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Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33637
ANG GIOK CHIP, doing business under the name and style of
Hua
Bee
Kong
Si, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SPRINGFIELD
FIRE
&
MARINE
INSURANCE
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
C.A.
Sobral
for
appellant.
Paredes
and
Buencamino
for
appellee.
Gibbs and McDonough and Ramon Ozaeta as amici curiae.
MALCOLM, J.:
An important question in the law of insurance, not heretofore
considered in this jurisdiction and, according to our information, not
directly resolved in California from which State the Philippine
Insurance Act was taken, must be decided on this appeal for the
future guidance of trial courts and of insurance companies doing
business in the Philippine Islands. This question, flatly stated, is
whether a warranty referred to in the policy as forming part of the
contract of insurance and in the form of a rider to the insurance
policy, is null and void because not complying with the Philippine
Insurance Act. The court has had the benefit of instructive briefs
and memoranda from the parties and has also been assisted by a
well prepared brief submitted on behalf of amici curiae.
The admitted facts are these: Ang Giok Chip doing business under
the name and style of Hua Bee Kong Si was formerly the owner of a
warehouse situated at No. 643 Calle Reina Regente, City of Manila.
The contents of the warehouse were insured with the three
insurance companies for the total sum of P60,000. One insurance
policy, in the amount of P10,000, was taken out with the Springfield
Fire & Marine Insurance Company. The warehouse was destroyed by
fire on January 11, 1928, while the policy issued by the latter
company was in force.
2
insurance declared:
"P20,000. Sun Insurance Office Ltd. (K & S)."
(Emphasis inserted.) Securely pasted on the left hand
margin of the face of the policy are five warranties
and special clauses. One of them is warranty F,
specially referred to on the face of the policy, reading
in part as follows:
WARRANTY F
It is hereby declared and agreed that during the
currency of this policy no hazardous goods be stored
in the Building to which this insurance applies or in
any building communicating therewith, provided,
always, however, that the Insured be permitted to
stored a small quantity of the hazardous goods
specified below, but not exceeding in all 3 per cent of
the total value of the whole of the goods or
merchandise contained in said warehouse, viz; . . . .
The applicable law is found in the Instance Act, Act
No. 2427, as amended, section 65 reading:
"Every express warranty, made at or before the execution of a
policy, must be contained in the policy itself, or in another
instrument signed by the insured and referred to in the policy, as
making a part of it." As the Philippine law was taken verbatim from
the law of California, in accordance with well settled canons of
statutory construction, the court should follow in fundamental
points, at least, the construction placed by California courts on a
California law. Unfortunately the researches of counsel reveal no
authority coming from the courts of California which is exactly on
all fours with the case before us. However, there are certain
consideration lying at the basis of California law and certain
indications in the California decisions which point the way for the
decision in this case
Section 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act corresponds to section
2605 of the Civil Cod of California. The comments of the Code
Examiners of California disclose that the language of section 2605
was quite different from that under the Code as adopted in 1872.
That language was found too harsh as to insurance companies. The
3
Section 65 of the Insurance Act and its counterpart, section 265 of
the Civil Code of California, will bear analysis as tested by reason
and authority. The law says that every express warranty must be
"contained in the policy itself." The word "contained," according to
the dictionaries, means "included," inclosed," "embraced,"
"comprehended," etc. When, therefore, the courts speak of a rider
attached to the policy, and thus "embodied" therein, or of a
warranty "incorporated" in the policy, it is believed that the phrase
"contained in the policy itself" must necessarily include such rider
and warranty. As to the alternative relating to "another instrument,"
"instrument" as here used could not mean a mere slip of paper like
a rider, but something akin to the policy itself, which in section 48
of the Insurance Act is defined as "The written instrument, in which
a contract of insurance is set forth." In California, every paper
writing is not necessarily an "instrument" within the statutory
meaning of the term. The word "instrument has a well defined
definition in California, and as used in the Codes invariably means
some written paper or instrument signed and delivered by one
person to another, transferring the title to, or giving a lien, on
property, or giving a right to debt or duty. (Hoag vs. Howard [1880],
55 Cal., 564; People vs. Fraser[1913], 137 Pac., 276.) In other
words, the rider, warranty F, is contained in the policy itself,
because by the contract of insurance agreed to by the parties it is
made to form a part of the same, but is not another instrument
signed by the insured and referred to in the policy as forming a part
of it.
Again, referring to the jurisprudence of California, another rule of
insurance adopted in that State is in point. It is admitted that the
policy before us was accepted by the plaintiff. The receipt of this
policy by the insured without objection binds both the acceptor and
the insured to the terms thereof. The insured may not thereafter be
heard to say that he did not read the policy or know its terms, since
it is his duty to read his policy and it will be assumed that he did so.
In California Jurisprudence, vol. 14, p. 427, from which these
statements are taken with citations to California decisions, it is
added that it has been held that where the holder of a policy
discovers a mistake made by himself and the local agent in
attaching the wrong rider to his application, elects to retain the
policy issued to him, and neither requests the issuance of a
different one nor offers to pay the premium requisite to insure
Facts:
Ang insured his warehouse for the total value of Php 60,000. One of
these, amounting to 10,000, was with SpringfieldInsurance
Company. His warehouse burned down, then he attempted to
4
recover
8,000
from Springfield for
the indemnity.The
insurance company interposed its defense on a rider in the policy
in the form of Warranty F, fixing the amount ofhazardous good that
can be stored in a building to be covered by the insurance. They
claimed
that
Ang
violated
the
3
percent
limit
by
placing hazardous goods to as high as 39 percent of all the goods
stored in the building. His suit to recover was granted by the trial
court. Hence, this appeal.
Ratio:
The Insurance Act, Section 65, taken from California law, states:
"Every express warranty, made at or before the execution of a
policy, must be contained in the policy itself, or in another
instrument signed by the insured and referred to in the policy, as
making a part of it."
Warranty F, indemnifying for a value of Php 20,000 and pasted on
the left margin of the policy stated:
It is hereby declared and agreed that during the currency of this
policy no hazardous goods be stored in the Building to which this
insurance applies or in any building communicating therewith,
provided, always, however, that the Insured be permitted to stored
a small quantity of the hazardous goods specified below, but not
exceeding in all 3 per cent of the total value of the whole of the
goods or merchandise contained in said warehouse, viz; . . . .
Also, the court stated a book that said, "any express warranty or
condition is always a part of the policy, but, like any other part of
an express contract, may be written in the margin, or contained in
5
G.R. No. L-9370
K.
vs.
THE MIDLAND
appellant.
Bruce,
Lawrence,
Ross
Thos D. Aitken for appellee.
YOUNG, plaintiff-appellee,
INSURANCE
and
COMPANY, defendant-
Block
for
appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
The purpose of the present action is to recover the sum of P3,000
upon an insurance policy. The lower court rendered a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P2,708.78, and costs. From that judgment the defendant appealed
to this court.
The undisputed facts upon which said action is based are as
follows:
1. The plaintiff conducted a candy and fruit store on the Escolta, in
the city of Manila, and occupied a building at 321 Calle Claveria, as
a residence and bodega (storehouse).
2. On the 29th of May, 1912, the defendant, in consideration of the
payment of a premium of P60, entered into a contract of insurance
with the plaintiff (policy No. 509105) by the terms of which the
defendant company, upon certain conditions, promised to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P3,000, in case said residence
and bodega and contends should be destroyed by fire.
3. On the conditions of said contract of insurance is found in
"warranty B" and is as follows: "Waranty B. It is hereby declared
and agreed that during the pendency of this policy no hazardous
goods stored or kept for sale, and no hazardous trade or process be
carried on, in the building to which this insurance applies, or in any
building connected therewith."
4. On the 4th or 5th of February, 1913, the plaintiff placed in said
residence and bodega three boxes, 18 by 18 by 20 inches
measurement, which belonged to him and which were filed with
fireworks.
5. On the 18th day of March, q913, said residence and bodega and
the contents thereof were partially destroyed by fire.
6. Said fireworks had been given to the plaintiff by the former
owner of the Luneta Candy Store; that the plaintiff intended to use
the same in the celebration of the Chinese new year; that the
authorities of the city of Manila had prohibited the use of fireworks
on said occasion, and that the plaintiff then placed the same in
said bodega, where they remained from the 4th or 5th of February,
1913, until after the fire of the 18th of March, 1913.
7. Both of the parties agree that said fireworks come within the
phrase "hazardous goods," mentioned in said "warranty B" of the
policy.
8. That said fireworks were found in a part of the building not
destroyed by the fire; that they in no way contributed to the fire, or
to the loss occasioned thereby.
The only question presented by the parties is whether or not the
placing of said fireworks in the building insured, under the
conditions above enumerated, they being "hazardous goods," is a
violation of the terms of the contract of insurance and especially of
"warranty B." "Warranty B" provides that "no hazardous goods
be stored" in the building insured. It is admitted by both parties
that the fireworks are "hazardous goods." The defendant alleged
that they were "stored." The plaintiff contends that under all the
facts and circumstances of the case, they were not "stored" in said
building, and that the placing of them in the building was not a
violation of the terms of the contract. Both the plaintiff and
defendant agree that if they were "hazardous goods," and if they
were "stored," then the act of the plaintiff was a violation of the
terms of the contract of insurance and the defendant was justified
in repudiating its liability thereunder.
This leads us to a consideration of the meaning of the accord
"stored" as used in said "warranty B." While the word "stored" has
been variously defined by authors, as well as by courts, we have
found no case exactly analogous to the present. The plaintiff says
that he placed said fireworks in the bodega after he had been
notified that he could not use them on the Chinese new year, in
order that he might later send them to a friend in the provinces.
Whether a particular article is "stored" or not must, in some degree,
6
depend upon the intention of the parties. The interpretation of the
word "stored" is quite difficult, in view of the many decisions upon
the various conditions presented. Nearly all of the cases cited by
the lower court are cases where the article was being put to some
reasonable and actual use, which might easily have been permitted
by the terms of the policy, and within the intention of the parties,
and excepted from the operation of the warranty, like the present.
Said decision are upon cases like:
1. Where merchants have had or kept the "hazardous" articles in
small quantities, and for actual daily use, for safe, such as gasoline,
gunpowder, etc.;
2. Where such articles have been brought on the premises for
actual use thereon, and in small quantities, such as oil, paints, etc;
and
3. Where such articles or goods were used for lighting purpose, and
in small quantities.
The author of the Century Dictionary defines the world "store" to be
a deposit in a store or warehouse for preservation or safe keeping;
o place in a warehouse or other place of deposit for safe keeping.
See also the definitions given by the Standard Dictionary, to the
same effect.
Said definitions, of course, do not include a deposit in a store, in
small quantities, for daily use. "Daily use" precludes the idea of a
deposit for preservation or safe keeping, as well as a deposit for
future consumption, or safe keeping.
In the present case no claim is made that the "hazardous goods"
were placed in the bodega for present or daily use. It is admitted
that they were placed in the bodega "for future use," or for future
consumption, or for safe keeping. The plaintiff makes no claim that
he deposited them there with any other idea than "for future use"
for future consumption. It seems clear to us that the "hazardous
goods" in question were "stored" in the bodega, as that word is
generally defined. That being true, suppose the defendant had
made an examination of the premises, even in the absence of a
fire, and had found he "hazardous goods" there, under the
conditions above described, would it not have been justified, then
and there, in declaring the policy null and of no effect by reason of
7
attempted to be taken without the operation of a clear, reasonable,
and material obligation of the contract. (Mack vs. Rochester
German Ins. Co., 106 N. Y., 560, 564.)
The appellant argues, however, that in view of the fact that the
"storing" of the fireworks on the premises of the insured did not
contribute in any way to the damage occasioned by the fire, he
should be permitted to recover that the "storing" of the
"hazardous goods" in no way caused injury to the defendant
company. That argument, however, is beside the question, if the
"storing" was a violation of the terms of the contract. The violation
of the terms of the contract, by virtue of the provisions of the policy
itself, terminated, at the election of either party, he contractual
relations. (Kyte vs. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 149 Mass.,
116, 122.) The plaintiff paid a premium based upon the risk at the
time the policy was issued. Certainly it cannot be denied that the
placing of the firecrackers in the building insured increased the risk.
The plaintiff had not paid a premium based upon the increased risk,
neither had the defendant issued a policy upon the theory of a
different risk. The plaintiff was enjoying, if his contention may be
allowed may be allowed, the benefits of an insurance policy upon
one risk, whereas, as a matter of fact, it was issued upon an
entirely different risk. The defendant had neither been paid nor had
issues a policy to cover the increased risk. An increase of risk which
is substantial and which is continued for a considerable period of
time, is a direct and certain injury to the insurer, and changes the
basis
upon
which
the
contract
of
insurance
rests.
(Kyte vs. Commercial Union Assurance Co. (supra); Frost's Detroit
Lumber Worksvs. Millers' Mutual Ins. Co., 37 Minn., 300, 302;
Moore vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62 N. H., 240; Ferree vs. Oxford Fire &
Life Ins. Co., 67 Pa. State, 373.)
Therefore and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower
court is hereby revoked and the defendant is hereby relieved from
any responsibility under said complaint, and, without any finding as
to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
8
G.R. No. L-4611
QUA
CHEE
GAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAW UNION AND ROCK INSURANCE CO., LTD., represented
by its agent, WARNER, BARNES AND CO., LTD., defendantappellant.
Delgado,
Flores
&
Macapagal
for
appellant.
Andres Aguilar, Zacarias Gutierrez Lora, Gregorio Sabater and
Perkins, Ponce Enrile & Contreras for appellee.
Property Insured
(Exhibit
(Exhibit
2637346
"Y")
(Exhibit
2637067
"GG")
(Exhibit
Total
10
discount on the premium to which the insured was entitled, since
the discount depended on the number of hydrants, and the fire
fighting equipment available (See "Scale of Allowances" to which
the policies were expressly made subject). The law, supported by a
long line of cases, is expressed by American Jurisprudence (Vol. 29,
pp. 611-612) to be as follows:
It is usually held that where the insurer, at the time of the issuance
of a policy of insurance, has knowledge of existing facts which, if
insisted on, would invalidate the contract from its very inception,
such knowledge constitutes a waiver of conditions in the contract
inconsistent with the facts, and the insurer is stopped thereafter
from asserting the breach of such conditions. The law is charitable
enough to assume, in the absence of any showing to the contrary,
that an insurance company intends to executed a valid contract in
return for the premium received; and when the policy contains a
condition which renders it voidable at its inception, and this result
is known to the insurer, it will be presumed to have intended to
waive the conditions and to execute a binding contract, rather than
to have deceived the insured into thinking he is insured when in
fact he is not, and to have taken his money without consideration.
(29 Am. Jur., Insurance, section 807, at pp. 611-612.)
The reason for the rule is not difficult to find.
The plain, human justice of this doctrine is perfectly apparent. To
allow a company to accept one's money for a policy of insurance
which it then knows to be void and of no effect, though it knows as
it must, that the assured believes it to be valid and binding, is so
contrary to the dictates of honesty and fair dealing, and so closely
related to positive fraud, as to the abhorent to fairminded men. It
would be to allow the company to treat the policy as valid long
enough to get the preium on it, and leave it at liberty to repudiate it
the next moment. This cannot be deemed to be the real intention of
the parties. To hold that a literal construction of the policy
expressed the true intention of the company would be to indict it,
for fraudulent purposes and designs which we cannot believe it to
be guilty of (Wilson vs. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 96 Atl.
540, 543-544).
The inequitableness of the conduct observed by the insurance
company in this case is heightened by the fact that after the
insured had incurred the expense of installing the two hydrants, the
company collected the premiums and issued him a policy so
worded that it gave the insured a discount much smaller than that
he was normaly entitledto. According to the "Scale of Allowances,"
a policy subject to a warranty of the existence of one fire hydrant
for every 150 feet of external wall entitled the insured to a discount
of 7 1/2 per cent of the premium; while the existence of "hydrants,
in compund" (regardless of number) reduced the allowance on the
premium to a mere 2 1/2 per cent. This schedule was logical, since
a greater number of hydrants and fire fighting appliances reduced
the risk of loss. But the appellant company, in the particular case
now before us, so worded the policies that while exacting the
greater number of fire hydrants and appliances, it kept the
premium discount at the minimum of 2 1/2 per cent, thereby giving
the insurance company a double benefit. No reason is shown why
appellant's premises, that had been insured with appellant for
several years past, suddenly should be regarded in 1939 as so
hazardous as to be accorded a treatment beyond the limits of
appellant's own scale of allowances. Such abnormal treatment of
the insured strongly points at an abuse of the insurance company's
selection of the words and terms of the contract, over which it had
absolute control.
These considerations lead us to regard the parol evidence rule,
invoked by the appellant as not applicable to the present case. It is
not a question here whether or not the parties may vary a written
contract by oral evidence; but whether testimony is receivable so
that a party may be, by reason of inequitable conduct shown,
estopped from enforcing forfeitures in its favor, in order to forestall
fraud or imposition on the insured.
Receipt of Premiums or Assessments afte Cause for Forfeiture
Other than Nonpayment. It is a well settled rule of law that an
insurer which with knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a policy as
no longer in force, receives and accepts a preium on the policy,
estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. It cannot treat the
policy as void for the purpose of defense to an action to recover for
a loss thereafter occurring and at the same time treat it as valid for
the purpose of earning and collecting further premiums." (29 Am.
Jur., 653, p. 657.)
11
It would be unconscionable to permit a company to issue a policy
under circumstances which it knew rendered the policy void and
then to accept and retain premiums under such a void policy.
Neither law nor good morals would justify such conduct and the
doctrine of equitable estoppel is peculiarly applicable to the
situation. (McGuire vs. Home Life Ins. Co. 94 Pa. Super Ct. 457.)
Moreover, taking into account the well known rule that ambiguities
or obscurities must be strictly interpreted aganst the prty that
caused them, 1the "memo of warranty" invoked by appellant bars
the latter from questioning the existence of the appliances called
for in the insured premises, since its initial expression, "the
undernoted appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the
premises insured hereby, . . . it is hereby warranted . . .", admists of
interpretation as an admission of the existence of such appliances
which appellant cannot now contradict, should the parol evidence
rule apply.
The alleged violation of the warranty of 100 feet of fire hose for
every two hydrants, must be equally rejected, since the appellant's
argument thereon is based on the assumption that the insured was
bound to maintain no less than eleven hydrants (one per 150 feet
of wall), which requirement appellant is estopped from enforcing.
The supposed breach of the wter pressure condition is made to rest
on the testimony of witness Serra, that the water supply could fill a
5-gallon can in 3 seconds; appellant thereupon inferring that the
maximum quantity obtainable from the hydrants was 100 gallons a
minute, when the warranty called for 200 gallons a minute. The
transcript shows, however, that Serra repeatedly refused and
professed inability to estimate the rate of discharge of the water,
and only gave the "5-gallon per 3-second" rate because the
insistence of appellant's counsel forced the witness to hazard a
guess. Obviously, the testimony is worthless and insufficient to
establish the violation claimed, specially since the burden of its
proof lay on appellant.
As to maintenance of a trained fire brigade of 20 men, the record is
preponderant that the same was organized, and drilled, from time
to give, altho not maintained as a permanently separate unit, which
the warranty did not require. Anyway, it would be unreasonable to
expect the insured to maintain for his compound alone a fire
fighting force that many municipalities in the Islands do not even
Insurance is, in its nature, complex and difficult for the layman to
understand. Policies are prepared by experts who know and can
anticipate the hearing and possible complications of every
contingency. So long as insurance companies insist upon the use of
ambiguous, intricate and technical provisions, which conceal rather
than frankly disclose, their own intentions, the courts must, in
fairness to those who purchase insurance, construe every
ambiguity in favor of the insured. (Algoe vs. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
91 Wash. 324, LRA 1917A, 1237.)
An insurer should not be allowed, by the use of obscure phrases
and exceptions, to defeat the very purpose for which the policy was
procured (Moore vs. Aetna Life Insurance Co., LRA 1915D, 264).
