NOTES ON BOOK

ZETA

OF
ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

being the record

by MYLES BURNYEAT and others
of a seminar held in London,

1975-1979

Sub-Faculty of Philosophy,
10 Merton Street,
Oxford,

1979

( reprinted 1986)

PREFACE
Once a month on winter Saturdays a group of scholars converges
on New York City by car , train and aircraft to discuss some
Greek philosophical text . On his return to Britain the group ' s
founder , G . E . L . Owen , set up a daughter house in London, which
first met at the British Academy in Piccadilly on Sth February
1975 and began discussion of Aristotle ' s Metaphysics book z.
M . F . Burnyeat took minutes of the meeting , which he later wrote
up and circulated. The record was continued , by Burnyeat and
others , at every subsequent meeting unti l , on 17th March 1 9 7 9 ,
we reached the end of Z .
This volume contains those minutes , together with two
previously unpubli shed papers, by G . E . L . Owen and G . J.Hughes ,
which we had before us during our discussions of Z 7 -9 and
Zl3 respectively. The proposal to publish was made in May
1979 , whenit was decided to leave all the material in the
form in which it had originally been circulated, with only
minor editorial deletions and clarifications . What follows ,
thereforeis a record of the London group ' s discussions , now
and then embell ished (as will appear) , but for the most part
merely organized , ' by the subsequent labours of the recorders.
In comparison with a commentary our record must lack unity
and comprehensivenes s ; but we offer it in the belief that
others will find value in an account of what a number of
people , working together , thought about this difficult text.
We express our cordial thanks to the British Academy for
making their premises available to us from 1 9 7 5 to 1977 , and
to the Ins itute of Classical Studies in Gordon Square for
extending the same favour since October 197 7 .
Nearly half the minutes are by Myles Burnyeat , the rest by
Julia Annas , Lesley Brown , Christopher Kirwan , Alan Lacey ,
Gwilym Owen , Malc olm Schofield , Bob Sharples and Michael Woods .
Others who attended meetings (many not often) were Elizabeth
Anscombe , Jonathan Barnes , David Charles , James Dybikowski ,
Theodor Ebert, Gail Fine , Peter Geach , Gerald Hughes , Edward
Hussey , Terence Ir win , Barrington Jones , Anthony Kenny ,
i

Geoffrey Lloyd , Anthony Long , Brian McGuinness , Richard

McKirahan , Gareth Matthews , Richard Sorabj i , Christopher
Taylor , David Wiggins and Kathleen Wilkes .
C .A . Kirwan
October 197 9 '

ABBREVIATIONS
The works of Aristotle are referred to as follows :
An . Pos:t

Posterior Analytics

Cat .

Categories

De An:

De Anima

EN

Nicbmachean Ethics

GC

De Generatione et Corruptione

Met .

Metaphysics

PA

De Partibus Animalium

Phys .

Physics

Pol .

Polictics

Rhet .

Rhetoric

SE

De Sophisticis Elenchis

Top.

Topics

Capital Greek letters refer to rooks of the Metaphysics unless

otherwise specified .
Unprefixed page numbers , as in ' 1002b 10 ' , refer to the
Metaphysics .

- ii

Other references :
Apostle

Aristotaes Metaphysics , translated

with commentaries by Hippocrates
G . Apostle , Indiana 1966

Asclepius

In Aristotelis Metaphysioorurtt<'Libros
A-Z Commentaria, ed. M . hayduck ,
Berlin 18 8 8 .

Barnes

Aristotle ' s Posterior Analytics ,

translated with notes by
Jonathan Barnes , Oxford 1975.

Bohn

Aristotle , the Metaphysics ,

translated by Revd. John H.
M ' Mahon , Bohn ' s Classical Library ,
London 1857 .

Bonitz

Index Aristotelicus , H . Bonitz ,

Berl1n 187 0 ,
or
Aristotelis Metaphysica , H . Bonitz ,
Bonn 1 8 4 8 -9 .

Jaeger

Aristotelis Metaphysica , w. Jaeger ,

Oxford Classical Texts , 1957 .

Oxford translation

Volume VIII (Metaphysica 1 . translated

W . D . Ross ) in The Works of Aristotle
translated in.co E11glish-, Oxford
19 2 8 .

Ps . Alexander

Commentary on Z (in fact by a

later hand ) in Alexander of
Aphrodisias , In Aristote lis
Metaphysica Commentaria , ed .
M. Hayduc, Berlin 1891 .

Reale

Aristoteles , la Metafisica ,
traduz ione , introduzione e
commento , Giovanni Reale ,
Loffredo 1 9 6 8

Ross

Aristotle ' s Metaphysics , text and

commentary , W . D . Ross , Oxford 19 2 4 .

The convention has usually been followed of writing mentioned

Greek words without inverted commas .

iii

Note to

2nd Impression

The text is revised only by the correction of a misprint on

page

1.

shall be happy to receive further corrections and

comments from readers,

for the benefit of future impressions.

C.A.

Kirwan

Exeter College,
Oxford.

March

iv

1986.

CHAPTER

Zl

8th February 1975

1 028a 1 0 :t:o v ;>.,(ye:l:aL n:oA.A.axk. We looked for a rendering
that would least suggest a definite unitary subject, since
the thesis says there is nonewhile it would be mis leading
to take a linguistic expression as the subject. Perhaps
' whatever we call )\,
ov', manufacturing a class by reference
to the expression.
1 028a i1 anua(ve:L. Supply as sub j ect a linguistic ex
pression from i;(J v. We discussed, but failed to il luminate ,
/
the sense of onuaLve:Lv tiere We also debated the issue
complete vs . incomplete e:'tvaL. The incomple te ,
of
suggested to some by 1 0 28a 15-18 , where Aristotle deals
with sentences like ' This is a man/warm ' , foundered on the
abstract nouns in a 19-20 illustrating ,(x A.A.a va (a 18)
i:othwv (a 14) = the i3'vi:a signified at a ll-l 3 . Thereafter
we often translated ' exists ' .
=

10 28a 1 1 - !2
{-6i gnifiesl what a thing
is and ( that it is) a this something, a subject . It was
suggested that the ua( joins the two marks of oo(a that will
later get pres sed , indeed overpressed , in different directions :
form and subjecthood (matter) .
1 0 28a 14

Again supply a linguistic subj ect from

' ( "!oi: L via the answers that question collect s :
these are
/
'
,,
,,.,
what onuaLve:L nv ooLav.
anua(ve:L.

10 28 a 15-18 . The parenthesis explains not why .()IJOLa is

/, .
/
n:pchov ov but why ( the answer to) l:L e:al:L signifies otoLa.
To perform this role it evidently presupposes ( a ) we know that
a man or a god are substances, . ( b ) that the 'this ' about which
the questions l:( n:o1ov !al:L1 etc . are asked is a sub stantial
individual , not e . g. a colour.
l.

1 0 2 8a

18

ON

NOTES
1028a 18-20

was thought to yield a two stage analysis for e . g .

'Heliotrope exists ' :

substance.

ZETA

( a ) H i s a quality,

( b ) H qualifies some

( Uninstantiated qualities are not

6(.i;a.)

By contra st ,

'Socrates exists' says that Socrates is a substance and that is

all - there is no analogue to (b)
But : -

for a substance to exi s t .

l028 a 18

C/

t'\
oui:wb
i:ou

of course, be an

ts'v

in the analysis of what it is

?fvi:oi;; .

The substance mentioned in (b) wi l l ,

i n its own right, but should we infer that

an account for what it is for a substance to exis.t must be

included in the analysi s of what it is for a quality to be an

7fvr

Such a requirement is made for i:ci,6ya:e:L'il in r2 , but here at

least it seems otios e .

&i:w i;; : in

a 18 is ambiguous on the point:

if it is read as part of the analysis of ?fvi:a, we get the

parallel with r , but i t might equally be Aristotle's way of
designating ( from outside the analys i s , so to speak) the sort
of

which the qualities , etc . mus t qualify if they are to

exi s t .

rtop(a arises. from the dependent nature of

non-sub&tantiaL existence : : if . ;1.;\.a are .not npc;;i;wi;; '>ovi:a
1028a 20-2.

The

but only '6vi:a in the dependent way described , maybe they are
not

vi;a

l028a 2 1

at a l l .
No great anxi ety was felt about the readings ona(ve: L

g\,. With either it was thought that ifu.aai:ov d'ui;f;N

should be taken a s subject ( contra Ross ) : and that the sense

).I.

of the point was not affected .

1028a 23

rte:q>uu.&'i;;.

inclination

to

Here, on the other hand , there was some

bracket the word , with Jaeger against Ross , on

the ground that the usual expansion for u.aa 'ai:o i s ;\.e;y c(e;vov ;
thi s to be weighed against texts where non substantial items
are u.aa' an i:&' ;\.e;y
l028a 24-25

'

c{e;va .
,,.

i:o 13a5L!:ov

etc . refer to particulars (cf . a 2 7 )

,.. specimen walkers and the like . Hence :

2

10 28a 2 6

CHAPTER 1
10 2 8a 26-9

The point being made i s that with 'the walker',

'the si tter' , etc . a reference to a definite sub j ect i s

(ta(vEaL)

manifest

i n the expres s ion itself,

- Kaana8aL

equally requires a subject, but when we speak of sitting we

,,,
may not have any determinate subject in view .
For xanyopLa

= designation cf . 1 0 4 7 a 34 .
1028a 2 9 - 3 1

Various construals of this sentence were canvassed .

It became clear, first that

aunv

/
ouaLa

since it would not be because of their des ignation

.

C/

,,,,,
xanyopLa
that KE(vwv

a 2 7 , not

,,,
Exaoov "
EOLvi second that ,,EKELvwv
most likely refers to the
,;.
' ::>
"'
'
more remote o aaoLELV, etc . a 20-2 1 , rather than o aya8ov,
,
' ">/
xa8nEvov a 28-29 1 i f the latter, "'
L
ov makes the point
,;
'
'
that o aaeLOV must always be o aaoLOV L1 eg, the walking
.

"'

"

man, whereas ' the man' is complete as it stands and does not
require to be backed by an answer to the question ' The man
what? ' .

This reading of o

ingenui ty ,

SO

was felt to need excess ive

o aaofELV,

we settled for\KEVWV =

etc.

was then construed in the light of a 18-20 : these items

can only be said to be. in that they are actions, etc . of what
is

nptwc

.1

- for them to be is to be something, an action,

quality etc . of a substance, whereas a sub stance, in that it

is

nWG,

j us t is

c&n}..(;iG).

All the same , th i s is not un

problematic in a text purportedly dealing with the complete

-'S'
ELvaL.

Why should Aristotle suddenly turn his contrast between

primary and dependent uses of the complete

between a complete. and an incomplete.use?
suggestion was made that,

xa\

explaining precisely that the

-i:(

in

,,..
ELVaL

into one

At this point the

8.nA.lG i s parenthetica l ,
np-CWG v i s intended as

the complete one, not the incomplete.

contrast more usually associ ated Wi th

Not only is this the

anG VS,.V L

i t preserves the chapter's concentration on the complete

and still yields the sense we want without diffi culty :

v-r:a

(complete use)

substance i s primary .

"'
ELvaL

within

The meeting closed

before this sugges tion could be properly aired .

3

but

ZETA

ON

NOTES

l.028a: ;30
8th March 19 75
1028a 30 - 1

&nA.wb

We adopted the suggestion that

is epexegetic to

the comp lete

note) .

For

't'vaL

"tL

"tv

rather than

npfu'"twb,

speci fying it as

as opposed to the incomplete

dnA.b

with

'i'vaL,_y {yvEcr8aL,

?:i.A.A.' Jv

"tL v

( see previous
c f . SE 166b

37 ff, Phys . 19 0 a 3 2 ; more in Bonitz .

10 28a 31-3

priority in time . Since priority in definition is

explained 34-6 and priority in knowledge 36-b 2, 3 3-4 is left,

b y elimination, as the explanation of priority in time.
does it work? 1 1 is not much help .

accidents are not'

How

'Sub stance is separable,

cannot mean that whi le accidents cannot

exis t without subs tance, subs tance can exist without ( any)
accidents , whether-s.ubstance is .taken. as.'..individual or kind .
To meet this constraint, 3 types of solution were canvas sed : ( 1)

( a ) An individual substance could exist without the

accidents, e.g . qualities, it has .

Ob jection :

the qualities

in question could exist without the substance, in other

individua ls .

No asymmetry emerges unless the qualities are

taken as particularized to the individual, and it is contro

versial whether Aristotle believed i n particularized qualitie s .
( b ) A kind o f subs tance, e . g . animals, can exist without
exhibiting a given quality, e . g . baldne s s ; but b aldness cannot exi s t without some animal having i t .

Ob j e ction :

works for determin ate qualities but not for ( al l )

th is

determinable

ones ; e . g . bodies could exist without any being pink but not
without any being coloure d .

So to maintain this account we

would need to fi l l out Aris totle's brief sentence with a

s tory about the dependence of determinable s on determinate s .
( 2 ) We looked at the idea that Aristotle h ad in mind something
les s precise , arising out of the context.of traditional debate
which is in his mind at the end of the chapter ( 28b 2 f f ) and
in Z 2 .

The idea was that Aristotle represents his que stion

' What is substance? '

as a sharpened version of the tradi tional

search for ( one or more ) primary beings .

These had been primary

in several senses, most notably in explanation and often also

in time, and prior or antecedent, if not to all qualities and
accidents, s ti l l to mos t ; hence separab le from these, as Aristotle
claims his substance is .

( In this connection we alluded to

4

CHAPTER

10 2 8 a 3 1

10 3 8b 2 6 - 9 , which agrees with Z l that accidents cannot be

prior in time because priority in time entails separab i lity;
but the outcome was inconclusive . ) The troub le wi th thi s idea,
however, is, first, that in order to see how Aristotle's substance
does meet the relevant criterion of primacy, we still have to
understand a precise Aris totelian sense in which substance is
prior in time to accidents; second, that priority in definition
is explained 35-6 in such entirely Aristotelian terms that there
seems to be no point of contact with anything in the tradi tion .
( 3 ) Finally, we tried approaching the question through a
Subs tances are the . things that change,

context of change .

accidents what they come to have by changing .

So, for any

quality you like to take, i ts existence (its being . the quality

of some substance)

is to be looked on as the result of a

change involving a .pre-existing substance (which does not

imp ly that that substance had no other attributes beforehand)
In this connection reference was made ...to An. Post.
[But the objection under ( 1 )

83a 4 ff;

( b ) seems to apply. ]

1028a 34-6 priority in definition. The. firs t.question was

whether the AbYOG G c?ua(aG included in the A6YoG Kaaou
mus t be an

actual definition or whether . a . s imple reference

I

to ( the) substance would suffi ce .

The Greek demands that it

be a definition, s ince the immediately preceding

obvious ly i s that.

AbYOG Kcrou

This is con firmed by 10 7 7b 3 - 4, and it

settles a point left open on . 8 Feb .

( see.. note to 10 2 8 a 18) .

This result has an important bearing .. on the next ques tion, which
concerns the range of ( a )

Ka'cno u

G o?icr(aG.

(b)

1
A . planet

body

A' .

( surface)
(,

substance

colour

B . yellow
The maximum range for

&

quality
/'

I:Kacrou would include \.Al as wel l as Bl,

and then the point would be that in either case definition

mus t include a definiton from A2 or A3 .
5

If an A2 definition

1028a 34

NOTES

ON ZETA

i s an indispensable part of any Bl definition, Aristotle i s

collllll itted to the intem;ting claim that any non-substance item
is associ ated with a definite kind of substance in such a way
that a definitional understanding of the former involves a
understanding of the kind of substance it

(definitional)
inheres in .

However, including Al rather hinders the emergence

of a clear a&Illllletry between substance and accident .

More

important, it is not Aris totle 's. practice, when defining items

from Al O.c Bl, to include a definition of the relevant A2 i tern

or of substance itself ( A3 ) .

Nor, confining ourselves to B l ,

does it help t o replace the route Bl-B2- (A' 2 ) -A2-A3 by the route
Bl-B2-B3-A3 :

when defining qualities Aristotle does not

include a definition of the category quality itself, let alone

a definition of substance.
A3 :

Kou
/

We are left, therefore, with B 3 and

@v Awv Kanyopnctwv

a 3 3, and the point i s

/

If

that a AOYOG of quality must include a AOYOG of substance .

i t i s asked what a A6YoG o f such categories as substance or
quality would look like, one may draw on Zl itsel f :
'

, 2

'

o L Ecr L KaL OoE

( a 11-12 ) .

o'ua(a

is

And it was suggested that

in r Aristotle is anyway colllllli tted to the idea of a AYOG of

quality, etc .

(The internal connection with the preceding part

of Z l would be closer i f Aris totle is thinking in terms of

explaining E'tva L for non-substances - a suggestion that was
made but...lost from

sight.)

Given, then, that only B3-A3 seem

to fit both the strong A6YOG -withi n-A6YOG claim and Aristotle's
practice, we mus t, and can, accept that Kaoov<at a 36 had the
broader range that Aris totle indicates at a 3 7 .
10 2 8a 3 6 -b 2 priority in knowledge . The problem was rais ed, how
does a contrast between two questions concerning . one single
( s ub s tantial)

thing prove an asymmet ry as to knowledge between

two things, substances and accidents?

And does not some knowledge

of accidents prece&and give the necess ary identi fication of a

subject about which to ask ' What is it? ' in the sense in which
that ques tion looks for an answer s ignifying substance ( a 14-15 ) ?
Preliminary clarifications :

5 vapwnoG

(a)

and io

ft%

are a

reporter' s speci fication of that about wh ich the question

.
' What is it? ' arises. It is not that the question arises in
the form ' What is

( the) man ? ' or 'Wh at is the fire? ' , but that

'What is it? ' i s asked and answered about someth ing that is in
6

CHAPTERS
fact

noL6v

man or a fire .

l, 2

10 28a 36'

(b) The adjective s in

nocrov and T

. .

b 2 are accusatives relating gramma tically to the

individual man or fire, being repeated from a 37-b 1 , i . e.

the phrases do not stand here for the categories quantity and
quality.

The problem itself was left over for the next meet ing .

llth Apri l 1 9 7 5
1028b 2 - 7

I t was sugges ted that Aristotle, given . his views on

the focal meaning of ift'!va.L,

""

"'

/ .

can

TL TO ov ; includes the question

claim only that.the question

T 'LC

.!:
11

...
oucr
L a. ; , not that the

inves tigations come to the same thing .

that two senses of T(c

( 1)

It was proposed

ota(a.; could be dis tinguishe d :

( a ) what conditions have to be fulfi l led for there to be

ocr(a?

( b ) what items fulfi l these condi tions? and that the

ques tion Tr

TO v

coincides with ( al but not (b)

Diffi culty

was fe lt over dis tinguishing ( a) and (b) sharply ( di stinctions

like " formal/material" were found unsatisfactory ) ; a theory
laden answer to ( b )

(e . g . " forms ", or - more disputed - " atoms " )

might restrict possible answers to ( a ) .

I t was felt, however,
that some such . . distinc tion would answer we l l to the way Z 2
discusses candidates previously put forward as otcr(aL whereas
Z3 is to fulfil the requirement of sketching Tnv ocrCav
OT L V ( 10 28b 3 2 ) and discusses the oo(a

TL

txa'."crTou ( 10 28b 35 ) .

( 2 ) I t was also suggested that Aristotle is not in 1028b 4

talking about the Aristote li an question

TC TO

v ; but referring

to this ques tion in the philosophical tradition .

This would

perhaps do more justice to the parenthes i s b 4-6, wh ich does not

provide very plausible answers to either the ( a ) or the ( b ) .
question.

1028b 8-15 'Ari stotle is here apparently putting forward the

C"ommonsense opinion that th-e best examples of o-?icr(a.L are

:pe:rce:p tible bodies ; t):l;ts is suggested by ( i ) his summingup of the p:roJ:ilems of . Z 2 at .!:> 28- 3 1, ( i i ) contrasts with the

apparently simi l.ar .c.8 , 1 0 1 7b 10-14, wh ich does inc lude a

character ization of t:lle se items whi ch goes beyond common- :

1 0 2 8b 8

NOTES

ZETA

ON

sense (not being predicated of a subject)

oaLlJ.OVLa

which are not perceptible-

and which includes

(unless they are the

he avenly bodies , c f . 10 2 8b 1 3 . )
10 28b 12

We decided that there was not sufficient ground for

Lvwv instead of lJ.Op{wv ( a ccepted

rni'vwv is rather awkward as an alternative

accepting ( wi th Jaeger )
by Ros s ) , although
to

lJ.OPLCJl\I.

1028b 15

We were indifferent between Jaeger's

1028b 16-18

,,,

aAlw>v

and Ross's

This looks like an argument about the limits of

perceptible bodies ( cf . 1090b 5 - 1 3 ) ; hence

usually taken to be Pythagore ans .

But ( a )

LOL

(b 16 ) are

this b i zarre view

is mentioned by Aristotle in different versions ( 9 88a 7 - 19,

nepaa have a
to be o&oCaL than bodie s . S o llAAOV fb 17 ) i s
.... _..r..\. ._
uw.u. MaL o on;pe;ov, MaL is
( b ) In 17-18 o

10 7 6 a 38 - b 11) but never as an argument that

better claim
unexplained.

'

'

'

pre sumab ly explicative , which sugge sts that the argument is

not limited to perceptible bodies .
refers to mathematicals as

n(paa

be long to perceptible things .

( c)

At 1002b 10 Aristotle

without implying that they

The argument i s thus probably

directed at the Academy argument that planes are "naturally

prior" to solids , lines to planes , points to lines and units
to points .

The doctrine itself is somewhat obscure :

see

10 17b 17-2 1 , 101 9 a 1-4 , and the references and discuss ion in
de S trycker , p . 9 3- 8 in Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth
century ( e dd . I . During and G . E . L . Owen, G8teborg 196 0 ) .

The

Academy ' s use of natural priority in this argument would con

tras t with Aristotle ' s own attempts to characterize the
priority of

oOoCa

(discussed last time ) .

then Aristotle has shifted from oGi.La

oGi.La

(mathematical) solid.

I f this is right

perceptible body to

But he is capable of thi s con

fusion in a rather similar context ( 10 7 7 a 14-20 , a 31-36 . )

. 10 2 8b 18-27

This refers to the different Academy the ories

"deriving" numbers and geometrical ob jects from . two ultimate

principles .

(A few i nformative references are appende d . )

8

CHAPTER
Given that

i"v LoL 5(,

1 0 2 8b 18

in b 24 are presumably Xenocrates , together

with what Theophrastus tells us

(Metaphys ics 6 a . 2 3-b 2 2 ) about

Xenocrates ' s inclus ion of the perceptible world in his

" derivation " , the references to the perceptible world here
(b 2 1 , 2 7 ) are probably incidental information to identi fy the
theories ; what concerns Aristotle . about these derivation
theories is that they give numbers , etc . primacy as
as against perceptible things .

o:acr(a L ,

The priority conferred by

" derivation" is again obscure, but ( probabJ;y) quite different

from the " natural priority" of b 16 - 18 ; Aristotle would thus
be distinguishing different arguments put forward by the same
group of . people.
Pas sages . where 'derivation from principles" in the Academy i s
discussed :
1080b 4-36,

1.

1083a 17-b 8

Plato, Speusippus &. Xenocrates

compared on number .

1085a 7-20

2.

( c f . 9 9 2a 10- 19 )
a 3 1-b 2 3

Derivation of geometrical
magnitudes

b 2 7- 1 0 8 6 a 18 .
3.

4.

10 8 7b 4 - 3 3

Variation.s on the princip les

10 8 8 a 15-b 35 .

within the Academy .

10 9-0b 13- 1 0 9 la 9 ,

Relation of entities produced ;

cf . de Anima 4 0 4b 16-. 3 0 . different versions of the

principles .

Alexander, in Met . 2 2 8
10-2 8 , 7 7 7 . 162 1 .
See H . D . Saffrey , Le Peri

Phi losophias d ' Aristote

.( Leiden 19 5 5 ) and review
by Cherniss , Gnomon 1959

5.

1090b 19-20

Speusippus ' s divis ion of the

. 10 75b 37-. 1 0 76a 3

materi a l principle

NOTES

1028b 18
10 8 4 a 2 9 -

6.

ON

b 2

ZETA

Derivation of entities "with in

the dekad " .

Alexande r , i n Met . SS.

7.

Problems over points .

2 0 ff Sextus , Adversus
Mathematicos . X 2S9 ff .
See de Voge l , Philosoph ia
part 1 pp . 2 8 3-S . c f .
9 9 2 a 20-4
Theophrastus ,

8.

Derivation sys tems compared .

Metaphysics 6a 2 3b 2 2 .

9.

Sextus Adversus

Plato ' s . " reduction of Forms

Mathematicos X . 2 S 8 .

to numbers" in Theophras tus .

cf. 1036b 1 2 , b 2 2 ,
1044a 13 .
10 .

1 0 8 8b 3S- 1 0 9 0 a 2 .

The principles as being and

not being .

11 .

The principles as good a.nd

9 8 8 a 14- lS ,
109la 2 9 - 1 0 9 2 a 1 7
Eudemus

evi l .

(Gaiser , Platens

ungeschriebene Lehre pp.

5 36-7
12 .

9 9 2 a . 13-19 ,

Aristotle ' s ob jection to the

10 8Sa 7-20

derivation of magnitudes .

a 3 1- 10 8Sb 4 .
1028b 19

"

nA.e: Lc.> could mean "more in number" , which would be a

reference to the difficult argument at 10 78b 3S-6

( c f . 9 9 0b 4 ) .

But in view of b 2 0 and 2 4 i s more likely to mean :"more in kind" .

.a then we must suppose

oucrLaG understood ; more serious ly , aLoLa i then grammati cally
awkward . A conuna after 'aAA.ov would make t5'va &oLa give a

aA.A.ov
.,

.aoLa.

I f ftA.A.ov goes with

,,

reason for the supposition in que stion ( c f . also 1028a 2 4 ) .

I t was also sugge sted that

may have fallen out by haplo. 10

CHAPTERS

2, 3

10 28b 19

>/

graphy after ovTa .

10 28b 2 7- 3 2 We discussed the distinction Aristotle is
drawing between the ques tions of b 28-9 and b 30 . The obvious
answer is that he is distinguishing the claims of candidates for
!> /
ouaLaL just discussed (e . g. numbers) from arguments for the
Prime Move r . This was questioned, on the grounds that the
l> ,,.
singular ouaLa can be used of numbers and mathematicals
( cf . 10 37a l0 .;.13. , 1076a 8 ) and that Aristotle. may be separating
the question of whether there are any non-perceptible o&,(a L
from the question of whether the y have separate existence
/
.,,,
( cf . 10 76a 32-7) . However this falls foul of the noTEpov
n
construction in b 30-31, which presents the existence of
' /
separate ouaLa as the only alternative to the non-existence
, ,,
of non-perceptible ouaLaL .

For lOth May 1975

Preliminari es on Z 3 : the following issues among others suggest
themselves.
"
Why is 1029b 1-3 given as the reason for investigating TO
,; /;'\
/';'.
TL nv E LVaL rather than the Z3 conclusion in 10 29a 2 6 -3 3 , viz .
that given ( a) the elimination of ifin as serious candidate
/
for ouaLa, ( b ) the posteriority of the concrete substance ,
15'
it is now proper to examine E L 8oc ( and look for it in perceptible substance s - this .justified in 1029b 3 - 12 ) ? For
\
/ ,,-:.
/';'\
.
TO TL nv E LVaL = E L 8oc . cf . e . g . 103 2b.l-2 , 10 35b 32 , 1044a
36
.
,.f"i/t.
"'
(cf . 10 3 3b 5-8 , 15-16 ) 1 for argument that TL nv E LVaL is
/
confined to EV'.
L 8n YEVouc;; c f . 10 3 0 a 1 1..,14 . Some poss ible answers :
(i ) Opening of Z4 ( =1029b 1-3) written before present Z3 and
10 29a 26-331 hence non-appearance of l?tter in summary of Z
<;".
in H (esp 10 4 2 a 2 6- 2 8 , 1042a 3 2-b 11 on .ln, 10 4 2 a 2 8-30 ,
1043a 2 6 ..,2 8 on Form) , which conforms to 1029b 1-3. :(Chrono
logical patchwork account has been extended b y some to Z 3
itself. )
( i i ) Argument o f Z3 merely aporetic, deriving un
acceptable conclusions . from improper treatment of n sub
sequently corrected (esp . in Z7-9)
( iii) At start of Z 4
: 11
I

... .

NOTES

ON

ZEll'A

be) a

q.
&LOOG

can have ( or
"""
Hence argument of Z 3 that &Looi; must be

it has not yet been shown that only the

i:C \I Etvcu.

,.

investigated gives no warrant for investigating l:L nv

.
that warrant come s from 1028b 3 4 = 1029b 1-3, and the

,..

& .vcu:
,
AOYLxn

inquiry of Z 4 does not as sume the conjoint introduction of

,,

r,.
-opT.J in the analysis of the physical individual
UAT.l
and &L5oi;;
at 1029a 2-5 .
II

ifAT.l

Z 3 treats

1-2)

as (one type of)

...

I>
unou&L&vov
npwi:ov
-

( 10 2 9 a

In two other sorts o f context Aristotle connects these

express ions; the question is what light if any these others

throw on the connection here .
c

et.

""'

'

UAT.l &Kacri:ov uaL

i:o

.,,,,.

( a ) At A 10 2 2 a 16-17 and 18-19

(
unoK&L&vov &Kacri:
nti!'tov
,,,.

'

is what Aristotle

elsewhere explains as the primary recipient of some attribute

or primary . sub j ect of .the corresponding predicate_ :

his examp le

is surface and colour ( e . g . Top . 1 3 lb 3 3 - 3 , 134a 18-25,

.. 2 4 8b 2 1-2 4!J?a 3 ) .

As colour epithets reach through to an ultimate

subject, surface, so on a more general. scheme all descriptions

transfer to an ultimate subjec t, matter ( 10 2 9 a 2 1-2 4 ) :
this do?
is not

The surface is
...

Ka3.aui:o

Ka31a6i:nv

wi' l l

white ( 10 2 2 a 3 0 - 3 1 ) , matter

anything ( 10 2 9 a 24-25 ) - if we claim these for

dif ferent uses of Ka31cYcan we make the analogy work? ( b ) At

Phys . 192a 3 1- 3 2 Aristotle says that matter is the primary
substrate of any. gven thing, that from which the thing comes
to be ( i ) with the substrate s ti ll surviving in it and (b) not

...
Kai:a crua&anuoi;;
'

( i . e . not as it' comes from its contrary or

privation, l . 9 lb 14-16 ) .

Does Z 3 presuppose an analysis of

change?
.
lOth May 1975
Method We start from the ordinary . materials of dialectical
discussion:

AY&l:aL

10 2 8b 3 3 , l02 9 a 2, . . . 00K&'i: 10 2 8b 35, 1 0 2 9 a 1

( c f . the question at 10 2 8b 278 , and 1 0 4 2 a 12-15 , where it i s

not Aristotle but the
as substance ) .
1029a 1 with

AOYOL

that argue for genus and universal

&'ALcri:a in
oucr.L/a), viz that

The most prevalent view ( taking

5ou&'i:,

although it could go with

>

sub stance is . the primary substrate, comes out . of these . . :

discussions ; i t connects , presumably , . with . the traditional

12

CHAPTER

debate about physis and what underlies change , but Ari stotle
formulates it as the thes is that substance is the primary or
ultimate sub j ect, that which of all else is said and which i s
not itself said o f anything further ( 10 28b 2 6 - 7 ; n . b .

' said

of' here does not contrast with being in ' , as in the

.e:!:.;

that distinction dis appears already Phys . 185a 3 1-2 ) . Our

own debate largely took . the form . of.a dialectical confrontation
of two readings of the argument which follows against equating
substance with primary substrate . .

It i s common ground between

the two readings that the objection to the equation i s that it

makes matter substance and matter fai ls to meet the condition
that. substance be

1:<.

OOPLC:n6v and i:ooe:

( 10 2 9 a 10 , 26-8) .

On

view (A) , that this i s so , and the sense in which it is so,

i s shown by the argument of 10.,.2 6 .

On view

(B). , that task is

performed at 20-26 , wh ile 10.,.19 undertakes to show it:is indeed

the case that the equation of substance with primary substrate
makes matter substance;

In more detail : -

'Prel iminaries on Z 3 ' above .

For (A), cf . II in

Of the two options there given for

i l lumination from outside, the more likely one i s ( b )

The

stripping operation of 1029a 1 1 f f . i s equivalent :Jto Jmai-ping

that the subject changes with respect to . any particular size,
qua lity, etc . it may happen to have .

For the aim i s to frame

a notion of the most basic subject t-0 whi ch all else i s

predi cate, not the notion o f a.bare sub j ect wh ich has no
predicates .
etc.

The subject thus arrived at i s not

c.

'

xae a ui:o nooo/v

;

( 10 2 9 a 2P), i . e . not necessarily any particular size , etc .

Sortal predicates mus t be stripped/changed too, for they are

no

less accidental to the matter of which they arepreidiciited

than predicates o f size or shape

,..

(i:L, ouc n a in 20-2 6 ) .

This

yields that notion of prime matter which is indicated by such

statements as ' The water in the kettle has turned to steam',
'Socrates 's flesh and bones are now ashes ' - there is matter
remaining the same through . these changes and s .i nce the changes
are substantia l , this matter is not
necessarily water/steam, etc .
argument then is this :
primary sub strate,

c:

,,

Ket3'aui:nv i:L

not

( not; not anything at a l l ) .

The

if you take seriously the search for a

(prime) <. matter i s the

Ycixai:ov ( 102 9 a 2 4 )

,,
you get to; but prime matter i s not xa3' aui:nv "f:L, nooov , etc . ,
whereas substance must be XCilP Loi:O'v and i:6'oe: i:L ; therefore,
13

,,

NOTES

ON

ZETA

substance is>.nbt. prime matte:i: , , nbt-be" pi:ima.i:y .. substrat.s .

According to ( B )

M . Schofield in PP,rones : i i;; ::19.72.'),,

( for wh ich cf .

the stripping operation re ally strips , i . e . it remove s both

I t i s unde rtaken in

determinate and determinable properties .

search of T L G K>..>.. n (ll.029.a :Ul :

give n that substance is the

primary sub strate , it must be matter , for what else remain s ,

when predi cates are removed, that could be subject to them all?
Answer:

nothing at all , for the stripping leave s nothing

( 10 2 9 a 12 , where (A) understands ' nothing but matte r' i 1029a

18 , where (B) doe s not think i:o 8p L Cdevov indicates a live
option ) .

Conclusion: so ( 10 29 a 18 :

c:i&i:e) matter is le f t , by

e l imination , as the primary substrate , and so (on the present

hypothes i s ) as substance , to which equation the ob jection is
the same as be fore .
Problems ( B ) was thought to run into diffi culty at 1 0 2 9 a 2 0

A.eyro

B'

ll'>..nv

Ki:A.:

given that on

(B) 's reading of 119 the

stripping does not put us in touch with matter , the only grip
we have on b">..n as yet i s the e xamp1e of the bronze of the statue
( 10 2 9 a 4 ) .

I f this i s not what is referred to at 1 0 2 9 a 19 and

explained at 1029a 2 0 , the sequence of thought i s j arred:

we

suddenly get an explanation of matter which does not seem to

fi t the example of bronze , though it is the explanation needed
to allow the ob jection at 1 0 2 9 a 27-8 to go through .

I f , on the

other hand, the example i s what is referred to and explained

at 192 0 , we get Aristotle saying that bronze is not Ka3'auo

l: L .

But i s he ready for .that before Z l 6 ?

And i s not bronze

crPLCJl:aL. i:Cl V :( 1 0 2 9.a"'2 1 ) ? On the other

side , (A) !lad to . say. that the if>..n 1n 1 0 2 9 a 30-2 is not , as one
one of the things o'fG

..

might have expected, . the bronze of the earlier example but

prime matter i
the passage gives no opinion on whe ther the bronze
is .. i:c56e i: L , because , since i t can be melted down , e tc . , the
bronze is not a serious enough candidate for being a primary
substrate .
Sibft\'1!

pol.nts: 011! <aeJ:.ail

between. :(A<) and iB:l';.

(l!l<Dstly: ifitlef)G!ndl.ertt o. the.dii>pe

:3.i1l028a 1
10.28b
=

,..

y,ap

exp.J,ci.ins why

substances as substrate.must be discusse d fir s t , but the pre

,,
ceding o L o seems idle .
14

'CHAPTER

i:e;

1029a 5

if

the

1029a 5

three candidates for the primary substrate

are A, b, and the compound (A + B ) , then, if A is

prior to B

or B to A, it is a fortiori prior to the complex (A + B ) .

1029a
j.n Z l .

1029a

OUOLO.,

prior : pre sumably in some or

ualA.ov
12 ir;l'v 'Y.A.A.oov:

all of

fue ways distinguished

other than things -that admittedly are not

as is impl ied by the parenthesis 1 0 2 9a 1 5 .

stand ' other than matte r ' here and, with (A) ,
matter ' at the end of the line, would
tautoloyous :

if

3<..

has more right to be called an

(To under-

'nothing but

leave the sentence

you strip off everything but the matter,

nothing but the matter remain s ) .

1029a

13

,,
OUVO.].l.Lb:

inter s ting as i t would be to consider the

stripping of potentialitis for change (e . g . once hurnt to

ashes, flesh loses the potentiality for being eaten, so this
t

too is not a property that prime matter has im3 ' a.un1v ) , the
context makes it appear that Ari stotle i s thinking of the
various categories into which the stripped

off predicates are

grouped, so that the ouva.ueL' are probably the ouva.ue L' in the
category of quality .
1 0 2 9 a 14-18
stripped?

Why

(Cat . 8 ) .

are geometrical properties the last to be

i( marked

Perhaps a picture of the op

out by the

subj ect 's dimensions being filled with e.g . bronz e .

Lastly, there was some ( inconclusive ) discuss ion of the
other outside connection suggested in 'Preliminaries on
under IL (a);

The

question

was

Z3 ' @bevel

whether Aristotle might parallel

the relation of surface tocolour by the relation of matter to

This would mean-that , just as whenever
' ,
something' is Coloured, there is a surface w!Hch i s xa.3 'a.ui:o

predicates generally

something has any predicate at. all, there

coloured, so when

is some matter which had that predicate xa3 '

'

,,

'

,.'

ti:t

(a quite

distinct sense of xa3 'a.ui:o from t.hat in which matter has none of

its predicates xa.3 ' aui:ol .

tl

But, .despite the use of uA.n for the

primary recipient at 102 2 a 18, it was not found that this line of
thought would be helpful with

Z3 .

15

1 0 2 9 a 27

NOTES
7th

ON

ZETA

June 1975
E:'to oG and

102 9 a 27-8

i:

E '.'".P"v are bettC'

car - date s c:han

An for oOo L a since they satisfy the criteria of being

and

XlllPLoi:ov.

Compare 10 4 2 a 26 ff.

i:o i:L

I t was thought ( a ) that

these criteria were connected, not independent and ( b ) that

f$\
Loo!;

.....

""

But if, a s appears from

strictly i s xwp Loi:ov AOY only .
'
/
,
,.
"'
. .
1042a 29, LOO!; being xwp Loi:ov AOY is i:oo i:L, would not the

same be true of

c/
uAn?

No,

uAn,
/

though separable in thought

perhaps, i s not separable Aoyw

" if this requires that a speci
fi cation can be given of it.
1029a 3 0 - 3 2

the concrete is

( i ) posterior and clear in itself,

c lear (when the other two are ;
( ii i ) clearly posterior?
1029a 3 2

'

/.

uoi:Epa xaL onAn .

cl'.

uAn

Does this mean

( i i ) posterior and (will: be)

i s, so go on to

I'>\
LOO!;),

or

( i ) was preerred.

What i s meant by calling matter

cpavEpct?

perhaps

that unlike that of form1.. the'-'conc1;!pt of.. matter is eas ily grape,
e . g . by consideration of substantial change.

The obje ction

that a grasp of the concept of matter must go hand in hand with

a grasp of that of form was not thought weighty .
1029b 3-12

This pass age was thought to have no spe cial rele

vance to its context (whether placed at the end of Z3 with

Jaeger or left in Z 4 ) and was not discus sed .

1029b 1-2

The prob lem raised under I in ' Pre l iminaries on Z 3 '

( above ) was e laborated by adding to reasons ( a ) and ( b ) a

further one, from a 3 0 - 3 2,ignored by Z 4 introduction, viz . that

1.'ooG

is the only one .o f the three candidates for oo(a that

i s not " c lear" . Of the solutions suggested in .. ' Preliminarie s '
( ii i )

found most favour :

investigation of

i: i:( v E"E'vaL

is a

. fresh start; only later ( Z 7 ) i s the close connection between

llJ\

EtooG and

t9I
i: 'o i:L, ,..
nv LVnL

e stablished .

16

CHAPTER
1029b 1 3

A.OYLKOOG .

l029b 13

The question of the chapter 's s tructure

was left for later discuss ion,

1029b 14

c.

e:Ka.oi:ce ;

"

e:Ka.OTov, codd

Though

an

'

emendation,

c /
e:Ka.oi:ce

was preferred, the dative. being so frequent in this context .

a.oi:ov

Even if we keep

the most natural interpretat ion (each

thing that is said Ka.ea.fii:o' is the

of wh ich it is so said)

' /
e: KO.Ol:W
\J

i;('ifv e:'t'va.L

( of the thing

) gives the same sense as reading

1029b 14-16

You are not

Ka.i: oa.ui:v

musical .

Despite the

oddity of the example (y9u) the point seems clear :

musical

does not apply to you in vi rtue of your being j ust that

individual you are ; you could cease to be musical without
ceasing to be .
1029b 16-18

Ka.ea.ti:6 wh ite
give the

Ka.ea.5i:6

The sense of

in Which a surface i s

(Al8, first recipient) is not that required to

i:C v e:'t'va.L .

To be white i s not the essence of surface,

for reasons analogous to the above .

1029b 18-22
passage.

There was

an

inconclusive discuss ion of this

I sele c t , without great confidence,

the following as

the main que stions arising and points emerging. Outline

It

seems that in this passage a se cond sugge stion about surface

and e s sence is obje cted to ( 182 0 ) , a third suggestion is made
and (perhaps )

a consequence -is .thereof drawn ( 2 1-2 2 ) . ,

i s the second suggestion?

( I ) .What

We agreed with M . J . Woods ( ' Subs tance

and essence in Aristotle ' , Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society 19 74-5 ) against Ross that it is that being white , while
not the es sence of surface , is the es sence of white surface .
(Ros s :
(2)

that being a white surface is es sence of surface . )

What is the objection to it?

or circularity .

a.?no = white,

as well as the definiendum .

Ros s :

surface.

Woods :

One on grounds of repetiton

=

i s in the de finiens

What is . wrong with repeti tion?

Perhaps snub- type difficulties .

gestion?

npooe:oi: Lv

( 3 ) ' What i s the third sug

being a smooth surface is the es sence of white

being smooth i s the e ssence of a white surface
17

I
NOTES

1.P2!lb 18

ON

ZETA

4!>
..
'
;>" \.
,, C/
"' '
,
,..
.
d ing
-,ru11derstan
e:nuq:ia.ve:1.,,-'C A:e:ux
v e:1.t-va.LL a4:ter 't'o a.ui;o xa. e:v
and translating 'being whate .and (therefore) smooth will be one
and the same as being a white surface ' . ( 4 ) What is the fate
of the third suggestion? (a) On woods ' view it.-.is . al lowed to
stand, since it is not open to the repetition obgectidn to
the second suggestion . It will be ruled out by the succeeding
lines wliii@h. deny_ that oU"v17e:i;a. xa.i; i;i; A:A:a.i; xanlYOP (a.i; have an
essence . (b) Suppose we read b 21-22 in the more natural way
as ; bei\'.}g white and being smooth will be one and the same ' .
Is this a reductio of the second suggestion? If so, is this
(i) because the conclusion is clearly false , or (ii) because
if being white and being smooth _are_the same the obj ection
on the grounds of repetition has not really been circumvented?
i . e . i f A has been ruled out as the es sence of AB , and C = A,
there will be the same obj ections to the claim that C is the
essence of AB. There was some support for (ii) ; none was voiced
for (i) . Against (ii) it was objected that this line of
argument would involve paradox of analy$sis type objections which
would prevent anything being the essence, of anything . Consensus
on the overall strategy of the passage was not reached . On
/
..,
...,
b 19-20 i.e:v ,..
a.pa
etc : (i) apa. is difficult , (ii) A:e:yovi;L: a
strong sense , roughly define , ( iii) there is use/mention confusion
.,, "'
in b 2 0 : the first a.ui;o the expression ' x ' , the second = the
thing x.

18th October 19 75
1029b 18-20 We started by going back to 19-20 , which sets two
,.
conditions for a A:oyoi; stating the essence of something : (i)
"
.
the A:oyoi; must state the definiendum , not something else , (ii)
the definiendum (sc . its name ) must not appear in the definiens .

With a view to making sense of the a.pa (1029b 19) , we looked for
a justification of the 2 conditions in the preceding 17-19 . It
was suggested that (i) arses out of 17-18 (being a surface is
not being white , i . e . 'white' does not say what surface is at all) ,
(iil out of 18-19 , read as saying that neither is being a
surface being a white surface , because the definiendum, surface ,
reappears in the definiens 'white surface ' . (n . b . some MS support
7
,,
for aui;nl . This , of course , involves going against Woods ' suggestion
18

CHAPTER

1 0 2 8b

(see previous note) that 17-18 says not that ' wh ite surface '
does not give the essence of surface (as Ross and above ) ,
but that ' white ' does not give the essence of white surface .
We considered, . in fact, 3 interpretations of the sentence
18-19 : ( a ) Nor is it ( .!!E_ .be ing a surface - understood.: subject
carried over from previous line ) being a white surface , because
it (aCrtil'aDi:n surface ) .'_ is::repeated.:..in .the "defJ.nii;ins the
first interpretation described above . (b) Nor is it (.!!
being white - subject understood from the complement in
previous line , though it was also pointed out that in 17-18
Ii'
, ,,.
... ,
d
/5'
\.
i:o
AEUX ELVaL coul be Sub)ect, i:o EnL<P<l.VEL ELVaL complement)
being a white surface , because it (ai:O' = white ) is repeated
in the_definiens - Woods ' view, motivated by a di fferent
understanding of 17-18 ' s objection to white ' s giving the
es sence of surface . According to Woods , the trouble wi th the
latter is that a surface may cease to be white , so that it is
no improvement to suggest defining surface by ' white surface ' ,
whereas i t might be possible , so far as the Objection goes ,
to define white sui:face by ' white ' According to ( a ) , 'white '
does not give the e ssence of surface simplfi because white is
something other than surface , in which case 'wh ite surface '
might still seem a possible definiens of surface . ( a) holds
cons tant the question ' What is the definition of surface ? ' ,
(b) the question ' What i s white the definitd.on of ' ? ( c )
Subject understood a s under (b) but the question under con
sideration is that white be defined by ' white surface ' , and
in 1 7-18 that white be defined by ' surface ' . The main motive
here was to secure defini.t;ions'LJ:hat .someone might actually
want to propose; , and by th.is test ' White is a (white) surface '
looks better than ' A surface i s ( a ) white ( surface ) ' or ' A
white surface i s white ' . However, the latter are no more
eccentric than the de finition of white man as"'thecessence of
whi te ; it does not seem that realistic examples are a prime
concern of the passage . It was also felt important to guide
our choice of interpretation not only by the need to make:
sense of 19' s pa but also by the need to construct a coherent
sequence of thought from 1029b 1 3 , and in particular from
066 on i:oli'to nt1v at 16 . From this point of view the examples
should supply per se predications which someone might think
19
=

"'

18

If
NOTES

1029b l'S

ON

ZETA

give the essence o f the subject but which fail to do so for

the reasons given in 17-18 and 18-19 respe ctively. By this
test it might seem that (a) fares best, but also that we went
wrong in discussing the issue as one concerning examples of
definiton rather than of per se predication .
10 29b 21-2 should give an example which does meet the 2
conditions set in 19-20 . What is it? We considered the
following : (d) being smooth is the essence of a white surface
- Woods ' : view, requirang us to supply ttniaveC A&UKD eva
after - alnb Kal rv Which many found tOO hard but in re
compense holding constant the de finiendum of interpretation
(b) from. 18-19 . ( e ) being smooth is the essence of white

( shades of Democritus ) - to arrive at this one s upposes ( 2 1 :

t?i.i that being a white surface is being a smooth surface
( condition (i) is met) , deletes the common factor , surface
(to. meet condition (ii) ) , and infers the identity of the
remaining factors; white and smooth . But the student is. left
.
,
to reconstruct the actual AOYO for himself, and he would
need to be cautious about generalizing the principle of his
inference ( from '4 is 2 doubled' and 14 is 2 squared' it does
not follow that ' doubled '
'.1<qua:l:!ed' ) Both {d) and Xel have
the consequence that the specimen A6yoc is al lowed for the
moment to stand (cf. minutes of 7th June 1975 under ( 4 ) (b ) ) .
We did not succeed in really integrating 21-2 into the sequence
of thought from 1 3-16 .
I

10 2 9b 2 3 What i s the. contrast implied by Ka(

!AAaG? Ros s :
substance-quality, etc . compounds a s we ll a s matter-form
compounds within the category of substance . Alternative ly ,
we have just considered a compound involving a quality (white
surface ) , but the problem i s general to any cross-categorial .
compound (hence the list of categories 24-5 ) , though as it
happens the example to be discussed (white man) is a compound
of substance and the same quality as before . Other possibil
ities were discussed , involving differentiae , but the results
were .inconclusive .

1029b 25 Combinations involving time and place would be , e . g .

I

?.Q

CHAPTER

1029b 25

...

On KLV.1')01.!G as a category name , see Ross' s

breakfast, landmark .
note ..

1029b 29 We tended to prefer the MSS 035{ to Jaeger ' s oD5{v ,

,,
'
<>.__
LV<l L , not cLa Lov .
and took OuO
o LCl L"" E'?'
=

"

Ma\ior problems in 1029b 23: .;,. 1030a 2 (1) The meaning of the
ob jection at 29. We saw little justification for.Ros s ' s
explanation , that the objection says that ' white man ' is not
internally per se ( ' white ' is not per se to man) , and that
therefore it cannot give the essence of anything. We thought
that , to be relevant , the ojection should state that ' cloak ' ,
i . e . ' white man ' , is not said per se of anything . ( 2 ) Sup
posing this is the meaning , no grounds are indicated for the
claim . (unle ss it be simply that white man is a compound)
( 3 ) The objection is followed by a reply ( 29- 3 4 ) which specifies
two ways in which something may fail to be said per se of
something. But surely they are not the only two ways . What
is clear is that if neither of these ways validates .the objection
- and we could not see that they did - the objection stands
until ctA.A.if gA.wi;; at l030a 2-3 raises the question whether
being a cloak (i . e . a white . man). is an es sence at all . ( 4 )
The account of the two ways ( 30 - 4 ) i s itself so obscure . as to
offer little help with these problems : - .

1029b. 30,.. 4 . . The clearest part is the specimen defective

definitions :
(i) ' White is AB', where 'AB' gives the definition of white
man ( 32-3) ;
(. i i) a ' A cloak , i . e . a white man , is white ' , or
(ii ) b ' A cloak , i . e . a.white man , is CD ' , where ' CD ' gives
the definition of white ( 33-4) . Note tha.t the fault in ( i )
i s not repetition o f 'white ' . ( I f it had been , we could
have related K npooa{o&W<; to npoaeoLv a'fJ,c{ (bl9) , taking
the train of thought in. reply to the objection of.28-9 to be :
Yes., that does look like an objection , but . surely .. there is .also
another . way of failing to.be per se , one which does not involv
with
repetition , .ti.! ( ii ) Any thoght tha.t this miht he
(b 21-2.) is blocked bY he fact .that. A.&u.ol &vP4o)nou. A.oyov .
.

21

1029b 30

NOTES ON

ZETA

( 3 2-3) could not mean a AOYOG consisting o the phrase 'white

man ' . ) No, the fault in ( i ) is that the definiendum (white ,
a3i;o' 31) is attached to something e lse (man , ((AA 31) in the
definiens , while in ( i i ) the something e lse (man ; f{AAO 33) is
attached to it (white , aii; 3 3 ) in the definiendum. Which of
these is u npocr{}toEii.lG ! It was dbUbteQ. (but cf . Woods op . ci t
pp . 175-6 ) that the phrase imported the concerns of Z5
,
Lai;
Lov i s not comparable to snubness , a term such that even
when you have said what it is hollowness , you have to add
' in a nose ' . So it must be explained out of 30-4 itself, and
.
the verb pocruEtcr{}aL occurs in both ( i ) and (ii) (explicitly
in 31, understood in 3 3 ) . Our only suggestion was that ( i )
involves addition be.c.ause .you define more than was set, ( i i )
does not because you define less than was set . (This i s close
to Ross ' s notes on 30 and 31-3) . The, choice between ( i i ) a
and ( i i ) b turns on 3 0 a. 12 , which we did not reach . More
important, we have not yet reached a . clear picture of Aristotle ' s
strategy in this opening paragraph of Z 4 .
'

'

Sth November 1975

I"
1030a 2-7 Boni tz ' s insertion of ce in a. 2 and .i;o5E
in a 3
seemed unnecessary , but we agreed that in a 3 K should be
olllli. tted be fore AW{;. Here Aristotle assume s that ( 1) a i; (
TYv Etva L i s a i;65E "t'. L ( a 3 ) : i f something i s the essence of
F then being it is j ust what it is (d'rtEP) for something to be
a particular F . : ( 2 ) ' only a subs ji.ance' l s '-a' t6aE "t'. L (a 5-6 ) .
Given. these we conclude in a 3-5 that something which i s such
that one thing is said of another (a:AAOU uai; ' &AAOU) is not a
/
'
I"
The reason . why e . g . J.ai;
i;o5E
"t'.L (because not a substance)
Lov
( = white man) is not a substance has to be sought in the
diffic.ult phrase &AAO uai;' ?i"AAOU. Four possible interpretations
of this . were rej.e cted in favour of a .fi fth which itself turned
out to create problems later in the chapte:r:. . ( 1.) 'White man '
involves . a . predication , viz . predicating white of some men.
But this would rule out substances too: ' rational' is predicable
of animals
( 2 ) ' White man ' involves a nonessential predication
(cf . here a 14 )
But this may also rule out to.o much 1 a
differentia predicated es sentially of substances might also be
22
,..

ll

CHAPTER

1030a 2

predicated nonessentially . (But exampJ.es of this were unconvincing . ) ( 2 ) also depends on understanding somel:hing not
in the Greek , viz . ' nonessentially ' . ( 3 ) White is not ex
clusive to men , so here something is predicated of what is
not identical with it. But if substances are not to be ruled
out this implies that the genus has to be identical with the
differentia . ( 4 ) White is something other than white man
(not ) , since some non-white-men are white . This does not
rule out substances if we suppose Aristotle to have in mind
here his doctrine .of "the. unity qf genus and differentia in
the species . So AAO Ka ' AAou = the differentia is not
logically equivalent to the species . Doubt was felt about
this on the grounds that this confines the subjects of pre. .
.

w
dications that are not aAAO Ka ' aAAou to species whereas the
doctrine should allow for the inclusion of particulars (in
' Socrates is a man ' etc . ) Also unhappiness. was felt about the
fact that while the 'II
aAAo = white , the ,,
aAAou = white man , given
.
,,,
.,,
ttAAou
the previous remarks on ouv3ETa . (5) aAAO = white. and ?,
= man , and the trouble is that these are items from different
categorie s . i . e . otiK r{AAO Ka ' AAOU rules out cross category
compounds; t J.10'.'T L ov was introduced above as such a crosl"'
:a ./
category hybrid. The argument would be : it isn ' t an uoLa
because only part of it is; something else has been added .
This fits better than (4 ) the previous points about definitions
misfiring by addition. But it does involve reading a point
?/
'I
about categories into the phrase aAAo Ka ' aAAou . And if it
is not to rule out substances it requires that differentiae
be in the . category of substance .
-

C/

1030a 6- 7 The ooo.E-cd.ause does not follow from what has gone
before , bt anticipates the following discussion to Show that
only substances can have definitions .
, 1090a 7.:-g A negative point about definitions . It ' s not a
/
'
"
suffic ient condition for a OPLOJ.10' that there be a AOYO'
with
the same sense as an i'fvo).1a; a single word can always be intro
duced and stipulated to mean the same as a Ayo, , so there is no
guararitee t11at there is anything that the vo).1a define s .
VOJ.la here = ' word ' , not ' name ' . The nearest parallel to the use
23

1030a 7

NOTES

ON

ZETA
.

....

of the Iliad example here is An . Post. 9 2b 26ff . ' n IALab '

here is not, contra some accounts , used as an rfv oua stipulated
to mean the same as ' MV LV e Loe , eec{ etc . ; it denotes the
A6Yob which is the Iliad.
10 30a 9 - 1 1 A ( more problematic) positive point about
definitions . A AOYOb is a definition if it means the same as
a word denoting some primary object . Fs are primary if a
thing is called an F not C{AAO xa ' &'.S..Aou . So the force of the
passage rests on a:'AAO xa< ' e(AAOU again. If it is to be taken
as in a 4 , it rules out cross-category compounds like white
man . But since there are 8pLoo(, in a derivative . sense , of
non-substances , ' it should here rule out also subj ects of
/
OP LoUOL in non-substance categorie s . But this give s us an
(excessive ly? ) weak sense for npwob , merely : not one thing
predicated of another .
'

c.

--

10 30a 11-17 Aristotle needs to argue here : if anything is

primary it is a specie s . But he argues instead : if anything
is a species it i sn ' t xa< e<ox etc . (a 13-14) . We
discussed the parenthe sis of a 13-14 to find il lumination, but
the passage could be interpreted as ruling out ( a ) white man
(cross category compound) (b) white ( item in non-substance
/
'
category) , or ( c ) both . xaa ue oxn v : 10 37b 18 did not
produce the illumination that might seem promised . The best
interpretation seemed to be : specie s are not said to be by
virtue of sharing , i . e . being shared by something else (whereas
,
"'
,
/
'
e . g . colours might be ) . xaL' na3oG
(
ou xa<a
naeob)
: this
/
'
seems meant to be explicative of ou xaa
erroxnv,
but fails to
put any restrictions on the way the latter is taken, unless
we are to suppose it undersd:ood. iil. .an undii.fferentiated<J
Platonic way, i . e . applied equally :to species and non-species
nouns . There was inconclusdve discussion on the force of
"
/
/
c.
using eoxn rather than eee
!; L, G . WG
ouul3el3nxob
: the best
interpretation seemed to be : it ' s not true that the species is
an accident:: of anything e lse . Assuming that the second phrase
is explicative of the first , the parenthesis gives us two points
about species ; ( i ) an ' internal' point : they are not shared
out; ( i i ) an ' external ' point : even if internally simple ,
24
=

>

CHAP.TER

10 30a 11 -

species are not accidents of things . I f what is ruled out here

is ( a ) , then we don' t ge t the required conclusion ( c ) , unless a:
6 and a 10 can be taken as ruling out (b) e xamples . Al terna.,,.
tively , ( c ) is not the required conclusion , since (b ) is not
ruled out until the following lines on the derivative senses of
"
/
opLaoG
. There was inconclus ive discussion on whether these
lines should be read as ruling out ( b ) , or as quali fying a
previous ruling-out by ruling (b) back in again in a derivative
sense . Two other points : ( 1) genera are not ruled out so far ,
at least not i f they a re species of a further genus . ( 2 ) i f
' species ' i s taken i n a narrowly biological sense then items
like numbers , artefacts etc . which have an es sence are rathe r
arbitrarily ruled out .
1030a 14-17 Doubt was felt about the syntax of thI!'r sentence.
Should i: ( ana (ve: L be excised as an intrusive glo s? In the
end it . was thought that it could s tand , understood as a
/
.,,.
' .:S/
:v i:a
aA.A.a i:'L anaL ve: L
nominal;i. za tion of the ph.rase A.e:ye:
' .
There is- use/iention. confuson. in .i:a
aA.A.a : ( i ) things o.f . .
which there is a A.QYOG ( i i ) items subdividing into 5v ai:a
/
,,,
e:av (;'\
n ovoa can be read ( i ) ' i f there is _ a
and A.oyoL . Hence- .>'
name ' , ( i i ) ' i f i t is a name ' . What are i:a ?!.A.A.a anyway? (A)
They are .c ross- category compounds , e . g . whi te man , for which
/
(..
/
one can give a name ( L.ai; Lov , e . g . ) or a longer A.oyoi;; . The
A.6yoi;; L i;boe: i;oe: crrcdPXE L Will presumably say that Whi te is
found in man . (B) They are non-substance i tems , and the A.tyoi;;
'
c /
.
v

oi:L i:ooe:
oe: unapxe: L will say that
for an item to be white ,
i:"'
something e . g. smoothness , is found in something e lse e . g .
surface .

1 3th December 19 75
10 30a 1 7- 2 7 The structure o f the argument is made clear by the
'
two e:p sentences 17-18 , 21- 3 : (' ai;L is said in more than one
'
way , there fore so is '?
i: L,,, ,.e:ai:L , there fore so also is 5pLa 6i;; .
Our problem was with the st!!P from the first to the second .
(Not that the next step could not be que ried too, but given
that c5pLad'G is defined in terms o f the i; ( ai:L question , it
is intelligible that Aristotle should think that being said
25

--

IP

1030 a 17

MOTES

ON

ZETA

in more than one way transfers from the definiens to de finiendum . )

18""20 .specifies , without arguing_ for , the several senses o f .
'
o
L ecr L , so the only assistance we have for the problematic
step is the explanation and analogy offered in 23- 2 7 . One
half of the analogy is clear: ,b '8v L is (at least)
mis leading as it stands (anA ) and can only be accepted with
the qualification added d crL v . But what would
be the parallel for noL 6v? What needs qualification to
avoid misleadingness , ( i ) . noL1iv Ya L , ( i i ) . noL v ta (
L , or .( iii) ,'Q no L v tcr L v :r( cr L ? Here ( i i ) was based on
reading crL as the main verb in the ti&,e clause of 2 4 : ' so
that . no L6v also is wv ,( . To this th objection W<l,$ r;;rJsed
that it is more natural , given the frequency in the context
of the expression ,6 ,i'.' crL, to take ,i;iv , ( io L as a single
phrase , leaving the ve rb to be unde rstood; the plural is
/
/ ,
'
\
paral leled by a L EcrL at 10 2 7b 2 8 , whereas o L ( 10 2 6a
36 , 10 4 5b 3 3 , l0 6 9b 9 , 1089b 8) invariably labels the category
of substance in contrast to the others . Furthe r , Alexander' s
lemma (not recorded in the apparatus ) has crL Wv , ( crL .
The counter-ob jection was that it is not much of an argument
to urge ' We can ask o f a quality , ( O L , so qua lity too is
.-Gv :r'C" lo:n', since the conclusion he re simply states that
quality is such as to admi t of that question. On the whole ,
however, this was not ' thought as weighty as the ob jections to
the alternati ve ; the appeal to what we can ask merely confirms
a thesis which had been in doubt earlier in the chapter . Thus
( i ) and ( i i i ) remain . Of these , ( i ) keeps the analogy clear,
but ( iii) seems to be needed for Aristotle to conclude at 24-5
'
,..
' '
'l.'he fra tUre of
that KO.L O TtO L OV v
the difficulty may be brought out by comparing 29- 32 , which

makes the parallel point about o""' L,, ,..

DV EIS'LVo.L , again
by
argument from . ,( crL . Here we were happy to take &nA/Jii;;
with e1.'vo.L and understand the contrast as one be tween 'what
it is to be (period) ' and ' what it is to be a quality , e tc . '
. o L/ >EOL
'
IS\
But unlike the E,g..LVO.L in o
'L 'F<
qV EoVO.L
, the EOL in
is not complete where the category of substance is concerned.
The question ' What i s a man1 ' specifically invi tes comple tion
of ' A man is
' So although we were confident that whateve r
i s derivative o r qualified about ' White is such and such ' . mus.t
26
,,. ,,

>

....

CHAPTER

l 0 30a 1 7

stem from the derivative or qualified character o f ' White is ' ,

we were not at all sure how the connection could actually be
spelled out . One suggestion was tha t to say what a man i s is
to specify what is when a man i s , whereas to say what whi te is
is not in the same way to specify what is when white is (since
i t is misleading to say that whi te is &n:A. ) , but rather to
specify what is a qual ity of some substance when white is a
quality of some subs tance . But it cannot be claimed that this
is evident in the text, and it was ob jected that the suggestion
attaches the qualification in the derivative cases of ' , (
crTL to the , ( rathe r than the crTL (with respect to quality ,
the question becomoas e . g . what quality is white ? ) and thus
spoils the argument from the ways . in which lcrT L is sai d .
Finally we noted that the thesis that ,( CTT L i s said in as
many ways as there are categories , however it is to be argued
for , appears to involve some departure from the doctrine of
Top . 10 3b 2 7 ff.
1030a 2 7-29 On nw!; oe:t A.ty e: cv see Woods op . ci t . pp . 170- 1 :
it refers pot right back to A.oy Lx!ai; a t 1029b 1 3 but to the
\
c.
immediately preeeaing . remarks to the e ffe ct that opccro!;
n:A.e;ovo.xtk A.{ye:To.L i the same reference , the re fore , for T
A.e:yc5'e:vov Ql0.ve:p6v at 2 8-9 . n fxe: L re fers forward as far
as b 3 . The sense of contras t , as opposed to which se ctions
it refers to , i s , however, less clear .
" " ""'
l0 30a 29-32 on TO T L nv e: LVO.L - anticipated above in note on
10 30a 1 7- 2 7 , third paragraph .
...

,,
1030a 32-b 6 Two options are re jected, that Ta.oo. are OvTo. o0
/
c/
.
wvuWb and that they are so (J)Q'O.UTW!; = xo.a' e; v . The additionsubtraction option remains , illustrated by the tl'crn:e;p-clause
33-4 and its preferabilij::y e;icplaine<L!;>y ..the lne: C-clauae 34-b 1 .
The additi_on aspect is clear enough , but what is the subtraction?
Ross suggests that adding a qualification to e:tvaL subtracts
from its full . meaning , but this assigns a di fferent type of
ob ject to the adding and the subtracting . The same ho. lds if it
IS!
is the .implications- of unqualified e; LVO.L which are subtracte d .
I f , then, linguistic i terns are to be subtracted, the possibilities
27
/

If
1030a 13 2

NOTES

ON ZETA

are two : ( a ) in speaking of a subs tance ' s xistence one subtracts

the qualifications which need to be added in speaking of a
qualit ' s existence (so Alexander) ; (b) given ' Socraes is a
man ' , one sub tracts ' a man' to bring out the way Socrates is .
On either, the re ference of i;aOa 32 mus t include substances ,
which was not s o on Ross ' s version . The analogy illustrates
qual ification by addition: ' ad.d. that it is unknowable ' , as
Rhet 1 40 2 a 6 where the example is coup led with cr L . n Bv
"
ov .
l0 30b 6:.. 12 Jaege r ' s insertion of }fv oa . in 8 can be avoided
by the usual allowance for use-mention indifference . Will the
"
meanings of e v rule out what Aris totle wants ruled out?
Elsewhere these meanings include , and do notcontrast with, one
by continuity and by being bound toge ther . The argument requires
some strong favoured sense of ' one ' in each category , excluding
e . g . a complex of qualities such as round and red .
l030b 12- 13 cnt is hardly j ustified by the immedia te ly pre
ceding section , P,E>r indeed by the chapter as a whole , which
spent much e ffort countering the thes is now conceded with a
mild qualification and no . exp;J.ication
. .

lOth January 19 76
1030a J2 ff A di fferent interpretation of these lines was
mooted: the addition-subtraction option is different from the
' focal rneaning ' option of 34 . Aristotle is re jecting the two
' " ..
"'
"'
c:.
,
optio.ns that "t'ClU"t'Cl are o va OIJ,W).!UCJJ!; , and that they are so
&aa6"t00l;; (
xa ' lfv) but with the possibility of qualifying
the statement containing &';'LVClL by addi tion and subtraction ;
his own favoured alternative is then brought in (b 3 4 ) . On
this interpretation lne ( in 34 is adversative , and what fo llows
it replaces , rather than illustrates , the addition-subtraction
ppt:hon . ( Examples of this usage can be found . ) On this reading
t'he addition and subtraction do not qualify the sense of e'tvaL
itse l f , which remains the. Sarl!Ei! , that . in wh.:l.ch s.ubs tances exist;
qualifications have to be added to use e'tva L of the existence
of a non- substance i tern . The farnili ar prob lern remains of
28

CPTEI<l:l . 4 , 5

l.D30a 3.2

finding a sui table sense for subtractio n; the best seemed to

be ' when speaking of a substance ' s exis tence , removing the
added qualifications necessary in speaking of a non-s ubstance' s
existence ' (so Alexander ; see last time ' s minutes . ) The main
ob jections to this reading were : : (a) in l0 30b 3-4 aua now
had to refer to two rather different options , but Aristotle
says that it makes no cdiffererice which you say . This would
have to be taken more weakly : ' it makes no difference for the
present purpose (both options preserving the primacy of the

'
(b ) if the sense of ecrL
substance sense of e LVaL )
is
constant how do we generate the necessary ambiguity in the . , (
cr L ; question? There has to be a primacy among uses of the
question as a whole .
'

"'

/
we
l0 30b 14-16 . For the meaning of o ex n:pocreecrewG AOYOG
naturally seek help from Z4 , 1 0 29b 32- 3 , where it is explained
;i s, defining A as AB . The . Z 5 examples could wel l be introduced
as special examples of introducing something .iir\ . the definiens
not in the definiendum, cases where A cannot be de fined or
explained without introducing B . However, later at 103la 4-5
K npocre 0ewG is explained as saying the same thing twice, and
it is not clear why the previous examples should involve
literal repe tition . The only justification for the second
characterzation seems to be the preceding regre ss argument
,,.
>/
(cf . a 5 - wcrnep ev OUO LG . )
:>

10 30)? 16-28 Aristotie ' s ,9xamples in 18-20 caused trouble .

/
'
Given the preceding lines we can see why o L cnnG is not xaa
/
/
cruj3enxoG
in a nose or a mere rr.a.3oG of it ( it is oe t v
woe)
, but why include KO LA6nG? The previous lines have
f,.
distinguished it from cases like the snub . Short of tampering
with the text the best solution appeared to be to take
Aristotle as thinking of one and the same characteristic of
(.
,;
(.
/
a nose being described both as n KO LAonG and as n OL\.LOnG
; in
fact it is only xae acr.o' under the latter description and not
under the former, but Aristotle may be falsely assuming a
transparent context . Wi thout some such assumption he seems
29

l 0 30b 16

NOTES

01!1

ZETA

to have no , grounds for distinguishing KO LA 6nG from A g uKcfv as

is done in 20ff .
<:/

l0 30b 2 0 -2 1 . How does the O L-clause exp lain how white is a

naaoG of Callias? What is required is rather : Callias is a
y
/.
to be white . Reading
man to whom it aua ganKg
for n in 20
would give the desired accidental conjunction of white and
man. In that case , however , why is Callias (as opposed to
man) brought in at all? There is a parallel to 21 in A , 981
a 19-20 . There was inconclusive discussion as to how -close
and/or he lpful the parallel was . The z passage emphasises
the fact that one cannot infer from ' white ' to ' man ' , but the
A passage i s not closely paralle l to this , or ristotie - would be
denying that one can infer from tallia s ' to :' man ' , and this
is neither Aristotelian doctrine nor relevant to the A passage .
.

.
-(
1030b 2 7 Kaaangp
If this refers to 1 0 30a 17-20
g LPnKa v .
(and cf . l0 3la 8-10) we get at .most deriyative. senses of
5p LoO"i;; for i terns in non-substance ea tegories , not for cross
category compounds,:;.llke .. white:. man . _ . Possib ly the :.. c laim should
be weakened: there are as many senses of 6p Ladi;; as there
are of ta L , and since there::. is .. a_ s.e nse_in :which white.: man
aL there is a sense in which it has a definition . But this is
not obvious from Z4 at leas t . Alternative ly , Aristotle is
referring to the last sentence of Z4 ; but in that case he
merely harks back to an unargued and puz zling claim. Perhaps
he is thinking of 1030a l L ff, where it is c laimed that only
species have an essence (and so a definiton) . This does not
seem to rule out particulars yet ( c f . Z 6 ) , and most plausibly
rules out accidental conjunctions like white man.

10 30b 2 8. - ,103la. 7 . Two main lines of interpretation of the

regress arguiuent were discussed. ( 1 ) b 2 8 gives the option
/
.
'
.....
'
.
that o OLov is identical with o KO LAov , and tkes it as
ruled out ; snubness is agreed to be concavity in a nose .
b 30-103.0 a 1 give the second option . Either you can ' t de fine
,,
"'
P L G c:ni1 (because you feel qua1ms at the regress ) , or you
,,
accept 'the regress . The assumption here cannot be that aLn
,
is identical 1n meaning with KOLAn ( that was ruled out .by
30

.CHAPTER

l03 0b, 2 8

,,

the first option) . Rather OL).IT) is identical \dth P\L G. KO LAT) .

/
C:\
But this gives us only the single move P
L G OL ).IT) = P"'L G PC.. \L G
,,
KO LAn . How do we get a regress to infinity (b 35) , and how
/
"'
do we get another P L G QJ.JJ.!1. turning up (b 35-a l) ? Perhaps
Aristotle assume.s that OLJ.lrl1 while not identical in meaning
,,.
with KO L AT)1 is implied by it, and can replace it in the ,
definiens . This accounts for b 35-a l and permits the
,,
/
.. ,
replacement of OLJ.ln by P L G KO LAn to proceed inde finitely .
Against this interpretation the main points were : ( i ) given
the regress , why is it harmful? Aristotle must be given the
as sumption that definitions are finitely spe cifiable . ( i i )
the sentence b 35-a l has to be used twice over, a s showing
us how the infinite regress works (which we would not guess
from the previous lines ) and as providing a reductio of it .
(iii) e:'t o'E: fl at b 35 has to be taken as giving a somewhat
artificial line of thought: i f it is not absurd for these
items to have es sence s , the ir having them leads to an infinite
regress . But this phrase gave trouble to all interpre tations .
( 2 ) The argument i s articulated into not two but three parts .
(a) 28:-:30 re jects the option that OLJ.l = KO {ATI (a"' above ) .
,;
c;. \
.... .
(b) 30-35:.. r!'!Jects the option that OL J.ITI = P L G KO LAT) .
For i f
s o , then 8t ,; OLJ.ln' = p\ ,; SLG KO (AT) , and this repe tition is
absurd (b 3 4 ) . ( c ) 35-6 re jects the option that OLJ.ln = l ,;
OLJ.ln, on the ground that this leads to an infinite regress
(which on this interpretation is confined to (c) , and plays
no pp.rt in (b ) .) For the regress all that is needed are the
/
4\
,
as sumptions ( i ) that one can say P L G OLJ.ITI and ( i i ) that OLJ.IT)
means \ ,; aLi{. Against this the main points are ( i ) ( c) is
still puz zling because it make s no use of KOLAn, and there seems
no re ason why anyone would defend this option . ( ii ) e:t B {
at b 35 has to be taken as re jecting any equation of O L J.lrl and
/.
KOLAn
, rather than the immediate ly preceding conclusion . ( 2a)
Agrees with the main analysis o f ( 2 ) , but takes ( c ) not as a
separate piece of argument but as an extra consequence of the
principle s tated in 30-31 ; O L J.ltl cannot be said on its own ,
so every time we use it we should add l ,; , but this leads to
infinitely many uses of P LG A ma j or difference between ( 1 )
and ( 2 ) i s that ( l ) takes the impossibility to be that of
'
"""
defining P L G aLn ( reading e: LTtE: LV in b 32 as ' define ' ) whereas
31
_

'

./

l0 30b 2 8

NOTES . ON

ZETA
"

,,.

( 2 ) treats the a lleged definiendum as TO O L UOV ( reading the

>
,..,
E LnE LV as ' say ' ) . l0 3la 6- ff sugges ts that both preceding
aporiai have been concerned with TO a Lu6'v, and the point is
then app lied to terms like ' odd numbe r ' , which are called
,,
auvouaouEva. The issue is cloude d , howeve r , by the fact that
,,
O LUOTnG is introduced at the beginning of the chapter as an
example of a auv5E5uaauefvov. I f the second aporia is read
as denying the definability of T6 a L u6'v rather than that of
P,L G OLn, its ove rall strategy can be read as fol lows : The
first option ( 2 8-30) rejects the idea that a Lbv and xoAov
mean the s ame . The second option ( 30 - 3 5 ) shows that if their
meanings are supposed di fferent we s ti l l ge t an .absurdity
C\
.,( as under ( 2 ) ) . Then (b 35-a l ) no explanation of P LG OLUn
,,,.
can be given ; it can be defined if a Lun can be , but the latter
/
can only be explained as . PC.\L G a Lun. The message o f the argument
is that i f you try to define TO O L U6v you. wi l l get into trouble
with ordinary phrases like 6\G a L un.
,

,,..

l 0 3 la 5 ff . How far does Aristotle have to extend his a.rgument

here to get the conclusion that only substances can be de fined?
Apparently he must regard all adjectives as being like ' snub '
in importing a reference to a more basic sub ject . What happens
with sortals is le ss obvious . But a basic problem here is
/
nG :
that often there will be no property analogous to KO LAoT
a shape ( in general) which in noses is snubnes s .

7th February 19 76

I'

The thesis to be argued for is given in full at i0 3lb 19 -20 :

each thing is identical not accidentally with its essence .
The scope of ' each ' here and at l0 3la 1 6 is unres tricted,
referring to i terns in the categories gene ra lly . The most
plausible restriction would be to universals , al lowing a
contrast with the case of Socrates at the end o f the chapte r,
but that would mean . taking a 20 ' s white man as a universal ,
in face of the fact that the argument for its non-identity
with the corresponding essence turns crucially on a premise
32

CTERS

5,

-io3la

concerning the identity of a man and a white man ( 2 2-3 ) ;

beside s , white man in Aristotle is s tandardly an example
of substance plus. attribute , and when we get to example s of
things said pe.r se , these are introduced as subs tances such
that no other substance is prior to them.
10 3la 16-17 is all that Ari sto t le offers to explain why
the thesis should be discussed at a l l . The seque l does little
to illuminate the motives that might lead someone to take a
stand for or against the thesi s . In Z 7 - t 10 32b 1-2 Aristo tle
says ' By form I mean e ssence ' , so one might say that Z 6
establishes for later use the thesis that forms at least
mus.t be identical with the corresponding essence , otherwise
absurdi ties result .
10 3 la 17- 1 8 . A general observation to the e ffect that thing
and essence would seem to be the same (because each thing =
its oGa (a , which in turn = i ts essnce ) , set off against an
initial (possib ly also final - see be low on the unclarity
as to Aristotle ' s ultimate verdict) supposition that. the
thesis does not hold for things said per accidens ( 19-2 0 ) .
103la 21-4 gives a reductio: argument in favout- of the
supposition that a whi. te man f' the essence of white man .
We were unable to improve on Ross ' s account of -the reasoning ;
Suppose they are the same ( 2 1 : E t ab), that i s ,
suppose ( l ) A white man
the es sence of white man . That will
/
'
' ,
'
commit you to the conclusion ( 2 1-2 : xaL o avepc.ince o
>
,,.
auo)
( 3 ) The essence of man = the essence of white man .
For we have available as second prmise :{ 2 4-3 : . aOo ydp
vepwrtoG)
( 2 ) A man
a white man , thi s being something
that anyone will be ready to say ( 2 3 : cpa.aLv, referring
to the ordinary man , not a theorist with .an interest in the
thesis under di scus sion) , and ( l ) and ( 2 ) toge the r yield the
'
'
0/
conclusion ( 3 ) (repeated in the waEclause , 2 3- 4 ) . So
runs the argument in the text , and we are left to suppl- ,
with Ros s , the further premise ( l ' l a man = the essence of
man , . given simply as a further application of the thought
behind ( l ) . We must further supply the thought that ( 3)
33
=

is

103la 2 1

NOTES ON

ZETA

is absurd and hence ( 1 ) must be re jected.

103la 24-5 . Now come s an ob jection or rese rvation to the
reductio which in the end we construed, with Ros s , as follows :
Perhaps it is not necessary that the essence of accidental
unities should be the same as that of the simple terms [ i . e .
( 3 ) , which says that the essence of the accidental unity white
man is the same as the essence of, the simp le term man, is not
a necessary consequence of ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) ] , because the extreme
terms [. the extreme terms in ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) , vi z . man and the
essence of white man] are not identical with the middle term
[white man] in the same way [ i .e . the identity in ( 1) is a
necessary one , that in ( 2 ) only accidental and this change
of modality ' invalidates the inference ] . But before accepting
thi s account we investigated alternatives : (a) does oK
&v<fyxn query the necessity not of the consequence but of the
consequent, ( 3 ) ? Ob jection : to use ( 3 ) for a reduc tio implies
the claim that it is false , and this is;.;not .met by saying it
is not a necessary truth . Or (b) does it query ( 2 ) , saying
it i s not necess ary that an accidental unity (white man , not,
on this hypothesis , the essence of white man) should be identical
with the simple consti tuent term man , i . e . ( 2 ) is an accidental
identity , ( 1 ) a necessary one , and only necessary identities
'
/
should be al lowed into the argument? Reply : a >axpa.
at 25
would then have to be white man and man, and the designation
""
of these as axpa. would be hard to understand . What cl inched
the matter was a re ference to SE . 168b 31-5 , which makes clear
that Aristotle holds that accidental identity is not transitive .
So he would maintain that ( 3) does not fo llow , and would ;
maintain it on the grounds of the di fference in ' modality '
between ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) - j ust as Ross ' s interpretation has him
say here .
10 1la 25- 8 . The objection or rese rvation o f 24-5 is now
modified by a reply or ( Ross ) an alte rnative reductio to do
the job more satisfactorily (hese two options merge into one
Again , . in _the end we came round to something close
another)
to Ross ' s re construction of the . reasgning : - What would
34

CHAPTER

103la 2 5

' perhaps seem to follow' is the identij:y o f a new pair o f

Kpa , the essence of whi te and the essence o f mus ical , and as
the argument for this conclusion . we can supply :
The musical man

the essence of musical man

The man = the musical man) or,_ more simp ly , The

) musical man
)
the white man
The white man
the man
=

The ssence of white man

the white man

So , the essence of white man = the essence of musical man

So , the es sence of white = the essence of musical
If the trouble be fore was the re li ance on accidenta l identity ,
it is not easy to see how this argUJllE3n t improve s the situation ,
and in any case the las t s tep commits a fal lacy of subtraction
( compare : ' To be an equalateral triangle = to be an equiangular
triangle , so to be equalateral = to be equiangular '.) . We
tried anoth_e r line : de lete 0:6. in 2 7 , so as to let the conclusion
be that the extremes become identical [ s c . with each other]
.
,;
per accidens , and take the KaL in 2 7 a s ' or ' , introducing a
'
second independent i l lustration on a par with ;;o
A.e:uKc.i
e:'>'LvaL
rather than the two to.gather consti tuting the new pa; but
the es sence of white was not one of the previous r1K pa , so if
the Kpa have to change it is. much . .the easies.t .course to " let
them be the essence of white and the e ssence of musi cal , and
we are back , in e ffect, with Ross ' s reconstruction .
...

103la 2 8 . c5oite: o'e: off could state ( a ) that the conclusion does
not seem to follow, hence the reductio does not work ; (b) that
the conclusion seems to be false , hence the reductio does work .
,\
/.
( a) is recommended by the SE . passage and by c5oEe: Le:v av
/
ouaLve: Lv in 26 . But i t leaves Aristotle without any argument
standing against the thesis that accidental unities are identical
with their essence , and g iven earlier doubts about whether such
35

10 3la 28 . .

NOTES ON

ZETA

things have an es sence , this is surpris-1.ng.

He moves t9 things said per s e , taking as the

l0 3 la 2 8- 3 1

case to work with a class o f substances speci fied as substances

such that no other substances or natures are prior to them.
Thi s

specification does , as his more usual specifi cation of

subsance as sub j ect would not, al low him to include the

Forms ; for 1 0 3 lb 15- 18 points out that i f there are Forms ,

the se and not the

,,.

"'

unoKELEvov

'

will be subs tance .

10 3la 31-b 3 , The argument i s condiional on es sence being

o o (a. ,

Does this come from 10 3la 1 8 ?

But that did not mean

the essence i s a substance , a nature .

Rathe r , it i s the

.Pl atonist who will think that is the only way to conce ive a
separ ate essence .
essence i s separate

Likewi se , the a rgument assume s that

it

is

if

prior, in explanation at least,

and hence for the Platoni s t i n being too , a more ultimate

,, .

"
L5Ea.

( 10 3 lb l ) .

The argument uses Platoni st machinery to

extract a conclusion the Platonist will have to accept i f
he once says that Forllk and e s sence

are distinct.

But would

the Platonist dis tinguish Form and essence like thi s?

indication is given that he would, so that
not a direct attack o n the Forms .

No

the passage i s

But there might be an

issue between Aris totle and the Platonist i f the ques tion
is not whether the Forms are distinct from the i r essences
but whether, i f they exis t , they are to be di s tinguished
from what Aristotle calls es sence .

The a rgument would be :

let the Platoni st take his favourite examp le o f some thi ng

said per se ; i f he dis tinguishes it from what

I call essence

he will be in trouble ; so far , then , essences must be identical

with the things said per se whose es sences they are .

'(,EP<lL

Textual points

in a 3 0 , bracketed by Jaeger, may as

well remain ( so Ros s ) .

1 0 3 lb l :

Ros s ' s

somewhat more securely gro.urided in the

,,

..

n p6EpQ.L

oo o (a.L is

MSS than Jaege r ' s

npOEPO.L KO.L a.ov OUOLO.L .

1 0 3 lb 3

,..,

The firs t

Ev

is

not answered .

The supposition here

argued amounts to a comple e divorce of Form and essence , such

36

CHAPTER
'

ehat

1 0 3 lb 3

they a nc>t on'ly df&b4no.t bUt. tiha:

assen

does. not

nor the characte r represented by the Form

be long to the Form

to the essence ( 4- 6 ; for

&noAEAU{vaL

implying non-predi cability

as connoting a separation

c f . Phys . 185a 2 8 ) .

So s trong a

divorce i s not immediately entaled by mere di stinctness .

so,

either the argi.unent was to be followed by a comp lementary one

dealing with the possibi li ty that Form. and essence , while
distinct, have some sort of marriage partnership , .2.f Aristotle
is pi ling absurdi ty on absurdity because he thinks that, i f
the essences can be shown t o be come a se cond l o t o f

o3o(aL

once they are dis tinguished from the Forms , this amounts to
se tting them up as independent householders on their own , i . e .
to the divorce s i tuation .
10 3lb 3-4

' 5 '

(v

It turns out in the seque l that ,(Jv

Forms ,

For 9 - 10 shows the essences are not

essences .

't/v,a,

6 -9 shows the Forms are not knowab le because they have no

The re sult of divorce i s thus tha t

e s sence to be known.

the things that exist are not knowab le , those that are knowab le
do not exist .
'

10 3 lb 11 f f

We adjourned whi le discussing

'

/
,
o ayaeov

e tc . in

12 : is i t s ti l l the Form or can Ari stotle begin to app ly his

b fiyae6'v , vi z . tha t about which,

/
./'
nOAAax AeyoEvov , one asks L o .,ayaeov?

identity thesis to his own

,...

though i t i s

'

even

6th March 1976

1 0 3 lb 11-15 . Aristotle asserts that

.....
/.
...
' >
xaAoV
xaL
ayaeov
o

are

the same as the i r essences , and then genera l i zes the asse rtion
...
'
'
This i nterpre tati on presupposes
ove r al l xae aua KaL npwa .

xa

in b 1 3 , but without the insertion

o'" ayaeov xaL KaAOV

/

( 1 ) Are

noted that ( a)

pa

"

tfoa

P laton ic Forms ?

is uninte ll igible .
I n favour we

i n b 11 seems to draw a conclusion from

a 28-b 1 1 which .was about Forms , and ( b ) i f they are not Forms
they are

men

and so perhaps not among

tba . . .. . . . np@a

( see

(2) ) ;

neverthe le s s we thought i t more l ike ly that Ari stotle is

speaking here in his
c..

"

"

""'

xa.e a.ua xaL npwa?

own

person .

( 2 ) What is included in

We assumed that the P l aton ic viewpoint

37

1 0 3 lb 11

NOTES

ON

ZETA

i s abandoned her i i f not before ) .

The ques tion was : are

( a) On . the one hand . npf:ha might

non'.'"substances among np&-m.?

refer to npbEpat. oo(a1. of a 3 0 1 on the other npa might =

c ,.
"
Ka3 ' aua (Kat. explicative ) , and c f . 10 30a 10- 1 .
(b) I t was

suggested that in b 2 2 - 3
'

,,

'

ou.j3EnxoG

of xaa

A.E uxov and o uouo t. Kv are examples

0

"

A.EyoEva, so not Ka3 ' aua .

O A.E ux6'v is the same

ou.j3Enxc!G = n3o i so it

Again st this

b 2 4-8 assert that

as its essence when

it signifies a

is only in its other

sense , the white thing , that o AEUKov is an examp le of a K .

a.

'
AEYOUEVOV
, and the Sub J e c t of onuaLVE L V in b 2 3 and

re ference of
AEY 6u&vov .

I
/
auo

'

'

. o A.&uxov , not o K . o .
in b 2 4 and b 26 is

( 3 ) What does

:Av

mean in b 14?

E and J read 'a.v .

This sugge s ted the sense ' to make a thing F i t is enough if

F belongs to i t ' , conveying that

,'b

( x being) y a3ov etc . is

no more than o (belonging to x) E L Va L :>.aya e tc .

\,

(cf .

Anscombe and Geach , Three Philosophe rs , B lackwe l l 19 6 1 , pp .

24- 6 ) .

!v

The alternative , with

uncontcacted, was ' this

would be suffi ciently estab li shed I

.

considered three interpretations :

ya36v
/

( 4 ) Kav un
(i)

1;' g'(on .

We
..
' even i f they ( s c . o

etc . ) are not P laton ic F.orms ' i then they would be

/

_-r;
"
na3n , so that na3n would have to be among the rtua
, see ( 2 ) ) .
( i i ) ' Even i f there are no.t P latoni c Forms ' .
The difficulty

with ( i ) and ( ii )
of

npwa

with

is that the only arguments for the identity

the ir essence s , a 31-b 1 1 , apparen tly relied

on special features of Forms i but

any case with Ka\
(Aristotelian)

O'oa

forms ' i

in b 1 3 .

"

"

( i ii )

difficulty arises in
' E ven if they are not

the point would then be that (..:though

some non-substantial Ka3 '

are forms .

this

..

aua

are forms) not all Ka3 '

"

aua

:i'
Ag ainst ( i i i ) i t was sugges ted that b 15-6 g (ng p

>
,
t. ,
L5Ea
E t.O L V at.

to this phrase .

' i f there really are ideas ' , may refer back

( 5 ) uaA.A.ov 5 I

by Ross ' s ' or rather e ven i f '

'(o(l)b K({V

We were not a ttracted

( " Aristo tle contemptuously adds" ) ,

preferring ' and more also i f ' , i . e .

' and even more i f ' .

But

then we found no easy pas sage between the Scylla that Aris totle ' s
arguments up to this point apply only to Forms and the Charybdis
that they apply equal ly to non-Forms . Perhaps , if ( i ) or ( ii )
is right under ( 4 ) , Aristotle thought that the price for non
identity is one which every one should, and Platonists do,
regard as excess ive .

I, .

38

C;-iAP'l.':o;;t

1Q3lb 11

/
, '
aL.. )LoEa
L , ti:\.e
103lb 15-8 , parantheseis . The premiss is e:-Lcnv
conclusion o;t l'crt"cu 'to f>nc;-: e:l'.'JJ.e:vov oto(a . How does the
aryument . 90? We canvassed three interpretaions of aov 't"c:t L
xa JJ.:3i.:f L v . ( .i) I t rreans ' subjects w i l l exist by cour tesv of
their pa:i;tic i;,-:ation in :a'ormr:i ' , from whici1 it follows that
subjects are not rcp!:i''t"c:t, hence r.ot oo(a.L , A;ainst this (a)
the purpose of the arguraent is unexplained , since Platonists
c.
/
.
will not assert that uTto'KE Le:vov is ouoLa (but pernaps they
should , ,. f.l,oss) , and if Aristotle is using Platonists to help
him show
that it is not oOo(a , we need H al g, L <'KO'.l) in b 1 5 ;
( b ) no use is made of xa.3 ' ox e: i. /vou ;:,t, 3.nd ( c ) it i s
;
c.
.,,
very hard to understantl unoxe: Le:vc:i as subj ect of OOV't"aL
.
( i i ) It means (Ross) ' the forms will exist only as and when
partic ipated in' . This is presented as something the P1atonists
rej ect (y = for otherwise) . The argument i s : .Since they
reject it , if substances are tola L , substances are things
which necessarily exist but do not necessarily hold of a
su!,'>jec t . Whence s before subjects are not TtPt:la. Against
this ( a ) of ( i ) still stands ; also (b) in b 17 ' exist ' is
harder than 'be' for e:'tva.L and ' not necessarily ' is harder
than 'necessarily not '. for ; also ( c ) the argument assimilates
' are partic ipated in ' to ' ar-e said of a subject' , contra
9 9 0b 30-1 where the latter bu.t; _ not the former 'is rated
transitive . We did not examine the force of these objections
thoroughly . ( iii) ;rt means ' the Forms will be participabl '
(u
t8e:E1. v e;3e:xa). . As under ( i ) this is to be :
.
'
,,,,.
understood as a consequence of E)LOLV
ac.L :!'LOEa
L . The argument
is : since the Forms are JJ.E;3E'K't"!, t_hey are not said of a
subject; so the Platonist is not forced to forgo their claim
to be substances in favour ' of that of sul?jects . The difficulties
with this were that (a) 990b 30-1 does not make U&3E K't"OV
incompatible with Ka3 1 TtOK E LJJ,(voU and ( b ) W have to construe
ot'K toi;a.L in b 16 as of>x &v<fyxn , ' it does not follow that i .
In reply to (b) it was suggested that ' it follows that not '
could be kept by understanding ' so there wil l be ho
unoxe: Le: vc:i' as an unexpressed intermediate conclusion .
,.

..

,,

103lb 18..,22 . We agreed that i<a\ lf't" L ye; introduces what

purports to be a new way of provipg the identity of each
39
"

If

------

l 03 lb 18

NOTES

ON

ZETA

thing with. its essence . On one view the new way is taking
cases ( Kau
EK3EcrLv
in the first sense of Ross ' s note on
' nv
'
,,
9 2 2b 10 ) . 8, L Y E
n(cracr3aL explains why this way works .
But (a) the syntax then seems to require 8, L YE <FhL) ( ' and
also because because
therefore
' ) , and (b ) it is
unc lear how the alleged explanation does explain . The other
"
..
view was that o
L YE ETtLcra03aL
supplies a new argument for
identity . We judged the argument a bad one , comparing the
fallacy in hearing x
hearing the sound of xi therefore x
the sound of x ' and noting Aristotle ' s own view that
knowledge of opposites is the same though the opposites are
not the same . We were also puzzled why .th is should be
presented as a new argument, s ince it has already appeared as
part of the divorce argilment in b 6- 7 ; but we thought that
oCwv v AYwv in b 18-9 might sloppily pick out the other
part alone . Four interpretations were suggested for Kal
Ka v K3EcrLv . ( i ) ' It is provable by taking cases too
that
'Against this we objected that (a ) nv is not accounted
for and (b) neither is OE , s ince L YE in(cracr3aL neither
explains wh!l. taking cases works as a. proof (see above ) nor
itself constitutes a ! case ' . ( i i ) We considered, but did
'
not favour , omitting KaL and understanding the sense .. Kaa ov
Aoyov , ' as I have set things out' . ( iii) ' Even if you try
to separate them, you wil l find them both one ' (Benitz ) was
thought to get support from l090a 1 7 , but to be fairly feeble .
( iv) I t was suggested that (K3EOL(; might be. a ( ? Platonic)
name for divorce , n6AUOLG (b 3 , 4- 5 ) , referring to the
n(cracr3aL argument just repeated from b 6- 7 ; but ' divorce '
also describes the unrepeated part of the argument in b 3-ll .
We were unsure whether &vifYKn in b 2 2 expresses necessitas
consequentiae , reinforcing cnE , or necessi tas conseq.uentis ,
...
/
,
confirming ou
Kaa
cruJ.113 E nKoG
in b 19 . The latter phrase.
shows that Aristotle believes he has proved more than the
bare truth of the identity thesis , but we did no.t discuss
the grounds of that belief .

...

'

'

27th March 19 76
'

'

)/

\
l 0 3lb 18- 22 . KaL Kaa
nv EK3EcrL v .

40

We began by reviewing

CHAPTER

1 0 3 lb 18

interpretation :'(i ) ' -in j:he pa:evious J;l.ote , . ' it is provable .by taking
Against the minuted ob jection that this
does not explain c:i'cr e we suggested ' so that an 8&cr L b will
cases also that

'

es tab lish ( the truth of the tf, L claus e , that knowing each thing
is the same as knowing its essence , and thereby ) the thesis
that each thing is its essenc e ' .
10 3lb 22-8 , parenthesis .
19-28 .

This recurs to the subject o f l03la

Two interpretaions had been canvassed on 6 th March 1976

(v. on 10 3lb 11- 5 ( 2 ) ) :

( i ) ,6

Ka. cruf3el3nK2>b >..e yoevov

is

equivocal , as >.. e uKov etc . are ; . ( i i ) it is univocal , picking

Since b 28 asserts
out just the non-nctaob sense of A.& UKov etc .
are the same as the ir es sences ( and hence otK &>.. b
that

na

nan

et ne'i':v

in b 24 mus t mean ' not unequii!TocalJy' true 'c:to sa:Y-' ) , the

dispute affects whether ( i ) some or ( i i ) perhaps no K . cr .

>..& yQ'eva. are the . same as their essences .

(i) :

Two things favoured

. K . cr . >.. e yc5'evov
re ference of a.Oo in

syntax , which seems to require

sub j ec t of

crna.fve L v

in b 2 3 arid

.,,,

as
b 2 4 and

b 26 ; and a 27- 8 , which seems to treat oucrLKO\J and >.. & uKov as
.
,
,
even when those words refer to no.an . We noted
K . cr . >.. eyoeva.
that 10 32a 2 is going to identi fy
.

ev

with i ts essence , even

,

i s neither a substance nor a na.aob in some other

category . We a ls o noted that the equivocation of . >.. & uK tv
though

i s exceptional ( Ca t . 2a 2 7-9 ,

wv n>.. e (a,oov)

e . g . to o 13a.5 L 6ov , where the

na.80

'

and does not extend

is o $ a.O L 6& L v .

1 0 3 lb 28-1032a 4 . This contains four . subsidary arguments for

the identity of thing and essence .

( 1) b 28-30 .

The absurdity

is said to follow from gi v:ing the e s sence of x a name , sc .

other than ' x ' , as Aristotle pres umably thinks. would be
required by non-identity .
translation :

What is t.he .al55Uf'dity? ,

( i ) Ross ' s

' there will be another essence bes ides that of x ,

e . g . another essence than. the essence o f horse ' .

( i i ) ' there

will be another. name besides ' x ' , e . g . another name for-what

it-is- to-be (=for) es sence o f horse ( s c . than ' horse ' ) '
dif ficulties are :

The

( i ) ' s absurdity doe sn ' t require s eparate names ,

( i i ) ' s does n ' t s eem absurd .

We preferred ( i ) :

the absurdity

lies in countenancing s uch a thing as the essence of. the essence

horse ; naming draws attention to this consequence of non- identity ,
by reveal ing essence o f horse as an existent , qua lifying. for
41

10 3lb 2 8

NOTES

ON

ZETA

its own essence . The fact that if.A.A.o = essence in 10 32a 2 also
favours ( i ) We agreed that one occurrence o f Lnnw mus t be
excised from b 30 , but the choice need not affect the sense .
( 2 ) b 31-2 . Ross sees this as proposing a means of avoiding
the absurdity in ( 1 ) : essence of essence of x won ' t differ
from essence of x if the latter is already ( 68U'G , ' straight
off ' , ' from the start ' ) the same as x . But this leaves out
KaL vuv , and the means would be insufficient . if only 'rvLa are
identified with their essences . So we preferred: ' even as
it is ( sc . without the incentive of the i;onov) ,some' JtJii,ings are
their essences , since ' 1 ng p . , then, should .cite a
reason granted even by the champon of non- identity , So it
cannot mean ince substances are the ir essences ' which he
u
>
,
would challenge , e . g . for LnnoG ; rather ' since ouoLa
of x =
essence of x ' . 686G either = 'just are ' , ' are no more than ' ,
or = ' it follows immediately that ' ; we thought that
Ar-istotle could have regarded as negligible the extra premiss
needed to mediate the LTIP clause , viz . ' and ouoLa of x = x,
in some cases ' . ( 3 ) b 32-a 2 . What are the Lpnva? ( i )
b 20-2 ' knowledge o f each thing i s the same as knowledge of
its essence ' ; each bit of knowledge .is specified in a. A.oy oG ;
<I

"

...

'

,,

'>

'

,,

"'

,,,

so the A.oyo L are the same . But then the yap clause is needed
neither to support the tpnsvov (rather was said in b 2 0 ,
({i; L ' , to be supported by it) nor as an extra premiss with
the tpnevov to support A.oyoG-identity . ( i i ) b 18- 20 ' each
;
thing is the same as its essence ou, Kai;a ounKoG ' , The
,,,,.
c. '
. /
yap clause s imply repeats . this Lpne:vov,
with c/
V;/V
L ""'L vaL
as a (new) E-xample . The thought would be ' we can go beyond
(mere ) :: identity to (necessary identity and therefore) A.oyoG
identi ty ' . To what are the lpn{va additional (KaL ) ? We
suggested : the considerations ..in ( 2 ) . I f so , ( 3 ) like ( 2 )
concerns only :things which ( arec or) have an oa Ca . ( 4 ) a 2- 4 .
We thought this was sufficiently different from ( 1 ) to
justify Aristotle adducing it . In ( 1) the absurdity was that
horse generates an .essence of its essence , here that it generates
an infinite chain of essences . <!> a6i;G A.OYOG : the same
argument, the same story .
42
.

'

CHAPTER

1 0 3 2 a. 4

10 3 2a 4-11 . We discussed two questions . ( 1) Is i t implied that

.
..,,
...
c. '
.
Q. 1
"'
S ocra tes is no t a npwi:oi; xa.L xa.v
p,ui;ov >.. i;: yoj.o.e:voi;; ? Ross though t , yes
taking the question of Socrates ' s identity with.. his essence as ,
' di fferent from , though a ll ied to ' the chapter' s question seemingly on the ground that i f sophis tical ob jections agains t
that identity were among the objections against the chapter' s
ae:'a L i; there would be no reason to single out that particular
identity for mention .

uptake :

But an adequate reason is to secure

the Socrates puzzle and its so lution were known to

Aristotle ' s audience . We concl uded that the passage affords

no evidence either way on thi s question .
sophistical

tf>..e: yxoi;

about . Socrates?

We tried out various

candidates , without reaching agreement .

Alexander :

( 2 ) What is the
( i ) Ross follows

if Socrates is his essence and Socrates is white ,

the essence of Socrates will be the essence of white Socrates .

We did not see how to generate from this a puzzle which would
cover univers als , e . g . man; for ' man is white ' mus t refer to
a particular man.

. ( i i ) Cf . SE . 16 6b 3 3- 4_:

' i f ( Coris cus )

is

different from Socrates , and . Socrates i s a man , Coriscus is

different from a man ' ; hence if man is the essenceof :Coriscu ,
Cori scus is different from his essence .
/

But this only attacks

the conj unction of. the chapte r ' s ae:aLi; with ' man is the essence
( i i i) .I f Socrates is his ess ence , and Socrates

of each man ' .

is white , his ess ence is white ; or ( iv)

if Socrates is. . his

ess ence , and Soc rates is the same as the man approaching ,
then his essence . is the same as the man approaching .

These use

failure of subs titutivity to discredit identity , and so will

have analogues using general terms lik.e ' man ' in pl ace of
proper names like ' Socrates ' . Furthermore ( iv) would be solved
by the doctrine that accidental identity is not trans itive ,
SE . 168b 31-5

For Sth May 19. 7 6 .

Prolegomenon to Z 7 -9

Interest was express.ad in raising some general issues about

Metaphysics Z 7-9 by way of approaching particular texts .

So

here , in shortened fqrm ., are some proposals I once advanced

for resolving a set o f paradoxes in .:those chapters together
with present reasons for distrusting the proposals .
43

NOTES
A.

ON

ZETA

The puzzles are these .

Early in Z 7 Aristotle says that a man or a plant is an

,..
,1
,,
, ,
example o f a 1J,Cl.A L Oa AEy oEV OUOLac EL vaL ( 1 032a 19-20 , c f .
l.

,._ ...
l0 3 4 a 4 ) , and the phrase recal l s the o u
oLa nc:.
,..

,.

aA Loa AEyoEvn

of Cat . 2 a 1 1- 1 2 .

echoed in " a plant or an animal"

.,..
,,.
'
E KaL
KUpwaa

" A man or a plant" is soon

( 1 0 32a 2 3 ) , which trans lators

(with the e xception of Reale ) s tandardly cons true as specimen

references to individuals

( " an animal , e . g . MJW" ) .

So it

seems that Socrates is sti l l an example of substance in the

prime sense o f the word .

Yet shortly afterwards , without more

argumen t , Aristotle cites not concrete individuals but the i r

form or essence as

,.

,.
npw-n
ouoLa
"

use of ot o Ca in what follows

( 1 0 3 2b 1- 2 ) , and holds to this

( l 0 3 3b 1 7 , l 0 3 4 a 3 1- 3 2 , cf .

l032b
3-6 with 1 6 ; so s ti l l in Z l O , 10 35b 15 & 2 6 and esp .
...

2 2 & 29 where the

particular ) .

2.

.,
ouo
a
,.

'

is contrasted with the concrete

In Z 8 , 1 0 3 3b 19- 2 4 ( c f . 10 3 4a 6 ) , A cis totle

.

argues that the form is not an individual

but a such , intrinsically predicative .

/
. ( :tOOE

'

l!.liH

"
/
WPL
OEvov)

Yet in the context

he has regularly introduced the form as a this

(not only 1 0 3 3b

13 & 19 but general ly 1033a 28-bl9 construe d , contra Ross , as

concerned with the possibi lity of generating form , not matter ;
thus perhaps (but not necessarily) excise
1033a 32 .

060

with Jaeger at

On this reading , the this that the bronze becomes

is the form it acquires ; making this- from- that or this- form

in-that

i s not to make this s implicite r , 1 0 3 3 a 31-b 5 ) . 3 . in

Z 8 . l 0 3 3b 22-26 , Aristotle says that what a maker makes

i s making) out o f a this

(or

(e ; g , this bronze ) . is a s uch (e . g .

a phere ) ; but when once i t i s made ( not is being made : c f .

the
.,

</

"

"'

oav YEvvnaD
4S\

O L!l.LU 1J

'

.>,.

of 1 0 33b 2 3 with

Phys . 2 0 lb 11- 12

"
,.
YEv
oav
n a

Me t .K 1 0 6 6 a 4- 5 ;

'-I

oav
tl'
so o Y EYOVO(; ,

1 0 3 3a 6 ,
'

l 0 33b 15 ) , i t is a this such , e . g . a particular brazen sphere .

But :

( a ) in this context the form is the " such " , yet Aristotle

denies that in making a s uch one makes a form ( 1 0 3 3a 28-b 19 ,

.)
recalled in Z l 5 , 1 0 3 9b 2 6- 2 7 , and as something proved Ev

AAOLG
that

in H J , 1 0 4 3b 16-18 ) ;

( b ) what can be meant by saying

a s tatue once made is a particular thing

"'

/
( ooE
TO LovoE )

but that what the s culptor is engaged in making f rom his

material is a sort o f thing?

Isn ' t the s tatue he is making

44

PROLEGOMENON

TO

Z79

the same particular statue that finally stands in the studio?

The proposal for resolving the puz zles start by answering No
to the last question.

B.

The thesis .

Roughly and provisionally : a sculptor engaged in making a

statue is not making e;ome particular statue , even if ' the
end-product is a particular statue ; a seed in the process of
becoming a tree is not becomng a particular tree , even if a
particular tree is the end-product . (Aristotle seems to call
/
such concrete end-products Y LYVOUEva, 1032a 12-15 , 2 0 , 25-2 6 ,
3 0-b 1 , b;.11-12 , 1033a 5-6 , b 12-13 , 16-19 , 1034a 9-1 0 ; so
y evvtuevov , 1033b 19 , OE L ouv LOTUEva, 1034a 3 3 ; but note
q
,
u
/
the proviso oTav yevn<aL , 103 3a' 6 , oTav y evvnav , 1033b 23 ,
;
y eveo3aL , 1 0 3 2b 3 1 , warning against reading the verb here as the
imperfective or continuous . ) Yet what the seed is becoming of the
bronze is being made into is indeed a tree or a statue ; we do
not produce the universal Statue ot Tree ( 1033a 8-b 18 , recalled
later , cf . A 3 (a ) ) . When Aristotle in 1032a 18-19 cites a man
and a plant as prime examples of substances , the phrases have the
is making/becoming a
logic of " a statue" and " a tree" in "
statue/a tree " . ' And just as " a statue" in such contexts is not
to be taken as referring to some particular statue under an
indefinite description, so " the statue which
is not
to be understood as referring to one under a definite description :
one cannot be making the sphere which the bronze comes to be
(1033a 28-2 9 , 3 3 , b 3-8 , 11-1 7 ) when one is maktng the bronze
into a sphere (a 3 2 - 3 3 )
The paradoxical air o f this may be
cleared by considering its philosophical credentials before
touching the exegetical dividends .

"

c.

Philosophical credentials

1 . The thesis i s not a complaint about temporal restrictions

on reference . It does not say that , if the process of becoming/
making a Y is still under way , there is not yet a particular Y
to re shown or christened - though later , all going well , we
shall have a definite reference to write into our process45

NOTES

report',

ON

ZETA

(As though the problem were met. by saying "'Thftt

seed is turning into a tree , namely

" this tree " . )

" after mapy yea:&'s

The point must hold good equally for "was

becoming/making" in cases whe re the e nd-products already exi s t .

I f " B ill is/was demold. shing a statue " carries a s part o f its
analys is the timeless
." B i l L is/was

( Ex )

( s ta tue x & demo l ishing

(Bil l , x)} ,

mak ing a statue " carries no such analysis .

This

would be wrong if one accepted Vendler s claim ( Phil osophical

Review lxvi

(1957)

p.

145) :

" I f I say of a person that he

is running a mile or of someone else that he is drawing a

circle , then I do cl aim that the first one will keep running
until he has covered the mile , and that the second will keep
draw ng until he has drawn the circle

If they do not

complete the ir activitd.es , my s tatement will turn out to be

false . "

For this would make the impo rting o f a particular

c ircle just as integral to the logic of " I am drawing a

circle" as it is to that o f " I am rubbing out a circle " .
El sewhe re c A:t.is. totelian p leasures I
Aristotel.ian Society . . lxxii

Proceedings

( 1 9 71- 2 ) p .

150)

0f

the .

I argued :

" Suppose you i nterrupt me when I am drawing a circle ;md the

circle is never finishedi i t cannot fol low that I was not
drawing a c i rcle .

For if what I was drawing was not a ci rcle

but the circle- fragment

interrupt my drawing " .

left on my pape r , you di d not

If Veridler were . fond o f centaur

picture s he might propose " ci rcle-drawing" instead of " drawing

a circle" to c over such cases , and e ven appeal to one of
Aris totle ' s favourite examples of

x Cvna !:: , olx6oona (; .

But,

al l Goodman difficulties apart, Aristotle ' s analysis does not

take this short way :

1 0 3 3b 22-24 e t passim .

One d i fference

( there are others ) may be conceded betwe.en drawing a circle

and making a s tatue or becoming a tree .
.process and p roduct can overlap :

In the latte r cases

an unfinished s tatue can

be a s tatue , an unfinished circle is not a circle .

disregards the difference , even in

o't.x65ona(;

Aristotle

(Phys

1 2 ) , and there are artificial ways of avo iding it

2 0 lb 11-

( "He ' s sti l l

working o n th e s ta tue h e made " , " It ' s be come a tree but s ti l l

growing" ) .

I t . does not affect the point that statements o f the

fonn "A is becoming/making a Y " do not carry in thei r truth

conditions or entailments any requirement that there must
46

PROLEGOMENON

TO

Z7-9

( timelessly) b e some particular Y for A t o bec ome/make .

Rej ecting the extensional analysis for such statements does
not require us to read them as reporting purposes or purpose
like ends , e . g . to read "making" as " trying/meaning to make" .
Such a reading would indeed j ustify our unwill ingness to
replace " a statue" or

" a tree " in such_cootexts .);iy .a description

.

true of the actual statue or tree that happened to: emerge ; and

perh_aps such cases are at the forefront of Aristotle ' s mind .

But the analys is should also provide for unintentional
developments or such deviations as Aristotle tries to
ac commodate at 1 0 3 3b 3 3 - 1 0 3 4 a 2 .

.3 .

It is natural to say

that , whereas " I am/was demolishing a statue " invites the

question "Which .s tatue ? " , with " I am/was making a statue " the
question does not arise or i f it arisea. may have ,l'lo answ.ez .
But .this needs c are

11 . . Geach" ( i b13lj_eve)

pointed o1lt '.that if

someone says " Callias is a man" the que stion "Which man ? "
would b e pointles s ; y e t patently this could not show that
Callias is not a particular man .

Suppose then I am at a dog

show and anxious to1 sort out the name s in my cata logue

(I

can ' t tell which are of dogs and which of owners ) ; then if
you tell me that Callias

is a man I shall still press the

( In fact it is hard to think of

que stion, Which man is he?

circumstances in which " Callias is a man" would be informative

but the further question would not c ol lect more information . )
By contrast ,

if I say that

have been making a statue this

does not enitle you to-. expec t that there is any answer to
the question "Which statue ? " .

I can disallow the question by

saying " Bu t , as usual , it c ame to nothing" .

But in default

the claim that allias

of any answer to "Which ma,n is C al l ia s ? "
points
out that even if
--thew
Mat
:Gareth
(b-)
.
is a man . WO\l.ld fail
the.

statue-making came to nothing I might have an answer to

"Which s tatue?"
sculptors ;

Statues were commi s s ioned from several

my assignment was the statue of . Yehoshua Bar-Hille!

for the Philosophy Lib rary

right statue now arises .

B ut , first , :the tfUes t<ion of the

If I did produce a statue answering

to the description there would . be no room for the que stion

whether I had produced the right .. statue , and even if I produce d
two or more statues competing for the description there would
be no room for the ques tion which was the right one ; but
if I set out to meet a particular man and met one or more
47

NOTES

ON

ZETA

answering to h i s description , both que stions could still be

Secondly , i t remains i n any case true that given the

raise d .

truth of " I was mak ing a s tatue " it is a contingent matter

that the ques tion "Which statue ? " should have or lack an
answe r , and given the truth of " I was demolishing a s tatue"
. t:h..iS.. , is not so .

4.

Some further points may be cleared by

developing an imaginary c onve rsation o f the sort that Aristotle

seems to envisage at 10 3 3b 8-26 ,

l0 3 4 a 5- 8 .

( The reasons for

not presenting th is as direct exegesis will be obvious . )

Objecto r :

Surely

the s tatue the sculptor was making is the

particular s tatue to be finished yeste rday .

Aristotle :

Le t us be explicit:

that he finished yesterday ':'

bronze into a s tatue .

the particular bronze s tatue

Then he was making that particular

Will not this formula satis fy your

hanke ring for the particular re ference?

At the same time i t

puts the reference where it bel6ngs , outside the purview of

" a statue" .

Making this bronze into a

statue is l ike making

it into a sphe re , which is s imply making it spherical ( l 0 3 3a

32-34)
O:

But surely if I make ( of

what I make

( o f or from)

or from)

this bronze a statue ,

the bronze. is a particular s tatue ;

the expres sion " a s tatue " : makes . . reference to j us t that statue .
A:

You will make me repeat my pattern of analys is , and that

will give you. a regress .

I f to make this bronze a statue is

to make it a particular statue , it is to make it a particular

Y which is a s tatue ; and th is
Y a s tatue
O:

is j us t to make the particular

( 10 3 3b 11-19 ) .

Then what be comes of your . l ater warni9g that the material

components are not to be ve sted with full parti cularity

5 - 16 ) ?

Here

( 1 0 3 3b 2 2- 2 6 , 1 0 3 4a . 5 - 8 ) you seem to have no

qualms on thi s , and you impl!'z' as much e lsewhere

1 0 4 la 2 6- 2 7 ) .

( 10 4 0b

( 10 35b 3 0 - 3 1 ,

Let me concede that a lump of bronze o r a pile

of bricks is . usually identifiable enough :

lumps and collections

can be dis tinguished and counte d , though with some fami liar
hazards that do not bese.t the counting of houses and s tatue s .

But th is last diittinc tion::.s e s sential . When : I make. the. lump

into a s tatue I make a highe r-orde r individual , falling under
a concept which imposes s tronge r conditions of identity and
numbering; and this new individual does not bre ak down into
48

PROLEGOMENON

Z7-9

TO

the old individual plus the attribute of s tatuenes s , as the

blue article I produce by paints o r dyes breaks down into
It is no t , as you have

the original article plus this colour .

put it e lsewhere , j us t an l/J...Ao xa '

11.AAOU AEybEvov .

So to

make this bronze into a s tatue is to make it into a different,

because di ffe rently individuate d , individua l ; and to this new
individual " a s tatue" mus t be suppose d to re fe r .
A:

Certainly , to know what makes something a man is to know

how to count and differentiate men :

one man is one exis ting man
contras t ,

in that sense a man is

( 1 0 0 3b 2 6 - 3 0 ,

1 0 5 4 a 1 6 - 19 ) .

By

to know what makes something blue is not to be ab le

to count bare blue somethings .

But to unde rstand the claim

that something is/was /will be becoming a man one need no t

accept that that man could be differentiated and counted
among others .
men .

One only need know how to count and di f fe rentiate

" Th i s is be coming a man" is in this respect l ike " This

So in such contexts " a man " is indeed a

is not a man" .

s ingular term but not a term profe ss ing to make a singular

re .ference .

And the analysis o f " I made a statue" is " I .

was

mak ing a r s tatue and (what happens to be true but is no part

of the analys is of the first conjunct)

there is

( timelessly)

a particular s tatue which resulted from the mak ing" .

D.

Exegetical dividends .

1.

Aris totle says that whateve r "Y L YVEa L become s or is

,.

becoming something ( L ) , e . g .
so- and- so ( 6oE )

in the category of subs tance a

s uch as a man or a plant ; and a man o r a

plant is a prime example o f substance

( 10 3 2 a 1 3- 15 , 18- 19 ) .

Give " a man" and " a plant" the i r proper use i n such contexts
and prob lem A 1 does not arise :

they carry no name ly-rider

such as " viz . Socrates or Callias or

not a prime sample of substance .

".

So Socrates is

The question " Which man ? "

d oes not arise o r c a n b e reduced to " What sort of man? " ,

something s till genera l .
a defin i tion :

To explain " a man" here is to give

what one de fines is always a sort of thing

( 10 3 6a 27_;2 8 ) , and i n such cases it is i:'he . form {s:.g . 1 0 3 5 a

: n , 1 0 3 5B 3-4.,-10 3 6.a I ) .

-Oi:Ji

;ithis readi-ng Ros" also mi srenders

iL032a 2 3. i n . .taking' ' " a plant- or an

49

an.irilaJ;

as

NOTES

ON

ZETA

specimen references to individuals . Probably the text should

be read: " For that which is produced has a nature , e . g .
a plant or an animal" : the express ions pik o.\lt a ... nature "
/
/
. h is
'
' LO
' '>',,
. the xaa
wh 1C
L uOG YOUVn
UOLG 10 32a 24 . ( So
Reale , without pursuing the impl ications : " ci o che si genera
ha una natura : per esempio , l a natura di p ianta o di animale " . )
So too Ross seems to mis take 10 3 3a 2 7 : Aristotle means , no t
" someth ing is produced, e . g . a spl-\ere or a circle " , but " that
which become s something , . e .g . a sphe re or a circle " ; he goes
on at once to say that the sphere ( i . e . what the thing becomes )
i s not itsel f produced ( 1033a 29-30 ) . The point of lines
31- 32 is surely that. to make an individual sphere is to
make it from something , e . g . bronze but if we are then supposed
to make the sphere which the individual be comes we need
something further to make it from, and are on a regress . In
" this bronze is becoming a sphere " we do not mention two
individuals or make two mentions of one . By this line of
"
argument the bronze becomes the T05 ; what " a sphere" stands
for is a such ( l 0 3 3b 2 1- 2 4 , 1034a 6 , cf . P lato , Timaeus 4 9 D-E ) ,
and Aristotle argues that to cons true i t as referring to an
individual such as a P latonic Form ( a T L G , 1 0 3 3b 20 , ,&0 ,
/
'
WP
LOUvov , 2.2 . & 2 4- 2 5 ) would produce an absurdity . I take it
he means that then the individual which should emerge on ly at
the terminus of the process would be otiose inasmuch as the
sphere that s omething was becoming would already be an
existing individua l . The argument of 10 33a 1-5 is in line
with this explanation . In 10 3 2b 32- 3 3 he points out that
s omething , vi z . matter, mus t pre-exist the change . (This
was said for natural changes at 1032a 1 7 , 20- 2 2 , and implied
for artificial at 1 0 3 2b 30 . ) This answers the ques tion , From
what are we to make a house or a sphere ? From what wil l there
come . a plant? The answer is, From matter , which become a
sphere , e tc . ( e . g . 10 32a 20-22 : Ross , misleadingly , " This
capacity is the matter in each" ) . But then as we ll as
speaking of "becoming a sphere " we can speak of "becoming a
bronze sphere " , and when we do . the function of "bronze"
becomes similar to that of "sphere " : it too is part of a
A.6Y oG , able to figure in a definition ( c f . , ( t crL 1033a 2 )
and thus helping to determine a sort o f thing , not to mark
50
I

It

PROLEGOMENON

TO

Z 7- 9

off the individual . 2 . Problem A 2 seems equally to dissolve .

Wha t the seed is becoming is indeed a this , for it is becoming
tree But what it is becoming is not any particular tree ,
but a such ; for the process is identified by saying what sort
of thing the seed is becoming . Here the vocabulary of " this"
and " such" which Aristotle inherited from Plato seems patently
too primitive a device to capture the point he is after . To
conclude that the form is " a this separable in logos " (Hl ,
1 0 4 2 a 29 ) is only a ges ture at the odd compound of s ingularity
and generality he has seen in " a tree" . 3 . A 3 (b) . has been
discus sed . As for A 3 ( a) , the same s imple vocabulary of
general and particular seems to be behind the trouble . It is
natural to assimilate the uses of n a s tatue" in " I am making
a s tatue'' and "What is a sta tue ? " , given that neither mentions
a particular statue and that the second is meant to elicit
an explanation of the sort of thing I am described as making
in the first . But to answer the question is to define a form,
and if I am not making a particular . s tatue I am not making a
form eithe r . Aristotle offers some palliative idioms : . one
makes the form in ( 10 33a 3 4 ) or into (10 3 3b 10 ) or even out
of ( 1 0 3 3b 2- 4 , given the construction suggested unde r A 3 (b ) )
.
/j'
the matter, but it is better to introduce E LVO.L (.1033b 8 - 9 ) :
one makes it that the form is in the matter . He is s truggling
with the assumption that where " a circle" does not refer to a
particular circle it mus t name a form ( 1 0 3 3b 1-3 ) .
E.

Qualms .

1 . Can Aristotle have had this use of t'.L in mind at 10 32a 14

.,/
c.
/
when he couples.it .with others , the uno t'. L VOG and e;x t'.Lvos;; ,
that are specimen references to quite concrete fathers ,
sculptors , etc . and the individual matter they operate on?
Perhaps 1032a 14-15 is sufficient to show the generality
intended ' in the "tL
(As G . E . R.Lleyd remark s , 10 32a 22-25
is not enough to show an essential generality , : in all three
occurrences of i; L in 10 32a 14 , given the prefatory xa36Aou
,
oe; of 10 32a 22 . ) 2 . The Y LYvoe;va tentatively represented
as " concrete end-products " in B above are Y LYvoe;va "tL , where
the interpretation recognises no reference to a concrete
end-product and contrasts the imperfective or c ontinuous
51

,,.

,,

I
NOTES

ON

ZETA

sense required. . for the verb with the perfective conveyed by

rJ
/
/
/
/
I
the oav yevn a L , oTav
yevvnen , yeveaL and ye yovoG of other
contexts ( o f . A 3 , B ) . Then evidently it is an error to
/
represent Y L YVOl,Leva as end products , merely on the strength
of their carrying particular matter and a particular agent .
But when it is not merely a case o f the matter becoming a
house ( e :, g . 10 32b 29-10 3 3a 1 ) but of the house which y (yveTaL
(e . g . 10 32b 1 2 , 1 0 3 3b 17- 1 7 , 10 34a 21-24 ) , we seem again to
have end-products on our hand , the' OAOb of l 0 33b 1 7 . To
'
the overs imple dichotomies of individual/sort and particular/
general we h ave to add a third with which Aristotle does not
come fully
to grips , that of the perfective and imperfective
'
I'
. YLYV&OL , with the uneasy expectation that we shall understand
the imperfective unless the context directly requires or uses
perfective forms to show that the other is called for . 3 .
How on this reading are Z 7-9 a justifiable insertion in a
context for which they were apparently not written? ( a )
Wht is thei r connection with the argument o f Z 6 , whose
identification .of any npWTov xa\ xae at. A&yo'evov with a
definable . essence would . seem, for .all . it says , .. to . apply to
Socrates or this house or that tree? How do they introduce
J.
in tractable form they get
Z l0- 1 1 ? ( a ) By reimporting UAn
beyond the (either negative or at bes t ambiguous) treatment
in Z 3 , and thus prepare for the warning about the scope of
Z6 in Zll , 1 0 3 7a 21-10 3 7b 7 . (b) A, and possibly the ,
central issue in Z l 0- 11 is the caveat that the matter-form
distinction is not to be reduced to .a diYision. be:tween . what
cannot and what can be canonized in a definition . (Might ZH
be best read as a s truggle with dichotomies ? ) I f we are not
to take tin men as a serious ly intel ligible variant we have to
count the familiar s tuff of men with its familiar powers ino
our general account. of man , and young Socrates was wrong
(10 36b 24-32) . The first moves are made in 1033a 1-5 : the
sort of matter has .its . place . . in de fining the sort o f tliiI?g
produced, even if the individuating . matter (10 34a 5-8) does
not . (And no harm in that individuating matte r , if matter is
the locus of s uch possibilities as .being in the market at ten
o ' clock , or i f the first shot at recognizing that. . Callias can
be burnt and Socrates buried unburn and both shared both
52
.

PROLEGOMENON

TO

1032a 13

Z7-9

possibil ities , but the possibilites could not be reali zed

in both . The residual "both " keeps its bite . )
G . E . L . OWen
King ' s College , Cambridge .

S th May 19 76
10 32a 1 3-14 . In reply to GELO' s qualm E l we were impressed
by the fact that on Aristotle ' s own explanation of L in
14-15 it would be something general and predicative at least
in the non-subs tance categories ; so why not for ,Q'og toor
uno L VOG .,,
gx LVOG L can be viewed as corresponding
to three questions , in which case it is left entirely open
whether the specimen answers will indicate something general
or something particular and whether .all . three will. be on the
same level in this regard . Whether this account also allows
'
,
a Y LYvogva to pass as end-products (cf . qual E 2) is a
question we did not fully explore . We noted, further , that
1032b 2 wpuld be a worse jolt than it initially is ( gi.ven
z I s progress to date) i f the uaA. L a a o Ba ra. L were Socrates ,
etc .
c.

1032a 15- 1 7 . ix OagwG comes out in Ross ' s Oxford translation

,,
uag
L . We accepted this, . swallowing the change to a
different use of K in the following E o . Aristotle is
de.fin.i!'lg one class o f yg_v{ag (l; (which he would not succeed
,,,
>
:>
E
E C/
uA.nG) and
in separating from a l l the rest if gx uagwG
then he identi fies for this class the three factors which
.
,,,
we already know from 13-14 must be present in any ygvgaLG :
,
'
there are conditions special to the class of UOLKaL ygvgag L G
't'
'

IC'
o u and the L ( 1 7- 1 9 ) , and on the g E ou also if
on the
(but only if) E
A.n c contrasts with e . g . the case of
qualitative change . These points collectively elucidate
=

r.-

>

'

gx ucrg<ilG

53

10 3 2a

NOTES

:Z2

ON ZETA
'

1032a 22-5 . We translated the triple xaL ' just as

and
and
'
'E'
indeed as ' , and noted the insurance taken out on the u ' ou
being a nature , something general : it is that in another
substance . We also noted that oS is highly schematic :
..
t.
"
no mention e . g . of u ' auou case$ .

,
,,,,
,,
l 032a 26- 8 . aL' 5' aAAaL
YEVEOE LG AEyovaL noLnOE LG works only
,,.
' f , at the least,we understand the coverage of Y EVEOLG in all
1
categories at the beginning of the chapter to have been
narrowed to the category of substance ( c f . a 20) . We did not
worry much about seeking a hard and fas t account of the triple
alternation in 2 7- 8 : perhaps 1.n6 txvnG = the man can give a
principled explanation of why he made the thing the way he
did , tn6 5Lavo L'aG = there is. no explanation of this form but
he can give his . reasons in that he can retrace his steps of
del iberation , no ouV<fEooG
he cannot even do that .
,

.,,,,,.

>

,,.

Text of 10 3 2b 4 Ross pri ts anoucr La without recording it in

his g pparatus but in his note ad loc . says it is the rea ding
of A
Jaeger appe ars not to recognize such a reading at al l
but credits Ab Alp with the same noucrr,v
a as the tradi tion
"'
,.
which adds onAouaL after it; he prints anoucrLa without

Some general points. which eme;i:ged on the ; strategy of Z 7-9 :

The chapters were written for another context , as is evidenced
by the fact that they take for granted that substance is form
and by their containing irrelevant material from the point of
view of Z ' s interests . But Aristotle himse lf put them in here ,
for the sake of what they contain that is re.levant to z . We
should not make too much o f the assumption that substance is
form , since that final outcome is not in any. case meant to
be an outright re jection of the other three candidates ; a ll
four have . to be unders tood in connection with each other .
5th June 1 9 76
PS to previous note on s trategy. The outcome we had in mind
was the summary of results in Hl . I t is true that 1042a 26-31
54

CHAPTER

1 0 3 2b

of that chapter lists as substances the canonical .triplet "

matter - form - compound of these , but Z 4 ' s candidates
(es sence , universa l , genus , sub ject , the last subdividing
into the canonical triplet - 10 29a 1-3) are all in play
earlier in Hl ( 1 0 4 2a 1 2 ff) , al though unive rsal and genus
are set aside at 2 1-2 . In any case the original point stands :
i f , as we again agreed, the assumption that substance is form
does not exclude outright all other candidates , there is no
danger that Z 7- 9 will preempt the result of Z ' s enquiry .
PPS to same : ad 1 0 3 3a 13-14 . Note A 3 . 10 69b 36-70a 2 , where
change is again schematized by prepos itional phrases with
the indefinite pronoun : tn6 't'LVOb for the efficient cause
'/
(particular) , E Lb 't' L for the form ( general) , so confirming
our linguistic intuitio n .
10 3 2b 1-5 . With the example of health we are back with non
substantial categories ( cf . 8 th May 1 9 7 6 ad 1 0 3 2a 26- 8 ) , to
be paralleled l ater by the example of a house ( c f . in this
respect the procedue in Phys , A7) . But what of health as
,
and paired with a privation ( 3-5 ) ? ouoLa must carry its
oucna.
Ii\
gene ral, not its . , sens e , mediated by E LOob (b 1-3) .
Among the conveniences to prompt Aristotle ' s choice of example
is that he needs something that can happen a.no i;a.ui;ouai;ou (a 29 ) ;
possibly also he likes to draw on his conception of health
as a configuration for morals about form ( fo r which c f . Phys .
H3 246b 3 f f , and remember the dimensions left at the
penultimate stage of the stripping in Z 3) . Also in tll is
,,
4
connection , oa.Ao't'nb ( 7 , etc . ) would be internal quableness
of hod:. and .col d . Rather more difficult is health as n i;n
" ,
(b 2 )
One suggestion was the fo llowing { J Alexande]
oucrLa.
in Met 4 8 9 . 9 - 16 ) :
:I

,,

"

..

'
E Lnwv OE O't'L 't'O
ELOob KO.L 't'O" 't'Ll'"' l"i'
nv ELVO.L
,...
:>. """
)
:J. /
't'OU
't'O, EL OOb npwi;nv OUOLO.V
EO't
' LV OUOLa.,
>....
, ;
O.L't'
LOV ennYa.YE
't'O KO.L ya.p 't'WV EVO.V't'LWV
<.
'
....
'
, ...
Ii'
't'f?OnOV 't' L VO. 't'O a.ui;o E LOoG . >EnE L on ya.p n
" L 't'O'
cri;{pncrLb 'tj;l AD mXE L , 'Il OE O't'EPnOE
'
>
n
a.noUOL,.
E'tva.L i;b E'toob Tll.1;)6-X.E"ra.1. ( i;D ya.p 0.U't'Ou
7

'

,,

...

,,,.

'

...

'

.....

'

'

55

.,.

------.............................

--------

1(;32b l

NOTES

ON

ZETA

/
tfl"' :J
)
n..; crgpncrLG
gcr L v) , g;,L on' xaL 'V crgpncrg L n gv
...
"
,....
'
"=>'
...
"'
"
01
"'
p UAD ouori o g L vaL KaL DAWG nv unap L v o
\
, ,,. ,
1) ,
,
'
.,,..
O L OOV
O
og.... gcrL
KaL
o aov
g L OOG gcr L v , auo
....
'
""
...
""'
/
.....
xaL ,opLCov
nv
uAnv uaL
uoa.ouv
, npwn
uaL
.,,,.
.,, ,
. 7
KUPLWG OUOLa
ou
av g>L,..n .
'\i

.,-

'

This interpretation seems to remove the parentheses in b 1-2

'
../
and takes the xaL Y"1.P sentence as ,explaining the problematic
'
s tatement within them. Yet the more obvious explanandum for
the ua y ct p sentence:. is. what _ precedes .the parenthesis': because ,
.
notoriously , any gxvn is a 5uvaLG wv gvav Lv , Aristotle
needs to check that his condition for n6 exvnc makings
'
covers opposed outcomes . But pe rhaps uaL yap KA . can do
this by/as wel l as explaining, in e ffect, that npfun = xup (a .
(We should remember that i f Z 7-9 comes in from elsewhere its
terminology cannot be expected to match the rest of z in
every detail . In fac t , 1054b 1 offers a reasonably parallel
use of npc&n oa (a . )
.

,,,.

.....

>

,,,.

'

t:J

,,,.

1 0 3 2b 6-14 gng Lon o5L uy L g La at 6 - 7 obviously represents

a definiton of health , i .e . something genera l , as is
appropriate on GELO' s account at the planning stage , prior to
successful completion of a making , and as is necessary for
the identification of health in the .mind with the art of
medicine ( 5 - 6 ) . When does particularity come in? On one
suggestion , already at 6- 7 , i f . Gy L {G and Y L {G mean a

\
<>
' healthy body ' rather than 'health ' ; but g L 5g o<HO
in b 8
is abstract
o aAo n a . Certainly at b 12 , but there was
disagreement as to how this was to be understood . Firs t,
' without matter ' does not exclude all re ference to matter
in the definition , as in the best sort of definit.ion according
to De An . I 1 (where note that the e xamples inc lude house , so
that the curious doctrine of two senses of ' house ' at H3 ini t .
may be referred to tile Platanists )' . L also the criticism of
Socrates the Younger at 1036b 24 f f . But , of course , any
reference to matter in the definition will be to a sort of
matte r . such a definition will still be ' without matter '
i n the sense Aristotle intends here , vi z . an idea as yet
unembodied in the material world . Second, the other te rm
56
=

C.

CHAPTER

l032b

of the contrast in b 1 2 . We disputed whether ' health/house

having matter ' , Aristotle ' s speci fication o f what the maker
makes , was sti l l something general embodied in particular
matter or whether the whole phras e carries a particular
reference , i .e . what results from the making is somebody ' s
health being healthy . We seemed finally t o reach a consensus
that it depends on the angle from which you regard the making :
prospective ly , he is ma:king a heal thy body/a house of such and
such a description (out of some particular matter) - .
retrospective ly , that over there is the healthy body/the
house he made , as particular as can be ( given successful
completion , but not otherwise) . . The only difr.i.culty is that
l l-l2 ' s general pronouncement about particular end-products
Uses y ryvgoea,L where We Would like to see the perfective
form emphasized,
__

l 0 3 2b 9

Jaege r ' s apparatus note gives the right sense for

goxaov ( the last thing in the order of deliberation, not
th.e last in execution) , but we did .not think it impossible
to get this sense out of the received word-order , without
Jaeger ' s suggested transposition .
)/

l032b 27-8 That being so, one would prefer to take goxaov
in 2 7 in the same straightforward sense , rather than Ross ' s
' minimal necessary basis ' . In other word s , as the last item
(L ) in deliberation ( the first in execution) , which wil l
.,,
,,.
produce , directly ()n\ guaub
can J:e understood in 28 without
necessarily inserting it into the text) or indirectly,
something which is a part ( P ) of health . That said, a
conj ecture in Ross ' s apparatus , further elaborated in Jaeger ' s
text, goes on to the idea that L is itself in some sense
"
(n;wb Bonitz) /in ' this sense (ouwb
EJ - in what sense is that?)
a part o f health . The conjecture is an attempt to combine
rather than choose between two MSS traditions . But the text
/ 7
'
.....
Ross actually prints (OUO o ' ..,,
goxaov
go, L , <O
1'0 LOUV
o'
/
c.
"
gpob nG
uy
L g LaG , - ) preserve s , what his con.jecture fudges ,
the distinction , which one wishes was more clearly made in
EN but is cle.ar in the previous lines of the present passage ,
between the external relation of L to P ( fngaL in 2 7 ) and the
57

""

--.................... .....

--------------------

NOTES

1J 32b 27

ON

ZETA
,.

consecutive rela:tiion to P to health (e:poi:; in 27) . As for

27 itse l f , the reason for the disjunction is not so much
that he wants to allow for heat being a part of health as
that in s.ome cases a constituent of the end may be immediately
executable , without further need for deliberation . But we .
agreed that we should re turn to this subject, to sort out
the transition (b 29-a 1) to the stones of a house and the
sense in which matter is a parti c f . Ross ' s worries pp . 184-5 .
For so far ' part ' has apparently been used in a fairly abstract
sense
constituent or part of the defining specification
of some thing like health . For the res t , 1 5 : ff says little
that is not repetition of the previous paragraph until
Aristotle gets on to the heat and the stones , which we have
next to face
=

3rd July 1 9 76
1 0 32b 21- 1033a 1 . We went over the passage discussed last
time in the light of difficulties that emerged then, notably
(a) the L/P distinction .
(b ) the transition from health to the house examp le .
( c ) the sense of ' part ' when matter is introduced as a part .
(a )

Would it be he lpful to read the text Ross prints

( rather than his conjecture , which Jaeger prints ) in b 2 9 ?
This gives crxaov the we lcome straightforward sense of
' last item in deliberation' (L) and so maintains a
distinction between L and P (part) . However , we run into
prob lems with the dis j unction in b 2 7 , where heat is said
to be e ither part of health or what makes such a part . This
need not mean ..tha t Aristotle is confused between L and P ,
just that, he ..hasn' t .. made up his. mind wli.ich heat ii;; ; but . in
this context this woula be rather feeble . In any case <o0<o
5 ' l!crxaov in b 2 8 reimports L/P confusion unless <O <o refers
only to the second dis j unc t , having the force of ' the latter' ;
but this is not very plausible . ( 2 ) Ross ' s conjecture fits
( 1)

58

CHAPTER

1032b 21

better an interpretation according to which Ari stotle is on

the contrary deliberate ly running together L and P . b 29
can then be read as saying that the last step in deliberation
produces a part of health and in that sense is itself a part
of health . This keeps more of the text of EJ. Howeve r, otiwG
would suggest that Aristotle has alre ady given some explanation
of how L can be P , but none has been .offered
And ( 2 ) runs
up more heavily than ( 1) does against the second problem,
vi z . the transition from health to house ; we want a programmatic
statement co llaps ing the L/P dis tinction and applying to heal th ,
houee and 'the other things" , but i n fact the general statement
emerges fom the discussion of health and the application to
the house example is not obvious . The las t step in the doctor ' s
deliberation is to rub the patient (b 2 6 )
This suggests that
we should follow pseudo-Alexander here and take the 'crxa.ov
here to be P L L G (This causes some awkwardness for the
sentence at 2 6-2 6 . ) Rubbing , however, is not plausibly a
part of health . Stones , on the other hand, are obviously
a p:art of a house , but not obvious ly the last step in the
...
builde r ' s deliberation . Should we therefore take A LO L as
elliptical for a re ference to the builde r ' s final point of
deliberation , which initiates action - e . g . the putting-together
of the stones , or the l ike? This view keeps L and P separate
at the cost of ( i ) assimilating the role of objects to that
of events , makirg health the de termining example 1 (ii) making
a sharp break between the two examples and the introduction
of matter as a part , moving at that point from efficient to
material causes , and ( iii) making it hard to see how what.
has been s aid has any releyance to the claim in b 30- 31 that
/
/
something mus t npoUrta.PXE L V . (Howeve r , at b 20- 2 1 una.pxe L v
is used o f an action potentially available to the agent .
But there would s ti l l have to be a continuity between this
and npouna.PXE L V in b 3 1 , but a sharp break between these
and evuna.PX E L V used o f matter in 10 3 2b 33 - 1033a 1 .) I f we
favour an interpretation of type ( 2 ) , then the L/P con flation
is made via a conflation something like : the rubbing makes
health , or a part of i t . This amounts to a feeb le , though
not impos sible., equivocat i on . on no Le'l:v . An advantage is that
the introduction of the stones example makes the transition to
59
.

"

......

1,----------------------------

10 3 2b 2 1

NOTES

ON ZETA

matter less abrupt . But just as a type ( 1 ) interpretation has

to make ' stones ' elliptical for some event involving stones ,
this interpretation has to assimilate an event l ike rubbing
to the role of objects like stones which are there be fore the
house is built and form part of i t . Possib ly the problem is
part o f the general problem of what sense we are to give to
' parts ' of non-material things like health . (c) ' matter is a
part ' in 10 32b 32-10 33a l is meant to explain the claim that
something must OnapX& LV. ; but in what sense is it a part? It
looks as though one can use Z l O and 1 1 (e . g . 10 35a 1-6 ) to fil l
out this passage : matter is part o f the definition or
specification of the aCvoA ov . But this runs up against y (yveaL
atfn in l 0 3 3a l - this ( the matter) is what becomes something .
This is only plausible of a particular lump of e . g . bronze ,
not of the sort o f matter mentioned in a definition , which
cannot become anything . This favours an interpre tation that
makes no sh.rp b reak be tween the examples and the . introduction
of matter, and is als o consonant with the interpretation we
accepted of the fol lowing . lines .- . However , this way of taking
matter as ? .part creates retrospective problems for the earlier
part of the passage ; if ' part ' in b 32 means a material part ,
presumably it does so earlier and all through the passage ;
but heat is not a material part of health . Again we have
inconcinnity because of the prominence given to he alth , a
non-material item .
1033a 1-5 . There are two poss ible ways o f taking the AA ' pa
sentence ; (a) ' is matter part of the formula (as well as part
c. e/
r
,
.,,
/
of the thing ) ? ' understanding n uAn epoG ea L after Acy, (b)
' is some e lement in the definition also pre-exis tent ( as wel l
as matter) ? ' understanding L npoun&'pxe L after A6Y We
decided in favour o f (a) , re jecting (b} for essential ly Ross ' s
reasons . When Aristotle later dis cus ses the pre-existence of
form he rej e cts the idea that a part pre-exis ts ; also the
conclusion at a 4 - 5 fits (a) better than (b) . The main
ob jections are that (b ) makes the passage irrelevant to its
context, and also that it. involves the doctrine that genus is
matte r , which would introduce a further confusion into the
introduction of matter here . Nothing seems to hang on reading
60

CHAPTER

10 3 3a 1

5'

the particle as interrogative a.pa. or inferential iliPa., and we

followed Benitz in reading AA ' &pa. .
,.,..

l0 3 3a 5-23 . Two points are made in this passage : ( 1 ) when we

say that X comes K Y , this is used properly where Y is a
privation, less properly where Y is matter . The reason for
this does not appear ti ll a 21- 2 2 : that from which a thing
comes must change and not remain . ( 2 ) we call the product in
a certain class of cases not X but Xish , e . g not E GAov but
/
EuA L vov . How are the two points re lated( ( 1 ) is evidently
meant to explain ( 2 ) , Ca.YT LOV in a 8 , 5 L b in a 1 6 ) , but how?
a 13-16 should clarify this , but contain ambiguities . Where
a privation is unobvious and there is no word for it , then
'
,,.
.,,.
c.
. .,
E:K TOUTWV
OOK E:"L Y LY
VE:OfuL WG
E:K E: L eJ<\ l(ClVOVTOG. ( i ) If lrOUTWV
here = matter like stone , bronze , etc . , then Aristotle is
saying that where there is no word for the privation we
improperly_ say that . the thing comes tx the matter , and ooxE:i
will = ' is sloppily thought to be ' . However , the G-clause
becomes strained, since K xavOVTOG is for Aristotle proper
usage (cf . a 10- 1 3 ) , and we have to interpret as , ' the
improper use is thought (wrongly ) to go like the proper one ' .
( ii ) -rou-rwv , however, could mean ' unnamed privations ' , in which
case ooxE: would = ' is rightly thought to be ' like the proper
usage . On ( 1 ) , the K distinction .shows ordinary language
to be muddled, on ( i i ) it shows it to have a fumbling grasp of
the correct distinctio n . Aristotle may in fact be indifferent
to the correctness of ordinary language here , concerned only
that it can be explained by the distinction . Neither ( i ) nor
( i i ) , however , show how ( 1 ) . supports ( 2 ) . The other passages
where the X/Xish ingUistic point is made do not help us much
with the train o f thought here ( 1 0 4 9 a 1 8- 2 4 , Phys 2 4 5b9 . )
There are two further puzzles about this passage . ( 1 ) Aristotle
is fond o f dis tinguishing different senses or uses o f gx ( 99 4a
22 ff , 10 23a . 26-b .. l l , 1 0 79b 23-4 ( =9 9 la 19- 20 ) , 109 2a 21 ff)
and has no overal l fixe d . doctrine , so he need not be doing more
than making a local point here for a specific purpose . But it
is still odd tha t the dis tinction he insists on flouts his own
usage in the surrounding passage , and even in the pre sent passage
at a 5-6 . ( 2 ) At a 11-12 we find that the healthy man is not
61
"

..

,.

.,,..

1. -----------------------

l 0 .3.3a 5

NOTES

ON

ZETA
)

said to be sic, because he comes to be ex xavovoG . We

would expect, thereore , the statue to be called not f; uA.ov
/
"
,
but f;uA. Lvov , because it comes to be ex EuA.ou . But Aristotle
precisely denies this ( c f . a 19-21 ) : a thing is properly x
its privation , not its matte r . So the latter point undermines
,
/
the former , making the relation of the f;uA.ov/EuA.
L:VOV point
to the ex-privation/ex-matter point yet more problematic .
?

l6th October 1 9 76
We were puzzled by the relation of Z 8 to what had immediately
preceded, and in particular by the parenthesis at l 0 33a 25- 7 .
What is the force of ,,cr,w? What is the re ference of Kon
,
O LWP LOLGlL ? WhY. does Aristotle apparently go back on his
recent insis tence that x is properly used of what does not
persist, and tel l us now to use it of the matte r , not the
,
cnfpnoLG? Does E:'aw mean ' Let i t stand as our view that
or ' Let it ( fo r the sake of the ensuing discussion) be
taken in the sense
1/
Probably the latter . We agreed anyway
that tfon oLWp L oa L is bes t referred to the beginning of Z 7 ,
i . e . in e ffect to Z 7 as a who le (with Jaeger and Ross ' s
ranslatioru) , and not to the immediately preceding discussion,
i . e . l033a 8 (with Ross ' s commentary and Apostle ) , nor to
Phys ics A ( as might poss ib l be thought , if Aristotle ' s point
was that we always give a name for matter, if not for the
atpno L G ) . In trying to find whe'..ller either of the uses of
x was the one Aris totle really plumped for we asked whether
what is seen by one who nLaA.tnE L crci>6opa ( l0 33a 21) is
Aris totie ' s own view or what linguistic usage actual ly is ,
since the trans ition to Z 8 seemed more violent if it was his
own view . The point is , has the end of Z 7 given us Aristotle ' s
own reason for speaking one way or the other, or only his
reason for why ordinary language does so? We decided it
wasn ' t really necessary to insist on the ' l inguistic usage '
interpretation . Taking i t as Aristotle ' s own reason we can now
perhaps make better sense of the end of Z 7 than we did l ast
time , when in particular we couldn ' t see how the point about
62
. '

CHbPTE.S..
the interpretation o f

1033a 2 4

7., 8

K could explain the wood/wooden point.

1 0 3 3a 5 ff . allows tha t we can talk

talking) o f something coming

(and indeed starts by

EK the matte r , though when we

look clos e ly we would not ( i . e . , on the present interpre taion,

ough t not to )

talk thu s without qualms

( anAWG ) ,

s ince

sK

should govern what changes but does not pe rs is t , i . e . the

/
/
is rather
crEPnOLG 0 In certain cases where the crEPnOLG
inde finite and we have no name for i t , we rely on the looser
way of talking (or perhaps this is how the looser way arises ?
But Aristotle doe s ' nt say this ) and s ubsti tute the matte r .
However, the association o f

K with the non-persi s tent s till

.;
draws us , so that whe n wood has been thus pre-empted by EK
'>
( the s tatue comes E K the wood) we fee l reluctant to go on

It

calling the s tatue Woo d , and so call i t wooden ins tead .

seems a fair gue s s tha t why Aris totle reverts 1 1 Z8 to what

,
he here (end o f Z 7 ) tre ats as a looser use o f EK , though he
was happier with i t earlier, is simpl that in Z 8 it is matter
rather than

,,.

OEPnOLG

that has a central role to p l ay .

But

this s til l leaves unexp lained why he fee ls so inclined to

tie K to the non-pe rs:tstent , whethe r . o r not .we take advantage
of the wood/wooden d i s cuss ion to derive the othe r sense from
it (see above ) .

Wha t might seem the most obvious sense of

K , where an ob j e c t come s

K a box , throws little light :

the

box pers i s ts , but the ob j ect i s no t the box , but at most ' boxis h '
( ' box born ' ) .

We d e c i de d , however, that despite these various

awkwardnes se s Ari s to t l e was in the clear at the start o f Z 8

s o far as serious c h a rges o f inconsistency o r i ncoherence went .
Turning to the mai n topics o f Z 8 , we displayed little
disagreement with the general lines of GELO' s prolegomenon to
the May 19 7 6 mee ti ng , whereby Aris totle is trying to transcend
dichotomies like th at o f form and particular .

In Z 8 he is

pl ainly trying to avoi d saying anything which suggests we

gene rate the form , s i nce this wold lead to a regress
3- 5 ) , however we take oho ( see below ) )

( 10 3 3b

Take a sentence

like 'We make a b ro n ze sphere by making bronze into a sphere ' :

if we also make wha t the last two words

(' a sphere ' ) s tand

for, we shall have to do so by making something into something

othe r than what. tho s e words s tand for , and then we shall have
to make this some th i ng other , ,.and so on .
63

(We found i t s l ightly

1.

: ,/

1033a 24

NOTES

ON

ZETA

s trange that Aris totle expressed the si tuation by saying th at ,

though we don ' t make v oqio. pav , we might make it Ka

ouJ.Lfl e:l3nKoG

( 10 3 3a 29- 31 ) .

This reve als a fear that e ven

saying we make xaAKnv oQJCLpav commits us to saying we make

( the form) OQlCLpa . But why , s i nce i t clearly does n ' t commit
us to s aying we make the bronze?
for oqio.t pav help?

Would putting an adjective

Ari s totle e vidently thinks not , as he also

worries about making something opoyy ov ( 1 0 3 3a 32- 4 ) . )

seems to s ay we can make
mus t avoid) making

6o e: ,

boe: t K ' something

He

without (what we

tout court; this interpretation o f

Z 8 i s s upported by the fact that 1 0 3 3a 3 2- 4 bans saying that

....

I;'\

( c f . l 0 33b 10 ) .
.

_,

c, ,

TOUOL , o .e:OTL

we make E:K

toe:

'

,...
TOUTO

'

e:v .,,
aAA'e- we make the form
cl ' ';)
'
Perhaps then o o L
o e:oT L oqio.pa , which

because we make o e: L o OG

xaAKOG ( 1 0 3 3b 2 - 3 )

is used of the form at 1 0 3 3b 13

.
l.S

indeed the form;

Still on the se general

points we though t 1 0 3 3b 19 f f . might show Aristotle attacking

Plato by saying that a Form as individual is not the right sort
o f form for creating individuals - a p roce s s which seems
otiose i f the form is alre ady embodied in (because it i s ) an
individual .
ail

We c ompared E N . I 6

( 1 0 9 6b 32- 4 ) , saying that

individual and s eparate Good, i n this sense , would be

unattai nab le .

In the course of all this we discussed several

individual pas s age s :

10 3 3a 2 7 ,

'

I s T L subject (Ros s ) or predicate o f Y L YV e: Ta L ?

The l atter perhaps fits the s entence most eas i ly .

1 0 44b 2 4

suggests . predicate too .

.

1.

10 3 3a 31-2 . What does OAWG mean?

For Ros s it means that the

'

O"Awi;;

a curious phrase for this , tll!lugl) . .Aristotle . s ometimes

unoKe: Lue:vov embraces b oth form and matter here .

c

We thought

"'

does treat form as unoK e: L e:vov ( 1 0 29 a 1- 3 , 1 0 4 2 a 2 6- 9 ) .

.

One

might even see z as a whole as a claim that form is the only

.
e
,,,et,
,
ultimately satis factory unoK e: L e:vov . Alternatively does o,,, wG
'!>i fy that; the noKe: (e:vov in question is what no{ve: L ,
so that

,,,,,,.

OTE:PT)OLG

c./.

is excluded and OA(l)b =

But Aris totle never talks o f

,,.

OTE:PT)OLG

,,,,,.
KUPLl!lb
"'

"

or anAWG ?

as unoKe: Le: vo v , even

</.
non-oAwi;;
, so c.t.:
OAWG can hardly be ruling his out , and to call

the matter

c.

,,.

' unrese rvedly ' unoK e: L e:vov may pe rhps sound odd
64

CHAPTER

10 3 3a 3 1

Z7.

after the wood/woo den qualifications of

OAWG

At l 0 3 3b 2 6

means ' taken general ly ' - but would that help here?

Neighbouring oc currences o f

Z/AWG

i n fact throw li ttle light .

We even toyed with the idea o f emending TOYOAQl:: to ..T.OYAIQl::, ,

but no obvious reason for the corruption o ffered itself , and

we agreed to remain in anop Ca , noting that other occurrences
of

e./

OAWG

,,

c.

unox Lvov might be

help here .

useful , but Benitz gave no

We considere d , and perhaps on the whole favoure

dropping either ,60 or L from the second bo L

( 1 0 3 3a 3 2 ) ,

...

noting that there is MS authority for dropping L .

00 ,

without L , could then mean the form and the GELO prolegomenon
view would be fac ilitated .

We also

force o f the ensuing sentence

the L were dropped .

(A{yw

) might be clearer i f

I f L is kept the best interpretation

would be that o f Ros s .

8nox L (vou

thought the explanatory

" c.l

OAWG

We took for granted that K ou

belonged with the predicate , not the sub j e c t , of

the sentence .
beginning at

We were a li ttle troubled by the p arenthe sis

A(yw

( 1 0 3 3a 3 2 ) , for the ensuing sentences seem

to . flow on natural ly from one to anothe r and there seems no

natural place for the parenthesis to end .
reference of OUo

In particular the

( 1 0 3 3b 3 ) will be affected by whether the

parenthes is ends at b 3 , as with Ros s and Jaeger .

.

,..

OUo will refer back to either ou

/

o r Co

( 1 0 3 3a 3 2 )

i f we drop L

fJ

OAWG

But

'

If it does ,

unox Lvou ( Ross ) ,

this would be an

awkwardly long re ference back , unless the parenthesis were a

marginal glos s , which the
to preclude .

importance

of its content seems

We the re fore preferred not to treat it as a

(so too the Bohn ( ' Now , I say , that

')
and Apos tle ) , and to let o'llo refer back to the immediately

parenthesis at all
'

'

GI

"

preceding oo L o O L crcpa pa , or e se

t
JUS

"

to crcpa;pa; i n

e i ther case we got the re ference we wante d , name ly the form ,

if we agree (see above ) that cot here is indeed the form.
l 0 3 3 a 3 4 . We hesitated over whe ther to fol low Ross ' s tentative
suggestion of a comma after ouo .

We elt that it might

suggest that we made the form , though we didn ' t discuss Ros s ' s
C/

/_

. aAA'<B

no L 1 H v is an odd
_
combination for ' makes one thing in anothe r ' . Without the
own objection, that POV L V
comma

POV

.smitrasts with what precede s , _ not with

on the who le we perhaps prefe rred no comma .

65

,/_
aAA
q; .

----------------------------................

c; .,i'
'
,...
TOUTO yap unEKELTO .

1 0 3 3b 1

Does this mean ' That is what we

as sumed ' , o r ' That is what the

s tarted ' ?

ZETA

ON

NOTES

LEvov
unoKE ,,.

was from which we

We did not decide , though l i ttl e seems to hang on

it .
.

10 3 3b 5 . There is no need to fol low Jaeger in dropp ing ou5E .

I t does not a ffect the sense . A final co mpl ication arose from
considering three l ater passages whi ch refe r back to this
chapter , at leas t by impl ication , namely 1 0 3 9b 2 6 , 1 0 4 3b 1 6 ,
1 0 4 4b 2 3- 4 .
"'

YEVEOL G

We have interpreted Z8 as banning any kind o f

Ye t these pass ages spe ak as though what had

o f f orms .

....

The pass ages which

been banned was only a proce s s o f YEVEOL G .
expli c itly refer b ack ( 1 0 39 b 2 6 , 1 0 4 3b. 1 6 L.might seem at first
t6' 'contradict . . Z 8.,. l(:o;r .tl+ey. .both. ..s.ay . , that no.,gne ' makes or .
gerle;rates ' . :the .. form,. while z a ( 1 0 3 3b 2 1- 3 ) s eems firs t to

equate form with

TO LoVOE

rather than
,.

TO LOV 5E .

one does ' make and genera te '

ToE

and then to say

Pre sumably , howeve r ,

TO LV 5E , as
K To'u'5E To L bv 5 E .

this cl ash i s only verb al . One does not make a

though it were a , s ort o f enti ty , but make s

Howeve r , to say no-one ' makes o r generates ' the form i s consist ent:
w ith saying it can

...,.
,..
,,.
'>I
TOU
Y L YVE 08a.L ,
YEYOVEVO.L O.VEU

a poss ib i l i ty

expl icitly allowed at 1 0 4 3b 15- 6 . 10 39b 26 s ays s imply that they

.......
/
E 'LOLV1
OUK
KClL Q>&opa.G ELOL KO.L
avEU YEVEOEWG

..,.,

.....

repeats but

'

then adds ( 1 0 44b 2 5 - 6 )

Which 1 0 4 4b 2 1

that white does come from

b lack , but differently from the way white man comes from b lack
that arise incl ude : How is yE yov{vo.L 6.\.Eu ToC
Questions
man .
.
,,.

Y LYVE08a.L

related to

,,..
i>
\
E,,LOLV?
KO.L\ OUK
E')LOL

Can any form both

be and not b e, o r are different forms envi saged, e . g . horse

-;J.

"

'

and unicorn - is 1 0 4 4b 2 8 ( EOTL V ) sig nificant here ? We

thought we might resume discussion o f these issues by s tarting
at 10 3 3b 1 9 .
1 3 th November 1 9 7 6
10 3 3b 19 - 2 1 .

I t was agreed that 1 9 - 2 1 rais es

doub t , arising

out o f the . immediately prece di.. ng .. passage , on . whe ther

TOCE

can

appropriately be used o f a form.

On one view , only at b 2 6

doe s Aristotle s tart to consider specifically the Pl atoni c
theory ( c f .

r..

oGv i n b 19 , connecting this passage with what

66

CHAPTER

napa aoos

On the other hand ,

precede s ) .

1 0 3 3b 19
is an expre s s ion

characteristic of passages critical of the Theory of Forms

(e . g . A 1 0 7 0 a 1 3 ) .

e lsewhere

1 0 3 3b 2 1- 2 4 . There was uncertainty about the translation of

these lines , re flecting di fferent interpretations o f Aristotle ' s
\
ocpa.ipa napo.
aaos .
,,

reasons for objecting to a

centered round ( a ) the meaning o f

y (yvso

sub je c t o f

in b 2 3 .

aos ) ,

oos and wp Losvov ,

:there is i:6os oL-ovos .
exis_t ed napa ,cfoos ) , i t
not

/
.

and ( b ) the

Two al terna ti ves were proposed :

ocpa.1pa na

os ' L - rather
denotes ,() o LO'vos ,

it

there would not come to be a

an . .expression like
,.
c.
/

(sc .

e; L OUwi;; nv

This uncertai nty

I f that were the case ( s c . i f there we re a

(i)

l'.i'

c/

>

' ocpa.'i:'pa ' )

but .-;

. .

it is

when generation has occurre d ,

( i i ) I f i t were thus
would not come to be

(sc. if

,6os L ,

oQXlpo.

when generation has occurre d it ( s c . the form) is

o Lovos .

):Jut

dos

According to ( i ) the argument would be that i f you

already have a this (as you would have i f

OQXlpa

is

nap'Cl. ,a'cros ) ,

the"re would be no room for a proces s , o f generation , since the

individual would be on the s cene from the s tart .

Some doub t

was expre ssed on whethe r that gives Aristotle an argument :

does the fact that a

aapo. - naPO. ,6'.'aos

would not be involved

in a change prevent there from being any?

Against ( i i ) , there

is the argument that it make s Aris totle say that the form
become s

,6os L

when the change is comple te , for which no

parallel was cited , and which seems incons i s tent with Aristotle ' s
Some were i n favour o f combining

normal docrine .

r./

Ii"

s L ouwi;; n v with ( i ) ' s o f the

,c5os L as subje t o f lvt:'vvso .

rendering of

(ii) ' s

res t o f the sentence ,

Alternative ly , i t
_
,,,..
was suggested that we might de lete the comma after nv found
i_.e . with

in Ros s ' s and Jaeger ' s texts .

i.e

na ,6'.aos)

( 1 I f it were a this in that way , '

This would make what he says here harmonise

with his readiness to say elsewhere that a form is a this .

Regarding the argument against the suppos i tion o f an

/'
,
napa aaos
...

i f the
be fore

ift'ooi;;
/

S L ooi;;

one sugge s tion , as alre ady me ntioned , was that

is treated as a particular, we have a " p arti cular

ysvsoLi;; ,

thus precluding any .

the possibility o f calling an

.s-

(That would leave open

s L ooi;; oos L

the way sugge s te d

'
in

in GELO ' s p role gomenon ) . Altem atively , Aristotle may be

67

10 33b 2 1

NOTES

ON

ZETA

implicitly referring to the regress argument of 1 0 3 3b 3- 4 .

10 3 3b 2 1- 2 2 . A question was raised about the suggestion of

,,.

aAAa

,,.

' " 01)\.IClLVE L in Jaeger ' s apparatus .

expressed for

.,

aAA '
/

Some s upport was

,.,

o o L ovoE , the reading of E ; one proposal

e/

was to delete o E , and construe o L as

' becaus e ' .

1033b 2 2- 2 3 . How is the nega tive claim that the form is not
..

"

,,.

OoE ' " and rop L crEvov to be understood?

S ince to say that a

form i s not in any sense at all , ,O"o E ' " ' would conflict with
1 0 3 3a 2 4-b 19 , it was thought that

'
xaL

c.

"

rop L aEvov was bes t

c ons trued a s a n epexegetical phrase restricting the sense o f

.,,

ooE

( ' It is not ooE in the sense of being a particular ' ) ;

but of course

p L a{vov

itse l f . requires interpre tation . At

Met . M 1 0 8 7a 16-18 being p La {vov i s connected with vE Y E L a
and with being , 6oE ' " , and contrasted with being

L aov ;

but it was not thought to be clear whether the same usage is

involved here .

There was further discussion of the use o f

' OE ' appropriate to a . form, a top ic adnumbrated i n GEL O ' s

prole gomenon, where the form was said to be a this inasmuch
as ( a ) form in th i s context e xpre sses ' a s tatue ' in express ions
such as ' is . making/becoming a statue ' or he statue '
in expressions such as ' the statue which this . bronze i s coming
to be , ' and ( b ) corresponds to a singular term but not a
referring express ion - so that ' this ' hits o f f s ingularity ,
not reference to a particular s tatue .
about (a)
/

and ( b ) :

,....

Doubts were raised

( a ) Aristotle does not use the expre s s ion

ooE EV <e5E only where

' a man' o r ' a statue ' .

.;

ooE represents a singular term like

In de Anima that formula is used in

c onnexion with the analys is of snubness into hollowness in a

nos e , where

KO LA6',n

is no s i ngular term, and here at 1 0 3 3a

3 2 - 4 , ' roun seems to be thought of as des i gnatng a form

which could be referred to as a this .

Aristotle generalises

the argument of 1 0 3 3a 2 4 -b 19 to change in -all the categories

.

in none of them does an E L oo come to be ( c f . Z 9 1 0 3 4b 8 f ) .

S o it may be wrong to s tress s ingularity as central to the
argument .

( b ) GELO al l ows that it is hard not to read 1 0 3 3 a

2 4b 19 as treating , toE ' , and What it stands in for

( ' sphere ' , e tc. . ) , as referring expre s s ions , as he remarks
68

CHAPTER

1 0 3 3b 2 2

that ' Aristotle i s s truggling with the assumption that where

' a circle ' doesn ' t refer to a particular circle , . it. must name a
form ( l 0 3 3b 1 - 3 ) .r - i . e . it does refe .t" but not to particular s .
/

ooE , reference
v ,;:
aAAW ( ouo

( i ) When Aristotle speaks of matter as

' E""
,..
-;!
is certainly in question;
( i i ) o
OOG ouo

Als o ,

clearly referential)
of

' BE '

...

"

( 1 0 3 3a 3 4 ) would s eem to j us tify the usage

in question:

COG

( i i i ) Aristotle ' s gloss on

at

1 0 3 3b 5-6 is strongly in the material mode of imprinting on

On this account Aristotle will not ( b 1 9 f ) allow that

wax .

,;

ooE

the form is

i f that is .. taken as meaning th at the form is

a de termi nate specific individua l ; but ,

,6oE '

in as referring to a form, because forms are entirely

general .
over

( a 2 4-b 1 9 ) he lets

On this view b 19 f is hygd.eriic :

' 6oE '

,,..

o ovoE '

is preferred

because generality is brought out more perspicuously ,

and likewise the fact that forms are not the sort o f things
that are made .
"'

&/

,,.

v ooE

1 0 3 3b 2 4- 2 6 . I t was suggested , with Ros s , that o ana

should be trans lated ' the whole this ' rather tha n ' this whole
On the other hand , b 1 5 might be thought to . favour
the second alernative .
A further suggestion, that the sentence

thing ' .

should be trans lated ' the whole thing

to the ob jection that

o v '

is a this ' was open

is rather remote in the sentence .

In this sentence , Aristotle seems to be explaining how Callias

qualifies as a thing that is generated despite the absence of
linguistic compl exity in the name itself
rt was tho ught

that Aristotle was rather conflating the form/aU' oAo

'7/

"

and

particular/universal contrasts . avapwnoG and 6ov are not forms

,.
but general auvo,.o. .

l033p 2 6- 2 9 : Three interpretaions o f b 2 9 were canvass ed :

(i)

( Ros s ) ' They ( sc . the Forms ) would not , on that account

at leas t , be sel fsubs istent substance s ' .

(ii)

' There would not ,

on account o f ( the exis tence o f ) these things at least , be

sel fsubs istent substance s ' .

( ii i )

' There would not , for thes e

reasons a t leas t , b e sel f-subsistent substances ' .

The choice

between these translations was thought to depend in part on the

.

'

.....

.,

,,,,

interpretation of npoG aG ouoaG

is saying that the

E'ton

in b 28 :

i f Aristotle

would not be use ful things to pos tulate

69

1 0 3 3b 2 6

!'OTES

ON

ZETA

as. substances , b 2 9 , on trans lation ( ii ), would be a mere

repetition o f the argument of 2 8 .

Also , on ( i ) , it i s unclear

what argument Aristotle has presented .

With ( i ii) , the

argument will be that the uselessness o f

Forms for

explanation shows that there is pro tanto no argument for

postulating s e l f- subsistent substance s .
1 0 3 3b 2 8
...

XPT)OLa

Or

XPT)OLT) ?

( see Jaeger ' s apparatus ) .

was preferred .

10 33b 2 9 - 3 3 . The argument was thought to be that you do not

need individuals , bUt '_ the_ efficie:ot.,cam;e w.i.l l .. f.:i..l l .. tl)e J:>.i.J. l ,
"'

hence no need to set up lln . . e L 096 .

Natural generation is

mentioned partly because ( i ) phys ical examples are those

where the cause is most clearly a particular;

(ii)

it is in

phys ical cases that you can explain most hygienically what
Platonists were trying to explain by a

napcl6E L ya .

I t looks

as i f he is specially anxious to draw attention to the fact

that the two things involved in the generation are the same
in form but different in number .
of

>I

9/

'"'

Hence antiPlatonis t relevance

av3pwno1:; av3pwnov yevvat; .

10 33b 3 3 f . The suggestion was made that the brackets should

be removed and

o[

in b 34 wi l l then answe r toi

e'v

in b 2 9 ,,

1 8 th December 19 7 6
Aristotle says that Forms would be looked for

1 0 3 4 a 2-5 .

especially in cases o f natural reproduction ; for they are

sub stances in the fullest sense .
of an.i.mal specie s ?
offere d :

(i)

Why particularly in the case

Two reconstructions of the argument were

On Aristotle ' s criteria , natural kinds , only ,

are ouo (a L ; but the Pl atonists Want to explain

B'vTa ; SO

they

have the best mo tive s for introducing Forms to explain

Aristotelian substances .
their Forms were

oi'.>o e"a L .

"'

( ii ) Platonists took it that

ouoLaL ;

so these can be only be Forms o f

so Forms mus t be o f Aristote lian oti o a L ( c f . A-

1 0 70a 1 8 f . )

oo(a L

I t appeared that he re Aristotle is tre ating

as individuals , but this was no t thouht to be much

70

CHAPTER

.LV

34a 2

evidence against GELO ' s view, as Aristotle is here working

with a somewhat unrefined conception o f
10 3 4a 5- 8 .

> ,.
ouaLa.

It was suggested that the point of this passage

is to issue a caveat :

you mus t not suppos e , from the fact that

the. process of coming-to-be results in an individual , that

the form is itself an individual .
points :

( i ) remains

is individualised .

,.

oLovoE

Aristotle now adds two

whereas matter is a this and

( i i ) The matter o f Callias is diffe rent

In what

from that of Socrates , whereas form is undivided .

Three , prima facie distinct,

sense does matter individuate?

things might be meant by the thesis that it does :

(i)

It

explains how we can tell that there is.more than one .

individual o f a given kind .

( i i ) I t explains how we can tell

one individual of a given kin9 from another .

(iii)

what makes one individual di fferent from another .

It explains
There was

discussion o f how far ( i ) and ( i ii ) , and how far the meta,,- _

phys ical and epistemological interpretations of them, can
be dis tinguished .

It was suggested that there was some

danger o f c ircularity, i f two individual s are differentiated

by appeal to the fact that acc idental but i ncompatible predicatEs
are true of a common form, but incompatible predicates were
explained as those that cannot both be true of the same subject ,
for then two countable ob jects are presupposed .
were raised about the reasoning of a 7- 8 .
remark that the
is between the

':>/

I>'

E LOOG is aoov?i
?i:'ooc ( i . e . inf ima

Some queries

What is meant by the

On one view , the contrast

spec ies ) ich cannot be

further dif ferentiated into species , and

the

YEVOG

which is

susceptible of differentiation , and Aristotle sees an anal ogy

between the divisibility of a
matter .

y (voc

and the divisibil ity o f

Some doub ts were expressed on how close the analogy

is , giYen the unlimited divisibility of matter , and the

limited divisibility o f a

"'
YEvoc
.

On this view it is assumed

that different classes o f human beings do not constitute

distinct species .

Alternative ly Aristotle is appealing to

the fact that however far the proces s of division is carrie d ,

you will always b e left with sometjling capable o f being
multiply reproduced

On the second view, the argument will

be that Callias and Socrates owe their sameness to their form

71

1 0 3 4a 5

NOTES

ON

ZETA

because forms are essentially multiply reproducible ,

thus
On the

al lowing dis tinct individuals to be the same in form .

first view, the point is that , Callias and Socrates both being
men, there is no morespcific . form that could differentiate
them .

Alternatively, Aristotle is arguing as fol lows :

Callias

and Socrates are dif ferent because their matter is different,

the same because their form is the same .

The argument would

have been easier to read that way if he had written (e . g . )

,.

?/

xo L vov instead o f aouov .

Z9
1 0 3 4 a 9-b 7 : The general point of this section is to raise a
problem about spontaneous generation :
both by

, {xvn

some thi!:)gs come about

and of their own accord, and s ome do not .

t ie s up with Z 7 , and

This

distinction . between natural , art ificial

The reason for the difference is

and spontaneous generation .

in

given in the anacolouth ic sentence beginning at a 1 0 :

some ccases the relevant matter is c.51p.able of being changed

by its e l f and in s ome .cases not .
..

1034a 11 :

c,/

What does n u>.. n

>/

apxouoa

,/

"'

nb ye:ve:oe:Clli;; mean?

Ros s

trans lates ' de termines ' , which s eems reasonable ( c f . 1 0 3 2b 2 4 ) ,

i . e . even when you have. a e:xv (nb , matter contro ls the
production .
meanings o f

This perhaps involves an equivocation on the

,(

apxe: Lv .

To tanslate

>/

apxouoa

as ' beg inning ' was

thought to be l inguistically impos s ible .

,.

1 0 3 4 a 1 3 : According to Ross , aunb refers back . to o Laun .

Stones cannot move themselves to bui l d a house , but they can ,
in a sense , move themselves :

On

they can move downwards .

this view , there are three sorts of matter :

( i ) matter which

can initiate motion , but o f an unambiti ous sort ,

( e . g . a s tone )

( ii ) matter which can move itself more ambitious ly , through

having a

{pob

o f the thing produced ;

cannot move its e l f at all .

The difficulty is to see what

Aristotle had in . mind for ( ii i ).

as matter c apable of initiating
have in mind for ( ii i )

( i i i ) matter which

He seems to regard ( ii )
.tel&C)iogical ch_p.nge

things in their proper placesi

72

.D!"d .he

1034a 13

CHAPTERS - - 8 t 9
There were two views o f these lines :

1 0 3 4a 1 9 - 2 0 .

( i ) The change which produce s things that can come to be

.,..

e:xvn will
,{xvn but are

without
have

be set in motion by those things that don ' t

cppable o f being set i n motion by other

things that don ' t have

txvn

or by a movement s tarting from

an a lready exis ting part of the product .

(ii)

{v

(Omitting

and inserting a dash after

,..

a.uwv)

change will be set in motion by things that don ' t have

The
...

e:xvn ,

but are capable o f being set in motion by other things those being e i ther external things o r a part of the thing
itse l f .
I t was thought by some that there i s i n fact no need to
excise

/'

e;v

with interpretation ( i i )

I t was suggested that

( i i ) is pre ferable because ( a ) in - this pas sage Aristotle is

.
/
atten ding
to th e ,e;x e;pouG
aas , hence one wouJ. d expect tb e
crucial introduction o f the ob ject o f spontaneous generation
to be given some prominence , and (b ) the l ong altern ative
(i)

seems to have no : point .

X Lve:craa.L

,(xvnv

Ross considered excis ing

following Chri s t ; that would be an

alternative to inserting a dash; another alte rnative is to

insert

K ,

as in Boni t z ' s text .

1 0 3 4 a 21-25 . I s Jaeger right to excise

in a 2 3 ?

/
/
c.
.,.
n,,, e:x
UE: PoYG PUWV!JUOU

I t was suggested that th ese words might .be kept,

on the strength o f the doctrine of the house in the mind of

the builder; but then what would be an example o f generation

{poG vuov? But the

being the e; L50G is certainly

E'xvn

not from a

doctrine of

as

itself

in ply .in this_ pass<lge .

Not a little upport was se cured for the view

"'
/'
,)
,\
that you must excise either n
owvu]J.Ou in a . . 2 3 or e;x
(cf a 2 4 ) .

{poG

.in a . 2 4 .

2 2 nd January 19 7 7
1 0 3 4 a 21- 2 5 . Two main interpretations o f this sentence were
canvassed , involving different readings :

c.

this reading o L x La.

"!)

,,,>

e;j;.;. oLX LO.G

is a case
73

,\ .,.

( i ) with text amended as .in Jaeiger, excis ing n e: x

,,.
,.,.
.
. e;re;pgui;; a 2 4
'- ft
"a
"

, :owuou
.
d insert..,ng
. 2 3_.an
- ..
/
0
a
owvuou
"!ll

(I

of !;".Ol-L(llv uou

e;potJib

On

NOTES

1 0 ;3 4a 2 1
/

.....

./

production; wcrnEp a ucrE L

.,.

(,;

ON
=

..

ZETA

just as natural things . Two

;

fur:ther categories o f E E owvuou production are then

,.

"

,,,..

e
adumbrated but not exemplified, ( 2 ) EU EPOUG owvuou
and
( 3 ) lE txovo'G L gpoU(; .
:( i i ) leaving E U {pOUG owvu'ou

,, )

On this reading
E L ( nEP = for instance ) ,

in a 2 3 and excising n EU EpOUG a 2 4 .

ca tegory ( 1 ) is exempli fied by

:>

,.,

')

:>

,,,

u;

category ( 2 ) by O L U L a E O L U LUG , and only the third category

is not e xempli fied ( is i t s upposed to be the heat example
that follows ? )

( i i ) was prefe rred in spite o f the di fficulty

C./

o f takdng mcrnE P as for insta nce ,

c.

'f>

")

.,

o L u L a E E O LU LaG is generation

EU EpOUG owvuou , the part being the form of the house .

The

fami l iar s tory according to which the mas ter builde r , that is
his cra f t , that ":is the formc of house in his mind, produces
r(>

the house is sketched in a 2 4 (read U l .

I n s upport o f form
,,,.
c/..
,,..
as EPOG , 1 0 3 2b 3 2 , "Where uA.n is called a Epo c; , was addUeeG. .
.,,,,

"

4"\

"'

Following Ross we took a L L ov ou no L E LV npwov

1 0 3 4 a 25-6 .
c(
Production o f
uaa ab, as sub j e c t , {poG .as complement .
houses by the form o f a house ' i s still i n questio n , presumably ,
and the uaa a8 ,o' qualification is to exclude e . g . the
mus icianship o f the mus ical builder from c ounting as the
caus e .
1 0 3 4 a 26-30 . These lines seem to .o f fe r , i:n .au example o f
.

"

c.

health produced fom nea t , a case o f E E owvuou production

( th:o.ugh
to us ) .

of wh.i.bh o f the above three cate<;Jories was not clear

What sort o f example does Aristotle h ave in mind?
"

'

,;

,;

Pres umably ano auoaou and not EXVV production of

health ( see 1 0 3 4 a 9 ) since the latter could be b rought unde r :

the E iwvU'ou rubric in the same way a s house produc tion .
Heat v

'D

if

u L v aE L

( H ) produces heat in the body (H ) whi ch

2
1
either is health o r a .part 0 health o t is folilcwed by Ollogical
.

or causal consequence) health or a part of health .

The

favoured candida te for H , i f it i s to b.a identical with

2
health , was , not a localised heat produced by rubb ing , but a
.

pe rvasive he a t , the righ t he at , i . e . 9 8 . 4 F .

might be
1
heat in a rubbing hand, or heat engendered by j ogging .

How could Aristotle hope to .justify the claim we took these

l ines to be making , that there is a case o f
74

E) E

..

owvuou

CHAPTER

1034a 26

None o f the following were found convincing (A)

production?

finding more favour than the others :

( A) Since H is health
2
.
and H is produced. f bUw'\i u ouf , healt\\ is produced E 6wvu'ou .
2
( B ) S in9e H is health , H , being also heat, will also be health .
1
2
( C ) Since H 1 ,
S o the health produced will be E E oov(o u .

qua productive o f health , is . .healthy , the health produced

by it is

"

e.

EE owvuou .

.
. ... ' /
xci se '.-nv l'j"\1
1i(t\>Slind

1 0 34a 2 9 - 3 0

KEvo

a&pJ.13'.'lt:

iii i :th .'.faegei:: o,

( =H ) to be accusative , and health to be the

2
The point is then essentially the
subject o f '&KoAoU3 KA .
to allow

s ame as ir. the previous sentence , s.ave the suggestion that

he alth is H
?

has been dropped in favour of a looser connection

,,;

(aKOAOU3""L KaL OUJ.ISeSnKE) .

1 0 3 4a 3 0 - 3 2
'>

'

Are thes e ines s till o n the sub j e ct o f

"

"Kl.Uooaou production , or are we b ac5 with

mean subs tance or form?

.,,,.

Exvn?

n6

Does

)
ouoLa
;'

Without answering these que s tions we

noted the closing remark o f the chapter (b 16- 1 9 :)' where it is

said that only in the case of substances does the production
for a quality or
of an A need p.n actual pre-exist :j.qg lt. 1
quantity potential will do .

This:. seems to take back what has

just been said and , furthermo.re , to be in conflict with the

doctrine given elsewhe re

(e . g . in the account of perception)

that even in the . case of qualities an actual F is needed for

an F .
1 9 th February 19 7 7

As a postscript to the minutes o f the meeting o f 2 2nd January

an alte rnative view o f 1 0 3 4 a 2 6 - 3 0 was further discus sed,
according to which Aris totle is not giving an account of the
,.

role o f a gpo1; , but i l lustrating a

...

,,

Kaa ouSESnKoi;;

case of

coming-to-be artificially , where health comes into being

artificially as a result o f s ome other

/
'
ouSESnKoi;;
Kaa

pro9ess .

This suggestion received cons iderable support .

1 0 3 4 a 3 0 - 3 3 . Thes e l ines had already been partly dealt with .
75

10 34a 3 0

NOTES

ON

ZETA

Aristotle takes the moral as being that in all cases of

y

" "
e:ve: c n i;; , OUOLO.
"

(i . e form)

is the

apxn'.

I t was suggested

that all cases under discussion down to a 32 are intended to

be cases of artificial generation, and .the._doctirine ts then
The cases

generalised to all cases of natural generati on .

already mentioned of pontaneous generation are all as- it-were

artificial cases ; i t is not c lear what. Aristotle would have
said about as-it-were natural cases of spontaneous generat ion .
/
<PUOEL

10 3 4 a 3 3-b 3 : The same s tory is said to hold of

.;

cruv Lcra.e:va..
'
o:mfpa.

Ross of fered the fol lowing interpretation of

Ko.iii :.

operate by art , i . e

a.no

sei;id operates in the same way as things .that

,6 crn{pa.

b i zarre way of referring to

,,

IS'

e: Looi;;

Against

( i ) that , if Aristotle is referring to

what is the effic ient c ause

e:xvni;; ' i s a way of referring to cases of exvn .

this it was ob j ected :

.,'d.

is an eff icient caus e , and

/'
\ , ,
c.
....
a.nAWG
, ' a.
a.no e:xvni;;
' is a
,,
,
;'
the EXV L ni;; ; ( i i ) EXEL ouva.e: L
.,

s its rather i l l with the general doctrine of

the chapter , since form is supposed ..to. be present .

It was

therefore suggest*d that the sentence should be interpreted

{pa.

in the light of GC I I , . where an

of change .
( cf

( i) )

But ob jection , on grounds of linguistic infelic ity

So it was suggested that

can be made to this too .

it should instead be cons trued as fol lows .

makes natural things j us t as
1034b

1.

pya.vov

is regarded as an

/'

'
) '
a.
a.no

' For the

crne;pa.

e:xvn i;; are made ' .

Cl

T o get the right sense , owvuov has t o be

interpreted as ' at least

.
owvuov
'
"

10 3 4b 3 . What is the point o f mentioning the man/woman cas e ,

given that i t i s not a c ounter-example to the human-being
begets-tw.man-b eing principle?

Perhaps that even in the most

unprob lematic cases there may be s ome dif ferences

(of which

a difference in sex is mos t striking ) ; hence it should not

be surpri sing that occas ionally the pa.rent and of fspring
are not even the s ame in pecies .
) \

1 0 3 4b 3-4 . There was much discussion of the words e:a.v

"

/'

n<1.ovou ,

bracketed by Jaege r .

. 76

The two clauses occur in all'

CHAPTER

1 0 3 4b 3

MSS in reverse order , and Ros s simply transposes .

Hence

four possib ilities were canvassed : ( i ) Jaeger ' s b racketi ng ,

which supposed the intrus ion of a marginal gloss 1
reading ;

( ii i ) the

MSS reading; ( iv) excising 5L

(ii)

Ross ' s

nL vou,

In favour of ( iv) as against ( ii )

leaving the other c laus e .

is the argument that i s paleographically s impler than the

hypothes i s of transpos i tio n . With ( iv) the argument i s :

you

mustn ' t expect all natural generation to be s traightforwardly

man-begets-man (after all even that al lows for s exual di fferences ) ,

5uov

but it wi l l be

unle s s the offspring is a

npwa .

With ( i i ) the argument will be s imila r , with the additonal

ehows .that the XJoegetS"'K princ iple

point that the mule example

has exceptions .

The question was raised whether the

MSS

reading could be kept, with an appropriate use o f parentheses

and dashe s , but that was thought to be intolerably clumsy .
It was noted that in pseudo-Alexander thes e words occur in

c.(vuov

the Ross order , but after rtcui;:

Aristotle move s to

1 0 3 4b 4- 7 .

/
;;>
;
LaULOll(lLOV

such cases come

matter is able to s tart things off

about as artificial cases :

Questions were raised about the syntax . of that

by itsel f .
sentence

(is

,,.

Y L YVLa L

the main verb? ) but the general point

was thought to be . clea r .

1 0 3 4b 7-19 . An appendix :

the s tory about the coming-to-be

of the bronzer s tatue has to be appl ied to

categorie s '. (b 7 - 1 0 ) :
bronze ,

Y LYVLa L ,
r,-.

so

in all the

j ust as the bronze sphere , :'out --not . .ehe

in . the
..

other categories there mus t be

a preexisting e L 5oi;: (b 1 0 1 6 ) .
that he says

y evecrLi;:

I t seemed a little surpris ing

,....
<- ., ,
_,L ,ecrLL
enL LOU
CUL xaL
a'

at b 1 3 .

Does this

reflect the fact .that . . the bronze sphere is not a substance:

"

according to the srictest criteria for bei ng an oucrLa?

is
of

</

"

CUL xaL
'\ GI
o?
xaL

a corruption o f oA.wi;:

KaL ,

Or

.
itse lf a corruption

1 0 3 4b 1 6 - 1 9 . Questions were raised ( a ) about the doc trine ,

and (b) about. how . it follows from .. what .precedes ( c f .

,,

ex LOULWV) .

The point ought to be that the effic ient cause of a substance ' s
coming-to-be must be another actual substance o f the same kind
77

1 0 3 4b 1 6

NOTES

ON

ZETA

( or someth ing very near it) ; but the e fficient cause of ( e . g . )

a quality ' s coming-to-be need not i ts e l f have the quality
actually ; but then need it have it even potentilly?

For

example , the production of a c olour for the first time by

the mixture o f other colours does not seem to require that
there exi s t to s tart with anything even potentially of the
new colour .

I t was thought that Aristotle might be conflating

a contrast between two sorts of caus ation with a contrast

between substances and non- substance s .

1 0 3 4b 2 0 - 2 8 . Two que s tions were raised about the initial

.;,nop (a. ( i ) I s Aristotle assilming that the parts o f a A. oyoc
are themse lves A.t'yo

( thus having a regress on his hands ) ;

( i i ) I f s o , how does the doctrine that the elements of a thing

all themselves have a A.6yoc fit in with the doctrine of

/

that lack a A.oyoc of 6 1 0 ?

o0v&sa.

All that the argument developed in

this passage would seem to point to is that there needs to be

a reference to each e lement in full A.YOG of some thing .

The

question was raised whether b 2 3- 2 4 need imply any more than

that there is a single A.dyoc for all the parts , rather than a
,,

,,,

s eparate A.oyoc for each one , butj the plural svovEG at b ' 2 4
i s agains t that .

It was suggested that Aristotle is not

committed to the view that every part of a A.6yoc is itse l f a

A. byoc , but is i n doubt whether the A.6yoc o f every part of the

"

thing is in the A.oyoc o f something .

1 9 th March 19 7 7
Ross sees Z l O as introducing two ques tions , which are then
discussed in alternating paragraphs :

( 1 ) Should the de finition

of a whole contain the defini tj. ons of the pa:i::tS'?

parts prior to the whole?
What parts are prior? )

( 2 ) Are the

(Or, in the introductory rubric ,

(1)

is introduced at 1 0 34b 2 0- 8 , and

( 2 ) at 1 0 3 4b 2 8- 3 2 ; and then we have :

(1)

l 0 3 4b 3 2 - 1 0 35b 3 ,

( 2 ) 1 0 35b 3- 3 1 , ( 1 ) 1 0 3 5b 3 1- 1 0 36a 1 2 ,

(2)

10 36a 1 3- 2 5 .

But

Ross makes no attempt to provide the relevant connectives at

the first two alleged switching-poi nts . 1 0 3 5b 3 cle arly reads
78

CHAPTERS . 9 ,

10

Hl 34b 20

as a renewal of the same problem, not a switch to a new one ,

.,
and 1035b 31 has the continuative gv ouv . We therefore
/
/
returned to the question , What ;is the gpoi:; of a A.oyoi:; ?
and thus to the two questions raised previous ly ( .(i) anc'l 0 .i ) in
the preceding note ) . We thought now that though the plurals
at b 2 4 were not conclusive against the view that there is
a single A.6yoi:; for all the parts , at . least one passage ( 10 35b
4-8) gives an exampe of a component of a ;i..!y oi:; which itse lf
/
has a A.oyoi:; ( the . right angle is a component in the definition
of the acute angle , and itself has a A. dyoi:; ) . Ho.weve-r ,. it did
not seem that t'h:t s must be s@Reraliisai!iie o aM. case i; ,
and indeed the plurals come i n :What may be a preliminary
and not fully rigorous passage . Any\o/ay_: it is an open question
whether 103Sb 4- 8 shows that a >..6yoi:; is divi ible into A. 6yo .
A ;i..ciyoi:; of the whole might be said to equal that of the parts
if the former simply mentioned the parts without giving A.O'yo
of them, though on this view one might expect Aristotle to
refer to the relevance of the order of the parts , Syllables
provide a case where the definition does list the part:;; , and
if the letters have no definitions they satisfy the 810
/
demand for iauv3Ea without definitions . (We noted in passing
Aristotle ' s apparent failure to appreciate properly the
les sons of the Theaetetus and Sophist . ) Letters might be
defined in terms of their contribution to syllables , but
Aristotle does not ..take this . l ine:.; However, it might be
syllable as such , rather than syllable, whose definition
he is considering, and then we could say the definition of
letters is involved , since we can define letter in general
without trying to define paricular letters . I f some ,
definitions do involve listing parts , it might be j ust to
these that Aristotle ' s remark (b 21-2) applies , saying that
as the definition is to the whole , so are parts of the
definition to the parts of the whole i for with a definition
like that of finger, as involving reference to man ( 10 35b
11) , man belongs in the definition but hardly corresponds
to any part of the finger . We were puzzled about the
relations between definitional and natural priority (b 30- 2 ) .
b 28 ff . says that if parts are prior to wholes , the acute
angle will be prior to the right angle , and the finger to
_

79

I
10 3 4b 2 0

NOTES

ON

ZETA

the man, but then seems to say the right angle and the man are
;
,.;..
prior both in AOYOG and in e: Lva.L . We noted that :Ma . . 1 0 8.4b . 7 ff .
makes the acute prior in one sense and the right in ano the r ,
but we found di fficulty i n what natural priority comes to in
mathematical cases , assuming i:t: does apply there .

We cannot

have a finger without an animal , for Aristotle but: .cannot

we have an ai;:Ulte angle wil:ha!.l.t a :ti:g'ht ..angle?

i'hel1e are

perhaps tjlree WaS of keeping na:tura:i pi!1iori:tyseparate fi:-0111

dfinitf:enal

( i) the acil'.le
l cbul.d .exist without . . the right

but would hot he acute , as goalposts .fuan exist without footballs

but a.re not yet goalpos ts i this seems to ass imilate the acute
case tc the finger oasei

tiil the right is epi stemq logically

prior in that we cannot know something is acute without reference

to a right - here only some right angle is neede d , which need
not contain the given acute , but one might .ask why the
compleme ntary obtuse would not equally be neede d i

( i i i ) an

acute can only be cons tructed by reference to a right .

This

last might e.plain why the obtuse is posterio r , if it can

only be cons tructed by constructing the complementary acute i
but Aristotle does not menti on obtuse angles , nor disc;uss
their distinction from .acutes in that rights cannot be broken
down into them ( s o tha t , unlike acutes in MS , they can hardly
be prior to rights as

e:1ioG ) .

?Cveu &AAnAwv

(b 3 2 )

is difficul t .

Pre sumably the suggestion of a reciprocal s i tuation is

misleading , and the phase is a highly condensed form o f
something like ' prior i n the sense derived from a n answer
to the question , . can they exis t without each other? '
10 34b 3 2- 4 . Does

&e: c'oaw

abandoning a topic?
;

refer to re jecting a s uggestion or

The suggestion would presumably be that

e;poG is ambiguous , but then it would be sl ightly odd that

.;
just one l:POTtOG was mentione d . More probably Ari s totle

intended to abandon the senses of {poG given at 1 0 2 3b 12-1.

( in Ll. 2 5 )

in favour o f those at 10 2 3b 1 7 - 2 5 .

1 0 35a 1 . ouv pres umably follows on OKe:rti:e;ov, with some s uch

force as ' so we must remark that

expressed that
.;

fi'An

'

Some surprise was

is s till in the running , despite Z 3 ,

unless ovnv . ( 1 0 2 9 a 19 )

is to be s tressed - but this s eems

80

CHAPTER.

10

too weak a n interpretation o f Z 3

i n z 1 0 is hardly portentous..

l035a
v

Anyway the role of uA.n

G/

But does uA.n here refer to a

relatively general matter , or the matter o f a particular

individua l ?
(cf .
as

That Aristotle is mainly talking o general cases

' the wolf has four legs ' ) is suggested by such thiilgl? . '
a .5'noG (hot a o ) at 1 0 3 4a 5 - 6 and
""

G EYoouG

( for auvoA.ov in the general sense see 1 0 35 b 2 7- 3 1 )

at a 7
Also

when he wants individuals or tokens rather than types he makes

this clear , as at 1 0 3 5 a 14- 7 (though he speaks rather oddly
there as thgh

tokem J ettei:s in wax or aiLr solllQ how belonged iii.

the same class along with types ) .

mean only ' in each case '

(/

EXa.aov ( l 0 3 5 a 8 ) need

(e . g . the wolf , the statue , etc . )

At a 1 7 f f . a substance is destroyed into i ts material c omponents

( cf . 9 8 3b 89 ) , not into matter and form, though b 20- 2 s ays
...

it is the auvoA.ov , not the oua a , which- .breaks down into

thesei it mig:Ot :seem odd for a type , as against token , to
break down into material parts - but

ene

cp,n say ' t.he

wolf dies when it loses i ts breath ' .

1 0 3 5 a 8-9 . Aristotle does not mean that

the matter should not

be spoken of in its own right or by itself ( the Z 3 doctrine,

- but irrelevant here ) , for which he could e as i ly have added

VEU eooUG .

He probably means that the matter should not

be said to be the thing in question in each c ase ( supp lying

.,

,.

Exaaov after A.ExEov) , or possibly that the matter is not

by itself the thing .
,

.. .(

1 0 3 5a 13 . Why EYYU Ep ?

Because we can deduce that the circle

has segments , but not that it is of bronze ?

This seems

awkward, since the segments should be what the c ircle i s

divisible into (which does not suggest form) - but perhaps
it is divided into the se se9111ents ; . but we deduce i:t has some
..,

I'

lOJSa 2 1 . The force o f oux E is ,

if you go on to say

'

l0 4 3b 14-5 , in H 3 :

' You no .longer talk correctly

1 0 3 5 a 25-b 3 , esp . a 2 9- 3 0 .
>/ /

Does the form perish at. all:? (Cf .

I)'

'

'

')

""""'

,,,.

n a o ov uva <l>8P-Pnv avEu ou cp3E pEa3a . )

The general form man could be destroyed in ' when I die ,

81

1 0 35a 25

NOTES

ON

ZETA

if the other::men go on, and !!!.l[ ( individua l ) foa:m could .be

des troyed .

Perhaps Aristotle means that i f a form is des troye d ,

it cannot be into matter and form ( o n pain o f a regre ss ) , nor

into material c ompone nt s , for i f these equal those of the
object they will play a redup l icated role , and i f they are
different we have another regress , fo the form will be a
duplicate o f the ob ject , and so need a form of its own .
/

KUKAOG

1035a 3 3-b 3 . I s the amb iguity o f

between geometrical

and physical circles , or between form and particular circles

within geometry , as ' Socrates ' is ambiguous between the man
and his soul ( o f . 10 3 6a 1- 2 ) ?

n' E";\L VaL

)/

,/

L o L ov ovoa is not

easy ; on the former . view i t . could mean that there is no

separate word for , e . g . , the circle in a Greek pediment .

We

remained . undecide d .
)'

)\ )/

navi:a i::i . E 'V L a which

"'
appears when Aristotle is saying that the parts o f a AOYoG ,
Finally we wondered about the phrase
,

or '1f the xai:a i:ov

,,

AOYOV

? '
ouo
L a , are prior ( 1 0 3 5b. s - 6 , 1 4 , 1 9 ) .

Ross points to Z l 2 1 0 3 8 a 1 9 as saying that the . . last differentia

o f a species is ne .f..ther prior nor posterior to i t ' ; but it
__

is not obvious that it does say thi s , not that Z l 2 anyway

justifies our phrase .

EVLa

Noti .1g that, in connexion with

comes in with reference to

from this problem ne;x:t time

,,
vonoL
G,

,,

lJ,Juxn ,

we agreed to begin

30th April 1 9 7 7
We resume d , as proposed , with the_ problemc. o f
( 1 0 3 5b 6 , 1 4 , 1 9 ) .

/
,\ >/
navi:a n EVLa

The priority to which s ome exception is ,

poss ibly , envisaged is on the first occasion (b 6 ) the

priority o f the parts o f a definit.i.on to the whole defini tion
( s o Ps-Alexande r , Ross ) ; so too on the second occasion (b 1 4 ) ,
except that the parts are further specified (b 1 3 )
in the sense . of . parts of the definition and of the

as parts _: _
' ,,..

ouoLa

corresponding to the definition - the whole to which the parts

,,
are prior is now given both a s linguis ti c . ( the AOYOG) and as
, ,,
non- linguis tic ( the. ouo La: corresponding ) , such parallelism
having been an assumption of the chapter since 1 0 3 4a 21- 2
82

CHAPTER 10

l035a 3 3

and being required to get the conclusion of 1 3 - 1 4 here from

,
/'
/'v uxn
"'
c. wv
..,
1 1y at b 1 8 TaunG
'
'
.
6ceii
n
; f ina
about oyoG
premises
(b 1 4 )

'

'

c.

')

,...

n xa't'a ov A.oyov ouaLa K't'A ,

( 15 - 1 6 ) , s o that we

have moved over to non- linguistic parts s imply; Gh the

auv6A.ou 6ceou

to which they are prior (b 19 ) see be low .

On

this third occasion one might be tempted to think that the

exception envis aged was :

in defining soul ,

the sugge stion

would be that,

is the only prior and independent

part to be mentioned, the rest being functions of a certain

For this view , take .

tyi;:e of body .

?;'v E't'vaL

,g TO LW5E

act"uaL (b 1 6 ) as a unitary phrase and further specification

/
;t"_
II'
?
/
'
'
C..
(b 19 ) ,
6wou
ou auvoA.ou
of n xaa Tov A.oyov ouaLa (b 1 5 )

\.
/
and keep o UEPOG in parenthesis b 15- 1 7 .
Difficulties : ( a )
,,
>I
the nava n EVLa point ought to be more general , having been
,...
>
introduced as such; (b) at b 20- 2 n ouaLa is contrasted with
both the body and . aU'voA.ov, indeed in such a way that ( c )
A

Aristotle would be inconsistent i f he had brought the body

into the definition at b 1 6 , as per the present suggestion;
fo.r b 20 makes . the body and its parts posterior to the oi'iai'.'a .
We also had difficulty ( d ) in determining the relevance of
perception (b 1 8 ) on this inerpretation :
have to be that various of the

ya

the argument would

which are not themselves

perception neve rtheles s req:ilire .;ierceptio:p, hence a body

capable of perception, thus j ustifying

;;; 't'O LW5E act'uaT L

.,

but not perspicuously present in the text .

- true ,

An alternative

interpre tation was that the parenthesis 1 6 - 1 8 j us ti fies the

main equation o f 1 4 - 1 7 : in the case o f animals , the

,,.

>
ouaLa

and form is soul , for in defining each ( s c . type of animal deleting

. ue:"ooG

in b 1 7 , with Jaeger ; Ross keeps the words

and has us de fining each part o f the body ) one should mention
its

yov,

which requires perception, hence ( not, as on the

first interpre tation, a certain type o f body , but , as Ross , )

soul - the definiton centres on soul .

. aCuaL
't'O L!35E

is not unitary with

On this view ,

. ,( v :fvaL
..

but

TOO"

modifies the whole sentence ( i .e . in the case of animals ,

soul. is o 6a

a ,

form and essence to a certain type of body ) ;

't'O auvO"A.ou 6u
a;

is the whole animal (soul and body ) , but

taken generally ( c f . 2 8- 9 ) ; while

'
..,,
f.
Cl
5n'-I OUOLWG
KaL xaa' Exaai:o't>

( 1 9-20 ) applies the point to i ndividuals o f the several species

83

NOTES

10 35a 33
( c f . 10 35a 17-)

ZETA

ON

Above all , this view keeps body out of the

,defini tion and 50 p;i;S!J:"ves na.s tency a t 2 0 "- '2 Note :tha:t

i f the point is applied to individuals at 1 9- 2 0 , it is made

generally firs t ; the discussion from b 1 4 is all on the general
le:ire l .

There is no l icence here to take soul as .individuatihg .

On the c ontracy , 1 0 3 6a 1- 2 explicit;Jcy makes soul something

general , and what indi viduates

Socrates is 'ilG crxnG
In b 1 6 acr ov is general , an ob ject o f
( l 0 35b 3 0 - 1 ) .
definition, whe ther

i;b

{po!;; i s r ad o r not .

15'A.nG

The drawback

to the second i nterpre tation is that it offers

no help with
.

"

)\ y

rr.a.vi;a n EV La .

Since Aristotle nowhere in Z l O e xplains his

reasons for thinking parts of a de finition/e s sence prior to the

whoie , i t i s hard to work out a case where the reasons might
fai!,

So much for the discussion of formal parts .

The

discussion of material parts raises the que s tion, what kind o f

division is intende d .

The man- finger example could go with

division as a spelling out of what a man is in the manner of

the Theaetetils wagqn:. ( a man is a finger, a heart e tc . )
then the circle example

But

(b 9 - 1 0 ) is a rogue , since one would

hardly spell out what a circle is as a pair of semicirc le s ;

these are the product o f actual divi s i on .

On the other hand ,

actual divis ion o f a man would produce only homonymous parts .

In fact, phys ical division seems to be separately catered for
in 2 2- 2 7 .

Having said ( ll- 1 2 )

that material parts are posterior

to their whole , in context clearly meaning pos terior in

definition, he says at 2 2- 3 that in a certain way and with
This looks like

certain exceptions they are prior to i t .

natural priority (whole and part can exist apart, e . g . if a

finger i s cut off a man ) , for so taken we c an unde rstand both
the qualificati on immediately added and explained in the
parenthes i s 2 3- 5 ( i f a finger is cut off . it is only
homonymous ly a finger and s o , in one way , it is not after all
prior [sc

..

even in existence ] but posterior) and the exception.

The point about the exception is that there will be one part,
the central sensori where the de finition ocr (a/soul i s
primarily realize d , such that the whole and part cannot exi s t
apart a t a l :l ; the whole ceases together with the part , so that
the posteriority claim fails here , i . e .
.

for the exceptional case ,

soi;

L
84

c,
5 ' WG

>/

La 5E

ou .

GI

aa denies ,

In respect of the

CHAPTER
priority claim ( L V
and finger .

G)

10

1 0 35a 3 3

there is nothing to dis tinguish heart

We jumped to 1 0 3 6 a 5-9 , with which c f . 1 0 4 0 a 2- 5 . Either ( i )

,

EVEAEX La:t; is a genera 1 term to cover both perception and

vo"ncrLG (so Ros s ) , in which case , while oG 5r1Aov uA. . is not
inappropriate in connection with v o o K trn Ao , , it seems

excessively sceptical for the perceived one s ; or

evEAEXE{aG

(ii)

is the actual existence o f the circles , i n which

case what is unclear is the second order. philosophical issue o f

whether or no t they s till are

( ? as ob jects of re ference ) .

Should

e i ther disappearance from ken or from exis tence make individuating

reference impos s ible ?

The tempation to say so is intelligible

xci3}0"Aou A ' (a 8) is not, as
in e i ther case , but perhaps
the above way of putting sugge s ts , description as opposed to

oY

'

reference , but an alternative for 5pLcrJ.!.6G ( a 5 ) , and the point

is tha t because individuals are known by perception or vonaLG 1
once that ceases all that remains is general 1trop os-:li.ti ions.
( such as de finitions ) , and i f individuals are spoken of and
known by these

( c f . a 8 ) it is not as the individuals they

are but in the way. that a particular man is covered by

This problem was adjourned

. generalizations about all men .

until next time .
2 6 th May 19 7 7

;
J.!.E POG

10 35b 31-10 3 6 a 2 .
form and of
or of
of

'

no point

',

'

'
"'>'
J.!.EV ouv

or (with Ross )

: ' there

are parts of a

' a part may be a part o f a form

not ' something is at 0111Ce . .part o f a form and

"'
"
xaL nG
uXG : we agreed . that the reading
.
4
'
Cl
'
to aunG . ( a ) . W91tEP uaL Alexander , or CiJG

'

""

of n gives
would mend

this , but at the cos t of makd.ng Ari stotle seem to say that

' aU"voAOV

\fAn G ,

is j us t

u ii'G EoouG .

( b ) I f we double

ud'L ,'Jk;

with Bon i t z , we could explain the variants as attempts

to give point to

a6nG

after haplography had corrupted the

text; .but , as Ross s ays , i t is unclear how the parts o f the

/
auvoAov could differ from those o f the matter . ( c ) We also
-'
'""
uAnG
xa'i. nG
. yap
difficulties .

suggested

;.

,...
'11 G UAnG ,
.,_

W>;

which avoids thes e

we thought the argument is : the

85

NOTES

1 P3 5b 3 1

ON

ZETA

.,,.

AOY06 is of circle ; circle is the same as being a circle , i . e .

is a form (v. b 3 2 ) ; so the parts of the A bYoc are parts of the

,
' '
form .
o 5e Aoyoc
would then either be an intermediate

conclus ion ,

' the AOY06 is of a universal , sc . form ' , supporting

'
5e

'"hat precedes as i f
uepn ,

,.....

were yap , or explanatory of i:ou Aoyou

,-

' we are not speaking: of Aoyo L

decription o f cruvoAa ' .

1 0 3 6 a 2'-9 . The argument of a 5 - 9 , already d;l scussed a:t the

meeting , detained us for som-e time further .
partial account found some favour :
c

....

no o p L cruoc

The fol lowing

concrete particulars have

.,.

and identify' them

'

(yvwp(i:;ovi:a.),)

sc . by a A

,,
(Aeyovi:aL
l
.

but whenever we give a Aoyo c of them

6y oc ,

it i s by a

general AOY06
1 sc . which does not individuate and so is not a
.
P L oUo"6 i ['for] their matter [ which alone individuates them] is
,

This

unknowable .t and s o cannot feature in a AOY06 o f them] .

6.AA
or,K et cr {v . After further reflection
agreed _ that &n e A86v i: E 6 lx i:nc vi:eAEXE C"a c could mean ' when

left a 5- 7 ,
we

,,

,,,,,,.

..

they pass out o f the exercise , sc . of von cr L G and a L cr8ncr L c '

-

(Ros s ) .

We now thought that the sentiment so expressed is not the

' exces s ively, sceptical ' one. that it i s uncertain whether anything
exists unperceived , but only :that whn a: particular is unperceived ,
its existence might be called in question .

We noted that this

r
interp etation is supported by the vari ant reading of Wi l liam o f

Moerbeke in a 6 :

see Ross ' s apparatus .

We were still puz z led ,

though , as to the relation between a 5-7 and a 7-8 , and in

,,,

particular between the two occurrences of yVWP L i:ovi:a L .

.

ae L

prevents the latter excluding cases of a L cr8ncr L 6 and voncrL c ,

.,,

or of aLcr8nC L 6 , but we did not agree whether it includes other

cases , i . e . whether Aristotle goes back bn his seeming impl ication

that concrete particulars are recognized only by at'crancr L G and

v cfncrL 6 .

Nor was it clear whether any such particulars might be

recognized by both the faculties .

.

One view was that a 78 makes

a point about the condif16ns . for speaking of (which must be

'

.'

.,,

..

possible without a L cr8n o L c ) and recogniz ing {which may be ) a

concrete particular , viz . that these require its subsumption
under a general

(not necessarily sortal) description .

overall arqument. would be :

Then the

though we cannot identify

...

particulars , even in perception , without a Aoyoc , this does not

"

amount to a OPLoUOC becau se it must fail to individuate .

86

But

C!WtPTER
it seemed awkward

10

l0 3 6a 2

to read into a 7 -8 both a conce ssion towards

the definability of particulars and insi stence that the concession

is not enough; and the awkwardness would be avoided if we took
a 7-8 to cover not every case of mentioning and recognizing but
rather every case of doing so by a

AOYOG .

Then a 5-7 and a 7 - 8

would function a s independent arguments against the definability

of particulars :

with a definable there is never reason to worry

that perhaps it went out of existence when I ceased to think o f

it , and Abyo L o f definables are never irredeemably xa36Aou .
We ignored 1 0 3 6 a 9 - 1 2 .
1 0 3 6 a 1 2 - 2 5 . A s ummary o f the chapter .
.....
KaL
,

perhaps

:I\

..,/

...

.,;

exaaov n ExaaTou i s introduced by n not

.
c
correcting n uxn iov n euxov on the ground that

In a 1 7 we noted that

....

identification of soul with living thing might suggest the

falsehood that every ( kind o f )
( kind o f )

living thing .

soul i s identical with every

This would force

aaov

to refer

to species not individul s , confirming our re luctance ( top of

page 8 4 ) . to find individual souls in the chapter .
I
in a 1 6 is answered
v
, L vG cpa,ifov in a 19 is

by

5'

'

\.

by

a
in

We agreed with Ros s that ' i$'v must be understood or ,

better , read in a 2 0 before

,
"'
TLVOC
op3nG
,

on pain o f making some

kind o f rigqt angle posterior to itse l f ; also with Ross , we

understood

ta,(pa a, (v

its end i s extended ) .

in the existing parenthes i s (easier if

We translated

,1 v xa\ TLVG

' one

kind of who le must be said to be posterior , and to one kind o f

part ' , noting that

xa't

seems redundant.

The relation of a 1 9 - 2 3 to the rest of the chapter ,

wh ich we did not . explore , seems to be this ( I )

' The _parts of

the bronze right angle , and o f the right angle formed by

particular lines , are prior to the whole ' , i1:N
with a 2 0 - 2 , picks up

aT LV gG

T L VC P3nc

in 1035b 2 3 , alluding to the

sense in which finger s exist apart ;

87

'

T L ev KaL

We thought that

&nAZlG 5 ' ot, <Pa, [ov in

probably to extend to npoTepa

answered

2 3 ; so the parenthesis ought

a 19 .

in a 2 4 .

1 0 36a 1 2

NOTES
(2)

ON

ZETA

' The parts o f the formula are prior to tbe bronze right

angle ' ,

I"\

EV

Twv

,....

,,

AOY

picks up 1 0 35b .J. 7-18 i

with a 20-2 ( i f this is intended) ,

' The . fD'l::m: -liif tigt apgle is prior to the the parts o f the

( 3)

particular ( e . g . b:conze ) right angle ' , a 22- 3 , picks up 1 0 35b

20 - 1 ;
(4 )

' tr'he parts o f the formula are prior <to :cthe form' , a 22 ,
picks up 1 0 35b 3-14 , s uppress ing ' al l o r some o f them ' .
Although all these answe rs are given under the suppos ition that
a thing is its form ( a 1 6 - 1 9 ) , i t appears that only ( 3 ) and

( 4 ) fit that case .

The alternative , in a 24- 5 , presumably

identifies things with

oU'voAa , E a nc tfAnc : .EP EtPT)i;a.

should then refer back-not only to ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) , , which make

the

OUOAOV

posterior , but to

.,,,,

t
EOT 5' WG
OU'

in 1 0 3 5b 2 3 ,
'

which makes i t prior to i ts parts and which i n turn p i cks up

1 0 3 4b 31-2 ( two kinds of priority) and 10 35b 1 1- 2 .
/

The

originally &19parate ques tion whether the loyoc. of a thing ' s

pa:l:ts i s part of- the thing ' s

AOYQG

does not get revived in

the summary .
Zll
l l th October 1 9 7 7
1 0 3 6a 3 1 starts a sl ippery s l ope argument inspire d by the
thought ( 28 - 9 ) that definition i s o f the form .

Aristotle

shows that if you press that idea too far, there wil l be no
s topping short o f the absurd conclusions o f b 1 7-20 .
(b 2.2 - 4 ) :

Mora

trying to remove all reference to . . matter i n a

defini tion gets you nowhere o r worse , some things j us t are

( to be defined as )

this in that or these things thus and s o .

(What is the scope o f this thesis?

Natural kinds , certainly ,

but artefacts have not yet been exclude d .J

34) .

S tage 1 ( 10 3 6a 31-

Circle is embodied in di f ferent types of matter (bronze ,

stone e tc . ) , so clearly none of these types o f matter is

essential to it,

Actual separation from some matter iS proof

that the matter is not part o f the :i essence of circle .

2 "( i )

( a 34-b 3 )

S tage

Even where matter and form are not seen to

88

CHAPTERS
,_

nr,

11

10 36a 3 1

be separated , there is nothing ( s c . in that fact alone) to

prevent the matter being inessenti a l .
were observed to be bronze :
part of the form

E . g . suppose all cittles

the bronze would s ti l l be no

( s o b 2 , with or wi thout Jaeger ' s {poG ) ;

i t would j ust be hard to separate off in the thought .

fa , presumab ly , Aristotle h imselfwould agree .
Stage 2

(ii)

(b 3- 7 ) ,

Thus

But now

comes the problematic example of man,

marked as such by the question :

are the f lesh and bones in

which we always find the form of man themselves part of the

and the definition, or are they ( iness enti al) matter which ,

form

like the bronze of the hypothetical bronze circles , we find

ourselves unable to separate because it is never actually found
separate?
s l ide .
.

At this point Aristotle wo.uld wish to stop the

But some people carry on fw:.ther .

They carry on

further for the reason given in 7- 8 EnE

no E .

Does

this mean ( a ) the form of man can turn up in something other

than flesh and bones , but it is unclear when this happens , or
(b )

it can happen that invar iably associated matter is

inessential - witness the hypothetical bronze circles but it is unclear what the conditions are which dis tinguish
such cases from cases like man ( s c . where flesh and bones
are not inessential ) ?

We

preferred (b ) .

Next , does this

give ( a ) ' the considerations which actually we ighed with

the VEG of b 8 or (b) ' Aristotle ' s diagnosis of the
unclarity they were responding to?

We preferred ( b ) ' -

rightly , s ince the ( b ) answer to our firs t question involved

Aristotle ' s position on defining man .
On, then to 5tage 3 (b 8 - 13 ) .

We resisted the thought

that the VEG are crazy enough to suggest that circ le need
not be embodied in lines .

Separation or s undering is not

their concern, nor has it been Aristotle ' s except insofar

as at S'tage 1 the actual and at Stage 2 ( i ) the possible
s eparation showed the matter to be inessential .

The VEG

worry about whether they should define circle or triangle

by reference to lines and the continuous .

Their thought

is that i f they mention lines they- won t be gi'll' ing .the

essence of circle or triangle , not that lines are not
necess ary to the actual exis tence of such figures .

And

one can imagine them reasoning : no particular lines are

89

1 0 3 6a 3 1

NQ';!)ES

..

ON.. ZETA ,

required , s o why should any be mentione d?

triangle are on the same footing ( 1 0 :

The lines of a

./

o o L oo

AEYEO&l. L )

as

the flesh and bones of a man and the bronze or marble of a

s tatue .

They are the ( intel ligible) matter, not part of the

essence to be specified in a definition ( 1- 1 2 ) .

This , then,

is the sense in which these pe ople reduce everything to

numbers :

they hold that in defining all you should

say i.s that it is two .

two somethings

They don ' t deny that a line mns.t be

( two points j oined by the continuous ) , but

what it essentially is is two .

L VEG?

are these

The rest is matter .

Who

Pythagoreans , say Alexander and Ross .

The

Pythagoreans are i ndeed mentioned at 1 8 , but with an introductory

'
KO.L

indicating that a certain absurd :cons equence is one that

they also used to get i nto .

LVEG

the

And the line of thought by which

reduce thing!! ' to numbers seems more sophisticated

than anything attested for the Pythagoreans proper .

We

therefore opted . for Pythagoreani zers at the Acadell\Y .

Mo;i:-e

precisely , the character initially i n view is Speusippus ,

who accounts for everything in terms of numbers plus various
' materia l ' e lements , without forms , in contrast to the
xenocratean party introduced at . 1 2- 1 3 by
,

AEYOVoov .

'
, ,-..
\
.,
/
L oEa.G
KO.L
oov a.c

The Xenocratean party offers an alternative version

of stage 3 , one that does not dispense with forms .

This

alternative vers ion, it turns out, itself c omes in two

var ieties .

{v

say that two is the Line itself ( 1 A line

is two ' gives the whole identity of a line )

..

oL

oE

say that

two is the form of l ine alrigh t , but lines are an example of

a class o f things where the form is not identical with . that
of which i t is the form .

Considered as the form . of two , two

is identical with that of which i t i s the form, but considered

as the form o f l ine , it is not .

In other words , while o L

""

oE

agree with Speus ippus that two gives the essence of line , and
with

..

,,

OL e:v

that i t also cons.ti tiltes ;the :fiau:m cif line , they

fur.ther remark that a line must be two as applied to s omething.,

vi z . two points in space , so that ' A line is two ' does not
give the whole identity of a l ine .

But even thes e people

embrace S tage 3 of the argument in that they confine the

definition to specifying the form, vi z . two , and exclude all
mention of matter , intelligible matter as much as sensible
90

CHAPTER

10 36a 31

There are thus three ways o f reducing everything to

matter .
numbers

11

defining things by numbers .

I t was unclear tc us

whether the three approaches would remain so sharply distinc.t

when i t came to differentiating various species of a l ine ,
f igure , etc . , but we thought i t a result of some intere s t

to

have seen that this Academic Pythagoreani zing was not exclusively
mathematical in its concerns , but had a connection with thoughts
about defining man .
in the Speusippean

Cf . the mention o uxn and

S tage 4

passage 1 0 9 0 b 1 8 - 1 9 .

?
,
aooJJ,aa
aLatma

_,,,..

( 1 7- 20 ) .

Aristotle draws attention to where the s l ide lands you .

Firs t ,

the counter intuitive consequence that you have j us t one form

for all sorts o f thing which seem to differ in form, as two
for two and line - j us t as used to happen to the Pythagoreans

xa\

also ( see above on

and c f , 9 8 7a 2 7 ) , when e . g . they- said

jus tice is 4 , friendship is 4 , and so on .

consequence

( in s trict grammar At:.istotle should have written

au.(3aL ve: L

The second

e:

"
xaL

e:voe:xe:cr8a. L )

is that there is nothing

to prevent you, i f you are not restrained by the though t that

forms which seem to be different are different, s l i ding all
the way to making one thing all on its own the form of
everything .

Here

(19)

)
,
auo

' alL on its own ' s eemed preferable

to the gibberish of Ros s ' s ' make one thing the Form-its e l f of
al l ' .

Al though we toyed with the idea of a weaker conclus ion ,

' here will be whole ranges of things apparently different in

form for which in every case you will have j us t one form ' ,
A

th is seemed insutficient to deliver the coup de grace ' .I n that

way everything will. be one '

From whi ch , perhaps , it is

(20) .

not too distant to the thought attributed to Pl ato and the

'1

,/

Pythagoreans at 9 9 6a 6 - 7 that o e:v and o ov c omprise the

.,, ...
ouaLa

,...

,,

oov ovoov .

10 3 6b 21-24 . Ari s totle draws his moral , and follows it up with

an as ide about the Younger Socrates . The point a t issue is
that , contrary to the comparison YS used to make , the relation
of man to flesh and bones is not comparable to that of circle
to bronze ; if you could s uppose it is comparable , that will
make you thi man could exist without s uch parts in the way
There is
that circle can e xi s t without being made o f bronze .
no need to saddle YS with the Pythagoreani zing separation o f
91

10 36b 2 1

NOTES

ON

ZETA

circle from lines which was under discussion earlier; no:t do

we have any evidence on YS , save some indication from Plato
Theaetetus 1 4 7 0 , S ophist :na B , Pbli.ticus . 2 6 6A , that he was
a working mathematician like his friend and con temporary
Theaetetus , to indicate the purpose of his comparison . Two
suggestions ;that have been made as to the purpose of YS ' s
comparison are Pslexander ' s , that it was an argument for
forms , and Kapp ' s ('Sokrates der J
that YS

"'

"t LVEC .

of the chapter .

{lrigere

' , Philo logus 1 9 2 4 )

Neitlfe;r suggestion s tands up to our acc ount

Aristotle does, not even say the comparison

was o n:: i1t.s own terms incorre c t , merely that it leads one
away from the truth and makes one s uppose something false .
10 36b 28- 3 2 , Aris totle ' s argument to dis tinguish the case of
circle from that o f man .
premises :

( 1)

He rests the argument on two

an'. animal is something perceptible ,

not toj . be defined

VEU K L VhOE!.lli;; .

If

and ( 2 )

(1)

it is

(2)

are each

i ndependently s ufficient for the conclusion, that woul d

seem to imply that eve:ry percept:i.ble kind of tiling has to hawe
matter mentioned i n its definition .
of
7

Or is
.

( 2 ) a consequence

I t would be i f Aristotle had written

( l) ?

aLa8ri"tov

...

'
aLa3nTLKOV

for

i n 2 8 , but then the hand o f 31-2 would be at best a

remote i l l us tration .

I t would be implausible to make him

say every perceptible kind of thing has to have kinesis

mentioned in its definition, but pe rhaps there is always
kinetic matter to be mentioned, so that, in a looser sense ,
kinesis i s a lways involved in the definition o f a sensible
Cf . Pbys . 1 9 4 a 1- 5 : number , line , figure are

thing.

K L vnaEwi;; ,

VEU

.not s o flesh , bone , and man - and this in a context

discussing definition1

and of . 1 0 2 6a 1- 3

Aris totle ' s practice

in de P artibus Animalium is to require men tion of various

kineseis

( modes of breathing, s leeping, etc .) speci fic to the

animal being defined, but pe rhaps he re he would be content with

mentioning hands , etc .

For he goes on to make the point ( 3 0 - 2 )

that a hand i s not a material part i n the relevant sense

unless it is. al ive and capable of functi oning :
' hand'

.,

in other words ,

alre ady brings kinesis with i t , s uch parts are

EXOV"t!.llV nwi;; .

EpWV

But now i t is no longer evident how ( 2 ) , unpacked

in the way we have unpacked it, can be seen as a consequence

92

CHAPTER
o f ( 1)

S o we left 2 9 ' s

construed ( 1 )

,,.

xa.i.

11

10 36b 2 8

to stand at face value and

';>

as designed s imply to back up oux oo L ov .

circle need not be perceptible , so certainly you cannot

require bronze , etc . i n its definition, but that consideration
is not available in the case of an animal , a perceptible th ing ,
which in fact - moving to ( 2 ) - requires kinesis to be ( i f
not mentione d , at least)
the

involved i n its definition, and hence

material parts capable of kinesis .

Re lation of Z l O and Zl l
They seem to cover much o f the same ground .

10 excels

in subtlety , 11 gives a cl:earer line of argument plus s ome

important conc lusions , e . g . in 10 3 7a 7-8 a qualification on
the sense n which Socrates may be identified with his form
( c f . Z 6 ) . B oth ch3'1pters are thinking about the place of the
notion

lpyov

i n a decent de fini tion o f man ( 1 0 35b 16-18 with

10 36b 2 8- 3 2) ; But Z l l gets fresh material from taking on

specific opponents

(Speusippus , Xenocrates , YS) .

We agreed to

consider the p roblem whether one of the two chapters is an

earlier ve rsion o f the othe r in the light of the summary at
the< eii.d . ,of Zl 1 which resumes the. entire discus s io n s ince Z 4 .
2 6 th November 1 9 7 7
10 36b 3 2- 1 0 3 7a 5 . Consideration- o f this section was linked to
discuss ion o f the possible i ndependence of Z l O and Z l l
last note)

( see

For the passage is suspected by Alexander and

Benitz o f having drif te d into 11 from 10 , where it bel ongs

with 10 3 4b 2 4- 1 0 35a 17 .

This would mean. tha t the: back

reference at a 4 is not referring us to 10 from :ll as it

appears to be doi ng; or e lse it betrays late r editorializ ing .
On the o ther hand , we were not satisfied tha t the passage
could j us t be spliced reasonably . into 1 0 ; yet it has to
.
have been written for somewhere .
I t is to be compared with
what s eem to be more than an accidental nllmber o f :careful
repetitions in 11 of points maoe with equal care in . 1 0 :
c f . 1 0 36a 2 8 with 1 0 35b 2 3 , 1037a 7-10 with 1 0 3 5 a 34-b 3
( i n both a point about double reference , though the i l lustration
changes from ' circle ' to the name ' Socrates ' ) , 10 3 7b 4-5 with
93

----

10 36b 3 2 .

NOTES ON

ZETA
'

10 35a 2 5- 8 . Negatively , if the first xaL in 1036a 26 means

that 11 opens with another question (so Ross , Oxford translation) ,
we could not see that it was another question from the one
discussed in 10 and answered in 10 35b 11 f f . What it was
another question than , and a natural sequel to , was the
'
questions discussed in Z 9 or Z6 . (Alternatively , if xaL
'
KaL means ' both and ' , so that 11 opens with a promise of a
j oint inquiry , it is still an inquiry already pursued in 10 ;
"
similarly if xaL
xaL roughly ,equals plain xaL , for which
Bonitz cites Pol . 1300b 21 . ) And returning now to the
mathematical passage 1036b 3 2- 37a 5 , it reads well enough as
a somewhat schematic and promissory parenthe sis within 11 ,
prompted by the .thought of business left over from the
discusson of Speusippus and Co . ( c f . Ross ad loc . ) provided that its topic has not already been dealt with quite
thoroughly . in 10 . These thoughts converged on a Hypothesis :
Z l l 1 wcs the first version .
It included the mathematical
parenthesis (bar the editorial back reference at a 4 - maybe
Aristotle actually said he would look into the topic later) .
I t was written to connect with Z 6 through Z 7- 9 (recall that
we think , with Ross ad 1032a 1 2 , that Z7-9 , though originally
written for a different context , were pressed into service
by Aristotle himself : Minutes of 8th May , 1976) . ZlO is a
later and in various ways more sophis ticated reworking of
the same range of questions . Admittedly , this gives us a
Z.11. introducing the term CHJVE: LA.n{vou (10 36a 27) , without
its understood complement 'with matter ' ( as at 1037b 5 ) and,
on the Hypothesis , without help from 1035a 23-5 in Z l O ;
the only precedent is back i n El a t 10 25b 32 . But this
seemed superable . (For a qualm of a different nature see
under 1037a 10- 20 below)

.....

.....

'

c./

1037a 5-10 . Does n ljJUxn nee: introduce a particular soul? - by

contras t e . g . with 1034a 6 ( Socrates is a -such in a -this) or
I
- '
1035b 30-1 ( e:axani u>..n is what particulari zes Socrates) . a 710 pass from the universal man , treated in 5 - 7 , to particular
men like Socrates and coriscus . The point Aristotle wants
....
'
'I.
(,/
,I.
w
to state is ooane:p
o xa86>..
ou xaL o xa& ' e:xaoov, as is the
universa l , so is the individual . But he is held up on the way
94

11

CHAPTER
by a c ompl ication:

1 0 3 7a 5

if , as some pe9ple want to s ay , Socrates

is his soul , the name will have a double reference and the
point to be made will hold only fr the use in which the
,

I n that use , or ( a 9 ) if Socrates

name picks out the auvoAov .
j us t is &nAWG this soul and this body
( i . e . that use is the
only use ) , then

C/

wonEp x A

I f this i s correct , ' this soul

and this. body ' is to be understood in .whatever terms we

,,

Unfortunate ly , whether this is

understand the. auvoAov o f 8 .

"

the normal Aristotelian auvoAov o f individuali zing matter

and universal form depends in part o n how seriously we take
c..

CL UEv

c;.

oL

OE

as actual disputants with views of their own,

apd whether the first party ( ?Plato , ?the ordinary man in

certain o f his idioms ) needs an i ndividual soul to .identify
Ros s , however , refers to Aristotle ' s ,
Socrates with .
,

!;;wov

h UX9.V

....

'

,.

E L UEV ya.p Ea L Ka.L

enterta.t ning o f the supposition

(.

TlL.
.

ih Z l!l ..( 1 0 36a 16-11 ) , an.d whil e oh. our

'

l!Juxn

Hypothes is it is not open to us to have Aristotle recalling

this s uppos i tion in 11 , i t could be further evidence o f
thinking .
parallel
.
antecedent

'

Then, whatever o ufv would s ay , the

'

E L UEV J.ta.L

""*

"

l!Juxn EwJ.tpa.nG

could be Aristotle ' s

and would not require an individual soul .

remains disconcerting, the more SO i f
taken, after

. cru'voAov ,

But

awuci ,6oE

as particula r .

'

..

n i.tiuxn n oE
has to be

Finally , what does

the universal- i ndividual parallel amount to when eventually

reached at 9-10 ?

I f S ocrates , as a sample individual , is

this soul and this body , the i ndividual matches what was
said of the universal in 6- 7 .

In respect of definition?

How?

If s o , Aristotle is misleading , s ince the definition cannot

be particularized to t he. individua l .
unity of form and matter ( so Ross ) ?

In :r;espect of being a
That s eems a trivial

inference .

10 3 7a 10-20 . Jaeger thought that these lines refer to Z l 2

and H 6 and are , with those chapters , a later addition to the
treatise on o a Ca. which was ZH before Aris totle came to his
conceptio n of first philosophy .
.

11-13 ( on numbers as another

'\>

But the reference o f lines

,,.

ouaLa.)

mus t be to N ( cf . Ml

10 76a 8-12)
On a 10-11 , the temptation res i s ted by Ros s , to unde rstand

95

NOTES

l0 37a 1 0
'

ON

ZETA

_,,

ouaLa after LG ')/'_

aAAn , ran s trong,
Cl
UAn would seem to make a question

on the grounds that to supply

of

e/_

..._

vonn uAn ,

which at 1 0 37a 5

Howeve r , thi s reasoning presupposes

has just been accepte d .

that 1 0 36b 3 2- 1 0 37a 5 do be long to the ch:apter - read as

von t"An ,

postponing

a 10-11 might equally be thought to te ll

against that part, at least, of our Hypothe sis .

Ross takes the other

.,

uAn

Alternatively ,

to be a Speusippean quasi-material

principle like the great-and-sma ll : that reconciles grammar

and Hypothesis .
of
as
if

(;/

UAn

The difficulty ove;r s uppfyihg

,-..

GL.

..,

,.

,,,

o ?ia{a

instead

nv OAnV WV O LOUWV OUOLWV has to be cons trued

c.
'
'
is that possible? Note that
rougl1ly = ci.c u.il.tKaG ouaLaG :
>
/
....
ouaLa i s lll,lpplied, xa.L 5e: L l:ne: Lv is epexege tica l , not a

is that

....

....

distinct question .

""

Whether the postponed i nquiry is s ingle

or double , it is for its sake that we are at present :discussing

sensible substances ( 1 3- 1 4 ,

"'

...

e:ne: i.

oou

referring

= ' s i nce i t must be conceded that

because

'

'

to nbe:pov) .

or

' I aay thi!?

i t i ntroduces re asons not why the foregoing

propos ition is true but why we need to be to ld we have a

further aim .

Because we migh t think , and in a way quite

correctly , that the discussion of sensible s ubs tance is the

business o f phys ics or second phdlosophy ; and this is confirmed
by the re flection that the physicist is concerned not only wth
'
matter but also , indeed more , with form (at a 1 7 insert ne:pL

"1c

oGa Ca.c o r , with Ross , understand something to the same

e'ffect)
1\r.e we to think , then, that the present discussion
i n fact is no di f ferent from ( the mo re general part of) physics

except in its having the further aim o f pass i ng on to questions

encopassing immaterial substances
the whole , we thought so .
i f there i s no

c;,

,/

,,

:e:e:pa ouaLa,

(numbers , God , e tc . ) ?

On

E l says that physics is primary

but here we seem to be assured

that it is secondary j us t so long as we can pursue it with a

view to the ques tion whe ther there is
announce the theme o f Zl 2 :
time ,

.-.

e/

axe:ne:ov yate:pov

c;,

/
e:e:pa ouaLa
.

the unity o f defini tion .

i s matched by

"'

vuv oe:

18-20
This

at the opening

o f Zl 2 .
S ilmmary from Z ! . This fits the Hypothesis .
insofar as i t refers in 21- 2 to Z 4 , in the snub example ( 30 - 2 )

1 0 3 7a 21-b 7 :
to Z5

and i n 31-fin . to Z 6 .

With re ference to this las t ,

96

CHAPTER

11

10 37a 2 1

we have an important qualifi cation or clarifi cation .

When

dealing with Z 6 we took its thesis thatreach tning i s : identical

not accidentally with its essence to have unres tricted scope ,
rej ecting a restriction to universa ls
February )

( f irst note on 7th

But the main argument in Z 6 was conducted as a

general one about

G ..._
xaa auTa
AEyoeva KaL' n;pwTa .
_,

"''

reemphasi zed here at 10 37a 3 3-b 4

Thi s is

(Jaeger is perhaps correct

with his brackeits at 2- 3 ) , but we now learn ( 10 3 7b 4- 6 )

that

the identity does not hold with the matter or with the
/

individual as OUVOAOV , i . e . Socrates the OUVOAOV is not a

..
,,.
/
n;pwTn oucna .

( That accidental unities are not identical with

their essen c e , 5- is not news :

there is some thing

1 0 3la 19- 2 8 . )

KaT cruaeanxt

Does this mean

even in identifying him as

Socrates , in that one must do this by way of his accidental

That might explain why Socrates i b$ing Socraees

predicates ?

( 10 3 2a 8 and note on 1 0 32a 4 -1 1 , 2 7th March 19 7 6 )

[A reconr

cruvELAntvoG 1 0 39b 2 2 . The

,.
!t
Ros s , Jaeger , ouo . ' <eL)
MSS have ouoe xaTa cruaeanxoG ev ;
;
; Boni t z , o to ' a'aa . . . . ; alii alia . We cons trued el
as Aristotle c onceding at Socrates ( qua crDvoAov) and his
s ideration of b 47 s parked by
'"),

'

.....

'

essence are accidentally one and the same , but Ross

(note ad

loc ) intended the same as Boilit:z : . ., s uch things as mus i cal

Socrates are not th same as their essence ( c f . 1 0 3la 1 9 - 2 8 ) .
'C'

But th is puts a strain oil O L O V

,,,

""
0(. WKPaTn
KUL TO oUOLKOV,

which i s mos t naturally taken , not as a n example of one thing

not identical with its essence, but as an exampfue of two things
accidentally one .

No .doubt t:o. say : .that S o.crates .arid his

essence are accidentally one and the same is too weak , but
it is on the other hand too strong to say

(with o o = ' not

even ' ) he is not even accidentally one with his essence .

not keep the MSS text and take

> '

ouoe

Why

' nor , on the o ther hand ' ?

' Nor on the other hand , is each thing as matter or together

with

its matter accidentally one with its essence . '

Aristotle

will be warnig, Don ' t j ump to the assumption, when I deny the
identity with ess ence for Socrates qua

mfvoAofv

that Socrates

and his essence are ( simply ) an accidental unity .

Matter is

made for a closer unity with form than Socrates has with the
mus ical , and this in turn makes a difference to the relation
of cruvoAOV to form/essence . )

The troubl e with the s ummary i s

97

1 0 37a 2 1

NOTES
,,,

ON

its resume of Z l 0-11 at 22-30 .

ZETA
I t seems to suggest that once

matter comes in there is in a way no >..oyoG , >.. 6yoG being of

form, e . g . of soul in the case of man - a thesis entirely
The best we could

alie n , surely , tothe spirit of Zl0-1 1 .

'\

,. /';'

I?'

do to square th;i.ng . up was to note ( a ) i:-o i: L nv e: L va.L comes

,,.

22-4 picks up the circl e-man contast and

apant from ouo La. :

s.YS that in some cases the material parts do need to be

""
mentioned in the AOYOG defining the i:- ;I'
L '>"
nv '>"
E L VCL L , but then 2 4

goes on to say that such parts a s are material do not belong

,,

,...

.,

,,...

in the >..o yoG nG ouoLCLG , since they are parts of n ouvo >..n
,,
,
'P /
,,,
;> ,,,,
"?'
'\ "
OUO L a. , i . e . OYOG
now is of OUOLCL = npwi:n OUOLCL ( 2 8 ) = E: L OOG

' , I

i:o e:vov ( 29 ) -

,,

.'

and not o f i;a.ui:-nG

cf . , after all , l 0 3 6 a 26- 3 0 , 1 0 3 7a 5 - 7 "

/.

,,,

i:-nG auvo>..n G ouoLa.b ;

but .this should not

,,

withdraw the sense in which there is >.. oyoG i:-a.ui:n G , as

including a type of matter , in . accordance with the initial
statement at 2 2- 3 .

Should not , but ( b ) apparently it does ,

and as individual .

For he explains

.,

,,,..

/
as a result o f Aristotle ' s confusing auvo>..
n ouoLa. as gneral

which there is not >..6yoG nG ouv6>..n G

general . .question ' What is man ? '

( y c(p , 2 6 ) the sense in

( i ) with reference to the

( 28) ,

( i i ) by the argument

that matter is &,Q"p L oi:ov ( 2 7 ) , which only fits the individual

( indeed in de P artibus Animalium there is quite a definite
number of 'materia questions to settle in defining each
species :

modes of breathing, sleeping , etc . ) Cf . 3 2- 3 where

...

he is sti ll running the general ouvo>..o v snub nose in tandem

with Callias .

Verdi e :

either these lines take us right back

to a sage prior to the enlightenment of Z l0-11 , but then

lines 2 2- 2 4 are disc:repapt. 9rc. the _condensed summary. . tias

..

bred confusion .
1 7th Decemb er 1 9 7 7
/

The ques tion was raised whether auvo>..o G was two- or threetermination .
,

I t was noted that in Zll 1 0 3 7a 26 , where Ross

.

prints auvo>..o u, several MSS have ouvo>..n G ; but the feminine

form does not occur elsewhere in this paragr aph and could
n

well be scribal error resulting fom the proximity of i:nG

/'

and i:a.ui:nG

98

CHP.PTERS

1037b 8

l _c 1 2

Zl2
10 37b 8- 1 4 . I f the reference to the_ Analytics in b 8 is to a
specific pas sage , An . P os t . B

6 . 9 2a 2 9 ff . , suggested by Ros s ,

seems the best candidate ; howeve r , the reference need not be

to a specific passage where the particular question taken up,
here is left unfinishe d , but could be more general .

S urprise

was expressed that Aris totle here refers to the Analytics

rather than to Z 4- 6 , which are in any case presupposed at
b 2 5- 2 7 be low ; the oddity is less if the reference is to a
particular passage in the Ana lytics than if it is general
and hence less motivate d .
1 0 3 7b 1 4 - 2 1

1 4 - 2 1 argues that the explanation of unity in

terms of participation that will work for ' man ' and ' wite '
will not work fer the genus and the differentia ; 21- 2 7 goes
on to rai s e difficulty if the genus does partake of the
differenti a .

b 14 :

ou- '/
av8poon.Q.

is odd , as it is not the

express ion that is in question but what '. it s tands for .

noAAcf is predicate - ' there are many things when

,,.
3a.epou aa.,epov
has the s ense of ' the one (genus )

,,.

b 15 :

' . b 18 :

does not

partake of the other '.Cdi:E ;eerentia) ' ; so therefore in b 1 5 f i t is j us t the case of men not white that is in question, not
a lso that o f white things tha t are not men .
difficul tie s were raised concerning 1 4- 21 .

Four main points /

( 1 ) Why is the

unity of white man regarded as unproblemati c , when i t might

seem that that of genus and differentia. is much c loser?
(2)

Why is it unacceptable that the genus should partake of

oppos ites

( 19 - 2 1 ) ?

( ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) were in the event discussed together) .

The

interpretation generally favoured was tha t , whereas in the

case

of ' man' and 'white ' there is no ob j e ction to a subs tance

possess ing contrary attr ibutes at different times

(cf .

Categories 5 . 4 a lOff . ) , in the case of the genus , regarded

not as ( e . g . )

' animal ' which may be one s pecimen animal or

another , but rather as one thing ' animal ' , this option is not
open .

( cf .

g'a.

in 1 9 ) .

Just so , no indivi dual man is both

white and not-white at the same time ( le aving as ide the

pos s ibility o f other qualifications , such as

' in one part/

99

.......

1 0 3 7b 1 4

NOTES

ON

ZETA

in . another ) ; of man in general it is true that ' man is white '

and also that ' man is not wh ite ' , but this case raises similar
problems to that of the genus , and the genus is here being
regardeC:. as like tht= individual ,,,an .

Arisi.:.itle is thus

drawing on his arguments against the P latoni c Forms , though

the latter are not here his immediate targe t .

The argument

was felt to be unsatisfactory because of the way in which it

dis regards any other way apart from temporal succession in
which the same thing could be characterized by opposites
in different parts of its e l f , cf . above) .

(e . g .

The argument is

a prelimnary one which suggests one possible answer to the

problem and then rej ects i t ; it was noted that Aristotle
immediately supposes the opposite of its conclusion ( 2 1 ) . Cf .
also

,..

oOX E L

in 1 9

qualified) .

( though the as s ertion in 18 is not thus

( 3 ) As against Benitz , Ros s ' s view that unity

by na'.eoG ( 1 6 ) i s not dis tinct from that by participation ( 18ff , )

was accepte d .

,,,
no.en

Ps-Alexander 5 1 8 . 1 7 uses

perhaps in a reminis cence of Z 4 10 30a 1 3 .

to gloss
.

,,,
ETEXn

However , Ros s ' s

description o f participation here as having a P latonic s ens e ,

as in H6 , was not accepte d .
H6 employs

'

,,,

XO.TO. E3EGLV

The reference to P latoni s ts in

rather than

,,,.

E't'EXE L V ,

s ignifi cance of this was not pursued.

but the

( 4 ) Ross explains

Aristotle ' s point as that one cannot infe r , from ' A partakes
in B ' and ' A partakes in not-B ' ,

' A partakes in B and not-B ' .

Rather, Aristotle ' s point is that this inference is valid ,

but , because the conclusion to which it leads cannot be
accepted in the . case of the genus

( ( 2 ) above ) , the premi s s

that the genus partakes o f the differentia mus t b e re jected .

1 0 3 7b 21- 2 4 . If unity i s by participation, too much will be
'
' r"'
) .
,,
In 2 1 't'O YEVOG (here , equivalent to TO wov is
unified .
understood as sub j ect of
understands

, yevE L

ETlXE L ;

with

(or the equivalent

EVUltCIPXE L

T t:

\,

i n 2 3 one

[so Ps-Al exander

5 1 8 . 3 4 and 3 8 respectively ] ) . I t was generally felt that the

s uggested explanation o f unity was not a very satisfactory one ,
though it qid at leas t provide a minimum necessary condition a genus would not form a uni ty with differentiae not be longing
to that genus .

The

very brief ( 2 3- 2 4 ) .

s ugges tion and its rebuttal were however

Aristotle ' s point migh t be ( 1 ) that
100

CHAPTER
differentiae do

n at

vunpxe: L v

12

1 0 3 7b 21

in the genus , or ( 2 ) that

they do but that is not the required explanation of the unity

of the ob j ect of de finition;

( 2 ) was pre ferred,

( 1 ) involving

ivU"napELG .

a distinction between participation and

Aristotle ' s

ob j e ction in 2 4 could b e ( i ) that there will be one thing

possessing all the differentiae in a genus , (ii)

that any

combination ::if diff!;!rentiae within a genus will form a unity

whereas in fact only certain ones do ;
[Ps-Alexander opts for ( i ) , 5 1 8 . 3 8 ] .

( i i ) was preferred.

"

,
auoc
AOYOG
.....

in 21

at first seemed inexa ct , as the ob j ection here was different

from that involving . con trar,i,es in 14'-4 ;1. ; the suggestion

w.as

same , how to get a unity [ cf . Ps- Alexander 5 1 . 32 f . ] .

It

made that the point is that the ques tion or prob l em is the
was however pointed out that the random combinations of
differentiae in ( i i ) would often involve contrar ies ::ir
incompatibles [ and ( i )

certainly would] ;

two-footednes s is

incompatible with any nther number of fet.

point is not

This

indeed s tressed, but that incompatible differentiae are in

question in 21-24 seemed gene ral ly favoured .

'

,,.

/'

..

"

...

OPLOIJ.OG is the AOYOG of OUOLa and an OUOLa

is a uni ty , pLoiW'c muat be one and be of a unity ; arbitrary
The
groups of differentiae are not definitions of oGo (aL .
1 0 3 7b 24-2 7 . As

question was raised whether this also applied to groups of

attr ibutes that were peculiar to ( e . g . ) man but did not
constitute his essence , but this point did not seem to be a
central issue here .
>

e:O L ,

27

5 19 . 4 ] .

Oll lJO. (Ve: L

OUO ,,La here

SC .

Is

or

0. L ?

[Ps-Alexander as s umes

expres s ion or thing?

,,

Stri ctly ,

,,

the< assertion should be ' express ions for QUOLaL s ignify . . . . ' ,
, ,
' . Perhaps
' ouoLaL are denoted by expressions which s ignify
however

""

onaLve: L

has the looser sense of ' points to ' ,

' indicates ' ;

cf . Categories 5 . 3b !Off . A problem was felt in that the passage

assumed that subs'tanQ.e !!.S the abj ec t qf def.!ni.t.Ul:in was .a !lrt.iey .
,
rather than proving i t .
Since i t was s.ubstance as the obj ect
of definition that was in ques tion here , this could not be
the ' primary substance ' of the Categories - and that it .was not
that type of substance that was being sough t had already been
indicated by Z 6 and Z l l .

Z l 2 was led up to by Z 4 1030a 6 f f ;

1.ol

1 0 3 7b 24

NOTES

ZETA

ON

the cpapter is not concerned to prove that the object o f

definitd.on has unity , but to explain how i t does .

Even so ,

the present passage , , asserting rather than atguing that .

it does , was felt to come oddly in the middle of the chapter .
The s equel in 2 7ff . explains how the ob j ect of He fi liilion has
unity rather than arguing for the assertion here that i t
does .

According to Categories 5 . 3a ! O f f . se condary substance

is not itself a unity i rather , it makes primary subs tance one .

This would suit

c,

ev

(sc .

.;

ona,ve )

in 2 7 here , but, if we

only have " ( se oonda.ry ) .substance ' reve als' a unity " , not that
i t is one , the argument of 2 4 - 2 7 will not go through .

I t has

earlier been emphasised that to be a substance is to be some

one thing and a

ooe

(e . g . in Z 3 by contrast with matter) .

P erhaps the present passage is one that would require and

receive further oral elaboration .

'

;'

oob cpaev

in 2 7 suggests

it is a generally asserted doctrine of Aristotle ' s that i s

i n questioni c f . e . g . z 7 , 1 0 3 2b lf . , l:J1lt here the point seems
particularly central to the present argument .
1 0 3 7b 2 7-10 38a 9 . Ross c laims that the type of de finition to
which that by divis ion is implicitly contras ted in 2 7- 2 9 is
definition by the consti tuent parts , comparing B 3 . 9 9 8b 1 3 ,
H2 . 1 0 4 3a 20 .

I n the H passage there is no reference to

definition [ 10 4 3a 1 4 ? ] ; it is questi onable how far the B

passage represents Aristotle ' s own position .

Is the contras t

rather with the type of definition recomme nded in PA I 2- 3 ,

which admits a multiplic ity of ove rlapping criteria, de fining
a thipg by the presence in i t of a combination of features
which does not re cur in any other type of thing?

Aristotle ' s

concern in the present passage is with the formal characteristics

that definitions must have in order that his argument for

the unity of the ob j ect of definition wil l w<i:lrl q . deflint!hon

mus t ful fil the condition . ( C )

that c lasses of things marked

out by differentiae at various leve ls must either be mutually

exclusive .2E be who lly contained the one within the other there mus t be no parti al overlap - and that each dt:Efetentia
mus t be confined to a single genus .
is to explain the unity of

Aristotle ' s prob lem here

the ob j ect of definition, and he

has selected the type of de finition that makes this easiest .

102

CHAPTER

12

10 ll7b 2 7

Th e impli cation i s that definitions not fulfil ling c are not

A.

:ro L

..fri'1:

(ac; ;

But .here there seems to be conflict with

PA , where definitions by divis ion are attacked and those

invo lving . mill:t;!,ple . ove rlappli.g.g .;ci:: i te.taare :::.thec.oii]:y- useful
type .

Even if Aristotle ' s pos ition were that the only useful

definitions of what are in fact unities do not reveal their

unity , there will::- stilL.b e the_ proo1em :that .attacks .:the
Z l 2 type of definition as misleading .

This attack makes i t

l ikely that Z l 2 precedes PA . The implicit a llusion i n 27-29

could s ti l l be to the type of definition envisaged as a
pos s ibi lity ; but there i s then.
fai lure to come b ack to it here .

the problem of Ari s totle ' s

He does not dis cuss

definition by consti tuent parts in z either .

I t is not clear

that the definition of a hous e in terms o f its purpose as a

covering at H 2 . 1 0 4 3a

16 is arrived at by divis.ion or fulfils

C; but the ques tion oftthe unity of the object o f definition

is not there mentione d , and it is questionable whether a hous e ,
:>

....

,,being an artefact, is an ouo L a at all .

Z l2 does not i ndeed..

treat definition: in a totally -2_ prd.ori fashion- i t is not

determined in advance what ways of ( e . g . ) being footed there

are , but when the differentiae are dis covered by empirical
enquiry they w i l l fit c .

The question was discussed how far

the inadequacies of c- type definition would or should have

been immediately evident, even if i t were regarded as

something that had not yet been achieved but should be aimed
at.

The question was also raised why Aristotle did not

i l lustrate his argument in this chapter by mathemati cal

rather than biological examples .
1 0 3 7b 30- 1 0 3 8 a 1 . Only the 'first ' , s ummum , .- genus and the
differentiae are required , as sub-genera are s imply s ummum
genus p lus success ive differentiae .
1 0 3 8 a 1-4 . Three views were put forward as to the import of
:these lines .

( i ) given condition C ( see last note but one )

there is no need for mo:te than the summum genus and the last
differentia , since the last di fferentia implies all the others .
But thi s invo lves assuming what i s not s tated until a L.ff, . , 2 1
f f . ; and the exampd.e of 'wingless two- footed animal ' a t b 3 3
103

NOTES

1 0 38a 1
does not satisfy c .

ON . ZETA

( i i ) all thet differentiae but the last

are packed into the genus , as if there were a s ingle name for
' two-footed :animal ' , the genus, and 'wingless ' were differentia .
a 4 then introduces a different example.

There is no need

for the differentiae packed into the genus to satisfy c ,

which has not yet been specified; a 5 ff . and a 9 f f . are not

reasons for a 1-4 but introduce new points .

As the matter

requi.ced .: for a particular form is a lre ady itself thereby

specified to some extent, s o with the genus for the species .
b 30 has referred to removal of intermediate genera - but i t
has done s o to retain j us t the summum genus , so hardly s upports
( ii ) .

IPs . Alexander 5 1 8 . 2 6 ff . attributes to Ar istotle

e lsewhere the view that the genus and all differentiae but the
last are to 'the last differentia as matter is to form; the
reference s eems problemati c , cf . H ayduck ad loc . Alexander ' s
.

interpretation is inf luenced by his reading

: i;.e;A.e:ui;a'Ca,

at b 30 ; 5 20 , 5- 7 ] ,

n' 8 aopa ,
,

( i i i ) b 3 3- .a 4

sc .

are s imply

concerned to show that the summum genus and the differentiae

are the only e lements in a defini tion however long or short
it is .

' TWo- legged animal ' in a 4 would then be intended as

an unreal example of an inf ima species involving only one

differentia ( cf . 10 3 7b 1 2f . ) .

But i t was felt that. the

passage was exces s iveiy laboured to be making just this

point .
1038a 5-9 .

The summum genus can be omitted if it is not

something over and above the species , or is but only as

matter; de finition will cons ist only of differentiae , and
( a 18) only o f the las t .

Unity shown by one-word definition?

Prob lem in that the more the analogy withrmatter is ... s.tressed ,
the more Aristotle s eems to be using the mode l of the genus
differentia relationship re j ected in 1 0 3 7b 1 4- 2 1 (but cf .

oou e!i.' i n b 19 , at le as t ; note on 10 37b 14- 21 above ) .

The

analogy is perhaps that, though the genus ' anima l ' cannot
change from ' dog ' to 'cat ' , i t is like matter in that it
rules out some possibilities;:::als o , an animal must be of
some species just as matter mus t be informed in some way .
The argument of a 6 - speech is both genus and matter, so
genus i:s matter l: . was .. agreed ,to be ludicrous .
104

The ques tion

CHAPTER
was raised whether ' animal '
>

a differentia o f oucna .

12

1 0 38a 5

is not a s l.U!Unurn genus but i ts elf

Will

>

,,

ouaLa

be the highest and only

genus of substances? - in this case genera like ' animal '

are in a s imilar position to the ir subdivis ions , and the
'

bring.r.ng .
wrong .

in of matter for the one and not the other s eems

B 3 . 9 9 8b 2 2 argues that

'
TO

)/

ov is not a genus ; i t

was que s tioned whether this a lso app lies to

ota(a .

I n any

case the argument in B 3 is that the genus cannot be predicated

o f the differentiae - one can say of a dog that it is an
animal but not

that the ' four footed ' is ; but Z l 2 s eems to

envis age defining the species by its las t differentia , so

tha t if in the case of ' dog ' this were 'four foote d ' one
could say ' dog is the four footed ' .

The application of B 3 ' s

argument to Z l 2 is therefore problematic .

2lst January 1 9 7 8
1038a 5-9 . We had another look at the argument about

(j)(A)Vn" ,

which on 1 7th December 1 9 7 7 had been pil loried as ' voice

is genus and matter, therefore genus is matter ' .

This time

we thought that AJ:istotle is not genera lizing , fatuous ly ,

from the observation that not only does s poken sound divide
into species of sound but also particular spoken sounds divide
into parts be longing to ( some of)

those species .

Rather his

point is that the species o f elementary s ound are different

actua l izations of a general vocal potentia lity , and this
does generali z e to other genera :

wha t is a dog could have

been , perhps could h ave become , a cat .

explicates

' a genus i s nothing

no.pa

in a 6 means ' or in other words ' .

1 0 38a 9- 30 .

...

The example

,.,..

its species ' , since n

I n a 9 the sense mus t be o divide the differentia ' ,

i . e . ' to divide by dividing the differentia ' , which ( if we

can ' t excise n

5Lapav ,

5Laoi:lal

requires emendation of v

doubtless to .dat:ive . : :We ;thought .l:hat Ai:iS:to.tle

would regard ' footed divides into c loven- footed and uncloven '
as a necess ary truth , but not knowable a priori .

We noted

that s uch divisions , though here apparently coinrnended ,

. . apparently fall fo.QJ. ot t;'1 e. Qb jec;t;Lons ;!,n PA I : ? ; 3 .agaA.nst
105

10 3 8a . 9

NOTES
di chotomy by privationi

ON

ZET 1\

and that Aristotl e ' s zoological

practice of defining each species by many ' last ' dif ferentiae
i s , at

bes t , here kept out of si .ght . Even if each of many

' last ' c .d ifferentiae in a species were neces sitated by the

rest, that would not, as the proj ect of Z l 2 requires ,

' show

that the differentiae in a definition may be reduced to one ' .

( Ross)

I f we select one las t differentia and understand it

as implying the res t , it will be single in expres sion only .

1038a 3 0 - 4 . The order of words ' two-footed footed ' makes the
redundancy of c' footed ' c lear because what it says has been
agree

'D

ELG o ' oGK rcr,Lv v

already said,

whether this . is ( a )

ooa C :

we did not

a corollary of the doctrine ab out

differentiae , re lying on the though t that what can be defined

in one word cannot contain ordered parts , and fur :her supported
by the following
thes is ,

yd,p

claus e i or (b)

a reason for the redundancy

' sc . and therefore what i s seen by a

/
ue:aaE
LG

superfluous must have been superfluous before '

/

( Ross) .

to be

nOOG

yap , , , , how could we have to think there is .a posteiior part and

a prior part ( or :

think of part ofc' it later, part earlier) ?

10 38a 3 4 - 5 . We were unsure whether

'

,,....

nv n:ownv

promi ses a return

to the same sub j e c t , definition by division , or advance to a

new one, presumab ly definition of other kinds .

np&iov

I n any case

b ack at 1 0 3 7b 28 has the latter force , and we wondered

whether the

'

oe;

in 10 3 8b 1 picks that up, so that Z l 3 is to be

seen as s ti l l dealing with definition.

unclear how much

' Ka;a, k

The context leaves it

lh aLp{cre; LG ' is meant .to exclude .

Z l3
Dis cussion of the chapter was introduced with general remarks
on the . pr.oblem 6f re conc i ling its conclusion that no Ka36Aou
,,
,,.
Aeoue:vov
is a substance with the treatment of e:Lon a$

Ka30'Aou

and s'ubstances .

S ome ob j ections were brought against

the two most familiar solutions :

(R. Albritton ,

that

e:'C on

are not

Ka3bAOU

' Forms of particular substances in Aristotle ' s

.
Metaphysi cs ' , Journal of Philosophy 5 4 , 19 5 7 , pp 69 9 -70 8 1
J . owens , The doctrine o f being in the Aris totel i an Metaphysics ,
106

CHAP.T!';.RS. .
Toronto 10 6 3 ) , or that not all
(M. J . Woods ,

12

J. 3

/_
xaeoAOU

are

/
/.
xaeoAou
Aeyoeva

' Prob lems in Metaphysics Z chapter 1 3 ' in Aristotle ,

. ed . J . M. E . Moravcs ik , Garden City 19 6 7 ) .

[We were pr6mised a

paper by G . J . Hughes , whi ch follows . ]

For 2 5 th February 19 7 8
Universals as Potential Substances :

The interpretation of

Metaphys ics Z l 3
Discussion of the thirteenth chpter of Book ! of Aristotle ' s
Met aphysics can hardly be said to have reached any s atis factory
conclusion (W . D . Ros s , Aristotle ' s Metaphys ics , Vol II , ad
.

loc . ; M . J ; .woods , . ' Proo lelils in Metaphysics z , Chapter 13 ' ,

in J . M . E . Moravcsik

( ed . )

Aristotle ; J . H . Lesher,

Form , Substances , and Univers als :

16

( 19 7 1 ) , pp.

1 69 - 7 8 ;

A Di lemma '

' Aristotle on
in Phronesis ,

and the articles by Albrit ton and

Lacey to wh.tch they refer ; see, .too, w . charl ton ,

' Aristotle

and the Principle of Individuati on' , in Phronesl s , 1 7

pp .

2 39 - 4 9 ) .

( 19 7 2 )

The translation of s ome . o f the: .key sentences i s

i n doub t ( e . g . , a t 10 3 8b 12- 1 3 , 18-2 3 , 2 9 - 30 ) ; theprecise force

of some of the central arguments is not c lear; and there i s
even a considerable di fference o f opinion about where Ari s totle
is putting forward his CMn views and where he is rehearsing
the arguments of his

( pres umab ly P latonist)

opponent.

Woods ' s

two c laims , that the argument of the chapter rests on a

dis tinction between a universal and a universal predicate , and
that Aris totle presupposes that the species-form provides a
principle of indivi duatiop , h ave both been denied .
Neverthel es s , i t appears to, me that i n .the s e respects
Woods has rather the better of the argument , and although I
shal l disagree with him on s ome quite s ub s tantial points of
interpretation , ..the general effect of what I h ave to s ay wi ll
be to reinforce the main lines of his pos ition .

I shall

consider once again , at the risk of: some tediUJ)I, the main
arguments of Z l3 relating them to what I take to be the main
conclusions about subs tance reached in the book as a whole .
I shall maintain that it is i-naccurate to ake the remark in
10 4 la 35 as a total re j ection of the view that universals
10 7

I
NOTES
are substances .

ON

ZEll'A

Lesher i s right to say that Aristotle ' s

treatment of substances lands him in something of a dilemma .

But I shall suggest that i t is not a dilemma of which Aristotle
was unaware , or which he did nothing to resolve .

It is true

that, in the case of material substances , Aristotle wishes to

say both that

it is only individuals such as Socrates and

Callias which are substances in actuality , and also that their

forms are prior in t ime , knowledge , . and definition

( thUs

sati sfying Aristotle ' s own criteria for being substance s ) .

In

my view, the d ila can be resolved by means of the distinction

between potency -and actuality , and there are enough indications
in the text to show that Aristotle saw this .

These conclusions

can throw some light both on . Aristotle ' s view of predication ,

and on the status he accords to material substances
I.

The beginning o f Zl3 explicitly recalls the discus sion

initiated in Z 3 .

(Ross rightly supposes that the discussion

of universals in 13 taken together with

the previous

discuss ion of essences suffices as an account of the c l aim

of genera to be substances . )

We may reasonably hope to understand

chapter 13 better i f we try first to assess the outcome of the

discussion earlier

in z of the c laims of substratum and

es sence to be substance , before we confront the discussion of

universals direc tly .
Each time Aristotle introduces a new candidate , i t i s
introduced a s one whose clai!ll; t o b e substance
and worth discussion .

are plausible

This is true of the general introduction

to the discussion at the start o f chapter 3 , inasmuch as it

determines the plan. of the rest of z as a whole

(a suming that

we may safely neglect chapters 7- 9 as later additions ) .

at the beginning of chapter

Moreover ,

Aristotle seems , at least to

some extent , to make the initial fourfold list of candidates

his own .

Aristotle is not , then , simply recalling the views

of his predece ssors , surveying a string of stalking-horses

none of which is expected to be a serious contender .

The

discussion of substratum in chapter: 3 is taken seriously, as is ' the

subsequent discuss ion of e s sence , and difficulties to which Aristotle

108 -

UNIYERSALS
cons tantly refers
10 3 7b 9 )

AS

POTENTIAL

S UBS TANCES

( e . g . , at 10 30b 14 , 1 0 3 4b 2 3 , 10 3 5a 2 6 , and

are presented as genuine difficulties , discussion of

wfiich may be expected to advance the inqui ry as a whole.

Thus , whi le Aristotle in the end rejects the view that
substratum in the sense of matter can properly b e identi fied
with sub stance ,

'

( although even here h e is careful to explain

why this idea should: have been proposed be fore he eventually

dismisses i t , at 10 2 9 a 10 2 7 ) he agrees that

b oth in the: sens of

composite individual and in the sense of form the c laims of

sub s tratum to be substance s eem justified and merit further
discussion ( 10 2 9 a 2 9 - 3 3 ) .

Both recur later in z .

In the case of the claims

of essences to b e substances ,

the s ituation i s of course a good deal more compli cate d .

At

the end of chapter 6 , Aristotle conc ludes that each individual

is one with his essence in no merely accidental s ense, and he
has alre ady pointed out at the beginning of the chapter that
this is an important conclusion , since i t i s commonly s upposed
that a thing is one with its substance .

Th i s all goes to

reinforce the c l aimof essence to be substance .

In h i s note on

10 3 2 a 8 ff . , Ross asserts that this conclusion must apply only

to universal s s uch as man and horse , or to the Ideas , i f there
are any , and not to individuals such as S ocrates and callias .
Ross maintains that Aristotle treats this latter question:. as
dif ferent from, however alli ed t o , the corresponding questions
ab out man and horse .

Close . examination of the text of l0 3 2 a

6 - 11 fails t o s upport Ros s ' s c laim that a distinction i s drawn

between the two cases .

I nd eed Aristotle s ays that the sophistical

questions about S ocrates and the essence of S ocrates are to be

solved ,in the s ame way as t;he questions about horse and the
essence of horse he has already discus sed ;

and the proof

given at 10 3 lb 2 0 - 2 2 would apply equally well to S ocrates as

it does to man , s ince an essence i s s imply what a ' this ' ..i s .
The reader of z 4-6 might b e forgiven for concluding that , once
one had di sposed of i l legitimate attempts to extend the notion
of essence to inc lude s uch things

as

white man and the I liad,

one could s ay that ess ences were subs tances and al so that
Socrates was a s ub s tance , since he i s one with his essence i n
n o merely accidental way .
both the senses of

This would at one stroke deal with

' subs tatum ' which we were left with at the

109

NOTES

ON

ZETA

end of chapter 3 .
Ros s , of cours e , wrote his note in the l i gh t o f the last
paragraph< of Z l l , where it is expli ci tly denied that Socr4tes
is the s ame as his essence , unless by ' S ocrates ' is meant ' the
soul 0 Socrates ' .
dealt with later.

The difficulty is a real one , and will be

But it s ti l l remains true that the general

pattern of the argument, b oth i n the case o f substratum and

of essence , i s that the propose d candidate is accepted once
the term has been properly restrict'ed ( ' sub s tratum ' to exclude
matter , and ' es s ence '

to exclude white man , etc . ) , al though

s ome further work remains to b e done i n each case .

There i s

therefore an antecedent expectation th at when Ari s totle comes

to consider the claims o f universals to be substances i n chapter
1 3 , the conclusion will b e that i f ' univers al ' is understood
in a duly restricted sense , i t will be true that univers als
are substances , although there will be s ome subsequent tidying
up to do b e fore the conclusion can be regarded as c ompletely
s atis factory .
Two hints i n the text of 1 3 at once serve to confirm this
expectati on .

Ari s totle begins ,

' The Universal ,: too , i s considered by s ome to b e in the

fullest sense an explanation and a principle ; s o let us
tackle the. probl.em . at :tli.is : point .as well . For:'.it does
not s eem possible that anything predicated universally
could be .a subs tance . '
( 10 3 8b 6 -9 )

Ari stotle i s not here saying (what would in any case be a very
odd thing t o s ay)

that we should consider this claim because

it cannot pos sib ly be true .

Rather , he is saying that it mus t

be considered despite the fact that i t does not appear to b e

a serious possib i l ity , because appearances may prove once again
to be deceptive .

I f we unders tand ' univers al ' i n the right way,

universals might after all turn out to be subs tances .

The se cond

hint is to b e fourid i n an interesting parallel between a remark

in this chapter and one . made in the discussion of matter in
chapter 3 .

At 10 29 a 2 6 , Ari stotle remarks ,

' Those who consider

the matter from this point of view will conclude that matter
1 10

UNIVERSALS
is s ub s tance . '

115

POTENTIAL

SUBS TANCES

He immedi ate ly goes on to point out that this

can hard1y be right despite the arguments which h ave been

advanced .

In just the s ame way we find him s aying in 1 3 ,

' Those who consider the matter from .thiff point

C. 10 3 8b. 3 4 - 3 5 ) ,

of view will take it as obvious that nothing which belongs

universally is a subs tance , and that nothing whi ch i s predicated
in common will indicate a ' thi s ' but only a ' such ' .
among many other prob lems , we have the Third Man . '

Otherwi s e ,
But j us t

as the corresponding remark was immedi ately qualified a t the

end of 3 , so too here .

At the nd of 1 3 , Aris totle points out

that this appare ntly agreed conclusion leads to di fficulties

and wi l l perhps have to be modi fi ed .

The<. arguments of Z l 3 , therefore , mus t not b e approached

as though Aristotle considered them to be completely s atis factory
i n thems elves , or as though he took them to show that it is
simply false to s ay that univers als are s ub s tances .

It follows

that thefact that one or all of the arguments advanced in

this chapter may not ee ent.i..re1y conclusive is not of i tself
a reason to s uppose that we m s t h ave misinte rpreted them, or
for concluding that Aristotle i s unaware of the di f ficulties
in reconciling what h sa:15 here with what he has earlier
argued about essences ,

for example , earlier in z .

Mis,- ...

understanding i s much more likely to arise i f we ins i s t on

trying to make the arguments i n Z13 complete the refutations
of a posi t ion wh!l.ch Aristotle does not wish to refute i n all
its generality .

We should not approach Z l 3 with the expectation

that in the co.urse of i t Ari stotle wi ll show that universals

are notsub s tances , but rather wi th the presumption that he
will show th at , with due quali fication , they are subs tances .

I t i s important to note that the conclusion of the whole

dis c ussion o f univers als in ch apter 16 ,

( 1 0 4 la 3-5) , far from

being a denial of the claims af universals to be sub s tances ,

i s a denial of that claim only i f ' univers al ' is taken to mean
' s omething whi ch i s one over many '
Form.

in the .manner of a P latoni c

But it . may well not b e unavoidable to take ' uni vers al '

i n this way .

Lesher i s , I tl'lihk , right to argue agains t Woods

that Ari stotle has no terminology to expre s s a distinction

111

NOTES

between ' univers al '

ON

ZETA

and ' univers al predicate ' .

But i t s ti l l

s eems t o me that Woods has made the righ t kind of move here ,
and that Ari s totle be lieves universals to be substances only
when they are not predicated o f individuals .

The di stinction

i s noti simply one of l anguage or logi c , but is rooted i n

Aristotle ' s theory o f potenti ality and actuali ty , and can b e
drawn clearly enough on the basis o f what Ari stotle s ays ,
despite the fact that he has e l ab orated no special termi nol ogy
i n which to s ay i t .
After this s omewhat lengthy preamb le , we may now turn to
the arguments presented i n Z l 3 .
II
The:.first argument depends o n a generally agreed semi
techni cal understanding of b oth

' substance ' and ' universal ' ,

and should not be pressed too closely .

I ts function i s

simply to indicate in a pre liminary manner why it i s that any

identi fication of s ub s tanc e i ahd universal seems out of the
ques tion.

For this purpose , Aris totle i nvokes the ordi nary

unders tanding . of ' s ub s tance ' which he has already used i n his
introduction to the discus sion of essences in chapter 6 :

' e ach

thing is though t to be nothing other than its own subs tance '
(10 3la 1 7 - 1 8 ) ; i n contras t to which a univers al is though t to
belong to many.

69 provides us wi th a s imple tes t which wi ll

suffice to . give initial shape to the prob lem Aristotle wishes

us to con front .
' every S.o crates ' .

We can s ay ' Every man ' but we cannot s ay

' S ocrates '

apparently refers to s omething

whi ch is proper to S ocrates . alone , whereas

' man ' refers to

s omething whi ch is common to many i ndivi duals .

But suppose that ' man ' di d function like
we could not s ay ' Every man I

So far , so good.

' S ocrates ' , and that

I t would then follCM ( on the

assumption that it were s t i l l possible to us e man ' as a predi cate

at all)

that i f man i s truly predicable o f A and B , A will b e

identical with B i n the s ame sense o f ' i denti cal ' required
when we s ay that i f A is S ocrates and B i s Socrates , than A i s
identi cal with B .
as follows

Here i n chapter 13 , Aris totle puts the point

( on the assumption that a univers a l , e . g . man , i s .a

s ub s tance) :
112

UNIVERSALS

AS

POTENTIAL

'Whose subs tance will it be?

SUBS TANCES

I t wi ll be the s ub s tance

either of every individual or of none .

But

[ . on the

assumption that. we .try to make i t the subs tance of every

individual ] then ' every ' would be impos sib le .
the sub s tance of some one indivi dua l ,
be that one . '

( 10 3 8b 1 2 - 1 4 )

I f i t is

the " others " will

( Explanatory expansions of

the argument are my own , not Ari stotle ' s , and have
accordingly been enclosed within< square b rackets . )
As Aristotle goes on to s ay ( repeating the position of chapter
6)

things whi ch are i dentical in subs tance and es sence are

identical wi th each other .

What s ense of ' i denticar i s required here?
best to understand i t i n the sec.end .
(10 5 4 a 3 4 - 3 5 ) ,

I think i t

o f the senses given in I 3

' We call a thing the s ame i f i t i s one both in

definition and i n number :

for example , you are one with yourself

both in form and in matter . '

True , Aristotle there speaks of

definition and number , whereas i n our pass age he s peaks of

substance and essence,

It may therefore b e tempting to refer

to the discussion of S ocrates :and Coriscus in Z l l , and to the

third of the senses in. I.3:;

' I f -the definition of i ts primary

substance is one ' . :.o . S ti l l , I think the temptation should be

'
res isted,
The beginning of z 1 3 ShoUl d ' h ave warned us that he

i s , as it were, s tarting all ove r again as if he were takd.ng .

up the discus sion o f universals where he left off i n Z 3 .

If

this is s o , h e i s operating with a s imple , almos t everyday ,

sense of ' subs tance '

and ' univers al ' , acco::ding to whi ch

<

subs tance-terms can apply only to an entity which i s numerically

one ,

wh:lreas univers al terms p.pply to entities whi ch are

numerically plural .
To b e sure, on this interpretati on the argument would
prove too much , as Woods and others h ave pointed out, in that

it would a ls o show that essences such " as man or featherless

biped cannot be sub s tances either, contra;Fy to .. what. Ari s totle
has already s aid about essences here in z .

However , I submit

that Aris totle is not presenting this argument as conclus ive,

but s imply as a consideration whi ch would apparently rule out
the identification of subs tances and univers als i n the normal
senses of thos e terms .

I t i s mis taken , for the reas ons given

113

......

NOTES

Otf

ZETA

earlier;to suppose' that Aristotle subscribes to this argument

withoti

qualification.

The second argument is presented under the same rubr i c ,

as another pr ima facie ob j e ction .
' Substane is not predicated of a substratlllJl , whereas aa
universal is always predicated of a subs tr.atum ' ( 10.381:b 15-16)
:onca .again, , a _patrs,age i-n ii _w ill serve

meaning of this ob j ection .

ta HJ untinate th'e :

In chapter 6

( 10 16 a 1 7 - 3 2 )

that things can b e called ' one ' for. several reasons .

he says
The first

is because their sub stratum does not differ in form , that is

to say , where there i s no perceptib le division.

H e gives as

an example that wine and oi l , and indeed al l juices , can be

s aid to be one because they all share a oommon element - wate r ,
or air.

The second reason for cal ling things one is because

they share a common genus ;

Aristot le ' s examples are hors e ,

man , and dog , which share in the genus animal .

genus here i s s imilar to matter .

H e s ays that

We may recall at this point

the argument in z 3 where in the .discus sion of substratum

Aristotle referred to the view that substance itself is
predicated of matter.

Th i s would fit very well into the

framework which is presupposed in n6 .

following positi on .

We would then have the

Things will be said to be one just if

there is a separately ident i f i ab le sub ject of which they can

all be equally be predi cated.

Thus , if we ask what is it wh ich

is oil , we can reply that it is water which is o i l ;

we can ,

simil arly , s ay that water i s wine , or for that matter , that

water is lime- juice .

This wil l suffice to enab le us to say

that oil , wine , and l ime-juice are one .

can say that
or equinei

In the same way , we

an animal i s human , or that an animal is canine ,

and this will also suffice for us to say th at man ,

dog , and horse , are one .

In these cases we have , apparently ,

substance terms being predicated of matte r , or , alternatively,

o:;e genus -terms which function like matter .
I f we compare the doctrine of n6 , repeated in Z 3 , with the
present passage in z 1 3 , i't is; plan .hat: Aristotle mu s t .ha;re
changed his mind .

Indeed, there

are enough hints in Z 3 that

Aristotle does not the:ie adopt as his own the view that sub s tance
is predicated o f matter , but gives it merely as part of a whole
theory with whose consequences he does not h imself agree .
114

H is

UNIVERSALS

AS

POTENTIAL

SUBS TANCES

own view in Z 3 is that matter cannot b e sub s tance because it

is not a s eparab le , identi fiab l e ,

individual .

I believe it

follows :that by the t.ime Al::' lstotle wrote z..1. _ he would no .. lgnger
h ave considered that in the examples offered in A6
oi l ' , or ' animal is human ' )

( ' water

is

there is any proper sub ject of

whi ch the predicates are asserted, since water and animal

ei ther are , or function as , matter, and matter is not a
suitable sub j ect s ince it it neither a ' th is '
identifiab le .

nor separately

Moreover , I think that by the time he wrote z ,

not merely would he no t have cons idered ' w ate r '

or ' animal '

suitable sub j ect terms ; he would not have cons idered dog or
man suitable predicates either , . if dog or man are taken as
substances .

In r 4

( 10 0 7 a 20 ff) , Aristotle distinguishes

between substance-terms and accident-terms in a way which i s

closel related t o the present dis cussion .

A particular man

is identical with man , and with the kind of animal whi ch i s

man , i n a way i n which h e i s not identical with whi te .
follow f rom this , as Kirwan correctly points out ,

It will

(Aristotle ' s

Metaphysics rAE , Oxford 19 7 1 , ad lac . ) , that sentences

apparently predicating a sub stance term of a sub j ect are , in
Aristotle ' s view. to b e

regarded as identity-statements rather

that as ins tances o f predicati on , precisely because there is no

s eparately identifiable sub j e c t ;

whereas ins tances o f accidental

predication , such as ' S ocrates is whit e '

are genuine examples

of predication precisely because S ocrates is not essentially

one with whit e , and white

can belong to many .

ob jection here in Z l 3 ( 10 38b 15-16)

In short , the

presuppos es a theory of

predication very different frcm that given in A6 , and mentioned

in Z 3 .
I suggest , then , that in Z Aristotle i s committed to the
view that the only instances of universals being predicated of
a sub j ect occur in c ategories other tha n substances , and that
substances are not predicated - of a sub ject becanse there. ls
no proper sub ject: , s eparately identifiab l e , for them to be
predicated o f .

I t is this , according to the present objection ,

which distinguishes subs tances - ram universals .

I t follows , too ,

that terms expressing .the essence of s omething are not univers als
either , because they are not predicated of many individuals .
They are not predicated of many individuals because in the
1 15

....................................-

NOTES

ON

ZETA

s trict sense they are not predi cated of i ndividuals at:. all ,
Hence , in Z 4 Aristotle makes it clear that being an essence i s
. incompatib le with being predicated o f someth ing else:
' An essence i s

j us t what a ' thi s '

is;

but when s omething

is predicated of something els e , the complex is not what

a ' this ' i s - e . g . wh.ttei...man .... is not what a ' this ' i s ,
since being a ' this ' be longs to. substances alone . '
( 10 30 a 2-6)
The<.:.a;-gumeilt .here:is(.:S.tated in terms of the e lements in definition s ,
o r alleged definitions , but the pri nciple would apply equally
to ' S ocrates is a man ' . or ' This flesh and bones i s. S ocrates ' .
This inerpretation may s ound excessively paradoxi cal ; worse
s ti l l , it appears to run clean c ounter to the text in thos e
passages in z s uch as 10 3 6 a 2 8 i.n which Aristotle speaks o f
forms , i n the sense of es sences , as universal .

I shall try to

explain b oth the apparent paradox and these passages in the

text later in the argument .

For the moment , I sugges t that it

makes good sense o f the obj ection at: Z l 3 . 10 3 8b 1 5 - 16 , in the

context of the res t of z , to s uppose that Aristotle means what
he say s , that substance-terms and essence-terms
essences are sub s tance s )

( i n s o far as

c annot be predicated of many individuals ;

and hehce that nei ther substances nor essences are universals .
I t i s at this point, after the preliminary ob jecti ons h ave
been set out , that the real discussion in Z l 3 begins .

I n effect,

the P latoni s t is required to show cause why universals , predi cated

as they are of a s eparately identifiable sub j ec t , should be
regarded as being in the category of subs tance rather than , as
is usually the case with universals like white or tall , in
some other category .

This the Platonis t attempts to do , by

suggesting that at least s ome terms expres sing what a thing is

.!!!:! be predicated of a separate+y identifiable s ub j ec t .

He

concedes that this w i l l not be the case with terms like ' man '
which , although it expresses what Socrates i s , i s not predicated
of Socrate s ,

(The P latoni s t in Z l 3 is a moderat e , and would be

content wd.th a modest succes s . for his position . )

But he argues

that genus-terms s uch . as 'animal ' surely do express what S ocrates

is , and yet are separable from sub j e cts s uch as Socrates or man .
116

AS

UNIVERSALS

POTENTIAL

SUBSTANCES

I t mus t b e admitted that the precise shpe of the Platonist

hypothesis is not totally clear, be cause of the cons iderab le
difficulties in trans lating and interpreting the elliptical
Greek of what is in any cae a very condensed argument, l0 3 8b
1 7- 2 3 .

I propose the following trans lation-cum-paraphrase :

But is i t pos sible that, al though a unive rs al cannot be

[ a full expres sion of what a thing is ]

like an essence,

it might nevertheless be present in an ess ence

is present in man and in horse?
j

animal

Iwhere ' present in '

.implies_ a separabili ty, and hence the possib i li ty of

universal predication ] .

-r

as

Clearly the universal will be

formula of the subs tance , and it makes no difference

that it is not the formula of everythins . in the subs tance
[no difference , th_at i s , because unlike other univers als
.s u ch as white or tall it wi ll s till be the formula of.
s omething subs tantial in the sub s tanc e ] .
still be the f3ubs tance o f s omething,

For it will

j us t as much as man

is the sub stance of the man i n which it i s pres ent .

the original

So

[P latonis t ] hypothesis would s ti l l s tand :

a univers al can be the [ parti a l ] s ubs tance of the form to

which it properly belongs .
The P latoni st here makes two assumpti ons :

that i t makes s ense

to tak of part of the es sence of s omethin g ; and tha t part of

the essence will be the substance of part of the thing .

I think

the rest of Z l 3 can b e read as attempting to demolish these

assiimpti ons in turn .
I n reading the argument in this way , I

am

agreeing wi th

Woods agains t Ross in attributing everything down to b 2 3 to

the P latoni s t .
:in

But i t seems to me very diffi cult to follow him

taking everything down to b 30 as a further continuation of

I n the firs t place , Aris totle c le arly

the P latoni st position .

indicates i n his text a very different s tructure for th e argument.

The ft rs t of the prima facie arguments agains- the view that
universals can be s ub s tances begins , at b 9 , with the phrase

(npov v)

_, For in the firs t place '

i s introduced b y the word ' Moreover '

, and the second,

( T )

ii

at b 1 5

W e find that the

s ame word ' moreover ' occurs twice more , at b 2 3 and b 29 ; then ,
at b 30 , Aristotle writes
it follows that

'

' Taking al l this together , then,

( gA 5 au(ve ) ,
117

which reads

NOTES

ON

ZETA

very naturally as the climax of a series of arguments whi ch he

has been at pains to s i gnal as he went along.

I t s eems to me

very odd to read b 30 as the beginning of Aris totle ' s cons idered
view , as Woods s eems to take i t .

Woods doub tless feels th at

the third and fourth arguments t b 23 and b 29 ) ,

taken as a

riposte to the P la toni s t , lack decis ive thrus t , since the

Platoni s t could interpret them to suit his own book ;

Woods

therefore proposes to take them as P latonis t right from th e

outs e t .

Agains t thi s , apart from the textual indications

I h ave already mentioned , is the fact that b 34 , and the whole

of the pass age from l0 39 a 5 tot;'the erid of .the chapter makes tt
clear that Aristotle himself does not regard any of the four
arguments as conclus ive .

Rather j:hey .shou_ ld- b e : seen in the light

of initial attempts , s tarting with the most s imple , and becoming

to begin . to get to grips with

. gradually more s oph isticated;, .

the Platoni s t posi tion..

I n a way, what Arstotle has already

written in z i s in s ome s ense a concession to P latoni sm;

it

s eems to me b e s t t o read this chapter as a gradually developed

effort to show that the concessions have not been disastrous
costly in terms of Aristotle ' s own developed views .

Read in

this ligh t , I think they make quite good Aristotelian sense .

With the third argument Aris totle begins his attempt to
counter the Platoni s t position in its now fully developed form:
Thirdly, however,

( e:T L oe:) it

would also be impos sib ly

odd for a substance , i f i t i s a composite at al l , to be

compos ed not of substances nor of ' thises ' but of qualities .
That would lead to the impossible conclusion that what
was a qua lity rather than a s ub s tance would be prior to
an ' individual ' this ' .

The modi fi cations of a s ub s tance

cannot b e prior to a subs tance either in formula, or in

_

td.me , or in coming to be;

be s eparate entities . '

if they we:c:e , they would also

( 10 3 8b 2 3 - 2 8)

Aristotle presupposes that universal terms refer to modi fi cati ons

( n&3nl

of substances , and that i s unavoidab le i f the universal is

genuinely predicated of s everal individuals .

alre ady appeared in Z 4 .

The same view has

At 10 30 a 13-14 , in a discussion of

essence in whtch he s ays that one element in an es sence cannot

11 8

UNIVERSALS

AS

POTENTIAL

SUBSTANCES

be predicated of the other , he concludes that only species of

a genus will be essences, since ' i t is agreed that here there
is:_ro question of predication by participation, or modi fication ,
or accidental predication . '

Again , in a difficult passage in

Z6 he argued that if there are Forms , and if Forms are substances ,

then the Forms themselves cannot b e predicated of another

sub ject ; if they were , they would exist only by being participated
in. For our present purposes , we may treat 'by participation ' ,
'modification of ' and ' accident of ' as equivalent.

Here in 1 3 ,

then , it is 'ilssumed that i f a term i s a universal , it must be

predicated of individuals by participation , and must refer

to

modi fications (na:'ari > of those indivduals which are accidental

properties .

Thus., if . animal .is genuinely universal, it will

refer . . to,.. an:.:.accidenal . property of S ocrate s , and will be

predicated of him by participation .

Naturally, . _it is open

to the P latonist simply to deny all this .

He certainly did not

mean to suggest that genus-terms referred to accidental

modifications of substances .

Sti l l , Aristotle insists against

the Platonist that genera can be truly universal only if they

are separable.
It is n.ot entifrely
whd.Ch

clear

whe.ther the .alleged . . separabili:ty

Aristotle has in mind here is that between animal and

Socrates , or between animal and human .

I t is his view that

essences are not predicated by participation of individuals

( as is clear in the case of F orms_, if there are any , from
10 3lb 1.8 , and also 'in the case of material subs tances , as is
shown by the contrast between the unity of such substances and
other , accidental , unities at 10 37a 3 2-b 7) .

Aristotle also

denies that genus terms are predicated by participation of

species terms , and vice versa.

The difficulty is not so much

showing whil:h of these views Aristotle holds , for he holds both .

The question is which on9 he is arguihg from here .

Since he

discusses the relationship between genus and species later in

the chapter, it is perhaps better to take the present argument
primarily as rej ecting the view that animal is a universal

a substance , on the grounds that if it is universal it must

be predicated of Socrates by participation , and if it is
predicated of him by participation it turns out to be an
accidental property and nQt a substantial property of S ocrates
119

NOTES
after all .

ON

ZETA

Universal genus- terms cannot , then ,

of the substance o f S ocrates

refer to part

.,/

' Fourthly ( E"t" L ) , this " sub stance" wi l l be present in

S ocrates , and will cons equently be the substance of
two things . '

( 10 3 8b 29 - 3 0 )

Which two things does Aristotle h ave i n mind? Had h e meant

'
that animal woul d be the substance of S o crates and of other
animals as wel l , I think he would hav written ' of s eve ral '
rather than ' of two ' ..

P erhaps h e means that animal would be

the substance of S ocrates and of part of S o crates , but this

interpretation requires us to supply a great deal without much
support in the text .

Ross suggests that the two are

class of animals and S o crates ' ;

' the

but I think it preferable to

take it to refer to the Form animal , and S ocrates .

The point

will then b that i f we take the universal . to be a s ub s tance ,

then , by the ar.guments of Z6 , i t will b .e its own essence , and
identical with its own subs tanc e ;

but, by th e argument deployed

at the beginning of :!H J , it mus t also be identical with the

subs tance of S o crates .
I n short ,. the Platonist is presented with a dil emma .

Either

he admits that a substance-universal i s identical with the

individual whose s ub s tance i t i s , or else he tries to make
substances genuinely univers al .

I f he takes the firs t

alternative , theljl., according to Ari s totl.e , he h as insuperable

prob lems with the ,use of

' every ' and with the relationship of

the separate individual entity animal to individual subs tances

like S o crates .

I f he takes the second alternative , in which

animal can be. truly predicated of S ocrates ,

' animal ' wi ll

turn out to refer to an accidental , not a subs tantial .property

of So crates .
I have already pointed out that the pass age 10 3 8b 38-10 39 a 2
makes it c lear that Ari s totle considers the conclusions s o far
reached as apparently secure in the light of the arguments
offered , but as still presenting some difficulties .

As well

he migh t , since it i s now by no means clear how his own theory

of es sences in the case of material i ndividuals can avoid the
first horn of the dilemma.

Of that more presently .

1 20

For the

UNIVERSALS

AS

POTENTIAL

S UB STANCES

moment, Ari s totle formulates one final argument which applies

atleast more sharply against the RJ.a ni s t than . it .does agains t
his own view of ess ences :
' I t i s impossible for a s ub s tance to be made up of
subs tances which are pres ent in it i n actuality . '
( l0 39 a 3 - 4 )
Aristotle here takes up the point about ' present i n ' made by the
P latoni s t at l0 3 8b 18 .

I n Z l 2 Ari stotle argued that a genus

does not parti cipate in i ts species , in reply to the question

how a substance can be one when its formula , contain;ng genus
and species , appears to be two.

A species like h uman is not

predicated by participation of a genus like animal , precisely

because apart trom the species the genus has no s eparately
identifiable existence;

it i s ' like matte r '

( l0 3 8 a 5 ) .

This

explains the at firs t sigh t peculi ar identi fi cation of the

species with the final differenti a .

Everything prior to the

final di fferentia is ' as matter ' , not a separable sub j ect of

which the di fferences are predicated;
one of participation.

the relationship is not

Now , if the J:!J,atonist tries to s eparate

out a genus and a species and suggests that eacp of these i s

a sub stance , h e is making

a mis take .

Genus and species are

not separab le , not parts of a substance at a l l .

of Z1 7 , it might be appropriate to s peak of
of ' parts ' .

In the language

' elements ' but not

This is , I think , the same argument as was used

against the identification of substance with matter in Z 3 .

The trouble with a l l thi s , from Aristotle ' s point of view ,
i s that precisely the s ame . arguments .,would app.ly to species
and to the forms of material individuals .

For just as it

i s his view that a genus i s not a separabl:i;i s ul:i j ect

of which the species is an additional property , he is also
committed by the arg\linents of Z l l-13 to the view that animal
is not

an

additional property of a s eparable humanity i.. Or .. man ;

and just as matter i s not a s eparab le s ub je c t which can have

subs tance or form

as

one of its properties , Aristotle i s

committed also to the view that ' being made o f f lesh and bones '
does not refer t o a property of theform of S ocrates either .
It follows that neither species , nor the forms of material
121

NOTES

ZETA

ON

individuals;. .-can count as substance's., i.f .they.<: are 'cons idered

apart from the genera or from the matter in whi ch they are
instantiate d .

S o , too, the soul and the f lesh-and-bones of

S ocrates might count as elements in the substance S ocrates ;

but they are not , by the argument o f Z l 3 , present in him as
actually tw o ,

and even his form cannot be said to be present in

actuality prior to h i s matter;

if it were , matter would have

the s tatus of an accidental modi fication of the form of Socrates ,

and this Aristotle refuses tO".accept .

We mus t now try to see

what the impact of this is on Aristotle ' s general theory of

11,,

substance , and how this doctrine can be h armonised with s ome

:1

of the earlier remarka in z .

''
I
"

III
The whole discussion i n Z l 3 seems to pres uppos e that genera
are universals , and the s ame assumption appears in H l , at
10 4 2a 1 5 .

Being a universal , then, apparently does not preclude

being an element! in:. a substance ; though it does prec lude being

a substance , and being part of a sub s tance .

The arguments i n

support of th11.s conclus i on are , a s w e have seen ,

couched in terms

of separab i li ty , predication , and modi fi ca.Li on .

I regard it

a s crucially important that the b ackground of this whole

discus sion i s the analogy with matte r , whi ch cannot be sub stance
precisely b ecause it is not separab le , and which cannot h ave
substance predicatE;!d of i't for precisely the same reas on .
is why ' S ocrates is man '

This

is not genuinely predi cation , nor is

' man is animal ' nor ' animal is human ' .

The whole accoun t ,

th en,

rests fairly on th e theory of actuality and potenti ality , and

i t is . iorth spelling this out in s ome detai l .

Matter is potenti ally an indefinite number of substances ,

though th:il:s i s not to s<iy. that i t is s omething which inde finitely
many subs tances share in common .

Genera are like matter , in that

theyeexSt .as c q ;pecies potenti ally , . though .tlii s :ts not to s ay

that genera are things which indefinitely many species h ave in
common, as is made c lear by 10 39b 7-16 .

I suggest that genera

can be regarded as universals because they are potentially an

indefinite numb er of species ;

but they are not univers als in

the sense of b eing s omething in which an indefinite numb er of

122

UNIVERSALS

AS

POTENTIAL

SUBSTANCES

species , share , nor in the ' rel ated sense that they are predicates
of an indefinite numbet of species .. Woods may not be able to
show that there is clear terminology in Aristotle to distinguish
between universals and universal predicates , but he seems to
me right to say that some such distinction underlies the whole
of Aristotle ' s posit ion . Its importance is perhaps obscured
by the fact that most universals , such as white , or tal l , are
also universally predicated . The only ones which are not
are those closely related to essence s .
Against Woods , however , i t is my view that the same can
also be said about essences . Discussion of Z l 3 has in my
opinion been bedevilled by thect::Once:rn to avoid interpreting
it in such a way as to call in question the apparently clear
doctrine of earlier chapters that essences are sub stances . But
the passage in 69 mentioned above where Aristotle says that we
can say 'every man ' because 'man ' is predicated of more than
one subject seems to suggest .that man is a universal; and if
..this is true without any furher qualification , then the
arguments of Zl3 would seem to apply to essences just as they do'
to genera . The remedy i s neither to conclude reluctantly that
13 is inconsistent with the rest of z , nor , as Woods does , to
force a different interpretation on the text of 1 3 . I t lies
in being clear about the possible equivocation on the term
' essence ' , in its rel ation to ' universal ' .
Consider an ,essence term like 'man ' ( and the same would
apply to fully explicit formulae or definitions of such terms)
In one sense , essence terms can be regarded as universal , in
the sense that there are indefinitely many individuals who
could be men; but 'man ' i not the name of some thing which they
share in common . The form Man is not an actual entity at all ,
but a potentiality which can be actualised in indefinitely
many individuals such as S ocrates and Callias . ' Man ' , like
' animal ', . .can be regarded as a universal term, just .so long
as it is understood that as universal it refers to a potentiality ,
not to any existing thing. It is precisely because substances
exist in actuality that universals cannot be substances . I
suggest that in so f ar as essence s , too , can be regarded as
potential entities ( as they can in the case of al l essences of
material individuals ) they are potential substances , can be
123

NOTES

ON

ZETA

regarded as univers als , and cannot be said to be actual

substance s .
Now it is perfectly true that the essence o f Socrates i s
not a potential entity, i t i s the actuality of his flesh
and bones . Because it i s the actuality of Socrates , it can
be said to be the substance of Socrates . But the actual form
of Socrates is not identical with the potenti ality Man taken
universal ly . For that potentiality to be actual in Socrates
we require the action of a moving cause . The mere fact that
the e ssence of S ocrates and the potentiality Man are not
different in definition does not suffdce -to show that they are
identical . Essence s , then , sub stan ces just when they are
the e ssences of actual individuals i in this case , essences
are not univers als , and are not predicated of the individuals
whose essences they are . Taken as universal s , essences are no
more than the potentiality of there being sub stances i this
potentiality is identical in definition with the relevant set
of individuals , but is identical with them in no other way .
( I think it is Aristotle ' s view , however , that essences , taken
as universals , are still somehow more actual than genera are ,
and that in this he still sticks to ".the doctrine of the Categories
at 2b 7 ff. I t is interesting that his discussion in the
Categories is couched in terms of 'be ing more a substance than ' ,
which fits neatly enough with the distinction I am urging
between essences as potential substances , and essences as actual
substance s . )
This interpretation explains why Aristotle s ays in the
final chapters of z that there can be no definition of
individuals as such - either of material individuals , or of the
Ideas if these are taken to be individual s . I think i t i s in
this sense , too , that we must take the remark in Z l l . 10 36 a 2 8 ,
where h e says that i t i s important to b e c lear about which parts
are parts of the form , for until we see this we will be unable
to define anything: ' s ince definition is of the universal and
of the form. ' Definition is of the form taken as universal,
not of the form of Socrates as such . The same goes for 10 37a 2 7 ,
' There i s no definition of the concrete substance with
its matter ( for its matter is dndefinite) although there
124

UNIVERSALS

AS

POTENTIAL

SUBSTANCES

is a definition of it with reference to its first substance

- for example , the formula of the soul of man . The
substance is the indwelling form from which , toge:ther with
matter , the composite is called substance . '
I do not think that this passage shows that the indwelling form
is a universa l . What it does show is that the definition we
give of it will be the same as the definition of the corresponding
universal , the poteney of which the indwel ling form is the
actualisation .
IV
My main contentions may be conveniently summa rised in two
stages . Firstly, I have argued for the truth of the following
assertions concerning predication : ( I shall use upper-case,
as Man, Animal , to indicated terms referring to potenti alities ,
which may be regarded as universals , and l ower-case to refer
to individual instantiations of them in actuality ) .
Man may be predicated of S ocrates
man may not be predicated of S ocrates
Animal may be predicated of lnan
animal may not be predicated of man
Animal may be predicated of a man
animal may not be predicated of a man
The negative statements here ex19mplify Aristotle ' s view that
(with a qualification to be introduced in a moment) statements
such as ' Socratei;; is a man ' or ' man is an animal ' are identity
statements . The positive statements reflect (what I take to
be the case) that Aristotle is prepared to concede to the
Platonist that in one sense essences can be regarded as
universals , and that the conclus ion of Z l 3 is that universals
are potentially substances but are not actual substances , nor
parts of ac!tua.l sUb stances .
Secondly , the discus sion highlights the fact that for
Aristotle there is something uns atisfactory in speaking of
material individuals as substances at all , precisely because
125

NOTES

ON

ZETA

it is not the whole truth to s ay that they are identical with

their essences . Man , taken as a universal , is prior in becoming
to Socrates ( as potentiality is prior in becoming to actuality) ;
Man i s also prior in knowledge to Socrates , s ince scientific
knowledge involves definition, and definition is of the universal ,
not of the material individual as such . Man , taken universally,
seems in one way to fulfil the criteria for being a substance
better than Socrates does . On the other hand , ' Man ' : is the
name of a potentiality , not of something that exists in actuality;
the only actual existents are individuals such as Socrates and
CB.llias , who are identical with Man only in definition . Only
the Prime Mover really satisfies all the criteria for being a
substance simultaneously . Knowledge of the Prime Mover is
therefore s cientific knowledge at its bes t . Once we start
inquiring scientifically ab out S ocrates and Cal lias and material
substances generally, we must recall the remark interpolated at
the end of Z 3 : ' Now 'What is knvwable ana primary for. a
particular set of people is often knowab le to a very small
extent , and has little or nothing of real ity . ' ( 10 29b 8-10 )
To this extent,. the Platonist whose views appear at various
points in z , and who is eventually confronted in Z l 3 , is shown
to be wrong, indee d , but not altogeher wrongheaded.
I

Gerald J ;. Hughes ,
Heythrop College ,
Uliiversity of London
,

2 5th February 19 7 8
We had before us the papers of Woods (see previous note) and
Hughes ( reproduced immediately above) b oth aiming to secure
the. :1h:iil6lili!ng gentira:l miisul t LJiom. hlle .chap ler . 'l'Jle '!: t'i t ique
be subtance does not apply
of the claims
. of the KCJaOAOU to
.,.
to the .{0G1i;: e . g . man . Man is not in the relevant sense
universally predicated of many individual men , because they are
not imdependen:t:lY. identif'iable as sjects. about ..which,one
could prceeci to .ask whether or not they are men ( c f:. , Woods
pp :< 37- 8 ) . I f this is correct , Z l3 provides no b asis for
commi tting Aristotle to individual forms . Notice therefore that
126
'-

CHAPTER

13

tnou&(&vov ,

when 10 3 8b 5-6 supplies two casesLof

back to Z 3 , these are ( a) the (parti cular)

to the

na3n ,

referring

animal as sub:j ect

(b) the matter as sub Ject to the actuality ( form) ,

not ( c) the particular animal e . g . S ocrate s , as sub ject to
its form or species . But we did not seek to make it part of the
sense of

' T ui::t3o>..ou '

from the start that it excludes man .

We start , rather , from a clash b etween ( a) Q 0 3 8b 6-8)

the Platonist incl ination ( o ouE

uaa6'>..ou as a.'(i:: Lov and

Pxn' -

"t' LOLV)

to see .

the first t ime in z that the search

apxif

for substance has been connected with the notion of

(b)

(b 8 f f)
"

- and

a series of prima facie ob jections tending to

"
/
()'\
..
.,
,..
t;\
(.
-

EOLKE
ua36'>..ou >.. & yo:vCilv .
show that

and

a.8uva"t'OV E LV(U OUOL av E LVaL O"t'Lol>v "t'CilV

' Prima facie ' glosses g'o LKE , which leads

us to expect that not every consideration to fol low will be

The initial ob jections are ( 1) npw ov

.

)
1 5- 16 . At 16- 17ca>..>.. ' apa the Platonist starts a

equally decis ive .

9-15,

( 2)

E"t'L

reply to ( 2 ) :

h ow far does. the reply extend? Woods ( p . 252)

tl
.
. .. '

lets it run to 3 0 , so that o>..(I)!; OE aul.J,6 a L v & L : is Aristotle ' s

thi;td ob jection .

We now fel t , however , that the phrase is not

the right wording for Aristotle to resume in his own voic e ,

especially when it fol lows what look like two more ob je ctions
introduced by

E "t' L

( 2 3-9 , 2 9 - 3 0 ) , the first of which appe als

to Aristotle ' s own criteria of sub stancehood (27-8 )

On these

grounds Hughes (pp.l:17-8 above lets the Platonist talk down to

.
23 only . An alternative interpretation ( Interpretation ( i i)

be low)

stops the Platonist at 18 , taking 1 8-2 3 as a dialectical

pause for Aristotle to dispose of the P latonist reply b e fore

resuming his ob j ections at 2 3

l""t' L o{

(one version of this story

in Ross ) .
Ob j e ction (1) 10 3 8b 9 - 15 . Aristotle does not indicate whether

u<faou/tucl'OT

refers to the particu&ar or the kind .

Nor need

he if he is simply airing an important consideration about

sub stance , viz . that it is peculiar or unique to what i t is the
substanci!! o f .

The idea of substance as unique to Socrates need

not be at issue .

It could still be that !!!2!! is sub stance,

being unique to one kind ore.class of individuals .

c

token , although n

L O Los; ,

e.

,-

"JI

oux unapXE L aA.Afii

127

By the same
.

looks to b e explanatory of

so that nothing can be both

LO LO!; and
.

,
KOL VOV

= 0

n>..E ,
LOOLV

10 3 8b

. ON

NOTES

ZETA

_,

G _,_,

unapxe Lv neUKEV , nevertheless the definition of KaeoA.ou as

KO Lv&'v leaves i t open whether is KaebA.ou in the relevant
sense .

( This point achieves the same result as the attempt

to distinguish

Kae&'A.ou

and

To know that substance is

Kaeo'A.ou A.ey Oli:evov in Woods p . 2 2 9 . )

/.
'
"
L o L OG , o... KaeoA.ou
i s KO Lvov , i s

,,,

not yet to know on which side of the double contrast man

should go .
1 0 3 8b 1 2 - 1 5 . The argument which completes Ob j e ction ( 1)

was

left over to next time .

Objection ( 2 )

1 0 3 8b 1 5 - 1 6 . Again a contras t :

is not said of a sub j e c t ,

(b)

/.

. KaeoA.ou

( a)

substance

i s said of a sub j e ct .

But again nothing to determine on which side be 1.ongs .

and ( b )

together entail that nothing can be both substance

,,,._

and KaeoA.ou .

Hen:ce .the P laton ist must ' deny or modify one of

these if he i s t o counter . with a

KaeoA.ou

which can be a substance .

The Platonist replies . 1 0 3 8b 16-1 8 . The sub j e ct of

is

b KaeA.ou ,

(P)

the specimen

grants , then, that

that essence i s .
and

( a)

ov

Kaeo"A.ou

is 6 ov .

vo{xeaL

The Platonist

cannot be substance in the way

[This puts e ssence on . the substance ,

n Kae noKe L&'vou

,Co L oG ,

s ide of earlier contrasts , in keeping

with what was said in the first paragraph on the present

meeting. ]

But perhaps it can still be substance , inasmuch

as it i s an e lement in the e s sence

Does this !ast

1f

c laim that even tt;ough 6 ov said of

_
a sub j e ct it can still be substance because it is an e lement

characteriz ation ( i )

in the essence - denying ( a)

- or does it ( ii )

claim that

6raov can be substance because it is -not said of a sub j ect but

rather

"

I'_
evunCJPXE
L

- denying (b) , with a nice reversal of

Categories notions?

We divided on this is sue , with fur:t.her

dis agreements ensuing

1 0 3 8b 18-23 - Interpretation ( i) :
Version ( A)
( 18 ) :

(Hughes p . 1 1 6 } .

[ I f that is so , ]

the Platonist continue s .

S tart from ( i)

above and continue

then it is clear that i t [ 6ov]

"

is

some formula of the substance [man' , horse ] ; no matter that

it is not the formula of everythlilg _ in. ,that .substance , it i s

128

CHAPTER

13

1 0 3 Sb 18

s till the fcrnniil a of something , just as much as is of the

man in which it is present; and so P ' s original suggestion
still results , with biov as the substance of the fonn to
which it properly belongs . Difficulties : qualms about a
,
/
.....

/
one-word >..o yoG'i forced rendering of TO
o.uTo
no.>.. L v ,
wb.ii:h should refer to a consequence which has occurred before
.
,, L OV to man
as a consequence; br"
/h orse . version
ov is not ,L/v
(B) ( cf. woods p . 2 3 2 ) .
Construe 18 as : [If that is so , ]
then it is clear that there i s a definition of it [ bt.ov ] ;
no matter that it [ this definition] is not the fonnula of
everything in !!!fil! it wil l s till be both substance and
"
Jof.0.3o>..ou , since it wi ll be unique to a clas s of species in
just the way !!!fil! is the oDa (a. of individual men . Difficulties :
,.
,,.
>
'
)/
?/
'.')

>
EKE I.. VOU
E:V Ii:'
00 E: L O& L = E:Jof.E: LVOU e: L OOU !:; 'e:v 'e h as to mean a
,
/
class of species (Woods p . 2 3 3 ) ; TO o.uTo
no.>.. Lv is stil l
troub lesome - even if the voice is P ' s rather than Aristotle ' s
(Woods pp. 231-2) , can the words mean that P ' s amended position
is the same as the one previous ly re jected? Version (C As
.
before , but offer1ng to solve the problems over r.:
LO Lov at 2 3
by the suggestion that the ift'ooi;; for which bV i s uniquely
the o&a Ca. is the Platonic Fonn Animal (which would of course
/")\
also be said of many individuals) . e: Looi;; has not been preempted for Aristotelian use in the chapter so far. The
general merit of Interpretation ( i ) is that it makes reasonable
sense for P to claim that if is unprob lematically substance ,
.so should animal be , yet since animal is only an e lement in
the essence which it is extracted from , it i s s aid Jo1.o.3t>..ou
of a number of separately identifiable subjects . The general
drawback of ( i) is that if P speaks al l the way to 2 3 , Aristotle
is setting do:wn prel iminary objections and merely notes a
' .., .;
possible line of reply to one of these . Also TO o.uTo
nc()., Lv sounds like it should refer to the recurrence of some
ob jectionable consequence .

..

"-i.

.,

1 0 3 8b 18-23 - Interpretation (ii) : Aristotle rebuts the

S tart from ( ii) above , translate
Platonist. Version (A)
oOJo1.ouv Joi.TA. . as under ( i) (B) but it is Aristotle not P speaking
and he means it as an objection. What ob jection? If there is
.?'
;'
G
,a >..oYo!:: of i t , it is after all Jof.0.3 ' un0Jo1. e: L e:vou >.. e: yoe:vov ,
129

1 0 3 8b 18

ON

NOTES

ZETA
,,

>

contra P ' s inten tion to use evunapxe L v to evade clause ( b )

15-16 .

Difficulty:

assertion .

Vrsion

of

Aristotle ' s reply i s b lank counter -

(B)

( Ross ) : the ob j ection is th at , if 6ov

has a definit ion , then it will itself

(Ari stotle meant to adn)

contain a universal element , which will mean there is a substance

contained in substance and so on ad infinitum .

oeov

P intended

xaaAOU

to be

to start with

"'

ob j e ction comes at 2 0 - 1 :

xaa noxe L1.1.lvou Al'YeaL .

6ov will b e
Difficulty :

oa(a

as such be objectionable since

at 1 0 - 14 .

version ( D) .

f!1

Difficulty :
"'

'The

oucrLa L vos and hence

being Lv cannot

is so spoken of by Aristotle

The ob jection comes at 2 3 :

( C)

Version

P must

construe 6 ov as s atisfying the uniqueness rquirement laid

down earlier, but it obviously cannot .
tC> supply that
( ii )

cknfvaov '

on Aristotil.e ' s behalf .

lf'a, L

also inclines to read

no dif ference
I'

AOYOG

Diff iculty:

ov

In terpretation

in 20 as exi s tential :

( so P cannot block the argument)

of everything in

we have

if there is not

( s. o Ross) (as opposed to :

it makes
i t makes

J is [ copula] not the

no difference if i t [ s c . AOYO of 6&i'ov
...
"
Ross goes on from this to something
AOYOG of everything in man)

approximating ( ii )

(C)

but incorporating also elements from

other o f the versions of both

(i)

perhaps too many such e lements .

( ii )

and ( i i )

considered above;

The general dif ficulty with

is the diffi culty of seeing how, if 6ov is meant by P

to b e both

xaa6Aou

and

o?iac'a,

"

any obj ec'tion can be in the . :.:

\,

For that is j u s t what o

The merit of

( ii)

"'

AOYOG of it
"
,
""'
xaaoAou and oucrLa

offing from the point that there is

it.

or of part of
ought to have .

i s that i t gives Aristotle an answer to P

and allows the point about

.,

l'o L ov

at 2 3 (whatever point that is)

to be arguing an ob j e ction on the strength of 1 0 - 1 1 , rather

than P claiming actually to meet the uniqueness requi rement .
we hoped . that investigation of the rest of the chapter might
break the deadlock .

Meanwhile , we might as well keep

ecr L .

in 19 .
llth March 19 7 8
10 3 8b 12-15

( left over from last time . )

The simp lest reading

o f the lines is that Aristotle presents a question ( O f which '. of

the given set of particulars will
130

xaaS'Aou ,

if it i s

H 38b 12

13

CHAPTER

and argues that neither of

substance , be the substance ? )

two c ontrary answers is pssible - and then appends a third

answer which won ' t do either .
two answers are available :

He first proceeds as if only

i t must be the substance either cf

all the particulars or of norre .

sc.

It cannot be said of all ,

because o f the uniquenes s requirement

1.1012 ) ,

(nor ,

,6

obviously , . o f none , s ince that would s imply mean that

xa36\ou

wasn ' t the substance of any of the things i t is

predicated of) .

and if

Then he adds , as by afterthought :

you think I ' ve left out an alternative , namely that it be

the substance of j us t ohe of the particulars , that wi ll have

xa3Aou

the consequence th9t the other particulars of which '

i s predicated are identical with that one :

( x ) (Kx+ x = a ) ,
"
where K i s
the xa3oAou , a i s the one pafticular i t is the
substance o f .

Difficulty :

certainly , K ex hypothesi will

not be the substance of any other particular, but why should

that entail

there is no other for it to be predicated of?

It looks as though the consequence is to be secured by addinq

in

(v ycip K,A . )

the thesis

( problematic but Aristote l ian)

that things which have one essence are one .

But the strongest

rendering. of this the s i s would be that ( x ) ( y ) '(Ex & Ey

x = y) ,

where E i s a substantial essence , and the hypothesis under

consideration precisely denies that K i s .the e s sence of all
things it i s predicated of .

Ros s ad lac asks us to understand

that the universal K will be no less the substance of its

other particulars , which o f fends against the denial just
mentioned , as i s pointed out by Woods

13-14

suggests ..that

or none ' , while

fv

218) .

(p.

Cherniss

gives the reason for the di s j unction 'all

y6.p

eliminates the first di s j unct on the

grounds that i f K was the substance of all , they would all be

one .

But besides the difficulty of taking

le;\

"

wv yap

as explaining

something other than the sentence immediately preceding

Woods p .

219 ) ,

' "

the suggestion really needs e:vo1:

I n view o f a l l this , Woods

(p .

219 , 2 3 5 )

wants

yap
12-15

'

in

( see

13.

not to

be an objection by Aristotle against P , but the drawing out

of a commi tment inherent in P ' s pos ition .

A commitment to

accept that K ; i f i t i s substance , i s the substance of all its

particulars , which then on Aristotelian grounds must be shown
to be in some appropriate way identical with each other .

131

In

10 38b 12

NOTES
other words ,

Evo

o'

ON

ZETA

introduces a consequence P must accept ,

not a consequence that refutes him.

Difficulty :

same offence of disregarding P ' s specific

of

is not the

' K is the subs tehce

EVO only involved in this interpretation also?

does the

yap

And how

clause work to jostify the inference ' I f of one ,

then a = that one ' ?

Further difficulty:

' If of one , then of all '

the consequence

can hardly be less impossible to

sustain the original first disj unct ' of al l ' .

A suggestion we did not try i s this :
of so much as one of the particulars

if K is the substance

(.!!_ . in virtue of being

predicated of i t ) , then , since as xa36'Aou it bears the same

relation to all the others as to that one , all these others

must be identical with the one i n question - the Aristotelian

grounds for this being that if

s tands to K in that relation

R wh ich constitutes K as the substance of a , then

( x ) ( R ( x , K} x = a ) .

This derives a consequence which P at

least :(if not Aristotle) would find objectionable , but it

argues and does not blankly counter-assert that K must be
the essence of everything it is predicated of .

Whether it

can be dug out of the text is another matter .

103'8b 2'3- 9 . S ee

first note of 2 5 th February

1978

for alternative

according to
. guesses as to which voice speaks these lines :
Woods P is still replying to earlier objections , according to
Hughes Aristotle is making his first objection to P ' s reply ,

18 .

according to Ross Aristotle has been speaking since

I f it

is P , he wi l l be arguing that animal , say , being an element

in < the sub stancehood of which is not in question)
,.

revealed by its definition (get the sense of EK from

18-23 ) ,

should be ackowledged as itself substance :

:>

EVUnaPXE LV

otherwise

it will be nonsubstance , no L Ov , but yet definitely prior to

substance , which is absurd .

Difficulty (aside from earlier

doubts about the voice being P ' s :

first note of 2 5th February

1 9 7 8 ) : it is not clear how P could al low himself to argue in

2 7- 9 that nen cannot be prior to substance because they would
be

/
XOOPLOTa.

are not truly

to give .

I f he again means that i f they are

/

naerr;

XOOPLOTa

they

he hardly has the argument he started out

I f , alternatively , the voice is Aristotle ' s obj ecting ,

what is the objection?

Ros s :

132

assuming the argument of

9-16

CHAPTER

13

l 0 38b 2 3

that universals are not substances , it fol lows that neither

are universals elements in substances , since that would make
(what has been shown to be)

nonsubstancer

prior to substance .

This does not sound like an additional absurdity in P ' s

e: L oe:,,

,,

position , as one would expect from

but at best shows

It

that an additional claim that P might make i S impossible .

is a claim, however , that he presumably would not make if he

An

once conceded that universals are not substances .

alternative reading would be that Aristotle is complaining

'

that whatever else o xa.3oA.ou may be ,

it is not
"'

/
ooe:
L,i

so P ' s position constitutes the genuine ooe: ' " from elements
which are not
the sense of

,toe: L ; and if not boe: L , or

,
ooe: L ( shuffling a bit in 2 5 ) ,
J,;

not o6a i:'a. in

/

then noLov

( in that generalized sense of no L ov which sometimes contrasts

exhaustively with oia (o.) .

And this gives an impossible priority

to (what in the end are seen to be) mere

like this story in Hughes p . 119 )
Tex:t at 10 38b 2 7 - 8 :
/

,
yvwae:
L - x.povw... .

/
,
A.oyce - x.povce
- y e:ve:ae:
L

( so a l l MSS and
/'

1 0 2 8a 3 2 - 3 has A.oy -

I t would be easy to emend

to match , as suggested by Lord

( S omething

Greek commentators , according to Ros s ) .

nan .

ye:ve:ae: v

to

yvwae:
L

( see Ross ad loc) . Ross dissents ,

noting however that no distinction can in fact be made between

/
W
X.POV
..

and

,,.,.
y e:ve:ae:
L

l0 38b 2 9- 3 0 .

Somehow we are to apply the foregoing to the case

of Socrates .

P ' s position results in there being an otia Co. in

Socrates , so that one o 6a (o. serves as the o Ga (o. of two things .

Which i s the second thing

(he first , on any interpretation , is

Socrates ) , and is this an objection?

On Woods ' s account it is

not an ob j ection but P still arguing for the. claims of animal

to be substance :

i f can be the substance of two things ,

vi z . the class of man ana. derivatively , Socrates , so can animal

be

(Woods pp .

234-5) .

Difficulty :

Woods had P claiming to

meet the uniquenes s condition as recently as 2 3

1 0 3 8b 1 8- 2 3 , interpretation

( i ) , version

(B) ,

( c f . note on

above ) .

quo'Lv

sounds all too much like an objection on grounds of non

uniqueness .
item :

I f s o , there are several candidates for the second

( 1 ) Callias - no supporters ;
133

(2)

the Form Animal '.

NOTES

1038b 29

ON

ZETA

(Hughes p . 12 - rather jumps the gun on the Third Man

objection coming at 1039a 2- 3 , and the idea of something being
the substance of iself has not been mentioned; ( 3 ) the species
man - animal, P ' s candidate for substance , wi ll be an element
in Socrates as well . as in , so there will be two things
for it to be the substance of, assuming (and this is the
.,
,
drawback) Socrates If we read ouoLa ouo L in 29 ( so
Ross 2nd edition , with good credentials) , we could think that
the point is that P supplies only one item to constitute as
substance two things that are ( for Aristotle) substance , viz.
Socrates and man .
,..

,.

'22nd Apri l 1 9 7 8

10'38b 30-34 . It was recognised that the interpretation o f this

section of the text depends crucially on where Aristotle is
supposed
to start to state objections to the Platonist . At
.
/
I
o>..wi;; oe: , or earlier? . There is also the question how far 30f .
introduce new considerations . The question arises what the
reference of v3pwnoi;; at 30 is . Is it ( i ) c ri'v3poonoi;; or
( i i ) the species ? If ( i ) , why should the conclusion follow?
C/
(That alternative seems ruled out anyway by ooa
>.. e:,y e:a
which implies the sort of thing that can be predicated) . If
( i i ) , we must ask whether (a) , since the hypothesis under
consideration appears to be that the universal is substance ,
it is being cited as an example of a universal , despite the
fact that previously it was te'ov that was the standard exam le
,
av3pwnoi;; was given as an example of a ' ",
of a xa3o>..
ou , and w
nv
15\ . .
e: LvaL ; or (b) it is , as before , serving as a standard example
6\
....
of a L nv e: LvaL . The view was expressed that, on any versi.ons
of interpretation ( i ) ( see note on 1038b 18- 2 3 above ) , it is
dffficult to make sense of this passage if v3pwnoi;; is bein
given as an example of a universal . I f , on the other hand ,
still accepting interpretation ( i ) , it is supposed to be an
example of a ,f v e:'fvaL , it is unclear why this premiss
should be mentioned. With interpretation ( i i ) on the other
hand, although there would still be the embarrassment of a
switch of example , this passage can be seen as picking up a
,
.
point
raised at 1038b 1 8 . av3pwnoi;; will be given as an example
134

CHAPTER

13

1 0 3 8b 30

of a uae6'Aou A&YO"uevov against whose claims to be an oo a

Aristotle has been. arguing at 10 3 8b 18 : if the uaeoAOU
Aeytuevo is substance , none of the things in the A;yOG will
,
be an ouoLa. With interpretation (i) we have to suppose that
in this section assertions are made for which the argument
follows later (at 1039a 38) , whereas on ( i i ) the section resumes
the earlier argument against the Platonist .
,.

..,

1038b 34- 1039a 3 . The question arises whether & L un is meant

to introduce , as an hypothesis from which absurd consequences
are derived, the denial of what has j ust been said , or the
denial that no universal is a substance . It was generally
thought that the conditional was meant to support the doctrine
,,
,,._
avepwnoG
about TOO&
T L . It was also thought that oc. TP LTOG 1:1/
might be taken as referring simply to a cluster of arguments ,
despite the infelicity of the particular example of KvepwnoG
in the present context .
In this argument against the claims of . uaeo1ou

/
..'.lvv ..apx.e
the xse d:.s
LV is reminiscent of
AE:yC?ue;;vov to be. ouoLa

10 39a 3-14 .

,,,

.....

,,.

earlier parts of the chapter , but the use of the OU'llO. ULG/
lve(py & LO. contrast is novel . The question was raised whether
Aristotle was relying on a principle that no single F can
consist of several Fs , where ' F ' is a substance term, or a
more general (and retty indefensible.) princ.iple that no
single thing can be constituted by an actual plurality of
things . On the first alternative , the propriety of taking a
categorial term like bOo(a as substituend of p might be
questioned; to do so would be to place strong requirements
on the unity of genuine substances , such as are going to
imposed in Z l 6 . a 7-11 were found puzzling in a nuniber of
respects . The subject of nol. e'i:' at a 12 could be either
"

AnuoKPL TOG or uey een

( in which case no L & L will mean, roughly
' constitute ' ) , but it makes little difference to the
interpretation of these lines which alternative is taken.
More important , it was unclear (a) whether we have a new
argument here (cf . xa't KO. oifov v P6rtov ) ; (b) how
serious Aristotle ' s endorsement of the argument is . On
>/
(a) , it was pointed out that there is a transition from &OTaL
135

1039a 3

NOTES

ON

ZETA

at a 8 to YEvt'a3aL at a 10 ; on {b) , that it is fallacious tc

move from ' It is impossible for one substance to be {sc . at the
same time ) two ' to ' It is impossible for what is one substance
at t to come to be . two at t " . ' It was suggestec" t.hat this
last point might be met by construing the verbs omnitemporally .
{ ' It is impossible for there to come to be one thing consisting
of { EK) two ' ) . In view of {a) and {b) , some were inclined to
suppose that Aristotle ' s endorsement of Democritus was less
than serious , or that a 9-11 were a gloss . One suggestion
was that the point of a 4-6 was to say that you can ' t have
an ouoLa consisting of actual ouoLaL , of 8-10 that you can ' t
l)
.,,
:,.
put an ouoLa together out of actual ouoLaL , or decompose it
into such - a different , though connected , p6int .
"'

>

-'

,,.

1039a 11- 1 4 . It was thought that the second alternative

,
mentioned in the n
n, sentence in 13-14 represents the
application to the case of numbers of the position j ust
developed ; but then the question arises whether we have
two alternatives , or two ways of stating an objection . 4
n
.,
ouac seems to be given simply as an example of a number ,
without any commitment on what their ontological status is .
Aristotle seems to be saying in this passage that , either on
the atomists ' or on the mathematicians ' view, you don ' t get
') ,I
,
, . "'
an ouo La EE ouoLwv : even though he doesn ' t accept either of
those views .
.,

.,

1039a 14-23 . We have a recap! tulation of various arguments

occurring earlier in the chapter . The. inference that: an
oGo (a must be &oi5'v3ETOG is dubious , given the possibility
hinted at earlier in the chapter , of saying that an ouo La
/
is composed of ouoLaL ouvaE L . The interpretation of a 21-22
was discussed. Taken at face value , they say that in one
way there is no defil'l:t:td.on of anything ; " but , a.gainst this , we
have Hughes ' s suggestion that Aristotle is saying rathe r that
in a way there is a definition of oio ra, in another way there
is not . This too might be thought a somewhat bizarre thing
for him to say . Finally , a question was raised about a 1 5 .
It seems strange that. Aristotle should say that no oGo (a is
!K Tc;;\i Ka3oou if his point is that no oo a is a universal .
Is this a point?
136
>

:>

...

/'

CHA,PTERS

1039a 24

13, 14

Zl4
. 20th

May

19 78

24-33 outline the position Aristotle attributes to the

Platonists , whom he presents as committed tO .i=he v iew that the
genus (as wel l .. as the species) is a separately existing substance
or substances ; the dilemma is then stated , unacceptable
consequence,; following both (A) if they assert that it is one
and the same ' animal ' that is in horse and in man (a 3 3 -b 6 )
and (B) if they claim that it is a different ' animal ' in each
case (b 7-16 ) . a 24-26 .
10 39 a

( since in the present chapter it is actually the generic , rather

than the specific, Form that is problematic ) ; but the difficulty
is lessened in that assumption (b) , in 25-26 , is one that
P latonists as well as Aristotle would accept. a 2 8-30 . The
question was raised whether this point still applied if the
. genus ' animal ' was regarded as the potentiality realised
differently in each species ; however , if to understand what
' animal ' is is to understand what species are and what are
not possible actualizations of it - that man ' and ' horse ' are
both animals , while ' table ' is not , e . g . - the AOY06 of animal
will be the same in each species . a 30- 3 3 . On the face of
it this is an argument from the principle (T) that the
constituents of a substance must themselves be substances . T
is asserted by Aristotle t Z l3 . 10 3 8b 23-29 , but rej ected by
Rhim at Z l6 . 1 0 4 0b 5-16 ; and he himself holds that an E 006 is a
/

TOCE
but is not made up of TO.O E . S o , either Aristotle , while
not himself endorsing T , regards the P latonists as committed
to :Lt ; or the argument depends not on T but on parity of
reasoning as between the species and the genus and differentiae
if the Platonists regard the former as a separately existing
substance , so must they the latter . That the argument is a
dialectical one against the P latonists , not an assertion of T
as a principle that Aristotle would himself endorse , is shown
by 30-31 ; Aristotle would accept that the specific form is
137
.,.

10 39a 24

NOTES
)

'

ON
'

ZETA
/

,,,

, but not auOG Kaa auov and KEXOOP LOUEVOV . The

passage enforces the application to Platonic genera of the
as sertion made generally about all P latonic Forms in (a) ,
24-25 above . However, a fllTther difficulty was felt in that
the argument only seems to show that , if the specfic Platonic
Form Man is separate from phenomenal men, so must the generic
Form Animal be separate from phenomenal animals - not from
the specific Forms , as argument . ( i i ) ( p . 1 3-9 ) requires . Admittedly
if Animal was . separate from the specific Forms the seconC'.
horn of the dilemma, (B) below, would arise ; but to appeal tc
that here was felt to be an anticipation

6'c5e:.

. A First Option: ( 10 39 a 33- 6 ) . Two o):ijections : . ( i ! a. 33-B2;

how can ' animal ' be a unity if it is in each of the separate
specific Forms ( reminiscent of Plato , Philebus 15B) ; ( i i )
B 26 , one and the same animal will b e two-footed and our
footed ( a point not raised in the Philebus passage ) . With ( ii )
c f . Topics 144a 28 . ( i ) involves both (a) and (b) above ; ( ii )
only ( a ) . The point was made that ( i i ) only involves . a
harmful contradiction if it is speci.fied that the conflicting
predicates are possessed in the same respect , etc . The problem
in (ii) was held to turn essentially on the genus being
regarded as an individual , Aristotle supposing the Platonists
to be .committed to this ( cf . Topics l 4 3b 23 ff . ) There would
be no problem if , as in Aristotle ' s own view, the genus were
the; potentiality for determination as the various species .
The objection here is not to Man being a Platonic Form; the
attack is on the Platonic theory as a whole involving Forms at
different levels of generality . The alternatives presented
in b 5-6 were not felt to be advanced by Aristotle in any very
precise sense .
.

B . Second Option ( 10 3 9b 7-16 ) . ( i ) b 7-9 , problem that there

will be an li'ne: L pa number of things of which ' anima 1 1 is the
substance; ( ii ) b 9-14 , problem that Animal Itself will be
many . ( i ) and ( ii ) were held to be separate arguments , Joachim ' s
e: for ',L in b 9 not finding favour (with:' it, the expression
would be repetitive , especially comparing 8-9 with 10-11 , and
the inference from Tte: Lpa in 7 to TtOAA in 9 would be weak) .
138

CHAPTER
( i ) h 7'- 9 .

14

1039b

The problem was to identify the difficulty . Ross

appeals to the argument in Z l 3 . 10 38b 14 that things of which
the substance is one are themselves one . But the problem of
,
One , Many and anE Lpa has been resolved by the Philebus (to
which the present passage was held to allude) with its
distinction between the many species and the if'n e Lpa particulars .
(That it is genus and species , not particulars , that are in
question in the present passage is shown by b 16 below. ) Three
interpretations were put forward :
( 1 ) The species , the substance of each of whic:!h is ' anima l '
are indefinite i n number because they cannot be further
specified - the distinction between them has already been
made in that the ' animal ' in each is different. If the
P latonists , chal lenged to say how ' animal ' differed in
each species , appealed to differentiae , the genus ' aniwal '
would be one and they would be driven back to the first
option (A) .
( 2 ) The species are isordere d ' because there' is no
way of classing them together - no common factor , ' aniwal '
in each being different
. ( 3 ) Each . species involves an indefinite number of ' animals '
because each level of differentiation involves a separate
ailima. 1 1
( 3 ) , though supported to some extent by b 11-12 in argument (ii) ,
was rejected as it was felt that the Greek of b 7-8 was hardly
a natural way of expressing it . ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) both involve
taking epov in b 7 to express difference in species and not
just in number . Aristotle is then presenting the Platonists
with the harsh alternative , either (A) ' animal ' is one and the
same individual - with incompatible predicates - in all the
species , :2 (B) there are different ' animals ' in each species
and an absence of any unity . Aristotle will: himself resolve
the dilemma. by his doctrine of the genus as potentially being
each of the different species in which it 1i.s actualized.
( i i ) h 9-14 was held to be a single argument ; t", L a 11 does
not introduce a new objection (though qualms were felt over
this ) , but 9-10 and 1 1-12 j ointly support thec assertion in 9 ,
Ka in 1 1 picking up E in 9 . 9 - 10 show why animal will be
many , 1 1-12 why it is the Idea Animal that wi ll be many , though
139
,

I
10.3 9b 7

NOTES

ON

ZETA

it was pointed out that 11-12 is stronger than 'it need be tc

supooi:.t this . 13- 14 gives the conclusion , equivalent to
.,,,
' 7/ "
,...
..,
u
,
,

.
e:i: L noA.A.a
e:cri:aL au, i:o
i:c 6wov in 9 (whether 6wov or e:v e:Kacri:ov
is aken as subject in 13- 1 4 , a point over which there was some
discussion) . In 14 6ov is to be understood with i:cw . 10- 1 1 :
i f ' anima l ' was not the substance o f ' man ' , whatever was--wou_ld
be his genus . 12-13 cannot be giving the reason for navi:a

in 12 (cf. o?iKo'U'v) ; we regarded :j.t rather as stating a

parenthetical consequence - if there are Ideas of all the
constituents of Man , there- will' be substances of all of therr_
( taking oi:aL as existential) . ( iii) b 14-15 , still dependent
on the assumption stated in b 7 that ' anima l ' is different in
each species ; how does the different animal in each _species
G/ <I
'
' seems easier
' l It se lf?. [This
come from: Anima
i f e:v e:Kacri:ov
is subj ect in 13-1] The point might be that differentiation
is no longer possible ( cf . ( 1 ) above) . ( iv) b 15-16 : problem
of the distinction between Animal Itself and the ' animal '
( in each species) whose substance it is . b 16f . , application of
these difficulties to particulars . It was remarked that the
difficuitie s raised under (A) do not apply to particulars on
Aristotle ' s own theory .
..

"'

Zl5
17th June 19 78
/

1039b 23- 5 . The argument in parentheses , ' I f x has yeve:cr L b ,

it has 8opcf , i s of E leatic lineage . Parmenides assumes that
the refutation of y {ve:crLb carries over without further ado
to 8opc:( (B 8 , 13-14 - unless we provide him with a specific
argument a<Jaiilst oocf by ( a ) accepting the emendation K
.,
.
i:ou e:ovi:ob in
B 8 , 12 , and (b) construing the result , not
as the emenders usually intend , as an argument against generation
from being, but as saying that from being you can ' t get anything
besides the being you already have , i . e . you can ' t change
being into not-being) . Melissus has the assumption , unargued ,
at B 2 . In his case it can be represented as the assumption
that if a thing has no ( temporal) boundary in one direction,
140
,...

....

CHAPTERS

14, 15

1039b 23

being &n:e: Lpov it has no boundary in any direction , the

mistake in which was pointed out by Eudemus ad Mel . B 5 .
The bacR reference 103 9 b 26-2 7 . To Z 8 . 1033b 22-3 for the phrase
...
n:ote: L KaL ye:vvcc , and to Z 9 . 10 3 4b 7 ff for the regress you get
if you allow generation of form. A3 was also canvassed , aseuming
it to be earlier . A back-reference to Z7-9 presents no daner
to our previous view ( 8th May 19 7 6 , end) that Z 7-9 were preesed
into service from another context by Aristotle himsel f .
,...

'"'

l039b 23- 6 . Given the results of z7.:.9 on y e:ve:c n i; , and the

.,..
Eleatic principle for extending these to 3opa , Aristotle
draws conclulions about 3op of aU"voA.ov and of form , by way
of preparation for the argument beginning 6 La ,o'ti',o at 27
which will use considerations about 3op to show there is
no definition of particulars . It may be important for the
argument to come ( see beaow) that 24 emphasizes the present
continuous tense : of the ;i..;yoi; there is not 3op6: : (3-4} in
the sense of a process of 3e: Lpe:a3aL ( 24 ) . The A.oyoi are
;
"'
'
and are not without
( a process of) y e:ve:aLG and 3opa . Perhaps
because they have no parts , like points which also come and ,
cease to be without a process of doing s o . In what sense is
it the case that the A.QY o L are and are not? ( a ) Aristotle
has a line in n:e:p LA.oao LQ.(; that certain ideas disappear
and get reinvented; (b) at times when there are no bricks and
builders it ceases to be-a ( real) possibility that there be
"'
1,\
,,
G"
houses : there is then no such thing as o O L K L CC e: Lvavi (c) ,
most weakly , the form is instantiated here and not there , or
here for a while and then no longer i (d) on the Categories
criterion of op , viz . loss of members , one would need to
say of biological essences , which are eterna l , that if it
were ever the case that they are not , it would be by having
no members .
""

'

"'

,,,.

1039b 25 o ' 6e: ' O L K L% . It is implied that this does -begin

V
E
and cease to exist by a process , so it has parts . Candidates
were : ( a ) the house itself (Albritton) , (b) an individualized
essence , a particular actui!l'lization of the potential! ty
represented by the general essence which answers to the question
141
"

':.

'

NOTES

10 39b 2 5

ON

ZETA

' What is a house? ' . Another way of expressing (b) is : this

house but from the formal point of view , this house qua
instantiation of form. Objection : either that just is the
(general) form of house or it undergoes processes of coming
into being and passing away at the same time as the house
does , in which case it must have matter and it is just. the
house itse l f . But even if (b) collapses into ( a ) , there
""
?
'
"
"
o Lx La\;
remains the problem, if the reference of <O <noE <n
is the house, what is its sense? Why that phrase here? After
all (and further against (b) ) , this is the very context in
which Aristotle is arguing there is no essence/definition of
the individual . Is the phrase no more than a coinage by
t'?'
/
'
contrast? i . e . <o
O">LX LO. E LVO.L does not stand for anything
that . y (y\IE <a.L : the only .oul::h phrase .that colll. t d do wouia be
'
r"' 4), '

<o <noE <n O L X L E LVO.L . We were remiss in not chasing up

.. ,
<o...... croL
E"9to'tl
LVO.L and the like elsewhere .

'

'

'

10 3'9b 3 2 . We favoured Ross ' s text o op Lcroi; En:Lcr<nov Lxov

over Joachim-Jaeger
(g) nicr<nuov Lxo(; . With <S> the
predicate is (tcr"t L ) T&v 6.va.yxa.(wv , without <> it is
,
')
En Lcr<nuov Lxov ( Ross : ' and therefore Twv avayxa.Lwv
') .

.,,,.

"

,...

.
'
10 39b 33- 4 . <O TOL OIJ"t"OV is the subJec:J, a vague one : the sort
,
..
/
of thing that can be now En:Lcr<nun , now ,ayvo
La. This in turn
must be construed generously , since Aristotle has j ust said
,,

,,
that e:n Lcr<nun can ' t be now that , now ayvo La. What he means
/
i s : the state which can be now true , now false , is ooEa.
The thesis i s : no nLcr<n'un of what can be otherwise , because
.,
EnLcr<nun is not compatible with change of truth-value , so
equally no demonstration:. or definition of what can be otherwise ,
hence none of particular sensible substances ( 1 0 4 0 a 2 o.GI@v
,
""
et
10 39b 2 8 OUCJLWV TWV O.LcrnTwv <WV xo. EXO.CJTO.) . These are
subsumed under what can be- otherwise on the grounds that they
are all PT ( 10 3 9b 30 , as argued earlier in the chapter , rut ,
Ross notes , in defiance of the distinction at Al . 1069a 30
between eternal and perishable substances ; yet cf . 1040a 27-8 ) .

,,

.,

r.

rt

I':\.

10 40a 2- 5 . The thesis is then illustrated by what is on any

interpretation a special case , insufficient to justify the thesis
142

CHAPTER

15

1040a 2

,.

as the yap implies it should . The question is , how special?

With this question goesanother , frst ra:rsed. !;:Jy ns in connection
with the similar passage Z l0 . 1036a 5-8 ( 30 th April and 28th ay
1 9 77 ) , as to how far Aristotle indulges in sceptical worries
about certainty . The present passage features prominently in
K . J . J . Hintikka , Time and Necessity (Oxford 1 9 6 3 ) chapter IV ,
as support f6r the - claim that Aristotle ' s restriction of
nLa,nun to things necessary is motivated by the uncertainty
of propositions which can change their truth value . But the
fact is , in Post . such considerations have at best a minor
role at 74b 32-9 .
To come , then, to the argument of 2-5 . It appears to
,
'
'
/
comprise two parts (,e
KaL
) , ( i ) 'a
Cfl{1e Lpoueva are ?aonAa
to those who have EnLa,hu which can be taken either (a) as a
reductio of it being tnLa,rfun (unles s , as some thought , 'o G
?/
.

"
.
.
can be hose who claim
the
exouaL
enLa,nun
' ) , or (b) as making
_point that the EnLa,ifun had (vide the AQYo L remaining) is not
of them ; ( ii ) when the . particulars are gone , the same AyoL
rmain in the soul but wi ll no longer be definitions and
demonstrations ( s c . of them) .
The main problem is ( i ) . Is 3e Lp6ueva present continuous
,.
or does it j ust do duty for Cfl{1ap'a (which mght .in context be
mis leading as also meaning ' perished ' ) ? We did not have the
linguistic resources to hand to decide whether the second was
.
Cl
)
...
>
)
/
.
possible
, but some felt that o'av eK 'nG aLa3noewG aneA3
would be a bizarre epexegesis of 3e Lpbeva present continuous :
to be in process of perishing is to be actually disappearing
from sight . But in a way that ' s j ust how it is , since when
Socrates dies the corpse . which remains in view is not him.
t/
o'av K,A . could also be a reminiscence of 1036a 6-1 . So the
choice remains : either Aristotle tak$ the very special case
,.
where the AOYOL are actually in process of falling false of
the perishing particular, or his point is that with a perisrable
this may happen when that particular is out of sight . Some
thought ' L in 5 favours the first . Further question affecting
the issue of scepticism: Is that ' may epistemic (we can ' t re
certain that it does not happen) or non-epistemic ( it is
not necessary that it does not happen) ? Top . 13lb 19-33 opts
for the first . Finally , even on the reading ' perishable'
143

"

NOTES

1040a 2

ON

ZETA

the case ll:s special : . not all of that wh1ch cah be bthe:twise
is covered by the singular propositions under consideration
here and in the related passages 1036a 3-8 , Top. 13lb 19- 3 3 .
S- 7 .

1040a

""'

C./

'
For i:wv npo1:;
opov (which l: L G indicates is pers6ns ,

not things - see Ross ad loc . ) we were uhable to resist the

translation ' those who are into definition ' . The object of
b.va.vpe:?v is not the particular thing he is purporting to define
but his definition : va.ipe:'Lv in the dialectical sense . The
lines form a dialectical j otting , not a further contribution
to the argument .
29-b 1 . Aristotle specifies two mistakes made by people
who think to define the sun . (a) that of citing a non-essential
property such as ' journeying above the earth ' or night-hiding ' ;
it would be f(i;onov to deny it was the sun just because it
stopped or appeared (!! . < at night) . [However, the argumentative
' ' "
'
force of 0 ya.p n ALOG OUOLO.V l: LVO. ona.LVE:LV e luded us . ] (b)
/
,
.
that of citing a AQYOG which is u0 Lvo1:; , such that there could
be another sun as thus defined . Presumably (b) is the
ineradicable generality of definition as such , (a) is a
particular way of misfiring . Compare Top . 13lb 19- 3 3 , where
the objection to ' the sun is the brightest body j ourneying
above the earth ' is not that it is an attempt to define an
individual but that it cites a contingent and perceptible
property of the sun , one which we cannot be certain will
continue to hold when the sun passes out of view. So far as
Top . is concerned , there are necessary properties of the sun
( 1 3 lb 2 4 ) and there are perceptible properties which bloug . to
their subject by necessity ( ib . 31-2) .
l0 40a

"'

14th

.,,..

""

October and 9 th December 1978

8 . Aristotle turns from arguing that particular perceptible

substances cannot be defined or subj ects of proof ( 10 39b 271040a 7) to the claim that no Idea can be defined ( 10 4 0 a 8 -27) .
Ross in his summary (ii p . 21 4 ) supplies "therefore" for on ,
though not in his translation (nor e . g . Reale , Apostle) . ( i )
of( does not require i t (J . D . Denniston , The Greek Particles ,

104oa

144

CHAPTER

15

1040a

8.

Oxford , 2nd edition pp . 222- 3 ) . (ii) Nor does the previous

argument based on mutability' and destructabi lity justify an
inference to immutables . So j ust continuative , "next , moreover" ,
a sign of the patched structure of this chapter , which brings
separate arguments for the indefinability of individuals of
two main: types without offerd.nq to harness them.
Or does 1040a 2 7-b 1 try a harness? Not if 1040a 29-b 2
is directed at particulars whose stability and uniqueness
are contingent while 1040b 2-4 is a last fling at Forms .
(It then becomes the less likely that a.'ui:wv in 1 0 4 0b 2 stanC'.s
for "of Clean , Socrates , the sun , etc . " or that the colon of
later edd . or the comma of Bekker should be read before n (:
that could as we ll take up from 1040a 2 7 . Bessarion starts
afresh with " Ceterum" . ) True , Aristotle illustrates his argument
abo.ut Forms by importing a concrete particular at 1040a 12-14 ,
but without appealing to mutability/contingency rather than the
inevitable generality of definition, and the argument is
recast for Forms in 1 0 4 0 a 22-27 .
io4oa 14-2 1 . overlap definitions (see 1 0 4 0 a 14-15) . If two. fobted animal (TFA) is such a definition , viz . of
( 10 4 0 a 19) ,
why should TFA be predicated/predicable of both A and TF
( 10 4 0 a 16-17 ) ? ( a ) We expect some A to be TFA and all TF to
be TFA . But this is not an overlap of A and TF but just Z l2
again , which was surely designed to avoid overlap . It wi ll not
help (with e ; q . Apostle ) to bring in other TFA such as birds ,
for this is merely to dispute the definition and then another
specimen overlap must be found in which some (not all) X and
some (not all) Y are XY . In 9 6 a 24-b 14 (see Barnes
ad lac . ) Aristotle recognizes such definitions : 3 is a nU!!lber
which. is ( i ) odd , ( ii ) npt;i\ov as having no factors exceeding 1
and (iii) npi:ov as not a sum of integers all exceeding 1 (where
( i ) excludes 2 , (ii) excludes non-primes in our sense and (iii)
excludes other such primes ) . Aristotle ' s argument here could
use such examples ; no doubt simplicity prompted the two-term
overlap . (b) Take XY as such an overlap (and take o v in
1040a 16 to be " to each severally" , as the examples show) .
Then why are the quahtifiers discounted in predicating XY of
X and of Y? Some X are XY , some (perhaps all) Y are XY : no
145

1040a 14

NOTES

ON

ZETA

identity-paradox yet . The answer seemed to be that Ideas are

individuals , so there is no place for quantifiers . (Cf . Top .
143b 11- 3 2 : for a Platonist the generic 1-i.Aa: must H:her have or
lack breadth , being one line . ) This is the move Aristotle
seems to defend in 1040a 17-21 in claiming that the componerts
,
,,.
of the definiendum are not only npoi:Epa but XWP Lai:a. (So this
sort of priority seems weaker than that in 1040a 21-22 , and
Ross ' s recourse to brackets does not help; nor does his appe2l
to Kl1hner-Gerth for the accusative absolute in 1040a 1 8 , but
against Jaeger we opted to keep it . ) We remained uncom fortak le .
....
, .,,
'
With i:o av3pwnoc;; used non-quotingly at l040a 19 cf . i:o A.Ei:nior.
Cfvapwnoc;; at 1030a l : no technical vocabulary to distinguish
use/mention here . With concrete individuals as guasi.. candidates
for definition in 1 0 4 0 a 12-14 cf . 1029a 14-16 , the note (above)
on 1039b 25 , and (of course ) Plato Theaetetus 2 0 80-2090.
.

,.

'27 Epni:aL . Where? The aLoLa that Aristotle goes on

to discuss in 1 0 4 0 a 2 7rb are concrete individuals capable at

,.
least theoretically of change (.and J:he oua1.'a of 1040a 33 is
such an individual - the sun might conceivably stop circling
., ,
or shine at night . ) But the aLoLa of 1040a 17 were Forms
revealed by definition : one more mark of a patchwork chapter .
io4oa

2-3 . In this (a) "Why does no one offer a definition of

an Idea of tqem? " (sc . of some individual such as Socrates or
Cleon) , or (b) "Why does none of them (sc . the Friends of Foirns )
offer to define any Idea?" (so e . g . Benitz , Ross ) , or (c)
"Why does none of them ( the FF) offer a definition of Idea? "
(On the last , Apostle , " a definition of Idea Itself as an
individual
and so it should be a common predicate or
,
calls for explanation . On
attribute" . ) On ahy reading aui:wv
(b) and ( c ) it seems textually ill-placed. (b) seems at first
unjustified , even given Socrates ' familiar failure to find
definitions in earlier Platonic dialogues , but Aristotle need
only be asking the Academic Back Bench to supply any accepted
oc;; to which his argument can be applied The.re would then be
a natural' reference back to 1040a 22-27 : any definition of a
Form is inevitably general and therefore not of an individual .
/
( c ) seems to call for someth ing stronger th..an L oEac;; .
146

104o'b

"'

CHAPTERS
10 40b 5-16 .

1040b 5

1 5 , 16

[The discussion of these lines was not recorded . ]

Zl6
4th November 1 9 7 8
10 4 0b 16- 2 4 . Aristotle turns very abruptly to a new topic at
1040b 16 , and continues discussion of it until b 24 at least .
I appears that he i s attacking the csecond of '.' two wrong views
about substance" (Ross ) . [Perhaps Aristotle , having relied on
unity as a criterion of substance: at b8-10 , now warns that we
wust not take unity to be substance . ] The view in question has
to be inferred from b 18-19 , 2 1 : i t consists in the claim
'- <-!
" "'
.
.
that TO Ev and TO
ov (unity
and being)
are the substance of
things . Aristotle ' s argument against this claim at b 16-17
is very unclear . Some possibilites : (a) Perhaps he argues :
( i ) unity and being are shared by a plurality of things ( indeed
by all things ) ; ( 2 ) but no substances are shared by a plurality
of things ; ( 3 ) so unity and being are not substance . ( 1 )
' "/
\
\ fa/
IE"
;'
'
,...
ap LJ.J.Ce
is stated by TO Ev
KUL TO ov ( 2 ) by WV La

., ?/
'
It/
To ov is an opaque
Difficulties in (a) are ( i ) that TO Ev
,,
' "
way of staing ( 1 ) , and ( ii ) that the clause KUL n oucr La
.,,
La is redundant . Perhaps ( i i ) can be softened by taking the
" C
c.
,,,...
/
words to mean : " thing has one substance" ( Tou EVOG = EVOG
T LVOG) , and as intended to express ( 2 ) . We then suppose that
Aristotle realizes that this is an imprecise way of putting ( 2 ) ,
'
.
and so immediately adds epexegetically : KUL wv KTA . Against
this defence against ( i i ) it may l.n turn be objected . that i t
"' '"
/
.
/
' r,/
is hard to read TOU EVOG (b 1 7 ) as EVOG T LVOG when TO EV both
in b 16 and b 1 8 means "unity " . Alternatively (b) we might
naturally read Aristotle ' s second premiss as designed to say
' e/
something specifically about TO EV , understood in the sense of
" unity" . On this assumption we might construe the argument as
follows (vel sim. ) : ( 1 ) If anything is , it is one (cf . 1003b
23-32 ) : so ( 2 ) the substance consisting in unity ( i . e . the
substance that unity is according to the view under attack :
n . b . TOU vo'G) must be one (sc . qua existing ; cf . 1003b 32-3) .
But ( 3 ) things which must have a substance which is one are one .
So (from ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) ) we conclude ( 4 ) that unity cannot be
147

10 40b 16

NOTES

ON

ZETA

substance of a plurality of things . (b) seems to do better than

(a) on a number of points : but it is a difficulty that Aristotle ' s
argument now gives him no reason to conclude (as he does
conclude ) that being cannot be substance of a plurality . [Yet
that is perhaps not very serious , since we have only to
_ ,,
,.... c. ,
.
.
.
t . in
substitute Tou
OVTOG for TOU
EVOG at b 1 7 ad ini
order
to achieve an exactly parallel argument for being . ] A further
difficuly is that ( 1 ) and ( 3 ) are good Aristotelian doctrine
,
(we expect Aristotelian truths after EnE t ) , but ( 2 ) introduces
an Aristotelian interpretation of what a believer in the view
attacke'! would have to say : Aristotle should have flashed a
'
::> ,,,.
warning light at that point . But perhaps the phrase n ouoLa
TOU vO'G is so odd that it flashes its own warning that this
is not Aristotle in propria persona . The view Aristotle
opposes is evidently the position elsewhere ascribed .to Flato
and the Pythagoreans ( 9 9 6 a 4 f f . ; lOOla 4 ff . ) . It is not
surprising that he should return at the end of Book z to what
in Book B he described as the hardest arld most':crud:li:al...guestion
in philosophy ; nor that :( if (b) is right) he should concentrate
on ,b t:'v , which is the most prominent Platonic/Pythagorean
,

apxn . What is the substance one in number which makes the

things which have it one in number (b 1 7 ) ? Perhaps ( i ) the
individual and individuating species of Albritton ' s interpretation
( ' Forms of particular substances in Aristotle ' s Metaphysics ' ,
Journal: of Phi losophy 195 7 , pp . 6 8 8-9 9 ) . Or perhaps ( ii ) the
actualisation of the species conceived of as potential . "But
how are:.we : to count actualisations? By difference in matter?
But then the concept of actualisation is an idle cog in the
explanation of individuation. " To this obj ection it may be
replied that the concept of actualisation d9es do some work ,
in that it implies an analysis of what i:t is to be something ,
i . e . some one thing . At b 19 Aristotle compares his conclusion
that unity and being cannot be substance with a point about
element and p:tinc:i.ple : the fact that something is an element
or princiJ'.rle isn ' t what its substance is . In b 19-21 he
indicates why we wouldn ' t accept, as an answer to the question
what something ' s substance is , the reply : its being an element
or principle . We want to know what principle . For we want
a more familiar specification - presumably more familiar to us
148
.

CHAPTER

16

1040b 16

less abstract and general . [ Exactly the same point is made

about beigg arid unity at l O O la 9 - 17 . J At b 21-4 he sums up
the section : ;ev probably indicates . this , ral:her than any
more specific inference . Being and one have a better claim
(ua>..A.ov uE'vl tolbeing substance than principle and element
'
>/
') '
and cause , but still . not a good enough claim (ounw OE ouoE
,....
.... ,,
' et
C. :>
,.
,au,a) . n . b . ( i ) o ov xaL Ev , n aPxn , etc . are again
' '
...
.,
.... >
6. 1 ent to o
EVL E.-;;i.LVa L xaL
ov L , o
apxn E L vaL ; ( i' i' )
equiva
oOwv perhaps does duty for wv npayua"wv ( and will then be
construed with oGo i'."a) , perhaps it means : " of these cand.' dates
(sc . being , unity , principle etc . ) " . Aristotle gives no
argument for u'a>..>.o
. v ufv . Possibilites : ( i ) "being and unity
belong to a thing in itself , while it is a principle , element ,
or cause only in relation to something e lse" (Ross) But nothing
can be found in tl'le text to support this . ( ii ) I s it that being
and unity are more fami liar than element , etc . (cf . b 20- 1 ) ?
But l O O la 9-17 makes it unlikely that this is Aristotle ' s
,

point; nor is _a>..A.ov UEV ouv at all obviously connected with

a - xA.. ( iii) Perhaps "being" or " unity" is at least
sort of answer (howeve.r inadequate) to the question (b 2 1 ) :
"What principle is it? " (The next chapter makes it clear
that to search for substance is to search for a principle or
explanation) . The argumeht for otfnw o ( is given at b 23-4 .
It is a bad argument , since Aristotle just assumes that
Q
.
..,,.

,;
.
EXOV L aunv must be singular . He needs to repeat the stronger
premiss of b 17 (xa'i. xA. . ) - which is perhaps how he means us
to read b 2 3- 4 . At b 2 4 we read an [presumably Christ and
Jaeger read atin because of an{,, J ; but nothing turns on it
.

"

10"40b 25"-7 . Aristotle argues that no il.cnvov can be a substance

...
'
( s c . such as a P latonic Form is supposed to b e , napa a
"'
,.,.
C/
xa ' Exao'a XWP L G ) , since xo Lva are found in many places at once ,
whereas what is ruly) one (sc . as a substance must be one)
cannot be . How does this relate to what precedes? Perhaps ( i )
Aristot;le offers a second reason , based on considerations
about o xo Lvo'v , why being and unity cannot be substance ,
'\ (./
aBBitional to that given at b 23-4 (Ross ) . But o EV as
what is one , not the universal unity , is then rather mis leading .
So perhaps instead ( i i ) he moves. from an- argument about being and
149

I
10 40b 25

NOTES

ON

ZETA

which exploits a consideration about ' Ko Lvc<i (b 21-4) to a

more general attack on the idea that universals might be
substance , i . e . on the P latonist position in general (cf .
b 30 ff . ) . [ Indeed , perhaps (iii) he is exploring a third
aspect of the conneKi6n of unity and substartce : first (b 5-10)
came a use of unity as a criterion of substance to exclude the
elments and the parts of animals from being substances ; ten
(b 16- 2 4 ) unity itself is denied the right to substancehbod;
now unity is again used as a criterion , this time to reject
the claims of universals in general . ]
a 3 . b 27-30 develops iCS in b 25-7 . Since the
platonist ' s Forms are substances , they were right to separate
them : perhaps because separateness or independence is a condition
of the unity of a substance , or perhaps (more simply) because
it is a condition of substancehood . But they were wrong to
make the Form ' one over many ' : whether - one connexion with
/
b 25-7 - ( i ) because ' one over many ' is tantamount tb KOLVOV ,
which was found incompatible with being a substance (b 23-7) ;
or - another connexion with b 25-7 - ( i i ) because the very notion
of one many is contradictory, implying the simultaneous
plurality of locations denied to unitary things at b 2 5 .
Another suggestion : ( iii) because nothing can be simultaneously
. separate< from the many (b 2 8 ) and yet them . (But why not?)
On (iii) , b 28 will make the connexion with b 2 5- 7 : the
P latonists were right at least to separate their For111S ,
giYing them the substantiality universals don ' t posses s ; b 29-30
wi l l be making a new point .
104ob "27- 1041

Zl7
20th January 1979
10"4la 8-9 . Is this to be translated '
concerning that
substance which is separate from sensible substances ' or ' that
substance wich is separate , amo19" sensible substances ' ? rt . was
thought that the first was the only option .

1041a 9-10 .

The question was raised whether it 1s he.re

150

CHAPTERS

1 0 4 la 9

16., 17
)

/'

regarded as indisputable that oucrLa is an aPxn or a L i: La ,

in which came a good deal of the earlier discussion in z
might have taken a very different turn , or as a new thought
(but cf Z l 3 . 10 38b 6-19)
It was also unclear whether this
conception of o?icr i'."a as &Px and ali: (a leads nelu.:tably to the
6'
'.I
,,.
view of oucrLa as e: t oo(; . One suggestion made was th at it was
only through equivocation on the meaning of xn that the
:
,,..
,.
premiss that oucrLa is an apxn leads to the conclusion that
it is an at i: i'."a ; the sense in which it is an b.pxn is that it
is the first category . If the conception of apxn as
explanation is pursued , does that lead necessarily to the
,
,
e.
,,.
picture of oucrLa as rather than unoKe: Le:vov? You can
ask ' Why does belong to Y? or ' Why does x beilong_ tb _K. ( i . e .
,
c
the unoKe: Le:vov) ? '

,.

.,,,,.

10 4 1a 13 .
It was proposed that AAO might be emended to
>/
aAAWG ( ' vacuous ly ' ) to give a better sense .
1 0 4 la 11- 2 0 : Problems were raised about Aristotle ' s reasons
for the dismissal of enquiries framed in the ' Why is the X X? '
form, in particular the argument of 15-19 . ( i ) The nAr{v
clause at 18-19 was found puz z ling : Aristotle has said that
you have a single AQY OG , which might be recast in the form
required for a genuine i:r(Tncr L (; , but it is too unspecific to
be any use . But then it is unclear how the nAnv- clause , and
what follows i t , introduce any qualification . ( i i ) 15-16
appear to present the standard view that what is to be explained
has to be accepted as being the case in advance of i:il-rncrLG
.( ' Why is it the case that .P ? ' presupposE:s ' P ' ) , and the example
is then given ( that there is an eclipse) of the sort of thing
of which an explanation may properly be sought ; but then is
' X is X ' being given as an example of the sort of thing for which
it is fruitless to ask for an explanation, or is it an instance
of the sort of vacuous expJ.anation that is no explanation at all
( i . e . Because it ' s itself (ati:o cri; L v a."ti:o)' is no explanation
"'
'
ii"
P
'
" '
,,;
r
of anything) ? E L G AOYOG ii.a t La. at i: La e:nt navi:wv ( 1 7 ) would
the second of these , but the unfavourable contrast with
suggest
. .
'
" Y
7/
.
the eclipse example , and what follows (oLa T L av3pwnoG av3pwnoG
) suggest the first . The adoption of the second would
151
,..

104la 11

NOTES

ON

ZETA

I./
permit , but not require , taking oT
L in 16 as ' because ' rather
than ' that ' . On the whole , it was felt that Aristotle was
concerned to rej ect ' Why is X X?' as a suitable form for a
question inviting the discovery of an a1,(a : it will always
be possible to get a more promising question in the ' Why does
Y belong to X ? ' form . Against this view of Aristotle ' s two
criticisms were raised : ( i ) The dismissal of "Why is X X? '
as a sensible question may invmlve the overlooking of a scope
ambiguity . In one way , to ask ' Why is X X? ' may be pointless ,
but not to ask , concerning x , why it is x . Aristotle may have
thought that tnis will always turn into the question of what
it is for some matter to have taken on a form apt to constitute
it as an X . But i t seems unreasonable to insist that the
question be framed in that form in advance of all inquiry .
( i i ) Aristotle ' s rejection of the ' Why is X X? ' enquiry may
have i.nvolved him in a fallacious argument for the conclusion
/
that ouaLa is form : if you were allowed to ask ' Why is X X? ' ,
the answer might bring in matter; and answer solely in terms
of form is required only if the nOKE Evov has been ruled out
in advance . Arguably , Aristotle ' s preferred formulation
prej udges the issue in favour of form , so far as the argument
/
of this chapter , relying on the connexion between ouaLa and
aoxif, goes (cf . note on 1 0 4 la 9 -10 above , ad fin) .
>

24th February 19 79
104la 24-6 . ' Why does noise occur in the clouds ? ' is claimed
to trans late ' Why does it thunder? ' into the form ' Why is s
P? ' , which Aristotle has j ust said is the proper form for
fruitful inquiry. The example is not yet in the required form ,
but no doubt Aristotle assumes it could be got there - his
examples in the Analytics are often similarly optimistic .
l0 4aa 2 8 . Should we excise TOUTo
AOY LKOOb , following Ps
Alexander ( and hence i;ossibly , after all, Alexander ' s original
commentary) and Jaeger against Ross? Gramma r might suggest Yes :
;J
;:>/
>I
'
'
o should pick up aLT LOV directly , in view of aLT Lov yap KaL
TotiTo at 30 . Content might suggest Yes : we have not been
eansidering essence AOY LKb (quite the contrary) and it is

152

CHAPTER

17

lv4la 28

surely not speaking A.oy .t KW!; to mention T ,L /')\

nv EI;'\LVaL ( 1029b 13 ,
by contrast , was to do with speaking A.oY LKG aBout , 1i'v E'l'vaL ) .
Ross defends the text with the view that speaking A.oy L KWG is
j ust speaking abstractly or generally , in contrast to the
particular cases of 29-30 where one asks for final or efficient
cause . A further problem for proponents of excision is to
c;
,
A
exp lain why a glossator should add WG E LTIE LV ;\.oy L K1JG
muddled allusion to 1029b 13? But why think of 'that here? If
the sentence is a gloss , it might be better to suppose it was
originally a gloss on some other remark more apt to evoke
, /
1029b 1 3 , e . g . TOUTO 5 ' n OUCTLa at 1 0 4 lb 9 .
"'

"

Cl.

104la 31-2 . ,6 TOLSucov a?(, Lov = efficient cause , acf,Epov =

final - Ross ' s identifications seem right , but when they are
combined with Kd in 32 Aristotle comes out 5'1y ing that final

causes are looked for to answer E LvaL

questions as well as
Y LYVEcr3aL
questions , thereby implying that efficient causes
"
questions , not also
are looked for only to answer Y LYVECT3aL
/;'to answer E LVaL - questions . But he does normally think there

.. .,.
....
. appropria
. te .
.
t o wh ic
' h T "L npoocov
EKLVti crE ; is
are E LvaL - ques t ions
one suggested solution : the last - mentioned questions would
be questions about particular existents that had come to be
q.
in the course of some chain of events , so if we take the E LVaLquestions more narrowly a s questions about the standing structure
of the universe , the efficierl: cause would indeed drop out . We
supposed that Aristotle would not want us. to infer that final
causation is appropriate to every E'tvaL - question , e . g .
mathematical ones should be excluded . Problems were raised
,.
/
about the TEAOG of cp3E LPEcr3aL but on the whole it seemed
'
_,
., ,
,....
.;
KaL Ql3E LPECT3aL as a
easier to take ETtL TOU Y LYVECT3aL
compendious reference to a single class of item .
'

,.

,. .
>/.
aA.A.nA.oov
vs . Ka< ' aA.A.oov
. The sense
104la 3 3 . We debated Ka< '
.
requires that Ka< ' aA.A.nA.oov mean not ' of one another ' but
' one of another ' , i . e . form of matter , but can it? On the
If
other hand , Ka< ' ;
aA.A.oov would seem to make the 1EyoEvov
be
form alone , contrary to the sense needed . Ross ' s reference
""'
" '
/..
TETa.y1,1.i;:voov"seemed to show that
to cat . lb 16 n un ' aA.A.nA.a."
Ka< ' A.A.nA.oov ought to be OK .
153
,

104lb

NOTES
.

..

.,,

ON

ZETA

,,

10 4 lb 1 . Does oa o anAwG AEY ea3aL explain Aava6'.'ve L or

n EL a L ? If the firs t , the point is that the question t'.vapwnoG
If the second ,
' ( a L is liable not to be properly understood .
i t is the wrong question. Either way one should ask the more
revealing question ' Why are these that? ' instead . Failure to
arti culate makes an inquiry into something indistinguishable
from an inquiry into nothing . ['iloss in the Oxford translation
has the inquiry b e ' on the borderline between a search for
something and a search for nothing ' i in his edition p . 2 2 4
he has ' shares the character o f a genuine and meaningless
inquiry ' . The latter is right because the idiom ' uo L v6v of
A and B ' refers not to what lies between A and B but to
something that includes or is shared in by both (so e . g .
P la to Menexenus 2 4 1C ) and hence , by a natural derivation , to
something that fails to distinguish between A and B ( s c , in
philosophy , Sextus Empiricus , Adversus Mathematicos VII 16 4 ,
175) ]

104lb 5 . We gratefully accepted Christ ' s

( L) .
,

,,
104lb 7 . It was thought that it would be nice to have OO L
/
secundum refer to the matter , as oo L has done so far , though it
is not of course impossible for it to shift over to the form
( i . e . ' This body halriilg this [_2. form] [is a man] ' - so Ross ) .
suggestions were : ' Why is this having this body a man? ' , ' Why
is this body having this [ sc . flesh , etc . ] a man? ' . But support
fpr these remained lukewarm. Another aesthetic urge was to
see if b 7 could yield a parallel to the question-answer format
of b 6 . Suggestions : ( a ) ' Why is this a man? Or is it that
this body [ is a man] by having this [ form] ? ' ( answer in form
of an amplifying question) ; (b) ' Why is this , i . e . this body ,
after ,oto) . Again
a man? By having thi s ' (punctuating
nothing more than lukewarm.
I

'

,..
' "'
104lb 8 . we decided we should leave out ouo . . orei:8oG
(with Jaeger against Ross) so as not to prejudice the results
I'
of the chapter . has to link to aLLov : the cause by which the
matter is something .
154

l04lb 9

CHAPTER 17
l.I

,.

104lb 9-lL Is i:o E"tEpoi;; i;ponoi;; another method of inquiry or

another than inquiry? The first would be superficially
inconsistent with the denial that of simples there is any
inquiry or teaching , btt only superficially so. In the context
o f the chapter inquiry is looking for the explanation of
s omething , and teaching is conveying the explanation of
something (cf . 982a 29-30 ) . Where explanation comes to an
.
end you have anAa (no examples given ; Ross says ' pure forms ' ,
but perhaps all we need is the abstract idea that explanation
must eventually terminate in inexplicables of some sort or
other) , and about these there wi ll no asking ' Why so? ' in the
same way as before . But that doesn ' t entail you cannot direct
any inquiry at them. For instance , you can try to justify (as
opposed to : explain) the proposition that they exist. E . g .
the Prime Mover is the termination of one type of explanatory
chain. It cannot itself be explained. But Aristotle goes on
at length to j ustify the proposition that the PM exists .
'

....

104lb 11' ff. In a preliminary. survey of this' Theaetetns "

I
the Al
E"tEPOV
reminiscent passage , we agreed that xaKe.'i\id at 19
"t L , i .e. principle of unity , and hence that 22-5 is not the
line Aristotle himself prefers but the other half of the
dilemma begun at 19 . Aristotle ' s view is that the "tEP&'v "t L
can be: neither a further element nor composed of elements . It
is the cause of a thing ' s natural unity and this is its cfua (a
.{25-8) Quod erat reperiendum.
=

17th March 1979

,

"'

10 4 lb 22f . That a thing ' s being EK O"tO LXE LOU as opposed to its
being a ai:oxE'i:ov implies its being composed of a plurality
,.
of elements is explicitly assumed here ; c-f . the plural ai:o L XE Loov
in 20 . The analogy was drawn between b 1 1-27'. and similar
discussions in Plato; it was noted that Sophist 253A suggests
that the letters cannot be known except in the context of
syllables , a point not made here , but against this it was argued "
that the question of our knowledge does: not affect that of what
makes a syllable a syllable .
155

104lb

NOTES

25

ON

ZETA

104lb 25ff , The identification of the essence with the structuring

factor appears to go against Zl . 1036a 2 2 ff, This raises
the whole question of the relation of Zl7 to the argument of
Z as a whole , and that in turn raises the further and separate
question of the strategy of z as a whole; whether it is driving ,
by elimination, towards one particular candidate for ocr Ca,
or whether it is throughout keeping different aspects of the
question in play . Z l7 could fit into the latter type of .
interpretation, as showing that both the form and the indivicl.ual
are necessary to the consideration of substance if the question
is aeked in the right way; 104lb 30 claims not that DOLG is
..,
,
./'.
.the only oucrLa, . it was noted , but that UOLG has a claim to re
';) ......
"
Ii\
oucrLa. Suspicion was expressed of i;oui:o
e: LOOG in 104lb 8 ,
as a possible gloss ; it was felt that it might commit Aristotle
too definitely to one particular interpretation of' ocr (a . Cf .
Z 7 . 1032b . l . Zl7 does not , it was argued , raise :p1=Cb1ems over how
whether form is particular or universal i the question what
causes being presupposes the being of the thing in question,
and it is here the cause of the being of an individual man
(e . g . ) that is in question. The relation of Hl to z as a whole
is problemati c , quite apart from its failure to mention Z l 7 ,
as i t seems to g o back to the start o f the question and to take
up again suggestions rej ected in z . It was noted that Hl . 1042a
22 appears to ignore Z l6 . Zl7 was criticised for being a
patchwork ' , . but the point was made that the same criticism could
be made of ZlS .

.
.

27 . The range of i;c;Jv it'AAWV here was discussed; it was felt

to be quite vague , approximating to ' etc . '
Cf . EN VII 1 . 1145b 3 i
,

also r3 . 00b 20 . OUAAaBn and crapE are good examples of compounds

:;
,,
but not of oucrLaL ( cf . , re crap E , Zl6 , l040b 5 ff . ) i nor indeed,
apparently , are some other examples in Zl7 go6d examples of
> oucrLaL ( cf . ' house ' in b 6 , and bea.ow on b 2 8 ff . )
1 0 4 lb

....

.,,

..
.

'

104lb . 2 7 f . Is e:v answered in 2 8 or in 31? On the.1 latter view

the . contrast would be between oucrLa and cri:O LXE: Lov; but the
position of . ."al.:1r .n 28 YTBS fe11: problematic . With regard to the
former view, it was supposed that oicr (a in 27 might refer loosely
to being in general i against any suggestion that 2 7 f f . was
.

156

...

"

CHAPTER

17

104lb 2 7

intended as a definitive conclusion to the whole o f z , i t was

noted that it is introduced by 6 not ,!J;v . But ocr(a in the
sense of being in general in 2 7 could hardly be contrasted
wi th the same term in a more restricted sense in 2 8 ff . The
,.. ,-;-.
sense of Aristotle ' s references to things differJ.ng. 't'c.> e: LvaL
was discussed, with reference to De An . r2 . 426a 16 f . , r4 . 429b
19 f, Phys . r3 . 202b 9 . The view favoured was that,"difference
,G vaL is difference in description where the di fferent
' '
descriptions imply different uaa auo predicates .
"

l04lb 2 8 ff . Three interpretations were put forward . ( i )

Substances are restricted to natural kinds ; cf . H2 . 1043b 2 1 ,
thoughis will in part depend on the force of 'rcrc.iG there .
Against this view it was pointed out that , if houses aren ' t
otcr(aL , it is difficult to see into what category they will
fal l . ( ii ) The contrast i s not between natural kinds and
artefacts , but between per se existents (whether men or houses )
and per accidens ones ( e . g . white man) . But this was held to
strain UOLG too far . (The sense of the example ' whiter!ll!ln '
was discussed; does i t refer to an individual ' s race or to
changes in complexion of a purely temporary kind? Plato
Theaetetus 154B was adduced in support of the latter ; but
the point was made that Aristotle may fail to distinguish
between (a) properties of Socrates that he might , man ,
equally well not have and (b) properties which he may actually
;
?
,,
lose . )
(iii) Take npayac.>v as depending on oucrLaL not on
La, so that the distinction is between properties that form
part of the essence of a thing and those that are accidental
( so Ps . Alexander in Met . 54 3 . 18 ff . ) . This , like (ii) , escapes
the problem of the restriction of substance to natural kinds ,

but strains cruve:crnuacrL

( contrast Ps . Alexander 5 1 3 . 21 , e:>LG
. , { v a'vaL t,oG 'ouuiB&'.;i..i;; a L . Ps , Alexa1J,der
has interpretation ( i ) at H2 . 1 0 4 3b 2 1 ( 5 5 3 . 2 3 ff . ) ; Asclepius
in Met . has interpretation ( i ) in the present passage ( 4 5 2 J!
Reverting to ( i ) , then , the question was raised whether the
restriction of ocr(aL to natural kinds is a new and unargued
assertion - which would hardly be in place if Z l 7 is intended
or whether it is
as the conclusion of the whole argument of Z
? ,. .
"
tl
I'
a consequence of oucrLa being apxn and aLLov . The latter point
157
,,

104lb 2 8

NOTES

ON

ZETA

might be argued on the grounds that , whi le a man is produced

by a man, a house requires a builder ; but thd:s argumene . s
scarcely open to Aristotle , who stresses the form of house in
the mind of the builder as the cause and disregards other aspects
of the builder . Another possible argument for natural kinds
b eing substances might be that , while there might be a time when
there are no table , ihere will never ( for Aristotle) be a time
when there are no hor ses ; but that argument is not advanced
here .
"

104lb 29 . aL for c/
oaaL would make the restriction of substances
to natural kinds less dogmatic; but that would weaken the
argument for the conclusion in 30 . After Kaa JaLv in 29 ,
understand , p;ri;lbal:rly , a,'t. i Kaa aLv could be taken with
,
/
u
oaaL oua La L -zrather than with what follows , but that would not
provide the contrast with 2 8-29 indicated by aAA '
>

. .

. . ,.

"

. .

- . . - :

158

. _:.

._

. . -

. i

.:

' ...

..

_.
, ' '