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What can Reasonably be Expected from a Truth Commission: A Preliminary

Examination of East Timorese Views
Etienne Mullet a; Félix Neto b; María da Conceição Pinto b
a
Institute of Advanced Studies, France b Department of Social Psychology, Oporto University,
Online Publication Date: 01 October 2008
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Commission: A Preliminary Examination of East Timorese Views',Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology,14:4,369 — 393
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What can Reasonably be Expected from

a Truth Commission: A Preliminary
Examination of East Timorese Views
Etienne Mullet
Downloaded By: [Mullet, Etienne] At: 07:24 21 October 2008
Institute of Advanced Studies, France
Félix Neto and Marı́a da Conceição Pinto

Department of Social Psychology
Oporto University
A survey examining the personal views of a sample of 344 ordinary citizens

living in East Timor, and already familiarized with the concrete work of a
truth commission on the possible objectives, functions, powers, and composi-
tion of truth commissions, was conducted. The material consisted of 98 items
that referred to the global meaning, the composition, the functioning, and the
possible missions of a truth commission. The results seem to indicate that most
participants strongly valued the symbolic nature of truth commissions as dis-
tinguished from their judicial or therapeutic nature. Strengthening the respect
for human rights everywhere, acquiring as much knowledge about past atro-
cities as possible, and restoring the dignity of all those victims and perpetrators
involved in the atrocities were conceived as clear priorities. Most participants
were aware of the limited scope of the truth commissions and did not have
unrealistic expectations regarding the outcomes of such commissions.
This study was aimed at analyzing the viewpoints of a sample of participants

from East Timor on truth commissions—on what ought to be their
stated objectives, their functions, their powers, and their composition. The
participants have been, for the most part, victims of human rights abuses.
Correspondence should be addressed to Etienne Mullet, Institute of Advanced Studies,

Quefes 17 bis, F-31830 Plaisance du Touch, France. E-mail: etienne.mullet@wanadoo.fr
369
370 MULLET, NETO, PINTO
The people of East Timor have endured the invasion of their territory and
political domination by Indonesia for 25 years, as well as the destruction
the militia and Indonesian army caused when leaving the country. The par-
ticipants in this study were well aware of the functioning of truth commis-
sions because a truth commission was operative in their country during
the time of the survey.
TRUTH COMMISSIONS
Now in more than 30 countries (e.g., Chile, El Salvador, Germany,

Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the Honduras), truth commissions
have been a component of the process by which a nation has attempted

to rebuild itself after a period of division, violent conflict, or civil war
(Borer, 2006; Hayner, 2002; Long & Brecke, 2003; Minow, 1998; Rothberg
& Thompson, 2000; Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005; Villa-Vicencio &
Verwoerd, 2000).
Minow (1998) identified 11 theoretical aspirations for truth commissions:
1. The overcoming of communal and official denial of the atrocity.

2. The gathering of detailed facts to meet the victims’ needs to know, to
build a record for history, and to provide minimal accountability and
visibility of the perpetrators.
3. The end and prevention of future violence (the transformation of
violence into words and institutional practices).
4. The creation of a sufficient basis for building a domestic democratic
order that respects and enforces human rights.
5. The consolidation and legitimization of a new democratic regime.
6. The promotion of reconciliation among former opponents.
7. The promotion of psychological healing for individuals, groups,
victims, bystanders, and offenders.
8. The restoration of the victims’ dignity.
9. The administration of the offenders’ punishment.
10. The expression that such collective violence should never occur again.
11. The building of an international order that has the capacity to prevent
and respond to atrocities.
Other authors have subsequently endorsed part or all of Minow’s (1998)

objectives. Crocker (2000) suggested that the goals of truth commissions
may include the establishment of truth about tragic past events, the
provision of a platform for the victims of these events, the apportionment
of perpetrators’ accountability and punishment, the achievement of the
TRUTH COMMISSIONS 371
rule of law, the compensation of the victims, the recommendation of

institutional and economic reforms, and the promotion of reconciliation
and democracy. Hayner (2002) suggested that truth commisions may have
‘‘any or all of the five basic aims: to discover, clarify, and formally ack-
nowledge past abuse, to respond to specific needs of victims, to contribute
to justice and accountability, to outline institutional responsibility and
recommend reforms, and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over
the past’’ (p. 24). Long and Brecke (2003) suggested that truth commissions
puncture the impunity of privileged groups and open space for the other
steps involved in reconciliation, complement judicial processes and some-
times substitute as a form of justice, restore society’s ethical foundation,
and are sometimes a vehicle for the reconstruction of the identities of
individual and key social groups.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is prob-
ably the best-known example of truth commissions. According to Jenkins
(2002), it demonstrated
the possibility of progress toward bridging the divide peacefully in a post-

conflict society. It facilitated the beginning of a dialogue between former
opponents, between victims and perpetrators; through its special hearings into
the role of different institutions in the apartheid era, it attempted to promote
understanding; through living examples of pain, grief, and cruelty, it encour-
aged reflection on responsibility for past wrongs, whilst at the same time sup-
porting the possibility of forgiveness; it understood the need for redress, but
did not seek to punish. In all these ways, and by the compassion and concern
of the Commissioners, it offered hope for a better future. (p. 251)
Although the work of the truth commissions has systematically benefited

the whole society, and further violence has usually been restricted to mini-
mal, residual levels, the principle of these commissions has been criticized
(Verwoerd, 2003).
SOME CRITICISMS LEVELED AGAINST TRUTH COMMISSIONS
The South African commission, the one most highly publicized around the
world, has sometimes been conceived as a model for other countries—in
particular, for the East Timorese commission. One type of criticism is that
the truth commission was nothing more than a byproduct of a compromise
between old regimes and emerging forces (such as liberation movements). It
is well-known that the transition to democracy, which resulted in an agree-
ment on an Interim Constitution that made provision for amnesty as part of
a truth commission process, was a negotiated settlement between de Klerk’s
National Party, Mandela’s African National Congress, and other anti-

apartheid movements. As a result, it is argued that the real question was
not whether to exchange justice for truth but to exchange justice for power
(Jenkins, 2002). Some authors even argued that the powerful companies,
who unconditionally backed the apartheid regime, supported the change
to escape the increasing international sanctions and to obtain better eco-
nomic opportunities under the new regime (see Pilger, 1998). One of the
direct consequences of this phenomenon is that the pursuit of justice was
in danger of being sacrificed for the sake of achieving strictly political and
economical purposes.
A second type of criticism is related to the concept of retributive justice;
namely, the commission has been accused of not prosecuting the authors of
violence and displaying a high degree of complaisance toward some (e.g.,

