1/11/2016

G.R.No.L2068

TodayisMonday,January11,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L2068October20,1948
DOMINADORB.BUSTOS,petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIOG.LUCERO,JudgeofFirstInstanceofPampanga,respondent.
E.M.Banzaliforpetitioner.
ActingProvincialFiscalAlbinoL.FigueroaandAssistantProvincialFiscalMarceloL.Mallariforrespondent.

TUASON,J.:
Thepetitionerherein,anaccusedinacriminalcase,filedamotionwiththeCourtofFirstInstanceofPampanga
afterhehadbeenboundovertothatcourtfortrial,prayingthattherecordofthecaseberemandedtothejustice
of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might crossexamine the
complainantandherwitnessesinconnectionwiththeirtestimony,onthestrengthofwhichwarrantwasissuedfor
thearrestoftheaccused.Themotionwasdeniedandthatdenialisthesubjectmatterofthisproceeding.
Accordingtothememorandumsubmittedbythepetitioner'sattorneytotheCourtofFirstInstanceinsupportof
hismotion,theaccused,assistedbycounsel,appearedatthepreliminaryinvestigation.Inthatinvestigation,the
justiceofthepeaceinformedhimofthechargesandaskedhimifhepleadedguiltyornotguilty,uponwhichhe
entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she
andherwitnessescouldbeexaminedandcrossexaminedinthemannerandformprovidedbylaw."Thefiscal
and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view
thereof,theaccused'scounselannouncedhisintentiontorenouncehisrighttopresentevidence,"andthejustice
ofthepeaceforwardedthecasetothecourtoffirstinstance.
Leavingasidethequestionwhethertheaccused,afterrenouncinghisrighttopresentevidence,andbyreasonof
that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the
accused'smotiontoreturntherecordforthepurposesetouttherein.InDequitoandSalingBuhayvs.Arellano,
G.R. No. L1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the
accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary
investigation so that they might be crossexamined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that
section11ofRule108doesnotcurtailthesounddiscretionofthejusticeofthepeaceonthematter.Wesaidthat
"whilesection11ofRule108definestheboundsofthedefendant'srightinthepreliminaryinvestigation,thereis
nothinginitoranyotherlawrestrictingtheauthority,inherentinacourtofjustice,topursueacourseofaction
reasonablycalculatedtobringoutthetruth."
Butwemadeitclearthatthe"defendantcannot,asamatterofright,compelthecomplaintandhiswitnessesto
repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of
arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnessesagainsthimdoesnotapplytopreliminaryhearings'norwilltheabsenceofapreliminaryexamination
beaninfringementofhisrighttoconfrontwitnesses."Asamatteroffact,preliminaryinvestigationmaybedone
awaywithentirelywithoutinfringingtheconstitutionalrightofanaccusedunderthedueprocessclausetoafair
trial.
Theforegoingdecisionwasrenderedbyadividedcourt.Theminoritywentfartherthanthemajorityanddenied
evenanydiscretiononthepartofthejusticeofthepeaceorjudgeholdingthepreliminaryinvestigationtocompel
thecomplainantandhiswitnessestotestifyanew.
Upontheforegoingconsiderations,thepresentpetitionisdismissedwithcostsagainstthepetitioner.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/oct1948/gr_l2068_1948.html

1/7

1/11/2016

G.R.No.L2068

Moran,C.J.,Paras,Pablo,Bengzon,andBriones,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions

FERIA,J.,dissenting:
Iamsorrytodissentfromthedecision.
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of
Masantol,Pampanga,andafterbeinginformedofthecriminalchargesagainsthimandaskedifhepleadedguilty
or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that the complainant present her
evidencesothatherwitnessescouldbeexaminedandcrossexaminedinthemannerandformprovidedbylaw."
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was
forwardedtotheCourtofFirstInstanceofPampanga.
ThecounselfortheaccusedpetitionerfiledamotionwiththeCourtofFirstInstanceprayingthattherecordofthe
case be remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might crossexamine the
complainantandherwitnessesinconnectionwiththeirtestimony.Themotionwasdenied,andforthatreasonthe
presentspecialcivilactionofmandamuswasinstituted.
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence during the investigation in the
justiceofthepeace,wasnotawaiverofhisallegedrighttobeconfrontedwithandcrossexaminethewitnesses
fortheprosecution,thatis,ofthepreliminaryinvestigationprovidedforinGeneralOrderNo.58andActNo.194,
towhichheclaimstobeentitled,asshownbythefactthat,assoonasthecasewasforwardedtotheCourtof
First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with said court to remand the case to the Justice of the
PeaceofMasantolorderingthelattertomakesaidpreliminaryinvestigation.Hismotionhavingbeendenied,the
petitionerhasfiledthepresentactioninwhichhesquarelyattacksthevalidityoftheprovisionofsection11,Rule
108,onthegroundthatitdepriveshimoftherighttobeconfrontedwithandcrossexaminethewitnessesforthe
prosecution,contrarytotheprovisionofsection13,ArticleVIII,oftheConstitution.
InthecaseofDequitoandSalingBuhayvs.Arellano,No.L1336,wedidnotdiscussanddecidethequestionof
validityorconstitutionalityofsaidsection11inconnectionwithsection1ofRule108,becausethatquestionwas
notraisedtherein,andwemerelyconstruedtheprovisionsonpreliminaryinvestigationorRule108.Insaidcase
thewriterofthisdissentingopinionsaid:
It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting opinion, then a practising
attorney,wastheonewhopreparedthedraftoftheRulesofCourtrelatingtocriminalprocedure,andthe
provisionsonpreliminaryinvestigationinthedraftwerethesameasthoseoftheoldlaw,whichgavethe
defendanttherighttobeconfrontedwithandtocrossexaminethewitnessesfortheprosecution.Butthe
SupremeCourtapprovedandadoptedintotothedraft,exceptthepartreferringtopreliminaryinvestigation
whichitmodified,bysuppressingsaidrightandenacting,initsstead,theprovisionsofsection11ofRule
108 in its present form. I prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority
decision,whichisajudiciallegislationandmakestheexerciseoftherightofadefendanttobeconfronted,
withandcrossexaminethewitnessesagainsthim,todependentirelyuponthewhimorcapriceofajudge
orofficerconductingthepreliminaryinvestigation.
Butnowthequestionofthevalidityofsaidsection11,Rule108,issquarelypresentedtothisCourtfordecision,
wehaveperforcetopassuponit.
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or
modifysubstantiverights."Theconstitutionaddedthelastpartoftheabovequotedconstitutionalpreceptinorder
toemphasizethattheSupremeCourtisnotempowered,andthereforecannotenactorpromulgatesubstantive
lawsorrules,foritisobviousthatruleswhichdiminish,increaseormodifysubstantiverights,aresubstantiveand
notadjectivelawsorrulesconcerningpleading,practiceandprocedure.
It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be
confrontedwithandcrossexaminethewitnessesfortheprosecutedinpreliminaryinvestigationaswellasinthe
trialofthecaseisasubstantiveright.Itisbasedonhumanexperience,accordingtowhichapersonisnotprone
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/oct1948/gr_l2068_1948.html

