Christology and the Trinity: An Exploration

By Edgar G. Foster
EMF Publishing
2001
All rights reserved
Table of Contents
Preface
Christology and the Trinity: An Exploration
Did the First Century Ecclesia Believe that Jesus Was Almighty God?
Gerald Borchert's Exegesis of John 8:58
Did the Ante-Nicene Fathers Teach or Believe in the Trinity?
The Kenosis of Jesus Christ: What Does It Tell Us about the Son of God?
Aseity and the Trinity
Excursus A: John 5:26 and Aseity
Does Hebrews 1:1-8 Teach that Christ is Almighty God?

Preface
Since 1983, I have intensely devoted my life to Biblical or theological studies. During
these relatively short but rewarding years, I have also endeavored to know the true God
more intimately. Furthermore, the present writer has tried to discern what God requires
of him as one of His worshipers. In the process of searching for the living God, I have
concluded that Jesus Christ cannot be Almighty God. Thus I have written this book to
dispel the erroneous notion that Christ is one persona in a triune Godhead.
Furthermore, we compose this monograph to present an authentic portrait of Jesus
Christ since a Christian has a twofold obligation to both expose falsehood and
communicate or teach truth.
In this work, I have employed Greek and Latin terms somewhat liberally. I have taken
care, however, to transliterate such terms and provide a concise glossary of words that
need to be defined.[1] This work also contains in-text citations (MLA Style) rather than
footnotes.[2] In this way, I am following the convention used by the Word Commentary
series and other theologians who have elected to dispense with footnotes. The MLA
citations consist of the author's name and the page number of the work that I am citing.
Consequently, all the reader has to do is go to the works consulted list in the back of this
book to find out what source a citation comes from. In future editions and in the second
volume of Christology, there will be a scholar's version that starts to include footnotes.
The reader should also note that we employ the historical-theological as well as the
grammatical approach in this work.[3] Based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas,
William Most has rightly contended that theology entails 'arguing from authority' (Most
2). With the words of Most in mind, I have endeavored to freely cite both theological

and historical authorities, always attempting to employ these authorities aright. Citing a
number of sources (at times extensively) is also necessary since certain persons claim
that only Jehovah's Witnesses explain particular Biblical verses (such as Phil 2:6-7) in
certain ways. Indeed, it is said that only the Witnesses posit certain notions about Christ
(e.g., that he is never called or identified as Creator in Holy Writ). Yet other detractors
suggest that Jehovah's Witnesses egregiously misuse scholarly sources. However, my
study will demonstrate that theologians who have shown themselves to be highly skilled
in the activity of "God-talk"[4] also corroborate the Witness view with respect to what
particular Bible passages actually say about the Son of God.[5] I apologize in advance for
the length and frequency of quotes at times, but I felt they were necessary in the context
of this work.
Additionally, we cover and discuss various views in this book. The summation of each
chapter represents the author's views, which are consonant with the religious beliefs of
Jehovah's Witnesses. In addition, while I have written this work primarily for theology
students, I hope that my fellow brothers and sisters will benefit from it as well. As
regards my qualifications, I have a degree in Classical Languages (Latin and Greek) and
I have been a Bible student for over fifteen years. I may now add that I have studied
ecclesiastical history at the University of Glasgow (focusing on Tertullian) and I am
currently completing postgraduate work at this wonderful research institution.
It is important to point out that while I am one of Jehovah's Witnesses, this project is
solely my own. Christology is not sponsored or in any way directed by the Christian
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses. Lastly, Vol. II of Christology will be released in
December 2003.[6]
October 10, 1997
Edgar G. Foster

Christology and the Trinity: An Exploration

Upon reading the title of this document, several readers may wonder why they should be
interested in the subject of Christology. Furthermore, one may rightly ask how we
should define Christology. To initiate the discussion, we will address the latter concern
first.
Christology is the theological doctrine of both the person and work of Jesus Christ.[7] It
systematically concerns itself with the pre-existent Christ (high Christology) as well as
the "enfleshed" Logos (low Christology).[8] Of all the significant Christian theological
sub-disciplines, systematic theologians generally consider Christology to be the
preeminent doctrine of Christian theology (theologia). In the words of theology
professor Owen Thomas, Christology is the "basis" of systematic Christian theology
(Thomas "Theology" 143). Oscar Cullmann has even declared that early Christian
theology "is in reality almost exclusively Christology."[9]

While we should temper Cullmann's words somewhat, since first century Christians
primarily focused on the God and Father of Jesus Christ in their sacred worship and
kerygmatic activities, his observations mutatis mutandis are accurate. For the
primordial documents written by the Primitive community of faith (the first century
Christian assembly) and the second century Church (ecclesia) clearly revolve around the
person of Christ and his exalted role in God's eternal purpose or aion prothesis (Eph
3:8-11; Phil 2:5-11; Col 2:1-3).[10] Therefore it is imperative that we thoroughly examine
the work and person of Christ as delineated in the Greek New Testament and the preNicenes.
But if the early Christian congregation considered Christ to be its ruler and Lord, and if
he was in fact 'life' for them (as the apostle Paul wrote in Phil 1:21-23), if the modern
Church has preserved the doctrinal tenets of the Primitive ecclesia--why should we
explore or seek to reconstruct modern Christology?
We should try to restructure the traditional Christological model put forth by most
Christian theologians as it is quite possible the modern Church presently composed of
nominal Christians does not preach the same Jesus that the first century community of
faith proclaimed (2 Cor 11:1-5).[11] In fact, it seems that during the post-apostolic period,
several Christian believers began to speculate vis--vis the being (ontos) of Christ Jesus.
"Could Jesus be Almighty God," they asked with sincere wonderment. Chapter one of
this publication will thus review the intriguing development of the Trinity doctrine and
discuss its relation to Christology as we also deal with Christological questions posed by
thinkers of ancient times.
At any rate, since the inception of the Trinity doctrine proper, "orthodox" Christianity
has adamantly taught that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit share one nature (ousia)
while subsisting as three persons (tres personae).[12] According to the Bible, however,
Jesus is not Almighty God: He is the only-begotten Son of God who is qualitatively
(essentially) distinct from his Father (Matt 16:14-17; Jn 3:16; 1 Cor 11:3; 15:24-28)!
Continually, the Johannine Gospel appears to militate against the Trinity doctrine. The
Gospel writer manifestly declares that the Son is subordinate to the Father and in fact
calls Him "My God." More importantly, Jesus starkly addresses his Father in prayer as
"the only true God" (Jn 14:28; 17:3; 20:17). Yes, the fourth Gospel consistently indicates
that the Trinity doctrine is not a product of divine revelation, but evidently originates
from the finite cognitive processes of men.
Commenting on this poignant situation, Swiss theologian Emil Brunner explains: "From
the time of Origen's doctrine of the Logos . . . speculation was rife in the sphere of
theology; thus men's interest were deflected from the historical centre to the eternal
background, and then severed from it. People then began to speculate about the
transcendent relation of the Three Persons of the Trinity within the Trinity" (Brunner
224). In this book, we will also explore and test Brunner's claims to see if they are
valid.[13]
Most Christian theologians, it seems, have obfuscated the authentic nature of Christ and
his salvific (soteriological) work by means of theological accretions. Since it appears that

Trinitarian theologians have made the identity of Jesus unnecessarily opaque, we must
now bring the alethic Christ into the light (Eph 5:13). Beneath the metaphysical
trappings (the ontological speculations of the Trinity doctrine) lies the bona fide Son of
God. As we survey the modern theological terrain, it soon becomes evident that
contemporary Christological formulations are seriously in need of restructuring. I hope
that the reader will keep an open mind while he or she reads information that will
probably appear heretical, unorthodox, and even inimical to the Christian faith, as
professed believers generally understand it. Having said the foregoing, I must now point
out that it is my desire to provoke thought in all persons who name the name of Christ
and thus help them to see what Scripture has to say about Jesus of Nazareth, the one
who was and is God's only-begotten (monogenes) Son (Jn 1:18; 20:28-31).

Did the First Century Ecclesia Believe that Jesus Was Almighty God?
Various theologians and Church historians have written that Primitive (first century)
Christianity neither affirmed nor taught that Jesus Christ is Almighty God (the second
Person of the Trinity). Speaking on our present theme, Brunner presents a balanced and
thorough discussion concerning the Trinity doctrine and its relation to first century
Christianity. After careful consideration of the New Testament and ante-Nicene
evidence, he concludes:
It was never the intention of the original witnesses to Christ in the New Testament to set
before us an intellectual problem--that of the Three Divine Persons--and then to tell us
silently to worship this mystery of the "Three in One." There is no trace of such an idea
in the New Testament . . . The ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity is not only the
product of genuine Biblical thought, it is also the product of philosophical speculation,
which is remote from the thought of the Bible . . . Similarly, the idea of the Three
Persons is more than questionable. Even Augustine felt this (cf. De Trinitate, V, 9). K.
Barth seems to share this misgiving (Kirchl. Dogm., I, I, p.703).[14]
While Brunner finds certain aspects of the Trinity doctrine problematic, most
contemporary Bible scholars and systematic theologians contend that the Primitive
Christian congregation (ecclesia) believed Jesus the Messiah was essentially God. Some
scholars even claim that the New Testament writers held divergent views about Christ or
that their respective Christological systems show signs of dialectical development
(Anderson 1ff). Nevertheless, at least some Protestant and Catholic theologians have
candidly conceded that the Trinity is not a strict Biblical doctrine. Certain thinkers have
even noted that the first century ecclesia did not believe that Jesus is Almighty God nor
did God's Primitive Christian people think that the Son of God is consubstantial with the
Father or ontologically identical to the Holy Spirit.
Martin Werner is one such writer who reports: "From a high angelic-being the Church
made Christ a god in terms of the concept of deity current in Hellenistic mythology"
(Werner 215). This change, avers Werner, took place in the post-apostolic era (214ff).
The present writer thinks that the change Werner recounts was, in fact, a deviation from

the primal tenets of first century Christianity, as we shall attempt to show in this essay.
But if the triune doctrine of God is simply a speculative human dogma that does not
truly represent the spirit of Jesus Christ's original teachings, it seems safe to conclude
that those theologians who declare that the Son of God is ontologically equal to the
Father are somewhat overstating their case. Indeed, as we examine the history of the
primordial ecclesia, it appears doubtful that early Christians ever viewed Jesus as
Almighty God qua Almighty God (Robinson 70). To buttress this point, please note the
words of John L. McKenzie (S.J.):
The relation of the Father and Son as set forth in [John 5:17ff] is the foundation of later
developments in Trinitarian and Christological belief and theology; it is not identical
with these later developments. Much of the discourse seems to be a refutation of the
charge that Jesus claimed to be equal to God. This is met by affirming that the Son can
do nothing independently of the Father. Later theology found it necessary to refine this
statement by a distinction between person and nature which John did not know.
(McKenzie 187)
McKenzie appears to substantiate the notion that the first century congregation of God
neither taught nor believed that Jesus Christ is Almighty God (Deus omnipotentia). It
did not make the fine subtle distinctions between "person and nature" that later
students or doctors of theology would introduce, implement, and heavily depend upon
to explain the supposed triune Being of God. To the contrary, the belief in the
omnipotence of Christ was a much "later" development in Christian history
(Youngblood 111). Fittingly, when commenting on the Greek of 1 Cor 8:5, 6, Clarence T.
Craig observes that for the first century writer of Corinthians: "only one is really God,
the Father of all, who is the Creator and consummation of all things" (Craig 93-94).
Craig further elucidates this point, saying:
Paul chose his prepositions [ex and dia] carefully in order to distinguish between God
the Father, who is the ultimate source of creation, and Christ, the Lord, through whom
[dia] this activity takes place . . . it is perfectly clear what Paul wants to affirm. Neither
Caesar nor Isis is Lord, but only Jesus Christ. When Paul ascribed Lordship to Christ, in
contrast to later church dogma, he did not mean that Christ was God. Christ was
definitely subordinated to God (Craig 93-94).[15]
In a monograph entitled Christianity: Essence, History and Future Hans Kung
convincingly demonstrates that the first century congregation of God did not teach that
Jesus is ontologically equal to Almighty God (Kung 95-97). After a brief review of the
New Testament evidence, he boldly declares that the Greek Scriptures do not teach that
there is one divine nature (physis) common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. That is,
the Greek Scriptures do not teach the Nicene doctrine of homoousion to patri. Rather,
the New Testament focuses on the Father: "from whom are all things and to whom are
all things" (97). He is the One who reveals Himself through Jesus Christ and He (the
Father) takes the lead in initiating,[16] in bringing to fruition the dynamic, interpersonal
divine revelatory and salvific activity gloriously manifested in human history through
the person of Jesus Christ (Jn 1:18; 2 Cor 5:19; Tit 3:4-7; Heb 1:1-2; 1 Jn 5:20). God has

supremely revealed Himself through (dia) Christ, not literally in Christ. True, the
apostle Paul does use en to describe God's saving work en Christ (2 Cor 5:19). However,
Paul utilizes the Greek preposition instrumentally in the aforesaid text: God was
reconciling the world of humankind by means of Christ (NWT).[17] Concluding our
Biblical search for evidence of Jesus' Deity, we can heartily agree with E.P. Sanders'
analysis: "Historically, it is an error to think that Christians must believe that Jesus was
superhuman, and also an error to think that in Jesus' own day his miracles were taken
as proving partial or full divinity" (Sanders 135).
Other theologians have also admitted this vital fact. In other words, they are well aware
that the Trinity is not a New Testament teaching and they admit that the New
Testament writers do not depict Jesus as Almighty God in the flesh, even if these same
scholars affirm the Trinity on other grounds. For instance, Cyril C. Richardson has
expressed his personal reservations about the doctrine of God's triunity being an
accurate depiction of the Living and true Deity portrayed in the Bible. According to
Richardson, the Trinity is "an artificial construct" (Richardson 148). As an "artificial
construct," it arbitrarily tries to resolve the perennial dialectical tension between God's
simultaneous absoluteness and relatedness to the world by esoterically delineating
necessary and eternal threeness in the Godhead. However, Richardson writes: "There is
no necessary threeness in the Godhead" (149). God's putative threefoldness, claims
Richardson, is neither eternal nor immutable nor necessary. Furthermore, the so-called
"necessary threeness in the Godhead" evidently does not obtain as an actual state of
affairs (Verhalten) "in the Godhead."
While he believes that there are immanent and necessary distinctions in the Godhead,
however, Richardson contends that the Trinity does not exhaust all of the distinctions
that one needs to make vis--vis the divine nature (ousia).[18] Nor does it resolve,
according to Richardson, the numerous antinomies evidently associated with the
absoluteness and relatedness of God. Consequently, this theologian declares that every
Trinitarian interpretation ever formulated has failed to resolve the tension between
God's absoluteness and relatedness to the world. In a word, Trinitarian formulations are
"artificial." Of course, Richardson obviously rejects the Trinity on other grounds that he
thoroughly covers in his treatise.
Nevertheless, we must genuinely ask whether Richardson's analysis is satisfactory. Does
a careful analysis of the Trinity doctrine show that it is an artificial construct, which has
failed to adequately delineate the transcendent nature of God? Most importantly, does
the Bible teach us that God is actually three divine Persons united in one community of
substance (substantiae per communionem)?
As we examine the Scriptural evidence we cannot help but conclude that the Trinity is
an anachronistic doctrine that is neither explicitly nor clearly taught in Scripture: "The
New Testament writers could not have said that Jesus Christ is God: God meant the
Father. They could and did say that Jesus is God's Son" (McKenzie 188). A close look at
McKenzie's entire work Light on the Gospels will reveal that he is not simply arguing
that early Christians did not identify Jesus with the Father (a position called modalism
or monarchianism). Rather, his observation is very clear when considered in its context.

