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L-17757
Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in favor of the
conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina
Macapagal; that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued
on December 17, 1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of
title for the said property; that on December 8, 1926, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1971 was issued in the name of Ezequiel
Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 which was
cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the cadastral court declared
lot 395 public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced,
after filing a homestead application therefor, was able to obtain
Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding
that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring
the lot public land, and, therefore, the same as well as the certificate
of title issued thereafter was null and void, the court ordered the
cancellation of OCT No. 3462 in the name of Juan de la Merced;
directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre and
surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs; and to pay the latter as the
landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural years
1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the suit; and the
receiver to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing
the harvest for the agricultural years 1953-1955.
Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the
promulgation of the decision was ordered suspended and the case
was re-set for hearing for reception of additional evidence.
On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:
The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated "Lot No. 395 of the Rizal
Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 and original Certificate of Title
No. 425, both of which cover Lot 3-6". They, however, claim
ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the decision rendered on
December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21,
entitled "Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et al.,"
(Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17, 1925 directing the
issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, Rec.
of exhibits).
No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-
2, much less was there a title issued in the name of the plaintiffs over
the said lot.
The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership
over the said lot on Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on
October 10, 1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-ininterest, pursuant to a homestead patent issued on September 15,
1931 (Exh. 1, for the defendants and intervenor), contending that the
decision of December 26, 1923, adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs,
was still subject to review since there was no decree issued pursuant
thereto.
The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been
correct if there was actually a petition for review of the decision of
December 26, 1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case
concerning Lot No. 395. The fact of the matter is that Original
Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued pursuant to a homestead
patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a public land in a decision
dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926
at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Manila for
Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together with Lots
Nos. 394 and 2044, was declared a public land and was the object of
a homestead application by the respective concessionaries (p. 21,
rec. of exhibits). . . .
It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral case No.
14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government of the Philippines vs.
Justo Abacan, et al., erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395
which was already adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff by the decision
dated December 26, 1923 (Exhs. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of
exhibits) and decreed that Lot 395 is public land. The same cadastral
court should have taken judicial notice of the said decision and the
other promulgated therein for the issuance of a decree in favor of the
plaintiffs over lot 395 (Exh. B-2).
While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the
public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant
the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it
declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued
therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as
The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the
effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923
adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order
dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of
title to Inocencio Santos? Did those orders constitute registration
under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has
not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property thereby
affected still be lost by adverse possession?
For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts
must be considered:
By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot
No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world,
including the Government;
That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19,
1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court,
without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title
would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no
longer be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the
issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot
No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said
property had already become final, and there being no imputation of
irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the
said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such
judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become,
from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by
adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, with costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So
ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19090
Victoria Balmeo filed in the same proceeding, a petition for the setting
aside of said decree and the cancellation of the certificate issued
thereunder, on the ground that the decision ordering the decree was
obtained by Busuego by misrepresenting herself to be the sole owner
of the lot when in truth, petitioners, through their predecessor-ininterest, were owners of one-half thereof, having acquired the same
by purchase from Teodora's mother, Fausta Busuego. In a separate
petition, Antonio and Rogelio Busuego, children of a deceased
brother of Teodora, also prayed for the same relief on the allegation
that their father was an undivided co-owner (with Teodora) of one-half
of Lot 2497, having acquired the same by descent from their father,
Severino Busuego.
In her answer to the petition of the Josons, respondent Teodora
Busuego claimed that the alleged contract executed by her mother
Fausta Busuego, for the sale of the latter's one-half share in the land,
was obtained by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest through fraud
and deceit. And, as regards the claim of her nephews, she contended
that her brother Roman (Antonio and Rogelio's father) had already
received his share on the inheritance and has no more participation in
the Lot in question.
By order of August 4, 1961, the court dismissed the said petitions for
the reason that its jurisdiction as a cadastral court being special and
limited, it has no authority to pass upon the issues raised in the
pleadings. Hence, the present appeal by the petitioners.
Apparently, the court a quo based its action on the provisions of
Section 38 of the. Land Registration Act which, in part, reads:
Sec. 38. ...
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in
the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest. ... .
It is not here disputed that the petitions filed with the cadastral court
under the original proceeding were for the review and annulment of
the decree of registration of Lot No. 2497 of the Gapan Cadastre in
favor of Teodora Busuego and/or the cancellation of the original
certificate of title issued in her name as a consequence thereof.
Likewise, it is admitted that the same were filed within the
reglementary period of one, year and that the petitioners charged
registrant Teodora Busuego with having obtained the decree and
certificate of title through actual fraud and misrepresentation. The
only question raised by this appeal is, which court should take
cognizance of the proceeding, the cadastral court that had issued the
decree or the competent Court of First Instance in the, exercise of its
general jurisdiction?
It may be stated that we find no case squarely ruling on this particular
point. The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section
38 of Act 496 may be sought in "the competent Court of First
Instance" is no sufficient indication that the petition must be filed in
the Court of first Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction,
considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts
on land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from
entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not
issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land
to another.3
... As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the
period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered
continues to be under control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it. Such is the ruling laid down in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa (48 Phil. 227), which was later reiterated in that of Roman
Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Philippine Railway Co. and Reynes (49
Phil. 546). ... ( Afalla et al v. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622).
In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act
496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the
decision and granted the said decree.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set
aside, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings pursuant to law. No costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation from the order dated September 9, 1965 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, issued in LRC Rec. No.