2/7

1/11/2016

G.R.No.L2068

totellalieagainstanotherinhispresence,knowingfullywellthatthelattermayeasilycontradicthim,andthatthe
credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a crossexamination. It is
substantiverightbecausebyexercisingit,anaccusedpersonmayshow,evenifhehasnoevidenceinhisfavor,
thatthetestimoniesofthewitnessesfortheprosecutionarenotsufficienttoindicatethatthereisaprobabilitythat
acrimehasbeencommittedandheisguiltythereof,andthereforetheaccusedisentitledtobereleasedandnot
committedtoprison,andthusavoidanopenandpublicaccusationofcrime,thetrouble,expense,andanxietyof
apublictrial,andthecorrespondinganxietyormoralsufferingwhichacriminalprosecutionalwaysentails.
ThisrightisnotaconstitutionalbutastatutoryrightgrantedbylawtoanaccusedoutsideoftheCityofManila
becauseoftheusualdelayinthefinaldispositionofcriminalcasesinprovinces.Thelawdoesnotgrantsuchright
to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of the
promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of in the Court of First
Instanceofsaidcity.Butthisright,thoughnotaconstitutionalone,cannotbemodified,abridged,ordiminished
bytheSupremeCourt,byvirtueoftherulemakingpowerconferreduponthisCourtbytheConstitution.
Sincetheprovisionsofsection11ofRule108asconstruedbythisCourtinseveralcases,(inwhichthequestion
of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right
underdiscussion,itfollowsthatsaidsection11diminishesthesubstantiverightofthedefendantincriminalcase,
andthisCourthasnopowerorauthoritytopromulgateitandthereforeisnullandvoid.
ThefactthatthemajorityofthisCourthasruledintheabovecitedcaseofDequitoandSalingBuhayvs.Arellano,
thattheinferiororjusticeofthepeacecourtshavediscretiontograntadefendant'srequesttohavethewitnesses
fortheprosecutionrecalledtotestifyagaininthepresenceofthedefendantandbecrossexaminedbythelatter,
does not validate said provision because to make the exercise of an absolute right discretionary or dependent
upon the will or discretion of the court or officer making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or
modifyit.
Petitionisthereforegranted.
PERFECTO,J.,dissenting:
In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs.Arellano, No. L1336, we
said:
In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted, and applied in a way that will not
contravenetheconstitutionalprovisionguaranteeingtoallaccusedtheright"tomeetthewitnessesfaceto
face."(Section1[17],ArticleIII.)
Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said reglementary section, the defendant is
entitled as a matter of fundamental right to her the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and to
crossexaminethem.
Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally be convicted, he is liable to endure the
ordeal eloquently depicted in the decision, and the constitutional guarantee protects defendants, not only
from the jeopardy of being finally convicted and punished, but also from the physical, mental and moral
sufferingsthatmayunjustlybevisiteduponhiminanyoneofthestagesofthecriminalprocessinstituted
againsthim.Hemustbeaffordedtheopportunitiestohavethechargesagainsthimquashed,notonlyat
thefinalhearing,butalsoatthepreliminaryinvestigation,ifbyconfrontingthewitnessesfortheprosecution
hecanconvincethecourtthatthechargesaregroundless.Thereisnojusticeincompellinghimtoundergo
the troubles of a final hearing if at the preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in his favor.
Otherwise, the preliminary investigation or hearing will be an empty gesture that should not have a place
withintheframeworkofdignifiedandsolemnjudicialproceedings.
Onthestrengthoftheabovequotedopiniontheopinionshouldbegrantedandsowevote.
Petitiondismissed.
RESOLUTION
March8,1949
TUASON,J.:
Thiscauseisnowbeforeusonamotionforreconsideration.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L
1336: "The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to
preliminaryhearingsnorwilltheabsenceofapreliminaryexaminationbeaninfringementofhisrighttoconfront
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/oct1948/gr_l2068_1948.html

3/7

1/11/2016

G.R.No.L2068

witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample
enoughtodisposetheconstitutionalquestionpleadedintheapplicationforcertiorari.Heedingthewishesofthe
petitioner,weshallenlargeuponthesubject.
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court 1 infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution.2Itissaidthattheruleinquestiondealswithsubstantivemattersandimpairssubstantiverights.
Wecannotagreewiththisview.Weareoftheopinionthatsection11ofRule108,likeitspredecessors,isan
adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the
twotermsinthisrespectmaybesaidtobesynonymous.Substantiverightsisatermwhichincludesthoserights
whichoneenjoysunderthelegalsystempriortothedisturbanceofnormalrelations.(60C.J.,980.)Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
whichgiverisetoacauseofactionthatpartofthelawwhichcourtsareestablishedtoadministerasopposedto
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
(36C.J.,2752C.J.S.,1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
punishmentforcommittingthem,asdistinguishedfromtheprocedurallawwhichprovidesorregulatesthesteps
bywhichonewhocommitsacrimeistobepunished.(22C.J.S.,49.)Preliminaryinvestigationiseminentlyand
essentiallyremedialitisthefirststeptakeninacriminalprosecution.
Asaruleofevidence,section11ofRule108isalsoprocedural.Evidencewhichisthe"themodeandmanner
ofprovingthecompetentfactsandcircumstancesonwhichapartyreliestoestablishthefactindisputeinjudicial
proceedings"isidentifiedwithandformspartofthemethodbywhich,inprivatelaw,rightsareenforcedand
redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading,
evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419 179 La., 462.) the entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds
withoutthrowingoutthewholecodeofevidenceembodiedintheseRules.
InBeazellvs.Ohio,269U.S.,167,70Law.ed.,216,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsaid:
Expressionsaretobefoundinearlierjudicialopinionstotheeffectthattheconstitutionallimitationmaybe
transgressedbyalterationsintherulesofevidenceorprocedure.SeeCaldervs.Bull,3Dall.386,390,1L.
ed.,648,650Cummingsvs.Missouri,4Wall.277,326,18L.ed.,356,364Kringvs.Missouri,107U.S.
221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there may be procedural changes which
operatetodenytotheaccusedadefenseavailableunderthelawsinforceatthetimeofthecommissionof
his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the
constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443
Thompsonvs.Utah,170U.S.,343,42L.ed.,1061,18Sup.Ct.Rep.,620.Butitisnotwellsettledthat
statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a
defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not
prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses at the
trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an expostfacto law. Hopt vs.
Utah,110U.S.,575,28L.ed.,263,4Sup.Ct.Rep.,202,4Am.Crim.Rep.417.Norisastatutewhich
changestherulesofevidenceaftertheindictmentsoastorenderadmissibleagainsttheaccusedevidence
previouslyheldinadmissible,Thompsonvs.Missouri,171U.S.,380,43L.ed.,204,18Sup.Ct.Rep.,922
or which changes the place of trial, Gut. vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573 or which abolishes a
court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S.,
377,382,38L.ed.,485,487,14sup.Ct.Rep.,570.
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary
investigation to crossexamine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to
offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an
essentialpartofdueprocessoflaw.Itmaybesuppressedentirely,andifthismaybedone,mererestrictionof
theprivilegeformerlyenjoyedthereundercannotbeheldtofallwithintheconstitutionalprohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to crossexamine witnesses in a preliminary
investigation,hisrighttopresenthiswitnessesremainsunaffected,andhisconstitutionalrighttobeinformedof
the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings,theonlystagewheretheguarantyofdueprocesscomesintoplay,hestillenjoystothefullextent
the right to be confronted by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminaryinvestigationtoanaccusedmaybegaugedbythefactthatthisformalityisfrequentlywaived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The difference is
somewhataquestionofdegree.(Dextervs.Edmands,89F.,467Beazellvs.Ohio,supra.)Itisdifficulttodrawa
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/oct1948/gr_l2068_1948.html