12
We see no reason why the prohibition of keeping gasoline in the
premises could not be expressed clearly and unmistakably, in the
language and terms that the general public can readily understand,
without resort to obscure esoteric expression (now derisively
termed "gobbledygook"). We reiterate the rule stated in Bachrach
vs. British American Assurance Co. (17 Phil. 555, 561):
If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that character,
it ought to have been plainly expressed in the policy.
This rigid application of the rule on ambiguities has become
necessary in view of current business practices. The courts cannot
ignore that nowadays monopolies, cartels and concentrations of
capital, endowed with overwhelming economic power, manage to
impose upon parties dealing with them cunningly prepared
"agreements" that the weaker party may not change one whit, his
participation in the "agreement" being reduced to the alternative to
take it or leave it" labelled since Raymond Baloilles" contracts by
adherence" (con tracts d'adhesion), in contrast to these entered
into by parties bargaining on an equal footing, such contracts (of
which policies of insurance and international bills of lading are
prime examples) obviously call for greater strictness and vigilance
on the part of courts of justice with a view to protecting the weaker
party from abuses and imposition, and prevent their becoming
traps for the unwarry (New Civil Coee, Article 24; Sent. of Supreme
Court of Spain, 13 Dec. 1934, 27 February 1942).
Si pudiera estimarse que la condicion 18 de la poliza de seguro
envolvia alguna oscuridad, habra de ser tenido en cuenta que al
seguro es, practicamente un contrato de los llamados de adhesion
y por consiguiente en caso de duda sobre la significacion de las
clausulas generales de una poliza redactada por las compafijas
sin la intervencion alguna de sus clientes se ha de adoptar de
acuerdo con el articulo 1268 del Codigo Civil, la interpretacion mas
favorable al asegurado, ya que la obscuridad es imputable a la
empresa aseguradora, que debia haberse explicado mas
claramante. (Dec. Trib. Sup. of Spain 13 Dec. 1934)
The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith (uferrimal
fidei) not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in
fact, it is mere so for the latter, since its dominant bargaining
position carries with it stricter responsibility.
Another point that is in favor of the insured is that the gasoline kept
in Bodega No. 2 was only incidental to his business, being no more
than a customary 2 day's supply for the five or six motor vehicles
used for transporting of the stored merchandise (t. s. n., pp. 14471448). "It is well settled that the keeping of inflammable oils on the
premises though prohibited by the policy does not void it if such
keeping is incidental to the business." Bachrach vs. British
American Ass. Co., 17 Phil. 555, 560); and "according to the weight
of authority, even though there are printed prohibitions against
keeping certain articles on the insured premises the policy will not
be avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the prohibited
articles are necessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade
or business conducted on the premises." (45 C. J. S., p. 311; also 4
Couch on Insurance, section 966b). It should also be noted that the
"Hemp Warranty" forbade storage only "in the building to which this
insurance applies and/or in any building communicating therewith",
and it is undisputed that no gasoline was stored in the burned
bodegas, and that "Bodega No. 2" which was not burned and where
the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured
bodegas.
The charge that the insured failed or refused to submit to the
examiners of the insurer the books, vouchers, etc. demanded by
them was found unsubstantiated by the trial Court, and no reason
has been shown to alter this finding. The insured gave the
insurance examiner all the date he asked for (Exhibits AA, BB, CCC
and Z), and the examiner even kept and photographed some of the
examined books in his possession. What does appear to have been
rejected by the insured was the demand that he should submit
"a list of all books, vouchers, receiptsand other records" (Age 4,
Exhibit 9-c); but the refusal of the insured in this instance was well
justified, since the demand for a list of all the vouchers (which were
not in use by the insured) and receipts was positively unreasonable,
considering that such listing was superfluous because the insurer
was not denied access to the records, that the volume of Qua Chee
Gan's business ran into millions, and that the demand was made
just after the fire when everything was in turmoil. That the
representatives of the insurance company were able to secure all
the date they needed is proved by the fact that the adjuster
Alexander Stewart was able to prepare his own balance sheet
(Exhibit L of the criminal case) that did not differ from that
13
submitted by the insured (Exhibit J) except for the valuation of the
merchandise, as expressly found by the Court in the criminal case
for arson. (Decision, Exhibit WW).
How valuations may differ honestly, without fraud being involved,
was strikingly illustrated in the decision of the arson case (Exhibit
WW) acquiting Qua Choc Gan, appellee in the present proceedings.
The decision states (Exhibit WW, p. 11):
Alexander D. Stewart declaro que ha examinado los libros de Qua
Choc Gan en Tabaco asi como su existencia de copra y abaca en las
bodega al tiempo del incendio durante el periodo comprendido
desde el 1.o de enero al 21 de junio de 1940 y ha encontrado que
Qua Choc Gan ha sufrico una perdida de P1,750.76 en su negocio
en Tabaco. Segun Steward al llegar a este conclusion el ha tenidoen
cuenta el balance de comprobacion Exhibit 'J' que le ha entregado
el mismo acusado Que Choc Gan en relacion con sus libros y lo ha
encontrado correcto a excepcion de los precios de abaca y copra
que alli aparecen que no estan de acuerdo con los precios en el
mercado. Esta comprobacion aparece en el balance mercado
exhibit J que fue preparado por el mismo testigo.
In view of the discrepancy in the valuations between the insured
and the adjuster Stewart for the insurer, the Court referred the
controversy to a government auditor, Apolonio Ramos; but the
latter reached a different result from the other two. Not only that,
but Ramos reported two different valuations that could be reached
according to the methods employed (Exhibit WW, p. 35):
La ciencia de la contabilidad es buena, pues ha tenido sus muchos
usos buenos para promovar el comercio y la finanza, pero en el
caso presente ha resultado un tanto cumplicada y acomodaticia,
como lo prueba el resultado del examen hecho por los contadores
Stewart y Ramos, pues el juzgado no alcanza a ver como habiendo
examinado las mismas partidas y los mismos libros dichos
contadores hayan de llegara dos conclusiones que difieron
sustancialmente entre si. En otras palabras, no solamente la
comprobacion hecha por Stewart difiere de la comprobacion hecha
por Ramos sino que, segun este ultimo, su comprobacion ha dado
lugar a dos resultados diferentes dependiendo del metodo que se
emplea.
14
adjuster investigator, Alexander D. Stewart, who examined the
premises during and after the fire. His testimony, however, was
based on inferences from the photographs and traces found after
the fire, and must yield to the contradictory testimony of engineer
Andres Bolinas, and specially of the then Chief of the Loan
Department of the National Bank's Legaspi branch, Porfirio Barrios,
and of Bank Appraiser Loreto Samson, who actually saw the
contents of the bodegas shortly before the fire, while inspecting
them for the mortgagee Bank. The lower Court was satisfied of the
veracity and accuracy of these witnesses, and the appellant insurer
has failed to substantiate its charges aganst their character. In fact,
the insurer's repeated accusations that these witnesses were later
"suspended for fraudulent transactions" without giving any details,
is a plain attempt to create prejudice against them, without the
least support in fact.
Stewart himself, in testifying that it is impossible to determine from
the remains the quantity of hemp burned (t. s. n., pp. 1468, 1470),
rebutted appellant's attacks on the refusal of the Court below to
accept its inferences from the remains shown in the photographs of
the burned premises. It appears, likewise, that the adjuster's
calculations of the maximum contents of the destroyed warehouses
rested on the assumption that all the copra and hemp were in
sacks, and on the result of his experiments to determine the space
occupied by definite amounts of sacked copra. The error in the
estimates thus arrived at proceeds from the fact that a large
amount of the insured's stock were in loose form, occupying less
space than when kept in sacks; and from Stewart's obvious failure
to give due allowance for the compression of the material at the
bottom of the piles (t. s. n., pp. 1964, 1967) due to the weight of
the overlying stock, as shown by engineer Bolinas. It is probable
that the errors were due to inexperience (Stewart himself admitted
that this was the first copra fire he had investigated); but it is clear
that such errors render valueles Stewart's computations. These
were in fact twice passed upon and twice rejected by different
judges (in the criminal and civil cases) and their concordant opinion
is practically conclusive.
The adjusters' reports, Exhibits 9-A and 9-B, were correctly
disregarded by the Court below, since the opinions stated therein
were based on ex parte investigations made at the back of the
insured; and the appellant did not present at the trial the original
15
entitle the insurer to avoid the policy. It is well to note that the
overchange of 20 per cent was claimed only on apart (70 per cent)
of the hemp stock; had the insured acted with fraudulent intent,
nothing prevented him from increasing the value of all of his copra,
hemp and buildings in the same proportion. This also applies to the
alleged fraudulent claim for burned empty sacks, that was likewise
explained to our satisfaction and that of the trial Court. The rule is
that to avoid a policy, the false swearing must be wilful and with
intent to defraud (29 Am. Jur., pp. 849-851) which was not the
cause. Of course, the lack of fraudulent intent would not authorize
the collection of the expected profit under the terms of the polices,
and the trial Court correctly deducte the same from its award.
We find no reversible error in the judgment appealed from,
wherefore the smae is hereby affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Qua v Law Union. G.R. No. L-4611 December 17, 1955
J. Reyes
Facts:
Qua owned 4 warehouses used for the storage of copra and hemp.
They were insured with the Law Union.
Fire broke out and completely destroyed 3 bodegas. The plaintiff
submitted claims totalling P398,562.81. The Insurance Company
resisted payment on the grounds that the fire had been deliberately
caused by the insured or by other persons in connivance with him.
Que Chee Gan and his brother were tried for arson, but were
acquitted by the trial court. As regards the insurance claim, the
trial court ruled in favor of Qua and entitled him to recover more
than Php 300,000 for indemnities from the insurance company.
Hence, the company appealed to the SC.
In its first assignment of error, the insurance company alleged that
the trial Court should have held that the policies were avoided for
breach of warranty. The contract noted that fire hydrants were
Issues:
1. WON the insurance company can void the policies it had issued
2. WON the insured violated the "Hemp Warranty" provisions of the
policy against the storage of gasoline
3. WON the insured planned the destruction of the bodega
Ratio:
1. The insurer, who at the time of issuance, has knowledge of
existing facts which would invalidate the contract from the
beginning, such constitutes a waiver of conditions in the contract
inconsistent
with
the
facts,
and
the
insurer
is
stoppedthereafter from asserting the breach of such conditions.
Also, an insurance company intends to executed a valid contract in
return for the premium received; and when the policy contains a
condition which renders it voidable at its inception, and this result
is known to the insurer, it will be presumed to have intended to
waive the conditions and to execute a binding contract, rather than
to have deceived the insured into thinking he is insured when in
fact he is not.
The appellant is barred estoppel to claim violation of the so-called
fire hydrants warranty, because it knew the number of hydrants
demanded therein never existed from the very beginning and
issued the policies.
To allow a company to accept one's money for a policy of insurance
which it then knows to be void and of no effect, though it knows as
16
it must, that the assured believes it to be valid and binding, is so
contrary to the dictates of honesty and fair dealing, and so closely
related to positive fraud, as to the abhorrent to fair-minded men.
The appellant company so worded the policies that while exacting
the greater number of fire hydrants and appliances, it kept the
premium discount at the minimum of 2 1/2%, thereby giving the
insurance company a double benefit. Such abnormal treatment of
the insured strongly points at an abuse of the insurance company's
selection of the words and terms of the contract, over which it had
absolute control.
Receipt of Premiums or Assessments after Cause for Forfeiture
Other than Nonpayment. It is a well settled rule of law that an
insurer which with knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a policy as
no longer in force, receives and accepts a premium on the policy,
estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. It cannot treat the
policy as void for the purpose of defense to an action to recover for
a loss thereafter occurring and at the same time treat it as valid for
the purpose of earning and collecting further premiums.
Moreover, taking into account the well known rule that ambiguities
or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that
caused them, the "memo of warranty" invoked by appellant bars
the latter from questioning the existence of the appliances called
for in the insured premises
2. The ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and
liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. So
long as insurance companies insist upon the use of ambiguous,
intricate and technical provisions, which conceal rather than frankly
disclose, their own intentions, the courts must, in fairness to those
who purchase insurance, construe everyambiguity in favor of the
insured.
Appellee admitted that there were 36 cans of gasoline in the
building designed. It However, gasoline is not specifically
mentioned among the prohibited articles listed in the so-called
"hemp warranty." The cause relied upon by the insurer speaks of
"oils", and is uncertain because, "Oils" usually mean "lubricants"
and not gasoline or kerosene.
17
G.R. No. L-14373
GENERAL
INSURANCE
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NG HUA, respondent.
AND
SURETY
18
no question that the policy issued by General Indemnity had
not been stated in nor endorsed onPolicy No. 471 of defendant. And
as stipulated in the above-quoted provisions of such policy "all
benefit under this policy shall be forfeited."2
To avoid the dissastrous effect of the misrepresentation or
concealment of the other insurance policy, Ng Hua alleges "actual
knowledge" on the part of General insurance of the fact that he had
taken out additional insurance with General Indemnity. He does not
say when such knowledge was acquired or imparted. If General
Insurance know before issuing its policy or before the fire, such
knowledge might overcome the insurer's defense.3However, the
Court of Appeals found no evidence of such knowledge. We have
read the pages of the stenographic notes cited by Ng Hua and we
all gather is evidence of the existence of the Insurance General
Indemnity Company. As to knowledge of General Insurance before
issuance of its policy or the fire, there was none.
Indeed, this concealment and violation was expressly set up as a
special defense in the answer. Yet plaintiff did not, in avoidance,
reply nor assert such knowledge. And it is doubtful whether the
evidence on the point would be admissible under the pleadings.
(See Rule 11, sec. 1.)
All the above considerations lead to the conclusion that the
defendant insurer successfully established its defense of warranty
breach or concealment of the other insurance and/or violation of
the provision of the policy above-mentioned.
Having reached the conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss
the other defenses.
Wherefore, the judgment under review will be revoked, and the
defendant insurer (herein petitioner) acquitted from all the liability
under the policy. Costs against respondent. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
19
G.R. No. L-1669
PAZ
LOPEZ
DE
CONSTANTINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ASIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
xxx
AGUSTINA
PERALTA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ASIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
xxx
xxx
Mariano
Lozada
for
appellant
Constantino.
Cachero
and
Madarang
for
appellant
Peralta.
Dewitt,
Perkins
and
Ponce
Enrile
for
appellee.
Ramirez and Ortigas and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici
curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
20
This POLICY OF INSURANCE is issued in consideration of the written
and printed application herefor, a copy of which is attached hereto
and is hereby made apart hereof, and of the payment in advance
during the life time and good health of the Insured of the annual
premium of Two hundred and 43/100 pesos Philippine currency and
of the payment of a like amount upon each first day of August
hereafter during the term of Twenty years or until the prior death of
either of the Insured. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
xxx
xxx
21
conserved5 and should not lightly be thrown out, still we do not
hesitate to enforce the agreement of the parties.
Forfeitures of insurance policies are not favored, but courts cannot
for that reason alone refuse to enforce an insurance contract
according to its meaning. (45 C.J.S., p. 150.)
Nevertheless, it is contended for plaintiff that inasmuch as the nonpayment of premium was the consequence of war, it should be
excused and should not cause the forfeiture of the policy.
Professor Vance of Yale, in his standard treatise on Insurance, says
that in determining the effect of non-payment of premiums
occasioned by war, the American cases may be divided into three
groups, according as they support the so-called Connecticut Rule,
the New York Rule, or the United States Rule.
The first holds the view that "there are two elements in the
consideration for which the annual premium is paid First, the
mere protection for the year, and second, the privilege of renewing
the contract for each succeeding year by paying the premium for
that year at the time agreed upon. According to this view of the
contract, the payment of premiums is a condition precedent, the
non-performance would be illegal necessarily defeats the right to
renew the contract."
The second rule, apparently followed by the greater number of
decisions, hold that "war between states in which the parties reside
merely suspends the contracts of the life insurance, and that, upon
tender of all premiums due by the insured or his representatives
after the war has terminated, the contract revives and becomes
fully operative."
The United States rule declares that the contract is not merely
suspended, but is abrogated by reason of non-payments is
peculiarly of the essence of the contract. It additionally holds that it
would be unjust to allow the insurer to retain the reserve value of
the policy, which is the excess of the premiums paid over the actual
risk carried during the years when the policy had been in force. This
rule was announced in the well-known Statham 6case which, in the
opinion of Professor Vance, is the correct rule.7
The appellants and some amici curiae contend that the New York
rule should be applied here. The appellee and other amici
curiae contend that the United States doctrine is the orthodox view.
We have read and re-read the principal cases upholding the
different theories. Besides the respect and high regard we have
always entertained for decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, we cannot resist the conviction that the reasons expounded
in its decision of the Statham case are logically and judicially
sound. Like the instant case, the policy involved in the Statham
decision specifies that non-payment on time shall cause the policy
to cease and determine. Reasoning out that punctual payments
were essential, the court said:
. . . it must be conceded that promptness of payment is essential in
the business of life insurance. All the calculations of the insurance
company are based on the hypothesis of prompt payments. They
not only calculate on the receipt of the premiums when due, but on
compounding interest upon them. It is on this basis that they are
enabled to offer assurance at the favorable rates they do. Forfeiture
for non-payment is an necessary means of protecting themselves
from embarrassment. Unless it were enforceable, the business
would be thrown into confusion. It is like the forfeiture of shares in
mining enterprises, and all other hazardous undertakings. There
must be power to cut-off unprofitable members, or the success of
the whole scheme is endangered. The insured parties are
associates in a great scheme. This associated relation exists
whether the company be a mutual one or not. Each is interested in
the engagements of all; for out of the co-existence of many risks
arises the law of average, which underlies the whole business. An
essential feature of this scheme is the mathematical calculations
referred to, on which the premiums and amounts assured are
based. And these calculations, again, are based on the assumption
of average mortality, and of prompt payments and compound
interest thereon. Delinquency cannot be tolerated nor redeemed,
except at the option of the company. This has always been the
understanding and the practice in this department of business.
Some companies, it is true, accord a grace of thirty days, or other
fixed period, within which the premium in arrear may be paid, on
certain conditions of continued good health, etc. But this is a
matter of stipulation, or of discretion, on the part of the particular
company. When no stipulation exists, it is the general
22
understanding that time is material, and that the forfeiture is
absolute if the premium be not paid. The extraordinary and even
desperate efforts sometimes made, when an insured person is in
extremes to meet a premium coming due, demonstrates the
common view of this matter.
The case, therefore, is one in which time is material and of
essence and of the essence of the contract. Non-payment at
day involves absolute forfeiture if such be the terms of
contract, as is the case here. Courts cannot with safety vary
stipulation of the parties by introducing equities for the relief of
insured against their own negligence.
the
the
the
the
the
23
premium, they did not constitute a debt. (Noblevs. Southern States
M.D. Ins. Co., 157 Ky., 46; 162 S.W., 528.) (Emphasis ours.)
For all the foregoing, the lower court's decision absolving the
defendant from all liability on the policies in question, is hereby
affirmed, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Montemayor, Tuason, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-1669
FACTS:
The answer to this is that as there are (in the example) one million
policy-holders, the "losses" to be considered will not be the death
of one but the death of ten thousand, since the proportion of 1 to
100 should be maintained. And certainly such losses for 10,000
deaths will not be "relatively small."
After perusing the Insurance Act, we are firmly persuaded that the
non-payment of premiums is such a vital defense of insurance
companies that since the very beginning, said Act no. 2427
expressly preserved it, by providing that after the policy shall have
been in force for two years, it shall become incontestable (i.e. the
insurer shall have no defense) except for fraud, non-payment of
premiums, and military or naval service in time of war (sec. 184 [b],
Insurance Act). And when Congress recently amended this section
(Rep. Act No. 171), the defense of fraud was eliminated, while the
defense of nonpayment of premiums was preserved. Thus the
fundamental character of the undertaking to pay premiums and the
Case 1:
Case 2:
24
Connecticut Rule
25
actual risk carried during the years when the
policy had been in force
26
[G.R.
No.
L-2668.
September
30,
1950.]
Guevara
and
Jose
G.
Flores,
for Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
27
28
announced in the well- known Statham 6 case which, in the opinion
of
Professor
Vance,
is
the
correct
rule.