"God meant the Father" for first century Christians, writes McKenzie. Thus, we seem
warranted in concluding that Jesus was immanently subordinate to God the Father in
the eyes of Primitive Christians. Further elucidating this point are the following words of
McKenzie: "It is altogether impossible to deduce the Nicene Creed, and still less the
dogmatic statements of the Council of Chalcedon from the Synoptic Gospels . . . The
word 'consubstantial' had not even been invented yet: far from defining it, the
evangelists could not even have spelled it. No, they did not know and they did not care"
(188). The words of John L. McKenzie again sound a distinct and unambiguous tone:
the Primitive ecclesia did not consider Jesus Christ "fully God and fully man" (vere deus
et vere homo). In truth, Jesus did not "become God" until the fourth century
(Rubenstein 211-231).
How the Belief that Jesus Is Equal to God Developed
Exactly how did the belief that Christ is ontologically equal to God the Father develop?
What factors were behind its organic and prolific growth in Christian theology? We shall
now briefly review the historical events associated with the development of the Trinity
doctrine.
The historical evidence shows that a major shift in Christianity resulted in the
uncomplicated Christian gospel acquiring extensive and complex metaphysical baggage.
At one point in the life of the Christian Church, disciples of Jesus were willing to accept
by faith, the life, death and resurrection of the only-begotten Son of God (1 Cor 2:116).[19] Though he talks exaltedly about "Gnostic" Christians (advanced believers),
Clement of Alexandria explicitly states that a simple faith (pistis) is the primary
requisite for eternal salvation through Christ: "To the Gnostic [Christian] 'are prepared
what eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of man;' but to
him who has exercised simple faith He testifies a hundredfold in return for what he has
left, a promise which has turned out to fall within human comprehension" (Stromata
4.18.4).
Unfortunately, this early Church father did not follow his own advice: his theological
ideas are largely the result of abstruse Stoicism and Neo-Platonism (Brown 87). Stanley
Burgess informs us of this fact, noting:
When referring to God, Clement follows Neoplatonic doctrine which makes heavy use of
negative theology: nothing can be said directly of God, for He cannot be defined. This
does not lead Clement to attempt any formal definition of the Trinity nor any Member
thereof. (70)
Backing Burgess' observation are these words from Clement of Alexandria's Stromata
(4.24.156):
The God, then, being indemonstrable, is not the object of knowledge, but the Son is
Wisdom, and Knowledge, and Truth, and whatever else is akin to these, and so is
capable of demonstration and definition. All the powers of the Divine Nature gathered

into one complete the idea of the Son, but He is infinite as regards each of his powers.
He is then not absolutely One as Unity, nor Many as divisible, but One as All is one.
Hence He is All. For He is a circle, all the powers being orbed and united in Him.
Commenting on this significant Clementine passage, Charles Bigg declares the dynamic
implication of these words:
Clement it will be seen, though Philo is before his eyes, has taken the leap from which
Philo recoiled. He has distinguished between the thinker and the thought, between
Mind and its unknown foundation, and in so doing has given birth to Neo-Platonism. It
is essentially a heathen conception, and can be developed consistently only on heathen
principles. (Bigg 64-65)
Clement 'heathenized' Christianity, to be sure. He was not alone in this practice,
however, for other second century believers also began to rationally investigate the
nature (ontos) of our Lord and Savior, Christ Jesus.[20] These professed Christians
earnestly endeavored to plumb the unfathomable depths of the Logos' seemingly
mysterious enfleshment, all the while ardently desiring to make sense of the supposed
ontological relationship obtaining between the transcendent Omnipotent Deity and "the
Son of His love" (Col 1:13). As a result, second century Christians subsequently began to
formulate numerous speculative notions about God and His beloved Son that have
continued to shape Christendom's doctrinal framework up to this very day (Hatch 133137).
How though could these Christians express in terms that would appeal to the public at
large, the seeming transcendent relationship obtaining between God and His onlybegotten Son? Ultimately, these believers decided to utilize Greek ontology to describe
the apparent exalted ontological relationship between the Father and the Son
(Copleston 17-22). Nevertheless, they did not carry out this determination without
encountering certain unexpected consequences.[21]
The Grecian view of ontology was faulty and riddled with inadequate philosophical
concepts and notions of being as such.[22] Indeed, it is now apparent that the early
Church Fathers placed too much trust in Grecian metaphysics when they worked out
their respective theological systems (Wolterstorff 126-127). As various these spiritual
forebears of modern-day Christendom began to lean inordinately on the Greek science
of being qua being (metaphysics), adulterated notions of God and Christ started to
slowly appear in the writings of such men as Irenaeus (quasi-Platonism), Ignatius
(possible binitarianism or ditheism), Justin Martyr (Platonism and Stoicism) as well as
Origen (paganistic syncretism).[23]
Again, we need to stress that none of the aforementioned individuals taught
Trinitarianism per se. Nevertheless, it seems accurate to attribute the pioneering of the
Trinity doctrine to these early Church Fathers (Barnard 100-105). That is, the preNicenes previously discussed in this work laid the groundwork for the Trinity by
positing metaphysical theories about God that went well beyond the rightful boundaries
long ago established by Scripture (1 Cor 4:6).

To further substantiate these charges, please note the following comments:

No single philosopher has contributed as much to Christian theology as Plato has.
Indeed, for many early Christian thinkers it was a perceived affinity between Platonism
and Christianity that allowed Christian thought to accommodate Greek philosophy. In
turn, it was Plato who gave Christianity crucial conceptual tools needed to articulate its
doctrines. (Allen and Springsted 1)
Notice that "early" Christian thought accommodated "Greek philosophy." Christian
history itself shows that this 'accommodation' involved more than simply borrowing
Greek philosophical terms or methods as "conceptual tools." Not only did Plato give
Christianity "conceptual tools," as it were, he provided an entire interpretive framework
that Christians subsequently implemented to shape their views about God and Christ.
The inimitable historian of philosophy, Frederick C. Copleston, even unabashedly
admits that early Christian apologists such as Justin Martyr or Theophilus of Antioch
"naturally made some use of terms and ideas taken from Greek philosophy" (Copleston
18). It is therefore no wonder that the Good of Plato in time became the God of
Christendom mutatis mutandis (Allen and Springsted 1).
Robert Wilken writes about the change that eventually took place in Christianity
regarding its attitude toward philosophy and Scripture. He informs us of the shift in the
following way:
Justin Martyr, a Christian writing in mid-second century, took the initial step of
presenting Christianity not as an exclusive religious tradition derived largely from
Judaism, but as a new philosophical way of life in competition with Stoics, Platonists,
Cynics, and the other ruling 'ways' of his day. What would Paul, whose scorn for
philosophy only served to support Justin's critics, have thought of Christianity as a
philosophical sect? The term 'philosophy' appears only seldom in Christian writings up
to this time, and where it appears it is usually regarded with contempt . . . No one before
him [Justin Martyr] had really thought seriously of presenting Christianity as a
philosophy, but this 'innovation,' after much opposition, came to be tolerated, accepted,
and finally celebrated by Christians of every stripe--from learned theologians to the
cobblers, washer-women, and wool-workers Celsus made fun of. (Wilken 177-183)
Concerning Origen, Stanley M. Burgess further observes:
In his understanding of the Trinity, Origen is deeply influenced by Neoplatonic thought.
Neoplatonism recognized the One, the unspeakable being from which all other beings
emanate . . . Throughout Origen's writings one can see a tension between the
recognition of the equality of members of the Trinity, and a more Neoplatonic position
which distinguished between the Father and the other members of the Godhead by
making the Son and the Holy Spirit subordinate beings. Swete (p. 131) correctly has
pointed out that Origen's teaching is not consistent throughout his writings. (Burgess
73)

While Burgess commendably admits that Neo-Platonism influenced Origen, he

nevertheless goes on to maintain that the Alexandrian theologian does not seem
consistent as one peruses his theological treatises. In his Commentary on John, for
example, Origen contends that the Logos created the Holy Spirit (2.6). However, in Peri
Archon 1.1.3, he purportedly contradicts what he explicitly declares about the Logos in
Commentary on John 2.6. Nevertheless, I do not think it is accurate to say that the
famed Alexandrian thought the Holy Spirit was an uncreated being. Nor did Origen
express such a notion in Peri Archon. Origen simply notes that the Church of his time
had not found a passage in Scripture that forthrightly declared the Holy Spirit is a
creature (Peri Archon 1.1.3). This does not mean that Origen believed the Holy Spirit
was not created, however. For elsewhere in Commentary on John he writes: "There are
three hypostases, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; and at the same time we
believe nothing to be uncreated but the Father" (Burgess 73). Therefore, Origen clearly
held that God created the Holy Spirit through the Logos (Compare Peri Archon 4.4.1).
Despite this fact, we must concede that Origen consistently espoused a Neo-Platonic
worldview that subordinated the Son and Spirit to the Father while in some way
construing each Person in the Trinity as God in some sense of the word. This is not to
say that Origen taught the Trinity per se. Nevertheless, the divine hierarchy of being
notion that characterizes Middle/Neo-Platonism evidently influenced his Christology
and special theology (Bigg 152-234). Appropriately, Hans Kung concludes that "as a
Christian one can speak of Father, Son and Spirit, without having to follow Origen in
taking over the Middle Platonic/Neo-Platonic doctrine of hypostases" (Kung "Christian
Thinkers" 67-70).
The previous reflections bring us back to the astute words of Emil Brunner:
From the time of Origen's doctrine of the Logos . . . speculation was rife in the sphere of
theology; thus men's interest were deflected from the historical centre to the eternal
background, and then severed from it. People then began to speculate about the
transcendent relation of the Three Persons of the Trinity within the Trinity. (Brunner
224)
Ergo, despite the vehement dogmatism employed in the modern proclamation
(kerygma) of the Trinity, a closer look at Christian history helps us to appreciate that
Primitive Christians simply did not think God is threefold nor did they believe that
Jesus was Almighty God. Contrariwise, the first century Christians affirmed that Christ
Jesus was ontologically subordinate to God the Father (1 Cor 15:24-28). The Trinity is a
fourth century innovation, pioneered by earlier developments involving speculations
regarding the peerless Deity of Judaism and Christianity (Hatch 332-333).
What though about alleged proof texts for the Deity of Christ? Does not the Bible itself
teach that Christ is Almighty God? What about Jn 8:58? Surely, this verse is a clear
indication that Jesus is Almighty God. We will address these issues in the next essay.
Gerald Borchert's Exegesis of John 8:58

Paul Anderson has written that the ego eimi sayings that one finds in the Johannine
Gospel are some of the "more controversial" statements debated in contemporary
Johannine studies (Anderson 21). The ego eimi declarations that occur with predication
normally do not present exegetical problems (John 6:51; 8:12). The difficulties come
when scholars examine the accounts where ego eimi ostensibly has no predicate (the socalled absolute use of ego eimi). In this regard, it is important to point out that most
exegetes consider John 8:58 to be one verse where ego eimi occurs in an absolute
manner.
In the words of Phillip Harner, when a writer employs ego eimi in an absolute manner,
he uses it in a "distinct, self-contained" way. That is, in a way which is "complete and
meaningful in itself" (Harner 3). Harner thus contends that ego eimi (when utilized in
an absolute manner) does not need a predicate in the context to make it complete.
Nevertheless, while Harner and other Biblical scholars insist on the uniqueness of ego
eimi without an explicit predicate, we should note that this view has not found
unanimous consensus among New Testament scholars or lexicographers. In fact, there
seem to be passages in the Greek Scriptures that belie this claim (John 4:26; 6:20;
9:9).[24]
In an article Ego Eimi in John 1:20 and 4:25 Edwin D. Freed examines the issues
surrounding ego eimi and questions whether the phrase ever occurs in an absolute sense
in the Johannine literary corpus. He repeatedly demonstrates how a predicate could be
supplied each time ego eimi appears in the Gospel of John. A predicate could also be
supplied in Jn 8:58.[25]
In spite of Freed's treatment, however, a number of scholars insist that ego eimi in Jn
8:58 is essentially "theophanic" (Anderson 21).[26] That is, Ex 3:14 putatively serves as a
backdrop for Jn 8:58. This OT passage evidently identifies God by means of the phrase
"I AM" (KJV). The LXX has ego eimi ho on, but note Ex. 3:15, where God is called ho on.
In view of the exclamation recorded at Ex 3:14, Anderson thinks that the expression ego
eimi in John 8:58, "is reminiscent of the revealing and saving work of Yahweh, as well as
images used to describe the true calling of Israel" (Anderson 21). In view of what
Anderson and other writers have claimed, we do well to ask: was Jesus identifying
himself with the I AM of Ex 3:14? Is Jn 8:58 "theophanic" in nature? Alternately, could
Jesus have simply been affirming his temporal existence prior to Abraham?
Critiquing Borchert's Exegesis of John 8:58
Admittedly, there are a number of learned works that scholars have produced on this
subject. I do not intend to discuss all of the immense research that has been published
about Jn 8:58, but I do want to review a few pertinent comments on this controversial
passage and then offer some remarks of my own concerning this verse. In particular, we
will focus on the observations of Gerald Borchert and critique his approach to Jn 8:58.
For starters, we should point out that Baptist exegete Gerald Borchert believes Jesus
clearly affirmed his Godhood (his essential and eternal Deity) in Jn 8:58. In fact,
Borchert claims that Jesus transparently identified himself with the so-called I AM of

the Old Testament, when he exclaimed ego eimi in Jn 8:58. His comments are as
follows:
Certainly the juxtaposing of the past tense concerning Abraham with both the prior time
and the present tense as they relate to Jesus explodes all natural reasoning concerning
time . . . Jesus claimed to be 'I am' over against Abraham. That claim was a reminder of
the claims for God in the Old Testament over against creation (Cf. Ps 90:2; Isa 42:3-9)
and of the self-designation for the comforting God of Isaiah. (Borchert 309)
Borchert definitely gives a Trinitarian slant to Jn 8:58: he vigorously proposes that
Jesus here identifies himself with the Most High God of the Old Testament. This stance
is one among many and is not to be seen as conclusive, however, since there are
countless and diverse treatments of Jn 8:58. At any rate, Borchert's main line of
reasoning is that the timeless and eternal existence of Jesus as represented by the use of
the Greek ego eimi is juxtaposed in Jn 8:58 with the temporal birth and finite existence
of Abraham. Thence, John's use of ego eimi unequivocally points to Jesus' eternal
existence.
In view of this data, we pose the following question: is Borchert's exegetical approach to
Jn 8:58 sound? Does it capture the vital and dynamic semantic value associated with
this fateful Johannine passage? Before answering these questions, it is beneficial to
review what other commentators have said about John's use of ego eimi in connection
with Jn 8:58.
The eminent Johannine scholar Raymond E. Brown pursued what remains up until now
a peerless discussion of our theme passage in his Anchor Bible Commentary on the
Gospel of John. Brown carefully detailed the sacred and banal uses of the term ego eimi.
And in doing so, he demonstrated that ego eimi could simply function as "a phrase of
common speech" (equivalent to "It is I" or "I am the one"). However, he also showed
that the formula could be used to denote solemnity and sacramentalism in the LXX, the
New Testament, in pagan Greek religious writings, and in the ancient writings of
Gnostic authors. Nevertheless, what does ego eimi denote in Jn 8:58?
In Appendix IV of the Anchor Bible Commentary Brown notes that there are four
Bultmannian classifications of ego eimi. These are as follows: (1) A presentation formula
which answers the question: "Who are you?" (2) A qualificatory phrase that addresses
the question: "What are you?" (3) An identification formula. (4) A recognition formula.
Does the Johannine employment of ego eimi in Jn 8:58 reflect any of the uses discussed
by Rudolph Bultmann? Brown favors the view that 8:58 is equating Jesus with YHWH
of the Hebrew Scriptures. He sees a possible connection between the Hebrew ani hu
used in Isaiah and the Greek ego eimi that John employs. Most modern commentators
would concur with Raymond E. Brown's conclusion in this matter. Hans Conzelmann,
however, does not interpret Jn 8:58 in an ontological manner. He writes: "Although the
'I am' formula stands out strikingly in Deutero-Isaiah, who describes Yahweh as the
light, John's terminology cannot be derived directly from there" (Conzelmann 351). The
grammatical and cotextual evidence of both Isaiah and the fourth Gospel seems to

confirm Conzelmann's stance.

Contra Brown, T.W. Manson has also proposed that ego eimi in Jn 8:58 means: "The
Messiah is here." He derives this understanding of 8:58 from Mk 13:6 (Cf. Lk 21:8)
where we find Jesus' prophecy concerning the last days: 'Many will come in my name
saying I am'.[27] Mt 24:5 adds that many would come in Jesus' name, saying: 'I am the
Messiah.' While certain expositors are inclined to reject Manson's view of Jn 8:58 for
what they deem, solid contextual and grammatical reasons, it cannot be denied that
Manson posits a suitable and thought-provoking alternative to the traditional reading of
Jn 8:58. Simply put, Manson believes that Jn 8:58 identifies Jesus as the Messiah of
God. Thus, according to Manson, it is not affirming his divine nature or eternal
existence per se. Is this view plausible? Does this explanation correspond with what the
writer of the fourth Gospel is trying to convey?
Manson's interpretation of Jn 8:58 does avoid a number of problemata that attend
Trinitarian explanations of this verse. It is very difficult, however, to see how Jesus
could have been simply and solely asserting his Messianic status in this Johannine
pericope. This is not to say that Manson's interpretation of this text is to be rejected in
toto. In contradistinction to Manson's exegesis, however, the primary point of Jn 8:58
seems to be that Jesus is predicating both his preexistence and his temporal superiority
over against Abraham's relatively mundane temporality. That is, Jesus subsisted before
Abraham came into existence and he did so on a higher plane of being, namely, a
spiritual mode of being (Daseinsweise).
This approach represents a straightforward way to read Jn 8:58. It is a grammatically
sound way to exegete the text. Therefore, to render Jn 8:58 as "I have been" makes
sense exegetically. In the excellent work Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament
Based on Semantic Domains, linguists Louw and Nida suggest that this Johannine
passage could be translated: "before Abraham came into existence, I existed" (LouwNida 158).[28] This rendering more accurately reflects the meaning of Jesus' words
recorded in 8:58. It also helps us to understand that Jesus was not necessarily speaking
in a metaphysical sense, when he said prin Abraam genesthai ego eimi. Yet, Kenneth L.
McKay's translation further improves Louw and Nida's suggestion. He suggests the
following: "I have been in existence since before Abraham was born."[29] McKay's
rendition is especially appropriate when we recall that ego eimi in Jn 8:58 is evidently a
durative present or present of past action.[30]
Summation
From our prior discussion, it seems warranted to conclude that Jn 8:58 does not
necessarily affirm the Deity of Christ Jesus. Gerald Borchert's suggestion that Jesus
strongly asserted his eternality at John 8:58 is evidently eisegetical. His comments again
are as follows:
The answer of Jesus to the Jews [in Jn 8:58] was an intriguing double amen . . . that
focused both on time and status: "Before Abraham was, I am (ego eimi, John 8:58) . . .