Mrs. Mandela), including granting amnesty for very serious crimes. This
could have the effect of convincing South Africans that even the new regime
can break the law and not apply justice (Wilson, 2001). These authors claim
that there is a direct link between ‘‘the bad example’’ set by the commission
and the daily violence that still goes on in South Africa (see Campbell,
2005).
A third type of criticism is that financial compensation for victims of
gross violations was not sufficiently addressed by the commission (Jenkins,
2002). Although in some cases material compensation has been offered, the
fact that the victims’ rights can be ignored by an amnesty process may result
in great disappointment, especially for those still in need of urgent relief. It
seems, however, that this criticism is directed less at truth commissions than
at the government and international donor.
A fourth type of criticism is related to the supposed healing function of
these commissions. Some authors have argued that ‘‘the telling could consti-
tute a second traumatic exposure which, just like apartheid, negates salient
understanding of the self’’ (Van der Walt, Franchi, & Stevens, 2003, p. 263).
Allan (2000) described, in detail, the trauma associated with the telling for
the victim, the victim’s family members, the truth commission staff, and
the audience. In many cases, the victims were selected by the commission
according to its own agenda (national reconciliation) and not necessarily
in accordance with what was best for the victims (Wilson, 2001). In
some cases, the victims were even prevented from mentioning the names
of their offenders (Verwoerd, 2003), which certainly was detrimental to their
well-being.
A fifth type of criticism is that, despite the specification of its mandate,
the TRC failed at developing a model of reconciliation at the most appro-
priate level—the intergroup level. The proponents of the TRC in South
Africa ‘‘framed forgiveness as an interpersonal relationship between
individual victims and perpetrators and not as an intergroup social relation-

ship’’ (Chapman, 2007, p. 52; see also Chapman & Spong, 2003).
Finally, it has been argued that truth commissions usually fail at render-
ing a broad picture of the causes and consequences of the violence because
of their tendency to focus on individual occurrences of violence (Mamdi,
1998), which tends to obscure systemic or structural forms of violence
(e.g., unequal distribution of land and wealth in the country and unequal
access to education and health services). This criticism relates more to the
visible aspects of the commission’s work (the hearings) than the conclusions
(made public only after 1998). It should be added that the commission’s
report unequivocally condemned the previous regime and the underlying
causes of violence.
A LACK OF EMPIRICAL DATA
The diverse views and criticisms presented earlier may stem from the
fact that very few empirical data exist on the attitudes of South Africans
toward the truth commissions and on the psychological impact of giving
public testimony to the victims (Gibson, 2004b). In addition, the few
empirical data that are available do not support most of these criticisms.
Gibson (2004b) showed that about 76% of Black South Africans inter-
viewed in 2001 evaluated it favorably. Moreover, (a) more than 85% of
them considered that the commission did a reasonable job of letting
families know what happened to their loved ones, of providing a true
and unbiased account of the country’s history, and of ensuring that human
rights abuses would not happen again; and (b) more than 70% of them
considered that the commission did a reasonable job of awarding compen-
sation to victims and of punishing those guilty of atrocities. The claim that
South Africans were dissatisfied with their commission appeared largely
limited to White South Africans.
Gibson (2002; see also Gibson, 2004b) showed that 72% of Black South
Africans agreed with granting amnesties decided by the commission, even if
they were directed at other segments of the population. However, only a
minority of Black South Africans (33%) considered the amnesties as just.
These amnesties were, therefore, viewed as a result of political compromises,
which, nevertheless, seemed to be acceptable to the majority of the popula-
tion that had suffered most under the apartheid regime. Gibson (2004c)
showed that South Africans’ degree of respect for law was, on average, of
the same level as that recorded in a Western country, like France. He also
showed a positive correlation between the respect for the law and the respect
for the commission’s work. Also, Gibson (2004a) found that acknowledging
that the apartheid system was a crime against humanity, and that many
atrocities had been committed for maintaining or fighting against this poli-
tical system, does in no way undermine reconciliation.
Finally, Kaminer, Stein, Mbanga, and Zungu-Dirwayi (2001) showed
that between participation and current psychiatric status or current forgive-
ness attitudes, the association was not significant. These authors realized a
direct assessment of the impact of publicly testifying on participants’ levels
of posttraumatic stress disorder. In the group that gave public testimony,
the percentage of participants with posttraumatic stress disorder was 24%.
In the group that just gave a statement, this percentage was 48%. These
results can in no way support the idea that ‘‘the telling’’ had further trauma-
tized the victims.
In summary, despite the massive political and sociological implications,

few empirical data are available on the short-term and long-term effects
of truth commissions. The empirical findings that were evidenced do not
necessarily sustain various common criticisms about truth commissions.
THIS STUDY
As stated by Verwoerd (2003), ‘‘much of the criticism and confusion sur-

