Apr-14
Feb-14
Nov-13
Aug-13
Jun-13
PE (x)
18
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
160
Aug-12
Jan-12
Jul-11
Dec-10
May-10
Oct-09
Apr-09
140
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
Page 82 of 88
30
25
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
15
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
Dec-12
Jun-14
Dec-15
Apr-10
35
Jul-11
20
AALI
May-08
Jan-10
Jun-06
10
Jul-08
15
Aug-04
20
Jan-07
1.00
Dec-15
Mar-14
Jul-12
Oct-10
Feb-09
May-07
Aug-05
Nov-03
1.00
Aug-02
UNTR
Dec-15
Oct-15
Aug-15
May-15
Mar-15
Jan-15
Oct-14
Aug-14
Jun-14
Mar-14
Jan-14
1.00
Jul-05
Mar-02
10
Oct-00
0.00
Jan-04
15
Jun-00
0.25
Nov-98
20
Jul-02
25
Sep-98
HEXA
Jan-97
Feb-01
Oct-13
Jan-97
Feb-95
Aug-99
10
Aug-13
Jan-16
Oct-15
Jul-15
May-15
Feb-15
Dec-14
Sep-14
12
May-95
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
MPMX
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Jun-14
Apr-14
Jan-14
Nov-13
Aug-13
May-13
Feb-98
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
40
Jul-12
PE (x)
25
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
30
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
14
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
HEXA
0.75
0.50
-0.25
5
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
UNTR
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 83 of 88
30
25
20
0.00
15
-0.25
10
-0.50
-0.75
Dec-15
Nov-15
Sep-15
Jul-15
Jan-15
20
0
SSMS
35
0.75
0.50
0.25
-1.00
Jul-14
60
40
Jul-15
100
80
Jan-14
120
May-15
160
140
Jul-13
1.00
Mar-15
BWPT
Jan-13
Dec-15
Apr-15
Aug-14
Nov-13
Mar-13
Jul-12
Nov-11
-0.75
Jan-15
Feb-11
1.00
Jul-12
Dec-15
May-14
Oct-12
Mar-11
Jul-09
Dec-07
May-06
Sep-04
Feb-03
Jun-01
Nov-99
1.00
Dec-14
-0.50
Jun-10
10
Jan-12
15
Oct-14
0.25
Oct-09
25
Jul-11
30
Aug-14
0.50
Jan-09
35
Jan-11
40
Jun-14
SGRO
Apr-98
May-08
Jul-10
10
Apr-14
15
Sep-96
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
20
Aug-07
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
LSIP
Jan-10
Jan-16
Jun-15
Dec-14
Jun-14
Dec-13
Jun-13
Dec-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Feb-14
Jan-16
Nov-15
Sep-15
Jul-15
May-15
Feb-15
PE (x)
40
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
25
Dec-14
PE (x)
200
180
May-12
Nov-11
May-11
Nov-10
May-10
Oct-09
PE (x)
45
Oct-14
Aug-14
Jun-14
Apr-14
Feb-14
Dec-13
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
SGRO
0.75
20
0.00
-0.25
-1.00
BWPT
0.75
0.50
0.25
-0.25
0.00
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 84 of 88
80
60
40
20
0.25
0
0.00
-20
-40
-0.25
-60
-80
-100
0.75
0.50
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Mar-12
Jan-14
Dec-15
May-14
Mar-15
Dec-15
Apr-10
MAIN
Jul-13
-60
May-08
-40
Sep-12
-20
Jun-06
Dec-11
20
Aug-04
40
Mar-11
1.00
Aug-02
60
Dec-15
Jan-14
Mar-12
Apr-10
May-08
Jun-06
Aug-04
Aug-02
Oct-00
1.00
May-10
JPFA
Oct-00
-0.75
Jul-09
Nov-98
-0.50
Nov-98
10
Sep-08
15
Jan-97
0.25
Jan-97
25
Nov-07
30
Feb-95
0.50
Feb-95
35
Feb-07
40
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
CPIN
Mar-93
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
Jul-12
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
Apr-06
Jan-16
Jun-15
Nov-14
Apr-14
Sep-13
Feb-13
PE (x)
100
Jul-12
PE (x)
80
Dec-11
May-11
Oct-10
Mar-10
Aug-09
Jan-09
PE (x)
45
Jan-12
Jun-11
Nov-10
Apr-10
Sep-09
Feb-09
0.75
20
-0.25
0.00
-1.00
JPFA
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Page 85 of 88
EPS Growth
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Mkt Cap
(USD mn)
2015
2016
Mandiri Universe
4,465
5,000
244,051
198,546
55,894
61,053
Code
Banking
BBCA
Neutral
BBNI
PER (x)
EV/EBITDA (x)
2015
2016
2015
2016
228,612
2.1%
14.8%
16.9
14.8
71,416
-0.7%
17.0%
12.7
10.8
2015
P/BV (x)
Div.Yield
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
9.3
8.7
2.8
2.5
2.5%
2.5%
N.A.