Certainly the juxtaposing of the past tense concerning Abraham with both the prior time
and the present tense as they relate to Jesus explodes all natural reasoning concerning
time. . . Jesus claimed to be "I am" over against Abraham. That claim was a reminder of
the claims for God in the Old Testament over against creation (Cf. Ps 90:2; Isa. 42:3-9)
and of the self-designation for the comforting God of Isaiah 41:4; 43:3, 13. (Borchert
309)
In harmony with Borchert's observation, I do not deny that Jesus "juxtaposed" his
existence with that of his forefather Abraham. My question is: Why does the
juxtaposition have to be a juxtapositioning of time vis--vis eternity? Why do we have to
contend that John establishes an antithesis between Creator and creature in 8:58? After
all, is there really a qualitative difference between eternality and temporality? Biblically,
there is not. The Scriptures do not equate eternity with timelessness (Cullmann). This is
not to say that time constrains God. Nevertheless, God is not necessarily atemporal
either (Boman 151-154, 205). The Bible teaches no such thing (Ps 90:2). What is more,
why could Jesus not simply have been making a distinction between his pre-existent
temporal status over against Abraham's "ordinary" temporal mode of being? This is not
out of the realm of possibility (either logically or exegetically). In this regard, McKenzie
writes:
Jesus asserts his own innocence and the vindication which the Father will give him. This
leads to a clear assertion of preexistence and his life is threatened for the first time. The
preexistent Messiah actually does appear in rabbinical literature; and it was also
rabbinical belief that the patriarchs and Moses saw the Messiah in a vision (McKenzie
193-194).
One of the foremost modern Catholic theologians therefore concludes that Jesus was not
necessarily juxtaposing his eternality with Abraham's temporality, but rather boldly
asserting his preexistence over against the comparatively mundane existence of
Abraham. By making this claim he was in effect proclaiming: "I am the Messiah."
Manson's exegesis of this controversial passage is therefore not to be utterly rejected,
only refined, because his explanation does not thoroughly account for the existential use
of ego eimi in Jn 8:58.[31]
As McKenzie and others effectively demonstrate, Jesus' preexistence is the focus of Jn
8:58 (not necessarily his "eternal existence"). Jn 8:58 does not say that Jesus is God, but
it does indicate that Jesus the Christ is the subordinate Son of the Most High Deity
(Jehovah our Father). Apropos here are the comments of K.L. McKay who pens the
following words: "If we take the Greek words [in Jn 8:58] in their natural meaning, as
we surely should, the claim to have been in existence for so long is in itself a staggering
one, quite enough to provoke the crowd's violent reaction."[32]
The first century ecclesia evidently did not believe that Jesus was God. It is my belief
that Jn 8:58 should not be invoked as proof of Jesus' Deity.
Did the Ante-Nicene Fathers Teach or Believe in the Trinity?

Some of the most significant extant religious documents available to us at present are
the writings of the ante-Nicene Fathers. The voluminous literary corpus produced by the
early Church Fathers is crucial since it provides a glimpse into the early Church's unique
belief system. In short, the ante-Nicene library of works contains early Christianity's
doctrine of God. Most important for our present purposes, these theological documents
help us to appreciate the early Church's position on the Trinity and its view of Christ in
God's divine purpose. With regard to the Trinity doctrine, however, what was the view of
the ante-Nicene ecclesia? Did the ante-Nicene fathers teach that God is threefold?
Alternatively, did these men espouse a subordinationist view?
When reading the last question, some readers may feel that we are guilty of the either/or
(vel/vel) fallacy. "Stop question loading!" logicians may assert. Yes, certain readers may
think that it is erroneous to assume that the ante-Nicene fathers were either Trinitarians
or subordinationists. Why could they not possess both viewpoints simultaneously?
Once a proper understanding of subordinationism is grasped, it will become clear that
there is no possible way a Christian can simultaneously affirm both subordinationism
and Trinitarianism. Why is this the case though?
First, we think that the very definition of subordinationism makes it logically impossible
to concomitantly affirm Trinitarianism and subordinationism. But to fully understand
this particular contention, it is imperative to define the subordinationist position,
restate the claims of classical Trinitarianism, and then juxtapose those claims with the
ante-Nicene writings.This study will endeavor to successfully navigate through the
torturous but exciting field of arcane Trinitarian terminology and clearly show the
necessarily contrasting positions of subordinationists and Trinitarians. We will conclude
that the ante-Nicene fathers were not Trinitarians qua Trinitarians.
Defining the Trinity Doctrine
As noted by contemporary theologians, there are in fact many disparate "doctrines" of
the Trinity (i.e., the Trinity doctrine is not monolithic). For instance, systematic
theologian Owen Thomas observes:
Our survey of the history of the [Trinity] doctrine in the text has indicated that there are
several doctrines of the trinity: Eastern, Western, social analogy, modal, so forth. There
is one doctrine in the sense of the threefold name of God of the rule of faith as found, for
example, in the Apostle's Creed. This, however, is not yet a doctrine. It is ambiguous and
can be interpreted in a number of ways. There is one doctrine in the sense of the
Western formula of "three persons in one substance." However, this formula is also
ambiguous if not misleading and can be interpreted in a number of ways. A doctrine of
the trinity would presumably be one interpretation of this formula . . . let us assume that
the phrase "doctrine of the trinity" in the question refers to any of a number of widely
accepted interpretations of the threefold name of God in the role of faith. (Thomas
"Theological Questions"34)

As Thomas accurately relates, there are many "widely accepted interpretations" of the
Trinity doctrine. These interpretations viewed from a collective standpoint, we can call
the Trinity doctrine. Despite certain Roman Catholic protests to the contrary, "the
Trinity doctrine" is not distinct from the many divergent, but acceptable ("nonheretical") interpretations of it.[33] Neither the Eastern Church nor the Western ecclesia
has formulated a well-defined, unambiguous or unanimously accepted creedal
statement regarding the triune doctrine of God. It is therefore appropriate to consider
any treatment of the Trinity not proclaimed heretical to be a delineation of the Trinity
doctrine proper, as Thomas writes above.[34]
Despite differing in form, there is a common thread that runs through every
interpretation of the Trinity doctrine. This common denominator is the notion that God
is one substance (or subject), but three personae: "We must regard the nature of the Son
as identical with that of the Father, since the Holy Spirit Who is both the Spirit of Christ
and the Spirit of God is proved to be a Being of one nature" (Hilary of Poitiers).[35]
If God is one substance (or subject), however, this fact ultimately means that
immanently (within the Godhead) subordination does not and cannot obtain among the
individuated divine personae, who presumably constitute the threefold God of
Christianity. Note well: one main point put forward in this study is that the orthodox
formulation of God's triunity rules out any form of subordination in the Godhead.
Trinitarianism does not allow room for subordination amongst the eternal, necessary,
and immutable relations of the Trinity. Moreover, I am arguing that the ante-Nicene
fathers believed the Son is subordinate to the Father because of his unique originative
generation (generatio) from the Father. We shall try to establish this point as we
proceed in this essay.
For now, it is sufficient to note that if a Christian contends that the Son is subordinate to
the Father in any way, if he or she says that the Holy Spirit is subordinate to the Father
or to the Son, then the aforesaid Christian thereby abnegates Trinitarianism and
subsequently begins to affirm subordinationism. Subordinationism and Trinitarianism
cannot exist side by side. Either a Christian is a Trinitarian or he or she is a
subordinationist: this is the traditional interpretation of the Church:
God the Father is the ground or presupposition of God the Son, and God the Father and
God the Son are the ground or presupposition of God the Holy Spirit. God the Son is of
or from God the Father, and God the Holy Spirit is of or from God the Father and God
the Son. But the Church interpreted this in such a way that there is no temporal priority
or subordination. (Thomas "Theology" 68)
Since the sixth century, the Western Church has continually affirmed that 'none is
greater or lesser in the Godhead' (The Athanasian Creed). There is no priority of one
"Person" over another in any respect. So the Church has traditionally maintained:
A classic contrast is between [John] 10:30, "The Father and I are one," and 14:28, "The
Father is greater than I." It is the perdurance of such lower christological statements
which shows that the Johannine community had not made a rival God out of Jesus, but

it also shows that the christology of John still stands at quite a distance from the
christology of Nicaea wherein the Father is not greater than the Son." (R.E. Brown "The
Johannine Community" 53)
John McKenzie adds that "a celebrated problem in Christology is found in John 14:28;
and it is perhaps best to say of this verse that there is much about the relation of Father
and Son which we do not know" (McKenzie 203). McKenzie is of course correct when he
declares that John 14:28 presents a Christological problem for Trinitarians.
Nevertheless, he is mistaken when he implies that this passage is a mysterious or
incomprehensible verse. The Bible makes it clear that Jesus is not God, but subordinate
to Almighty God (El Shaddai). Yes, subordinate in every respect. In the book of
Revelation, Jesus repeatedly calls the Father "my God" (Rev. 3:12). How though could
God possibly have a God? Surely, Jn 14:28 unambiguously substantiates that the Son's
"act of existence" or very act of being (actus essendi) is not equal to the Father's (cf. Jn
20:17).
In demonstrating the veracity of the previously-mentioned observations, namely, that
the Church has traditionally maintained the equality of the tres personae in una
substantia, Charles Ryrie informs us that the opera ad intra trinitatis: "has to do with
generation (filiation or begetting) and procession which attempts to indicate a logical
order within the Trinity but does not imply in any way inequality, priority of time, or
degrees of dignity. Generation and procession occur within the divine Being and carry
with them no thought of subordination of essence" (Ryrie 54). Ryrie is also quick to
point out, however, that the eternal generation idea is not "an exegetically based
doctrine." Yet, further in his work, he avers that the idea conveyed by the eternal
generation teaching is "not unscriptural." But he cautions us that the notion of an
eternal begettal must not be stated in such a way so as to undercut the "personal and
eternal and coequal relation of the Father and Son" (54). The Baptist theologian's
insights thus verify that the Trinity doctrine proper does not allow room for a "superior"
God and a "subordinate" God: "No person of the Trinity is any less God than the others;
in particular, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not demigods or intermediaries,
subordinate to the Father." (Macquarrie 192) It is important to grasp this thought
because of what scholars have observed about the ante-Nicene fathers.
Speaking of the ante-Nicenes, New Testament scholar Robert M. Grant perspicuously
explains that: "the Christology of [early Christian apologists] . . . is essentially
subordinationist. The Son is always subordinate to the Father, who is the one God of the
Old Testament." He adds: "Before Nicaea, Christian theology was almost universally
subordinationist. Theology almost universally taught that the Son was subordinate to
the Father" (Grant "Gods" 109, 160). It is clear that Robert Grant thinks Christology was
universally subordinationist in nature prior to the Nicene council of 325 C.E. This
statement is significant because of what the term subordination denotes. In this regard,
Robert Wilken elucidates matters for us when he speaks of subordination and the anteNicenes in these terms:
From the very beginning, the Christian tradition had struggled with the question of
Jesus' relation to God . . . Very early Christians tried to account for his extraordinary life

and accomplishments and his Resurrection, and it was not long before he was called Son
of God--then God. Even so, he was not God in the sense in which the Father was God--or
was he? Was he creator, was he eternal, should he be addressed in prayer? These and
other questions troubled thoughtful Christians for almost three centuries. During these
years, most Christians vaguely thought of Jesus as God; yet they did not actually think of
him in the same way that they thought of God the Father. They seldom addressed
prayers to him, and thought of him somehow as second to God--divine, yes, but not fully
God . . . When the controversy over the relation of Jesus to God the Father broke out in
the early fourth century, most Christians were 'subordinationists,' i.e. they believed that
Christ was God but not in precisely the same way that the Father was God. (179)
In addition, Wilken contends:
Arius took the traditional [Christian] understanding of God to mean that Christ, the
Word, or Son of God, had come into being at a particular moment by a creative act . . .
The problem raised by Arius became particularly acute because Christians were unclear
in their own minds how they should express the relation between the Son and the
Father. Christian tradition did not give an unambiguous answer. (Wilken 177-184)
As this New Testament expert explains, the Christological picture during the anteNicene period (second century-fourth century) is somewhat unclear. Nevertheless, we
can safely say that the ante-Nicene fathers did not believe that Jesus was fully God and
fully man (vere deus et vere homo). The early Christians were not Trinitarians--they
were subordinationists. They "vaguely" thought of Jesus as God. Yet he was not God in
the same way that God the Father was Deity for them. In fact, both Justin Martyr and
Origen speak of the Logos as a "second God" or as one who is in "second place" vis--vis
the Most High God:
And although we may call Him a "second" God, let men know that by the term "second
God" we mean nothing else than a virtue capable of including all other virtues, and a
reason capable of containing all reason whatsoever which exists in all things, which have
arisen naturally, directly, and for the general advantage, and which "reason," we say,
dwelt in the soul of Jesus, and was united to Him in a degree far above all other souls,
seeing He alone was enabled completely to receive the highest share in the absolute
reason, and the absolute wisdom, and the absolute righteousness (Contra Celsum 5.39).
As one reads the writings of Justin Martyr and Origen, he or she finds that Jesus was
unequivocally viewed as subordinate to the Father in an immanent sense. That is, the
Son was subordinated to the Father ontologically as well as economically: "What has
provided historians of doctrine for more than a century with an occasion for discussion
has been the fact that Justin could conceive in one category the Logos-Son together with
the 'host of the other good angels, of like being to him', and that he set this angel-host,
together with the Logos-Christ, before the (prophetic) Spirit" (Werner 135).
Additionally, when commenting on the writings of Justin Martyr and his
Christologically significant statements, Demetrius C. Trakatellis observes that for
Justin: "The differentiation in divinity between the Father and the Son is so pronounced

that one wonders what exactly Justin meant when he used the term theos for both of
them" (Trakatellis 52). Justin himself shows the chasm between the Father and the Son
that Trakatellis mentions, when he writes:
These and other such sayings are recorded by the lawgiver and by the prophets; and I
suppose that I have stated sufficiently, that wherever God says, 'God went up from
Abraham,' or, 'The Lord spake to Moses,' and 'The Lord came down to behold the tower
which the sons of men had built,' or when 'God shut Noah into the ark,' you must not
imagine that the unbegotten God Himself came down or went up from any place. For
the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps,
nor rises up, but remains in His own place, wherever that is, quick to behold and quick
to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of indescribable might; and He sees all
things, and knows all things, and none of us escapes His observation; and He is not
moved or confined to a spot in the whole world, for He existed before the world was
made. (Dialogue With Trypho 127)
Consequently, although immense Christological obscurities pervade the writings of the
ante-Nicenes, one fact seems secure: the ante-Nicene Fathers were universally
subordinationists. Moreover, in Justin's case, it is obvious that the subordinationist
understanding of at least some of the ante-Nicenes is a subordination of essence. We
should not forget this point since the present writer contends that it is impossible to
simultaneously affirm subordinationism and Trinitarianism. For as Leonard Hodgson
reminds us, the ante-Nicene documents show: "The Fathers . . . tried to give an
intelligible account of the divine unity [but] never shook themselves free from
subordinationism" (Hodgson 100). And as Hodgson also notes: "Subordinationism, as I
have indicated earlier, attempts to preserve the [divine] unity by making one person
ultimately the real God and the others divine because of their relation to him" (100).
It seems correct to contend that the ante-Nicene fathers never shook themselves free
from subordinationism. This thought is quite interesting in view of Hodgson's definition
of subordinationism. Note that he defines subordination as making one divine Person
"the real God" and the other Persons divine by virtue of their relation to "the real God."
What implications does Hodgson's view have for those who want to introduce some type
of subordination into the Godhead (economic subordination) while excluding other
forms (ontological subordination)? We read:
The notion that in the Trinity one Person may be the fount or source of being or
Godhead for another lingered on to be a cause of friction and controversy between the
East and the West, and still persists today. The main thesis of these lectures, I have said,
is that the act of faith required for acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity is faith that
the Divine unity is a dynamic unity actively unifying in the one divine life the lives of the
three divine persons. I now wish to add that in this unity there is no room for any trace
of subordinationism, and that the thought of the Father as the source or fount of Godhead is a relic of pre-Christian theology which has not fully assimilated the Christian
revelation. (Hodgson 102)
The implications for the Trinity doctrine are profound and staggering if what Hodgson