rounding the TRC process is a sign of a deeper problem, namely a lack of
consensus about what can and cannot reasonably be expected from this bold
experiment in responding to some of the wrongs of our past’’ (p. 266). In
effect, truth commissions have always been planned in a top-down way.
The populations to whom these commissions were addressed have rarely
been extensively consulted about the functions of such a commission; that
is, about what a truth commission ought to be, or even if it had to be at
all, given the current situation in their country. Thus, it seemed very worth-
while to conduct a survey examining the personal views of a sample of
ordinary citizens already familiarized with the concrete work of a truth com-
mission on the possible objectives, functions, powers, and composition of
truth commissions.
This study was conducted on a sample of East Timorese participants. The
choice of East Timor was motivated by the fact that East Timor has, in fact,
become one of the most recent countries to adopt a truth commission, estab-
lishing a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation with the
swearing-in of its commissioners at the beginning of 2002.
East Timor is located on the island of Timor, in southern Asia. Its capital
city is Dili, and its population is about 1,000,000 inhabitants. It is bordered
by Indonesia to the west. East Timor was a Portuguese colony from 1702 to
1975. In 1859, the Portuguese who occupied the whole island ceded the
western portion to the Netherlands. From 1942 to 1945, Japan occupied the
country, which resulted in the deaths of 40,000 to 70,000 Timorese. In 1975,
East Timor gained its independence but, a few days later, was invaded and
occupied by Indonesian forces. It was reported that, during the invasion,
mass killings and mass rapes took place. In 1976, the country became the
Indonesian province of East Timor. Over the next two decades, between
100,000 to 250,000 individuals were killed as result of the fighting against
the occupation and the local militia.
In 1991, the public in the West was made aware by an unexpected TV
report that many East Timorese youngsters were killed at the Santa Cruz
Cemetery in Dili. This massacre, and the publicity around it, attracted sym-
pathy for the Timorese cause. In 1996, Bishop Carlos Belo of Dili and José
Manuel Ramos Horta, two leading activists for peace and independence,
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1997, South African president
Nelson Mandela visited Suharto and the imprisoned Xanana Gusmão, the
leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Timor and future first
president of East Timor, and urged the liberation of East Timorese leaders.
In 1998, President Suharto was led to resign, and President Habibie offered
East Timor autonomy within Indonesia. In 1999, the international pressure
gained momentum, and President Habibie was forced to announce the hold-
ing of a United Nations (U.N.) supervised referendum about the future of
East Timor. An overwhelming majority of the East Timorese voted for inde-
pendence from Indonesia. Infuriated with the results, anti-independence
Timorese militias, supported by the army of occupation, decided to pursue
a scorched-earth policy. They launched a series of attacks against properties,
irrigation and water supply systems, public buildings, hospitals, and schools.
About 300,000 people were forcibly driven into West Timor as refugees, and
about 2,000 were assassinated. In late 1999, a multinational peacekeeping
force was sent by the U.N., which put an end to the violence.
In 2002, East Timor was recognized by the U.N. as an independent state.
At the present time, the country is still in a state of unrest and Australia,
Portugal, New Zealand, and, recently, Malaysia had to send troops to
Timor in an effort to stop the violence between the government and part
of the military. With about $1 a day for living expenses, the average East
Timorese citizen is the poorest citizen in the world.
It is highly likely that before a truth commission option was under con-
sideration in East Timor—that is, before 2001—very few of the participants
in this study, all ordinary citizens, would have been able to express clear
views about what a truth commission could be or ought to be. As a result,
asking the East Timorese population about the missions and composition of
truth commissions in 2001 would probably have been meaningless. How-
ever, from 2002 to 2004, the population was able to familiarize itself with
the work of a truth commission and, therefore, people in general were in a

better position in 2004 to express their views about what truth commissions
ought to be. They had been told about truth commissions. They had seen
the way a local truth commission worked. They had observed the successes
and the limits of such commissions, and discussed them with their friends
and relatives. They had possibly attended local reconciliation initiatives
(Babo Soares, 2005). In a certain way, they had become ‘‘grass-root experts’’
about truth commissions, and it was this ‘‘expertise’’ that we wanted to
capture.
If, owing to the lack of previous empirical work on this topic, precise
hypotheses cannot be put forward, several clear research questions have
guided this study: (a) Are truth commissions really needed? (b) From the
many possible missions suggested by Minow (1998) and other authors,

which of them appear as ‘‘necessary’’ to the participants? (c) In particular,
do offenders’ punishment, adequate reparations and compensations from
them, and psychological healing appear as the main objectives for such
commissions? (d) Should truth commissions be composed of individuals
close to the government or, by contrast, should it include independent-
minded individuals? Finally, (e) Who can or should appear in front of such
commissions?
METHOD
Participants
The sample of participants was composed of 160 (47%) women and 184
(53%) men from the Dili region. Their ages ranged from 18 to 52, and the
mean age was 23 (SD ¼ 3.70). The sample was mainly composed of young,
educated persons who were able to complete a questionnaire: 4% had mas-
ter’s degrees, 72% had completed secondary education, 13% had completed
primary education, and the remaining 11% had not completed primary
education. Forty-seven percent of the participants were students at Dili
University.
Two hundred sixty-seven participants declared that they had personally
suffered (e.g., being raped, severely hurt, tortured, detained) from the con-
flicts, and 298 declared that a close family member had suffered from the
conflicts (e.g., a close family member had been killed or severely hurt). Only
24 participants (7%) declared that they had not—directly or indirectly—
suffered from the conflicts. These figures are consistent with Modvig
et al.’s (2000) findings (see also Dunn, 2004). Thus, many of the participants
were either primary victims (they had personally suffered from the many
conflicts in their areas) or secondary victims (they had indirectly suffered

through members of their family). Furthermore, all participants were
tertiary victims; that is, they had suffered from the brutal exploitation and
partial destruction of their country, even if they or their family were not per-
sonally involved in the massacres. Thus, all participants were emotionally
involved in the study.
All participants were unpaid volunteers. They were approached in var-
ious ways. Some were known by the experimenters or by a member of their
family. They were contacted directly, explained the aim of the study, and
asked to participate. These first participants, after working with the experi-
menters, helped to contact other people. Direct contact and mutual reassur-
ance convinced people to participate in the study. Special efforts were made
to contact people from different geographic areas. Out of 400 questionnaires