N.A.
2.1
1.8
1.9%
1.9%
12,750
12,400
22,712
17,796
20,044
7.9%
12.6%
17.7
15.7
N.A.
N.A.
3.5
3.0
1.2%
1.5%
Buy
4,935
5,900
6,649
8,971
11,974
-16.8%
33.5%
10.3
7.7
N.A.
N.A.
1.5
1.3
2.9%
1.9%
BBRI
Buy
11,375
11,500
20,274
24,023
26,819
-0.9%
11.6%
11.7
10.5
N.A.
N.A.
2.5
2.1
2.1%
2.1%
BBTN
Buy
1,310
1,500
1,000
1,891
2,451
69.5%
29.6%
7.3
5.6
N.A.
N.A.
1.0
0.9
1.6%
2.7%
BDMN
Neutral
2,900
3,150
2,008
2,589
3,526
-0.6%
36.2%
10.7
7.9
N.A.
N.A.
0.8
0.7
2.8%
2.8%
BJBR
Buy
770
1,100
539
1,257
1,520
12.7%
20.9%
5.9
4.9
N.A.
N.A.
1.0
0.9
9.7%
10.1%
BJTM
Neutral
446
400
476
1,015
1,153
8.1%
13.6%
6.5
5.7
N.A.
N.A.
1.0
0.9
9.0%
9.2%
BTPN
Neutral
2,350
3,000
992
1,755
1,945
-5.3%
10.8%
7.8
7.1
N.A.
N.A.
1.0
0.9
0.0%
0.0%
PNBN
Neutral
715
1,000
1,244
1,755
1,983
-25.5%
13.0%
9.8
8.7
N.A.
N.A.
0.8
0.7
0.0%
0.0%
10,378
9,823
10,626
-14.6%
8.2%
14.6
13.5
9.3
8.4
2.4
2.2
5.5%
3.8%
975
900
540
-29
410
N/M
N/M
-258.1
18.2
10.8
7.1
0.9
0.8
2.7%
-0.1%
5.5%
Building Materials
SMCB
Sell
INTP
Neutral
19,750
21,600
5,253
4,972
5,130
-5.7%
3.2%
14.6
14.2
9.9
9.1
2.9
2.8
6.8%
SMGR
Neutral
10,700
12,100
4,585
4,880
5,086
-12.3%
4.2%
13.0
12.5
8.5
8.1
2.4
2.1
4.4%
2.3%
5,461
2,639
3,333
26.8%
14.2%
24.6
22.7
12.3
10.2
3.1
2.7
0.7%
0.5%
598
400
498
6.0%
-26.7%
12.2
16.6
7.8
6.4
1.8
1.6
1.2%
1.4%
Constructions
ADHI
Buy
2,325
2,880
PTPP
Buy
3,900
4,560
1,364
714
845
34.3%
18.4%
26.4
22.3
10.5
8.2
6.1
3.7
0.6%
0.0%
WIKA
Neutral
2,835
3,000
1,251
596
746
-3.1%
25.2%
29.0
23.2
15.3
11.2
3.9
3.4
0.7%
1.0%
WSKT
Buy
1,685
1,900
1,653
751
977
27.7%
8.3%
25.3
23.4
12.8
13.1
2.1
2.3
0.5%
0.0%
WTON
Neutral
945
970
595
177
266
-49.4%
49.9%
46.5
31.0
21.8
16.7
3.7
3.4
1.2%
0.6%
2,764
1,569
2,044
11.8%
30.2%
24.4
18.7
13.2
11.2
3.5
3.1
1.5%
1.6%
2,764
1,569
2,044
11.8%
30.2%
24.4
18.7
13.2
11.2
3.5
3.1
1.5%
1.6%
252
439
568
20.1%
29.3%
8.0
6.2
6.4
5.8
1.0
0.9
0.0%
0.0%
Toll road
JSMR
Buy
5,625
8,650
Rice Mill
AISA
Neutral
1,085
2,500
Consumer
252
439
568
11.9%
29.3%
8.0
6.2
6.4
5.8
1.0
0.9
0.0%
0.0%
69,408
29,560
32,415
3.5%
9.7%
32.5
29.6
20.3
19.2
7.5
7.0
2.2%
2.2%
1.9%
ICBP
Neutral
13,950
14,000
5,877
3,086
3,298
18.5%
6.9%
26.4
24.7
17.4
16.1
5.1
4.6
1.6%
INDF
Neutral
5,525
6,000
3,505
3,272
4,160
-15.8%
27.1%
14.8
11.7
8.4
7.8
1.8
1.6
4.0%
3.4%
MYOR
Sell
28,000
24,500
1,551
1,104
784
173.5%
-29.0%
19.4
27.4
12.1
13.2
4.3
3.8
0.4%
1.1%
ULTJ
Buy
3,710
5,100
775
402
511
43.8%
27.0%
26.7
21.0
14.3
11.4
4.1
3.5
0.4%
0.5%
UNVR