asserts is true. In the quote above, Hodgson maintains that the ontological dogma of the
Trinity allows "no room" whatsoever for one divine Person to serve as a Fount or Source
of Being for another member of the Godhead. Each Person must possess full deity in an
underived sense--no divine Person can obtain His personal form of Being from another
Person of the Godhead. There is no room in the Trinity doctrine, Hodgson believes, for a
fatherly "source of divinity" (fons divinitatis). Contrariwise, the Trinitarian formula
(expressed in the Quicunque Vult) requires that the one divine life be actively unified in
the lives of three divine Persons. We should thus consider the thought of the Father
serving as the source or fount of Godhead, Hodgson writes, "a relic of pre-Christian
theology which has not fully assimilated the Christian revelation." All of these factors
cause Hodgson to conclude:
The Quicunque Vult leaves no room for misunderstanding. 'In this Trinity none is afore,
or after other: none is greater, or less than another; but the whole three Persons are coeternal together; and co-equal.' The express rejection in these verses of all
subordinationism is good reason for the retention of this document among the official
standards of the Church's faith. (102)
There is no doubt, where Hodgson stands doctrinally. However, John V. Dahms thinks
that Hodgson has simply ignored what the rest of the famed creed says to his own
theological detriment: "One part of the Athanasian creed must not be so interpreted as
to negate what is said in another part. However much the equality of the persons is
emphasized in the creed, the derivation of the Son from the Father is also affirmed"
(Dahms 499). Dahm's objection aside, the present writer contends that Hodgson is
correctly interpreting the spirit of the Quicunque Vult and the Trinity doctrine proper.
While John V. Dahms has shown that the Quicunque Vult may allow room for
subordination and the notion of a fatherly fons divinitatis, it seems safe to conclude that
the overall thrust of the Quicunque Vult is non-subordinationist in nature. Ergo, it
appears wise to agree with Hodgson's interpretation of this monumental creed. Other
theologians (ala Jurgen Moltmann) have followed suit and outlined similar Trinitarian
depictions of God that some also think are tritheistic. Regardless of how one views
Hodgson's explication of the Trinity, however, there can be no doubt that the Church
has traditionally interpreted the Trinity in a way that negates subordination and
temporal priority in both the internal and external life of the Godhead (Alfs 31-37).
In contrast to Hilary, Hodgson, Moltmann, and Dahms, ante-Nicene father Tertullian
did not ontologically equate the Father and the Son:
Because God is in like manner a Father, and He is also a Judge; but He has not always
been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His having always been God. For He
could not have been the Father previous to the Son, nor a Judge previous to sin. There
was, however, a time when neither sin existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of
which was to constitute the Lord a Judge, and the latter a Father. In this way He was not
Lord previous to those things of which He was to be the Lord. But He was only to
become Lord at some future time: just as He became the Father by the Son, and a Judge
by sin, so also did He become Lord by means of those things which He had made, in
order that they might serve Him. (Against Hermogenes 3.18)

According to Tertullian, the eternal Most High God became a Father. Thus, before God
brought forth the Word, the Son qua Son did not exist as an individuated rational being
coterminous with the Supreme God. The words of the Christian apologist alert us to the
fact that he was a subordinationist and not a Trinitarian. W.H.C. Frend confirms this
construal of Tertullian's theology, writing that in the Latin apologist's theological
system:
The Word was derivative ("a portion of the whole") and subordinate, and equally liable
to Modalist interpretations (345).
Frend supplements his comments on Tertullian's Christology by adding:
Despite Tertullian's thrust against Praxeas, Trinitarian theology never had a high
priority in the thought of the North African church leaders . . . Fourth century
inscriptions if anything emphasize the subordination of Son to Father. God [the Father]
was "Omnipotent," Christ was "Saviour." In this period, few African Christians showed
much concern regarding the accusation that Donatus was an Arian. (346)
The Subordinationist Views of Origen and Novatian
The Alexandrian theologian Origen likewise expressed subordinationist sentiments
when he wrote: "We can say that the Saviour and the Holy Spirit exceed all creatures
without possible comparison, in a wholly transcendent way, but that they are exceeded
by the Father by as much or even more than they exceed the other beings"
(Commentary On John 130, 25, 151). Concerning this passage, eminent Origenist Henri
Crouzel admits that: "Of course later orthodoxy would not express it like that, it would
avoid anything that could express a superiority of the Father over the other two"
(Crouzel 203). Origen also manifestly stated that the Father made the Holy Spirit
through Christ: "We therefore, as the more pious and the truer course, admit that all
things were made by the Logos, and that the Holy Spirit is the most excellent and the
first in order of all that was made by the Father through Christ. And this, perhaps, is the
reason why the Spirit is not said to be God's Son" (Commentary on John 2.6). This
proclamation is a sure sign of essential subordination in the "Godhead."
The early church father Novatian also wrote a comprehensive tome on the Trinity that
transparently depicts the Son in subordinationist terms. In this magnificent theological
treatise, Novatian waxes in a somewhat rhetorical manner as he exclaims:
Thus God the Father, the Founder and Creator of all things, who only knows no
beginning, invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, is one God; to whose greatness, or
majesty, or power, I would not say nothing can be preferred, but nothing can be
compared; of whom, when He willed it, the Son, the Word, was born, who is not
received in the sound of the stricken air, or in the tone of voice forced from the lungs,
but is acknowledged in the substance of the power put forth by God, the mysteries of
whose sacred and divine nativity neither an apostle has learnt, nor prophet has

discovered, nor angel has known, nor creature has apprehended. To the Son alone they
are known, who has known the secrets of the Father. He then, since He was begotten of
the Father, is always in the Father. And I thus say always, that I may show Him not to be
unborn, but born. But He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the
Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time. And He is always in
the Father, unless the Father be not always Father, only that the Father also precedes
Him,--in a certain sense,--since it is necessary--in some degree--that He should be
before He is Father. Because it is essential that He who knows no beginning must go
before Him who has a beginning; even as He is the less as knowing that He is in Him,
having an origin because He is born, and of like nature with the Father in some measure
by His nativity, although He has a beginning in that He is born, inasmuch as He is born
of that Father who alone has no beginning. (De Trinitate 31)
Novatian thinks that the Son was always in the Father. No doubt, Novatian believes that
there is a distinction between the immanent Logos and the begotten Word. But notice
that this Latin Church Father conceives of the Son having a "beginning." Indeed, he
explicitly claims that Father in some sense "precedes" the Son. The Son is in fact less
than the Father since he originated from Him.
Concluding this well-written section of his tome, Novatian climaxes by uttering these
telling words of faith:
For all things being subjected to Him as the Son by the Father, while He Himself, with
those things which are subjected to Him, is subjected to His Father, He is indeed proved
to be Son of His Father; but He is found to be both Lord and God of all else. Whence,
while all things put under Him are delivered to Him who is God, and all things are
subjected to Him, the Son refers all that He has received to the Father, remits again to
the Father the whole authority of His divinity. The true and eternal Father is manifested
as the one God, from whom alone this power of divinity is sent forth, and also given and
directed upon the Son, and is again returned by the communion of substance to the
Father. God indeed is shown as the Son, to whom the divinity is beheld to be given and
extended. And still, nevertheless, the Father is proved to be one God; while by degrees in
reciprocal transfer that majesty and divinity are again returned and reflected as sent by
the Son Himself to the Father, who had given them; so that reasonably God the Father is
God of all, and the source also of His Son Himself whom He begot as Lord. Moreover,
the Son is God of all else, because God the Father put before all Him whom He begot.
Thus the Mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature
subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God; with every creature
subdued to Him, found at one with His Father God, has, by abiding in that condition
that He moreover 'was heard,' briefly proved God His Father to be one and only and true
God. (De Trinitate 31)
It is clear that Novatian thinks of the Father as "the only true God" (Jn 17:3; 1 Thess 1:9;
1 Jn 5:20). The Son is only deity in a qualified sense. It is apropos that the Son thus
turns over the Kingdom to his God and Father at the end (telos). Based on these
eloquent theological formulations, Robert Grant concludes:

Novatian finally ends his treatise with allusions to the passage in 1 Corinthians (15:2428) that speaks of the final subjection of the Son to the Father, 'that God may be all in
all.' His own stance is thus subordinationist and can be explained in reference to his
reliance on Biblical passages. Apparently the work is difficult to interpret toward the end
because a later orthodox reviser has tinkered with the text. (Grant 159-160)
From these affirmations, we can see that Novatian is yet another early Church father
who was an avid subordinationist. His pronouncements seem to provide condemnatory
evidence against the notion that the Trinity was an early Church teaching or belief.
The Views of Theophilus
It is also significant that the early Church Father Theophilus was not a Trinitarian qua
Trinitarian: he was a thoroughgoing subordinationist. The captivating theological
language of this early Church Father is reminiscent of Philo Judaeus' Hellenistic
Judaism and it is evident that the apologist closely mimicked Philo's literary and
theological writing style. For instance, in his work To Autolycus (3.9) Theophilus
repeats a Philonic formula word for word, indicating that the Alexandrian Jew heavily
influenced him. By his overall writing and theological style, Theophilus proves himself
"an heir of Hellenistic Judaism and presumably reflects some of its major developments
in the second century. His doctrine of God uses Biblical texts most of the time for
philosophical conclusions" (Grant 129).
Grant also points out that Theophilus is frequently inconsistent in his writings.
Sometimes he differentiates between the Logos and Wisdom, while at other times he
equates them. Moreover, the Christian apologist vividly describes the generation of the
Logos and at times produces modalistic implications concerning God and His Logos.
One thing is clear in the writings of Theophilus, however: he is not a Trinitarian. True,
in To Autolycus 2.15, he employs the word "Trinity" (trias). But what does the signifier
(used in this context) mean? When describing the creation of the cosmos says,
Theophilus clarifies matters for us:
In like manner also the three days which were before the luminaries are types of the
Trinity, of God, and His Word, and His wisdom. And the fourth is the type of man, who
needs light, that so there may be God, the Word, wisdom, man.
Does the aforementioned statement by Theophilus demonstrate that he was a
Trinitarian? We urge the reader who is inclined to answer in the affirmative to read
carefully the words of this ancient Church Father. What is the "Trinity" he is discussing?
Is it a triunity composed of three personae united in one divine substance? Hardly, for
the text specifically states that the Trinity Theophilus has in mind is a "triunity" of God
[the Father], the Logos of God [the Son], and God the Father's wisdom. In this
momentous passage, he equates God's Logos and God's Sophia as he often does
throughout this work. His Trinity is therefore not putting forth what later theological
dogmatists affirmed. This is why Grant notes:

A passage in Theophilus of Antioch is sometimes invoked for the doctrine of the Trinity,
but it proves nothing. He is offering symbolical exegesis of the "days" of creation in
Genesis (Grant 156).
Grant continues:
What we find in these early authors, then, is not a doctrine of the Trinity--a term we
reserve for a doctrine that tries to explain the relation of the three Persons to the one
God--but a depiction of three Persons. In other words, we find the materials for such a
doctrine but not a doctrine as such . . . Even if this could be viewed as a correct picture
of the earliest stages of doctrinal development, the meaning was not necessarilyor one
might say 'necessarily not'expressed in its initial stages. (156)
Adding to Grant's testimony in even stronger terms, Stanley Burgess comments in this
way about Theophilus' "trinity": "The members of the Trinity are not named as Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit, however; rather, they are God, His Word (Logos), and His
Wisdom" (32). The conclusion we thus arrive at concerning ante-Nicene Christology is:
"Before Nicaea, Christian theology was almost universally subordinationist. Theology
almost universally taught that the Son was subordinate to the Father" (Grant 160).[36]
Based on the previously stated data, Kung's conclusion seems to accurately account for
the historical development of the Trinity. He pens the following words:
We should note that whereas the Council of Nicaea in 325 spoke of a single substance or
hypostasis in God, the starting point in the 381 Council of Constantinople was three
hypostases: Father, Son and Spirit. There has been much discussion in the history of
dogma as to whether the transition from a one-hypostasis theology to a three-hypostasis
theology is only a terminological change or-more probably (as the temporary schism in
Antioch between old and new orthodox shows)-also involved an actual change in the
conceptual model. At all events it is certain that we can speak of a dogma of the Trinity
only after the Second Ecumenical Council in Constantinople. (Kung "Christianity" 187)
Kung and others rightly contend that the Trinity was a gradual ecclesiastical
development that resulted from an imperial decree promulgated in the fourth century. It
was not a first century Christian teaching.
The Testimony of Lactantius
One of the most damaging testimonies supporting the aforesaid details presented in this
essay is the witness given by the fourth century ecclesiastical apologist-historian Lucius
Lactantius. Did he believe that Jesus was consubstantial with the Father? Was he a
Trinitarian qua Trinitarian? Interestingly, Lactantius was an apologist par excellence in
the Church circa 320 CE. This means that his writings reflect the spirit of the Church
during the years preceding the Nicene ecumenical Council of 325. Notice this Lactantian
apologetic written in the fourth century:
We have sufficiently taught, as I think, in our Institutions, that there cannot be many

gods; because, if the divine energy and power be distributed among several, it must
necessarily be diminished. But that which is lessened is plainly mortal; but if He is not
mortal, He can neither be lessened nor divided. Therefore there is but one God, in whom
complete energy and power can neither be lessened nor increased (A Treatise On The
Anger Of God 11).
Not only did Lactantius believe that there was one God, he also affirmed that God is one
persona:
Therefore all divine power must be in one person, by whose will and command all things
are ruled; and therefore He is so great, that He cannot be described in words by man, or
estimated by the senses. (A Treatise On The Anger Of God 11)
Who did Lactantius think that this one Persona was? Who was this one true God?
For thus at length He may be called the common Father of all, and the best and greatest,
which His divine and heavenly nature demands. (A Treatise On The Anger Of God 5)
From the aforementioned quotes, it seems apparent that Lactantius was not a
Trinitarian. He believed that one uncreated God brought forth two spirits who were two
created gods in a Platonic sense. This vital piece of information evidently explains why
the Holy Spirit does not figure prominently or even at all in Lactantius' conception of
the Godhead (Campenhausen 61-86). He lucidly expresses this point when he writes:
God, in the beginning, before He made the world, from the fountain of His own eternity,
and from the divine and everlasting Spirit, begat for Himself a Son incorruptible,
faithful, corresponding to His Father's excellence and majesty. He is virtue, He is
reason, He is the word of God, He is wisdom. With this artificer, as Hermes says, and
counsellor, as the Sibyl says, He contrived the excellent and wondrous fabric of this
world. In fine, of all the angels, whom the same God formed from His own breath, He
alone was admitted into a participation of His supreme power, He alone was called God.
For all things were through Him, and nothing was without Him. In fine, Plato, not
altogether as a philosopher, but as a seer, spoke concerning the first and second God,
perhaps following Trismegistus in this, whose words I have translated from the Greek,
and subjoined: "The Lord and Maker of all things, whom we have thought to be called
God, created a second God, who is visible and sensible. (A Treatise on the Anger of God
42)
The testimony of Lactantius solidifies the fact that the ante-Nicene fathers did not
subscribe to the Trinity, but were avid subordinationists. Many more examples could be
given. However, space does not permit. The examples we have given should
demonstrate the main point. More on this matter will be discussed in Christology (Vol.
II).
Conclusion

What can we extract from our discussion regarding the ante-Nicene fathers? First, it
becomes evident that the early Church Fathers did not affirm the orthodox doctrine of
the Trinity. They were subordinationists who believed that only the Father is truly God.
The Son was secondary in the thought of the early Church Fathers, being ontologically
subordinate to his Father. Therefore, the ante-Nicenes were not Trinitarians qua
Trinitarians. This is not to say that the thoughts of the ante-Nicenes were strictly
Biblical. It does, however, show that the ante-Nicene Fathers did not believe in the
ontological teaching of the Trinity, strictly speaking. We could cite examples from the
writings of Irenaeus and Ignatius to demonstrate the ante-Nicene position in a more
detailed fashion. But we will discuss these ecclesiastical leaders in the second volume of
Christology.

