Sect 01-02 PWC Students

IPM Well Control
Schlumberger IPM
Sections 1 and 2
Schlumberger Private
Preventative
Well Control
Course
Before we get started
PWC January 2007
Safety issues.
Fire escapes.
Lunches & Coffee breaks.
Toilets.
Computers and cell phones.
Questions????
Why the Preventative Well Control Course?

Two main reasons for the PWC Course:
1.
IPM incident rate: 1/60 (includes all WC incidents, kicksblowouts).
Industry average: 1/615 (only includes blowouts).
2.
The number of well control incidents in IPM has reached an

unacceptable level:
To develop a common culture: because IPM is made up of people

from different backgrounds and companies, there is not a common
culture. It is a good opportunity to bring various well control ideas
together, share experiences and bring everybody to the same page.
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IPM Well Control Training

IPM well control training includes 3 elements:
2. IWCF regulatory training or equivalent certification as per

country of operations regulations and client requirement.
1. Basic introductory module for new hires and fresh outs

(fundamental WC).
3. Preventative well control course IPM mandatory.
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Course Outline
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Introduction
IPM standards
The U-tube
Kicks causes, prevention and detection
Well control by well design
Well control equipment
Diverters
Shut-in procedures
Course Outline
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Well control in OBM

Gas migration effects
Constant BHP well control
Other methods of well control
Ballooning
Well control in workover operations
Well Control and IPM Standards

Pre-Tests (2 hours)
We want to determine your level of understanding of
well control
40 Questions IPM standards
40 Questions Well control based
Keep answers short and to the point
Answer all questions that you know first
There is one unconventional part of the test:

self-assessment - Please write what you think your
score is at the bottom of the page
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Section 1
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Introduction
Introduction - Section 1
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Well control incidents examples, consequences

and costs
Root causes of IPM incidents
The objective of the PWC
Well Control Incident Dacin

Well GG-617
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10
IPM Well Control Incidents

Root Causes, examples:
Complacency
Lack of knowledge and skills of rig personnel
Lack of commitment and leadership
Inadequate work practices and WC preventative training
Inadequate Well Design
Lack of training in PWC
Application of standards
Poor contractor & supplier management
Inadequate risk management & management of change
process
Lack of communication
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11
Distribution of IPM Incidents by type

(2 year period form 99 00, +/- 300 wells)
Well Control
17%
49%
17%
Cementing
Stuck Pipe
17%
Casing & Completions
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(2003, +/- 1400 wells)
3%
3%
1% 1% 0%
Stuck Pipe
Well Control
4%
Hole Conditions
7%
Loss Circulation
Others
Program Error
3%
3%
Wellhead equipment
Cementing Problems
Downhole equipment Failure
9%
Rig contractor
Wireline
15%
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51%
Waiting on equipment
13

(2004, +/- 1750 wells)
2%
3%
15%
Drilling Equipment
2%
3%
Drop tool / String in well

Kick / Influx
Loss Circulation
Rig Contractor
Stuck Pipe
10%
Support Equipment
Tool
21%
Unplanned Cement left in string

Unsuitable Conditions
23%
4%
17%
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(2005, 1984 wells)
Sum of % of total NPT (year 2005)
30%
8%
Category
Stuck Pipe
Loss/failure equipment
Well Control Incidents
3rd party equipment
11%
21%
13%
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Loss of operation activity

Loss Circulation
Others
4%
13%
15

(2006, XXX wells)
Category
0%
Loss of Operation Activity

12%
Sum of % of total NPT(year 2006)
Stuck Pipe / Tools
11%
12%
Unknown
Loss Circulation
2%
10%
2%
Other
Downhole Equipment Failure
Cementing
Well Control
Hole Problems
3%
Waiting
8%
5%
0%
3rd Party Contractor Equipment

Rig Equipment
5%
8%
7%
7%
8%
Loss / Failure of Equipment

Equipment
Primary Mechanical
Acquisition/Computers
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(2006, XXX wells)
Category
Well Control
Sum of % of total Red Money (2006)
17%
Loss Circulation
Loss of Operation Activity
20%
Cementing
3rd Party Contractor Equipment
Downhole Equipment Failure
Other
Unknown
Stuck Pipe / Tools
13%
Hole Problems
0%
2%
2%
2%
13%
Waiting
Rig Equipment
3%
3%
3%
4%
5%
5%
8%
Equipment
Loss / Failure of Equipment
Primary Mechanical
Acquisition/Computers
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IPM Well Control History

(1995 December 2006)
Year
1995
# Wells
Total
24
Wells /
Kick
-
Wells /
Blowout
-
Comments
1996
145
29
1997
19
536
28
536
1998
14
507
36
1999
300
75
100
Cem, drlng, rig move
2000
493
62
82
Cem, drlng, log, trip
2001
14
1,595
114
532
B/O on W/Overs
2002
21
1,570
75
785
B/O on W/Overs
2003
20
1,414
71
471
B/O Operator Error
2004
27
1,752
65
1,752
2005
15
1,984
132
2006
19
2,300
121
1,150
Total
166
21
12,620
Drilling
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Reported Reported
Kicks Blow Outs
0
0
Gas at surface
18
IPM Well Control History

(1995 December 2006)
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187 well control incidents in

144 months!!
19
A catastrophic well control incident

could put IPM out of business
Former IPM President
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20
Worldwide Operator Blowout Costs

(1976 1989)
Year
Amount
Phillips, Ekofisk Platform, Norway, North Sea

Pemex, Abkatun-91, Mexico
Mobil, Arun C-II-2, Indonesia
Aramco, Berri-34, Saudi Arabia
Gulf Oil, Angola
Pemex, Ixtoc, Mexico
Pemex, Giraldas-22, Mexico
Pemex, Juspi-2A, Mexico
Mobil, Arun C-II-8, Indonesia
Aramco, Hasba-6, Saudi Arabia
Apache, Key #1-11, Texas, USA
Mobil, West Venture, Nova Scotia, Canada
Texas O&G, Marshall Well, Texas, USA
Total, Bekepai, Indonesia
PRC Oil, Manchuria, PRC
Elf, Tcebuila, Congo
Pemex, Yum-2, Mexico
Pemex, Luna-11, Mexico
Oil India, Bay of Bengal, India
PetroBras, Anchove Platform, Brazil
Saga Pet, 2/4-14, Norway, North Sea
1976
1777
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1980
1980
1982
1985
1985
1985
1986
1986
1987
1987
1987
1988
1989
$56,000,000
$12,000,000
$93,000,000
$65,000,000
$90,000,000
$85,000,000
$20,000,000
$15,000,000
$53,000,000
$22,000,000
$52,000,000
$124,000,000
$50,000,000
$56,000,000
$22,000,000
$45,000,000
$46,000,000
$18,000,000
$25,000,000
$530,000,000
$285,000,000
Operator/Well Name/Location
$1,764,000,000
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PWC Course Motivation

What are we trying to do?
Eliminate mistakes which create well control incidents
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How are we going to do this?

Increase (advance) our understanding of the well
control problems that are occurring and the
procedures that are likely to be used in our operations
Aim to push competence to decide what to do and
how to do it on the rig-floor level
22
PWC Course Motivation Cont.
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What should be our attitude?

We (EVERYBODY)
EVERYBODY should be open to having our
understanding increased and corrected
We should try to create an atmosphere in this class
where you can say I do not understand that or Im
not sure I understand that
We should look for simple, practical solutions to Well
Control
Zero Well Control Incidents
23
Well Control & Standards Tests
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2 hours
24
Section 2
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IPM Standards
25
Section 2
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What are standards

Which standards apply to (preventative) well
control
26
SLB Policies and Standards

Policy
A company statement of governing principles
Standard
Procedure
A document detailing the established way of
conducting an activity
A document detailing a minimum level of excellence or

adequacy to be attained
Guideline
Document to guide work in order to comply with
policies and standards
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IPMs Adherence to QHSE Policy (1)

Statement of Policy - Operations will be conducted in
legal, ethical, and responsible manner.
Improving quality of operation

Ensuring health & safety of staff and others
Protect the environment
These principles to be held as equal to financial results
Management dedicated to:
Schlumberger Goal:
Become the recognized leader in QHSE
Make QHSE an integral part of IPM culture
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IPMs Adherence to QHSE Policy (2)

IPM will establish standards, guidelines, and procedures
and communicate to everyone involved in projects.
First, those of Schlumberger Limited
Second, those of Schlumberger Oilfield Services
Finally, those of IPM (which will take priority if more
stringent)
IPM will operate under policies, standards, guidelines:
IPM will prepare a bridging document for all work outside

Schlumberger
Key differences to be addressed and documented
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Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) (1)

IPM-ST-WCI-033
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A SIMOPS plan is required on all projects where drilling and /

or intervention work is proceeding within 30 meters of each
other and / or production operations
Objective is limiting excessive risk imposed by multiple
operations at the same time as opposed to the risk associated
with the execution of these operations individually
SIMOPS: two or more major operations carried out
simultaneously as any of these activities: production or
injection, live well operations, pigging operations, running or
pulling riser or heavy lifting, skidding rig, hot work, drilling and
workover operations, conductor driving and installation,
injection to annulus, repair or c/o Xmas tree or annulus valves
or pumping and flowing through temporary lines
30
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) (2)

IPM-ST-WCI-033
As a minimum, the SIMOPS plan shall contain the

following sections:
Duties and responsibilities
Review / risk analysis of SIMOPS
Introduction
Safety system
Emergency procedure
Technical data
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Project Bridging Document (1)

IPM-ST-WCI-030
Objective:
A Bridging Document is to be prepared during the

planning stage of all IPM Projects, preferably before
finalizing the Operations Program. The Bridging Document
must, in all cases be finalized prior to starting any
operations
1) To reconcile the different standards, practices and/or
procedures that the various players involved in IPM
supervised operation may have, in order to obtain
consistency
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IPM-ST-WCI-030
Objective, Cont.:
Topics Include:
- General
- Well control
- Shallow gas - Directional drilling
- H2S
- Logging
- Daylight ops - Well ops standards and procedures
- Exemptions to IPM Standards
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2) To resolve potential differences prior to the start of

operations, particularly when it comes to implementing
certain fundamental procedures where there is room for
interpretation and clarification
33

IPM-ST-WCI-030
Well Control Related:
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Well control certification requirements

Well control drills: type and frequency
BOP configuration: requirement for casing rams
BOP (& related equipment) tests: function, pressure,
frequency, test pressures, BOP test sheet
Casing pressure test requirements
Leak Off Test (LOT)
Kick tolerance while drilling
Standard regarding drilling breaks
34

IPM-ST-WCI-030
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Flow check standard (frequency and duration)

Amount of pressure overbalance to maintain in static
conditions
Pore pressure prediction/detection methods
Review of kick detection equipment (PVT, flow indicators)
Minimum chemical stocks (barite and cement)
Amount of active mud volume and reserve mud volume and
weight
SCR frequency
35

IPM-ST-WCI-030
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Agreement on general well kill methods, pre-recording

of information, standardized well control worksheet and
formula
Detailed shut-in procedure
Stripping checklist
Wellsite individual responsibilities and line of command
during well control operations
Surveying standard for vertical wells
36
What happened if standard cannot be complied to?

Intention: to comply with the minimum standards
If a standard cannot be complied to:
conditions, previous analysis and evaluation / mitigation of the risk
involved (risk management)
Exemptions are alerts to the managers
An exemption request must be submitted in QUEST
Exemption procedure is detailed in the Standard:
Obtain exemption in a specific operation, under special
SLB-QHSE-S010, with IPM appendix
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Management of Change and Exemption Standard (1)

SLB-QHSE-S010
SLB operations are continuously subject to change, implying that
associated risk levels also evolve. It is essential that these changes are
managed in a controlled manner so that risk is always maintained at an
acceptable level
SLB expectations for key business deliverables are defined through

associated management systems, policies, standards and work
instructions
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SLB-QHSE-S010
Management of change process: Process to manage significant
changes associated with increasing and decreasing risk levels.
Exemption process: Process to obtain appropriate approval for

deviation from SLB policies and standards for a specific period of time.
Significant change: Any change that introduces new hazards or any

change that causes an increase in the level of the risk that has the
potential to result in an HSE accident or an SQ non-conformance.
Examples of such changes are: environment, equipment, personnel,
process, etc.
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SLB-QHSE-S010
Contractual terms and conditions, work-scope, historical norms,

procedures and work instructions using the management of
change process
This standard describes what to do when significant change is

introduced following deviation from:
Policies and standards using the exemption process
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SLB-QHSE-S010
Our people, assets and the environment are protected from any
coercion to perform operations beyond standard practices
The management of change and exemption processes shall be followed

in order to manage the operational risk and grant and control exemptions
to policies and standards, so that:
Risk is adequately managed, following the steps defined in the

HARC standard, as technologies and processes, that are not
addressed by existing documentation, are intentionally or
unintentionally introduced
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SLB-QHSE-S010
It applies to all SLB ops and for all deviations from policies, standards
and deviations from contractual terms, work-scope, historical norms,
procedures and work instructions generated at any level, whether
generic or process-related and where significant change has been
introduced.
All management of change requests should be written in such a way that
they apply to the specific work process or operation requiring the
deviation from an approved contractual terms and conditions, workscope, procedures/work instructions, their use limited to the operational
unit and the validity kept to the duration of the specific work process or
operation.
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SLB-QHSE-S010
In no circumstances should requests be submitted, and in no

circumstances may they be approved, with respect to any action that
may or will lead to non-compliance with applicable laws and regulations,
which shall be adhered to at all times.
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All exemption requests should be written in such a way that they apply to
the specific activity requiring the deviation from a policy or a standard
requirement, their use must be limited to the segment or operational unit
and the validity kept to a maximum of 12 months.
43

SLB-QHSE-S010
The management of change and exemption processes shall be followed

to manage operational and commercial risk by ensuring that all
significant changes to design, equipment, operations, modifications and
deviations from policies and standards are justified, approved, recorded
and monitored in a controlled and effective manner and that relevant
parties are identified and advised of changes as needed, including
during personnel handovers.
The sequential procedure to be applied is illustrated in the next slide.
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SLB-QHSE-S010
Originator identifies the significant change
2.
Direct line Manager of Originator set up a risk assessment team
3.
Comprehensive risk assessment is performed
4.
Risk control plan to lower risk to ALARP is developed (HARC)
5.
Approver reviews all the details of the request
6.
Originator obtains approval from relevant Approver
7.
Upon approval Originator must communicate details of the

Management Of Change (MOC) or exemption to all those involved
8.
Activity is performed
9.
Originator must close out the MOC or the exemption
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1.
45

SLB-QHSE-S010
All exemption shall be logged into QUEST at originating location; if not

feasible request shall be logged into QUEST by the QHSE function at the
appropriate level
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If repeated requests are being made for the same exemption, then the
case should be reverted to the appropriate owner of the corresponding
policy / standard for a possible revision of the associated document
46
What Happens When Things Change?

Original Workscope
Well proposal
Basis of design
Basis of design
Operations
program
Operations
program
End of well
report
End of well
report
Well proposal
Risk Analysis
(Prevention & Mitigation to
ALARP)
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Modified Workscope
New Hazards and Risks ?
47
Management of Change Process

Acknowledge
the
change
Identify new hazards

and risks resulting
from the change
Likelihood
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Modify
Program or
Procedure
-1/1L
-2/2L
-3/3L
-4/4L
-5/5L
-2/1S
-4/2S
-6/3S
-8/4S
-10/5S
-3/1M
-6/2M
-9/3M
-12/4M
-15/5M
-4/1C
-8/2C
-12/3C
-16/4C
-20/5C
-5/1MC
-10/2MC
-15/3MC
-20/4MC
-25/5MC
Severity
Communicate
& Proceed
Obtain approval
from initial
program/procedure
approver
Analyze risks
Identify Prevention
& Mitigation Measures
to reduce risk
to ALARP
48
Section 2
Group discussion
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IPM Standards related to Well Control
49
Standards Presentations
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Review the IPM standards related to well control and

briefly explain why they are important and how they apply
to the operations
50
Kick Detection Equipment (1/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-003
Minimum standards for kick detection equipment:

Pit Volume Totalizer ( PVT) System.
Trip Tank Indicator.
System requirements:
Electronic or analog pit level indicator to measure mud tank levels.
Drilling fluid return indicator (Delta Flow Meter).
Display for key information.

Visual and audible warnings.
Measurements by:
Mud pit probes (potentiometric sensors) in the mud tanks.
Mud flow return sensor (paddle) in the flowline.
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Kick Detection Equipment (2/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-003
Display visible to the Driller, show the following:

Trip tank volume.
Individual volume of all pits.
Summing of volumes of selected.
The gain/loss measurement reset automatically to zero by a push

button. The gain/loss and mud return measurements equipped with
visual and audible alarm.
The drilling contractor is responsible for maintaining this equipment in

good working order at all times.
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Mud return.
52
Well Control Equipment Testing Requirem.

IPM-ST-WCI-004
The BOPs and related equipment will be tested regularly.
Equipment in safe and reliable condition that will withstand maximum

anticipated wellhead pressure.
Frequency: Every 14 days or during the first trip after the 14-day
interval with a maximum interval of 21 days.
Low pressure test (200 to 300 psi) for 5 min. and high pressure tests
will be conducted for a minimum of 10 min.
The diverter system will be function tested on installation.
Calibration: trip tank, flow meters, and critical sensors/monitors should

be accurately calibrated on a regular basis.
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BOP Stack and Diverter Minimum

IPM-ST-WCI-005
Provide sufficient BOP integrity and operational flexibility to

accommodate all anticipated well control situations.
Working Pressure:
Exploration wells: full evacuation of the well to gas (dry gas, 0.1 psi/ft).
Development wells: maximum shut-in tubing pressure (analysis of PVT
of fluid, reservoir fluid composition, injection or stimulation).
Equipment Specification:
BOP: in accordance with, or exceed API RP 53.
H2S areas: NACE requirements.
Accumulator and closing times: API Spec 16D and API RP 53.
Diverter: API RP 64.
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Well Control Certification

IPM-ST-WCI-006
All IPM supervisory staff involved in well operations shall have a

valid and recognized well control certificate, and have successfully
completed Preventative Well Control (PWC) training.
All other IPM project technical staff complete the WCF.
The recognized well control certificates are: IWCF, IADC-WellCAP,

PITS, GOST.
If a region or country has local regulations requiring certification other

than IWCF (or equivalent), all IPM operations will comply with local
regulations.
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Consensus of Well Control Procedures

IPM-ST-WCI-007
To avoid conflict and confusion during well control operation.
Prior to start well operations, agreement with the Operator and the
Drilling Contractor in: well control procedures, formulae, systems of
units, conversion factors, capacities, and kick sheets.
Agreement in Bridging Document and Well Control Briefing

Document.
Well control procedures available to key office and wellsite personnel.
Shut in (or divert) procedures will be posted at the Drillers position.
IPM personnel must be conversant with: Well Control Manual, Project

Bridging and Well Control Briefing Document.
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Well Control Drills

IPM-ST-WCI-008
Repetitive Drills:
Increase the awareness of kick recognition.
equipment, the actions to be taken and their respective functions.
Well control drills will be held, as a minimum, on a weekly basis.
Drill will include special procedures, different from those of the Drilling
Contractor.
The Well Site Supervisor will ensure that the drills are recorded in the
daily drilling reports.
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Familiarize rig-site personnel with the operation of well control
57
Casing, Liner and Tubing Pressure Testing (1/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-009
All casing strings and liners (including lap areas and seals) shall be
pressure tested prior to:
Perforating.
Commencing completion operations.
Maximum Test Pressure: not exceed the rated pressure of the

wellhead, BOP, or 80% of the minimum internal yield of the weakest
segment of the casing string.
Minimum Test Pressure: the effective pressure during the test at any
point shall be at least 110% of the maximum pressure which that
point shall experience during the lifetime of the well or tubular in
question (without exceeding the maximum test pressure).
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Drilling out the shoe track.
58
Casing, Liner and Tubing Pressure Testing (2/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-009
Liner-laps: tested to a minimum of the formation leak-off pressure at

the casing shoe.
Production/Test/Injection Tubing: as a minimum, the test pressure

shall give an internal pressure at the lower section of tubing or packer
assembly equivalent to 110% of the pressure load from the shut-in
tubing pressure and the produced or injection fluid.
Repeat pressure tests if mechanical integrity is in doubt (long rotating

hours, high dogleg severity, or corrosion).
Pressure Test Validity: pressure declines no more than 1% over a

minimum 15 minute shut in period.
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Minimum Chemical Stocks

IPM-ST-WCI-010
Mud weighting material and cement, to handle unexpected well

control situations.
The minimum stock levels are:

Weighting material: to raise the entire mud circulating volume by 120
kg/m3 (1 ppg ), or to the leak off, whichever is the lesser.
Cement: 120 meters (400 feet) open hole plug in the current hole size
with a 100% contingency (offshore or remote locations).
If the minimum stock is unavailable, the WSS is directed to cease

drilling operations until there is sufficient stock on location to
continue.
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Kick Tolerance
IPM-ST-WCI-011
Kick Tolerance: maximum volume of influx that can be circulated out

without breaking down the weakest formation.
Minimum kick tolerance: 3 times the rigs kick detection threshold.
Exploration wells: 1.0 ppg kick intensity on top of the pore pressure.
Development wells: 0.5 ppg kick intensity on top of the pore pressure.
All kick tolerance shall be more than 25 bbls.
The influx shall be deemed to be dry gas (0.1 psi/ft).
For each relevant hole section, assume:
Maximum expected pore pressure.

Minimum expected formation strength.
Swabbed kick scenario: mud weight equals pore pressure and zero kick
intensity.
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Barriers (1/2)
IPM-ST-WCI-012
Barrier: any impervious material or device that can be demonstrated

to temporarily or permanently prevent the flow of wellbore and
reservoir fluids.
After setting the surface casing string, wells shall have two or more
dissimilar tested and impermeable barriers at all times.
Barrier Testing and Integrity:
A barrier is acceptable when it has been tested in the direction of flow

and demonstrated to hold pressure to the maximum potential
operating pressure with zero leakage.
Pressure tests shall be for 15 minutes for positive pressure tests and
30 minutes for inflow tests.
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Barriers (2/2)
IPM-ST-WCI-012
Barriers for Open Hole Wireline:
Losses or gains: the fluid cannot be considered a barrier. Wireline

surface pressure equipment shall be considered.
On failure of a barrier the WSS shall initiate immediate measures to

secure the integrity of the well and restore or replace the failed
barrier. Other activities should cease unless doing so increases the
risk of an incident.
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Normal operations: barriers are the drilling or completion fluids and

the rig BOP.
63
Authority During Well Operations

IPM-ST-WCI-013
Every well operations site shall have a designated Person-In-Charge

(PIC ) who has authority over all operations at that location.
Responsibilities of key individuals at the wellsite will be reviewed

when preparing the Project Bridging Document and agreed to by the
Client, IPM, and the Drilling Contractor.
In the event of a disagreement on operational safety issues, the matter

will be referred to their respective supervisors. If safety is not an
immediate concern, made the well safe until the matter is resolved.
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Well Shut-in Method

IPM-ST-WCI-015
The response time to shut in the well will be minimized by:

Proper kick detection equipment.
Using the hard shut-in method.
The objective is to minimize the size of the influx and providing lower
choke and annulus pressures.
A notice displaying the shut-in procedures will be posted at the

Drillers position.
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Full authority to the driller to shut in the well.
65
Well Control Method

IPM-ST-WCI-016
IPM use industry recognized methods (Drillers, W&W and

Volumetric).
The Drillers method is preferred when the bit is on bottom.
The combined Volumetric / Stripping method is preferred when the

bit is off bottom, followed by the Drillers method once the bit is on
bottom and / or below the influx.
All IPM personnel responsible for well operation must be conversant

with the recognized industry accepted well control methods as well
as with the non-conventional methods used in specific situations.
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Kick Detection
IPM-ST-WCI-017
Any influx of formation fluids will be detected as quickly as possible

by:
Monitoring pit volumes.
Training personnel in kick detection.
Objective: to minimize the reaction time, size of influx, and severity of

well control operations.
All rig crews must understand the importance of early recognition

of a kick.
Shut-in procedures or diverter procedures, must be posted near the

drillers controls in English and in the local language.
PWC January 2007
Performing flow checks of all drilling breaks.
67
Kick Prevention (1/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-018
Primary well control: fluid density > formation pressure.
Primary well control is to be maintained at all times.
Minimum overbalance: of 200 psi, or 50 psi with the riser removed

(offshore operations).
Consideration to pump heavy pill prior to POOH. Run swab and surge
calculations.
Periods with no pipe in the hole must be reduced to a minimum.
PWC January 2007
68
Kick Prevention (2/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-018
The Driller or designated relief must ensure that:

Hole full at all times.
Trip sheet,
sheet filled out on every trip (deviations must be investigated).
Discrepancies investigated by a flow check. Close BOPs if flow
check is inconclusive.
Whilst POOH flow checks are to be performed:
PWC January 2007
Use trip tank when tripping.
On bottom.
Bit at the shoe.
BHA is about to enter the BOP (prior to pulling first drill collar).
Horizontal wells: bit out of the horizontal section.
Flow check for a longer period when a coring string is at casing shoe.
69
Constant Bottom Hole Pressure

IPM-ST-WCI-019
Constant bottom hole pressure in excess of the formation

pressure will be maintained, even if the MAASP has to be
exceeded prior to the influx reaching open hole weakest
point.
Objective: to prevent any further influx of formation fluids into the

wellbore.
The automatic MAASP control feature is kept switched OFF, that is,
there will be no automatic choke pressure limitation to MAASP.
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70
Reporting of Well Control Events

IPM-ST-WCI-020
All well control events will be reported using the IPM WCI Report
using the template in Quest.
Objective:
To gather historical information.
Report outlining the root causes.
Implementation of remedial actions.
Kick: unplanned but controlled flow of formation fluids into the

well bore requiring the closure of BOPs.
Planned Kicks: intentional underbalanced drilling or in setting

upper protective casing(s) in deepwater operations where natural
flows and weak formations necessitate drilling to the extreme
limits of kick tolerance.
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71
Shallow Gas Risk Assessment and Contingencies

IPM-ST-WCI-021
Shallow gas: any gas accumulation encountered during drilling

at a depth above the casing setting point of the surface casing.
A shallow gas risk assessment will be made for all well

locations.
In all cases there will be a contingency plan to cover a shallow

gas flow.
Consideration shall be given to set the surface casing as shallow

as will allow for well shut in without broaching to surface.
If there is any indication of the presence of shallow gas, gas

will be assumed to be present and the well surface location
will be moved.
PWC January 2007
72
WC while Running and Cementing Casing (1/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-022
Maintenance of Fluid Column:
Sufficient fluid height in both the casing and the annulus.

Monitor pit volumes and returns.
Check volumes to fill the casing. Top up the casing every 5 joints.
Run surge calculations.
Primary well control displacing cement and spacers.
Monitor pit levels during cementing operations for gains and losses.
Monitor cemented annulus until surface samples are hard.
Maintenance of Barriers
PWC January 2007
Two non-return valves: running casing into a hydrocarbon-bearing zone.

Automatic-fill float equipment is to be tripped closed.
No differential or automatic fill-float equip. through hydrocarbon zones.
Slotted liner / Screens: contingency plan for well flowing.
73
WC while Running and Cementing Casing (2/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-022
Casing Rams
Annular preventer: if no run through hydrocarbon bearing formation.
Liner run through section with potential hydrocarbon bearing

formations: no need to change rams.
Suitable crossover from the casing threads to the drill pipe threads is
made up to the IBOP and is readily available on the rig floor.
PWC January 2007
Change upper rams to casing rams: when run through potential

hydrocarbon bearing formation.
74
Leak-off Test or Shoe Test

IPM-ST-WCI-023
Test on formation strength: in the open hole after drilling 10 to 20

feet of new formation below each casing string where a BOP has
been installed.
Objective: to determine integrity of the formation below the shoe or

primary cement job around the shoe.
The EMW at the shoe will be used for well control purposes.
Leak Off Test (LOT): pressure is increased until deviation from a

linear pressure-volume plot is first seen. For exploration/appraisal
wells.
Formation Integrity Test (FIT): pressure is applied to the formation

to achieve a predetermined kick tolerance. Applied in development
wells.
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75
Well Control Briefing

IPM-ST-WCI-028
Well Control Briefing is required, before WS personnel assume

responsibilities.
Objective: to ensure clear understanding of project objectives

relating to well control.
Specific project Well Control Briefing document: including, e.g.

project well control exemptions, shallow gas, kill procedures, lost
circulation zones, abnormal pressure, local tectonics, rig well control
equipment and all other pertinent project information required in the
performance of their well site responsibilities.
Document continuously updated throughout the execution phase.
Re-certification every year, when the document is changed and/or

prior to assuming well site responsibilities at a new project.
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76
Gas Detection Equipment (1/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-031
Rig Type
Combustible Gas
H 2S
Land rig
2 (bell nipple & shaker)
3 (rig floor, shaker & cellar deck)
Offshore &
3 (bell nipple, shaker, mud
5 (rig floor, shaker, cellar deck, mud
inland water rig
tank room)
tank room, living quarters air intake)
Minimum Gas Detection Equipment Specification: gas detection and

alarm for monitoring of combustible gases and H2S. Visible and audible
alarms. Minimum detection points shall be as follows:
Two portable electronic gas detectors for: oxygen, combustible gases

and H2S.
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77
Gas Detection Equipment (2/2)

IPM-ST-WCI-031
Gas detector sensors setting:

Oxygen Deficiency 19.5%.
Lower Explosive Level L.E.L.
Visual low and high level alarms, activate at 10 and 20 ppm

respectively.
High level alarms: activate an audible evacuation alarm.
Equipment calibrated and tested as per manufacturer.
Alarms should be functionally tested at least once daily.
PWC January 2007
H2S Concentration 10 parts per million by volume (ppm).
78
Contingency Stripping Procedure

IPM-PR-WCI-002
Stripping: movement of tubular in and out of a pressured wellbore.
Ram-to-Ram emergency stripping:

Both rams are solid block of the same size as the pipe.
There is at least one safety ram and a shear ram installed below the
stripping rams.
Casing pressure is below 1,000 psi
Annular emergency stripping: casing pressure is below 1,000 psi.

Floating rigs, heave below 5 ft with pitch/roll below 1 degree.
Stripping speed: below 2 ft/sec at all times.
Requisites: stripping worksheet and pre-job safety meeting.
PWC January 2007
Surface stack.
79
Summary
Standards and guidelines are reviewed periodically.
File exemptions, may help to change standards and procedures.
http://intouchsupport.com/intouch/methodinvokerpage.cfm?metho
d=iteview&caseid=3271495
PWC January 2007
Can be downloaded from InTouch:
80
PWC January 2007
End of sections 1 & 2
81

Sect 01-02 PWC Students

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Sect 01-02 PWC Students

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IPM Well Control

Before we get started

PWC January 2007

Why the Preventative Well Control Course?

IPM incident rate: 1/60 (includes all WC incidents, kicksblowouts).

Industry average: 1/615 (only includes blowouts).

The number of well control incidents in IPM has reached an

To develop a common culture: because IPM is made up of people

PWC January 2007

IPM Well Control Training

2. IWCF regulatory training or equivalent certification as per

1. Basic introductory module for new hires and fresh outs

3. Preventative well control course IPM mandatory.

PWC January 2007

PWC January 2007

PWC January 2007

Well control in OBM

Well Control and IPM Standards

40 Questions IPM standards

40 Questions Well control based

Keep answers short and to the point

Answer all questions that you know first

There is one unconventional part of the test:

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PWC January 2007

PWC January 2007

Well control incidents examples, consequences

Well Control Incident Dacin

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IPM Well Control Incidents

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Distribution of IPM Incidents by type

Casing & Completions

PWC January 2007

Distribution of IPM Incidents by type

PWC January 2007

Distribution of IPM Incidents by type

Drop tool / String in well

Unplanned Cement left in string

PWC January 2007

Distribution of IPM Incidents by type

PWC January 2007

Loss of operation activity

Distribution of IPM Incidents by type

Loss of Operation Activity

Sum of % of total NPT(year 2006)

Stuck Pipe / Tools

3rd Party Contractor Equipment

Loss / Failure of Equipment

PWC January 2007

Distribution of IPM Incidents by type

Stuck Pipe / Tools

PWC January 2007

IPM Well Control History

Cem, drlng, rig move

Cem, drlng, log, trip

B/O Operator Error

PWC January 2007

IPM Well Control History

PWC January 2007

187 well control incidents in

A catastrophic well control incident

PWC January 2007