Neutral
35,325
41,000
19,473
5,808
6,051
1.2%
4.2%
46.4
44.5
33.2
32.4
57.7
54.9
2.1%
2.2%
GGRM
Buy
54,500
56,000
7,576
5,256
5,665
-2.1%
7.8%
20.0
18.5
11.8
11.1
2.9
2.6
1.8%
1.8%
HMSP
Buy
91,000
111,000
30,590
10,484
11,751
3.0%
12.1%
40.4
36.0
29.5
28.1
12.2
11.7
2.4%
2.4%
WIIM
Buy
404
840
Healthcare
61
148
195
44.0%
31.5%
5.7
4.3
3.8
2.6
0.9
0.8
5.2%
6.9%
5,816
3,028
3,281
-1.0%
8.3%
26.6
24.5
17.7
16.0
4.6
4.1
1.6%
1.6%
1.2%
KLBF
Neutral
1,385
1,500
4,691
2,004
2,156
-3.0%
7.6%
32.4
30.1
20.9
19.1
6.1
5.4
1.3%
SIDO
Neutral
515
550
558
440
490
5.9%
11.4%
17.6
15.8
11.6
9.9
2.9
2.6
2.7%
2.8%
TSPC
Neutral
1,745
2,100
567
585
635
1.0%
8.6%
13.4
12.4
9.1
8.2
1.8
1.6
3.7%
3.0%
3,113
679
899
17.2%
32.4%
63.5
47.9
31.8
25.0
8.6
7.7
0.7%
0.7%
MIKA
Buy
2,210
3,400
2,323
584
758
13.0%
29.7%
55.0
42.4
40.6
34.1
9.9
8.7
0.9%
0.9%
SILO
Buy
9,450
11,000
789
95
141
51.6%
49.1%
115.2
77.3
20.2
14.8
6.3
5.8
0.1%
0.1%
Hospital
Retail
6,206
3,569
4,182
1.8%
17.2%
24.1
20.5
13.3
11.5
4.6
4.1
1.8%
2.0%
ACES
Neutral
735
720
911
531
617
-3.3%
16.3%
23.8
20.4
14.8
12.8
4.6
4.0
1.1%
1.5%
ERAA
Neutral
550
600
115
197
175
-7.0%
-11.1%
8.1
9.1
8.2
7.4
0.5
0.5
3.7%
3.3%
LPPF
Neutral
16,150
17,600
3,404
1,808
2,036
27.4%
12.6%
26.1
23.1
17.8
15.8
43.6
22.4
1.9%
2.2%
MAPI
Sell
3,860
2,700
463
34
179
-53.9%
431.2%
189.8
35.7
8.7
6.8
2.5
2.3
0.2%
0.1%
MPPA
Neutral
1,675
2,175
651
321
366
-42.0%
14.0%
28.0
24.6
12.0
10.6
3.0
2.8
1.8%
1.1%
RALS
Neutral
595
680
305
320
323
-9.9%
0.9%
13.2
13.1
7.6
6.9
1.2
1.2
4.1%
4.2%
TELE
Buy
705
1,040
357
359
486
5.0%
35.3%
13.8
10.2
9.1
8.1
1.8
1.6
2.5%
3.4%
Automotive
17,837
18,146
20,760
-4.1%
11.9%
13.5
12.1
11.3
10.4
2.3
2.1
3.5%
3.6%
ASII
U/R
5,950
U/R
17,403
17,717
20,132
-7.0%
11.0%
13.5
12.2
11.1
10.3
2.3
2.1
3.6%
3.6%
IMAS
U/R
2,170
U/R
434
429
628
N/M
47.0%
14.2
9.7
14.6
14.2
1.0
0.9
1.4%
1.9%
4,347
8,021
6,110
40.3%
####
7.5
9.8
3.9
3.9
1.3
1.2
3.9%
3.0%
Heavy Equipment
Page 86 of 88
Net Profit
EPS Growth
PER (x)
EV/EBITDA (x)
P/BV (x)
Code
Rating
Price
(Rp)
Price
Target
Mkt Cap
(USD mn)
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
HEXA*
Buy
1,130
4,250
69
28
45
26.4%
61.1%
2.5
1.6
1.6
0.9
0.3
UNTR
Sell
15,875
13,250
Plantation
Div.Yield
2016
2015
2016
0.3 10.9%
14.0%
4,278
7,469
5,461
39.1%
-26.9%
7.9
10.8
4.1
4.2
1.4
1.3
3.8%
2.8%
2,657
5,063
5,694
25.5%
12.5%
7.3
6.5
4.4
3.9
1.5
1.3
5.3%
6.6%
AALI
Buy
16,000
30,800
1,820
3,181
3,576
19.1%
12.4%
7.9
7.0
5.3