7
"The appellants and some amici curi contend that the New York
rule should be applied here. The appellee and other amici curi
contend that the United States doctrine is the orthodox view.
"We have read and re-read the principal cases upholding the
different theories. Besides the respect and high regard we have
always entertained for decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, we cannot resist the conviction that the reasons expounded
in its decision of the Statham case are logically and juridically
sound. Like the instant case, the policies involved in the Statham
decision specifies that non-payment on time shall cause the policy
to cease and determine. Reasoning out that punctual payments
were essential, the court said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It must be conceded that promptness of payment is essential in
the business of life insurance. All the calculations of the insurance
company are based on the hypothesis of prompt payments. They
not only calculate on the receipt of the premiums when due, but on
compounding interest upon them. It is on this basis that they are
enabled to offer assurance at the favorable rates they do. Forfeiture
for non-payment is a necessary means of protecting themselves
from embarrassment. Unless it were enforceable, the business
would be thrown into utter confusion. It is like the forfeiture of
shares in mining enterprises, and all other hazardous undertakings.
There must be power to cut off unprofitable members, or the
success of the whole scheme is endangered. The insured parties
are associates in a great scheme. This associated relation exists
whether the company be a mutual one or not. Each is interested in
the engagements of all; for out of the co-existence of many risks
arises the law of average, which underlies the whole business. An
essential feature of this scheme is the mathematical calculations
referred to, on which the premiums and amounts assured are
based. And those calculations, again, are based on the assumption
of average mortality, and of prompt payments and compound
interest thereon. Delinquency cannot be tolerated nor redeemed,
except at the option of the company. This has always been the
understanding and the practice in this department of business.
Some companies, it is true, accord a grace of thirty days, or other
29
new policies cheaper than to pay arrearage on the old. To enforce a
revival of the bad cases, whilst the company necessarily lose the
cases which are desirable, would be manifestly unjust. An insured
person, as before stated, does not stand isolated and alone. His
case is connected with and co-related to the cases of all others
insured by the same company. The nature of the business, as a
whole, must be looked at to understand the general equities of the
parties.
"The above consideration certainly lend themselves to the approval
of fair-minded man. Moreover, if, as alleged, the consequences of
war should not prejudice the insured, neither should they bear
down
on
the
insurer.
"Urging adoption of the New York Theory, counsel for plaintiff point
out that the obligation of the insured to pay premiums was excused
during the war owing to impossibility of performance, and that
consequently no unfavorable consequences should follow from such
failure.
"The appellee answers, quite plausibly, that the periodic payment
of premiums, at least those after the first, is not an obligation of the
insured, so much so that it is not a debt enforceable by action of
the
insurer.
Under a Oklahoma decision, the annual premium due is not a debt.
It is not an obligation upon which the insurer can maintain an
action against insured; nor is its settlement governed by the strict
rule controling payment of debts. So, the court in a Kentucky case
declares, in the opinion, that it is not a debt. . . . The fact that it is
payable annually or semi-annually, or at any other stipulated time,
does not of itself constitute a promise to pay, either express or
implied. In case of non-payment, the policy is forfeited, except so
far as the forfeiture may be saved by agreement, by waiver,
estoppel, or by statute. The payment of the premium is entirely
optional, while a debt may be enforced at law, and the fact that the
premium is agreed to be paid is without force, in the absence of an
unqualified and absolute agreement to pay a specified sum at some
certain time. In the ordinary policy there is no promise to pay, but it
is optional with the insured whether he will continue the policy or
forfeit it. (3 Couch, Cyc. on Insurance, Sec. 623, p. 1996.)
30
preserved it, by providing that after the policy shall have been in
force for two years, it shall become incontestable (i. e., the insurer
shall have no defense) except for fraud, non-payment of premiums,
and military or naval service in time for war (sec. 184[b], Insurance
Act). And when Congress recently amended this section (Rep. Act
171), the defense of fraud was eliminated, while the defense of
non-payment of premiums was preserved. Thus the fundamental
character of the undertaking to pay premiums and the high
importance of the defense of non-payment thereof, was specifically
recognized.
"In keeping with such legislative policy, we feel no hesitation to
adopt the United States Rule, which is in effect a variation of the
Connecticut rule for the sake of equity. In this connection, it
appears that the first policy had no reserve value, and that the
equitable values of the second had been practically returned to the
insured in the form of loan and advance for premium."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
We see nothing in the present case which would justify a departure
from the ruling laid down in the above decision, according to which
the nonpayment of premiums does not merely suspend but puts an
end to an insurance contract, "since the time of the payment is
peculiarly of the essence of the contract." The rule is not affected
by the fact that the nonpayment is due to war or that the insured
has not been negligent. There is, therefore, nothing to the
argument that in this case plaintiffs failure to make premium
payments after January 14, 1942, should be excused as being due,
not to its own negligence, but to defendants omission to make
arrangements for the receipt of premiums that were to fall due
during the period of enemy occupation. And, besides, as the trial
court says in its decision,." . . It is unreasonable to expect the
defendant to send notice of its closing to the thousands of its
insured in the Philippines immediately before and after the fall of
Manila, because then such a step would be impracticable owing to
the confusion and disorder occasioned by the war. Besides, even if
such a notice were actually sent, defendant could not have
received payments of insurance premiums because its offices were
closed and its American officials interned upon orders of the
Japanese
authorities."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
FIDELA
SALES
DE
GONZAGA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CROWN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
Beltran
and
Anuat
Nicodemus L. Dasig for appellee.
for
appellant.
TUASON, J.:
This is one more case wherein the question of the effects of war in
a pre-war insurance contracts is presented.
Reduced to their absolute essentials, the facts are that, on
September 26, 1939 the Crown Life Insurance Co., whose home
office is in Toronto, Canada, issued to Ramon Gonzaga through its
branch office in Manila a 20-year endowment policy for P15,000.
The insured paid in due time the agreed yearly premium, which was
P591.00, for three consecutive years, the last payment having been
effected on September 6, 1941. On account of the outbreak of war,
no premiums were paid after that date, although the policy was
continued in force up to June 12, 1943, under its automatic
premium loan clause.
Ramon Gonzaga died on June 27, 1945 from an accident.
Unsuccessful in her attempt to collect the amount of the policy his
widow and the beneficiary named in the policy began this suit on
December 18, 1947. The defendant set up the defense that the
policy had lapsed by non-payment of the stipulated premiums of
the stipulated dates. And the trial court in a carefully written
decision ruled against the plaintiff.
Since this action was decided by the court below, several cases
analogous to this one in its main characteristics have come up
before this Court. (Paz Lopez de Constantino vs. Asia Life Insurance
Company,1 G.R. No. L-1669; Agustina Peralta vs. Asia Life Insurance
Company,2 G.R. No. L-1670; James McGuire vs. The Manufacturers
Life Insurance Co;3 G. R. No. L-3581; National Leather Co; Inc. vs.
The United States Life Insurance Co., 4 G.R. No. L-2668; Victoria
Hidalgo Vda. de Carrero, et al., vs. The Manufacturers Life
31
Insurance Co.,5 G. R. No. L-3032; and West Coast Life Insurance Co.
vs. Patricio H. Gubagaras,6 G. R. No. L-2810) In Paz Lopez de
Constantinos. Asia Life Insurance Company, G. R. No. L-1669, the
leading case, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Bengzon,
adopted this doctrine:
The case, therefore, is one in which time is material and of the
essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves absolute
forfeiture is such be the terms of the contract, as is the case here.
Courts cannot with safety vary the stipulation of the parties by
introducing equities for the relief of the insured against their own
negligence.
The aforecited decisions are decisive of the proposition that nonpayment of premiums by reason of war puts an end to the contract.
There is, however, one aspect of the case at bar not raised before
and upon which the plaintiff rest her case in the alternative.
In its answer, the defendant alleged that "through its General
Agents, Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, Inc., it had its offices open in
the city of Manila during the Japanese occupation in the
Philippines." Taking advantage of this allegation, and ignoring her
own in her complaint that "for the whole duration of the (war)
and from thence to sometime thereafter, that is, in October, 1945, .
. . defendant closed its business in the Islands, and had absolutely
no agency or representative here to represent it, with authority to
collect premiums from the Insured." the plaintiff asserts that it
was the defendant's duty to notify her husbands of its postal
address during the war, and that its failure to do so excused
deliquency in the payment of the premiums. The plaintiff cites the
provision of the contract which states that "all premiums
subsequent to the first year are payable to the Company's
authorized cashier at the place stated in the fourth page hereof, or
at such other place instead thereof as may be designated from time
to time by noticed to the Company mailed to the Insured at his last
known post office address."
The evidence on this feature of the case reveals that, the defendant
being an enemy corporation, its offices, which were housed at the
Chaco building when the hostilities broke out, were ordered closed
by the Japanese Military authorities in January 1942, and the
officers of Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, Inc., defendants general
32
acquaintance; and so were some of the defendant's Filipino
employees who handled the insurance business of Hanson, Orth
and Stevenson during the occupation. And Gonzaga admittedly
come to Manila on a visit every now and then, and could have,
without difficulty, contacted any of those people.
For another thing, the policy carried a clause providing for its
reinstatement under certain conditions within three years from the
date of lapse on application of the insured. The present policy
lapsed on June 12, 1943, the Company's Manila branch was
reopened on May 1, 1945 and resumed regular business through
the same general agents at the Wilson Building on Juan Luna
Street, Manila and Ramon Gonzaga died on June 27, 1945. It is
undoubted that Gonzaga knew all that. It is not denied that he was
an employee in the United States Navy, that the united States Navy
had an office in the same Wilson Building, and that he came at
least twice a month to that office for his salary.
Both in law and in reason, the action was properly dismissed and
the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Laws
Applicable:
FACTS:
33
G.R. No. L-22684
defendant-appellant.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal upon a question of law taken by Woodworks, Inc. from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
50710 "ordering the defendant, Woodworks, Inc. to pay to the
plaintiff, Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance, Inc., the sum of
P3,522.09 with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, and
costs of the suit."
Appellee Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
commenced this action in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover
from appellant Woodworks, Inc. the sum of P3,522.09, representing
the unpaid balance of the premiums on a fire insurance policy
issued by appellee in favor of appellant for a term of one year from
April 1, 1960 to April 1, 1961. From an adverse decision of said
court, Woodworks, Inc. appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civil Case No. 50710) where the parties submitted the
following stipulation of facts, on the basis of which the appealed
decision was rendered:
That plaintiff and defendant are both corporations duly organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines;
That on April 1, 1960, plaintiff issued to defendant Fire Policy No.
9652 for the amount of P300,000.00, under the terms and
conditions therein set forth in said policy a copy of which is hereto
attached and made a part hereof as Annex "A";
That the premiums of said policy as stated in Annex "A" amounted
to P6,051.95; the margin fee pursuant to the adopted plan as an
implementation of Republic Act 2609 amounted to P363.72, copy of
said adopted plan is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made a part
hereof, the documentary stamps attached to the policy was P96.42;
claims
that
the
court a
I. The lower court erred in stating that in fire insurance policies the
risk attached upon the issuance and delivery of the policy to the
insured.
II. The lower court erred in deciding that in a perfected contract of
insurance non-payment of premium does not cancel the policy.
III. The lower court erred in deciding that the premium in the policy
was still collectible when the complaint was filed.
IV. The lower court erred in deciding that a partial payment of the
premium made the policy effective during the whole period of the
policy.
It is clear from the foregoing that on April 1, 1960 Fire Insurance
Policy No. 9652 was issued by appellee and delivered to appellant,
and that on September 22 of the same year, the latter paid to the
former the sum of P3,000.00 on account of the total premium of
P6,051.95 due thereon. There is, consequently, no doubt at all that,
as between the insurer and the insured, there was not only a
perfected contract of insurance but a partially performed one as far
as the payment of the agreed premium was concerned. Thereafter
the obligation of the insurer to pay the insured the amount for
which the policy was issued in case the conditions therefor had
been complied with, arose and became binding upon it, while the
obligation of the insured to pay the remainder of the total amount
of the premium due became demandable.
We can not agree with appellant's theory that non-payment by it of
the premium due, produced the cancellation of the contract of
insurance. Such theory would place exclusively in the hands of one
of the contracting parties the right to decide whether the contract
should stand or not. Rather the correct view would seem to be this:
as the contract had become perfected, the parties could demand
from each other the performance of whatever obligations they had
34
assumed. In the case of the insurer, it is obvious that it had the
right to demand from the insured the completion of the payment of
the premium due or sue for the rescission of the contract. As it
chose to demand specific performance of the insured's obligation to
pay the balance of the premium, the latter's duty to pay is indeed
indubitable.
Having thus resolved that the fourth and last assignment of error
submitted in appellant's brief is without merit, the first three
assignments of error must likewise be overruled as lacking in merit.
Wherefore, the appealed decision being in accordance with law and
the evidence, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
35
G.R. No. L-25317 August 6, 1979
PHILIPPINE
PHOENIX
SURETY
COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WOODWORKS, INC., defendant-appellant.
&
INSURANCE
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution of October 4, 1965 on a pure question of law and
"because the issues raised are practically the same as those in CAG.R. No. 32017-R" between the same parties, which case had been
forwarded to us on April 1, 1964. The latter case, "Philippine
Phoenix Surety & Insurance Inc. vs. Woodworks, Inc.," docketed in
this Court as L-22684, was decided on August 31, 1967 and has
been reported in 20 SCRA 1270.
36
is the "premium". "The premium must be paid at the time and in
the way and manner specified in the policy and, if not so paid, the
policy will lapse and be forfeited by its own terms." 6
The provisions on premium in the subject Policy read:
THIS POLICY OF INSURANCE WITNESSETH, THAT in consideration of
MESSRS. WOODWORKS, INC. hereinafter called the
Insured, paying to the
PHILIPPINE
PHOENIX
SURETY
AND
INSURANCE, INC., hereinafter called the Company, the sum of
PESOS NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX ONLY the
Premium for the first period hereinafter mentioned. ...
xxx xxx xxx
THE COMPANY HEREBY AGREES with the Insured ... that if the
Property above described, or any part thereof, shall be destroyed or
damaged by Fire or Lightning after payment of Premium, at any
time between 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the TWENTY FIRST
day of JULY One Thousand Nine Hundred and SIXTY and 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of the TWENTY FIRST day of JULY One Thousand
Nine Hundred and SIXTY ONE. ... (Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph "2" of the Policy further contained the following
condition:
2. No payment in respect of any premium shall be deemed to be
payment to the Company unless a printed form of receipt for the
same signed by an Official or duly-appointed Agent of the Company
shall have been given to the Insured.
Paragraph "10" of the Policy also provided:
10. This insurance may be terminated at any time at the request of
the Insured, in which case the Company will retain the customary
short period rate for the time the policy has been in force. This
insurance may also at any time be terminated at the option of the
Company, on notice to that effect being given to the Insured, in
which case the Company shall be liable to repay on demand a
ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term from the
date of the cancelment.
Clearly, the Policy provides for pre-payment of premium.
Accordingly; "when the policy is tendered the insured must pay the
37
essential part of the contract. This is true, for instance, in the case
of life, health and accident, fire and hail insurance policies. 12
In fact, if the peril insured against had occurred, plaintiff, as insurer,
would have had a valid defense against recovery under the Policy it
had issued. Explicit in the Policy itself is plaintiff's agreement to
indemnify defendant for loss by fire only "after payment of
premium," supra. Compliance by the insured with the terms of the
contract is a condition precedent to the right of recovery.
The burden is on an insured to keep a policy in force by the
payment of premiums, rather than on the insurer to exert every
effort to prevent the insured from allowing a policy to elapse
through a failure to make premium payments. The continuance of
the insurer's obligation is conditional upon the payment of
premiums, so that no recovery can be had upon a lapsed policy, the
contractual relation between the parties having ceased. 13
Moreover, "an insurer cannot treat a contract as valid for the
purpose of collecting premiums and invalid for the purpose of
indemnity." 14
The foregoing findings are buttressed by section 77 of the
Insurance Code (Presidential Decree No. 612, promulgated on
December 18, 1974), which now provides that no contract of
insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding
unless and until the premium thereof has been paid,
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and
plaintiff's complaint hereby dismissed.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.
FACTS:
Upon WOODWORKSs application, PHIL. PHOENIX issued in its favor
a fire insurance policy whereby PHIL. PHOENIX insured
WOODWORKS building, machinery and equipment for a term of
one year from against loss by fire. The premium and other charges
amounted to P10,593.36.
It is undisputed that WOODWORKS did not pay the premium
stipulated in the Policy when it was issued nor at any time
thereafter.
Before the expiration of the one-year term, PHIL. PHOENIX notified
WOODWORKS of the cancellation of the Policy allegedly upon
request of WOODWORKS. The latter has denied having made such
a request. PHIL. PHOENIX credited WOODWORKS with the amount
of P3,110.25 for the unexpired period of 94 days, and claimed the
balance of P7,483.11 representing , earned premium. Thereafter,
PHIL. PHOENIX demanded in writing for the payment of said
amount.
WOODWORKS disclaimed any liability contending, in essence, that
it need not pay premium because the Insurer did not stand liable
for any indemnity during the period the premiums were not paid.
For this reason, PHIL. PHOENIX commenced action in the CFI of
Manila. Judgment was rendered in PHIL. PHOENIXs favor . From this
adverse Decision, WOODWORKS appealed to the Court of Appeals
which certified the case to SC on a question of law.
ISSUE:
May the insurer collect the earned premiums?
HELD:
NO. The Courts findings are buttressed by Section 77 of the
Insurance Code (Presidential Decree No. 612, promulgated on
December 18, 1974), which now provides that no contract of
insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding
unless and until the premium thereof has been paid,
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.
Since the premium had not been paid, the policy must be deemed
to have lapsed.
38
The non-payment of premiums does not merely suspend but put,
an end to an insurance contract, since the time of the payment is
peculiarly of the essence of the contract.
In fact, if the peril insured against had occurred, PHIL. PHOENIX, as
insurer, would have had a valid defense against recovery under the
Policy it had issued. Explicit in the Policy itself is PHIL. PHOENIXs
agreement to indemnify WOODWORKS for loss by fire only after
payment of premium, Compliance by the insured with the terms
of the contract is a condition precedent to the right of recovery.
The burden is on an insured to keep a policy in force by the
payment of premiums, rather than on the insurer to exert every
effort to prevent the insured from allowing a policy to elapse
through a failure to make premium payments. The continuance of
the insurers obligation is conditional upon the payment of
premiums, so that no recovery can be had upon a lapsed policy, the
contractual relation between the parties having ceased.
Moreover, an insurer cannot treat a contract as valid for the
purpose of collecting premiums and invalid for the purpose of
indemnity.
DISPOSITION:
The judgment appealed from was reversed, and PHIL. PHOENIXs
complaint dismissed.
39
G.R. No. L-22375 July 18, 1975
THE CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
PLASTIC
ERA
CO.,
INC.,
AND
COURT
OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa and Lozada for petitioner.
K.V. Faylona for Private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
47934 entitled "Plastic Era Manufacturing Co., Inc. versus The
Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc."
On December 17, 1960, petitioner Capital Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Capital Insurance) delivered to the
respondent Plastic Era Manufacturing Co., Inc., (hereinafter referred
to as Plastic Era) its open Fire Policy No. 22760 1 wherein the former
undertook to insure the latter's building, equipments, raw
materials, products and accessories located at Sheridan Street,
Mandaluyong, Rizal. The policy expressly provides that if the
property insured would be destroyed or damaged by fire after the
payment of the premiums, at anytime between the 15th day of
December 1960 and one o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th day of
December 1961, the insurance company shall make good all such
loss or damage in an amount not exceeding P100,000.00. When the
policy was delivered, Plastic Era failed to pay the corresponding
insurance premium. However, through its duly authorized
representative, it executed the following acknowledgment receipt:
This acknowledged receipt of Fire Policy) NO. 22760 Premium
x
x
x
x
x)
(I
promise
to
pay)
(P2,220.00)
(has
been
paid)
THIRTY
DAYS
AFTER
on
effective
date
--------------------(Date)
On January 8, 1961, in partial payment of the insurance premium,
Plastic Era delivered to Capital Insurance, a check 2 for the amount
40
Assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals petitioner assigns the
following errors, to wit:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SENTENCING PETITIONER TO
PAY PLASTIC ERA THE SUM OF P88,325.63 PLUS INTEREST, AND
COST OF SUIT, ALTHOUGH PLASTIC ERA NEVER PAID PETITIONER
THE INSURANCE PREMIUM OF P2,220.88.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
SHOULD HAVE INSTITUTED AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION OF THE
INSURANCE CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN IT AND PLASTIC
ERA BEFORE PETITIONER COULD BE RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY
UNDER ITS FIRE INSURANCE POLICY.