that were printed and distributed, 85% were returned.
Materials
The survey was largely based on Minow’s (1998) 11 theoretical aspirations
framework. Minow’s work has been criticized on the grounds that several of
these aspirations are potentially contradictory, and no suggestion about the
way to resolve these contradictions has been indicated (Fletcher, 2001),
Minow’s list of objectives constituted a useful basis for generating question-
naire items covering a sufficiently broad spectrum of missions and functions
for truth commissions.
Each of Minow’s (1998) theoretical objectives inspired one-to-several
questionnaire items on the possible missions of a truth commission. For
example, the first objective listed, the overcoming of denial, inspired items
such as, ‘‘One of the main missions of these types of commissions must be
to ensure that the atrocities are not denied that they occurred by anyone,’’
and ‘‘One of the main missions of these types of commissions must be to
ensure that the atrocities are known in the whole country.’’
Additional items were also created for allowing the participants to
express their own personal views, notably regarding (a) the composition
of the commission and the composition of the task force on which the com-
mission should rely if necessary and (b) who can (or must) appear in the
commission and under which conditions. Examples of items were, ‘‘The
commission must include religious individuals,’’ and ‘‘The commission must
have at its disposal an external task force partly composed of journalists and
experts in communication.’’
Finally, items aimed at obtaining an overall assessment of the necessity
and potential dangers of truth commissions were also incorporated in the
questionnaire. Examples of items were, ‘‘After a politically very troubled
period, the recourse to these types of commissions is needed,’’ and ‘‘These

types of commissions are, in most cases, an impediment to Justice.’’
Overall, the questionnaire was made up of 98 items. A 10-point scale was
printed following each item. The two extremes of the scale were labeled dis-
agree completely and completely agree. A large scale was chosen to provide
participants with more latitude for responding. This questionnaire was first
written in Portuguese, then translated from Portuguese to Tetum (the main
dialect in East Timor) by a bilingual translator, and then from Tetum to
Portuguese by another translator. The material was also submitted to sev-
eral knowledgeable individuals to detect any possible inconsistencies.
Procedure
The data were gathered from June to August 2004. Each participant
responded individually in his or her own home or at the university, depend-
ing on what he or she found most convenient. The experimenters asked par-
ticipants to read the questionnaire’s items expressing attitudes about the
missions and functions of truth and reconciliation commissions and to rate
his or her degree of agreement with each statement. The participants were
told that it was their opinion that mattered and that they were free to com-
pletely disagree with the content of the items.
RESULTS
Each rating by each participant was converted to a numerical value

expressing the distance (from 0–10) between the mark on the response
scale and the origin. These numerical values were then subjected to statis-
tical analyses. First, we systematically computed correlation coefficients
between age, gender, educational level, and personal suffering, on the
one hand, and each of the items of the questionnaire, on the other hand.
Although some coefficients were significant, their magnitude was always
small—always lower than .15. As a result, it was decided to pool all the
participants into the same sample and to conduct the statistical analyses
on this overall sample.
Are Truth Commissions Really Needed?

For the item, ‘‘After a politically very troubled period, the recourse to these
types of commissions is needed,’’ the mean level of agreement was reason-
ably high. A majority of the responses (81%) was located between 7 and
10, which was defined as the agreement range. A minority of the responses
(7%) was located between 0 and 3, which was defined as the disagreement
range. Another minority (12%) of responses were in the intermediate zone;
that is, they were undetermined. For the item, ‘‘These types of commissions
are, in most cases, an impediment to Justice,’’ the mean level of agreement
was low. A majority of responses (59%) was located in the disagreement
range. A substantial number of responses (28%) were, however, located in
the agreement range. In both cases, the percentage of participants who
agreed was significantly higher than the percentage of participants who
disagreed, p < .01 (chi-square test).
Who Might be the Members of the Commission?

The participants agreed with the idea that the members of the commission
must be independent from the political system. In particular, religious
persons, historians, journalists, lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, and psy-
chologists were favored (from 72%–82% agreement, p < .01). A majority of
participants were hostile to the idea that the members should be designated
by the government or the U.N., or that the commission should include
members of the police, the military, or the former government (from
50%–60% disagreement).
As for the independent task force on which the commission could have
recourse, the participants’ views were mixed. In descending order, partici-
pants favored the presence of journalists and experts in communication
(64% agreement), lawyers (55%), religious persons (54%), philosophers
(48%), psychiatrists (47%), members of the police (47%), diplomats (46%),
sociologists (45%), medical doctors (45%), political experts (45%), psychol-
ogists (44%), and members of the military (42%).
Who Can Appear in Front of these Commissions?

The participants massively agreed with the idea that ‘‘these types of commis-
sions must hear any person who solicits a hearing’’ (84% agreement vs. 5%
disagreement, p < .01). The participants disagreed with the idea that ‘‘these
types of commissions may force someone to appear and testify’’ (68% dis-
agreement vs. 19% agreement, p < .01). Regarding the authors of the atro-
cities, views contrasted more: 55% of the participants agreed with the idea
that ‘‘appearing in front of the commission must be mandatory for the
authors of the atrocities,’’ and 41% agreed with the idea that ‘‘appearing
in front of the commission must be optional (on a voluntary basis) for the
authors of the atrocities.’’
What Ought to be the Missions of these Commissions?