The Kenosis of Jesus Christ: What Does It Tell Us about the Son of God?
One subject that has continually initiated considerable controversy is the issue of Jesus
Christ's kenosis. The word kenosis (in this context) refers to the "self-emptying" of the
heavenly Logos, who was with God "in the beginning" (Ryrie 260-262). It pertains to the
act of self-negation whereby the Son of God "became flesh" and resided among men
(John 1:14). This theological doctrine that we will now examine in some detail finds its
origins in the "hymn" recorded at Phil 2:5-11.
The term "kenotic" derives from the Greek kenoo, which can mean: "to empty."
Apparently, Theodotion was the first theologue to use "kenosis" as a theological term in
his translation of Isa 34:11. However, both Gregory Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria
use the word to express the action whereby Christ "emptied himself." Additionally, the
Latin Vulgate renders Phil 2:7 with the phrase "semetipsum exinanivit," while Tertullian
uses the formula "exhausit semetipsum" in his work Adversus Marcionem. The real
concern for each of these thinkers seems to have been: 'In what sense did Christ empty
himself'? Thus we seem justified in viewing the term kenosis as an emptying, and in our
discussion it will refer to the Son of God's self-emptying described in Phil 2:6-7.
Admittedly, there have been many theories and a number of approaches to
Christological kenoticism. We shall examine some of these theories and then analyze the
locus classicus of the kenotic event: Phil 2:6-7.
The Traditional View of Christ's Kenosis
Philippians 2:6ff has often been associated with the so-called hypostatic union of Christ
Jesus. Theologians have frequently enlisted this passage to putatively elucidate the
personalistic ontological uniting they say occurred when he assumed the form of a man.
In this regard, Bishop Cyril declared that Phil 2:6ff demonstrates that "God [was from]
God, being by nature the only-begotten Logos of God, the radiance of the glory and the
express image of the person of him who begot him" (Pelikan 1:247-248). In other words,
Cyril thought that Phil 2:6ff helps Christians to understand that the "enfleshed" Son of
God was "unchangeable according to nature," and "[remained] completely what he was
and ever is" during his earthly life. Therefore, he believed that the alleged incarnate God

enjoyed "an indivisible unity [of nature]" while subsisting in the form of a man (1:248).
As shown from Cyril's comments, Phil 2:6-7 has played an eminent role in the
formulation of Christological dogma. It has therefore proven to be a significant Biblical
account vis--vis the development of Christological systematizations. In view of its
admitted didactic character, Pope Leo thought that Christians should interpret the
kenosis of Christ as "the bending down of [the] compassion" of God: not as the "failing
of [God's] power" (Pelikan 1:255-258). The kenosis event also signified, for Pope Leo,
that both natures of the only-begotten Son of God 'met in one person.' Subsequently
"lowliness [was] assumed by majesty, weakness by power, mortality by eternity." The
upshot of such an exegesis is that we can describe the life of Christ as somewhat of a
dialectical tension between his divine and human natures. This theological data
supposedly explains the seeming contradictory events in the life of our Lord and Savior.
Hence, one who believes in the incarnation is supposedly able to reconcile the Biblical
occasions where Christ appears to lack divine knowledge and looks like he is passible, by
appealing to the kenosis. As man, kenoticists contend that Christ was mutable, mortal,
lowly, and weak; as God, however, they claim that he was Impassible, Immortal,
Transcendent and Omnipotent. To resolve the ostensibly conflicting elements of this
theological stance, Christian scholars invoke Phil 2:6ff. Evidently, this Biblical account
adequately clarifies the "enfleshment" (incarnatio) of "God the Son." However, we must
ask whether Paul's words really justify Trinitarian explanations of Jesus' limitations on
earth. For example, what is Phil 2:6-7 speaking of when it says that Christ "emptied
himself"? What are the implications of this Pauline statement?
The Synod of Antioch in 341 CE decided that Christ emptied himself of "the being equal
with God" (kenosas heauton apo tou einai isa theo) when he became incarnate. While
the Synod thus emphatically affirmed that Christ is fully God and fully man, it
simultaneously contended that he emptied himself of equality with God during his
"incarnation" (incarnatio). Consequently, it seems that certain fourth century Christians
viewed the kenosis of Christ as the supreme act of humility whereby God the Son (the
second Person of the Trinity) engaged in self-abnegation vis--vis his equal standing
with God the Father and God the Holy Spirit. The kenosis thus serves as an event that
Christians should emulate in their personal lives: "If the divine majesty lowers itself in
such great humility, does human weakness have the right to make boast of anything?"
asked Ambrose of Rupert with regard to the kenotic event" (Pelikan 3:23). Professor
Pelikan also notes:
In this he was carrying on a way of speaking characteristic of his fathers and brethren,
who took delight in the paradox of the incarnation. Christ, the Son of God, has
undergone humiliation in order to save mankind, and it was only fitting that his
followers should imitate his humble suffering. (3:23)
Probably one of the most intriguing interpretations of the kenosis event is the one
proposed by Anselm of Canterbury. In his famous work, Cur Deus Homo, Anselm
expounded on Phil 2:6ff and its meaning for the Christian faith. This theologian thought
the kenosis implies that the Son of God, the Father, and the Holy Spirit all made a
determination that "he [the Son] would not manifest the sublimity of his omnipotence

to the world in any other way than through his death" (Pelikan 3:142). In Anselm's
theological paradigm, Christ the God-man (deus et homo) had to die in order to
effectuate the deliverance of humankind from sin. The Son (in his preexistent state) was
incapable of suffering or dying. However, by means of the kenosis--the Logos became
capable of suffering, was susceptible to morbidity, and consequently was able to deliver
humanity through his holy blood, which according to Anselm, possessed infinite worth.
The famed bishop of Canterbury thus concluded that as a result of the Son's utter
spontaneity and divine free heartedness, Christ in the person of God the Son "enfleshed"
showed himself willing to die and satisfy the eminent justice of God. It was only by
means of the kenosis that Christ's death had been possible: there was no other way for
the Impassible to become passible.
While Anselm's treatment of Phil 2:6-7 seems to clear up any conundrums that may
develop when we discuss the enfleshed Christ, the question still remains--did Anselm
really remove the enigmatic features surrounding the kenosis? Does Phil 2:6-7 serve as
clear proof of Christ's Deity?
Other Interpretations of the Kenotic Event
As can be seen from a brief perusal of the patristic tradition, theologians have generally
interpreted the kenosis of Christ as an example of divine humility, self-negation and
"divine self-limitation." The idea of divine self-limitation has especially been explored
since the nineteenth century. Gottfried Thomasius is one such theologian who exerted a
profound influence on the teaching concerning the self-limitation of the Son during his
days in the flesh:
The transition into this [human] condition is manifestly a self-limitation for the eternal
Son of God. It is certainly not a divesting of that which is essential to deity in order to be
God, but it is a divesting of the divine mode of being in favor of the humanly creaturely
form of existence, and eo ipso a renunciation of the divine glory which he had from the
beginning with the Father and exercised vis--vis the world, governing and ruling it
throughout. (qt. in Welch 48)
Discoursing on this same theme, Dietrich Bonhoeffer summed up contemporary notions
of the kenotic event when he dramatically stated:
Behold the God who has become man, the unfathomable mystery of the love of God for
the world. God loves man. God loves the world. It is not an ideal man that He loves, but
man as he is; not an ideal world, but the real world . . . God becomes man, real man
(Bonhoeffer 71).
It is apparent that traditionally and contemporarily, the kenosis of Christ has often been
interpreted as an event involving divine self-negation, humiliation and self-limitation.
Kenotic theories have frequently been employed to explain how Christ could be "fully
God and fully man" (vere deus et vere homo): they have been utilized to demonstrate
how he could be simultaneously Impassible and passible. With these preliminary points

covered, we shall now take the time to examine this doctrine in the light of Phil 2:6-7.
Philippians 2:6-7: Exegesis and Exposition
One of the most controversial passages of Holy Writ is Phil 2:6-7. In the NRSV this Bible
passage reads: "though he [Christ] was in the form of God, [he] did not regard equality
with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave,
being born in human likeness, and being found in human form, he humbled himself." It
is now my intent to analyze closely Phil 2:6-7 and to discern whether or not the Bible
supports any of the kenotic theories set forth by ancient or contemporary theologians.
From the outset, we note that the apostle Paul writes: en morphe theou huparchon ouch
harpagmon egesato to einai isa theo. What did the apostle mean when he penned these
rich Greek words? In what sense was Christ en morphe theou huparchon? Here again,
this verse has proven to be a metaphorical battleground for contemporary theologians
and exegetes. Many have wondered, exactly how did Christ exist en morphe theou
huparchon? Theologian Charles Ryrie makes the following observation:
J.B. Lightfoot, after a detailed study of morphe in Greek philosophy, in Philo, and in the
New Testament, concludes that it connotes that which is intrinsic and essential to the
thing. Thus here [in Phil 2:6] it means that our Lord in his preincarnate state possessed
essential Deity" (Ryrie 261).
Spiros Zodhiates echoes the thoughts of Ryrie. He points out that morphe denotes
"form" in that:
Morphe in Philippians 2:6-8 presumes an [objective] reality. None could be in the form
(morphe) of God who was not God. Morphe is the reality which can be externalized, not
some shape that is the result of pure thought. It is the utterance of the inner life, a life
which bespeaks the existence of God. (Zodhiates 937)
Kenneth Wuest's views are as follows:
It is to this expression of glory that the words, being in the form of God, refer. The word
God is anarthrous here, referring not to any single person of the Godhead but to deity as
such . . . The word essence in the translation comes from the demands of the Greek text
here since theos is anarthrous. The presence of the Greek article identifies, its absence
qualifies. Its absence emphasizes nature, essence. In this state of preincarnate being,
Paul says that our Lord thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Equality with God
here does not mean equality with the other person of the Godhead, but equality with
deity as such. The word God is again anarthrous. And this equality here is not equality in
the possession of the divine essence but in its expression, as the context indicates.
However, the expression presupposes the possession of that essence. (When Jesus
Emptied Himself, Kenneth Wuest, 1958)
As can be discerned from the aforementioned comments, Zodhiates, Ryrie and Wuest

believe that en morphe theou describes the eternal existence and substantial Deity of
Jesus Christ. Christ en morphe theou huparchon is thus said to signify essential and
substantial Godhood. This conclusion could possibly be true if we understood morphe to
signify "essential, substantial" reality. But is this how we should define morphe in this
particular context?
Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon appears to take a different view of morphe. Other
explicators of Scripture also support the stance delineated in this work. In his GreekEnglish Lexicon, Thayer particularly notes that morphe may denote:
The form by which a person or thing strikes the vision; the external appearance:
children are said to reflect psuches te kai morphes homoioteta (of their parents) 4 Macc.
15.3 (4); ephanerothe en hetera morphe, Mark 16:12; en morphe theou huparchon, Phil.
2:6 . . . he [the Logos] bore the form (in which he appeared to the inhabitants of heaven)
of God (the sovereign, opp. to morph. doulou), yet did not think that this equality with
God was to be eagerly clung to or retained . . .(Thayer 418)
Thayer's words indicate that one probably should not conscript morphe to buttress the
belief that Jesus is fully God (vere deus). Morphe, based on Thayer's observations, may
simply refer to an "external appearance" or "outward reflection." In the NT, it evidently
does not refer to the substance or essence of a thing. Christ could therefore have existed
as a reflection of Deity; consequently, he would not necessarily have subsisted as a
member of the triune Godhead. (For another ancient use of morphe as "outward
appearance" with regard to children, cf. Philo, De Legatione 55.) Instead of being
Almighty God per his essence, Christ could have simply resembled God the Father
outwardly as he lived among the heavenly hosts (John 14:9; Col. 1:15). A number of
scholars have become aware of this point in their study of the lingual signifier morphe.
These individuals have consequently been unable to avoid concluding that morphe
carries the sense of "external appearance" in Phil 2:6:
By seeing the expression 'in the form of God' against the common wisdom of Antiquity
that offspring bear the visible likeness of their parents, Paul's thought becomes much
clearer. As the Son of God from heaven, Christ bore the outward morphe of his Father in
his existence before becoming a man and divested himself (heauton ekenosen) of it in
order to take the form of a slave. (Wannamaker 185)
Additionally, in an article entitled "Ernst Lohmeyer's Kurios Jesus," Colin Brown writes
that morphe "connotes visible appearance" (Martin and Dodd 27). Upon reading A
Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Early Christian Literature (BAGD),
it is indeed very difficult to avoid this understanding of morphe. This superb reference
work says that morphe carries the sense of "form, outward appearance, shape." It is
used generically of bodily form in 1 Clement 39:3: "For what can a mortal man do? Or
what strength is there in one made out of the dust? For it is written, "There was no
shape [morphe] before mine eyes, only I heard a sound" (Cf. Job 4:16 LXX), and the
Bible writers also employ morphe to describe "the shape or form of statues, appearances
in visions similar to persons, [and] the risen Christ ephanerothe en hetera morphe"
(BAGD 528).

BAGD additionally notes that Christ appeared in a "different form" after his resurrection
(Mark 16:12). Paul's use of morphe (in Phil 2:6) thus suggests that although Jesus
existed en morphe theou in his preexistent state of glory, he did not possess absolute
Deity before he became flesh. In other words, he outwardly resembled God the Father in
heaven, but was evidently inferior to this same God per substance and rank (John 14:28;
1 Cor. 11:3; 15:24-28). A closer look at the classical and Scriptural use of morphe will
provide further illumination on this matter. To further discern the Pauline use of
morphe, please note the words of Moises Silva below:
If we stress the classical usage of this term [morphe], the technical sense of Aristotelian
philosophy suggests itself: morphe, although not equivalent to ousia ("being, essence"),
speaks of essential or characteristic attributes and thus is to be distinguished from
schema (the changeable, external fashion). In a valuable essay on morphe and schema,
[Lightfoot] argued along these lines and remarked that even in popular usage these
respective meanings could be ascertained. The many references where morphe is used of
physical appearance . . . make it difficult to maintain Lightfoot's precise distinction,
though there is an important element of truth in his treatment. (Silva 113-114)
Upon closer examination, it becomes manifestly obvious that Phil 2:6-7 (by its use of
morphe) does not unequivocally establish the essential deity of Christ. The employment
of morphe in Philippians does not necessarily substantiate the teaching that Christ is
God incarnate. To derive this conclusion from Phil 2:6 demonstrates a mistaken overreliance on the Greek term. Moises Silva offers further valuable comments along these
lines as floolws:
[Lightfoot's] claim that morphe (opposite schema) refers to unchangeable essence can
be sustained by some references, but too many passages speak against it. (Silva 122)
Silva also quotes Plato (Republic 380d) who inquires about God's ability to alter His
"shape" (to autou eidos eis pollas morphas). The New Testament professor
subsequently references Xenophon, Philo, Lucian and the fourth century writer,
Libanius, who wrote: ouch ho tois theos tes morphen eoikhos (Silva 123). All of these
references indicate that morphe refers to one's external appearance (not to one's
intrinsic essence).
At this point, we must point out that all of the foregoing does not mean Silva denounces
Trinitarianism; he surely does not concede that Phil 2:6 is dissonant with Trinitarian
claims. His comments do help us to see, however, that one cannot base his or her belief
in Christ's Deity on the mere occurrence of morphe in Phil 2:6. As we shall note
elsewhere in this discussion (contra Silva), the self-emptying described in Philippians is
not necessarily consistent with the claims of Trinitarianism.
Philippians 2:6-7 and Other Divine Beings
To help us understand this point in more depth, it is beneficial to consider the

observations of Jane Schaberg concerning the respective semantic fields of elohim and
theos. She astutely notes that unity may be emphasized in the New Testament "without
any intended implication of equality" between the Father and the Son (Schaberg 8). For
example, Jesus claims that he and the Father are one (Jn 10:30). But this verse need not
imply that Jesus is declaring himself equal to the Father in any way (Jn 14:28).
Moreover the apostle John describes Jesus as theos in his Gospel (Jn 1:1, 18; 20:28).
Nevertheless, it appears that the NT writers utilize theos in a broad monotheistic
context. Thus, elohim is applied to Melchizedek five times in the Qumran document
concerning the ancient priest-King. Philo also applies the word theos to Moses. We may
therefore conclude that the New Testament teaches us there are subordinate divine
beings or godlike ones who are not to be equated with YHWH (John 10:34-36).
In a similar vein, Phil 2:6-7 tells us that a divine being humbly became the man Jesus
Christ who subsequently lived on earth and underwent an excruciating and ignominious
death. Afterwards, God resurrected him, subsequently giving Christ a position of
authority more eminent than any other in the universe, save that of the Father Himself
(Phil 2:5-11). According to Phil 2:6-11 and 1 Cor 15:24-28, however, the Son will
eventually hand over the Kingdom to his God and Father.
Jn 17:3 further assures us that the Son of God is not to be identified with the only true
God. For John, there was only one true God: the Father. The writer of Philippians also
subscribed to the thought found in the Johannine Gospel. He indicates this belief by his
use of morphe and the cotext of Phil 2:6-7. Let us now return to our consideration of
this pivotal term and also introduce another key word.
Morphe and Harpagmos
Earlier we reviewed Lightfoot's treatment of morphe and his inadequate claim that the
term refers to the substance or essence of a thing in Phil 2:6. The deficient nature of
Lightfoot's argument is also highlighted by Robert B. Strimple in the Westminster
Theological Journal where Strimple openly relates that for years he too tried to uphold
Lightfoot's distinction between morphe and schema until he had to admit that there "is
really little evidence to support the conclusion that Paul uses morphe in such a
philosophical sense here [in Phil 2:6]" (Strimple 259). Strimple also cites four instances
where morphe appears in the LXX (Judg 8:18; Job 4:16; Isa 44:13; Dan 3:19). We now
reproduce all four texts for the benefit of our readers:
Anesten kai ouk epegnon eidon kai ouk en morphe pro ophthalmon mou all' e auran kai
phnhn ekouon (Job 4:16 Brenton).
Eklexamenos tekton xulon estesen auto en metro kai en kolle erruthmisen auto kai
epoiesen auto hos morphen andros kai hos horaioteta anthropou stesai auto en oikos
(Isa 44:16 Brenton).
Strimple writes concerning these four passages: "In each instance . . . morphe refers to
the visible form or appearance" (260). Furthermore, it is worthy of note that Aquila
employs morphe in Isa 52:14 to describe the "outer appearance" of the Messiah.