3. WE HAVE SHOWN ABOVE THAT PLASTIC ERA'S ACTION WAS
UNWARRANTED AND THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ABSOLVED FROM THE COMPLAINT, AND CONSEQUENTLY, THE
LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED PETITIONER A
REASONABLE SUM AND AS ATTORNEY'S FEES P25,000.00.
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not a contract of
insurance has been duly perfected between the petitioner, Capital
Insurance, and respondent Plastic Era. Necessarily, the issue calls
for a correct interpretation of the insurance policy which states:
This Policy of Insurance Witnesseth That in consideration
of PLASTIC ERA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. hereinafter called
the Insured, paying to the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.,
hereinafter called the Company, the sum of PESOS TWO THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT the premium for the first period
hereinafter mentioned, for insuring against Loss or Damage by only
Fire or Lightning, as hereinafter appears, the Property hereinafter
described and contained, or described herein and not elsewhere, in
the several sums following namely: PESOS ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND ONLY, PHILIPPINE CURRENCY; ... THE COMPANY HEREBY
AGREES with the Insured but subject to the terms and conditions
endorsed or otherwise expressed hereon, which are to be taken as
part of this Policy), that if the Property described, or any part
thereof, shall be destroyed or damaged by Fire or Lightning after
payment of the Premiums, at anytime between the 15th day of
December One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty and 1 'clock in
the afternoon of the 15th day of December One Thousand Nine
Hundred and Sixty-One of the last day of any subsequent period in
41
In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation
shall be held in abeyance.
any way operate as a forfeiture of its rights under the policy, there
being no express stipulation therein to that effect.
42
Where the check is held for an unreasonable time before presenting
it for payment, the insurer may be held estopped from claiming a
forfeiture if the check is dishonored. 12
CA: affirmed
But precisely in this case, Plastic Era has complied with its
obligation to pay the insurance premium and therefore Capital
Insurance is obliged to make good its undertaking to Plastic Era.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed
from, We hereby affirm the same in toto. Costs against the
petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid insurance contract because there was
an extention of credit despite failing to encash the check payment
SO ORDERED.
Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
G.R.No.
L-22375
July
18,
1975
Lessons Applicable: Estoppel and credit extension (Insurance)
Laws
Applicable: Article
1249
of
the
New
Civil
Code
FACTS:
43
44
G.R. No. L-28501 September 30, 1982
PEDRO
ARCE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., defendantappellant.
INSURED cashed the check but then sued the COMPANY on the
policy.
The court a quo held that since the COMPANY could have
demanded payment of the premium, mutuality of obligation
requires that it should also be liable on its policy. The court a
quo also held that the INSURED was not bound by the signature of
Evelina on the check voucher because he did not authorize her to
sign the waiver.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
The trial court cited Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. vs.
Delgado, L-18567, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 177, to support its first
proposition. In that case, this Court said:
On the other hand, the preponderance of the evidence shows that
appellee issued fire insurance policy No. C-1137 in favor of
appellants covering a certain property belonging to the latter
located in Cebu City; that appellants failed to pay a balance of
P583.95 on the premium charges due, notwithstanding demands
made upon them. As with the issuance of the policy to appellants
the same became effective and binding upon the contracting
parties, the latter can not avoid the obligation of paying the
premiums agreed upon. In fact, appellant Mario Delgado, in a letter
marked in the record as Exhibit G, expressly admitted his unpaid
account for premiums and asked for an extension of time to pay the
same. It is clear from the foregoing that appellants are under
obligation to pay the amount sued upon. (At p. 180.)
Upon the other hand, Sec. 72 of the Insurance Act, as amended by
R.A. No. 3540 reads:
SEC. 72. An insurer is entitled to payment of premium as soon as
the thing insured is exposed to the perils insured against, unless
there is clear agreement to grant credit extension for the premium
due. No policy issued by an insurance company is valid and binding
unless and until the premium thereof has been paid " (Italics
supplied.) (p. 11, Appellant's Brief.)
Morever, the parties in this case had stipulated:
IT IS HEREBY DECLARED AND AGREED that not. withstanding
anything to the contrary contained in the within policy, this
45
insurance will be deemed valid and binding upon the Company only
when the premium and documentary stamps therefor have actually
been paid in full and duly acknowledged in an official receipt signed
by an authorized official/representative of the Company, " (pp. 4546, Record on Appeal.)
It is obvious from both the Insurance Act, as amended, and the
stipulation of the parties that time is of the essence in respect of
the payment of the insurance premium so that if it is not paid the
contract does not take effect unless there is still another stipulation
to the contrary. In the instant case, the INSURED was given a grace
period to pay the premium but the period having expired with no
payment made, he cannot insist that the COMPANY is nonetheless
obligated to him.
It is to be noted that Delgado was decided in the light of the
Insurance Act before Sec. 72 was amended by the addition of the
underscored portion, supra, Prior to the amendment, an insurance
contract was effective even if the premium had not been paid so
that an insurer was obligated to pay indemnity in case of loss and
correlatively he had also the right to sue for payment of the
premium. But the amendment to Sec. 72 has radically changed the
legal regime in that unless the premium is paid there is no
insurance.
With the foregoing, it is not necessary to dwell at length on the trial
court's second proposition that the INSURED had not authorized his
daughter Evelina to make a waiver because the INSURED had
nothing to waive; his policy ceased to have effect when he failed to
pay the premium.
We commiserate with the INSURED. We are wen aware that many
insurance companies have fallen into the condemnable practice of
collecting premiums promptly but resort to all kinds of excuses to
deny or delay payment of just claims. Unhappily the instant case is
one where the insurer has the law on its side.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is reversed; the
appellee's complaint is dismissed. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
46
G.R. No. L-67835 October 12, 1987
MALAYAN
INSURANCE
CO.,
INC.
(MICO), petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIA CRUZ ARNALDO, in her capacity as the
INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER,
and
CORONACION
PINCA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
When a person's house is razed, the fire usually burns down the
efforts of a lifetime and forecloses hope for the suddenly somber
future. The vanished abode becomes a charred and painful
memory. Where once stood a home, there is now, in the sighing
wisps of smoke, only a gray desolation. The dying embers leave
ashes in the heart.
For peace of mind and as a hedge against possible loss, many
people now secure fire insurance. This is an aleatory contract. By
such insurance, the insured in effect wagers that his house will be
burned, with the insurer assuring him against the loss, for a fee. If
the house does burn, the insured, while losing his house, wins the
wagers. The prize is the recompense to be given by the insurer to
make good the loss the insured has sustained.
It would be a pity then if, having lost his house, the insured were
also to lose the payment he expects to recover for such loss.
Sometimes it is his fault that he cannot collect, as where there is a
defect imputable to him in the insurance contract. Conversely, the
reason may be an unjust refusal of the insurer to acknowledge a
just obligation, as has happened many times.
In the instant case the private respondent has been sustained by
the Insurance Commission in her claim for compensation for her
burned property. The petitioner is now before us to dispute the
decision, 1 on the ground that there was no valid insurance
contract at the time of the loss.
The chronology of the relevant antecedent facts is as follows:
On June 7, 1981, the petitioner (hereinafter called (MICO) issued to
the private respondent, Coronacion Pinca, Fire Insurance Policy No.
this
payment
to
47
The pivotal date is the date the notice of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration was received by MICO.
MICO avers this was June 18, 1982, and offers in evidence its Annex
"B," 12 which is a copy of the Order of June 14, 1982, with a signed
rubber-stamped notation on the upper left-hand corner that it was
received on June 18, 1982, by its legal department. It does not
indicate from whom. At the bottom, significantly, there is another
signature under which are the ciphers "6-13-82," for which no
explanation has been given.
Against this document, the private respodent points in her Annex
"1," 13 the authenticated copy of the same Order with a rubberstamped notation at the bottom thereof indicating that it was
received for the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. by J. Gotladera on "613-82." The signature may or may not habe been written by the
same person who signed at the bottom of the petitioner's Annex
"B."
Between the two dates, the court chooses to believe June 13, 1982,
not only because the numbers "6-13-82" appear on both annexes
but also because it is the date authenticated by the administrative
division of the Insurance Commission. Annex "B" is at worst selfserving; at best, it might only indicate that it was received on June
18, 1982, by the legal department of MICO, after it had been
received earlier by some other of its personnel on June 13, 1982.
Whatever the reason for the delay in transmitting it to the legal
department need not detain us here.
Under Section 416 of the Insurance Code, the period for appeal is
thirty days from notice of the decision of the Insurance
Commission. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on
April 25, 1981, or fifteen days such notice, and the reglementary
period began to run again after June 13, 1981, date of its receipt of
notice of the denial of the said motion for reconsideration. As the
herein petition was filed on July 2, 1981, or nineteen days later,
there is no question that it is tardy by four days.
Counted from June 13, the fifteen-day period prescribed under Rule
45, assuming it is applicable, would end on June 28, 1982, or
also four days from July 2, when the petition was filed.
If it was filed under B.P. 129, then, considering that the motion for
reconsideration was filed on the fifteenth day after MICO received
notice of the decision, only one more day would have remained for
it to appeal, to wit, June 14, 1982. That would make the
petition eighteen days late by July 2.
Indeed, even if the applicable law were still R.A. 5434, governing
appeals from administrative bodies, the petition would still be tardy.
The law provides for a fixed period of ten days from notice of the
denial of a seasonable motion for reconsideration within which to
appeal from the decision. Accordingly, that ten-day period, counted
from June 13, 1982, would have ended on June 23, 1982, making
the petition filed on July 2, 1982, nine dayslate.
Whichever law is applicable, therefore, the petition can and should
be dismissed for late filing.
On the merits, it must also fail. MICO's arguments that there was no
payment of premium and that the policy had been cancelled before
the occurence of the loss are not acceptable. Its contention that the
claim was allowed without proof of loss is also untenable.
The petitioner relies heavily on Section 77 of the Insurance Code
providing that:
SEC. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon
as the thing is exposed to the peril insured against.
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or
contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and
binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except
in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace
period provision applies.
The above provision is not applicable because payment of the
premium was in fact eventually made in this case. Notably, the
premium invoice issued to Pinca at the time of the delivery of the
policy on June 7, 1981 was stamped "Payment Received" of the
amoung of P930.60 on "12-24-81" by Domingo Adora. 14 This is
important because it suggests an understanding between MICO and
the insured that such payment could be made later, as agent Adora
had assured Pinca. In any event, it is not denied that this payment
was actually made by Pinca to Adora, who remitted the same to
MICO.
48
The payment was made on December 24, 1981, and the fire
occured on January 18, 1982. One wonders: suppose the payment
had been made and accepted in, say, August 1981, would the
commencement date of the policy have been changed to the date
of the payment, or would the payment have retroacted to July 22,
1981? If MICO accepted the payment in December 1981 and the
insured property had not been burned, would that policy not have
expired just the same on July 22, 1982, pursuant to its original
terms, and not on December 24, 1982?
It would seem from MICO's own theory, that the policy would have
become effective only upon payment, if accepted and so would
have been valid only from December 24, 1981m but only up to July
22, 1981, according to the original terms. In others words, the
policy would have run for only eight months although the premium
paid was for one whole year.
It is not disputed that the preium was actually paid by Pinca to
Adora on December 24, 1981, who received it on behalf of MICO, to
which it was remitted on January 15, 1982. What is questioned is
the validity of Pinca's payment and of Adora's authority to receive
it.
MICO's acknowledgment of Adora as its agent defeats its
contention that he was not authorized to receive the premium
payment on its behalf. It is clearly provided in Section 306 of the
Insurance Code that:
SEC. 306. xxx xxx xxx
Any insurance company which delivers to an insurance agant or
insurance broker a policy or contract of insurance shall be demmed
to have authorized such agent or broker to receive on its behalf
payment of any premium which is due on such policy or contract of
insurance at the time of its issuance or delivery or which becomes
due thereon.
And it is a well-known principle under the law of agency that:
Payment to an agent having authority to receive or collect payment
is equivalent to payment to the principal himself; such payment is
complete when the money delivered is into the agent's hands and
is a discharge of the indebtedness owing to the principal. 15
49
(f) a determination by the Commissioner that the continuation of
the policy would violate or would place the insurer in violation of
this Code.
As for the method of cancellation, Section 65 provides as follows:
SEC. 65. All notices of cancellation mentioned in the preceding
section shall be in writing, mailed or delivered to the named insured
at the address shown in the policy, and shall state (a) which of the
grounds set forth in section sixty-four is relied upon and (b) that,
upon written request of the named insured, the insurer will furnish
the facts on which the cancellation is based.
A valid cancellation must, therefore, require concurrence of the
following conditions:
(1) There must be prior notice of cancellation to the insured; 17
(2) The notice must be based on the occurrence, after the effective
date of the policy, of one or more of the grounds mentioned;18
(3) The notice must be (a) in writing, (b) mailed, or delivered to the
named insured, (c) at the address shown in the policy; 19
(4) It must state (a) which of the grounds mentioned in Section 64
is relied upon and (b) that upon written request of the insured, the
insurer will furnish the facts on which the cancellation is based. 20
MICO's claims it cancelled the policy in question on October 15,
1981, for non-payment of premium. To support this assertion, it
presented one of its employees, who testified that "the original of
the endorsement and credit memo" presumably meaning the
alleged cancellation "were sent the assured by mail through our
mailing section" 21 However, there is no proof that the notice,
assuming it complied with the other requisites mentioned above,
was actually mailed to and received by Pinca. All MICO's offers to
show that the cancellation was communicated to the insured is its
employee's testimony that the said cancellation was sent "by mail
through our mailing section." without more. The petitioner then
says that its "stand is enervated (sic) by the legal presumption of
regularity and due performance of duty." 22(not realizing perhaps
that "enervated" means "debilitated" not "strengthened").
On the other hand, there is the flat denial of Pinca, who says she
never received the claimed cancellation and who, of course, did not
have to prove such denial Considering the strict language of
Section 64 that no insurance policy shall be cancelled except upon
prior notice, it behooved MICO's to make sure that the cancellation
was actually sent to and received by the insured. The presumption
cited is unavailing against the positive duty enjoined by Section 64
upon MICO and the flat denial made by the private respondent that
she had received notice of the claimed cancellation.
It stands to reason that if Pinca had really received the said notice,
she would not have made payment on the original policy on
December 24, 1981. Instead, she would have asked for a new
insurance, effective on that date and until one year later, and so
taken advantage of the extended period. The Court finds that if she
did pay on that date, it was because she honestly believed that the
policy issued on June 7, 1981, was still in effect and she was willing
to make her payment retroact to July 22, 1981, its stipulated
commencement date. After all, agent Adora was very accomodating
and had earlier told her "to call him up any time" she was ready
with her payment on the policy earlier issued. She was obviously
only reciprocating in kind when she paid her premium for the period
beginning July 22, 1981, and not December 24, 1981.
MICO's suggests that Pinca knew the policy had already been
cancelled and that when she paid the premium on December 24,
1981, her purpose was "to renew it." As this could not be done by
the agent alone under the terms of the original policy, the renewal
thereof did not legally bind MICO. which had not ratified it. To
support this argument, MICO's cites the following exchange:
Q: Now, Madam Witness, on December 25th you made the alleged
payment. Now, my question is that, did it not come to your mind
that after the lapse of six (6) months, your policy was cancelled?
A: I have thought of that but the agent told me to call him up at
anytime.
Q: So if you thought that your policy was already intended to revive
cancelled policy?
A: Misleading, Your Honor.
50
Hearing Officer: The testimony of witness is that, she thought of
that.
Q: I will revise the question. Now, Mrs. Witness, you stated that you
thought the policy was cancelled. Now, when you made the
payment of December 24, 1981, your intention was to revive the
policy if it was already cancelled?
23
A close study of the above transcript will show that Pinca meant to
renew the policy if it had really been already cancelled but not if it
was stffl effective. It was all conditional. As it has not been shown
that there was a valid cancellation of the policy, there was
consequently no need to renew it but to pay the premium thereon.
Payment was thus legally made on the original transaction and it
could be, and was, validly received on behalf of the insurer by its
agent Adora. Adora. incidentally, had not been informed of the
cancellation either and saw no reason not to accept the said
payment.
The last point raised by the petitioner should not pose much
difficulty. The valuation fixed in fire insurance policy is conclusive in
case of total loss in the absence of fraud, 24 which is not shown
here. Loss and its amount may be determined on the basis of such
proof as may be offered by the insured, which need not be of such
persuasiveness as is required in judicial proceedings. 25 If, as in this
case, the insured files notice and preliminary proof of loss and the
insurer fails to specify to the former all the defects thereof and
without unnecessary delay, all objections to notice and proof of loss
are deemed waived under Section 90 of the Insurance Code.
The certification 26 issued by the Integrated National Police, Laoang, Samar, as to the extent of Pinca's loss should be considered
sufficient. Notably,MICO submitted no evidence to the contrary nor
did it even question the extent of the loss in its answer before the
Insurance Commission. It is also worth observing that Pinca's
property was not the only building bumed in the fire that razed the
commercial district of Lao-ang, Samar, on January 18, 1982. 27
There is nothing in the Insurance Code that makes the participation
of an adjuster in the assessment of the loss imperative or
FACTS:
51
this
payment
to
MICO appealed
ISSUE: W/N MICO should be liable because its agent Adora was
authorized
to
receive
it
(a)
SEC. 64.
No policy of insurance other than life shall be
cancelled by the insurer except upon prior notice thereof to
the insured, and no notice of cancellation shall be effective
unless it is based on the occurrence, after the effective date
of the policy, of one or more of the following:
non-payment of premium;
(c)
52
(d) discovery of willful, or reckless acts or commissions increasing
the hazard insured against;
(f)
a determination by the Commissioner that the continuation of
the policy would violate or would place the insurer in violation of
this Code.
(1)
SEC. 65.
All notices of cancellation mentioned in the
preceding section shall be in writing, mailed or delivered to
the named insured at the address shown in the policy, and
shall state (a) which of the grounds set forth in section sixtyfour is relied upon and (b) that, upon written request of the
named insured, the insurer will furnish the facts on which
the cancellation is based.
A valid cancellation must, therefore, require concurrence of
the following conditions:
(2)
The notice must be based on the occurrence, after the
effective date of the policy, of one or more of the grounds
mentioned;
53
[G.R. No. 115024. February 7, 1996]
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,
INC.,respondents.
[G.R. No. 117944. February 7, 1996]
RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.
LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early
morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are
succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for
serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiffs version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the
morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was
driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her
restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza
Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with
a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction
of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something
wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there
were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help
if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear
right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that cars
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, put on
her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to
open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her
car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when
she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which
was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from
under defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the
rest
of
the
body.
She
was
brought
to
the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee). She
was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital
confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg
(P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount
of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
and other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of
P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his
way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining,
visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He
testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right
lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when
he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San
Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80
kph, with full bright lights. Temporarily blinded, he instinctively
swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiffs car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning
device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense
that the left rear portion of plaintiffs car was protruding as it was
then at a standstill diagonally on the outer portion of the right lane
towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the
testimony of plaintiffs witness that after being bumped the car of
the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the
sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that
plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the
vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars involved
in the accident, testified that the plaintiffs car was near the
sidewalk; this witness did not remember whether the hazard lights
of plaintiffs car were on, and did not notice if there was an early
warning device; there was a street light at the corner of Aurora
54
Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not mostly dark,
i.e. things can be seen (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after
plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk compartment,
defendants car came approaching very fast ten meters from the
scene; the car was zigzagging. The rear left side of plaintiffs car
was bumped by the front right portion of defendants car; as a
consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved to the right and hit the
parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of
defendants car, which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He
stated that defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could
smell it very well (pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs submissions and
found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court
likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and
severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the
defendants to jointly and severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous
expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of
the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3)
weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a
month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga
restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment; and
(c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in plaintiffs two (2)
beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorneys fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial courts decision, defendants filed an Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in
Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to
show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of
55
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent courts decision by
filing two separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R.