4.8
1.9
1.7
5.7%
6.8%
LSIP
Buy
1,235
2,700
609
1,378
1,528
38.9%
10.8%
6.1
5.5
2.4
1.9
1.0
0.9
4.7%
6.6%
SGRO
Buy
1,670
3,050
Property
228
503
590
36.1%
17.2%
6.3
5.4
3.8
3.0
1.0
0.8
4.1%
4.8%
9,732
12,096
14,459
-11.2%
19.5%
11.1
9.3
8.5
7.5
1.9
1.6
0.5%
1.5%
APLN
Buy
319
420
472
1,031
1,236
32.5%
19.8%
6.3
5.3
7.2
7.3
0.9
0.8
2.4%
3.2%
ASRI
Buy
327
730
422
1,240
1,811
13.0%
46.0%
4.7
3.2
4.9
4.3
0.8
0.7
6.1%
9.0%
BSDE
Buy
1,765
2,400
2,343
2,499
3,073
-34.6%
23.0%
13.0
10.6
9.9
8.2
1.7
1.5
2.9%
1.9%
CTRA
Neutral
1,355
1,350
1,485
1,436
1,557
24.4%
8.4%
14.3
13.2
10.7
9.6
2.4
2.1
1.1%
1.4%
CTRS
Buy
2,155
3,600
308
643
490
9.9%
-23.8%
6.6
8.7
4.2
5.0
1.4
1.2
3.1%
3.5%
JRPT
Buy
700
1,350
695
877
1,117
21.5%
27.3%
11.0
8.6
9.4
7.1
2.5
2.0
1.1%
1.1%
LPCK
Buy
6,725
13,500
338
864
778
2.4%
-10.0%
5.4
6.0
4.3
5.0
1.3
1.1
0.0%
0.0%
MDLN
Buy
467
680
423
610
996
-14.3%
63.3%
9.6
5.9
6.6
5.3
1.0
0.8
0.0%
0.0%
PWON
Buy
464
620
1,614
1,714
2,266
-31.9%
32.2%
13.0
9.9
8.9
7.1
3.1
2.4
2.6%
1.8%
SMRA
Neutral
1,565
1,600
1,631
1,183
1,137
-15.4%
-3.9%
19.1
19.9
12.8
12.0
3.4
2.9
-8.2%
-1.2%
Industrial
1,138
1,700
1,919
-4.0%
12.8%
9.3
8.2
6.7
6.6
1.1
1.0
2.6%
3.0%
DMAS
Buy
205
270
714
1,016
1,222
5.4%
20.2%
9.7
8.1
7.4
5.9
1.2
1.1
3.1%
3.7%
BEST
Neutral
277
410
193
211
222
-46.1%
5.4%
12.7
12.0
8.4
11.7
0.9
0.8
0.7%
0.4%
SSIA
Buy
680
1,100
231
473
474
13.9%
0.3%
6.8
6.7
5.2
5.6
1.1
0.9
2.6%
3.0%
3,982
4,336
5,846
54.2%
34.8%
12.7
9.4
8.5
6.8
2.6
2.1
1.5%
2.3%
CPIN
Buy
2,840
6,000
3,370
3,548
4,425
46.4%
24.7%
13.1
10.5
9.3
7.6
3.2
2.6
1.5%
2.1%
JPFA
Buy
605
1,600
459
591
1,047
77.9%
77.0%
10.7
6.1
6.7
5.5
1.2
1.0
1.8%
3.2%
MAIN
Sell
1,255
2,100
154
197
373
252.0%
89.8%
10.8
5.7
6.8
4.5
1.5
1.2
0.5%
1.8%
2,455
6,178
6,926
-8.3%
12.1%
5.4
4.8
3.3
2.8
0.5
0.5
9.7%
10.8%
Poultry
Coal
ADRO*
Neutral
486
700
1,123
205
226
14.2%
10.3%
5.6
5.0
3.8
3.3
0.4
0.4
7.1%
7.9%
HRUM*
Neutral
695
915
136
-4
-2
N/M
59.2%
-35.0
-84.6
2.4
2.0
0.5
0.5
0.0%
0.0%
ITMG*
Neutral
5,675
8,300
463
113
125
-43.4%
10.4%
4.2
3.7
1.3
1.0
0.6
0.5 19.1%
21.4%
PTBA
Buy
4,405
10,000
733
1,938
2,141
-3.9%
10.5%
4.9
4.5
3.6
3.1
1.1
1.0
9.5%
10.5%
4,344
7,021
7,202
-21.9%
2.6%
8.6
8.3
5.1
4.8
1.5
1.4
8.4%
6.1%
Sell
2,480
3,400
4,344
520
526
-28.0%
1.1%
8.6
8.3
5.1
4.8
1.5
1.4
8.4%
6.1%
250
649
728
57.1%
12.2%
5.3
4.8
6.0
5.2
0.9
0.8
2.6%
3.8%
Buy
490
810
250
48
53
24.9%
10.5%
5.3
4.8
6.0
5.2
0.9
0.8
2.6%
3.8%
1,253
853
1,931
-20.0%
97.4%
16.4