Because Minow (1998) warned that the 11 aspirations she suggested were
probably overlapping, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted on
the corresponding 54 items. Based on the scree test, an eight-factor solution
was retained and subjected to varimax rotation. Eigenvalues ranged from
8.44 (1st principal component) to 1.61 (8th principal component), and the
eigenvalues of the other components were lower than 1. The factors are pre-
sented in the order that resulted from the analysis. The complete results of
the factor analysis are shown in Table 1.
Identifying, denouncing, and banishing (4% of the variance). This was

loaded with items such as, ‘‘publicly denouncing the authors of the atroci-
ties’’ and ‘‘permanently banishing the authors of the atrocities.’’ Agreement
percentages ranged from 38% to 55%, with a mean value of 49%. Disagree-
ment percentages ranged from 25% to 44%, with a mean value of 31%. Iden-
tifying, denouncing, and banishing the authors of the atrocities was not
unanimously considered a goal for truth commissions.
Shaming, punishing, and obtaining reparations (7 %). This was loaded

with items such as, ‘‘shaming the passive bystanders’’ and ‘‘reducing the
authors of the atrocities’ rights and privileges.’’ Agreement percentages ran-
ged from 28% to 43%, with a mean value of 35%. If only items which load-
ings on the factor were higher than .40 were considered, disagreement
percentages ranged from 36% to 52%, with a mean value of 45%. Shaming,
punishing, and obtaining reparations from the authors of the atrocities was
not, in general, considered a goal for truth commissions.
Preventing political instability and collective violence (5 %). This was

loaded with items such as, ‘‘preventing the premature fall of the new gov-
ernment’’ and ‘‘substituting an institutionalized response to individual
revenge.’’ Agreement percentages ranged from 13% to 44%, with a mean
value of 32%. Disagreement percentages ranged from 32% to 74%, with a
mean value of 51%. Preventing political instability and collective violence
was not, in general, considered a goal for truth commissions.
Restoring collective dignity (5 %). This was loaded with items such as
‘‘restoring the collective dignity of the victims’’ and ‘‘restoring the authors
of the atrocities’ dignity.’’ Agreement percentages ranged from 66% to
73%, with a mean value of 70%. Disagreement percentages ranged from
TABLE 1
Results of Factor Analysis Conducted on the Items Regarding the Truth Commissions’ Missions
Factors %
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A D
Identifying, denouncing, and banishing

Publicly denouncing the authors of the .55 .24 .17 .13 .02 .22 .25 .02 53 31
atrocities
Permanently banishing the authors of the .51 .36 .05 .17 .05 .07 .05 .04 38 44
atrocities
Permanently banishing the passive .49 .25 .05 .19 .11 .04 .09 .04 51 25
bystanders, those who had the capacity
to intervene
Identifying and itemizing the authors of .48 .20 .01 .03 .02 .35 .04 .24 55 25
the atrocities
Shaming, punishing, and obtaining
reparations
Shaming the passive bystanders .06 .67 .11 .07 .07 .00 .04 .02 40 42
Reducing the authors of the atrocities’ .13 .66 .07 .11 .08 .18 .09 .12 32 49
rights and privileges
Punishing the passive bystanders, the ones .08 .65 .08 .10 .08 .12 .09 .04 34 46
who did nothing to prevent the
atrocities
Obtaining material restitution from the .12 .61 .14 .09 .09 .06 .05 .09 28 52
authors of the atrocities
Reducing the passive bystanders’ rights .11 .57 .01 .07 .03 .16 .08 .10 36 39
and privileges (those who had the
capacity to intervene)
Shaming the authors of the atrocities .24 .56 .04 .07 .20 .08 .07 .19 43 36
381
(Continued )
TABLE 1
382
Continued
Factors %
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A D
Dispossessing and expropriating the .17 .48 .19 .02 .16 .22 .09 .39 30 51
Equitably punishing the authors of the .32 .35 .33 .05 .21 .10 .06 .00 51 34
atrocities
Preventing political instability and
collective violence
Preventing the return to power of the .05 .12 .71 .01 .00 .22 .04 .09 21 69
Preventing the premature fall of the new .14 .20 .58 .22 .07 .17 .01 .00 13 74
government
Substituting an institutionalized response .01 .03 .52 .06 .06 .13 .17 .10 42 37
to individual revenge
Ensuring that the authors of the atrocities .14 .03 .52 .22 .06 .04 .05 .06 39 42
are treated as human beings despite
their crimes
Healing the victims’ moral wounds .24 .23 .45 .05 .04 .20 .28 .03 44 32
Preventing violence toward the authors of .01 .09 .38 .11 .12 .28 .22 .26 41 37
the atrocities
Ensuring that the atrocities are not denied .05 .04 .34 .01 .08 .15 .12 .03 51 35
that they occurred by their authors
Restoring collective dignity
Restoring the collective dignity of the .01 .01 .05 .78 .15 .13 .10 .00 73 12
victims
Restoring the passive bystanders’ dignity .08 .14 .01 .64 .09 .17 .05 .14 66 12
Restoring the authors of the atrocities’ .01 .05 .08 .52 .18 .09 .35 .11 68 12
dignity
Restoring the victims’ dignity .18 .07 .12 .49 .34 .18 .15 .09 73 10
Healing collective moral wounds of the .10 .12 .06 .38 .38 .12 .20 .22 65 17
victims
Relieving the victims’ moral and .04 .08 .10 .37 .29 .13 .28 .30 63 19
psychological wounds
Reconciling opposing parties and
strengthening the respect of human rights
Rebuilding the sense of communality in .14 .08 .09 .17 .67 .15 .13 .11 82 8
the country
apologize and repent
Ensuring that the future governments .12 .13 .05 .15 .61 .11 .12 .27 82 7
respect human rights
Building links between former opposing .15 .13 .05 .14 .59 .06 .18 .03 81 9
parties
Restoring public morale .01 .05 .15 .18 .58 .14 .06 .00 81 7
Reducing the divisions between former .29 .22 .13 .13 .58 .04 .16 .21 66 22
opponent groups
that they occurred by future
governments
Gathering as much information as .13 .16 .02 .09 .53 .18 .00 .12 81 6
possible about what really happened
Preventing the resumption of these acts of .10 .13 .14 .17 .51 .24 .14 .01 82 8
collective violence
Ensuring that the future governments are .10 .12 .16 .35 .49 .37 .04 .19 85 5
attentive to the respect of human rights
everywhere in the country
Ensuring that the victims are fully aware .36 .16 .10 .04 .48 .33 .08 .06 80 12
of what happened to them
383
(Continued )
384
TABLE 1
Continued
Factors %
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A D
Favoring forgiveness between former .11 .13 .03 .01 .47 .22 .41 .15 81 7
opponent groups
Reducing the social gap between former .07 .15 .25 .30 .45 .21 .25 .09 70 19
opponent groups
Contributing to the building of an .17 .29 .12 .11 .44 .16 .00 .00 76 12
international order likely to prevent
aggressions, tortures, and atrocities
everywhere in the world
are aware of their crimes
Establishing the basis of a new, .14 .18 .25 .01 .37 .02 .20 .23 72 9
democratic order in the country
Ensuring that the atrocities are known in .33 .30 .24 .13 .35 .32 .03 .08 68 19
the whole world
Knowing and publicizing the truth
that they occurred by anyone
Ensuring that the atrocities are known in .21 .02 .13 .09 .15 .57 .01 .04 81 9
the whole country
Obtaining the truth about the atrocities .12 .09 .04 .06 .33 .56 .00 .08 82 7
Ensuring that the victims know who their .34 .02 .04 .01 .30 .50 .05 .09 75 13
aggressor was
Substituting a civilized response in place .08 .04 .35 .08 .00 .44 .23 .20 73 13
of brutal revenge
Writing the true history of the country .23 .05 .02 .28 .32 .40 .07 .26 83 6
during this time period
Terminating violence toward the authors .01 .06 .18 .12 .08 .39 .35 .07 76 9
of the atrocities
Healing perpetrators’ moral wounds
Healing the authors of atrocities’ moral .14 .05 .03 .01 .04 .03 .67 .06 56 20
wounds
Healing the moral wounds of those who .02 .13 .02 .17 .02 .05 .62 .04 60 15
did nothing to prevent the atrocities
Healing the passive bystanders’ moral .07 .17 .23 .20 .13 .07 .52 .00 64 14
wounds
Promoting reconciliation between former .10 .01 .24 .08 .15 .26 .34 .27 69 10
opponent groups
Enforcing the new government
Enforcing the stability of the new .09 .02 .07 .11 .28 .10 .13 .63 72 12
government
Strengthening the legitimacy of the new .02 .04 .09 .20 .41 .03 .19 .57 74 12
government
Variance explained 2.34 3.67 2.76 2.73 5.88 3.19 2.52 1.88
Percentage of explained variance .04 .07 .05 .05 .11 .06 .05 .03
Cronbach’s alpha .60 .76 .61 .73 .65 .63 .71 .82
Note. A ¼ agreement; D ¼ disagreement. Bold-faced values are the ones that have been considered for computing the agreement percentages.