Since, as Strimple concurs, the theme of Jehovah's Suffering Servant undoubtedly serves
as a backdrop in the Philippians account--it seems reasonable to assume that morphe as
used in Isa 52:14 bears a similar meaning in Phil 2:6. Strimple concludes: "meager
though the Biblical evidence is, it is sufficient to make a prima facie case for the
reference being to a visible manifestation" (260). These exegetical insights do not mean
that the systematic theologian views the New Testament account as dissonant with
Trinitarianism. Yet, his words do show the inappropriateness of interpreting the
morphe tou theou of the apostle Paul through Aristotelian lenses. Strimple's words
manifestly show the futility of trying to prove Christ is God via the Biblical use of
morphe and an appeal to Aristotle or Philo's use of the term. (cf. Wannamaker 185-187
for a clarification of God's "outward appearance.")
Next, the apostle Paul writes: ouch harpagmon egesato to einai isa theo. What is the
significance of this phrase? The Greek word harpagmos is derived from the term
harpazo. Harpazo can depict the act of stripping, spoiling, snatching, seizing with force,
or robbing someone. The lexical signifier is also used to describe "an open act of violence
in contrast to cunning and secret thieving" (Zodhiates 892). Moreover, harpazo carries
the sense of a forcible seizure, a snatching away or taking to oneself (See Dunn's
observations in Dodd and Martin 77). Early Christian writers employ it at Acts 8:39, 2
Cor 12:2, 4; 1 Thess 4:17, Rev 12:5, Mt 11:12. The sense of the word in Phil. 2:6 is not so
much retaining as it is that of forceful seizure:
Once we recognize that for Paul Christ did not possess equality with God in an absolute
sense, for the very reason that he was the Son of God, the meaning of the problematic
expression ouch harpagmon hegesato becomes clear. Every interpretation which
assumes the essential equality of Christ with God is excluded. In spite of certain
difficulties, the sense of ouch harpagmon hegasato must lie in the direction of res
rapienda: the Son of God did not think equality with God something to be grasped.
(Wannamaker 188)
To attribute a passive sense to harpagmos appears to be unwarranted (Hawthorne 8485). Exploring this issue further before coming to any definite conclusions, however, we
will now note the exegesis of Moises Silva:
The ambiguous phrase in v. 6, [ouch harpagmon hegesato], has created a literature far
more extensive than it probably deserves. In particular, one is impressed by the futility
of trying to reach a decision regarding Jesus' preexistence and deity on the basis of
whether harpagmon has an active meaning or a passive meaning . . . if one opts for the
passive idea, is the nuance positive ("windfall, advantage") or negative ("booty, prize")?
Further, if it carries a negative nuance, we must decide whether it speaks of a thing
already possessed, which one is tempted to hold on to . . . or a thing not possessed,
which one may be tempted to snatch. (Silva 117)
In the end, Silva concludes that a sense of retaining may be the most likely meaning of
harpagmos in Philippians 2:6ff. But he is forced to admit that such a conclusion is
uncertain and not central to the "hymn" of Philippians 2:6-11 (117). Furthermore, he

adds that the few instances of harpagmos outside of Christian literature are all active
and not passive (as is the case with harpagma). Consulting Abbott-Smith also reveals
that "there is certainly a presumption in favour of the active meaning here" since the
apostle does not use the LXX form harpagma. Paul thus speaks of an act of seizing: not
a thing seized or a prize (A-S 60).
Though being a firm advocate of Trinitarianism, Greek Professor Daniel B. Wallace also
openly admits that while it may be theologically "attractive" to construe harpagmos as a
passive voice verb (in Phil. 2:6), "it is not satisfactory" (Wallace 634). Wallace
convincingly demonstrates that we must interpret the verse in the light of the phrase
heauton ekenosen. He concludes that the only translation harmonious with Philippians
2:7 is "a thing to be grasped" (an active meaning for harpagmos). We can thus see that
an objective look at the usage of harpagmos in the NT leads one to conclude that
harpagmos in Phil 2:6 evidently carries the active meaning of snatching (i.e., a
usurpation). This apostolic passage therefore appears to be affirming the fact that Jesus
did not aspire to equality with God. To the contrary, completely antithetical to the first
Adam, the one who existed en morphe theou contentedly subjected himself to his Father
in heaven: "What Christ emptied himself of was his right to be served, his privileged
position as the Son of God, and his visible glory [morphe] by taking the form of a slave"
(Wannamaker 188).[37]
What Philippians 2:6 Tells Us about the Son of God
We now come to the culmination and crowning point of our discussion. What is
Philippians speaking of when it says that Jesus "emptied himself"? We have touched on
this point some in the earlier sections of this study. Now let us probe this subject a little
deeper. In doing so, we will first note how Charles Ryrie interprets Philippians 2:7-8:
Notice that whatever the emptying involved, it was self-imposed. No one forced Christ to
come into this world and eventually die . . . Other uses of the verb empty are found in
Romans 4:14 (void); 1 Cor. 1:17 (void); 9:15; 2 Cor. 9:3: but they do not really contribute
to the understanding of this passage . . . The self-emptying permitted the addition of
humanity and did not involve in any way the subtraction of deity or the use of the
attributes of deity. There was a change of form but not of content of the Divine Being . . .
He added humanity. And this in order to be able to die. (262-263)
The observations made by Ryrie show us that he thinks the self-emptying of Christ in no
way involved "the subtraction of deity." The enfleshed Logos simply "added humanity."
Since Ryrie believes that Christ possessed absolute Deity in heaven, he subsequently
argues that the Messiah was wholly Deity during his incarnation. Ryrie thus vigorously
contends that Christ did not give up any of his divine attributes when he emptied
himself in order to become a man. To relinquish any of his divine attributes would
suggest that Christ was not the God-man during his relatively brief sojourn with
humanity (a view utterly unthinkable for Ryrie).
I must say at the outset that I vehemently disagree with Ryrie on the definition of kenoo

and its relevance to Phil 2:7. Greek writings utilize kenoo to delineate the effecting of a
complete emptiness, void, or an absolute negation. In addition, writers of sacred
literature employ kenos to describe vainglory, groundless self esteem, and empty pride
(Phil 2:3, 4 Macc 2:15).
The LXX uses kenos to describe abject emptiness or complete negation (cf. Gen 31:42,
Deut 15:13; Job 22:9). Kenodozos also specifies: "glorying without reason, conceit, or
eagerness for empty glory" (Gal. 5:26).[38] Simply put, kenoo may convey the sense, "to
empty" or "make empty." Thayer therefore understands Phil 2:7 to mean that Christ
"laid aside equality with the form (external appearance) of God." Thus Christ was made
void: emptied (negated) as regards his being en morphe theou. He completely divested
himself of his spirit nature and the outward form wherewith he subsisted in the
presence of God:
The verb kenoun requires an object to be expressed which is understood. Those who
believe that Christ possesses equality with God in his preexistence naturally urge that
Christ emptied himself of his equality. However, my explanation of vs. 6 has ruled out
this possibility (Wannamaker 188).
No, Christ did not empty himself of ontological equality with God. In fact, he was never
consubstantial with his Father in the first place. Therefore, when Christ emptied himself
of existing in God's form, he simply stopped subsisting in the external form (outward
appearance) of God.
Now just what does this statement imply? As pointed out by William Barclay, kenoo in
Phil 2:7 seems to imply that even if Christ was Almighty God (God the Son) in heaven,
he surely was not such on earth. Heb 2:11-17 also supports this conclusion when it
reports that Jesus became like his brothers in every respect. If Jesus was like unto his
human brothers in all respects, then how could he have been God enfleshed? One way
out would be to interpret the term "all" (panta) in Heb 2:17 in a relative manner. Such a
choice, however, must be determined on the basis of cotext and other grammatical
factors. We must not appeal to the relative sense of panta based on theological
presuppositions alone. While William Barclay admittedly denied that the kenosis
eternally put the Deity of Christ in eternal jeopardy, it is difficult to see how his
contention can be successfully sustained. Nevertheless, it does seem that Barclay rightly
defines kenoo, though he does not extrapolate the same conclusions from this definition
that I have.
But if kenoo does refer to the total emptying of a container or person, another
conundrum raises it unsightly head vis--vis incarnational dogma. If Jesus emptied
himself of subsisting in God's form while he lived on earth, then he ceased being either
God or manifesting the peerless glory of God. Ryrie argues that such emptying is
logically impossible and that it certainly did not occur in the case of our Lord (contra
Barclay). One has to ignore the clear meaning of kenoo, however, to argue for such a
conclusion. According to BAGD, kenoo can signify "to empty." Hence, it is reasonable to
conclude that when Paul says Jesus "emptied himself," he possibly meant that Jesus of
Nazareth (the embodied Word of God) ceased to be what he previously was in the

heavenly realm.
Conclusion
What can we therefore extract from this survey of kenotic opinions? To encapsulate
matters, we can say that the Logos in his pre-existent state subsisted in God's form
(God's external likeness). Despite this basic fact, we can rightly proclaim that he was not
God during this time, but ontologically subordinate to God. In order to die for
humankind and honor his Father--the Logos 'emptied himself' of existing in God's form,
he manifested authentic humility. This emptying evidently entailed Christ's becoming a
man, divesting himself of his spiritual mode of being, suffering on a stauros and humbly
submitting to an ignominious death. This interpretation of Jesus Christ's kenosis is the
most straightforward exegesis of this controversial passage. It is a reinterpretation of an
opaque teaching about the only-begotten Son of God.

Aseity and the Trinity

The doctrine of God's aseity is one of Christian theology's primary tenets. In the
theological paradigm of most Christians, God is the self-existent, self-caused One: "It is
to this very property of absolute independence, or self-existence by nature that we give
the name aseity" (Sauvage).
Anselm of Canterbury was evidently the first theologian to employ the term aseity: He
used it to describe the self-existence of God. Other thinkers also employed this word and
consequently defined God as "the Absolute, the innominable Self-caused [AUTOPATOR
et Causa sui], in whose transcendent 'I Am,' as the ground, is whatever verily is." Yes,
these theologians viewed God as the One who uniquely enjoys: "eternity, self-existence,
necessary existence, [and] spirituality" (Pelikan 5:189-190). Similarly, the fourth
century bishop Athanasius claimed that it was "an admitted truth about God that he
stands in need of nothing, but is self-sufficient and filled with himself" (1:52-54).
From this brief perusal of the theological tradition, it is difficult to see how we can think
of God in any other way than self-existent and necessary. In fact, Professor Jerome
Adler reminds us that if "God's existence were not thought of as independent,
unconditioned, and uncaused existence . . . we would not be thinking of God as the
supreme being" (89). Adler's comments adequately delineate the traditional Christian
view of aseity. Moreover, a cursory historical survey of the theological terrain reveals
that God's necessary existence and His aseity are also associative attributes. In this
regard, Adler emphatically states that to describe God as independent in His existence
"is just another way of saying that God has a necessary existence" (89). We can therefore
declare that God is self-caused since He derives His Being from no one. As Owen
Thomas writes:
God is revealed as sovereign, free, independent and self-sufficient . . . Since God's

lordship means the divine freedom in relation to the world, the divine self-sufficiency
and independence of the world, many theologians, beginning with Anselm, have used
the philosophical term a se, by or from the divine self, that God is self-derived. There is
no matter or fate prior to God which conditions the divine freedom. It is in this case that
the term absolute is applied to God (Thomas "Theology" 82).
Anselm of Canterbury himself writes in a famed passage from his work Monologium:
"Whatever things there are else, then, exist through something other than themselves,
and this alone through itself. But whatever exists through another is less than that,
through which all things are, and which alone exists through itself. Therefore, that
which exists through itself exists in the greatest degree of all things" (Deane 88).
These statements go to the very heart of aseity. If God is necessary, then it seems that
from a Trinitarian point of view, the Godhead in its entirety must also be necessary
(since the Godhead is supposed to be immanently triune). Therefore, it appears that
each "person" in the Godhead must possess esse a se. Thus, if the Godhead in its
entirety is self-existent and necessary, if each divine Person possesses the quality of
aseity, this fact indicates that Trinitarians have seemingly postulated three self-existent
metaphysical entities that collectively form one God. Indeed, if the premises stated
hitherto are valid, then the specter of tritheism appears to hover over the triune teaching
of God. The ontological dogma of the Trinity once again seems to produce irresolvable
and problematic antinomies!
The Ante-Nicene Fathers and Aseity
A brief look at the Ante-Nicene Fathers demonstrates their affirmation of God's
inimitable self-existent nature. One patristic who elucidated the notion of God's aseity
was Athenagoras. In his writings, Athenagoras affirms a God who is "uncreated, eternal,
invisible, impassible, incomprehensible, and infinite," one "who created and now rules
the world through the Logos who issues from him" (Embassy For the Christians 10.1).
Further showing that God is esse a se, Athenagoras transcendently proclaims that "God
is in himself all things to himself: inaccessible light, a complete world, spirit, power,
reason" (Embassy 16.1). True, Athenagoras' words are tinged with Platonic concepts.
Yet they beautifully delineate the self-existent character of God.
At this point, however, certain readers will probably disagree vehemently with the
conclusion that I extract from the words of Athenagoras. 'Athenagoras was a
Trinitarian,' some will ardently insist. Are these sentiments true, however?
In the theological model espoused by Athenagoras, the Logos is not on par with the
Father: The Logos is God's "ideal form" and "energizing power" that gives shape and
order to the kosmos. The Logos is not fully divine (or fully Deity) in Athenagoras' eyes
(neither is the Holy Spirit a third "Person" in Athenagorean theology). To the contrary,
Athenagoras regarded the Holy Spirit as "an effluence of God which flows forth from
him and returns like a ray of the sun." Of course, we cannot deny that Athenagoras
spoke of God the Father, the Logos, and the Holy Spirit subsisting in simultaneous unity

and diversity. Athenagoras, however, not only worshiped God and His Logos; he also
included "angels" in his theologia as beings worthy of worship (Embassy 10.1ff). This
fact suggests that Athenagoras undoubtedly had a very broad view of what constitutes a
"god" (as did Justin Martyr).
With the foregoing in mind, what are we to conclude about Athenagoras' theologia? In
the book Gods and the one God, Robert Grant writes that Athenagoras constructed his
theological concepts from Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (Athenagoras also
incorporated Stoic thought when systematizing the nature of God). Grant provides
compelling evidence that Athenagoras' ideas are Trinitarian concepts in utero that
simultaneously employ Platonic and Pythagorean philosophical notions to explain
Christian theology (Grant 158). The bottom line, however, is that Athenagoras was not a
Trinitarian: He subordinated the Logos to the Father. What is more, we must point out
that Athenagoras' Christology and angelology were tainted and impure. Nevertheless,
his theology does assist us in gaining a proper understanding of Christianity's
traditional view of God's transcendence and aseity (158).[39]
Is The Trinity Compatible With God's Aseity?
The Patristics did not originate the idea of God's self-existence. The Bible itself
unequivocally teaches that God is self-existent (John 5:26). This peerless book
overwhelmingly demonstrates that God alone is inherently and by His very nature selfexistent (self-sufficient). The concept of God deriving self-existence from a fons
divinitatis seems logically incompatible with the notion of aseity. Theoretically, a
derived kind of divinity or a consequential form of self-existence appears to be inferior
to an underived one as Tertullian implies in Adversus Hermogenem. How can the
Supreme Being receive Godhood? Is this idea either rational or scriptural? Summing up
the problem, Brunner aptly observes: "In the New Testament the Son, or Jesus Christ, is
never called the Creator. This title is given to the Father alone. It is He who 'granted
unto the Son to have life in Himself' " (Brunner 232). Brunner thus concludes that the
Bible raises the "problem" of the Trinity perhaps, but it does not teach that God is tres
personae in una substantia.
Interestingly, the Amplified Bible renders John 5:26: "For even as the Father has life in
Himself and is self-existent, so he has given to the Son to have life in Himself and be
self-existent." Not only are the Father and the Son self-existent, Holy Writ also reveals
that God will reward resurrected anointed Christians with the gift of self-existence (1
John 3:1-3). The charism of aseity will not make such ones equal to God. Nevertheless,
they will perpetually enjoy an uninterrupted state of deathlessness akin to the very life
of God (cf. 1 Cor. 15:51, 52).
Robert Knopp tries to deal with the difficulties produced from John 5:26, when he
relates the following: "It is obviously contradictory to say that the Father gives the Son
life in himself . . . How then can the Son have life in himself if he has been given it by the
Father? John is trying to make human language do what it cannot do--express the
infinite-and of course his human language breaks down in the attempt, as must all

theological language that tries to express divine mystery" (Knopp 274).

