3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO DECLARE AN ACT OR LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL; CONSTITUTIONS.

The Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in
the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY; REQUISITES. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to
the decision of the case itself.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PROPER PARTY; CASE AT BAR. With particular regard to the requirement
of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners
and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury
as a result of the acts or measures complained of.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO DECLARE AN ACT OR LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; TRIBUNAL WITH WIDE DISCRETION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT. Even if, strictly
speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to
waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
7. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL SUPREMACY. . . . When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution.
8. ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTION; PRESIDENT; EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER DURING MARTIAL LAW,
SUSTAINED. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or
reverse it on that issue.
9. ID.; 1987 CONSTITUTION; PRESIDENT; LEGISLATIVE POWER, AUTHORIZED. As for the power of
President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above. The said measures
were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was
formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments
intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other
measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEASURES PROMULGATED REMAINS VALID EVE