p < .05. p < .01.
385
10% to 12%, with a mean value of 11%. Restoring collective dignity was, for
a majority of the participants, considered a goal for truth commissions.
Reconciling opposing parties and strengthening the respect of human

rights (11 %). This was loaded with items such as, ‘‘rebuilding the sense
of communality in the country’’ and ‘‘ensuring that the future governments
of the country respect human rights.’’ Agreement percentages ranged from
66% to 85%, with a mean value of 78%. Disagreement percentages ranged
from 5% to 22%, with a mean value of 11%. Reconciling opposing parties
and strengthening the respect for human rights was, in general, considered
a goal for truth commissions.
Knowing and publicizing the truth (6%). This was loaded with items
such as, ‘‘ensuring that the atrocities are known in the whole country’’
and ‘‘ensuring that the victims know who their aggressor was.’’ Agreement
percentages ranged from 76% to 83%, with a mean value of 78%. Disagree-
ment percentages ranged from 6% to 15%, with a mean value of 10%.
Knowing and publicizing the truth was, in general, considered a goal for
truth commissions.
Healing perpetrators’ moral wounds (5%). This was loaded with items
such as, ‘‘healing the moral wounds of those who did nothing to prevent
atrocities’’ and ‘‘healing the authors of atrocities’ moral wounds.’’ Agree-
ment percentages ranged from 56% to 64%, with a mean value of 60%. Dis-
agreement percentages ranged from 14% to 20%, with a mean value of 16%.
Healing the authors’ atrocities was, in general, considered a goal for truth
commissions.
Enforcing the new government (3%). This was loaded with items such
as, ‘‘enforcing the stability of the new government.’’ Agreement percentages
ranged from 72% to 74%, with a mean value of 73%. Disagreement percen-
tages were 12%. Enforcing the new government was considered a goal for
truth commissions.
The Publicizing of the Commission’s Work

Participants overwhelmingly agreed that ‘‘the work of the commission must
be publicized on a regular basis by the national media’’ (90% agreement vs.
5% disagreement, p < .01), and that ‘‘the international media must be
informed on a regular basis of the work of the commission’’ (83% agreement
vs. 9% disagreement, p < .01). A majority of participants agreed with the
idea that ‘‘the commission should work in the country’’ (70% agreement),
and 48% of the participants opposed the idea that ‘‘the commission should
work outside the country.’’ The work of the commission was, however,
clearly conceived as being conducted in coordination with international
institutions (73% agreement vs. 17% disagreement, p < .01).
DISCUSSION
A clear majority of East Timorese participants agreed with the idea that,
after a politically very troubled period, recourse to truth commissions
may be needed. This result was consistent with Gibson’s (2004b) findings
that a majority of Black South Africans were, overall, satisfied with the
work of their commission. A clear majority of participants agreed with