7581, Quirino Bolaos, et als., petitioners, versus J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., et al., respondents, reading in full as follows:
In their urgent petition dated March 17, 1965, the petitioner prayed
that an order be published at the expense of the petitioners and
addressed to all to whom it may concern enjoining all and sundry
"pending the promulgation of the decision of the Supreme Court on
any appeal which may be taken from the decision of this Honorable
Court dated January 12, 1965" to desist from disturbing the physical
possession of petitioner Quirino Bolaos of the parcel of land object
of this case comprising 13.2619 hectares and included in the area
covered by said TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686 of the Registry of Deeds
of Rizal.
It appears that in a case filed before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, entitled "J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
represented by its managing partner, Gregorio Araneta, Inc. versus
Quirino Bolaos," the plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the
parcel of land object of the present action from the defendant therein,
and who is now one of the petitioners; that decision having been
rendered in favor of the plaintiff in said case and against the
defendant, defendant Quirino Bolaos appealed the case to the
Supreme Court (Exhibits "B," "B-1," to "B-7") which rendered a
decision (No. L-4935, May 28, 1954), affirming the decision of the
lower court.
In Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623 of this Court, Branch II, a
decision was rendered on January 18, 1965, declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal as null
and void. The petitioners made this decision as the basis of their
action, alleging that the certificate of title covering the parcel of land
now in litigation having been derived from Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, it follows that these titles which were issued later should
also be declared null and void in the event the aforementioned
decision becomes final and executory, or the same is affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
The petition merely prays for an Order to be published at the expense
of the herein petitioners to enjoin all and sundry from disturbing the
physical possession of petitioner Quirino Bolaos of the parcel of land
object of the petition and which is included in the property covered by
TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686. It is not disputed that the petitioners
were in possession of the parcel of land object of this petition at the
time that the civil action before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, was instituted and up to the present time (Exhibits "B-2"
to "B-5"). The records show that the petition was published at the
expense of the petitioners in the Daily Mirror in its issues of May 22,
29, and June 5, 1965 (Exhibit "A"). The decision of the Supreme
Court in the aforementioned case was promulgated on May 28, 1954.
Notwithstanding the lapse of more than ten years, it appears that said
decision has not been executed and the defendant in said case,
Quirino Bolaos, who is one of the petitioners in the present case, is
still in possession of the parcel of land in question. In view of the
decisions in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623 of this Court,
Branch II, as already stated above, it would appear that the position
of the petitioner that their possession should not be disturbed until
said decision is reversed by the appellate court, is tenable.
lwph1. t
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE DECISION
IN G.R. NO. L-4935 HAS NOT YET BEEN EXECUTED AND THAT
PETITIONER BOLAOS IS STILL IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND
IN QUESTION.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ISSUING THE ORDER DATED 5
AUGUST 1965.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted order, the relief sought by
appellees in their petition filed with the court a quo was virtually a
general preliminary injunction against the whole world not to disturb
their alleged possession of the parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 37677 and 37686 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal issued to appellant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. upon the ground that in the three other civil cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623 of the same Court of First Instance of Rizal, the said
court has rendered a decision, still pending appeal, declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the two above-mentioned titles
have been derived null and void, principally for want of jurisdiction of
the court that issued said original title on account of defects in the
publication of the notices of the proceedings for their registration, the
injunction to last, per their prayer, until the decision of this Court in the
said three civil cases, albeit the impugned order itself does not
specify the period of its duration. Petitioners sought such relief
notwithstanding the admitted fact that in a previous case filed by
appellant Tuason against appellees for the recovery of the
possession of said land, that of Tuason vs. Bolaos, 93 Phil. 106,
wherein appellees had alleged among their defenses that appellant
Tuason's titles were obtained "thru fraud or error and without
knowledge (of) or notice, either personal or thru publication to" said
appellees, this Court upheld the validity of the questioned titles and
affirmed the decision of the trial court "declaring defendant (now
appellee Bolaos) to be without any right to the land in question and
ordering him to restore possession thereof to plaintiff (now appellant)
Tuason." In the said decision of this Court, it was held:
implemented. Section 112 of Act 496 which is the only provision in the
said law empowering the land registration court to issue post or afterregistration orders refers exclusively to amendments and alterations
of the title issued and has nothing to do with possession of the land at
all.
The theory of appellees is not clear in their brief. Seemingly, they are
of the belief that since the above-mentioned Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 which was annulled was issued in the same LRC No.
7581 in which the present petition was filed, it should follow that the
court a quo may act on their petition. Appellees' position is not
correct. The mere fact that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 has
been voided in so far as the titles involved in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623, derived from said original certificate of title, are
concerned, does not mean that such declaration of nullity affects also
the other titles, also derived from it but issued in the names of other
persons who have neither been heard nor notified. This is elementary
under the due process principle. Although incidents regarding any title
derived from an original one are supposed to be filed in the same
expediente or record of the original proceeding, the incidents
regarding each title so derived constitute separate and distinct
proceedings from those affecting the other titles derived from the
same original title, and are, accordingly, always treated as such.
Indeed, the very fact that ordinary civil actions had to be filed by the
plaintiffs in those three civil cases relied upon by appellees proves
that the relief sought by them in their petition in the court below may
not be obtained in the form of a mere incident in the original
registration proceedings or expediente. Besides, as already noted
earlier, there is no showing that there is now pending in the lower
court either an action or any kind of proceeding in which appellees
are asking that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 37677 and 37686 of
appellant Tuason should be annulled, assuming without deciding that
such a relief could still be available to appellees inspite of Tuason vs.
Bolaos, supra. Such being the case, the trial court placed the cart
before the horse in issuing its questioned order, for how could anyone
be enjoined from disturbing the possession of somebody whose right
to such possession has not even been alleged, much less
established in an appropriate proceeding?
Having come to this conclusion, We consider it unnecessary to
Castro,