No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages
because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuelas own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the
event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to
be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
allegation that Valenzuelas car was close to the center of the right
lane. We agree that as between Lis self-serving asseverations and
the observations of a witness who did not even know the accident
victim personally and who immediately gave a statement of the
incident similar to his testimony to the investigator immediately
after the incident, the latters testimony deserves greater weight. As
the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the
transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial courts reliance
on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendants assertion that
he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a
motorcycle, his perception of speed is not necessarily impaired. He
was subjected to cross-examination and no attempt was made to
question his competence or the accuracy of his statement that
defendant was driving very fast. This was the same statement he
gave to the police investigator after the incident, as told to a
newspaper report (Exh. P). We see no compelling basis for
disregarding his testimony.
56
who stated that it was raining all the way in an attempt to explain
why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn., Oct. 14,
1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he
arrived at the scene only in response to a telephone call after the
accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no
substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguezs testimony that would
impair the essential integrity of his testimony or reflect on his
honesty. We are compelled to affirm the trial courts acceptance of
the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note
that Lis testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies
leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely
adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which
would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident.
Against Valenzuelas corroborated claims, his allegations were
neither backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances
proven in the course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely
at a speed of 55 kph. when out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiffs car. He alleged
that upon seeing this sudden apparition he put on his brakes to no
avail as the road was slippery.[9]
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Lis
disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The
average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty
applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li.
Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road
conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora
Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing
conditions of the road if he were alert - as every driver should be to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses. Physiological fight or flight[10] mechanisms are at work,
provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.[11] Lis failure to react in a manner
which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been
only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving
at a very fast speed as testified by Rodriquez; and 2) that he was
under the influence of alcohol. [12] Either factor working
independently would have diminished his responsiveness to
roadconditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to
reaching Valenzuelas car, rather than be in a situation forcing him
to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with
approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan
Police immediately after the incident, he said that while driving
along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer
right in front of him, which was plaintiffs car, indicating, again,
thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of his
surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was not,
then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the
parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which
had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at
the plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he
put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiffs car in front of him, but
that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes to show
again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast.
For, were it otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his
car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding
that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was
running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour,
then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided
hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at
the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his
testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police immediately
after the accident and is, therefore, more believable, that he did not
actually step on his brakes, but simply swerved a little to the right
when he saw the on-coming car with glaring headlights, from the
opposite direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car
of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside the
sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little
to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming
car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue
separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there is plenty
of space for both cars, since her car was running at the right lane
going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right
lane going to Cubao.[13]
57
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his
company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to
determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of
contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora
Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty
of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection. [14] Based on the foregoing definition, the standard
or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point
of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor
who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no
such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when
placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require
the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.
[15]
Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court
of Appeals,[16] an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be
a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.[17]
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular
accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children
suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[18] that the driver therein, Jose Koh,
adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid
hitting the children. Using the emergency rule the court concluded
that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the
collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of
negligence.[19]
58
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was
the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. Negligence, as it is
commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others.[23] It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.[24] We stressed, in Corliss
vs. Manila Railroad Company,[25] that negligence is the want of care
required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the
court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in
driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving
at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had
settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample
testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the
influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of
effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were
significantly lessened. As Prosser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile
must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and
persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections,
such as one who sees a child on the curb may be required to
anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his failure to act
properly when they appear may be found to amount to
negligence. [26]
Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting
him on the night of the accident was clearly of his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Lis employer. In denying liability on the part of
Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Lis testimony, that the
visit was in connection with official matters. His functions as
assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work outside
the office as he has to visit buyers and company clients, but he
admitted that on the night of the accident he came from BF Homes
Paraaque he did not have business from the company (pp. 25-26,
tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). The use ofthe company car was partly
required by the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for
59
holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for
his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point,
however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends.
Utilizing thebonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180
of the Civil Code,[28] we are of the opinion that Lis employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the
damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains
the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in
the second example, the car is really owned and maintained by the
employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are
companies totally absolved of responsibility when an accident
involving a company-issued car occurs during private use after
normal office hours?
60
the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the
business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the
private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the
managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose
of furthering the companys image, a company owes a responsibility
to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to
whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car
are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted
that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to
scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite
often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers
and contacting and meeting with company clients. [30] These
meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours
because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of
representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients
were both social as well as work-related functions. The service car
assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled
both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly
successful entity, increasing the latters goodwill before its clientele.
It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing
the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the
night of the accident because he was coming from a social visit
with an officemate in Paraaque was a bare allegation which was
never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving.
Assuming he really came from his officemates place, the same
could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just
been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss
sales and other work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the
steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency
and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car.[31] Not having been able to overcome the burden of
61
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the
nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly
speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage
and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of
the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional
restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory
functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness,
psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts
discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00
granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and
nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by
Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent driving of his
Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the court of
Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
Lessons Applicable: Effect of Non-Payment (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Art. 19,Art. 20,Art. 21, Art. 2200 of the new Civil
Code;Section
77
of
the
Insurance
Code
FACTS:
62
may in a proper case maintain an action at law for
compensation or damages
Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the nonpayment of premiums is to put an end to and render the
insurance policy not binding
63
G.R. No. 95546 November 6, 1992
MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.,
represented by American International Underwriters
(Phils.), Inc., respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case involves a purely legal question: whether payment by
installment of the premiums due on an insurance policy invalidates
the contract of insurance, in view of Sec. 77 of P.D. 612, otherwise
known as the Insurance Code, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 77. An insurer is entitled to the payment of the premium as
soon as the thing is exposed to the peril insured against.
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or
contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and
binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except
in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace
period provision applies.
Sometime in early 1982, private respondent American Home
Assurance Co. (AHAC), represented by American International
Underwriters (Phils.), Inc., issued in favor of petitioner Makati
Tuscany Condominium Corporation (TUSCANY) Insurance Policy No.
AH-CPP-9210452 on the latter's building and premises, for a period
beginning 1 March 1982 and ending 1 March 1983, with a total
premium of P466,103.05. The premium was paid on installments on
12 March 1982, 20 May 1982, 21 June 1982 and 16 November
1982, all of which were accepted by private respondent.
On 10 February 1983, private respondent issued to petitioner
Insurance Policy No. AH-CPP-9210596, which replaced and renewed
the previous policy, for a term covering 1 March 1983 to 1 March
1984. The premium in the amount of P466,103.05 was again paid
on installments on 13 April 1983, 13 July 1983, 3 August 1983, 9
September 1983, and 21 November 1983. All payments were
likewise accepted by private respondent.
64
hence, it could not be said, inspite of the reservations, that no risk
attached
under
the
policies.
Consequently,
defendant's
counterclaim for refund is not justified.
As regards the unpaid premiums on Insurance Policy No. AH-CPP9210651, in view of the reservation in the receipts ordinarily issued
by the plaintiff on premium payments the only plausible conclusion
is that plaintiff has no right to demand their payment after the
lapse of the term of said policy on March 1, 1985. Therefore, the
defendant was justified in refusing to pay the same. 1
Both parties appealed from the judgment of the trial court.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 2modifying
that of the trial court by ordering herein petitioner to pay the
balance of the premiums due on Policy No. AH-CPP-921-651, or
P314,103.05 plus legal interest until fully paid, and affirming the
denial of the counterclaim. The appellate court thus explained
The obligation to pay premiums when due is ordinarily as indivisible
obligation to pay the entire premium. Here, the parties herein
agreed to make the premiums payable in installments, and there is
no pretense that the parties never envisioned to make the
insurance contract binding between them. It was renewed for two
succeeding years, the second and third policies being a
renewal/replacement for the previous one. And the insured never
informed the insurer that it was terminating the policy because the
terms were unacceptable.
While it may be true that under Section 77 of the Insurance Code,
the parties may not agree to make the insurance contract valid and
binding without payment of premiums, there is nothing in said
section which suggests that the parties may not agree to allow
payment of the premiums in installment, or to consider the contract
as valid and binding upon payment of the first premium. Otherwise,
we would allow the insurer to renege on its liability under the
contract, had a loss incurred (sic) before completion of payment of
the entire premium, despite its voluntary acceptance of partial
payments, a result eschewed by a basic considerations of fairness
and equity.
To our mind, the insurance contract became valid and binding upon
payment of the first premium, and the plaintiff could not have
denied liability on the ground that payment was not made in full,
for the reason that it agreed to accept installment payment. . . . 3
Petitioner now asserts that its payment by installment of the
premiums for the insurance policies for 1982, 1983 and 1984
invalidated said policies because of the provisions of Sec. 77 of the
Insurance Code, as amended, and by the conditions stipulated by
the insurer in its receipts, disclaiming liability for loss for occurring
before payment of premiums.
It argues that where the premiums is not actually paid in full, the
policy would only be effective if there is an acknowledgment in the
policy of the receipt of premium pursuant to Sec. 78 of the
Insurance Code. The absence of an express acknowledgment in the
policies of such receipt of the corresponding premium payments,
and petitioner's failure to pay said premiums on or before the
effective dates of said policies rendered them invalid. Petitioner
thus concludes that there cannot be a perfected contract of
insurance upon mere partial payment of the premiums because
under Sec. 77 of the Insurance Code, no contract of insurance is
valid and binding unless the premium thereof has been paid,
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. As a consequence,
petitioner seeks a refund of all premium payments made on the
alleged invalid insurance policies.
We hold that the subject policies are valid even if the premiums
were paid on installments. The records clearly show that petitioner
and private respondent intended subject insurance policies to be
binding and effective notwithstanding the staggered payment of
the premiums. The initial insurance contract entered into in 1982
was renewed in 1983, then in 1984. In those three (3) years, the
insurer accepted all the installment payments. Such acceptance of
payments speaks loudly of the insurer's intention to honor the
policies it issued to petitioner. Certainly, basic principles of equity
and fairness would not allow the insurer to continue collecting and
accepting the premiums, although paid on installments, and later
deny liability on the lame excuse that the premiums were not
prepared in full.
65
We therefore sustain the Court of Appeals. We quote with approval
the well-reasoned findings and conclusion of the appellate court
contained in its Resolution denying the motion to reconsider its
Decision
While the import of Section 77 is that prepayment of premiums is
strictly required as a condition to the validity of the contract, We
are not prepared to rule that the request to make installment
payments duly approved by the insurer, would prevent the entire
contract of insurance from going into effect despite payment and
acceptance of the initial premium or first installment. Section 78 of
the Insurance Code in effect allows waiver by the insurer of the
condition of prepayment by making an acknowledgment in the
insurance policy of receipt of premium as conclusive evidence of
payment so far as to make the policy binding despite the fact that
premium is actually unpaid. Section 77 merely precludes the
parties from stipulating that the policy is valid even if premiums are
not paid, but does not expressly prohibit an agreement granting
credit extension, and such an agreement is not contrary to morals,
good customs, public order or public policy (De Leon, the Insurance
Code, at p. 175). So is an understanding to allow insured to pay
premiums in installments not so proscribed. At the very least, both
parties should be deemed in estoppel to question the arrangement
they have voluntarily accepted. 4
The reliance by petitioner on Arce vs. Capital Surety and Insurance
Co. 5 is unavailing because the facts therein are substantially
different from those in the case at bar. In Arce, no payment was
made by the insured at all despite the grace period given. In the
case before Us, petitioner paid the initial installment and thereafter
made staggered payments resulting in full payment of the 1982
and 1983 insurance policies. For the 1984 policy, petitioner paid
two (2) installments although it refused to pay the balance.
It appearing from the peculiar circumstances that the parties
actually intended to make three (3) insurance contracts valid,
effective and binding, petitioner may not be allowed to renege on
its obligation to pay the balance of the premium after the expiration
of the whole term of the third policy (No. AH-CPP-9210651) in March
1985. Moreover, as correctly observed by the appellate court,
where the risk is entire and the contract is indivisible, the insured is
not entitled to a refund of the premiums paid if the insurer was
G.R.
No.
95546
November
6,
1992
MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
CO., represented by American International Underwriters
(Phils.),
Inc., respondent.
FACTS:
Sometime in early 1982, private respondent American Home
Assurance Co. (AHAC), represented by American International
Underwriters (Phils.), Inc., issued in favor of petitioner Makati
Tuscany Condominium Corporation (TUSCANY) Insurance Policy No.
AH-CPP-9210452 on the latter's building and premises, for a period
beginning 1 March 1982 and ending 1 March 1983, with a total
premium of P466,103.05. The premium was paid on installments on
12 March 1982, 20 May 1982, 21 June 1982 and 16 November
1982, all of which were accepted by private respondent.
Successive renewals of the policies were made in the same manner.
On 1984, the policy was again renewed and petitioner made two
installment payments, both accepted by private respondent, the
first on 6 February 1984 for P52,000.00 and the second, on 6 June
1984 for P100,000.00. Thereafter, petitioner refused to pay the
balance
of
the
premium.
Private respondent filed an action to recover the unpaid balance of
P314,103.05 for Insurance Policy. Petitioner explained that it
discontinued the payment of premiums because the policy did not
contain a credit clause in its favor. Petitioner further claimed that
the policy was never binding and valid, and no risk attached to the
66
policy. It then pleaded a counterclaim for P152,000.00 for the
premiums already paid for 1984-85, and in its answer with
amended counterclaim, sought the refund of P924,206.10
representing
the
premium
payments
for
1982-85.
DECISION
OF
LOWER
COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint and counterclaim
(2) CA: ordering herein petitioner to pay the balance of the
premiums
due
ISSUE:
Whether payment by installment of the premiums due on an
insurance policy invalidates the contract of insurance, in view of
Sec. 77 of P.D. 612, otherwise known as the Insurance Code, as
amended,
which
provides:
Sec. 77. An insurer is entitled to the payment of the premium as
soon as the thing is exposed to the peril insured against.
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or
contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and
binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid,
except in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the
grace
period
provision
applies.
RULING:
No, the contract remains valid even if the premiums were paid on
installments. Certainly, basic principles of equity and fairness would
not allow the insurer to continue collecting and accepting the
premiums, although paid on installments, and later deny liability on
the lame excuse that the premiums were not prepared in full.
At the very least, both parties should be deemed in estoppel to
question the arrangement they have voluntarily accepted.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the appellate court, where the
risk is entire and the contract is indivisible, the insured is not
entitled to a refund of the premiums paid if the insurer was exposed
to the risk insured for any period, however brief or momentary. The
obligation to pay premiums when due is ordinarily as indivisible
obligation to pay the entire premium.
67
G.R. No. 102253 June 2, 1995
SOUTH
SEA
SURETY
AND
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VALENZUELA HARDWOOD
AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Two issues on the subject of insurance are raised in this petition,
that assails the decision, that assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals. (in CA-G.R. NO. CV-20156), the first dealing on the
requirement of premium payment and the second relating to the
agency relationship of parties under that contract.
The court litigation started when Valenzuela Hardwood and
Industrial Supply, Inc. ("Hardwood"), filed with the Regional, Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch l71 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, a complaint for the recovery of the value
of lost logs and freight charges from Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation or, to the extent of its alleged insurance cover, from
South Sea Surety and insurance Company.
The factual backdrop is described briefly by the appellate court
thusly:
It appears that on 16 January 1984, plaintiff [Valenzuela Hardwood
and Industrial Supply, Inc.] entered into an agreement with the
defendant Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on
board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former's lauan round
logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment
to Manila.
On 20 January 1984, plaintiff insured the logs, against loss and/or,
damage with defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
for P2,000,000.00 end the latter issued its Marine Cargo Insurance
Policy No. 84/24229 for P2,000,000.00 on said date.
On 24 January 1984, the plaintiff gave the check in payment of the
premium on the insurance policy to Mr. Victorio Chua.
68
As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability
even for the negligence of its agent is valid (Home Insurance
Company, Inc. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., 23 SCRA 24).
The shipping corporation should not therefore be held liable for the
loss of the logs. 2
In this petition for review on certiorari brought by South Sea Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc., petitioner argues that it likewise should
have been freed from any liability to Hardwood. It faults the
appellate court (a) for having Supposedly disregarded Section 77 of
the insurance Code and (b) for holding Victorio Chua to have been
an authorized representative of the insurer.
Section 77 of the Insurance Code provides:
Sec. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon
as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured against.
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or
contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and
binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except
in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace
period provision applies.
Undoubtedly, the payment of the premium is a condition precedent
to, and essential for, the efficaciousness of the contract. The only
two statutorily provided exceptions are (a) in case the insurance
coverage relates to life or industrial life (health) insurance when a
grace period applies and (b) when the insurer makes a written
acknowledgment of the receipt of premium, this acknowledgment
being declared by law to be then conclusive evidence of the
premium payment (Secs. 77-78, Insurance Code). The appellate
court, contrary to what the petition suggests, did not make any
pronouncement to the contrary. Indeed, it has said:
Concerning the issue as to whether there is a valid contract of
insurance between plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant South
Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., Section 77 of the Insurance
Code explicitly provides that notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, no policy issued by an insurance company is valid and
binding unless and until premium thereof has been paid. It is
therefore important to determine whether at the time of the loss,
the premium was already paid. 3
No attempt becloud the issues can disguise the fact that the sole
question raised in the instant petition is really evidentiary in
nature, i.e., whether or not Victorio Chua, in receiving the check for
the insurance premium prior to the occurrence of the risk insured
against has so acted as an agent of petitioner. The appellate court,
like the trial court, has found in the affirmative. Said the appellate
court:
In the instant case, the Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229
was issued by defendant insurance company on 20 January 1984.
At the time the vessel sank on 25 January 1984 resulting in the loss
of the insured logs, the insured had already delivered to Victorio
Chua the check in payment of premium. But, as Victorio Chua
testified, it was only in the morning of 30 January 1984 or 5 days
after the vessel sank when his messenger tendered the check to
defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (TSN, pp. 3-27,
16-17, 22 October 1985).
The pivotal issue to be resolved to determine the liability, of the
surety corporation is whether Mr. Chua acted as an agent of the
surety company or of the insured when he received the check for
insurance premiums.
Appellant surety company insists that Mr. Chua is an administrative
assistant for the past ten years and an agent for less than ten years
of the Columbia Insurance Brokers, Ltd. He is paid a salary as a
administrative assistant and a commission as agent based on the
premiums he turns over to the broker. Appellant therefore argues
that Mr. Chua, having received the insurance premiums as an agent
of the Columbia Insurance Broker, acted as an agent of the insured
under Section 301 of the Insurance Code which provides as follows:
Sec. 301. Any person who for any compensation, commission or
other thing of value, acts, or aids in soliciting, negotiating or
procuring the making of any insurance contract or in placing risk or
taking out insurance, on behalf of an insured other than
himself,shall be an insurance broker within the intent of this Code,
and shall thereby become liable to all the duties requirements,
liabilities and penalties to which an insurance broker is subject.
The appellees, upon the other hand, claim that the second
paragraph of Section 306 of the Insurance Code provide as follows:
69
Sec. 306. . . . Any insurance company which delivers to an
insurance agent or insurance broker a policy or contract of
insurance shall be deemed to have authorized such agent or broker
to receive on its behalf payment of any premium which is due on
such policy of contract of insurance at the time of its issuance or
delivery or which becomes due thereon.
On cross-examination in behalf of South Sea Surety and Insurance
Co., Inc. Mr. Chua testified that the marine cargo insurance policy
for the plaintiff's logs was delivered to him on 21 January 1984 at
his office to be delivered to the plaintiff.