8.3
4.6
3.8
0.5
0.5
6.2%
6.3%
Neutral
303
500
209
-683
-220
11.9%
67.8%
-4.2
-13.1
12.4
10.0
0.3
0.3
0.0%
0.0%
INCO*
U/R
1,455
U/R
1,045
114
157
-23.5%
30.8%
8.3
6.2
3.0
2.4
0.6
0.5
7.4%
7.5%
25,776
15,872
20,808
34.1%
31.9%
22.6
17.1
6.0
5.4
3.6
3.3
3.0%
3.6%
EXCL
Buy
3,385
4,000
2,087
-516
1,153
42.1%
N/M
-56.0
25.0
6.9
5.7
2.2
2.0
0.0%
0.8%
ISAT
U/R
5,325
U/R
2,091
441
1,147
N/M
237.1%
85.4
25.3
3.7
3.9
2.1
2.0
0.9%
1.5%
TLKM
Buy
3,060
3,225
21,599
15,947
18,508
8.9%
16.1%
18.7
16.2
6.4
5.6
4.1
3.7
3.5%
4.0%
5,533
2,535
2,914
18.3%
14.9%
30.2
26.3
14.4
12.9
6.8
5.4
0.0%
0.0%
Telco
Tower
TBIG
Neutral
5,650
8,000
1,958
1,101
1,167
-15.4%
5.9%
24.6
23.2
13.8
13.0
5.3
4.3
0.0%
0.0%
TOWR
Buy
4,850
5,000
3,575
1,434
1,747
70.5%
21.9%
34.5
28.3
14.8
12.7
8.1
6.3
0.0%
0.0%
4,962
3,037
3,753
-5.5%
23.6%
22.6
18.3
14.3
12.6
5.1
4.4
2.8%
2.4%
SCMA
Neutral
3,040
3,000
3,211
1,534
1,769
5.5%
15.3%
29.0
25.1
20.3
17.8
11.3
9.5
2.3%
2.4%
MNCN
Buy
1,645
2,200
1,750
1,503
1,984
-14.7%
32.0%
16.1
12.2
9.8
8.6
2.5
2.2
3.8%
2.5%
493
679
799
22.0%
17.7%
10.0
8.5
6.5
5.8
1.8
1.5
0.0%
0.0%
Buy
367
375
493
50
58
12.4%
16.0%
10.0
8.5
6.5
5.8
1.8
1.5
0.0%
0.0%
Media
Textile
SRIL*
Note:
- *)
net profit in USD mn
- U/R
means Under Review
- n/a
means Not Available
- N/M
means Not Meaningful
- N.A
means Not Applicable
Source: Mandiri Sekuritas estiamte
Page 87 of 88
RESEARCH
John Rachmat
Tjandra Lienandjaja
Liliana S Bambang
Ariyanto Kurniawan
Matthew Wibowo
Rizky Hidayat
Aditya Sastrawinata
Leo Putera Rinaldy
Wisnu Trihatmojo
Yudha Gautama
Kevin Halim
Priscilla Thany
john.rachmat@mandirisek.co.id
tjandra.lienandjaja@mandirisek.co.id
liliana.bambang@mandirisek.co.id
ariyanto.kurniawan@mandirisek.co.id
matthew.wibowo@mandirisek.co.id
rizky.hidayat@mandirisek.co.id
aditya.sastrawinata@mandirisek.co.id
leo.rinaldy@mandirisek.co.id
wisnu.trihatmojo@mandirisek.co.id
yudha.gautama@mandirisek.co.id
kevin.halim@mandirisek.co.id
priscilla.thany@mandirisek.co.id
lokman.lie@mandirisek.co.id
silva.halim@mandirisek.co.id
andrew.handaya@mandirisek.co.id
cindy.amelia@mandirisek.co.id
janefer.soelaiman@mandirisek.co.id
karmia.tandjung@mandirisek.co.id
santikara.salim@mandirisek.co.id
oos.rosadi@mandirisek.co.id
vera.ongyono@mandirisek.co.id
yohan.setio@mandirisek.co.id
zahra.niode@mandirisek.co.id
kusnadi.widjaja@mandirisek.co.id
edwin.setiadi@mandirisek.co.id
jane.sukardi@mandirisek.co.id
michael.taarea@mandirisek.co.id