4/7

1/11/2016

G.R.No.L2068

lineinanyparticularcasebeyondwhichlegislativepoweroverremedyandprocedurecanpasswithouttouching
uponthesubstantiverightsofpartiesaffected,asitisimpossibletofixthatboundarybygeneralcondition.(State
vs.Pavelick,279P.,1102.)Thisbeingso,itisinevitablethattheSupremeCourtinmakingrulesshouldstepon
substantiverights,andtheConstitutionmustbepresumedtotolerateifnottoexpectsuchincursionasdoesnot
affecttheaccusedinaharshandarbitrarymannerordeprivehimofadefense,butoperatesonlyinalimitedand
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the
rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensivesystemofprocedure,addingnewanddifferentruleswithoutregardtotheirsourceanddiscarding
oldones.
Themotionisdenied.
Moran,C.J.,Paras,Pablo,Bengzon,Briones,andMontemayor,JJ.,concur.
FERIA,J.,dissenting:
Idissent.
Themotionforreconsiderationmustbegranted.
According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be confronted with and crossexamine the witnesses for
the prosecution in a preliminary investigation granted by law or provided for in General Orders, No. 58, as
amended,inforcepriortothepromulgationoftheRulesofCourt,isnotasubstantiverightbutamerematterof
procedure,andthereforethisCourtcansuppressitinsection11,Rule108,oftheRulesofCourt,forthefollowing
reasons:
First.Because"preliminaryinvestigationiseminentlyandessentiallyremedialitisthefirststeptakeninacriminal
prosecution." . . . "As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . . "The entire rules of
evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court." And therefore "we can not tear down section 11 of
Rule108onconstitutionalgroundswithoutthrowingoutthewholeCodeofevidenceembodiedintheserules."
Secondly.Because,"preliminaryinvestigationisnotanessentialpartofdueprocessoflaw.Itmaybesuppressed
entirely,andifthismaybedone,mererestrictionoftheprivilegeformerlyenjoyedthereundercannotbeheldto
fallwithintheconstitutionalprohibition."
Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of exact definition. The
differenceissomewhataquestionofdegree"...Itisdifficulttodrawalineinanyparticularcasebeyondwhich
legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected,asitisimpossibletofixthatboundarybygeneralcondition...."Thisbeingso,itisinevitablethatthe
Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerateifnottoexpectsuchincursionasdoesnotaffecttheaccusedinaharshandarbitrarymannerordeprive
himofadefense,butoperatesonlyinalimitedandunsubstantialmannertohisdisadvantage."
Beforeproceedingitisnecessarytodistinguishsubstantivelawfromprocedure,forthedistinctionisnotalways
wellunderstood.Substantivelawisthatpartofthelawwhichcreates,defines,andregulatesrightsasopposedto
objective or procedural law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights. What constitutes practice and
procedureinthelawisthemodeorproceedingbywhichalegalrightisenforced,"thatwhichregulatestheformal
stepsinanactionorjudicialproceedingsthecourseofprocedureincourtstheform,mannerandorderinwhich
proceedings have been, and are accustomed to be had the form, manner and order of carrying on and
conductingsuitsorprosecutionsinthecourtsthroughtheirvarioussagesaccordingtotheprinciplesoflawand
theruleslaiddownbytherespectivecourts."31Cyc.LawandProcedure,p.1153id.,32,section405Rapalje&
Lawrence'sLawDictionaryAndersonLawDictionaryBouvier'sLawDictionary.
SubstantiverightsmaybecreatedorgrantedeitherintheConstitutionorinanybranchofthelaw,civil,criminal,
administrative or procedural law. In our old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, there are
provisions which create, define and regulate substantive rights, and many of those provisions such as those
relatingtoguardianship,adoption,evidenceandmanyothersareincorporatedintheRulesofCourtforthesake
ofconvenienceandnotbecausethisCourtisempoweredtopromulgatethemasrulesofcourt.Andouroldlawof
CriminalProcedureGeneralOrdersNo.58grantstheoffendedpartytherighttocommenceacriminalactionor
file a complaint against the offender and to intervene in the criminal prosecution against him, and grants the
defendant in the Court of First Instance (except in the City of Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary
investigationincludinghisrightsduringsaidinvestigation,andtherightsatthetrial,whicharenowreproducedor
incorporated in Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules of Court, except the rights now in question. And all
these,andothersnotnecessaryforustomention,areobviouslysubstantiverights.
(1)Astothefirstargument,thepremise"thepreliminaryinvestigationiseminentlyandessentiallyremedialisnot
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/oct1948/gr_l2068_1948.html