It would appear that at this point Knopp finds himself enclosed in a cognitive labyrinth
from which he must try to extricate himself through linguistic and metaphysical
acrobatics. He is hard pressed to explain how Jesus can be Almighty God and possess
self-existence while at the same time look to his Father to supply the aforesaid selfexistent life (John 5:26; 6:57).
Knopp appeals to the failure of human language to adequately express the "infinite."
Such appeals--although well intentioned--are decidedly erroneous. Contra Knopp, we
think we can safely contend that God has provided humans with language so that we
might efficaciously express the infinite, though we cannot articulate the infinite
exhaustively. As Carl Henry astutely noted, using human language to convey divine
meaning and authorial intent is essential if we would understand God's self-disclosure
transmitted through the pages of the holy Bible (White 100). In the final analysis,
Knopp concludes that the apostle John "is saying that by generation the Son derives his
life from the Father and that, nevertheless, this divinely generated life is the very life of
God, the very being of God, absolute equality with the Father" (Knopp 274).
Seemingly, this author has successfully delivered himself from the pit of contradiction,
but in actuality, he has done nothing more than stay the inevitable since he merely
asserts the Son's equal essential standing with God the Father without really providing
evidence that correlates with John 5:26. (The apostle John does not teach what Knopp
asseverates!) Simply put, the idea of derived Deity or aseity is highly problematic.
Therefore, certain theologians reject both the notion of the eternal begettal of the Son
and the eternal spiration of the Spirit (Zodhiates 306). Hence, the problem of derived
aseity still looms in the horizon.
Despite the foregoing, some thinkers have tried to solve the problems presented in this
essay by positing the Father's dependence on the Son and the Holy Spirit. That is, some
theologues contend that each Person in the Godhead is dependent on the other two
divine Persons. Nevertheless, theologians in Eastern Christendom have traditionally
viewed the idea of the Father being dependent upon the Son or Holy Spirit with
repugnance and I am not so sure Western theologians generally accept this stance
either. Rightly (mutatis mutandis), Greek Orthodox theologians have generally viewed
the Father as the pele [source], the arche [principle], and the aitia [cause] of the
Godhead. In the eyes of these eminent authorities:
The Trinity [is] a unity only if "both the Son and the Spirit are led forth from one cause,
the Father"; any other theory [is] "blasphemy" and a resurgence of the godlessness of
polytheism . . . in the guise of Christianity." Although the Son and Spirit, as well as the
Father, were without beginning, they did nevertheless have a single cause within the
Godhead, namely, the Father, who had no cause distinct from Himself. Dionysius the
Areopagite had taught that "the Father is the only source of the supersubstantial
Godhead; The Trinity could be compared to a balance scale, in which there was a single
operation and center (the Father), upon which the other two arms (Son and Holy Spirit)
both depended. (Pelikan 2:197)

Eastern theologians have generally not been able to tolerate the position that contends
the Father has vital need of the Son or Holy Spirit since the Father is considered to be
the singular principle in the Godhead (Burgess 2:50-51). What is more, John 5:26
indicates that the Father has life in himself independent of any other Person.
Consequently, while the Grecian view of the Godhead eradicates some of the problems
that plague the Western Trinity, it still fails to explain the concept of derived aseity in
the Godhead in a satisfactory manner.
Aseity Does Not Harmonize with the Trinity
The Scriptural testimony seems to reveal that God is indisputably a se esse. He is Self
Caused. This means that He is neither dependent upon nor derived from anyone. If
Trinitarians postulate three personae that consubstantially possess the property of
aseity individually, then they are positing three gods. If these same believers argue that
the Son or the Holy Spirit is dependent upon the Father, then the said parties face the
dilemma of arguing that neither Christ nor the Holy Spirit are vere deus. Either way
Trinitarians evidently produce an ineluctable conundrum that they cannot easily
expunge. It seems that the concept of God's aseity conflicts with the Trinity doctrine.
Which point of view will we accept then? Will the reader believe that God is three-in-one
and self-existent or unipersonal and self-existent? The choice is yours.

Excursus A: John 5:26 and Aseity

The Johannine phrase "life in himself" (zwen en heauto) and its variant forms is a very
interesting and significant formula since John writes in verse 5:26 of his Gospel: "For
just as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted also to the Son to have life in
himself" (NWT). This dominical passage provides a number of important details that
should influence our view of Biblical Christology.
First, John informs us that the Father has "life in himself." Jesus makes this observation
in a context discussing the resurrection of the dead, which is an ancient Jewish topic, to
be sure. The enfleshed Son of God reports that the Father has life in Himself to show the
role that the Father plays in the resurrection. The dead come to life when they hear the
Son of God's voice (Jn 5:26-29). Nevertheless, the Son is able to resurrect those in the
memorial tombs (mnemeiois) because the Father, who has life in Himself, "has granted
to the Son to have life in himself" (Jn 5:26).
What exactly does John mean when he employs the formula "life in himself" in this
particular Bible verse? In what sense can we say the Father and Son have life in
themselves?
Before reviewing the semantics of the text, we need to explore another passage in which
similar language appears. The germane text here is John 6:53:

"Accordingly Jesus said to them: 'Most truly I say to you, Unless you eat the flesh of the
Son of man and drink his blood, you have no life in yourselves'" (ouk exete zoen en
heautois).
We will not address the Eucharistic controversy surrounding this text. It is sufficient to
note that while certain exegetes contend that John's words have a bearing on the
transubstantiation doctrine of Roman Catholicism, Paul Anderson has proffered a
recent explanation of John 6:53ff that seems to have refuted the Roman Catholic
reading of this passage (Anderson 139-140). However one may choose to treat the
sacramental issue this text evokes, we now want to concentrate on the clause: "you have
no life in yourselves."
While it is tempting to equate the formula in John 6:53 with the one in 5:26, there is
most certainly a difference in view of the context. While the phrase in 5:26 most surely
is a statement about the Father and Son's ability to impart life to others, John 6:53
evidently does not predicate such a notion of those who "eat the flesh of the Son of man
and drink his blood." In context, all that 6:53 teaches is that those subsisting off of the
blood and flesh of Christ in a symbolic manner will have everlasting life and
subsequently be resurrected "at the last day" (note the parallelism in 6:54). The "life"
mentioned in connection with the Father and the Son at John 5:26, however, is "life" in
a unique qualitative sense. J.R. Michaels recognizes this fact in his commentary on
John's Gospel: "In itself, the phrase does not include the notion that one has the power
to confer that life on others, but such translations as 'source of life' (both GNB and
Jerusalem Bible) can be defended on the basis of the context, especially the parallelism
with v. 21" (93).
We are thus faced with the question as to what type of life is mentioned by John in John
5:26? What is the point that John is communicating?
In view of the cotext, it seems that we can rightly infer John is telling his readers that
the Father is self-existent and possesses the power to both sustain His own life and
grant the same ability to others, namely, the Son. But even the Son depends on the
Father to sustain his life (6:57). Trinitarian commentator Michaels even writes: "Jesus
lives because of the Father both in his life on earth and in resurrection from the dead,
while the disciple lives because of Jesus in both senses as well" (119). Robertson adds:
"The Living God possesses life wholly in himself and so he has bestowed this power of
life to the Son" (206).
From the foregoing, it seems that we can set out the following proposition, to wit, the
Father is self-existent and does not depend on anyone or anything for His continued
existence. On the other hand, the Son has been granted life in himself by the Father. The
four Gospels demonstrate this fact as they detail the earthly sojourn of the Son. We also
witness the truthfulness of John's account as we take note of the other NT writings that
deal with the resurrected Christ, who is a life-giving spirit (1 Cor 15:45). John 5:26 is
another passage that makes us wonder how Trinitarians can harmonize aseity and the
Trinity. How can the "second Person" of the Trinity derive his own personal form of selfexistence from God the Father? The evidence indicates that the Son is not Almighty

God. He is rather comparable to the Son of Man in 1 Enoch. In that famed

pseudepigraphal book, YHWH makes Enoch the eschatological Judge, granting him an
exalted position in heaven. The Son of Man in John's Gospel also seems to be a highranking godlike figure: The Judge of the eschaton. Jn 5:26 clearly delineates the
subordinate position of the Christ. He depends upon the Father to possess the type of
life mentioned in the aforesaid Bible verse.

Does Hebrews 1:1-8 Teach that Christ is Almighty God?

Among the many "proof texts" that Trinitarians use to buttress their belief in Jesus'
Deity, Heb 1:8 is considered to be one of the most striking and explicit examples. In
Greek, the verse reads as follows: pros de ton huion ho thronos sou ho theos eis ton
aiona tou aionos kai he rhabdos tes euthutetos rhabdos tes basileias autou (WestcottHort). TEV translates the passage in a way that would seem to uphold the notion that
Christ is God on some level. It says: "About the Son, however, God said: "Your kingdom,
O God, will last forever and ever! You rule over your people with justice," whereas
Byington's Bible in Living English renders Heb 1:8 thus: "but as to the Son 'God is your
throne forever and ever, and the scepter of integrity is the scepter of his reign.'
From a comparison of the two Bible versions cited above, translational and theological
questions immediately come to the fore. Heb 1:8 makes us wonder how we are to
understand what the book of Hebrews teaches concerning the ontological status of our
Lord and Savior. Does Hebrews show that Jesus is Almighty God? Alternatively, does it
ontologically subordinate him to the Father?
This essay will try to establish a more moderate claim than the Christological teaching of
Hebrews as a whole. In this chapter, I will focus on what Heb 1:8 and its cotext has to
declare about the Deity (deity) of Jesus Christ. In order to show the first century writer's
seeming intent and meaning, I will approach Heb 1:8 from three primary perspectives:
(1) From an Old Testament perspective, looking to see what we can learn from Ps 45:6ff,
(2) From a cotextual perspective. That is, I will examine the word proskuneo in Heb 1:6
and try to discern how its meaning bears on one's understanding of theos and thronos in
Heb 1:8. (3) Lastly, I will consider the syntax of Heb 1:8 and attempt to determine how
one either should or might construe the word order in the said passage. This paper will
argue that we should interpret Heb 1:8 as a royal account that religiously delineates the
kingly status of the risen and exalted Christ without attributing to him full Deity. We will
therefore begin by outlining the structure of Heb 1:1-8 and discussing verse by verse
how each unit of the text contributes to understanding Heb 1:8.
The Structure and Cotext of Hebrews 1:1-8
Hebrews 1:1-4 constitutes the exordium of the treatise written to the first century
Christians living in Jerusalem and Judea. It is a monumental accomplishment, not only
religiously and theologically, but rhetorically as well. Professor Harold W. Attridge
interestingly points out that "the rhetorical artistry of this exordium surpasses that of

any other portion of the New Testament" (Attridge 36). George H. Guthrie adds: "With
its majestic style and high concentration of programmatic topics, which the author will
elaborate throughout the book, Heb 1:1-4 may be identified as the 'introduction' of the
discourse" (Guthrie 119). Indeed, Heb 1:1-4 will serve as the ab initio of this discussion.
Hebrews 1:1, 2 initiates the Christological discussion that permeates the Epistle
addressed to certain first century Jewish believers in a peerless rhetorical fashion. The
writer liberally employs the literary device of alliteration as he writes: polumeros kai
polutropos palai ho theos lalesas tois patrasin en tois prophetais ep' eschatou ton
hemeron touton elalesen hemin en huios (UBS4).
Admittedly this Biblical passage is filled with dynamic and skillful examples of
alliteration that instantly grab the reader's attention. It is imperative, however, not to
overlook the vital Christological message contained in the passage because of its literary
features. The writer of Hebrews makes it clear that in the pre-Messianic age, God (ho
theos) communicated to humankind via numerous and diverse means and ways through
such prophets as Isaiah, Jeremiah, Obadiah as well as Daniel. A.T. Robertson also
explains: "The Old Testament revelation came at different times and in various stages,
and ways, as a progressive revelation of God to men. God spoke by dream, by direct
voice, by signs, in different ways to different men (Abraham, Jacob, Moses, Elijah,
Isaiah, etc.). The two uses of 'many' are a literary device meaning 'variously' "
(Robertson 557).
While we surely cannot label what Robertson calls, "the Old Testament revelation,"
inferior--Heb 1:1, 2 definitely tells us that the divine revelation recorded in the Old
Testament was only a faint adumbration of the things that were to come (Heb 9:11). For
in the last days (eschatou ton hemeron) of the Jewish system of things, God decided to
speak through "a Son" (NRSV). Before we explore the Epistle's delineation of God's
revelatory activity manifested through the Son, two points relating to Greek articles and
anarthrous constructions now deserve our attention at this point.
First, we note that the writer of Hebrews utilizes the articular construction ho theos in
Heb 1:1. The article, writes A.T. Robertson, "is never meaningless in Greek" (Qt. in
Young 55). This observation does not mean that we always understand why a particular
writer decided to use or not to use the article at a particular point in a treatise, however.
For in Philo, we read that the God of the Old Testament (YHWH) is properly called ho
theos (De. Som. 1.229ff). But Philo specifically remarks that Greek writers call the Logos
theos (without the article). Origen supports this understanding of Greek grammar in
Commentary on John as he too indicates that there is significance in including or
omitting the article.
The use or non-use of the article is a complex issue and we do not want to suggest that it
is a problem one can easily resolve by arbitrarily differentiating between nouns that
have the article and nouns that do not: "It is very difficult to set forth exact rules [for the
article] that will cover every case" (Young 55). The truthfulness of this contention can be
seen when we note that Ignatius of Antioch clearly has no trouble describing Jesus of
Nazareth as ho theos in his writings (Eph. 18:2) and John 20:28 prima facie depicts

Thomas addressing Jesus as: ho theos mou kai ho kurios mou. Furthermore, Satan the
Devil is seemingly described as ho theos tou aionos in 2 Cor 4:4, though certain scholars
have suggested (based on the LXX reading of Dan 5:4) that Jehovah is actually the God
alluded to in 2 Cor 4:4 who blinds the minds of the unbelievers (Scott 85). That is, God
allows the minds of unbelievers to be unreceptive to divine enlightenment (Rom 11:8; 2
Thess 2:11, 12). The position taken in this work, however, is that ha Satan is the referent
delineated by the signifiers ho theos tou aionos in 2 Cor 4:4.
Regardless of how writers employ the article elsewhere in the New Testament, it appears
that Murray J. Harris is correct as he observes: "When (ho) theos is used, we are to
assume that the NT writers have ho pater in mind unless the context makes this sense of
(ho) theos impossible" (Harris 47). Indeed, Harris' observation is both astute and
germane to our discussion when we return to Heb 1:1, 2 and note that it is ho theos,
whom the writer of Hebrews argues actually spoke through the prophets of antiquity.
Fittingly, the author of Hebrews employs the article when speaking of God the Father,
for Heb 1:1, 2 definitively shows that ho theos spoke to humans through a Son (elalesen
hemin en huios). Thus, ho theos in Heb 1:1 must be synonymous with ho pater. This
point additionally means that YHWH spoken of in the Old Testament (the One also
called Alpha and Omega and the Most High God in Ps 83:18) must be ho pater (not ho
huios tou theou). While this fact does not seem to bother him, Murray Harris does
acknowledge: "For the author of Hebrews (as for all NT writers, one may suggest) 'the
God of our fathers,' Yahweh, was no other than 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ' " (Harris 47). This comment in no way implies that Harris disavows the supposed
Deity of Jesus Christ or that of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, Harris' observations serve
to make the pivotal point that the God (ho theos) of Heb 1:1 is none other than the God
and Father of Jesus Christ. In my view, the writer of Hebrews seems to maintain a
crucial ontological distinction between the Most High God and His anointed Messiah.
With that point established, we must move on to the second issue involving articular
and anarthrous constructions in Heb 1:1-2.
As mentioned earlier, while he recounts God's activity carried out through the Son of
God, the writer of Hebrews tells us that God ultimately and definitively spoke through
(instrumental en + the dative of person) "a Son" (NRSV). Richard A. Young thinks that
the anarthrous construction in Heb 1:2 focuses on "the nature rather than the
personality of the Son." Young thus concludes: "the character of the Son is contrasted
with that of the prophets" (68). He subsequently points to the anarthrous construction
in Heb 5:8 as proof of this contention, where Hebrews reports that although the man
Jesus Christ was a Son of God, "he learned obedience from the things he suffered."
Young again notes that the focus in Heb 5:8 is on "the character of the Son rather than
his specific identity" (68).
Daniel B. Wallace basically echoes the sentiments of Richard Young, averring that "a
Son" is probably the way Heb 1:2 should be rendered. Yet overall Wallace thinks that
there is no satisfactory way to compactly and succinctly communicate the writer's intent
in Heb 1:2. Nevertheless, Wallace does decide that the anarthrous construction in this
passage "is clearly qualitative," but closer to the indefinite category on the continuum
(of definite, indefinite and qualitative forces) than the definite one (Wallace 245).