the idea that any individual who wants to appear in front of the commission
should be heard. There was, however, a substantial minority who held the
view that appearing in front of the truth commission must be made obliga-
tory for the authors of atrocities. Furthermore, a majority disagreed with
the view that the truth commissions could be, in most cases, an impediment
to justice (although a substantial minority tended to agree with this view).
The participants expressed strong views favoring members of the commis-
sion who could maintain their independence from political pressures. In par-
ticular, religious persons, historians, journalists, lawyers, sociologists,
philosophers, and psychologists were favored over members of the police,
the military, or the government. As to the composition of the task force
on which the commission could rely in case of necessity, participants’ views
were mixed. The overall impression was that they did not consider the pre-
sence of such an additional task force very useful.
Participants expressed clearly structured views about the missions of the
truth commissions: Factor analysis of their responses showed eight interpre-
table factors. In other words, despite using a tool that was not necessarily
familiar to them—a questionnaire—the participants were able to respond
in a sufficiently coherent way that a clear structure was evident. If their
responses had been haphazard, no structure would have emerged, and the
results of the survey would have been highly questionable. The 11 possible
objectives postulated by Minow (1998) were reduced to 8 practically non-
overlapping ones. The participants mostly agreed with the views that the
work of the commission must be aimed at strengthening, nationally and
internationally, respect for human rights; at obtaining the truth about what
really happened in the country during the troubled period; at legitimizing
the new government in its efforts to implement a new democratic order;
and at restoring the dignity of all those involved in the atrocities—the
victims as well as the passive bystanders and even the perpetrators. That
knowing the truth was considered a major goal for truth commissions is
consistent with the strong tradition of history-telling among Timorese
(Rawski, 2002).
In other words, participants were able to express clear priorities among
goals, which partly respond to Fletcher’s (2001) concerns. Among Minow’s
(1998) 11 aspirations for truth commissions, 6 were indisputably considered
as priority goals: the overcoming of communal and official denial of the
atrocity, the gathering of detailed facts to meet the victims’ needs to know
and to build a record for history, the creation of sufficient basis for the
building of a domestic democratic order respecting and enforcing human
rights, the consolidation and legitimization of the new democratic regime,
the promotion of reconciliation among former opponents (and opponent
groups), and the restoration of the victims’ dignity.

In contrast, participants clearly disagreed with the views that the work of
the commission must be aimed at banishing the perpetrators and their
accomplices from the country or from political life. This is consistent with
the views expressed by Babo-Soares (2005) that banishing the perpetrators
was considered by the East Timorese as counterproductive because, as
was the case in Rwanda, banished persons may endanger, even from abroad,
the long-term stability of the country. They also expressed reservations
regarding the idea that the work of the commission should be aimed at sys-
tematically identifying perpetrators or at shaming, punishing, or obtaining
proper reparation from them. Participants were, in fact, concerned about
healing the perpetrators themselves rather than condemning them. This
finding is consistent with grass-root observations reported by Babo-Soares
(p. 225). For East Timorese, justice was considered as no more than an
option on the way to reconciliation (see also Kingston, 2006). This finding
is also consistent with Thomas and Garrod’s (2002) observations that young
Bosnians seemed unwilling to espouse hate and revenge toward the perpe-
trators of the ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ in ex-Yugoslavia.
Also, the participants agreed with the view that the work of the commis-
sion should take place in the country, under international auspices, and
must be highly publicized, nationally and internationally. This view is con-
sistent with some of Fletcher’s (2001) suggestions.
Most participants were seemingly aware of the limited scope of the truth
commissions and did not show unrealistic expectations about what could be
obtained through such commissions. Although truth commissions are costly
enterprises, most participants supported the view that establishing a truth
commission after a very severe conflict was needed. It is interesting to note
that the percentage of participants who favored the presence of a truth com-
mission closely matched the percentage of electors who voted for complete
independence in the 2002 ballot. This finding is also consistent with Long
and Brecke’s (2003) observation that the truth commissions are efficient at
preventing the re-occurrence of intrastate violence, which is crucial to people
who have experienced violence and domination over two decades.
It should also be added that most participants did not expect a truth
commission to exercise a therapeutic effect on victims of atrocities. This
is not to say that the participants, most of whom had suffered directly
or indirectly from the conflict, were indifferent to matters such as psycho-
logical suffering and physical illness resulting from atrocities. However, at
the time of the study, most participants may have realized that complete
healing can only be attained after a long period of ordinary and peaceful
life. They were also possibly aware that being offered a national and inter-
national platform for telling their story and being heard without interrup-
tion or skepticism was crucial to most people and vital for survivors of
trauma (Minow, 1998, p. 58). That most participants did not also attribute
absolute priority to personal healing through truth commissions may be
another reason for their lack of enthusiasm for the additional task force.
This finding is consistent with the observation by Modvig et al. (2000) that
East Timorese people look primarily at the local community and the
church for assistance, and the findings by Kaminer et al. (2001; see also
Silove, Zwi, & Le Touze, 2006).
However, it should be added that most participants agreed with the idea
that some short-term political goals can be part of the objectives of the truth
commissions, such as stabilizing the new democratic government. This result
is consistent with Gibson’s (2002) findings.
It seems fair to conclude that most participants in this study strongly valued
the ‘‘symbolic’’ nature of truth commissions. Strengthening the respect for
human rights everywhere, acquiring as much knowledge about past atrocities
as possible, and restoring the dignity of all, victims as well as perpetrators, who
were involved in the atrocities were conceived as clear priorities. This is con-
sistent with views expressed by Bhargava (2000) that truth commissions can,
above all, collectively generate and reinforce the belief in the end of an era of
gross injustice and officially celebrate the inauguration or the restoration of
a minimally decent order. This is also consistent with views expressed by
Ignatieff (1998) that, beyond this, truth commissions can do little.
If one practical recommendation can be suggested as a result of this
survey, it would be that future truth commission planners should, when
feasible, take some time to ensure that the necessarily limited aims of the
planned commission (a) match the aspirations and expectations of the popu-
lation; and (b) that these limitations are clearly understood by everyone,
especially the ones who will actively participate. The moral significance of
truth commissions may easily be undermined by too little consensus on
the nature of these processes (Verwoerd, 2003, p. 269).
Limitations of the Study