5/7

1/11/2016

G.R.No.L2068

correct.Undoubtedlythemajoritymeanstosayprocedural,inlinewiththeconclusionintheresolution,because
remedial law is one thing, and procedural law is another. Obviously they are different branches of the law.
"Remedialstatute"is"astatuteprovidingaremedyforaninjuryasdistinguishedfromapenalstatute.Astatute
givingapartyamodeofremedyforawrongwherehehadnoneoradifferentonebefore....Remedialstatutes
are those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such superfluities in the common law, as arise
eitherfromthegeneralimperfectionsofallhumanlaw,fromchangeoftimeandcircumstances,fromthemistakes
and unadvised determination of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause whatsoever."
(Black'sLawDictionary,thirdedition,pp.1525,1526.)
It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to right of defendant after arrest "is a rule of
evidenceandthereforeisalsoprocedural."Inthefirstplace,theprovisionsofsaidsectiontotheeffectthat"the
defendant, after the arrest and his delivery to the court has the right to be informed of the complaint or
informationfiledagainsthim,andalsotobeinformedofthetestimonyandevidencepresentedagainsthim,and
maybeallowedtotestifyandpresentwitnessesorevidenceforhimifhesodesires,"arenotrulesofevidence
andinthesecondplace,itisevidentthatmostoftherulesofevidence,ifnotall,aresubstantivelawsthatdefine,
create or regulate rights, and not procedural. "Rules of evidence are substantive rights found in common law
chieflyandgrowingoutofreasoning,experienceandcommonsenseoflawyersandcourts."(Statevs.Pavelich,
etal.,279P.,1102.)"Itistruethatweighingofevidenceandtherulesofpracticewithrespecttheretoformpartof
thelawofprocedure,buttheclassificationofproofsissometimedeterminedbythesubstantivelaw."(U.S.vs.
Genato,15Phil.,170,176.)Howcanthelawonjudicialnotice,conclusiveaswellasjuristantum presumption,
hearsay and best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, interpretation of documents, competency of a person to
testifyasawitnessbeconsideredprocedural?
Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional
groundswithoutthrowingoutthewholecodeofevidenceembodiedintheseRules,"isevidentlywrong,notonly
forthereasonjuststated,butbecauseourcontentionthatthedefendantcannotbedeprivedofhisrighttobe
confronted with and crossexamine the witness of the prosecution is a preliminary investigation under
considerationwouldnot,ifupheld,necessarilyteardownsaidsection.Ourtheory,isthatsaidsection11should
besoconstruedastobevalidandeffective,thatis,thatifthedefendantasksthecourttorecallthewitnessor
witnessesfortheprosecutiontotestifyagaininhispresence,andtoallowtheformertocrossexaminethelatter,
the court or officer making the preliminary investigation is under obligation to grant the request. But if the
defendant does not so ask the court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be confronted with and
crossexaminethewitnessagainsthim.
(2)Withrespecttothesecondargumentorreason,itistruethatthepreliminaryinvestigationasprovidedforin
theGeneralOrders,No.58,asamended,isnotanessentialpartofdueprocessoflaw,because"dueprocessof
law" is not iron clad in its meaning its does not necessarily mean a particular procedure. Due process of law
simplyrequiresaprocedurethatfullyprotectsthelife,libertyandproperty.Forthatreasontheinvestigationtobe
made by the City Fiscal of the City of Manila under Act No. 612, now section 2465 of the Administrative Code,
before filing an information, was considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy the due process of law
constitutionalrequirement(U.S.vs.Ocampo,18Phil.,1U.S.vs.GrantandKennedy,18Phil.,122).Butitisalso
true that we have already and correctly held that: "The law having explicitly recognized and established that no
personchargedwiththecommissionofacrimeshallbedeprivedofhislibertyorsubjectedtotrialwithoutprior
preliminary investigation (provided for in General orders, No. 58, as amended) that shall show that there are
reasonablegroundstobelievehimguilty,therecanbenodoubtthattheaccusedwhoisdeprivedofhisliberty,
tried and sentenced without the proper preliminary investigation having been made in his regard, is convicted
withouttheprocessoflaw,"(UnitedStatesvs.Banzuela,31Phil.,564).
TherulinginBeazellvs.Ohio,269U.S.167,70Law.ed.,216,quotedintheresolution,hasnoapplicationtothe
present case, for the question involved therein was the power of Congress to alter the rules of evidence and
procedure without violating the constitutional precept that prohibits the passing of ex post facto law, while the
question herein involved is the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure,whichdiminishthesubstantiverightofadefendant,expresslyprohibitedbythesameprovisionofthe
ConstitutionthatconfersuponthisCourtthepowertopromulgatesaidrules.
(3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion that "the distinction between remedy and
'substantive right' is incapable of exact definition" indeed "the difference is somewhat a question of degree,"
(Dextervs. Edmonds, 89 F 487), is immaterial, because, as we have already said in refuting the majority's first
reason,remedyandprocedurearetwocompletelydifferentthings.
Asabovedefined,substantivelawisclearlydifferentiatedfromprocedurallawandpractice.Butevenassuming
arguendo that it is difficult to draw the line in any particular case beyond which the power of the court over
procedurecannotpasswithouttouchinguponthesubstantialrightoftheparties,whatthisCourtshoulddointhat
case would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of procedure which many increase, diminish or modify
substantive right in order to avoid violating the constitutional prohibition above referred to. Because as this
Supreme Court is not empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or abrogate substantive rights, but only to
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/oct1948/gr_l2068_1948.html