andreas@mandirisek.co.id
boy.triyono@mandirisek.co.id
damar.gumilang@mandirisek.co.id
herianto@mandirisek.co.id
yohanes.triyanto@mandirisek.co.id
hendra.riady@mandirisek.co.id
indra.masari@mandirisek.co.id
yogiswara.perdana@mandirisek.co.id
widodo@mandirisek.co.id
Linawati@mandirisek.co.id
bambang.suwanto@mandirisek.co.id
ruwie@mandirisek.co.id
aidil.idham@mandirisek.co.id
yuri.ariadi@mandirisek.co.id
INSTITUTIONAL SALES
Lokman Lie
Silva Halim
Andrew Handaya
Cindy Amelia P. Kalangie
Janefer Amanda Soelaiman
Karmia Tandjung-Nasution
Mirna Santikara Salim
Oos Rosadi
Vera Ongyono
Yohan Setio, CFA
Zahra Aldila Niode
Kusnadi Widjaja
Edwin Pradana Setiadi
Jane Theodoven Sukardi
Michael Taarea
RETAIL SALES
Andreas M. Gunawidjaja
Boy Triyono
A. A. Damargumilang
Herianto
Yohanes Triyanto
Hendra Riady
Indra Mas'ari
Yogiswara P.
Widodo
Linawati
Bambang Suwanto
Ruwie
Aidil Idham
Yuri Ariadi
INVESTMENT RATINGS: Indicators of expected total return (price appreciation plus dividend yield) within the 12-month period from the date of the last
published report, are: Buy (10% or higher), Neutral (-10% to10%) and Sell (-10% or lower).
DISCLAIMER: This report is issued by PT. Mandiri Sekuritas, a member of the Indonesia Stock Exchanges (IDX) and Mandiri Sekuritas is registered and
supervised by the Financial Services Authority (OJK). Although the contents of this document may represent the opinion of PT. Mandiri Sekuritas, deriving its
judgement from materials and sources believed to be reliable, PT. Mandiri Sekuritas or any other company in the Mandiri Group cannot guarantee its
accuracy and completeness. PT. Mandiri Sekuritas or any other company in the Mandiri Group may be involved in transactions contrary to any opinion
herein to make markets, or have positions in the securities recommended herein. PT. Mandiri Sekuritas or any other company in the Mandiri Group may seek
or will seek investment banking or other business relationships with the companies in this report. For further information please contact our number
62-21-5263445 or fax 62-21-5275711.
ANALYSTS CERTIFICATION: Each contributor to this report hereby certifies that all the views expressed accurately reflect his or her views about the
companies, securities and all pertinent variables. It is also certified that the views and recommendations contained in this report are not and will not be
influenced by any part or all of his or her compensation.