Ultimately, Wallace writes that Heb 1:2 speaks of the Son in a way that greatly sets him
apart from both angels and men. Should one read this much into the anarthrous
construction in Heb 5:8, however?
As we analyze Heb 1:2, we must note that the expression concerning Christ could be
definite, indefinite, or qualitative. More than likely, it actually overlaps on the
continuum of these three "forces" (definite, indefinite, and qualitative). Since while the
phrase in Heb 5:8 could be either definite, indefinite or qualitative, an indefinite sense
alone (while possible) does not seem likely in Heb 1:2. En huios could well be definite
here (as suggested by Ryrie). However, in view of the context and the manner in which
the writer employs the anarthrous construction when delineating the exalted position of
the Son throughout the rest of the letter, a qualitative or indefinite reading is the most
likely one in Heb 1:2. Although I tend to concur with Wallace and Young in viewing Heb
1:2 and 5:8 as qualitative, I think that they read too much into the anarthrous
construction in Heb 1:2. (The present writer actually tends to favor the overlapping
notion advanced by Wallace.)
The character or quality of sonship may be emphasized in Heb 1:2, and the writer may
also stress the Son's superiority to the angels and Old Testament prophets. These facts,
however, do not indicate in and of themselves that the Son God spoke through was
ontologically superior to or is ontologically better than the holy angels or prophets of
God. That is, the inarticular usage by the author of Hebrews does not mean the Son is
Deity in the writer's eyes (Heb 7:28). He became better than the angels when he
received a new name from God (Heb 1:4). Nevertheless, when God spoke through this
human Son, he was actually lower than the angels were and on par with his human
brothers and sisters, being like unto them in all respects (excepting sin). We do well to
remember that Heb 1:2 deals with Jesus of Nazareth and his activity in the sphere of
humanity. Therefore, it could very well teach that Christ was a continuation of the divine
prophetic tradition initiated in times of antiquity. But he was greater than Moses and
the other prophets since he existed before the prophets (Heb 3:1-6). He was also
preeminent since Jehovah God created all things through him as the preexistent wisdom
of God (cf. Heb 1:3; 2:6-16; 4:15).
Hebrews 1:3-4
In Heb 1:3, we come to yet another thorny problem in the exordium of Hebrews. Writing
in delightfully pictorial terms, the author of Hebrews points out that the Son of God,
through whom God made all things (panton), is the apaugasma tes doxes [tou theou]
and the character tes hupostaseos autou [i.e., theos].
BAGD indicates that we cannot always discern the meaning of apaugasma. Its active
sense is "radiance" or "effulgence"; the passive sense is "reflection" (BAGD 82). This
reference work goes on to demonstrate that Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret and
Chrysostom all accepted the active meaning of apaugasma. F.F. Bruce also suggests
construing apaugasma as active in Heb 1:3 as does A.T. Robertson (Bruce 5; Robertson
557).

Harold Attridge offers a perspicuous observation regarding this issue, when he informs
us that "the context of Hebrews itself, where apaugasma is paralleled with 'imprint'
(character), may support a passive understanding of apaugasma, although that second
term [character] is not entirely free from ambiguity" (Attridge 43). In the final analysis,
after discussing Philo and the deuterocanonical book of Wisdom, Attridge has to admit
that the meaning of apaugasma is not easy to pin down. He seems to think, however,
that the passive sense is more preferable in Heb 1:3 than the active sense. While the
precise meaning of apaugasma and even character may be somewhat ambiguous, the
overall thrust of the words in the text are clear enough.
In Heb 1:3, the Son is manifestly identified as the apaugasma (reflection or radiance) of
God. The expression is similar to Paul's use of eikon tou theou in Col 1:15 and,
furthermore, the phrase informs us that as the image of God, Christ starkly resembles
God and perfectly reflects his Father's matchless characteristics. He is not, however,
equal to his Father (Buchanan 7). The apostle John pointedly writes that the One who
sends is greater than the one sent (Jn 13:16). Heb 7:7 also communicates the principle
that the One who blesses is greater than the one blessed (Lk 1:42). As the apostle, priest,
prophet, coworker and reflection of God the Father, the Son aptly mirrors God. Yet, he is
not in the same category of being as his Father.
We could make the same point about the Greek word character. The word indicates that
the character is a faithful reproduction of the original (Lev 13:28). The character bears
the form of the original without being identical to the original (2 Macc 4:10). The Son
thus externally resembles God without being God himself. Time and space do not permit
us to dwell any longer on Heb 1:1-4, however. We must move on to the next section of
Hebrews chapter 1. For more information on character, consult Abbott-Smith 479.
Hebrews 1:5-8
Guthrie views Heb 1:5-14 as an expositional unit that highlights the Son's superiority to
the angels (145). In this regard, he is followed by Attridge and William L. Lane.
Nevertheless, while these passages evidently form a literary unit filled with scriptural
proofs, it is outside the scope of this essay to deal with Heb 1:10-14 at this time. I will
consider those passages in volume II of Christology. Now we will discuss Heb 1:5-8 and
its Christological significance.
Hebrews 1:5-8 continues to present an argument a fortiori for the superiority of the Son
over the angels. However, the line of reasoning employed in this Biblical book does not
mean that the writer thinks the Son of God is Deity. It is in the context of the Son having
become better than the angels and consequently inheriting a name better than God's
holy and heavenly spirit creatures that the words of Heb 1:5 are penned: "For to which
of the angels did he ever say, 'Thou art my Son, today I have begotten thee?' And again,
'I will be to him for a Father, and he shall be to me for a Son' " (Heb 1:5 ED).
Admittedly, the presupposed answer to the rhetorical questions in Heb 1:5 is an

emphatic, "None!" In the Hebrew Scriptures, to be sure, the angels are called "sons" of
God. Indeed they are sons of the Majesty (the Father) and Bible writers even attribute
the appellative elohim to them (Gen. 6:1-6; Job 1:6-12; 38:1-7; Ps 8:5). Never has God
addressed an angel with the words "my Son," however. After God resurrected the Son,
he took his place at the right hand of the Majesty, and became head of all government
and authority (Eph 1:19-23; Col 2:10; 1 Pet 3:22). He subsequently inherited a name
more excellent than the angels and was in this way deemed the royal and priestly Son of
God: "In the same way, it was not Christ who glorified himself in becoming high priest,
but rather the one who said to him: 'You are my son; this day I have begotten you" (Heb
5:5, 6 NAB). The catena of passages cited in Heb 1:5-8 indicate that the royal-priestly
status of the Son is being stressed in Heb 1:5. Conversely, Hebrews chapter one does not
necessarilyteach that the Son is Almighty God.
Buchanan picks up on this important and indispensable detail, when he declares: "Both
quotations in [Heb] 1:5 are related to kings who are called God's sons . . . The first
quotation (Ps 2:7) is from an enthronement Psalm. It pictures the kings of surrounding
nations plotting against the Lord and his anointed one, meaning his anointed king" (13).
Buchanan goes on to add: "It is such a powerful king as this who is called God's Son and
his anointed one" (13). In this capacity, the Son of God is empowered by his Father to sit
at the right hand of the Majesty (a term for God). Appropriately, Buchanan therefore
reminds us that Rabbi Yudan (in the Midrashim) remarked that God would fulfill the
promises contained in Ps 2 for the Messiah: "This means that the rabbis considered the
Messiah to be a king, Son of God, and Son of man" (14). The first citation included in
Heb 1:5 thus points to a royal interpretation of the passage and it demonstrates why Heb
1:5 does not negate the filial status of angels (See Robertson 558). We also better
understand the Messiah's role in God's purposes as well.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Christology was always meant to be a readable and accessible work for the public. It
was not written as a "scholarly work" per se. Thus while some of the discussions could
have been more in-depth, I think the essays appropriately reflect the original intent of
the author.
[2] This new edition is obviously evidence of an adjustment to the author's views vis-vis footnoting!
[3] Originally, grammar did not play a large part in most of the arguments found in
Christology. The work was supposed to be theological in nature (i.e., it was an
experiment in systematic theology).
[4] Howard W. Stone and James D. Duke (How to Think Theologically) note that the
English term "theology" etymologically refers to logia (sayings or accounts) concerning
theos (God, gods, or goddesses depending on the context). See Stone and Duke 1996:7.
[5] By saying certain scholars or theologians "corroborate" the Witness view, I do not
mean to imply that theologians discussed in this work consciously agree with Jehovah's
[1]

Witnesses or even purposely do so. Nor do I think that these thinkers share the same
Weltanschauung as that of Jehovah's Witnesses. This type of consensus is neither
realistic nor necessary. Those who expect Jehovah's Witnesses to only cite authorities
who agree in toto with the Witnesses are manifesting a unique form of bias that is not
shown toward more "orthodox" writers.
[6] Circumstances have forced me to alter the original publication date.
[7] Cf. Macquarrie 1977:268-327
[8] Most theologians refer to the Deity of Christ when they employ the terminology "high
Christology" and have reference to the humanity of Christ when they write about "low
Christology." However, the present writer utilizes the said terminology to speak of the
preexistent Son of God, who was the first creation of YHWH (Rv 3:14). Alternatively, I
use the terms "low Christology" to speak of the man who was known as Jesus of
Nazareth. Context will determine how we are employing the formulae throughout this
work. Petr Porkorny demonstrates the importance of the earthly Jesus when he writes:
"Without the earthly Jesus Christology would remain idle speculation; dogmatically
speaking its doctrine would be docetic in character. The history of Jesus is part of
Christology" (Porkorny 1997:14).
[9] Consult page 143 of Owen Thomas' introduction to systematic theology.
[10] For prothesis, BDAG notes that the signifier evidently points to the "divine purpose"
that is eternal in nature. Observe how the apostle John enlists aion in Rev 14:11; 19:3;
20:10; 22:5. God's prothesis may be eternal in that it will confer eternal benefits on
humankind. In other words, Paul appears to focus on future eternity rather than past
eternity. His comments thus in no way suggest that God formed His purpose in eternity
past.
[11] I use the word "model" in a collective sense here. That is, while Christology has
assumed many faces throughout history, orthodox Christologies have traditionally put
forth the view that Jesus is (in some manner) God. One of the most recent approaches to
Christology attempts to show that Christ is God per his identity. The writer extendedly
argues that Christ partakes in the very identity of God by sharing the divine throne with
YHWH and engaging in both the protological and eschatological works of God.
However, we think it is significant that the New Testament neither calls nor explicitly
identifies the preexistent Logos with the Creator of ta panta. A prime example of such
an omission is Jn 1:3 (See Louw-Nida). The apostle John's subordinationist theme in the
fourth Gospel also seems to sound the death knell for identity Christology.
[12] Some thinkers prefer to say that the tres personae are one natura, instead of
contending that they share one nature. In view of the accepted terminology homoousia
(consubstantial), however, Harold O.J. Brown seems correct when he speaks of the
three so-called divine hypostases "sharing a common substance or nature" (Brown 91).
[13] See Stone and Duke's discussion of theological validity (1996:35).
[14] Brunner 1949:226-239.
[15] Interestingly, Hans Conzelmann provides evidence that "The Christian use of kurios
cannot be derived from the LXX. The reverse is in fact the case" (Conzelmann 1969:8384). His comments suggest that when the early Christians called Jesus "Lord" (kurios),
they did not mean that he is God or YHWH.
[16] Besides Jn 3:16, other passages such as Jude 25 and Rv 19:6-9 indicate that God the
Father initiates and "takes the lead" in the revelatory and soteriological works

predicated of God in Scripture. The Son serves as God's minister or agent. He is Savior
in that God effects salvation through the Son.
[17] For a discussion of the causal or instrumental use of en, consult BAGD 260. Clear
examples of the instrumental en are Mt 12:24; Jn 1:4; Rom 3:24; Phil 4:7; Heb 1:2.
[18] Richardson thinks that the two primary distinctions we need to make vis--vis God's
Being are the divine distinctions of absoluteness and relatedness.
[19] Finley Hooper details these developments in his Roman Realities. See 1979:498500.
[20] Tertullian attempts to analyze the generatio of the Son in Adversus Praxean 5-8.
Furthermore, he discusses the two substances that allegedly constitute the one person of
Christ, in the same work (Consult 27 of Adversus Praxean).
[21] Interestingly, existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger lamented the theological
use of philosophy based on the apostolic words found in 1 Cor 1:20ff. Cf. Allen and
Springsted 1992:259
[22] An example of such "inadequate notions of being as such" is the Platonic Doctrine of
Forms. Alasdair MacIntyre discusses the problematic features of Plato's doctrine in
MacIntyre 1998:26-56. See also Wolterstorff 1970:263-293.
[23] Origen's syncretism is well documented. For a discussion of texts that imply some
early Christian writings contained elements of binitarianism, see Pelikan 1:184-186.
[24] See eimi in BAGD 224.
[25] Note how Thayer classifies Jn 13:19 under his entry for eimi (177).
[26] Gerald Borchert even avers that ego eimi in Jn 6:20 is "a divine identification
statement" (1996:259).
[27] GRB Murray notes that most exegetes think Mk 13:6 simply affirms Jesus' Messianic
office. That is, most exegetes do not think the divine name is in view here (Murray
1993:391-392).
[28] Louw-Nida of course think that Jn 13:19 is theophanic and may think Jn 8:58 is as
well. But my comments here deal with the issue of translation, not theology, strictly
speaking.
[29] McKay 1994:42. McKay also rejects the divine identification view of Jn 8:58. See
Furuli 236-239.
[30] Richard Young uses the terminology "durative present" whereas McKay seems to
prefer "present of past action" (1994:41-42). Both formulae describe an action that
began in the past and continues up until the present. Young lists Jn 14:9; 15:27; 1 Jn 3:8
as examples of durative presents. Wallace (1996:519-520) cites Lk 13:7; 15:29; Jn 5:6;
Acts 15:21; 27:33; 1 Cor 15:6 (possible); 2 Pt 3:4; 1 Jn 3:8.I consider Jn 8:58 to be a
durative present as well. It can thus fittingly be translated, "I have been." Furuli argues
that the translation, "Before Abraham came into being, I have been" (NWT, et. al.), is
"ungrammatical" (1999:237). Nevertheless, both he and other Norwegian linguists with
whom he consulted think the NWT rendering is superior to the common rendering, "I
am" (1999:238).
[31] Existential here is a grammatical, not a philosophical category. See Young.
[32] McKay 1996: 302ff
[33] In private conversations, Professor Philip Blosser of Lenoir-Rhyne College has
insisted that there is a marked difference between the Trinity doctrine and
interpretations of the said dogma. The present writer obviously disagrees with Blosser's
position. Evidently, so does Owen Thomas.

Consult Moltmann 1984:137ff for a review of Trinitarian development and diversity

throughout Christian history.
[35] De Trinitate 7.26
[36] Grant's words imply that after Nicaea, subordination was not universally taught by
the Church.
[37] Hawthorne thinks that we could possibly construe en morphe theou as a dative of
sphere (81). Wallace provides examples of this usage in his grammar (1996: 153-155).
The position taken in this work is that en morphe theou is a dative indirect object.
Wallace writes that this use is by far "the most common of the dative uses" (1996:141).
Cf. Rom 8:3; Phil 2:7, 10.
[38] Thayer 343
[39] Cf. Frances Young's From Nicea to Chalcedon for further details on Athenagoras'
Christology and its ties to Arianism (page 63).
[34]

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