6/7

1/11/2016

G.R.No.L2068

promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure which "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights," this Court can not step on them in making the rules, and the Constitution must be presumed not to
toleratenorexpectsuchincursionaswouldaffectthesubstantiverightsoftheaccusedinanymanner.
Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and crossexamine the witness against him in a
preliminaryinvestigationwouldaffecttheaccusednotinalimitedandunsubstantialbutinaharshandarbitrary
manner.Thetestimonyofawitnessgivenintheabsenceofthedefendantandwithoutanopportunityonthepart
ofthelattertocrossexaminehimisahearsayevidence,anditshouldnotbeadmittedagainstthedefendantina
preliminary investigation that is granted to the latter as a protection against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, supra). Otherwise, an accused who is innocent and should not be
arrested, or if arrested should be released immediately a short time after his arrest after the preliminary
investigation,wouldhavetobeheldfortrialandwaitforaconsiderableperiodoftimeuntilthecaseistriedand
acquittedaftertrialbytheCourtsofFirstInstanceinprovincesonaccountoftheadmissionofsuchevidencein
thepreliminaryinvestigation,evidencenotadmissibleatthetrial.
Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the necessary proceedings the decision of the
majorityreversedormodifiedinaccordancewithmydissentingopinion.
PERFECTO,J.:
Wedissent.OuropinionintheDequitocasestillstands.Themotionforreconsiderationshouldbegranted.

Footnotes
TUASON,J.:
1Rightsofdefendantafterarrest.Afterthearrestofthedefendantandhisdeliverytothecourt,he
shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the
substanceofthetestimonyandevidencepresentedagainsthim,and,ifhedesirestotestifyortopresent
witnessesorevidenceinhisfavor,hemaybeallowedtodoso.Thetestimonyofthewitnessesneednotbe
reducedtowritingbutthatofthedefendantshallbetakeninwritingandsubscribedbyhim.
2TheSupremeCourtshallhavethepowertopromulgaterulesconcerningpleading,practice,and
procedureinallcourts,andtheadmissiontothepracticeoflaw.Saidrulesshallbeuniformforallcourtsof
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts,
subjecttothepoweroftheSupremeCourttoalterandmodifythesame.TheNationalAssemblyshallhave
thepowertorepeal,alter,orsupplementtherulesconcerningpleading,practice,andprocedure,andthe
admissiontothepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/oct1948/gr_l2068_1948.html

7/7