SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners, vs.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188056 , January 8, 2013
Facts:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom
Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies
(Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their
written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a
number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ)
Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial
Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for
appropriate action.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ)
Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial
Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for
appropriate action.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the
DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary
of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182.
Issue:
WON respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
DO No. 182.
Ruling:

They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the
Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already indicated why the issuances
were not infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the
petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
There is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In
ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, the Court has extended the presumption of
validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued by
administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and
are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they
have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.
FREEMAN, INC., FREEMAN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., CHIAO
LIAN, LECHU S. LIM, PERLITA S. DYOGI, OLIVIA S. SANTOS, CARMEN S. SAW
and RUBEN CHUA, petitioners, vs. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, SAW MUI, RUBEN SAW, DIONISIO SAW, LINA S. CHUA, LUCILA
S. RUSTE and EVELYN SAW, respondents.
G.R. No. 110265, July 7, 1994
Facts:
This petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the order of respondent Securities and Exchange Commission dated 7
January 1993 in SEC-EB No. 308 denying the action of petitioners to nullify the 7
January 1992 order of the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No.
3577.
Sometime in 1986 and 1987, Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN), was granted a loan by
Equitable Banking Corporation (EQUITABLE) as evidenced by two (2) promissory
notes, P.N. No. 125957 dated 8 December 1986 for P1,700,000.00 payable 8
December 1987, and P.N. No. TL-369 dated 24 April 1987 for P6,000,000.00 payable
24 April 1988. Saw Chiao Lian, President of Freeman, Inc., signed as co-maker in
both promissory notes.
When FREEMAN failed to pay its obligations, EQUITABLE instituted collection suit
against FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian. EQUITABLE also prayed for preliminary
attachment.

On 27 May 1988, private respondents Saw Mui, Ruben Saw, Dionisio Saw, Lina S.
Chua, Lucila S. Ruste and Evelyn Saw filed an answer in intervention claiming that
they owned the minority interest in FREEMAN.
On 12 October 1988, the trial court denied the intervention of private respondents.
The denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court. 2
The collection case was terminated when the parties entered into a compromise
agreement duly approved by the court and a decision rendered thereon on 5
December 1988. However, Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN) and Saw Chiao Lian,
defendants in the trial court, failed to comply with the judgment.
On 30 January 1989, a writ of execution was issued. Two (2) parcels of land
belonging to FREEMAN covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220 were levied upon and
sold at public auction on 31 March 1989. The highest bidder was one of the
petitioners, Freeman Management and Development Corporation (FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT), which thereafter registered its certificate of sale with the Register of
Deeds.
On 23 May 1989, before FREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the
properties purchased at the auction sale, private respondents, representing the
minority shareholdings of FREEMAN, filed a petition with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the dissolution of FREEMAN, accounting and
reconveyance of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220.
On 5 April 1990, private respondent filed a similar complaint against petitioners with
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. The complaint sought to annul the
compromise agreement between EQUITABLE on one hand and defendants FREEMAN
and Saw Chiao Lian on the other, as well as the promissory notes executed by Saw
Chiao Lian, the auction sale, and the sheriff's certificate of sale of the lots covered
by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same
was a duplication of the case pending in the SEC. But the motion was denied.
Petitioners went up on certiorari to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial
court and directed the dismissal of the complaint by reason of the pendency of the
case.
On 7 January 1992, on motion on private respondents in SEC Case No. 3577, and
despite the opposition thereto by petitioners, SEC Hearing Officer Juanito B. Almosa,
Jr., issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the consolidation of ownership
of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the auction
sale of 31 March 1989, the redemption period having expired on 7 April 1990.
On 7 January 1992, on motion on private respondents in SEC Case No. 3577, and
despite the opposition thereto by petitioners, SEC Hearing Officer Juanito B. Almosa,
Jr., issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the consolidation of ownership
of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the auction
sale of 31 March 1989, the redemption period having expired on 7 April 1990.