This study has several limitations. The first resides in the way the sample
was constituted. Participants were volunteers and, although special efforts
were made to contact people from different geographic areas and from dif-
ferent educational levels, the sample was mainly composed of young, edu-
cated persons. Although no notable difference as a function of gender,
age, education, or personal suffering was observed (e.g., between-factor
scores and age correlation coefficients ranged from –.08 to .06), we are
unsure about the degree of generalizability of our results. These results
are, nevertheless, coherent and consistent with empirical results gathered
in others studies (Gibson, 2004b; Kadima Kadiangandu & Mullet, 2007;
Neto, Pinto, & Mullet, 2007a, 2007b), with grass-root observations (Babo
Soares, 2005), and with qualitative data obtained from the few persons in
the sample who spoke Portuguese. In addition, Chapman (2007) recently
reported qualitative data gathered by Picker (n.d.) showing that (a) finding
out the truth about human right violations, (b) gaining public acknowledg-
ment, and (c) restoring honor and dignity were among the concerns that
motivated the victims to participate in the TRC hearings.
Another limitation is that our survey was neither a pure prospective
assessment nor a pure retrospective evaluation. On the one hand, conduct-
ing a survey in East Timor about what can be expected from a truth com-
mission before people can observe the functioning of the commission and
judge its success and limitations would have probably been meaningless.
Except for the elite, few people had ever heard about truth commissions
before 2001. As a result, we chose to conduct the survey once the people
had gained sufficient knowledge about the reality of a truth commission.
On the other hand, directly asking people about what should have been
done instead of what was currently being done could have run the risk of
our study being perceived as interfering with the work of the commission.
Now that the commission has completed its work and sufficient time has
elapsed, assessment of the degree of satisfaction of the East Timorese with
their commission and its many components will become a realistic objective
for future studies.
A third limitation is that context-specific information about the
conflict situation in East Timor and the unique characteristics of the truth
commission in this country were minimized in an effort to keep the analysis
on a broader level; that is, one that can be generalized across contexts.
The eight-factor solution found in this study may constitute a useful basis
for creating a reduced set of items that could be applied in studies of other
populations that may, currently are, or have in the recent past experienced a
truth commission. When we gather data from other countries using the same
device, possibly complemented by additional items corresponding to objec-

tives not considered in this study, and with measures clearly distinguishing
short term, mid-term, and long term effects of truth commissions, we will be
able to make strong claims about what ordinary citizens in the world
can expect from truth commissions. This study is a first step toward this
objective.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by POCTI=PSI=46245=2002, PTDC=PSI=

55336=2006, the Université de Toulouse (CLLE-LTC, UTM, CNRS,
EPHE), and the Centro Cognição e Afectividade (Oporto University). We

are grateful to Luis Costa for the translations into Tetum, and to Philip
Thorne for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Etienne Mullet received his Ph.D. in Psychology from the Sorbonne, France
in 1979. Currently, he works at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Ecole
Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, France. He is a member of Professor
Neto’s research team.
Félix Neto received his Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of
Coimbra, Portugal in 1983. He is currently Professor of Psychology, and
Director of the Affect and Cognition Centre at the University of Oporto.
His current main interests involve cross-cultural psychology.
Marı́a da Conceição Pinto received her Ph.D. in Psychology from the
Open University of Lisbon, Portugal in 2005. She is currently research assis-
tant at the Affect and Cognition Centre at University of Oporto. She is a
member of Professor Neto’s research team.
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What can Reasonably be Expected from a Truth Commission: A Preliminary

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What can Reasonably be Expected from

Institute of Advanced Studies, France

Félix Neto and Marı́a da Conceição Pinto

A survey examining the personal views of a sample of 344 ordinary citizens

This study was aimed at analyzing the viewpoints of a sample of participants

Correspondence should be addressed to Etienne Mullet, Institute of Advanced Studies,

Now in more than 30 countries (e.g., Chile, El Salvador, Germany,

have been a component of the process by which a nation has attempted

1. The overcoming of communal and official denial of the atrocity.

Other authors have subsequently endorsed part or all of Minow’s (1998)

rule of law, the compensation of the victims, the recommendation of

individual and key social groups.

the possibility of progress toward bridging the divide peacefully in a post-

Although the work of the truth commissions has systematically benefited

SOME CRITICISMS LEVELED AGAINST TRUTH COMMISSIONS

National Party, Mandela’s African National Congress, and other anti-

violence and displaying a high degree of complaisance toward some (e.g.,

individual victims and perpetrators and not as an intergroup social relation-

A LACK OF EMPIRICAL DATA

In summary, despite the massive political and sociological implications,

As stated by Verwoerd (2003), ‘‘much of the criticism and confusion sur-

the work of a truth commission and, therefore, people in general were in a

many possible missions suggested by Minow (1998) and other authors,

conflicts in their areas) or secondary victims (they had indirectly suffered

to contact people from different geographic areas. Out of 400 questionnaires

period, the recourse to these types of commissions is needed,’’ and ‘‘These

Each rating by each participant was converted to a numerical value

Are Truth Commissions Really Needed?

Who Might be the Members of the Commission?

Who Can Appear in Front of these Commissions?

What Ought to be the Missions of these Commissions?

Identifying, denouncing, and banishing (4% of the variance). This was

Shaming, punishing, and obtaining reparations (7 %). This was loaded

Preventing political instability and collective violence (5 %). This was

Identifying, denouncing, and banishing

Reconciling opposing parties and strengthening the respect of human

The Publicizing of the Commission’s Work

work of their commission. A clear majority of participants agreed with

groups), and the restoration of the victims’ dignity.

Limitations of the Study

device, possibly complemented by additional items corresponding to objec-

This work was supported by POCTI=PSI=46245=2002, PTDC=PSI=

EPHE), and the Centro Cognição e Afectividade (Oporto University). We

violence. Berkeley Journal of International Law, 19, 428–442.

tion Commission: ‘‘Race,’’ historical compromise and transitional democracy. International

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