When the appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
delivered to Mr. Chua the marine cargo insurance policy for the
plaintiffs logs, he is deemed to have been authorized by the South
Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. to receive the premium which is
due on its behalf.
When therefore the insured logs were lost, the insured had already
paid the premium to an agent of the South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc., which is consequently liable to pay the
insurance proceeds under the policy it issued to the insured. 4
We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the
appellate court. Just as so correctly pointed out by private
respondent, it is not the function of this Court to assess and
evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary,
adduced by the parties particularly where, such as here, the
findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the
matter coincide.
WHEREFORE, the resolution, dated 01 February 1993, granting due
course to the petition is RECALLED, and the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
South Sea v CA G.R. No. 102253 June 2, 1995
J. Vitug
Issue:
Facts:
70
When the logs were lost, the insured had already paid the premium
to an agent of the South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., which
is consequently liable to pay the insurance proceeds under the
policy it issued to the insured.
Ratio:
The court followed the factual evidence of the lower courts and
held that they didnt try questions of fact.
71
G.R. No. 95641 September 22, 1994
SANTOS B. AREOLA and LYDIA D. AREOLA, petitionersappellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND
ASSURANCE, INC., respondents-appellees.
Gutierrez, Cortes & Gonzales for petitioners.
Bengzon, Bengzon, Baraan & Fernandez Law Offices for private
respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
On June 29, 1985, seven months after the issuance of petitioner
Santos Areola's Personal Accident Insurance Policy No. PA-20015,
respondent insurance company unilaterally cancelled the same
since company records revealed that petitioner-insured failed to
pay his premiums.
On August 3, 1985, respondent insurance company offered to
reinstate same policy it had previously cancelled and even
proposed to extend its lifetime to December 17, 1985, upon a
finding that the cancellation was erroneous and that the premiums
were paid in full by petitioner-insured but were not remitted by
Teofilo M. Malapit, respondent insurance company's branch
manager.
These, in brief, are the material facts that gave rise to the action for
damages due to breach of contract instituted by petitioner-insured
before
Branch 40 RTC, Dagupan City against respondent insurance
company.
There are two issues for resolution in this case:
(1) Did the erroneous act of cancelling subject insurance policy
entitle petitioner-insured to payment of damages?
72
plus documentary stamps and premium tax" to the account of the
insured.
Shocked by the cancellation of the policy, petitioner-insured
confronted Carlito Ang, agent of respondent insurance company,
and demanded the issuance of an official receipt. Ang told
petitioner-insured that the cancellation of the policy was a mistake
but he would personally see to its rectification. However, petitionerinsured failed to receive any official receipt from Prudential.
Hence, on July 15, 1985, petitioner-insured sent respondent
insurance company a letter demanding that he be insured under
the same terms and conditions as those contained in Policy No. PABG-20015 commencing upon its receipt of his letter, or that the
current commercial rate of increase on the payment he had made
under provisional receipt No. 9300 be returned within five
days. 6 Areola also warned that should his demands be unsatisfied,
he would sue for damages.
On July 17, 1985, he received a letter from production manager
Malapit informing him that the "partial payment" of P1,000.00 he
had made on the policy had been "exhausted pursuant to the
provisions of the Short Period Rate Scale" printed at the back of the
policy. Malapit warned Areola that should be fail to pay the balance,
the company's liability would cease to operate. 7
In reply to the petitioner-insured's letter of July 15, 1985,
respondent insurance company, through its Assistant Vice-President
Mariano M. Ampil III, wrote Areola a letter dated July 25, 1985
stating that the company was verifying whether the payment had
in fact been issued therefor. Ampil emphasized that the official
receipt should have been issued seven days from the issuance of
the provisional receipt but because no official receipt had been
issued in Areola's name, there was reason to believe that no
payment had been made. Apologizing for the inconvenience, Ampil
expressed the company's concern by agreeing "to hold you cover
(sic) under the terms of the referenced policy until such time that
this matter is cleared." 8
On August 3, 1985, Ampil wrote Areola another letter confirming
that the amount of P1,609.65 covered by provisional receipt No.
9300 was in fact received by Prudential on December 17, 1984.
Hence,
Ampil
informed
Areola that Prudential was "amenable to extending PGA-PA-BG20015 up to December 17, 1985 or one year from the date when
payment was received." Apologizing again for the inconvenience
caused Areola, Ampil exhorted him to indicate his conformity to the
proposal by signing on the space provided for in the letter. 9
The letter was personally delivered by Carlito Ang to Areola on
August 13, 1985 10 but unfortunately, Areola and his wife, Lydia, as
early as August 6, 1985 had filed a complaint for breach of contract
with damages before the lower court.
In its Answer, respondent insurance company admitted that the
cancellation of petitioner-insured's policy was due to the failure of
Malapit to turn over the premiums collected, for which reason no
official receipt was issued to him. However, it argued that, by
acknowledging the inconvenience caused on petitioner-insured and
after taking steps to rectify its omission by reinstating the cancelled
policy prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent insurance
company had complied with its obligation under the contract.
Hence, it concluded that petitioner-insured no longer has a cause of
action against it. It insists that it cannot be held liable for damages
arising from breach of contract, having demonstrated fully well its
fulfillment of its obligation.
The trial court, on June 30, 1987, rendered a judgment in favor of
petitioner-insured, ordering respondent insurance company to pay
the former the following:
a) P1,703.65 as actual damages;
b) P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2. To pay to the plaintiff, as and for attorney's fees the amount of
P10,000.00; and
3. To pay the costs.
In its decision, the court below declared that respondent insurance
company acted in bad faith in unilaterally cancelling subject
insurance policy, having done so only after seven months from the
time that it had taken force and effect and despite the fact of full
payment of premiums and other charges on the issued insurance
73
policy. Cancellation from the date of the policy's inception,
explained the lower court, meant that the protection sought by
petitioner-insured from the risks insured against was never
extended by respondent insurance company. Had the insured met
an accident at the time, the insurance company would certainly
have disclaimed any liability because technically, the petitioner
could not have been considered insured. Consequently, the trial
court held that there was breach of contract on the part of
respondent insurance company, entitling petitioner-insured to an
award of the damages prayed for.
II
I
Respondent Court of Appeals is guilty of grave abuse of discretion
and committed a serious and reversible error in not holding
Respondent Prudential liable for the cancellation of the insurance
contract which was admittedly caused by the fraudulent acts and
bad faith of its own officers.
74
premiums, further reinforces the allegation of bad faith. Such
fraudulent act committed by Malapit, argued petitioner-insured, is
attributable to respondent insurance company, an artificial
corporate being which can act only through its officers or
employees. Malapit's actuation, concludes petitioner-insured, is
therefore not separate and distinct from that of respondentinsurance company, contrary to the view held by the Court of
Appeals. It must, therefore, bear the consequences of the
erroneous cancellation of subject insurance policy caused by the
non-remittance by its own employee of the premiums paid.
Subsequent reinstatement, according to petitioner-insured, could
not possibly absolve respondent insurance company from liability,
there being an obvious breach of contract. After all, reasoned out
petitioner-insured, damage had already been inflicted on him and
no amount of rectification could remedy the same.
Respondent insurance company, on the other hand, argues that
where reinstatement, the equitable relief sought by petitionerinsured was granted at an opportune moment, i.e. prior to the filing
of the complaint, petitioner-insured is left without a cause of action
on which to predicate his claim for damages. Reinstatement, it
further explained, effectively restored petitioner-insured to all his
rights under the policy. Hence, whatever cause of action there
might have been against it, no longer exists and the consequent
award of damages ordered by the lower court in unsustainable.
We uphold petitioner-insured's submission. Malapit's fraudulent act
of misappropriating the premiums paid by petitioner-insured is
beyond doubt directly imputable to respondent insurance company.
A corporation, such as respondent insurance company, acts solely
thru its employees. The latters' acts are considered as its own for
which it can be held to account. 11 The facts are clear as to the
relationship between private respondent insurance company and
Malapit. As admitted by private respondent insurance company in
its answer, 12 Malapit was the manager of its Baguio branch. It is
beyond doubt that he represented its interest and acted in its
behalf. His act of receiving the premiums collected is well within the
province of his authority. Thus, his receipt of said premiums is
receipt by private respondent insurance company who, by provision
of law, particularly under Article 1910 of the Civil Code, is bound by
the acts of its agent.
75
both a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of
one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. 15
Under the circumstances of instant case, the relationship as
creditor and debtor between the parties arose from a common
cause: i.e., by reason of their agreement to enter into a contract of
insurance under whose terms, respondent insurance company
promised to extend protection to petitioner-insured against the risk
insured for a consideration in the form of premiums to be paid by
the latter. Under the law governing reciprocal obligations,
particularly the second paragraph of Article 1191, 16 the injured
party, petitioner-insured in this case, is given a choice between
fulfillment or rescission of the obligation in case one of the obligors,
such as respondent insurance company, fails to comply with what is
incumbent upon him. However, said article entitles the injured
party to payment of damages, regardless of whether he demands
fulfillment or rescission of the obligation. Untenable then is
reinstatement insurance company's argument, namely, that
reinstatement being equivalent to fulfillment of its obligation,
divests petitioner-insured of a rightful claim for payment of
damages. Such a claim finds no support in our laws on obligations
and contracts.
The nature of damages to be awarded, however, would be in the
form of nominal damages 17 contrary to that granted by the court
below. Although the erroneous cancellation of the insurance policy
constituted a breach of contract, private respondent insurance
company, within a reasonable time took steps to rectify the wrong
committed by reinstating the insurance policy of petitioner.
Moreover, no actual or substantial damage or injury was inflicted on
petitioner Areola at the time the insurance policy was cancelled.
Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is
technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion
that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or where
there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or
actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
16902 on May 31, 1990, REVERSED. The decision of Branch 40, RTC
Dagupan City, in Civil Case No. D-7972 rendered on June 30, 1987
is hereby REINSTATED subject to the following modifications: (a)
Facts:
Prudential
Guarantee
cancelled
Areolas
personal accident
insurance on the grounds that the latter failed to pay his premiums
7 months after issuing the policy. Areola was supposed to pay the
total amount of P1,609.65 which included the premium of
P1,470.00, documentary stamp of P110.25 and 2% premium tax of
P29.40. The statement of account had a stipulation not considering
it a receipt. It also reminded the customer to ask for a receipt after
payment. There was also a stipulation calling for a demand for a
provisional receipt after payment to an agent. A provisional receipt
was sent to petitioner telling him that the provisional receipt would
be confirmed by an official one. The company then cancelled the
policy for non-payment of premiums. After being surprised, Areola
confronted a company agent and demanded an official receipt. The
latter told him that it was a mistake, but never gave him an official
receipt. Areola sent a letter demanding that he be reinstated or he
would file for damages if his demand was not met. The company
then told him that his payments werent in full yet. The company
replied to Areola by telling him that there was reason to believe
that no payment has been made since no official receipt was
issued. The company then told him that they would still hold him
under the policy. The company then confirmed that he paid the
premium and that they would extend the policy by one year.
Thereby, the company offered to reinstate same policy it had
previously cancelled and even proposed to extend its lifetime on
76
finding that the cancellation was erroneous and that the premiums
were paid in full by petitioner-insured but were not remitted by the
company's branch manager, Mr. Malapit.
However, they were too late for Areola already filed an action
for breach of contract in the trial court.
The companys defense lay in rectifying its omission; hence, there
was no breach of contract.
The court ruled in favor of Areola and asked Prudential to pay
250,000 pesos in moral and exemplary damages. The court held
that the company was in bad faith in cancelling the policy. Had the
insured met an accident at that time, he wouldnt be covered by
the policy.
This ruling was challenged on appeal by respondent insurance
company, denying bad faith in unilaterally cancelling the policy. The
AC absolved Prudential on the grounds that it was not motivated by
negligence, malice or bad faith in cancelling subject policy. Rather,
the cancellation of the insurance policy was based on what the
existing records showed. The court even added that the errant
manager who didnt remit the profits was forced to resign. Areola
then filed for a petition in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Did the erroneous act of cancelling subject insurance
policy entitle petitioner-insured to payment of damages?
2. Did the subsequent act of reinstating the wrongfully cancelled
insurance policy by respondent insurance company, in an effort to
rectify such error, obliterate whatever liability for damages it may
have to bear, thus absolving it?
Ratio:
As for any obligation wherein the agent has exceeded his power,
the principal is not bound except when he ratifies it expressly or
tacitly.
Malapit's failure to remit the premiums he received cannot
constitute a defense for private respondent insurance company; no
exoneration from liability could result therefrom. The fact that
private respondent insurance company was itself defrauded due to
the anomalies that took place does not free the same from its
obligation to petitioner Areola. As held in Prudential Bank v. Court
of Appeals
A bank is liable for wrongful acts of its officers done in the interests
of the bank or in the course of dealings of the officers in their
representative capacity but not for acts outside the scope of their
authority. Accordingly, a banking corporation is liable to innocent
77
third persons where the representation is made in the course of its
business by an agent acting within the general scope of his
authority even though the agent is secretly abusing his authority
and attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some
other person.
Prudential is liable for damages for the fraudulent acts committed
by Malapit. Reinstating the insurance policy can not obliterate the
injury inflicted. A contract of insurance creates reciprocal
obligations for both insurer and insured. Reciprocal obligations are
those which arise from the same cause and in which each party is
both a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of
one is dependent upon the obligation of the other.
2. Due to the agreement to enter into a contract of insurance where
Prudential promised to extend protection to petitioner-insured
against the risk insured, there was a debtor creditor relation ship
between the two parties. Under Article 1191, the injured party is
given a choice between fulfillment or rescission of the obligation in
case one of the obligors fails to comply with what is incumbent
upon him. However, said article entitles the injured party to
payment of damages, regardless of whether he demands fulfillment
or rescission of the obligation.
The damages would be nominal because the insurance company
took steps to rectify the contract . There was also no actual or
substantial damage inflicted. Nominal damages are "recoverable
where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated
against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any
kind, or where there has been abreach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can
be shown.
78
SPS. ANTONIO A. TIBAY and VIOLETA R. TIBAY and OFELIA
M. RORALDO, VICTORINA M. RORALDO, VIRGILIO M.
RORALDO, MYRNA M. RORALDO and ROSABELLA M.
RORALDO, petitioners,
vs. COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
FORTUNE
LIFE
AND
GENERAL
INSURANCE
CO.,
INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N*
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May a fire insurance policy be valid, binding and enforceable upon
mere partial payment of premium?
On 22 January 1987 private respondent Fortune Life and General
Insurance Co., Inc. (FORTUNE) issued Fire Insurance Policy No.
136171 in favor of Violeta R. Tibay and/or Nicolas Roraldo on their
two-storey residential building located at 5855 Zobel Street, Makati
City, together with all their personal effects therein. The insurance
was for P600,000.00 covering the period from 23 January 1987 to
23 January 1988. On 23 January 1987, of the total premium of
P2,983.50, petitioner Violeta Tibay only paid P600.00 thus leaving a
considerable balance unpaid.
On 8 March 1987 the insured building was completely destroyed by
fire. Two days later or on 10 March 1987 Violeta Tibay paid the
balance of the premium. On the same day, she filed with FORTUNE
a claim on the fire insurance policy. Her claim was accordingly
referred to its adjuster, Goodwill Adjustment Services, Inc. (GASI),
which immediately wrote Violeta requesting her to furnish it with
the necessary documents for the investigation and processing of
her claim. Petitioner forthwith complied. On 28 March 1987 she
signed a non-waiver agreement with GASI to the effect that any
action taken by the companies or their representatives in
investigating the claim made by the claimant for his loss which
occurred at 5855 Zobel Roxas, Makati on March 8, 1987, or in the
investigating or ascertainment of the amount of actual cash value
and loss, shall not waive or invalidate any condition of the policies
of such companies held by said claimant, nor the rights of either or
any of the parties to this agreement, and such action shall not be,
or be claimed to be, an admission of liability on the part of said
companies or any of them.[1]
79
aforementioned for insuring against Loss or Damage by Fire or
Lightning as herein appears, the Property herein described x x x
2. This policy including any renewal thereof and/or any
endorsement thereon is not in force until the premium has been
fully paid to and duly receipted by the Company in the manner
provided herein.
Any supplementary agreement seeking to amend this condition
prepared by agent, broker or Company official, shall be deemed
invalid and of no effect.
xxx xxx xxx
Except only in those specific cases where corresponding rules and
regulations which are or may hereafter be in force provide for the
payment of the stipulated premiums in periodic installments at
fixed percentage, it is hereby declared, agreed and warranted
that this policy shall be deemed effective, valid and binding upon
the Company only when the premiums therefor have actually been
paid in full and duly acknowledged in a receipt signed by any
authorized official or representative/agent of the Company in such
manner as provided herein, (Italics supplied).[6]
Clearly the Policy provides for payment of premium in
full. Accordingly, where the premium has only been partially paid
and the balance paid only after the peril insured against has
occurred, the insurance contract did not take effect and the insured
cannot collect at all on the policy. This is fully supported by Sec. 77
of the Insurance Code which provides
SEC. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon
as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured
against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy
or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid
and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been
paid, except in the case of a life or an industrial life policy
whenever the grace period provision applies (Italics supplied).
Apparently the crux of the controversy lies in the phrase unless and
until the premium thereof has been paid. This leads us to the
manner of payment envisioned by the law to make the insurance
policy operative and binding. For whatever judicial construction
80
the insurer and the insured, there was not only a perfected contract
of insurance but a partially performed one as far as the payment of
the agreed premium was concerned. Thereafter the obligation of
the insurer to pay the insured the amount, for which the policy was
issued in case the conditions therefor had been complied with,
arose and became binding upon it, while the obligation of the
insured to pay the remainder of the total amount of the premium
due became demandable.
The 1967 Phoenix case is not persuasive; neither is it decisive of
the
instant
dispute. For
one,
the
factual
scenario
is
different. In Phoenix it was the insurance company that sued for the
balance of the premium, i.e., it recognized and admitted the
existence of an insurance contract with the insured. In the case
before us, there is, quite unlike inPhoenix, a specific stipulation
that (t)his policy xxx is not in force until the premium has been
fully paid and duly receipted by the Company x x x. Resultantly, it
is correct to say that in Phoenix a contract was perfected upon
partial payment of the premium since the parties had not otherwise
stipulated that prepayment of the premium in full was a condition
precedent to the existence of a contract.
In Phoenix, by accepting the initial payment of P3,000.00 and then
later demanding the remainder of the premium without any other
precondition to its enforceability as in the instant case, the insurer
in effect had shown its intention to continue with the existing
contract of insurance, as in fact it was enforcing its right to collect
premium, or exact specific performance from the insured. This is
not so here. By express agreement of the parties, no vinculum
juris or bond of law was to be established until full payment was
effected prior to the occurrence of the risk insured against.
In Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. v. Court of Appeals [9] the
parties mutually agreed that the premiums could be paid in
installments, which in fact they did for three (3) years, hence, this
Court refused to invalidate the insurance policy. In giving effect to
the policy, the Court quoted with approval the Court of Appeals
The obligation to pay premiums when due is ordinarily an
indivisible obligation to pay the entire premium. Here, the parties x
x x agreed to make the premiums payable in installments, and
there is no pretense that the parties never envisioned to make the
81
Thus, no vinculum juris whereby the insurer bound itself to
indemnify the assured according to law ever resulted from the
fractional payment of premium.The insurance contract itself
expressly provided that the policy would be effective only when the
premium was paid in full. It would have been altogether different
were it not so stipulated. Ergo, petitioners had absolute freedom of
choice whether or not to be insured by FORTUNE under the terms of
its policy and they freely opted to adhere thereto.
Indeed, and far more importantly, the cardinal polestar in the
construction of an insurance contract is the intention of the parties
as expressed in the policy. [10] Courts have no other function but to
enforce the same. The rule that contracts of insurance will be
construed in favor of the insured and most strongly against the
insurer should not be permitted to have the effect of making a plain
agreement ambiguous and then construe it in favor of the insured.
[11]
Verily, it is elemental law that the payment of premium is
requisite to keep the policy of insurance in force. If the premium is
not paid in the manner prescribed in the policy as intended by the
parties the policy is ineffective. Partial payment even when
accepted as a partial payment will not keep the policy alive even
for such fractional part of the year as the part payment bears to the
whole payment.[12]
Applying further the rules of statutory construction, the position
maintained by petitioners becomes even more untenable. The case
of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[13] speaks only of two (2) statutory exceptions to the
requirement of payment of the entire premium as a prerequisite to
the validity of the insurance contract. These exceptions are: (a) in
case the insurance coverage relates to life or industrial life (health)
insurance when a grace period applies, and (b) when the insurer
makes a written acknowledgment of the receipt of premium, this
acknowledgment being declared by law to, be then conclusive
evidence of the premium payment.[14]
A maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the expressed
exception or exemption excludes others. Exceptio firm at regulim in
casibus non exceptis.The express mention of exceptions operates
to exclude other exceptions; conversely, those which are not within
the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general
rule. Thus, under Sec. 77, as well as Sec. 78, until the premium is
paid, and the law has not expressly excepted partial payments,
there is no valid and binding contract. Hence, in the absence of
clear waiver of prepayment in full by the insurer, the insured
cannot collect on the proceeds of the policy.
In the desire to safeguard the interest of the assured, itmust not be
ignored that the contract of insurance is primarily a risk-distributing
device, a mechanism by which all members of a group exposed to a
particular risk contribute premiums to an insurer. From these
contributory funds are paid whatever losses occur due to exposure
to the peril insured against. Each party therefore takes a risk: the
insurer, that of being compelled upon the happening of the
contingency to pay the entire sum agreed upon, and the insured,
that of parting with the amount required as premium, without
receiving anything therefor in case the contingency does not
happen. To ensure payment for these losses, the law mandates all
insurance companies to maintain a legal reserve fund in favor of
those claiming under their policies.[15] It should be understood that
the integrity of this fund cannot be secured and maintained if by
judicial fiat partial offerings of premiums were to be construed as a
legal nexus between the applicant and the insurer despite an
express agreement to the contrary. For what could prevent the
insurance applicant from deliberately or wilfully holding back full
premium payment and wait for the risk insured against to transpire
and then conveniently pass on the balance of the premium to be
deducted from the proceeds of the insurance? Worse, what if the
insured makes an initial payment of only 10%, or even 1%, of the
required premium, and when the risk occurs simply points to the
proceeds from where to source the balance? Can an insurance
company then exist and survive upon the payment of 1%, or even
10%, of the premium stipulated in the policy on the basis that, after
all, the insurer can deduct from the proceeds of the insurance
should the risk insured against occur?
Interpreting the contract of insurance stringently against the
insurer but liberally in favor of the insured despite clearly defined
obligations of the parties to the policy can be carried out to
extremes that there is the danger that we may, so to speak, kill the
goose that lays the golden egg. We are well aware of insurance
companies falling into the despicable habit of collecting premiums
promptly yet resorting to all kinds of excuses to deny or delay
payment of just insurance claims. But, in this case, the law is
82
manifestly on the side of the insurer. For as long as the
current Insurance Code remains unchanged and partial payment of
premiums is not mentioned at all as among the exceptions
provided in Secs. 77 and 78, no policy of insurance can ever
pretend to be efficacious or effective until premium has been fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Fortune Life issued a fire insurance Policy to Tibay on her twostorey residential building at Zobel Street, Makati City. The
insurance was for P600,000.00 covering the period from January
23, 1987 to January 23, 1988. On January 23 1987, Tibay only paid
P600.00 of 3,000 peso premium and left a balance.
The insured building was completely destroyed by fire. Tibay then
paid the balance. On the same day, she filed a claim on the policy.
Her claim was accordingly referred to the adjuster, Goodwill, which
immediately wrote Violeta requesting her to furnish it with
the necessary documents for the investigation and processing of
her claim. Petitioner complied, and she signed a non-waiver
agreement.
Fortune denied the claim for violation of the Insurance Code. Tibay
sued for damages in the amount of P600,000.00 representing the
total coverage of the policy.
The trial court ruled for petitioners and made fortune liable for the
total value of the insured building and personal properties. The
Court of Appeals reversed the court by removing liability from
Fortune after returning the premium.
Hence this petition for review.
The petitioner contended that Fortune remained liable under the
subject fire insurance policy in spite of the failure of petitioners to
pay their premium in full.
83
Held: No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The pertinent provisions read:
2. This policy including any renewal thereof and/or any
endorsement thereon is not in force until the premium has been
fully paid to and duly receipted by the Company in the manner
provided herein.
This policy shall be deemed effective, valid and binding upon the
Company only when the premiums therefor have actually been paid
in full and duly acknowledged in a receipt signed by any authorized
official of the company
Where the premium has only been partially paid and the balance
paid only after the peril insured against has occurred, the insurance
contract did not take effect and the insured cannot collect at all on
the policy. The Insurance Code which says that no policy or
contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and
binding unless and until the premium has been paid.
What does unless and until the premium thereof has been paid
mean?
Escosura v. San Miguel- the legislative practice was to interpret
with pay in accordance to the intention of distinguish between full
and partial payment, where the modifying term is used.
Petitioners used Philippine Phoenix v. Woodworks, where partial
payment of the premium made the policy effective during the
whole period of the policy.
The SC didnt consider the 1967 Phoenix case as persuasive due to
the different factual scenario.
In Makati Tuscany v CA, the parties mutually agreed that the
premiums could be paid in installments, hence, this Court refused
to invalidate the insurance policy.
Nothing in Article 77 of the Code suggested that the parties may
not agree to allow payment of the premiums in installment, or to
consider the contract as valid and binding upon payment of the first
premium.
Phoenix and Tuscany demonstrated the waiver of prepayment in
full by the insurer. In this case however, there was no waiver. There
was a stipulation that the policy wasnt in force until the premium
has been fully paid and receipted.
There was no juridical tie of indemnification from the fractional
payment of premium. The insurance contract itself expressly
provided that the policy would be effective only when the premium
was paid in full.
Verily, it is elemental law that the payment of premium is requisite
to keep the policy of insurance in force. If the premium is not paid
in the manner prescribed in the policy as intended by the parties
the policy is ineffective. Partial payment even when accepted as a
partial payment will not keep the policy alive.
South Sea v CA stipulated 2 exceptions to the requirement of
payment of the entire premium as a prerequisite to the validity of
the insurance contract.
These are when in case the
insurance coverage relates to life or insurance when a grace period
applies, and when the insurer makes a written acknowledgment of
the receipt of premium to be conclusive evidence of payment.
Hence, in the absence of clear waiver of prepayment in full by the
insurer, the insured cannot collect on the proceeds of the policy.
The terms of the insurance policy constitute the measure of the
insurers liability. In the absence of statutory prohibition to the
contrary, insurance companies have the same rights as individuals
to limit their liability and to impose whatever conditions they deem
best upon their obligations not inconsistent with public policy.
Dissent:
J. Vitug
All the calculations of the company are based on the hypothesis of
prompt payments. They not only calculate on the receipt of the
premiums when due, but on the compounding interest upon them.
It is on this basis that they are enabled to offer assurance at the
favorable rates they do.
84
The failure of appellants to fully pay their premium prevented the
contract of insurance from becoming binding an Fortune. This
series of acts is tainted with misrepresentation and violates the
uberrimae fidae principle of insurance contracts.
Tibay had entered into a "Non-Waiver Agreement" with
the adjuster which permitted Fortune to claim non-payment of
premium as a defense.
The law neither requires, nor measures the strength of the
vinculum juris by any specific amount of premium payment.
Payment on the premium, partly or in full, is made by the insured
which the insurer accepts. In fine, it is either that a juridical tie
exists (by such payment) or that it is not extant at all (by an
absence thereof). Once the juridical relation comes into being, the
full efficacy follows. This is a partially performed contract.
The non-payment of the balance shouldnt result in an automatic
cancellation of the contract; otherwise, the right to decide the
effectivity of the contract would become potestative.
Instead, the parties should be able to demand from each other the
performance of whatever obligations they had assumed or, if
desired, sue timely for the rescission of the contract.
In the meanwhile, the contract endures, and an occurrence of the
risk
insured
riggers
the
insurer's
liability.
Also, legal
compensation arises where insurer's liability to the insured would
simply be reduced by the balance of the premium.
It must here be noted that the insured had made, and the insurer
had accepted partial premium payment on the policy weeks before
the risk insured against took place. An insurance is an aleatory
contract effective upon its perfection although the occurrence of a
condition or event may later dictate the demandability of certain
obligations. Fortunes stipulation that insurance shall not "be . . . in
force until the premium has been fully paid," and that it "shall be
deemed effective, valid and binding upon the company only when
the premiums therefor have actually been paid in full and duly
acknowledged," override the efficaciousness of the insurance
contract despite the payment and acceptance.
85
UCPB
GENERAL
INSURANCE
CO.,
INC., petitioner,
vs. MASAGANA TELAMART, INC., respondent.
DECISION
On July 21, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58, Makati City, a civil complaint against petitioner for
recovery of P18,645,000.00, representing the face value of the
policies covering respondent's insured property razed by fire, and
for attorney's fees.[2]
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] affirming with modification that
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, ordering petitioner to
pay respondent the sum of P18,645,000.00, as the proceeds of the
insurance coverage of respondent's property razed by fire; 25% of
the total amount due as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 as litigation
expenses, and costs.
The facts are undisputed and may be related as follows:
On October 23, 1992, after its motion to dismiss had been denied,
petitioner filed an answer to the complaint. It alleged that the
complaint "fails to state a cause of action"; that petitioner was not
liable to respondent for insurance proceeds under the policies
because at the time of the loss of respondent's property due to
fire, the policies had long expired and were not renewed.[3]
After due trial, on March 10, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
58, Makati, rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
86
"All other claims and counterclaims asserted by the parties are
denied and/or dismissed, including plaintiff's claim for interests.
"SO ORDERED.
"Makati, Metro-Manila, March 10, 1993.
"ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES
Judge.[4]
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. [5]
On September 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision[6] affirming that of the Regional Trial Court with the
modification that item No. 3 of the dispositive portion was deleted,
and the award of attorney's fees was reduced to 10% of the total
amount due.[7]
The Court of Appeals held that following previous practise,
respondent was allowed a sixty (60) to ninety (90) day credit term
for the renewal of its policies, and that the acceptance of the late
premium payment suggested an understanding that payment could
be made later.
Hence, this appeal.
By resolution adopted on March 24, 1999, we required respondent
to comment on the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss within
ten (10) days from notice.[8] On April 22, 1999, respondent filed
its comment.[9]
Respondent submits that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
no timely notice of non-renewal was sent. The notice of nonrenewal sent to broker Zuellig which claimed that it verbally
notified the insurance agency but not respondent itself did not
suffice. Respondent submits further that the Court of Appeals did
not err in finding that there existed a sixty (60) to ninety (90) days
credit agreement between UCPB and Masagana, and that, finally,
the Supreme Court could not review factual findings of the lower
court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[10]
We give due course to the appeal.
The basic issue raised is whether the fire insurance policies issued
by petitioner to the respondent covering the period May 22, 1991
to May 22, 1992, had expired on the latter date or had been
extended or renewed by an implied credit arrangement though
actual payment of premium was tendered on a later date after the
occurrence of the risk (fire) insured against.
The answer is easily found in the Insurance Code. No, an insurance
policy, other than life, issued originally or on renewal, is not valid
and binding until actual payment of the premium. Any agreement
to the contrary is void.[11] The parties may not agree expressly or
impliedly on the extension of credit or time to pay the premium and
consider the policy binding before actual payment.
The case of Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Cruz-Arnaldo, [12] cited by
the Court of Appeals, is not applicable. In that case, payment of the
premium was in fact actually made on December 24, 1981, and the
fire occurred on January 18, 1982. Here, the payment of the
premium for renewal of the policies was tendered on July 13, 1992,
a monthafter the fire occurred on June 13, 1992. The assured did
not even give the insurer a notice of loss within a reasonable time
after occurrence of the fire.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42321. In lieu
thereof, the Court renders judgment dismissing respondent's
complaint and petitioner's counterclaims thereto filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 922023.Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
87
[G.R. No. 137172. April 4, 2001]
UCPB
GENERAL
INSURANCE
CO.
INC., petitioner,
vs. MASAGANA TELAMART, INC., respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In our decision of 15 June 1999 in this case, we reversed and set
aside the assailed decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the judgment of the trial court (a) allowing
Respondent to consign the sum of P225,753.95 as full payment of
the premiums for the renewal of the five insurance policies on
Respondents properties; (b) declaring the replacement-renewal
policies effective and binding from 22 May 1992 until 22 May 1993;
and (c) ordering Petitioner to pay RespondentP18,645,000.00 as
indemnity for the burned properties covered by the renewalreplacement policies. The modification consisted in the (1) deletion
of the trial courts declaration that three of the policies were in force
from August 1991 to August 1992; and (2) reduction of the award
of the attorneys fees from 25% to 10% of the total amount due the
Respondent.
The material operative facts upon which the appealed judgment
was based are summarized by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
decision as follows:
Plaintiff [herein Respondent] obtained from defendant [herein
Petitioner] five (5) insurance policies (Exhibits "A" to "E", Record,
pp. 158-175) on its properties [in Pasay City and Manila].
All five (5) policies reflect on their face the effectivity term: "from
4:00 P.M. of 22 May 1991 to 4:00 P.M. of 22 May 1992." On June 13,
1992, plaintiff's properties located at 2410-2432 and 2442-2450
Taft Avenue, Pasay City were razed by fire. On July 13, 1992,
plaintiff tendered, and defendant accepted, five (5) Equitable Bank
Manager's Checks in the total amount of P225,753.45 as renewal
premium payments for which Official Receipt Direct Premium No.
62926 (Exhibit "Q", Record, p. 191) was issued by defendant. On
July 14, 1992, Masagana made its formal demand for
indemnification for the burned insured properties. On the same
day, defendant returned the five (5) manager's checks stating in its
88
"V" and "V-1"). And so were as other policies: Fire Insurance Policy
No. 34657 covering risks from May 22, 1990 to May 22, 1991 was
issued on May 7, 1990 but premium therefor was paid only on July
19, 1990 under O.R. No. 46583 (Exhs. "W" and "W-1"). Fire
Insurance Policy No. 34661 covering risks from May 22, 1990 to
May 22, 1991 was issued on May 3, 1990 but premium was paid
only on July 19, 1990 under O.R. No. 46582 (Exhs. "X' and "X1"). Fire Insurance Policy No. 34688 for insurance coverage from
May 22, 1990 to May 22, 1991 was issued on May 7, 1990 but
premium was paid only on July 19, 1990 under O.R. No. 46585
(Exhs. "Y" and "Y-1"). Fire Insurance Policy No. 29126 to cover
insurance risks from May 22, 1989 to May 22, 1990 was issued on
May 22, 1989 but premium therefor was collected only on July 25,
1990[sic] under O.R. No. 40799 (Exhs. "AA" and "AA-1"). Fire
Insurance Policy No. HO/F-26408 covering risks from January 12,
1989 to January 12, 1990 was issued to Intratrade Phils.
(Masagana's sister company) dated December 10, 1988 but
premium therefor was paid only on February 15, 1989 under O.R.
No. 38075 (Exhs. "BB" and "BB-1"). Fire Insurance Policy No. 29128
was issued on May 22, 1989 but premium was paid only on July 25,
1989 under O.R. No. 40800 for insurance coverage from May 22,
1989 to May 22, 1990 (Exhs. "CC" and "CC-1"). Fire Insurance Policy
No. 29127 was issued on May 22, 1989 but premium was paid only
on July 17, 1989 under O.R. No. 40682 for insurance risk coverage
from May 22, 1989 to May 22, 1990 (Exhs. "DD" and "DD-1"). Fire
Insurance Policy No. HO/F-29362 was issued on June 15, 1989 but
premium was paid only on February 13, 1990 under O.R. No. 39233
for insurance coverage from May 22, 1989 to May 22, 1990 (Exhs.
"EE" and "EE-1"). Fire Insurance Policy No. 26303 was issued on
November 22, 1988 but premium therefor was collected only on
March 15, 1989 under O.R. NO. 38573 for insurance risks coverage
from December 15, 1988 to December 15, 1989 (Exhs. "FF" and
"FF-1").
Moreover, according to the Court of Appeals the following
circumstances constitute preponderant proof that no timely notice
of non-renewal was made by Petitioner:
(1) Defendant-appellant received the confirmation (Exhibit 11,
Record, p. 350) from Ultramar Reinsurance Brokers that plaintiffs
reinsurance facility had been confirmed up to 67.5% only on April
15, 1992 as indicated on Exhibit 11. Apparently, the notice of non-
renewal (Exhibit 7, Record, p. 320) was sent not earlier than said
date, or within 45 days from the expiry dates of the policies as
provided under Policy Condition No. 26; (2) Defendant insurer
unconditionally accepted, and issued an official receipt for, the
premium payment on July 1[3], 1992 which indicates defendant's
willingness to assume the risk despite only a 67.5% reinsurance
cover[age]; and (3) Defendant insurer appointed Esteban Adjusters
and Valuers to investigate plaintiffs claim as shown by the letter
dated July 17, 1992 (Exhibit 11, Record, p. 254).
In our decision of 15 June 1999, we defined the main issue to be
whether the fire insurance policies issued by petitioner to the
respondent covering the period from May 22, 1991 to May 22, 1992
had been extended or renewed by an implied credit arrangement
though actual payment of premium was tendered on a later date
and after the occurrence of the (fire) risk insured against. We
resolved this issue in the negative in view of Section 77 of the
Insurance Code and our decisions in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals[2]; South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[3]; and Tibay v. Court of Appeals.[4] Accordingly, we
reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent seasonably filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
adverse verdict. It alleges in the motion that we had made in the
decision our own findings of facts, which are not in accord with
those of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The courts below
correctly found that no notice of non-renewal was made within 45
days before 22 May 1992, or before the expiration date of the fire
insurance policies. Thus, the policies in question were renewed by
operation of law and were effective and valid on 30 June 1992 when
the fire occurred, since the premiums were paid within the 60- to
90-day credit term.
Respondent likewise disagrees with our ruling that parties may
neither agree expressly or impliedly on the extension of credit or
time to pay the premium nor consider a policy binding before actual
payment. It urges the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that
despite the express provision of Section 77 of the Insurance Code,
extension of credit terms in premium payment has been the
prevalent practice in the insurance industry. Most insurance
companies, including Petitioner, extend credit terms because
Section 77 of the Insurance Code is not a prohibitive injunction but
89
is merely designed for the protection of the parties to an insurance
contract. The Code itself, in Section 78, authorizes the validity of a
policy notwithstanding non-payment of premiums.
Respondent also asserts that the principle of estoppel applies to
Petitioner. Despite its awareness of Section 77 Petitioner persuaded
and induced Respondent to believe that payment of premium on
the 60- to 90-day credit term was perfectly alright; in fact it
accepted payments within 60 to 90 days after the due dates. By
extending credit and habitually accepting payments 60 to 90 days
from the effective dates of the policies, it has implicitly agreed to
modify the tenor of the insurance policy and in effect waived the
provision therein that it would pay only for the loss or damage in
case the same occurred after payment of the premium.
Petitioner filed an opposition to the Respondents motion for
reconsideration. It argues that both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals overlooked the fact that on 6 April 1992 Petitioner sent by
ordinary mail to Respondent a notice of non-renewal and sent by
personal delivery a copy thereof to Respondents broker,
Zuellig. Both courts likewise ignored the fact that Respondent was
fully aware of the notice of non-renewal. A reading of Section 66 of
the Insurance Code readily shows that in order for an insured to be
entitled to a renewal of a non-life policy, payment of the premium
due on the effective date of renewal should first be
made. Respondents argument that Section 77 is not a prohibitive
provision finds no authoritative support.
Upon a meticulous review of the records and reevaluation of the
issues raised in the motion for reconsideration and the pleadings
filed thereafter by the parties, we resolved to grant the motion for
reconsideration. The following facts, as found by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, are indeed duly established:
1. For years, Petitioner had been issuing fire policies to the
Respondent, and these policies were annually renewed.
2. Petitioner had been granting Respondent a 60- to 90-day credit
term within which to pay the premiums on the renewed policies.
90
The first exception is provided by Section 77 itself, and that is, in
case of a life or industrial life policy whenever the grace period
provision applies.
The second is that covered by Section 78 of the Insurance Code,
which provides:
SEC. 78. Any acknowledgment in a policy or contract of insurance
of the receipt of premium is conclusive evidence of its payment, so
far as to make the policy binding, notwithstanding any stipulation
therein that it shall not be binding until premium is actually paid.
A
third
exception
was
laid
down
in Makati
Tuscany
Condominium Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[5] wherein we ruled
that Section 77 may not apply if the parties have agreed to the
payment in installments of the premium and partial payment has
been made at the time of loss. We said therein, thus:
We hold that the subject policies are valid even if the premiums
were paid on installments. The records clearly show that the
petitioners and private respondent intended subject insurance
policies to be binding and effective notwithstanding the staggered
payment of the premiums. The initial insurance contract entered
into in 1982 was renewed in 1983, then in 1984. In those three
years, the insurer accepted all the installment payments. Such
acceptance of payments speaks loudly of the insurers intention to
honor the policies it issued to petitioner. Certainly, basic principles
of equity and fairness would not allow the insurer to continue
collecting and accepting the premiums, although paid on
installments, and later deny liability on the lame excuse that the
premiums were not prepaid in full.
Not only that. In Tuscany, we also quoted with approval the
following pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision:
While the import of Section 77 is that prepayment of premiums is
strictly required as a condition to the validity of the contract, We
are not prepared to rule that the request to make installment
payments duly approved by the insurer would prevent the entire
contract of insurance from going into effect despite payment and
acceptance of the initial premium or first installment. Section 78 of
the Insurance Code in effect allows waiver by the insurer of the
91
entered DENYING the instant petition for failure of Petitioner to
sufficiently show that a reversible error was committed by the Court
of Appeals in its challenged decision, which is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
No pronouncement as to cost.
UCPB v Masagana G.R. No. 137172. April 4, 2001
C.J. Davide
Facts:
In our decision of 15 June 1999 in this case, we reversed and set
aside the assailed decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the judgment of the trial court (a)
allowing Respondent to consign the sum of P225,753.95 as full
payment of the premiums for the renewal of the five insurance
policies on Respondents properties; (b) declaring the replacementrenewal policies effective and binding from 22 May 1992 until 22
May 1993; and (c) ordering Petitioner to pay Respondent
P18,645,000.00 as indemnity for the burned properties covered by
the renewal-replacement policies. The modification consisted in
the (1) deletion of the trial courts declaration that three of the
policies were in force from August 1991 to August 1992; and
(2) reduction of the award of the attorneys fees from 25% to 10%
of the total amount due the Respondent.
Masagana obtained from UCPB five (5) insurance policies on its
Manila properties.
The policies were effective from May 22, 1991 to May 22, 1992. On
June 13, 1992, Masaganas properties were razed by fire. On July
13, 1992, plaintiff tendered five checks for P225,753.45
as renewal premium payments. A receipt was issued. On July 14,
1992, Masagana made its formal demand for indemnification for
the burned insured properties. UCPB then rejected Masaganas
claims under the argument that the fire took place before the
tender of payment.
Hence Masagana filed this case.
92
Ratio:
Section 77 of the Insurance Code provides: No policy or contract of
insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding
unless and until the premium thereof has been paid
An exception to this section is Section 78 which provides: Any
acknowledgment in a policy or contract of insurance of the receipt
of premium is conclusive evidence of its payment, so far as to make
the policy binding, notwithstanding any stipulation therein that it
shall not be binding until premium is actually paid.
Makati Tuscany v Court of Appeals- Section 77 may not apply if the
parties have agreed to the payment in installments of the premium
and partial payment has been made at the time of loss.
Section 78 allows waiver by the insurer of the condition of
prepayment and makes the policy binding despite the fact that
premium is actually unpaid. Section 77 does not expressly prohibit
an agreement granting credit extension. At the very least, both
parties should be deemed in estoppel to question the arrangement
they have voluntarily accepted.
The Tuscany case has provided another exception to Section 77
that the insurer may grant credit extension for the payment of the
premium. If the insurer has granted the insured a credit term for
the payment of the premium and loss occurs before the expiration
of the term, recovery on the policy should be allowed even though
the premium is paid after the loss but within the credit term.
Moreover, there is nothing in Section 77 which prohibits the parties
in an insurance contract to provide a credit term within which to
pay the premiums. That agreement is not against the law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. The agreement binds
the parties.
It would be unjust if recovery on the policy would not be permitted
against Petitioner, which had consistently granted a 60- to 90-day
credit term for the payment of premiums. Estoppel bars it from
93
[G.R. No. 130421. June 28, 1999]
AMERICAN
HOME
ASSURANCE
vs. ANTONIO CHUA, respondent.
COMPANY, petitioner,
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner seeks the reversal of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40751, which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 150 (hereafter trial court), in Civil Case No. 91-1009.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance
business. Sometime in 1990, respondent obtained from petitioner a
fire insurance covering the stock-in-trade of his business, Moonlight
Enterprises, located at Valencia, Bukidnon. The insurance was due
to expire on 25 March 1990.
On 5 April 1990 respondent issued PCIBank Check No. 352123 in
the amount of P2,983.50 to petitioners agent, James Uy, as
payment for the renewal of the policy. In turn, the latter delivered
Renewal Certificate No. 00099047 to respondent. The check was
drawn against a Manila bank and deposited in petitioners bank
account in Cagayan de Oro City. The corresponding official receipt
was issued on 10 April. Subsequently, a new insurance policy,
Policy No. 206-4234498-7, was issued, whereby petitioner
undertook to indemnify respondent for any damage or loss arising
from fire up to P200,000 for the period 25 March 1990 to 25 March
1991.
On 6 April 1990 Moonlight Enterprises was completely razed by
fire. Total
loss
was
estimated
between P4,000,000
and P5,000,000. Respondent filed an insurance claim with
petitioner and four other co-insurers, namely, Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation, Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.,
Filipino Merchants Insurance Co. and Domestic Insurance Company
of the Philippines. Petitioner refused to honor the claim
notwithstanding several demands by respondent, thus, the latter
filed an action against petitioner before the trial court.
94
3. P200,000.00 as loss of profit;
6. Cost of suit.
95
Petitioner invokes respondents admission that his check for the
renewal of the policy was received only on 10 April 1990, taking
into account that the policy period was 25 March 1990 to 25 March
1991. The official receipt was dated 10 April 1990. Anent
respondents testimony that the check was given to petitioners
agent, a certain James Uy, the latter points out that even
respondent was not sure if Uy was indeed its agent. It faults
respondent for not producing Uy as his witness and not taking any
receipt from him upon presentment of the check. Even assuming
that the check was received a day before the occurrence of the fire,
there still could not have been any payment until the check was
cleared.
Moreover, petitioner denies respondents allegation that it intended
a renewal of the contract for the renewal certificate clearly
specified the following conditions:
Subject to the payment by the assured of the amount due prior to
renewal date, the policy shall be renewed for the period stated.
Any payment tendered other than in cash is received subject to
actual cash collection.
Subject to no loss prior to premium payment. If there be any loss,
and is not covered [sic].
Petitioner asserts that an insurance contract can only be enforced
upon the payment of the premium, which should have been made
before the renewal period.
Finally, in assailing the excessive damages awarded to respondent
petitioner stresses that the policy in issue was limited to a liability
of P200,000; but the trial court granted the following monetary
awards: P200,000 as actual damages; P200,000 as moral
damages; P100,000 as exemplary damages; and P50,000 as
attorneys fees.
96
to make the policy binding, notwithstanding any stipulation therein
that it shall not be binding until the premium is actually paid.
This Section establishes a legal fiction of payment and should be
interpreted as an exception to Section 77.[9]
Is respondent guilty of the policy violations imputed against
him? We are not convinced by petitioners arguments. The
submission of the alleged fraudulent documents pertained to
respondents income tax returns for 1987 to 1989. Respondent,
however, presented a BIR certification that he had paid the proper
taxes for the said years. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
gave credence to the certification and it being a question of fact,
we hold that said finding is conclusive.
Ordinarily, where the insurance policy specifies as a condition the
disclosure of existing co-insurers, non-disclosure thereof is a
violation that entitles the insurer to avoid the policy. This condition
is common in fire insurance policies and is known as the other
insurance clause. The purpose for the inclusion of this clause is to
prevent an increase in the moral hazard. We have ruled on its
validity and the case of Geagonia v. Court of Appeals[10] clearly
illustrates such principle. However, we see an exception in the
instant case.
Citing Section 29[11] of the Insurance Code, the trial court reasoned
that respondents failure to disclose was not intentional and
fraudulent. The application of Section 29 is misplaced. Section 29
concerns concealment which is intentional. The relevant provision
is Section 75, which provides that:
A policy may declare that a violation of specified provisions thereof
shall avoid it, otherwise the breach of an immaterial provision does
not avoid the policy.
To constitute a violation the other existing insurance contracts must
be upon the same subject matter and with the same interest and
risk.[12] Indeed, respondent acquired several co-insurers and he
failed to disclose this information to petitioner. Nonetheless,
petitioner is estopped from invoking this argument. The trial court
cited the testimony of petitioners loss adjuster who admitted
previous knowledge of the co-insurers. Thus,
COURT:
Q The matter of additional insurance of other companies, was that
ever discussed in your investigation?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, from the start, you were aware the insured was
insured with other companies like Pioneer and so on?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q But in your report you never recommended the denial of the
claim simply because of the non-disclosure of other insurance? [sic]
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q In other words, to be emphatic about this, the only reason you
recommended the denial of the claim, you found three documents
to be spurious. That is your only basis?
A Yes, Your Honor.[13] [Emphasis supplied]
Indubitably, it cannot be said that petitioner was deceived by
respondent by the latters non-disclosure of the other insurance
contracts when petitioner actually had prior knowledge
thereof. Petitioners loss adjuster had known all along of the other
existing insurance contracts, yet, he did not use that as basis for
his recommendation of denial.The loss adjuster, being an employee
of petitioner, is deemed a representative of the latter whose
awareness of the other insurance contracts binds petitioner. We,
therefore, hold that there was no violation of the other insurance
clause by respondent.
Petitioner is liable to pay its share of the loss. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals were correct in awarding P200,000 for
this. There is, however, merit in petitioners grievance against the
damages and attorneys fees awarded.
There is no legal and factual basis for the award of P200,000 for
loss of profit. It cannot be denied that the fire totally gutted
respondents business; thus, respondent no longer had any business
to operate. His loss of profit cannot be shouldered by petitioner
whose obligation is limited to the object of insurance, which was
the stock-in-trade, and not the expected loss in income or profit.
97
Neither can we approve the award of moral and exemplary
damages. At the core of this case is petitioners alleged breach of its
obligation under a contract of insurance.Under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded in breaches of
contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. We find no such fraud or bad faith. It must again be stressed
that moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. Such damages are
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion
or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action.Its award is
aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the
suffering inflicted.[14] When awarded, moral damages must not be
palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the
result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial
court judge.[15]
the
award
of
attorneys
fees
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
American Home v Chua G.R. No. 130421. June 28, 1999
C.J. Davide
Facts:
Chua obtained from American Home a fire insurance covering the
stock-in-trade of his business. The insurance was due to expire on
March 25, 1990.
98
companies promptly paid the claims. American homes was made to
pay 750,000 in damages.
American Home filed the petition reiterating its stand that there
was no existing insurance contract between the parties. It invoked
Section 77 of the Insurance Code, which provides that no policy or
contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and
binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid and the
case of Arce v. Capital Insurance that until the premium is paid
there is no insurance.
Issues:
Held: Yes. No. Yes, but not all damages valid. Petition granted.
Damages modified.
Ratio:
1. The trial court found, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
there was a valid check payment by respondent to petitioner. The
court respected this.
The renewal certificate issued to respondent
acknowledgment that premium had been paid.
contained
the
In the instant case, the best evidence of such authority is the fact
that petitioner accepted the check and issued the official receipt for
99
There was no fraud to justify moral damages. Exemplary damages
cant be awarded because the defendant never acted in a reckless
manner to claim insurance. Attorneys fees cant be recovered as
part of damages because no premium should be placed on the right
to litigate.
100
G.R. No. L-31845 April 30, 1979
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-31878 April 30, 1979
LAPULAPU
D.
MONDRAGON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NGO HING, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Sycip, Salazar, Luna &
Manalo for petitioner Company.
Voltaire Garcia for petitioner Mondragon.
Pelaez, Pelaez & Pelaez for respondent Ngo Hing.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The two above-entitled cases were ordered consolidated by the
Resolution of this Court dated April 29, 1970, (Rollo, No. L-31878, p.
58), because the petitioners in both cases seek similar relief,
through these petitions for certiorari by way of appeal, from the
amended decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, ordering
"the defendants (herein petitioners Great Pacific Ligfe Assurance
Company and Mondragon) jointly and severally to pay plaintiff
(herein private respondent Ngo Hing) the amount of P50,000.00
with interest at 6% from the date of the filing of the complaint, and
the sum of P1,077.75, without interest.
It appears that on March 14, 1957, private respondent Ngo Hing
filed an application with the Great Pacific Life Assurance Company
(hereinafter referred to as Pacific Life) for a twenty-year
endownment policy in the amount of P50,000.00 on the life of his
one-year old daughter Helen Go. Said respondent supplied the
essential data which petitioner Lapulapu D. Mondragon, Branch
Manager of the Pacific Life in Cebu City wrote on the corresponding
form in his own handwriting (Exhibit I-M). Mondragon finally typewrote the data on the application form which was signed by private
respondent Ngo Hing. The latter paid the annual premuim the sum
101
medical examination ... said insurance shan be in force and in
effect from the date of such medical examination, for such period
as is covered by the deposit ...,PROVIDED the company shall be
satisfied that on said date the applicant was insurable on standard
rates under its rule for the amount of insurance and the kind of
policy requested in the application.
D. If the Company does not accept the application on standard rate
for the amount of insurance and/or the kind of policy requested in
the application but issue, or offers to issue a policy for a different
plan and/or amount ..., the insurance shall not be in force and in
effect until the applicant shall have accepted the policy as issued
or offered by the Company and shall have paid the full premium
thereof. If the applicant does not accept the policy, the deposit shall
be refunded.
E. If the applicant shall not have been insurable under Condition A
above, and the Company declines to approve the application the
insurance applied for shall not have been in force at any time and
the sum paid be returned to the applicant upon the surrender of
this receipt. (Emphasis Ours).
The aforequoted provisions printed on Exhibit E show that the
binding deposit receipt is intended to be merely a provisional or
temporary insurance contract and only upon compliance of the
following conditions: (1) that the company shall be satisfied that
the applicant was insurable on standard rates; (2) that if the
company does not accept the application and offers to issue a
policy for a different plan, the insurance contract shall not be
binding until the applicant accepts the policy offered; otherwise,
the deposit shall be reftmded; and (3) that if the applicant is not ble
according to the standard rates, and the company disapproves the
application, the insurance applied for shall not be in force at any
time, and the premium paid shall be returned to the applicant.
Clearly implied from the aforesaid conditions is that the binding
deposit receipt in question is merely an acknowledgment, on behalf
of the company, that the latter's branch office had received from
the applicant the insurance premium and had accepted the
application subject for processing by the insurance company; and
that the latter will either approve or reject the same on the basis of
whether or not the applicant is "insurable on standard rates." Since
102
13-14). In this first place, there was no contract perfected between
the parties who had no meeting of their minds. Private respondet,
being an authorized insurance agent of Pacific Life at Cebu branch
office, is indubitably aware that said company does not offer the life
insurance applied for. When he filed the insurance application in
dispute, private respondent was, therefore, only taking the chance
that Pacific Life will approve the recommendation of Mondragon for
the acceptance and approval of the application in question along
with his proposal that the insurance company starts to offer the 20year endowment insurance plan for children less than seven years.
Nonetheless, the record discloses that Pacific Life had rejected the
proposal and recommendation. Secondly, having an insurable
interest on the life of his one-year old daughter, aside from being
an insurance agent and an offense associate of petitioner
Mondragon, private respondent Ngo Hing must have known and
followed the progress on the processing of such application and
could not pretend ignorance of the Company's rejection of the 20year endowment life insurance application.
At this juncture, We find it fit to quote with approval, the very apt
observation of then Appellate Associate Justice Ruperto G. Martin
who later came up to this Court, from his dissenting opinion to the
amended decision of the respondent court which completely
reversed the original decision, the following:
Of course, there is the insinuation that neither the memorandum of
rejection (Exhibit 3-M) nor the reply thereto of appellant Mondragon
reiterating the desire for applicant's father to have the application
considered as one for a 20-year endowment plan was ever duly
communicated to Ngo; Hing, father of the minor applicant. I am not
quite conninced that this was so. Ngo Hing, as father of the
applicant herself, was precisely the "underwriter who wrote this
case" (Exhibit H-1). The unchallenged statement of appellant
Mondragon in his letter of May 6, 1957) (Exhibit 4-M), specifically
admits that said Ngo Hing was "our associate" and that it was the
latter who "insisted that the plan be placed on the 20-year
endowment plan." Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable
that the progress in the processing of the application was not
brought home to his knowledge. He must have been duly apprised
of the rejection of the application for a 20-year endowment plan
otherwise Mondragon would not have asserted that it was Ngo Hing
himself who insisted on the application as originally filed, thereby
103
We are thus constrained to hold that no insurance contract was
perfected between the parties with the noncompliance of the
conditions provided in the binding receipt, and concealment, as
legally defined, having been comraitted by herein private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and in
lieu thereof, one is hereby entered absolving petitioners Lapulapu
D. Mondragon and Great Pacific Life Assurance Company from their
civil liabilities as found by respondent Court and ordering the
aforesaid insurance company to reimburse the amount of
P1,077.75, without interest, to private respondent, Ngo Hing. Costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Issues:
J. De Castro
Facts:
Ngo Hing filed an application with the Great Pacific for a twentyyear endowment policy in the amount of P50,000.00 on the life of
his one-year old daughter Helen. He supplied the essential data
which petitioner Mondragon, the Branch Manager, wrote on the
form. The latter paid the annual premium the sum of P1,077.75
going over to the Company, but he retained the amount of
P1,317.00 as his commission for being a duly authorized agent of
Pacific Life.
Upon the payment of the insurance premium, the binding deposit
receipt was issued Ngo Hing. Likewise, petitioner Mondragon
handwrote at the bottom of the back page of the application
form his strong recommendation for the approval of the insurance
application. Then Mondragon received a letter from Pacific Life
disapproving the insurance application. The letter stated that the
said life insurance application for 20-year endowment plan is not
available for minors below seven years old, but Pacific Life can
consider the same under the Juvenile Triple Action Plan, and
advised that if the offeris acceptable, the Juvenile Non-Medical
Declaration be sent to the company.
Ratio:
The receipt was intended to be merely a provisional insurance
contract. Its perfection was subject to compliance of the following
conditions: (1) that the company shall be satisfied that
the applicant was insurable on standard rates; (2) that if the
company does not accept the application and offers to issue a
policy for a different plan, the insurance contract shall not be
binding until the applicant accepts the policy offered; otherwise,
the deposit shall be refunded; and (3) that if the company
disapproves the application, the insurance applied for shall not be
in force at any time, and the premium paid shall be returned to
the applicant.
The receipt is merely an acknowledgment that the latter's branch
office had received from the applicant the insurance premium and
had accepted the application subject for processing by the
104
insurance company. There was still approval or rejection the same
on the basis of whether or not the applicant is "insurable on
standard rates." Since Pacific Lifedisapproved the insurance
application of respondent Ngo Hing, the binding deposit receipt in
question had never become in force at any time. The binding
deposit receipt is conditional and does not insure outright. This was
held in Lim v Sun.