Issue:
WON the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of
jurisdiction in sustaining the order of its Hearing Officer granting the writ of
injunction enjoining consolidation of ownership in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT.
Ruling:
SEC Case No. 3577 arose from the action filed by private respondents as minority
shareholders of petitioner FREEMAN for the dissolution of the corporation and
reconveyance of the properties conveyed to another petitioner FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT in a public auction. The SEC maintained that it had jurisdiction to
issue the writ of injunction preventing the consolidation of ownership in FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT on the basis of our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals.
Our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals should be understood in the light of two(2)
basic legal principles. First, that administrative agencies like the SEC are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction and as such can exercise only those powers which are
specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. 14 Section 5 of P.D. No. 902A, as amended, provides the cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide. These include controversies arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
and, between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it
concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. Section 6 of the
same decree empowers the SEC to issue preliminary or permanent injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction.
The action for dissolution of FREEMAN filed by its minority stockholders is well
within the jurisdiction of the SEC to resolve in accordance with P.D. No. 902-A.
However, the inclusion in the SEC case of FREEMAN MANAGEMENT of which private
respondents are not stockholders for the purpose of compelling it to reconvey to
FREEMAN the properties originally owned by the latter but were levied upon and
sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT in a public auction is a matter outside of the limited
jurisdiction of the SEC. The petition for reconveyance of properties against
FREEMAN MANAGEMENT is not an intra-corporate controversy since private
respondents have no shares or interests whatsoever in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT, a
corporation separate and distinct from FREEMAN, which is undergoing dissolution
proceedings in the SEC.
The second basic principle is the doctrine of non-interference which should be
regarded as highly important in judicial stability and in the administration of justice
whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened,
modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 15 The SEC is
at the very least co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have no
power to control the other. 16 Moreover, in the instant case, judgment was rendered
by the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44404 approving the compromise agreement

between EQUITABLE on one hand, and FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian on the other. A
writ of execution was issued against the defendants to enforce the judgment and
two (2) properties of FREEMAN were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT as highest bidder in the public auction.
Finally, the judgment was fully satisfied and a certificate of sale was issued to
FREEMAN MANAGEMENT. It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully
satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all. 17 It cannot be modified
or altered. Hence, the properties sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT are now
considered excluded from the corporate assets of FREEMAN and can no longer be
the subject of the proceedings in the SEC for the dissolution of the latter. Therefore
SEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a writ of injunction enjoining FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT from consolidating its ownership over the two (2) parcels of land it
acquired as highest bidder in the execution sale.
RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY
GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.

LUIS

T.

SANTOS

and

G.R. No. 90336, August 12, 1991

Facts:
The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng
mga barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents
of the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened
in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding
the election of its officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente
Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres
of Baras. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial
Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with
Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold
Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its
members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding
officer. Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila,
Jacob and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:

PresidentRuperto Taule, Vice-PresidentAllan Aquino, SecretaryVicente Avila,

TreasurerFidel Jacob, Auditor Leo Sales 1
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a
letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting
the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as
President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent
Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent
Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a
purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected
President of the FABC in Catanduanes.
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election
of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new
one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of
Region V of the Department of Local Government.
Issue:
WON the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay
Councils and/or WON he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in nullifying the election.

Ruling:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational setup of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong
barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
members. However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with
jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and
regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by
law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned
to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective
organization.

Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests
jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest
filed in relation thereto and consequently declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,
administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. 19 The jurisdiction of
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes
reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. 20 Such jurisdiction
is essential to give validity to their determinations. 21
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by
necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power
to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng
mga barangay. An understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over
local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the
President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the
katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than
the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local
government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and
non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component
of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be
achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by
the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the
political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of
presidential power to general supervision over local governments. 27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28
This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that
"the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 29 To
deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the
elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy
of promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by
respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June
18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his
jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election
protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary

courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest.